PRESS CLIPPINGS

Enclosed are clippings of the latest local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Press and Public Affairs Office as of:

Monday, October 18, 2004

The press clips are produced Monday to Friday.
If you are aware of omissions or have any comments or suggestions please contact
Ibrahim Tommy
Ext 7248
MOBILE: 232 76 645 914
A member of the Hinga Norman-CDF Defence Fund, Reverend Alfred M. Sum Foray, has claimed that there has risen among the ranks of the government of Sierra Leone individuals using the enormous powers of government to subvert public interests, overturn the national courts and negate the mandate of the citizens.

Rev. Alfred Sam Foray stated in an e-mail that "instead of people [usually the armed forces] overthrowing the government, reverse coups are using government power to rob the people of their power through political machinations and the use of henchmen."

Norman Blasts Gov't, Special Court

"From front page news" - the word coups/dictators and henchmen - is attributed to Tejan Kabbah's former Ambassador to the United States, John Ernest Leigh.

The accountant to Chief Hinga Norman said that "with junta Paul Krugma and his AFRC thugs out of the way, there is a new breed of coups/dictators operating with the expressed or implied knowledge of the executive branch of our government in concert with the so-called Special Court for Sierra Leone."

Rev. Sam Foray named the Registrar of the Special Court and head of an entity within the Special Court known as the Outreach Group, Mrs. Binta Mamsary, as one such prominent individual who is using this group to "harass defence witnesses, investigators and others of the CDF defendants."

"Through the efforts of this group, the defence team for Mr. Norman and his colleagues have found it very difficult to acquire credible witnesses, retain investigators and properly secure documents pertinent to their defense," Rev. Sam Foray states.

He added: "In short, the aim of the group headed by Binta Mamsary is to delay the trial of their former colleagues."

Rev. Sam Foray went on to state that "what is most disturbing about this whole scheme is that Binta Mamsary is the wife of Mr. Sholo Mamsary, Secretary to the President and former National Security Adviser."

He further states that "in addition to Binta Mamsary's outreach group, we are also aware that elements of the presidential guard at State Lodge frequently provide security to the so-called Special Court in lieu of the national police."

"This is in direct contrast to the alleged independence of the court from the government of Sierra Leone," Rev. Sam Foray states, adding that, "In fact, the real role of these State Lodge rent-a-cops is to infiltrate the court and with Binta Mamsary's personal and professional connections to both the President and the Registrar, President Kabbah in effect becomes a back-seat driver of a supposedly independent, international court."
Special Court witness falls ill

By Brima Samura

One of the witnesses that was supposed to testify at the Special Court last Friday failed to appear for the day’s session. Prosecutor Peter Harrison notified the court that the witness, TF1-167 is unavoidable absence because of poor health conditions. The Chief of witness protection Mr. Saleem Vahidy stated that he couldn’t really tell the motivation of the witness.

Contd. Page 2

Special Court witness falls ill

From Front Page

for not appearing in Court, noting that he has not yet received details of the witness’s symptoms. Prosecutor Peter Harrison applied for an adjournment to today which was vehemently opposed by Defence Counsel Joudache. He said that it will cause a delay in which the cross-examination of witnesses are carried out as it is highly necessary to deal with one witness before proceeding to another. Presiding Judge Benjamin Bo, after considering both applications said that the bench is concerned with the judicial complexities and the manner in which situations that are sometimes beyond their control normally arise and therefore assumes that witness TF1-167 might be able to testify today. He therefore granted Peter Harrison’s application for today saying that it is necessary in the spirit of fairness and to allow the prosecution team ample time to prepare.
FAMILY RALLYING BEHIND JAILED CDF CHIEF IN WAKE OF FALSE RUMOURS ABOUT HIS DEMISE

Sunday October 17, 2004

Family and supporters of incarcerated Civil Defence Force (CDF) Commander, Chief Hinga Norman are rallying behind the personality as false rumours spread in Freetown that he is either seriously ill in jail or he may have infact died.

Family sources told COCORIOKO that the rumours were all untrue and that Chief Norman was very much alive and kicking. Though he is very upset by his trial, the former Army Captain is said to be hale and hearty. Also, the U.S-Based Spokesman of the CDF, The Rev. Alfred SamForay, made a public release last week to announce that Chief Norman was alive and that the rumours spreading in Freetown were false.

Norman is however involved in a standoff presently with the Special Court for Sierra Leone which is trying him and two other CDF leaders for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. He and the other CDF men have boycotted the trial in protest against the use of concealed witnesses against them. They have also protested to the Supreme Court that the SCSL, a UN-supported War Crimes Tribunal trying leaders of warring factions in Sierra Leone's bloody Civil War, is illegal and unconstitutional.
Special Court: FBI Involvement Revealed

Standard Times (Freetown)
NEWS
October 14, 2004
Posted to the web October 15, 2004

By Theophilus S. Gbenda

What was previously kept secret from the rest of the public has finally came to light at the all-mighty Special Court for Sierra Leone, following days of hostile cross examination of Liberian born, General John S. Tarnue by defence counsels.

According to the witness, he had cause to flee to Ghana for medical treatment and to seek political asylum, after being arbitrarily arrested, detained under house arrest, and tortured by Charles Taylor.

Lodged in one of the hotels in Ghana, the witness said he was actually in financial stress when four FBI officials, accompanied by the chief of investigations of the Special Court, Dr. Alan Wyhte, met him and sought to get information about blood diamonds and Taylor’s involvement with the RUF.

The interview with the FBI, according to the witness, took place in late December 2002, and that he was subjected to an exclusive pornographic test as part of the interview session.

After the interview, the witness made it clear in his testimony that he informed his quests of his unwillingness to disclose anything further until he was relocated to a country out of Africa for his safety.

This was how, according to the witness, he had to be relocated to Washington DC, from where an exclusive interview was conducted with him by Dr. Alan Whyte.

Statements obtained from him in December 2002 by the FIB and in April 2003 by Dr. Alan Whyte all formed part of the records of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the witness attested.
Meanwhile, days of hectic examination in chief, cross examination and re-examination of the Liberian General, who happens to be the first witness ever to testify in public view, has finally ended and he is expected to travel back to his new found home later today.
Liberia Government Freezes Assets of Charles Taylor

Liberia's transitional government has finally frozen the assets of former president Charles Taylor and several of his relatives and associates, seven months after such sanctions were ordered by the UN Security Council.

Charles Taylor’s assets

Taylor supporter who is now a senior figure within the broad-based transitional government; Edwin Snow, the managing director of the state-run Liberian Petroleum and Refining Corporation.

Snowe is said to have provided funds for Taylor, who ignited Liberia's 14-year civil war by launching a rebellion in 1989.

The former warlord became president in 1997, but rebel attacks on Monrovia forced him to quit power and go into exile in Nigeria in August 2003, paving the way for a peace agreement.

The assets freeze extends to Taylor's present wife, Jewel Howard Taylor, who is now back in Liberia, and two of his former wives, Agnes Reeves-Taylor and Tuppee Taylor.

It also covers the former president’s son, Chucky Taylor, who headed his father’s elite military force, the Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU).

Several former ministers and senators are covered by the measure, as well as a sprinkling of Taylor's former business associates.

They include Victor Anatoljevich Bout, an eastern European dealer in arms and gems, and Gus Kouwenhoven, a Dutch businessman who lived in Liberia for over 20 years and owned Monrovia’s Hotel Africa.

Moussa Cisse, the former head of protocol at the presidency, who handled arms from diamond and timber sales on Taylor’s behalf, was another of those sanctioned.

I have directed the Justice Minister to liaise with the courts to freeze all assets of those associates of Charles Taylor as demanded by the UN Security Council,” Gyude Bryant, the chairman of the transitional government, said in a speech on Thursday to mark the first anniversary of his swearing in.

An aide of Bryant told IRIN that Taylor’s former residence in the eastern suburbs of Monrovia would be impounded, along with all funds in local banks belonging to the affected individuals.

Curiously these include one former

Continued page 2
LIBERIA: Government freezes assets of Charles Taylor relatives and cronies
15 Oct 2004 18:26:08 GMT
Source: IRIN

MONROVIA, 15 October (IRIN) - Liberia's transitional government has finally frozen the assets of former president Charles Taylor and several of his relatives and associates, seven months after such sanctions were ordered by the UN Security Council.

"I have directed the Justice Minister to liaise with the courts to freeze all assets of those associates of Charles Taylor as demanded by the UN Security Council," Gyude Bryant, the chairman of the transitional government, said in a speech on Thursday to mark the first anniversary of his swearing in.

An aide of Bryant told IRIN that Taylor's former residence in the eastern suburbs of Monrovia would be impounded, along with all funds in local banks belonging to the affected individuals.

Curiously these include one former Taylor supporter who is now a senior figure within the broad-based transitional government; Edwin Snowe, the managing director of the state-run Liberian Petroleum and Refining Corporation.

Snowe is said to have provided funds for Taylor, who ignited Liberia's 14-year civil war by launching a rebellion in 1989.

The former warlord became president in 1997, but rebel attacks on Monrovia forced him to quit power and go into exile in Nigeria in August 2003, paving the way for a peace agreement.

The assets freeze extends to Taylor's present wife, Jewel Howard Taylor, who is now back in Liberia, and two of his former wives, Agnes Reeves-Taylor and Tupee Taylor.

It also covers the former president's son, Chucky Taylor, who headed his father's elite military force, the Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU).

Several former ministers and senators are covered by the measure, as well as a sprinkling of Taylor's former business associates.

They include Victor Anatoljevich Bout, an eastern European dealer in arms and gems, and Gus Kouwenhoven, a Dutch businessman who lived in Liberia for over 20 years and owned Monrovia's Hotel Africa.

Moussa Cisse, the former head of protocol at the presidency, who handled arms from diamond and timber sales on Taylor's behalf, was another of those sanctioned.
Cop may face sex tourism charges

By Padraic Murphy
October 18, 2004

A SENIOR police officer on trial in Sierra Leone for allegedly sexually assaulting a 13-year-old girl could also be charged by Australian authorities under child sex tourism laws.

Victorian Superintendent Peter Halloran, who has been working as a war-crimes investigator with the UN Special Court, was charged with child sex offences after a Tasmanian officer and fellow UN investigator Mandy Cordwell allegedly found a 13-year-old girl in his room in June.

Australian Federal Police sources have confirmed they are monitoring Mr Halloran’s trial at Freetown’s High Court and said a legal opinion was being sought on whether the 56-year-old can be charged under child sex tourism laws.

Mr Halloran has consistently denied any wrongdoing. His supporters claim he is the victim of a smear campaign and the country’s corrupt judicial process.

An internal investigation by the Special Court found there was no evidence the girl had been assaulted and criticised Ms Cordwell for apparently tricking the girl into lodging a complaint with local police.

However, Australian Federal Police officers have contacted Ms Cordwell and are seeking a legal opinion from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on whether Mr Halloran can be charged under Australia’s child sex tourism laws.

AFP sources said a legal opinion was being sought because Mr Halloran had been charged by Sierra Leone authorities and any new charges "could place him in a double jeopardy situation”.

The AFP is keeping a close eye on Mr Halloran’s trial, which is due to go ahead on Thursday. The AFP’s liaison officer based in Pretoria, South Africa, is expected to contact many of the witnesses.

The Australian believes the AFP is also considering sending its own specialist investigators to Sierra Leone.

Canadian war-crimes investigator Ralph La Pierre is expected to testify when Mr Halloran’s trial resumes on Thursday.

The alleged victim has already told Freetown’s High Court she was not assaulted by Mr Halloran, and previously gave conflicting statements to police.

But Mr Halloran’s defence suffered a setback on Friday when judge Samuel Ademusu admitted into evidence one of the girl’s earlier police statements in which she alleged she had been sexually assaulted.

Mr Halloran, a decorated detective who was once touted as a future commissioner, has recently been the subject of an Ethical Standards Department investigation into long-term inappropriate relationships with criminals.
ESD sources have expressed concern Mr Halloran was granted leave and allowed to travel to Sierra Leone.

A senior Victoria Police corruption investigator has also contacted Ms Cordwell and advised her to increase her security.

Australia's child sex tourism laws were introduced in 1994. The laws make it illegal for any Australian citizen or resident to engage with sexual intercourse with children under the age of 16 outside of Australia.

Mr Halloran joined the National Crime Authority in 1987 and worked on undercover operations targeting Australian criminals in The Philippines.

A spokeswoman for the Australian Crime Commission - which succeeded the NCA last year - could not say exactly when Mr Halloran left because records were no longer kept, but confirmed he had departed "under a cloud" in the early 1990s.

The Australian

This report appears on NEWS.com.au.
Monday, October 18, 2004

DISPATCH FROM THE DARK CONTINENT, PART 2
How private warriors turned tables in war
Mercenaries entered fray in Sierra Leone to hold back rebel carnage

Editor’s note: This is Part 2 of longtime WorldNetDaily contributor Anthony C. LoBaido’s series on white mercenaries in black Africa. In this installment, LoBaido details the brutal mercenary war in the troubled West African nation of Sierra Leone. It was there that the elite, white, ex-special forces soldiers from South Africa and the UK battled limb-hacking rebels, cannibalism and piracy for the sake of diamond profit. Their private war became a personal affair in an almost epic quest to save the black African children being butchered by the local irregular militia.

In Part 1, LoBaido covers the colorful history of white mercenaries in Africa and the attempt by black leaders to make them extinct.

By Anthony C. LoBaido

© 2004 WorldNetDaily.com

Take the wine cup of this fury at my hand, and cause all the nations to whom I send thee to drink it. And they shall drink, and be moved, and be mad, because of the sword that I will send among them.

– the prophet Jeremiah

CAPE TOWN, South Africa – When it comes to mercenaries, it could be fairly said that South African Bert Sachse is "the real thing." Sachse is an elite special forces soldier who can handle everything from logistics to intelligence gathering to diplomacy, air-to-ground special forces tactics and even the close up "hard killings."

A charming and wiry man with bright eyes, this writer remarked upon meeting him: "I had been expecting Arnold Schwarzenegger."

Sachse simply smiled and flexed as though in a bodybuilding pageant. Clearly, being a special forces soldier involved far more than muscles.

Sachse’s story is a long and amazing road that sheds a great deal of light on the exploits and motivations of the modern mercenary.

"I got involved with (mercenary group) Executive Outcomes (some years ago). Eeben Barlow (the founder of EO) did the wheeling and dealing. Eeben and I have spoken and socialized. He is a pleasant guy and we have a working relationship," Sachse told WorldNetDaily during an interview in Cape Town.
That relationship eventually led Sachse, a 34-year veteran of the old Rhodesian and South African special forces, into a war unlike that which he had ever seen before. More specifically, it was a mercenary war in Sierra Leone.

A troubled and unstable history

In 1995, the ruling military counsel in the West African nation of Sierra Leone contracted the UK-based mercenary outfit Sandline to restructure and retrain the Sierra Leone army. This tender was extended as a means to fight the brutal rebel Revolutionary United Front, or RUF, rebels. The RUF, which had started as a student movement in the capital of Freetown, was receiving training and logistical support from neighboring Liberia.

Liberia, founded by former U.S. President James Monroe as a colony to repatriate ex-slaves, was led back then by Charles Taylor, an escaped convict from the U.S. Taylor is best remembered for asking that "only black soldiers" from America be sent to his country to help stop the anarchy. The Bush administration rejected that racist notion and immediately began to seek closure on Taylor's misrule.

In February of 1996, just six weeks after an officer's coup overthrew its president, the acting (though unstable) military government of Sierra Leone was set to hold the first multi-party elections in that country since 1977. Sandline, the kissing cousin of the South African mercenary group Executive Outcomes, was tasked with the job of stopping the ensuing civil war that had broken out in the wake of the coup.

The civil war raging in the nation at that time featured pockets of resistance spread around remote areas of Sierra Leone. Not surprisingly, the areas Sandline was commissioned to subdue were those rich in minerals. Also not surprisingly, the RUF was active in those particular areas. Various Middle Eastern terrorist groups were also interested in these same diamonds, and this point was not lost on British intelligence or the CIA, even before 9-11.

The RUF was ostensibly opposing the sketchy regime of Joseph Momoh in Freetown. Today Sankoh, a former corporal in the army, was at that time the leader of the RUF.

The RUF had been hounding Sierra Leone since March of 1991. They fought together with troops from Liberia on loan from Charles Taylor and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. That troika invaded Sierra Leone and sought to take over the diamond mines in Koidu. That was the real reason for the fighting initially.

Sankoh had been exiled to Libya and there he'd embraced the "Pan African" ideal that sought and continues to seek (under the guiding hand of the ANC and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe) a united African continent free of Western (read "white") influence.

Sankoh's indoctrination in Libya took place in the era preceding the rise of IMF and World Bank loans and credit, the revaluation of gold in exchange for debt relief, the Internet and high-technology agreements, various agendas of transnational corporations, GATT and the World Trade Organization's de facto trade regime, white mercenary armies and the black African auto-genocide of HIV/AIDS.

These factors combined to form a virtual, post-modern neo-colonialism that shattered the paradigm that had existed between the West and Africa since the early 19th century and perhaps far earlier.

In actuality, the new Pan African ideal is embodied in "Nepad," (the New Economic Program for African
Development), which was and remains funded in large part by the UK and the futuristic economic aspirations of the British Commonwealth, European Union, Bilderbergers, United Nations and other major players seeking major social and monetary restructuring on a transnational scale.

Not to be forgotten is the emerging African Union, which seeks to merge all of Africa into a single political, economic and military block that by default could eventually become a part of the emerging one-world trade and government regime.

**British intelligence and the colonial hangover**

Sachse's story of commanding the operation in Sierra Leone is an amazing one on many levels. It is in many ways the film "Tears of the Sun," moving from reel life to real life.

Certainly, nothing Sachse had studied at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst could have prepared him for what he would face down in the jungles of West Africa. Nor could a combined 34 years in the Rhodesian and South African special forces.

"The operation was handled more by Sandline than by EO," Sachse told WorldNetDaily. "More of it was run from London than from Pretoria."

Asked why that was so, Sachse replied, "Well for one thing, Sierra Leone is a former British colony."

It should come as no shock that it was the mining concerns of a large corporation that lay semi-hidden behind Sandline's newest cash cow. In this instance, all evidence pointed to Branch Energy, a South African mining company with gold and diamond interests in Sierra Leone, as well as a lucrative kimberlite—a diamond-producing gravel—formation holding in Kono.

EO/Sandline's links in Sierra Leone are complex. They point to the mercurial British entrepreneur and ex-military man Anthony Buckingham. Mr. Buckingham is rumored to be an astute businessman and a former underwater attack diver. He in turn has links with Branch Energy and Sandline International. Sandline was co-founded by Buckingham and Simon Mann, a former British SAS officer. Mann has been convicted by a court in Zimbabwe of trying to plan a coup against the leftist dictator in oil-rich Equatorial Guinea.

While the activities of the old South African Defense Force and Civil Cooperation Bureau lay most often in the shadows, the activities of Buckingham and EO were immediately surveyed by the British intelligence community at large.

For example, British defense intelligence published an official report stating that Ranger Oil paid the scholarly and erudite Mann and Buckingham a cool U.S. $30 million to organize the foreign mercenaries to fight in Angola.

An EO-London version of the mercenary outfit was set up on Sept. 7, 1993, as a British company to work as a joint venture with EO-South Africa. This was documented in a "Secret U.K. Alpha Eyes" intelligence report published by a British intelligence agency. The report was supposed to be hidden from the CIA, NSA and other pro-British Western intelligence agencies.

Linking Sandline with EO was child's play. For example, Sandline and EO shared a UK office located at Plaza 107, Kings Road in Chelsea. In another arrangement, Sandline and Branch Energy shared a UK office at 535 Kings Road, London. In the words of that French policeman Inspector Renault in the film...
"Casablanca," "It was all very convenient."

British intelligence (MI-6) was also very interested in Sandline and Executive Outcomes. Back then, British intelligence wrote that EO's influence in Africa presented a "cause for concern."

British defense intelligence wrote, "EO will become even richer and more potent, capable of exercising real power even to the extent of keeping military regimes in being. Its influence in sub-Saharan Africa could become crucial."

Speaking of the success of EO in Angola, South African intelligence wrote, "The OAU may be forced to ... perhaps offer EO a control for the management of peacekeeping, continent-wide." The OAU was the forerunner of the emerging African Union, or AU, which, along with the G8, has sought to stamp out white mercenaries in African and replace them with regional, rapid-deployment peacekeeping forces.

Despite the best efforts of the analysts at MI-6, there were precious few who truly understood what EO /Sandline was, how it was divided up or who owned it.

When it came to EO-London, nowhere was Buckingham listed in public records. Luther Eeben Barlow and his second wife, Sue, were listed as the primary owners.

Of course, EO and Sandline are virtually interchangeable, and the interests of the British super-elites and super-rich UK industrialists also come into play when it suits their respective parties. This was readily apparent in Sierra Leone.

In a corporate game of wheel-of-fortune going on in Sierra Leone in the mid 1990s, Branch Energy was bought out by Carson Gold, which in turn was gobbled up by a bigger fish called Diamond Works Ltd. Diamond Works is financed by Ivanhoe Capital Corp. in Singapore. Australian mining magnate Robert Friedland, the head of Diamond Works, denied any linkage to Sandline and EO's operations.

MI-6, mercenaries, diamonds and terrorists

In Sierra Leone, British intelligence was interested in the EO/Sandline operation because "diamonds from that area were being used by terrorist groups around the world to fund their operations" against the West, Sachse told WorldNetDaily.

"This is a totally different ballgame. In this game, one doesn't ask a lot of questions. But I can tell you that as an ex-colony, the UK felt the responsibility to take an interest in the diamonds sold there, the merchants, terrorist involvement and stopping that flow."

Continued Sachse: "We went into Sierra Leone in our own interests. I think we could have handled the whole thing ourselves. As I said, we are not mercenaries but think of ourselves as 'privateers.' We went in where no other government would. I know the Yanks don't like losing guys for nothing. The Brits made it easier by turning a blind eye, seeing how far things would go."

"You ask why wasn't our operation stopped?" he continued. "One can assume there is a link between Sandline and British intelligence."

Sachse said that Sandline/EO put pressure on the rebels and that the Brits condoned this. The rebels would be denied access to raw materials, "by which there was money to be made."
While fighting in Sierra Leone, EO/Sandline received help from the British military and were in contact with British intelligence. For example, a television crew filmed technicians from a British frigate docked at Freetown fixing a Russian-made helicopter that was being used by Sandline/EO in the war against the RUF.

Sasche told WND: "We needed a good CASEVAC (Casualty Evacuations) system. We learned about CASEVAC in the Bush War in Angola. We used the Russian MI-17, like a Dakota. We have good pilots."

Good equipment was vital for this operation, Sasche said.

Asked if Luther Eeble Barlow just walked into the Kremlin and simply said, "Ivan, I need some attack helicopters?" Sasche replied, "The arms trade is kept close to the chest. As for arms in Sierra Leone, there was the government and our own means."

Russian equipment is chosen in some instances over that which was manufactured in the U.S. or other Western nations.

"Russian equipment was made for the local guy. It falls in the water. No problem. Look at the AK-47. Western weaponry is more precision-oriented. You have to know what you are doing. But if it gets some dust in it …," Sasche said.

Asked to elaborate on Sandline and EO's interaction with British intelligence, Sasche said, "I am the man at the top of the pyramid. I can't get into detail about my contacts with various intelligence agencies, be they British intelligence or the CIA. It would cause too many problems. People at the top just don't talk that way."

Concerning the 35 tons of Bulgarian arms shipped to Sierra Leone that turned all of the UK into a media-driven uproar, Sachse, as always, put things in perspective free of political and mass-communications spin.

"They were AK-47s meant to refit the Sierra Leone army. Remember, they would throw down their weapons and run away when the RUF engaged them. There was nothing the British could do about this shipment. There was no way that Peter Penfold (a top British official in Sierra Leone) could have intervened. He did not know the shipment was coming. Mr. Penfold was forced to resign over the arms scandal and most Sandline operatives feel that was unfair. All of the arms deals were done outside of the UK – no threat of us going against the law of the land, at loggerheads or contravening the law. Penfold could not have tracked where the shipment of arms came from or when it was delivered. It was out of his hands," Sachse said.

"The British (representatives) in Sierra Leone were well-disposed toward us. They saw the need for some positive action to be taken to stabilize the situation, although they couldn't openly support us for political reasons. But they were sympathetic toward us, very pleasant, nice. There was frustration that nothing was being done. Obviously, they knew we were the answer to the problem."

Pondering the hysterics over the 35 tons of AK-47s from Bulgaria sent to Sierra Leone by Plaza 107, Sachse was resolute.

"We were merely trying to re-supply the Sierra Leone army, which, as I said, threw down their weapons and ran away when facing the RUF in the field. Of course, the ECOMOG (the West African peacekeeping force operating at that time in Sierra Leone) commanders knew the shipment was on the way. It was
unloaded by the Nigerians and taken to their base. It was stored at the airport and only a very small percentage of those weapons got to the Sierra Leone army. The Nigerians got to keep almost all of it. You can imagine that they sold them elsewhere," he said.

"Sierra Leone is corrupt. If you've got the money you can buy anything. You get stopped every five minutes on the street by the police and there are small bribes to be paid. You can't move a foot without someone wanting something from you. The officials in the country are so poorly paid; this is how they must supplement their means."

Ask about the related hysteries over a British television station broadcasting British sailors working on a Sandline/EO helicopter, Sachse said, "The British frigate came into port. The pilots struck up a relationship with the British Royal Navy's aircrew over drinks. Our helicopter needed maintenance. We needed machinery and whatnot that we did not have. Our pilots and their pilots had a relationship of professional courtesy. I think that they (the British forces) must have cleared it, because he flew the helicopter in key side (dockside) for them to work on it."

Sachse continued: "Tim Spicer controlled the military side of the activities in Sierra Leone. I flew often to London to meet with him inside Plaza 107. He was the man I directly reported to. He is easygoing, efficient, thorough and very good at trying to procure what we needed to be done in the field. My links to Tony Buckingham (the head of Plaza 107) are social."

The way the mercenaries were running freely around Sierra Leone was proving too big an indignation for many of the natives to handle. At a conference held in Freetown in the 1990s, the head of the local teachers' union called for the complete withdrawal of EO, calling them hard-core "apartheid attack dogs." That exact quote made it past the media censors and eventually made the evening news. The man was jailed.

"It's easy to cry 'racism' and 'apartheid" said Sachse.

"The fact is that we had both white and black soldiers working together. We get along well. We have fought and bled and died together.

"The government in Sierra Leone was so corrupt. Many officials were receiving bribes from the RUF in the form of diamonds. When we came in there to sort things out, that was stopped. I believe that is why we were so heavily criticized — not only were we defeating the RUF in the field, but we were also drying up the corruption. We were bringing stabilization to the country. So the critics were the corrupt ones and they were the ones who wanted to get us out. Wars in Africa are fought by the black man; they pay the biggest price."

Sachse described how he met with Valentine Strasser, who back then was the de facto leader of Sierra Leone.

"He was a lieutenant in the army," Sachse explained. "This was after the coup. We went to see him and he was half asleep. He had been partying all night. He needed to organize the finances to pay us. Sandline was set up as an organization to make money. The country's finances were in such a (poor) state. As I said, the government was very corrupt at certain levels."

Sachse described the way in which Sandline/Executive Outcomes carried out the campaign in Sierra Leone.
"I was asked to make an initial assessment on the ground," he began.

"When I first got to Sierra Leone the first thing we had to sort out was the threat to Freetown. The primary objective was restoring freedom of movement. On the outskirts of town, the RUF was doing well. The regular Sierra Leone army was useless. We did the fighting ourselves. In their regular army there was no discipline. No training. You must train for counter-insurgency and go out and meet the enemy. The rebels were getting training and arms. The Sierra Leone army wore civilian clothes under their uniforms. If the rebels came they would take off their uniforms and leave everything behind, including their equipment."

One is reminded of Mao's dictum that "The enemy is our quartermaster."

"We got after Foday Sankoh. Once Sandline got involved we began to provide an escort to the convoys - military consignment and diamonds. We lost under ten men in all. I think about six," Sachse said proudly.

**Limb-hacking, child-hating rebels**

Sachse talked a great deal about what it was like to deal with seeing the black Africans, especially the children of Sierra Leone, having their limbs hacked off by the RUF rebels. Sitting in a Cape Town café, one could see he was visibly moved and affected by what he had seen. It was clear Sachse truly cared about the children of Sierra Leone.

"This affects me very severely - kids being mutilated. We in Sandline/EO did a lot to try and prevent the hacking off of the limbs in the course of achieving our objectives," he told WorldNetDaily.

"You can't go into shock when you see such things. You have to live with it and have a certain aloofness. You must be a hard-ass and continue to lead your men. You take a village; then you call in the medic.

"Typically, the limbs are not hacked off when you are there. You arrive after it has been done. The children are weeping. The children accept it as a punishment. Of course you have sympathy. These horrible crimes against the children happened in the absence of troops to protect them. Their wounds, by the time Sandline/EO arrived, had already grown gangrenous."

Sachse elaborated on his involvement with the children of Sierra Leone.

"The kids are very affectionate. Kids come up and talk to you as a soldier; they are naturally curious. There is the exchange of cigarettes and sweets. If there is fighting, you push the children to one side - you don't want them to be in the way," he explained.

"I have been in the special forces for 34 years, and I can tell you I would never allow any atrocities against women and children. I have very strong principles. Zero atrocities. We used our own doctors and medics to help the children whose limbs were hacked off in Sierra Leone."

Asked why the RUF rebels committed such atrocities, Sachse replied, "The rebels would terrify the civilians. They would decide to 'teach them a lesson' for being pro-government and put ten or 15 pro-government civilians into a hut and then throw in two or three phosphorus grenades. One would be able to hear screaming inside the hut while the rebel soldiers stood outside laughing. There was total fear in certain areas as the rebels engaged in scorched-earth tactics."
Sachse said that he knew that a few South African mercenaries (not affiliated with Executive Outcomes or Sandline) had gone to Liberia to train the RUF.

Asked how they could train soldiers who would hack off limbs, he said, "You are doing a job training soldiers. What they do with that training after that is out of your control."

So could Sachse train soldiers who would go on to hack the limbs off of children? "No, I couldn't," he responded. "Those men worked for Charles Taylor during training. They were only training. They were not deployed. They (probably) figured, 'I work for an organization. I train soldiers. What they do with that training is not my fault.' They want to keep it clean."

Sachse lamented the fate of children involved in war, both as victims and as combatants. Yet the phenomena of child soldiers is far from new. For example, "The Children's Crusade" of the year 1212 saw over 15,000 youngsters organized on a military mission to the Holy Land. Around 7,500 marched under the leadership of a 15-year-old shepherd boy named Steven. Steven claimed that Christ Himself had called him to lead the brigade. The other half of this child army marched under the banner of a 10-year-old boy from Germany named Nicholas, who said that angels had appeared to him.

Sachse spoke more about the need to keep special forces tactics out of the media at large.

"Sandline operations like Sierra Leone were politically sensitive. The technology changes, but the techniques don't change very much. You don't want to jeopardize the next operation. Generally speaking, true special forces (like the) SAS and the Recces, what have you, don't talk about it. What you've done, you've done. It's about honor. It's a code. You don't talk out of turn. One does not talk about the actions one carries out in the special forces. The true professional does not talk about it drinking in a pub. It can affect your job, your family and yourself. Technology may have changed, but the techniques of special forces operations have not. You might wind up making someone else's job harder in the future by speaking about your own operations."

Sachse also explained his wariness about journalists.

"Usually, I am wary about talking to journalists. They want to pin certain things on you, saying, 'You knew this and that.' For example, I knew something about Dr. Wouter Basson and South Africa's nuclear, biological and biochemical programs. Dr. Basson is a friend of mine. I met one particular journalist who tried to tie me to him. I told this journalist, 'Look around Cape Town. It is orderly. There is peace. You have a life to lead. All of that is here because of people like me. ... we had to stop the onslaught against this country, or it today would look like other countries in West Africa. A real mess would have been made here.'"

The Sierra Leone battle plan

Sachse took WorldNetDaily from A to Z in the entire campaign for Sierra Leone.

"We had 80 soldiers in total - 60 on the ground and 20 in the air wing. The command element was white and they were very good soldiers. In the South African Special Forces we had recruited black soldiers from the equator down. We had French-speaking soldiers, Swahili and others. We had black officers in the reconnaissance regiments. Many ethnic groups were represented," he said.

During the interview, Sachse continually was confronted with the question of who was "we" when he spoke. Was "we" Sandline/EO and/or Branch Energy? It soon became pretty clear that when Sachse said,
"our mines," he didn't mean Sandline/EO's.

"As for Branch Energy, they had a mining concern, kimberlite, a large stake," he said.

"They had to go underground for the alluvial diamonds. Vast amounts of money were involved, machinery and what have you. They were given concessions by the government. I would say that if I had to guess, the corporate interests involved are Tories, and as business guys, they support the government of the day."

As it turns out, a liberal British politico, David Steel, was at one time a non-executive director with Buckingham's oil group. Despite the government-business-intelligence connections that combined to organize the Sierra Leone campaign back in the UK, there was trouble brewing.

For example, in February of 1999, a month after the RUF's horrible "No Living Thing" operation was launched, the British Parliament issued a report on Sierra Leone. This report blasted British Foreign Office officials and diplomats who "withheld" information from the Blair government concerning Sandline's activities in shipping arms to Sierra Leone.

This was because a U.N. edict forbade such an activity. Sierra Leone President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah had been thrown out of office in a coup. Sandline and EO wanted to bring him back to power and in doing so, perhaps enter into the good graces of said government and their own British financiers, who in turn only wanted new and greater access to diamond rights in Sierra Leone.

All of this greatly affected Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and his "ethical foreign policy" program, which insisted on morals, environmental care and human rights as the core of British policy. (The proposed Tony Blair fresh-water pipeline from Kurdistan/Turkey to North Cyprus and over to Israel probably did not fit in well with Cook's ethos.) There was a push for Cook's resignation, but he was only demoted when Blair shook up his Cabinet.

Politics aside, Sachse had a job to do, and he did it with amazing efficiency.

"We had a force of about 20 at Rutah and a force at the mine in Kono to stop the stealing and stripping of the machinery there, used for digging for diamonds," Sachse told WND.

"In Bomoesa, we had about five guys. We didn't need many soldiers. These are elite special forces; they can take on many times their own numbers, especially against these RUF rebels. They didn't even mine the perimeters."

"In May of 1995, Phase I began. We moved in and established ourselves in the capital. ... Phase II was to make sure that we got paid, which meant getting the Kono diamond mine back in operation. Phase III aimed at looking to generate capital for the government in other areas of the nation. Phase IV was aimed to clean up other pockets of resistance."

Sachse continued: "In Phase I we assessed the threat. The rebels sat outside the city of Freetown, about 20 miles away. We analyzed the situation and contained it. We had to deal with Freetown as it was about to be overrun. We went in and got briefed by intelligence sources. We built up our own intelligence sources from the Sierra Leone army. We got intelligence appreciation. We had a good working relationship with the Sierra Leone army commander at their military HQ. We had sophisticated radio equipment to monitor the RUF. We could listen in on what they were planning, what they were up to, and this gave us a direction."
What plan did Sachse and his men come up with?

"We had very little choice," he said.

"Based on the inputs, there was an obvious course of action. We went to Benguela and deployed. We had our helicopters and BMPs, which are armoured vehicles. The majority of the Sierra Leone army were not properly trained. We did our best to train them in the short time we had to work with them, but they were at least cannon fodder. The one thing we had in our favor was the MI-17 Russian helicopters. They had 50-caliber guns at the backdoor and on the sides. They flew out of the range of the RPGs while the enemy on the ground were within range of the 50-caliber guns."

The RUF had never seen a force deployed against it like the mercenaries of Sandline and Executive Outcomes.

"We presented the enemy with a different problem – airpower. We knew how to position our soldiers and how to cut off the enemy. It’s a matter of battle-move-chase. There was good air-ground interaction. We cut off the enemy. We had a Cessna 337 recon plane, which is called a ‘push-pull.’ It could carry out recon for six or seven hours. Recon plays a big part in a war. The Cessna circles and circles. ... the jungle only allows a certain amount of aerial recon," explained Sachse.

"The RUF had a large force (but) I cannot say the number of troops. Yet it was a big force, enough to take the capital of Freetown. As for the Sierra Leone army, well, no one (in the citizenry) cared if they lived or died, and they were not being paid. The RUF were not used to meeting an enemy in the field with effective firepower. They came up against Sandline/EO. They were all drugged up, all fired up and we gave up zero ground. We cut them off and killed a hell of a lot of them. The first time they faced our soldiers they lost their will.

"Remember, the old South African Defense Force was a well-oiled killing machine par excellence. Africa has never seen nor will ever see, unfortunately, its likes again."

Sachse continued: "This massive push broke up the RUF. They lost momentum, impetus, and it reversed the situation. We pushed them back quite far. They were not going to take the capital. They were doomed to their bases in the interior of the country and retreated to lick their wounds."

Sandline/EO was on a roll.

"We then organized our vehicles and soldiers and set out on a convoy from Freetown to Kono. In dealing with potential ambushes, we looked for ‘killing ground,’ ground you can zero in on with good observation points and space to cut off the enemy if they break out. We had the helicopters fly overhead for reconnaissance. Between Freetown and Kono it is 125 miles. The RUF soldiers we encountered were told to fight or else. We would leap frog, move up, secure, sweep, clear," he said.

"The Sierra Leone army had no maps. We produced our own maps in London and bought whatever else we needed. The rebels worked with minute maps, tourist maps. Our maps were far more sophisticated and were updated with satellite imagery. But in reality, Sierra Leone had not changed that much. Our own maps were a good scale. We had aerial photography maps, accurate planning. You can’t fight in the jungle – it’s too thick. All of our sorties were pre-planned flights."

Sachse said that the RUF "had sympathizers" in Sierra Leone in every walk of life.
"At the airport, for example, when our helicopters flew out going east, a call would be made to the RUF, 'they're on their way.' But where were they going exactly? We would confuse the RUF. Soldiers are told to sit and watch in the field. Hours and days go by and they get bored. They say, 'They won't come today,' but that's the day you come."

Then Phase II of the operation began.

"At the Battle of Kono – Phase II – the enemy decided, or whoever had trained them, 'If you are going to make a last stand, you make it here.' This was on a certain approach to town. There were no spaces through the mountains. There was an approach, coming downhill, and then a bridge over a river and then you went uphill again approaching Kono," Sachse said.

"It was a nice area to defend with the right equipment, and if you had the training, you could hold here. Rolf Van Heerden led the operation into Kono. He was my second in command. He was a very effective commander in Angola with Executive Outcomes. He was skilled enough to read what was happening. He used air support wisely. He softened them up with the mortars and the RUF withdrew."

Continued Sachse: "We went into Kono. The RUF had withdrawn into the jungle. We took control of Kono and set up our headquarters and defenses. We secured the approaches to the town and our base. We mopped up the resistance and set up patrols. The RUF kept coming back in little guerrilla groups, launching probing attacks.

"We had our vehicles and mobilized the correct counter-measures. We neutralized the enemy in Kono and worked with local authorities to get the town running on normal footing again. We shared intelligence with police and the (other) authorities. There was a curfew from dawn till dusk and patrols in the city at night."

The strategy employed by Sachse was working.

Sachse continued to explain that part of the operation: "The helicopters would fly at night back to Freetown. The enemy was not used to being recced at night. In the field you make fires. Before Sandline/EO was deployed, the rebels had a life of luxury. But we recced them day and night. They had to cook, but fires make smoke. The Sierra Leone people turned against them. The RUF angered them by doing things like taking all of the (much needed) drugs from the local hospitals. The RUF was now on the run from Sandline/EO. They began to abandon their wounded. We would detect movement in their camps and we would attack," he said.

The Sachse spoke with something not unlike joy.

"Since their initial winning streak, the RUF was totally in reverse gear," he said.

"For the RUF and their leaders, their newfound freedom was over. They were unhappy soldiers, guerrillas living hand to mouth. No more Sierra Leone army to face. Instead, (they faced) our elite killers. No more goodies from the locals. They began to run out of supplies and ammunition."

Sachse said that Kono had around 6,000 citizens when Sandline/EO arrived on the scene.

"And they had more citizens when we left. We left behind about 40 men in Kono to guard the diamond mines and equipment there and about 20 in Rutah. In Kono, the diamonds were being produced again, but there was a lot of illegal mining going on. Authorities were bribed. Everyone was there in their own
interest. There were illicit diamond deals going on. The Lebanese came in. It was all wrong. This was not like DeBeers (with controls on the mining). But even DeBeers tried (mining) offshore of Sierra Leone."

Soon it was time for Phase III.

"Phase III involved us going to Rutile (which, strangely, is the name of both a rare mineral commodity and the name of the town). We met minor resistance and we pushed them out. Rutile was not lucrative to the enemy, as it needs to be reprocessed. It was a prestige target. There are alluvial diamonds there and titanium (used for fighter jet engines) Rutile is very rare; only in Australia, Richard's Bay, South Africa and in Sierra Leone can you mine it. Those three places, that's all. The Australians and South Africans had an interest naturally in keeping the Sierra Leone operation closed," said Sachse.

"We went down to Boenkemena and stabilized the area and pushed out the rebels. ECOMOG came in to occupy the town and help to run it. (Today) Sankoh's headquarters was attacked with Nigerian artillery."

_Tomorrow: Part 3 of the series explores the rampant cannibalism in Sierra Leone and the international efforts to shape the nation and its neighbors._

_Read Part 1, "White mercenaries in black Africa."

_Anthony C. LoBaido is a longtime contributor to WorldNetDaily.com._
Residents in southern Guinea region fearful of "foreign attacks"
-French radio
327 words
17 October 2004 14:11
BBC Monitoring Africa

Text of report by Radio France Internationale on 17 October

[Presenter] The crisis in Cote d'Ivoire may pose a threat for the entire [west Africa] region. Sierra Leonean and Liberian Presidents Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Gyude Bryant met in Kenema, southeastern Sierra Leone, yesterday. The Liberian leader is also expected in Guinea soon. People in southern Guinea, a region bordering Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, fear rebel attacks. Olivier Roger reports from Nzerekore.

[Roger] Nzerekore has been dreading a rebel attack since 7 October. On that day, local authorities held a meeting with heads of districts and elders and told them that some combatants were planning to attack the town. Nzerekore is located at the border with Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. The rumours of war, which have been troubling the region, are consistently causing fear among Nzerekore residents. Local authorities did not provide details. They just explained that the combatants were being trained in northern Cote d'Ivoire, as well as in training camps in Mali and in Liberia. This is not the first time that such rumours have been going round, and they always lead to a psychosis.

Thus, under the supervision of the prefect and the governor, heads of district have set up vigilante committees. At 10 p.m. [local time] every day, young volunteers set up roadblocks in every district of Nzerekore and carry out identity checks. There are frequent clashes between the Guerze and the Konianke, the major ethnic groups in Region Forestiere region, and the fear of a foreign attack comes at the right time to defuse the tension.

Yet Nzerekore is not the only place fearing foreign attacks. The fear is also present in Cote d'Ivoire. Last week, the New Forces leader, Guillaume Soro, said he was fearing an attack that could come from Guinea.
FREETOWN, Oct 15 (AFP) - Sierra Leone's President Tejan Kabbah and his Liberian counterpart Gyude Bryant are to hold a one-day meeting at the weekend in Kenema, Sierra Leone's third largest city, diplomats said Friday.

They are to discuss issues surrounding peace and security between the two states as well as within the Mano River Union economic, which also includes Guinea, one of the diplomats told AFP.

After the meeting, expected to take place on Saturday, the Liberian leader will travel to Guinea for similar talks. The weekend meeting will be Bryant's third visit to Sierra Leone in recent months.

Bryant leads a transitional government created after the departure into exile of former Liberian president Charles Taylor, ending 14 years of conflict. His term will end in January 2006 once an elected government is installed.

Sierra Leone's president, whose own country recently emerged from a decade of civil war considered among the most brutal in modern history, has taken a leading role in engaging all sides of the Liberian peace process.
Court to rule on Milosevic plea

By Geraldine Coughlan
BBC correspondent at The Hague

Judges at the war crimes trial of ex-Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic are due to consider issuing subpoenas to defence witnesses unwilling to testify.

Mr Milosevic's lawyer, Stephen Kay, fears there will not be enough witnesses to conduct a proper defence.

He said many witnesses due to testify refused to appear after Mr Milosevic was barred from representing himself.

Slobodan Milosevic faces 66 charges of war crimes during the 1990s Balkan wars at The Hague's UN tribunal.

Appeal hearing

Mr Kay told the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague that the number of defence witnesses willing to testify was at a critical low, and that this threatened to undermine the defence case.

The lawyer said "a large number" of the 150 witnesses contacted so far had refused to testify - if Mr Milosevic was not allowed to defend himself.

Mr Kay told the court he had asked foreign governments to make the witnesses available and that he would consider asking the court to subpoena around 20 witnesses, including state officials - if the requests to governments failed.

Judges assigned Mr Kay, who is a British lawyer, as Mr Milosevic's counsel last month.

Mr Kay said some witnesses may reconsider after an appeals court rules on whether to allow Mr Milosevic to represent himself, as he did during the first two years of his trial.

An appeal hearing is set for next Thursday. However, it is not clear when the court will deliver its ruling.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3751876.stm
The Guardian (London) October 18, 2004

Copyright 2004 Guardian Newspapers Limited
The Guardian (London)

October 18, 2004

SECTION: Guardian Home Pages, Pg. 9

LENGTH: 668 words

HEADLINE: Diamonds whose price is measured in blood: Jewellers ignore code of conduct on gems from conflict zones

BYLINE: Lee Glendinning

BODY:
An Amnesty International France advertisement questions the human cost of diamonds sourced from regions of conflict.

Britons may be unknowingly buying diamonds mined in Sierra Leone, where profits are used to arm militias. Many UK jewelers have conceded they have no real policy on sourcing diamonds.

"Conflict" or "blood" diamonds bought by developed countries have funded guns for child soldiers, provided arms to fight UN peacekeeping forces, and financed several African civil wars, according to Amnesty International.

Research by the environment group Global Witness revealed that in the 1990s the Angolan rebel army Unita generated $ 3.7bn over six years largely by trading illegal gems.

And now, almost two years after the diamond industry agreed to a self-regulation system to prevent the trade in diamonds from regions of conflict, many UK jewelers are unable to assure customers that the diamonds they are buying have not been sourced from conflict regions.

Members of Amnesty International visited more than 330 high street stores to question them about their diamond policy and found that only 38% of salespeople said they had received training about conflict diamonds.

Almost half of the diamond retailers said they could not provide a copy of their company policy on conflict diamonds and more than a fifth said they had no store policy on the issue at all.

Leading British jewellery retailers Asprey, Theo Fennell and Debenhams did not respond to letters requesting written information about company policy on conflict diamonds. In the US, Costco Wholesale Corporation, TJ Maxx and Kmart did not respond.

The research, also by Global Witness campaigners, shows the diamond industry has not implemented a system of self-regulation which was agreed in January 2003.

Under the Kimberley Process - a scheme to banish conflict diamonds from the legal rough diamond trade - three commitments were made.

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=78150b1752afd21d69cc7a86c9496b87&docnum=1&_fmt=... 10/18/2004
These included a **code of conduct** and system of warranties being implemented and employees being informed about conflict **diamond** regulations.

The World **Diamond** Council has also proposed that the industry create a system of warranties for **diamonds**. Under this system all buyers and sellers of both rough and polished **diamonds** must provide a warranty saying the **diamonds** have been bought from a legitimate source and not involved in funding conflict.

Susie Sanders, a campaigner for Global Witness, said it was important to keep up the pressure on the industry to stamp out the problem.

"Some progress has been made but the industry is not taking it seriously enough," she said.

"There is a lack of systematic monitoring and no penalties for retailers if they do not meet the requirements set out in the Kimberley Process.

"This means there are no consequences if they are found not to be compliant."

The findings, which Global Witness campaigners say are "pretty disappointing" will include research from Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland and will be presented at the World **Diamond** Congress in New York this week.

Amnesty International and Global Witness have now called upon governments to intervene, asking for independent monitoring, rigorous auditing and inspections.

The director of Amnesty International UK, Kate Allen, said the **diamond** industry was not taking the issue of conflict **diamonds** seriously enough.

"The trade in conflict **diamonds** has fuelled protracted and bloody wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, destroying nations and costing an estimated 3.7 million lives," she said.

"Governments must step in and audit companies to ensure that **diamonds** are not funding conflict or human rights abuses."

Those wanting to buy **diamonds** could make a difference, she said, by insisting on written assurances that they were clean.

"**Diamonds** may be expensive, but they needn't cost people's lives," she said.

Maxi Jazz, page 18
SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 8

LENGTH: 645 words

HEADLINE: A continent in crying need of peacekeepers;
Helping Africa help itself

BYLINE: Jean-marie Guehenno

SOURCE: International Herald Tribune

DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS

BODY:
President George W. Bush recently told the UN General Assembly of plans by the Group of 8 industrialized countries to train 75,000 peacekeepers, initially from Africa, for operations on that continent and possibly beyond. In their second debate, both Bush and Senator John Kerry seemed to endorse U.S. logistical support for the peacekeeping efforts of the African Union in the Darfur region of Sudan.

These offers are welcome, above all because most of the world's remaining wars are in Africa. In the last decade, more than six million Africans have died directly or indirectly as a result. What is happening now in Darfur is, in some ways, just the latest episode of a story of poverty and conflict that stretches back across much of the continent for almost half a century.

Africa's wars call for assistance at many levels, but training peacekeepers is one good place to start. A recent Oxford University study compared peacekeeping with a range of other interventions, from sanctions to development assistance. The study found that peacekeeping offered by far the best return on donor investment.

Sometimes, as in Mozambique and Namibia, peacekeeping has eased a transition from war to peace, and the peacekeepers have gone home. Elsewhere, as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, peacekeepers are still on the ground, and real peace has yet to take root. Yet even there, the men who hacked the limbs off children are out of business and the slow climb back to human decency has begun.

In Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and even Sudan, hot wars appear to be cooling, and a surge in peacekeeping is helping to bring a degree of stability. The UN now has around 50,000 peacekeepers deployed in eight African operations, double the figure of five years ago. And as the number of peacekeepers has gone up, the number of war deaths has plummeted. But even these troops are overstretched, and the package offered by the G-8 offers real hope of filling the gaps and developing Africa's own peacekeeping capacity.

But there are two pitfalls to be avoided in the build-up of this capacity. The first concern is that peacekeeping not become a purely regional affair. The danger is that peacekeeping in Europe, for
example, will get the full benefit of Europe’s economic strength, while Africa, where the world’s worst wars are being fought, will get much less.

This is already happening to a degree. Congo, where millions have died, is 200 times as large as Kosovo. Yet Kosovo has a larger peacekeeping force that is better equipped, better supported and backed by an aid effort that is, per person, several hundred times more generous than the one that feeds Congo.

The second concern is not to depend on peacekeeping alone. Peacekeeping does work, and massively cuts casualties, but it is not a solution to every conflict. It can be the wrong solution altogether, as in Rwanda or Somalia, or it can simply be not enough. In Sierra Leone, for example, peacekeepers have brought security, but what happens now? The country remains desperately poor, ranking dead last of the 177 countries on the UN’s human development index for 2004. There is a real risk that if the international effort doesn’t broaden quickly, Sierra Leone could lapse back into misrule and conflict.

Security is the foundation without which state-building cannot ultimately succeed. But peacekeeping needs to go hand in hand with reforming the security forces, supporting the rule of law and laying the foundations for economic growth.

Bush, Kerry and the G-8 have laid down a challenge to help Africa keep the peace. Seventy-five thousand peacekeepers will be a solid beginning, but not yet the whole solution.

***

Jean-Marie Guehenno is the United Nations under secretary general for peacekeeping operations.

[Not to be reproduced without the permission of the author.]

LOAD-DATE: October 15, 2004

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=3f504b9638ab81a3a00202658749b3ea&docnum=1&_fmt... 10/18/2004
ABIDJAN, 15 Oct 2004 (IRIN) - The government of Cote d'Ivoire appealed for calm as the much-hyped deadline for disarmament to begin passed by on Friday with rebel forces refusing to hand in a single weapon.

Defence Minister Rene Amani said a television broadcast on Thursday night that people should not pay attention to "a certain number of rumours" that have been flying round the economic capital Abidjan.

He was apparently referring to widespread fears that youth militia groups which support President Laurent Gbagbo would once more go on the rampage, staging rowdy protest demonstrations and attacking immigrants and people from the north of Cote d'Ivoire suspected of being rebel sympathisers.

Other factors have also contributed to growing tension in the country.

In recent days, Abidjan newspapers have reported possible moves by Gbagbo to sack the the military high command.

And the rebel movement which occupies the northern half of Cote d'Ivoire has repeated allegations that government forces are preparing to launch an attack on rebel territory from neighbouring Guinea.

Amani said the process of disarmament, which was due to have begun on Friday, was still on course and "negotiations are progressing."

"There is nothing to be afraid of," Amani continued. "I would like to reassure each and every one of you that everything will be normal....that everybody should go about their business calmly, that schools should open, that markets should open and that everybody should go about their ordinary business."

The United Nations, which has a 6,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d'Ivoire, took the precaution of suspending all travel into the country by visiting UN personnel until 20 October.

With Cote d'Ivoire's fragile peace process once more in deadlock, the prospects for the country's future looks as dark and ominous as the heavy rainclouds which gather over Abidjan every afternoon to drench the city in torrential rain.

Civil war broke out in Cote d'Ivoire in September 2002, but a French-brokered peace agreement signed in January 2003 has yet to be implemented in full.

The fighting eventually stopped in May 2003, leaving rebel forces in control of the northern half of the country. And a broad-based government of national reconciliation was formed to guide the country to presidential elections in October 2005.

But Gbagbo has yet to implement in full a series of political reforms demanded by the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement and until he does so the rebels are refusing to lay down their weapons.

The latest target date for the start of disarmament - 15 October - was set at a summit meeting of the Ivorian factions in the Ghanaian capital Accra at the end of July. But Gbagbo failed deliver his side of the bargain by putting promised political reforms on the statute book by the end of September, so now the rebels are refusing to disarm.
The government and rebel armies have agreed technical arrangements for the disarmament process to begin with the French and UN peacekeeping forces in Cote d'Ivoire.

But Colonel Soumaila Bakayako, the military commander of the New Forces rebel movement, stressed earlier this week that the order for his men to lay down their weapons would be a political decision.

And Guillaume Soro, the rebel leader, made clear that not a single gun would be handed over until the delayed reforms were enacted. Most of the planned measures are aimed at giving the four million West African immigrants to Cote d'Ivoire and their descendants greater political and economic rights.

"Nothing is going to happen on 15 October. We are still armed, the country is divided and parliament hasn't voted through the reforms," Soro told IRIN in an interview earlier this week. "So long as there is not a minimum level of confidence, which must exist as a contract between the political actors, we are not going to talk about DDR (disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation)."

The "Accra Three" summit at the end of July, was billed at the time as a last chance to get the Ivorian peace process back on track. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and a dozen African heads of state turned up to force the rival factions into a compromise.

Now diplomats in Abidjan find it difficult to see a way out of the crisis that does not involve the men with guns stepping forward to take control of the situation.

"Where are we going? For over a year and a half we have been at a stand-still," one exasperated African diplomat told IRIN.

"No blockage is perpetual. An answer will come and it will come from the military," he predicted.

"The politicians should not under-estimate that ties between the government and rebel soldiers," he warned, hinting that the military commanders of both sides could strike an agreement between themselves and seize the initiative from their political masters.

One senior UN official in Abidjan told IRIN: "The only solution is a robust action." That, he said, could either come from "outside or inside."

But no-one has so far talked seriously about applying international sanctions against Cote d'Ivoire, a country which has been starved of development aid by the international community since the conflict began.

And with 10,000 foreign peacekeepers already stationed in the country to keep the government and rebel armies apart, it is difficult to see what more foreign governments can do.

But as time ticks by with no solution in sight, diplomats warn it will become harder and harder to hold free and fair presidential elections next year as planned.

Amoikon Tiemele, a senior figure in the Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), the largest opposition party in parliament, expressed concern at the latest turn of events.

"I am very worried. You can easily predict a deterioration of the situation," he told IRIN.

[ENDS]