Enclosed are clippings of local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Outreach and Public Affairs Office as at:

Thursday, 8 March 2012

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On International Women’s Day, CARL-SL Urges the Sierra Leone Government to Enact the Sexual Offences and Legal Aid Bills

Freetown, March 7, 2012 - The Centre for Accountability and the Rule of Law - Sierra Leone (CARL-SL) today urged the Government of Sierra Leone to step up efforts to enact the Sexual Offences and Legal Aid Bills. The bills, if enacted, would represent a significant step forward in addressing sexual based crimes as well as enhancing access to justice for the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans. Sexual-based crimes and inadequate access to justice certainly constitute some of the major challenges confronting the country.

Section 23(1) of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone guarantees every accused a fair hearing within a reasonable time, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) imposes a duty on states to provide legal assistance to indigent persons “where the interest of justice requires”. Ten years after the end of Sierra Leone’s civil war, it is estimated that at least 70% of the legal needs of poor Sierra Leoneans are unmet. In a country where poverty and illiteracy levels are ever so high, it is obvious that providing fees for legal services remains a major barrier to access to justice.

The Legal Aid Bill makes provision for free legal representation and advice to indigent Sierra Leoneans in both criminal and civil matters. The Bill is a novelty, and represents a progressive attempt to model the national justice system along the lines of countries like Nigeria and the UK. The Sexual Offences Bill would not only help combat sexual based crimes, but would also promote a Sierra Leonean society free from egregious sexual immoralties. It also imposes sanctions on persons who induce mentally disabled persons to engage in sexual activity.

“Out-of-court settlements for sexual-based offences pose a serious impediment to national efforts at fostering accountability for such crimes. The Sexual Offences Bill imposes sanctions on persons, regardless of their status, who enable out-of-court settlements. Once the bill is enacted, Sierra Leone will genuinely begin the journey towards a society that respects the rights of women and girls,” CARL’s Executive Director said today.

CARL welcomes the efforts by the government and its partners for initiating the bills, and urges the relevant authorities to demonstrate genuine commitment to ensuring that the bills are enacted without undue delay. As Sierra Leone joins the international community in commemorating the International Women’s Day, enacting the bills without undue delay would send a clear message about the country’s increased commitment to enhancing access to justice for the vast majority of its citizens as well as combating sexual based crimes in the country.
Former ambassador for war crimes advocates international justice

By MEGAN ERNST

David Scheffer framed the way the world dealt with Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi, among other international criminals.
Former Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Expert on United Nations Assistance on the Khmer Rouge Trials addressed students at Dean Rusk Hall Tuesday in a presentation titled: “The End of Impunity: War Crimes Tribunals in the 21st Century.”

David Scheffer

Scheffer, discussed his book “All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals,” which draws from his experience as an ambassador during the Clinton administration.
In this presentation organized by the Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy and the Georgia Society of International and Comparative Law, Scheffer addressed atrocity crimes past, present and future, and how indicted leaders will face either international trial or “vengeful retribution.”

Scheffer was the first person to serve in the American government in his position. He called the time before war crimes tribunals “the Old World.”

Before World War II, little thought was given to achieving justice in cases of atrocity crimes, Scheffer said.
The Nuremberg trials and Tokyo military tribunals were the closest thing to the modern day international war tribunals, he said, but nothing of its kind was done between the end of WWII and the 1990s, when his job was created under then-US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright.
“I had the privilege of having the lead American job in building the international criminal tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the permanent International Criminal Court,” Scheffer said.
The policies Scheffer created are still functional today. They frame the way leaders such as Muammar Ghadafi, Omar al-Bashir and Charles Taylor have been treated internationally.

He thought of himself as a “carpenter” of war crimes tribunals, but carried also the weight of the knowledge that “these would be the international community’s frontal assault on impunity.”
“I was the ambassador to hell,” he said. “But I was also the ambassador to hell and back.”

When discussing the importance of an international criminal justice system, Scheffer used an example familiar to many.

“I’m going totally against the grain here – I could never win political office – but I do have a difficulty with the fact that Osama bin Laden was killed under a kill order,” he said. “For me, that’s a problem in
Scheffer’s experience in international law and policy helped him form strong convictions on the subject. “With respect to international justice and treaty-making, I find it to be an incredibly destructive argument. It backfires constantly,” he said, when asked about American exceptionalism. And many were happy to hear his strong convictions. “We are very lucky to have Ambassador Scheffer come and talk to us. He is truly one of the most prominent experts in war crimes law in the world,” said Diane Marie Amann, the Emily and Ernest Woodruff Chair in International Law at the University, “and it was an easy decision to invite him and we are very happy he accepted.”
Does Lebanon still care who killed Rafik Hariri?

Alex Rowell

A sign of slain PM Rafik Hariri reading, “The truth for the sake of Lebanon.” Many in Lebanon have lost interest in the trial set up to bring Hariri’s killers to justice. (AFP photo)

When the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) announced last week that it amended the indictment handed down in the case of the 2005 murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, it was met with a collective shrug. For an event that, just seven years ago, shook the country to its very bones, bringing around a million protesters to the streets in outrage, the question of who killed Hariri appears to have become one of conspicuous indifference to many Lebanese today. As much as Rafik Hariri’s son, the exiled Future Movement leader and former PM Saad Hariri, tried to revive the passions of the masses in his speech on the anniversary of his father’s assassination earlier this month, the reality is that even for many supporters, the STL is now of little importance.

NOW Lebanon asked a number of Lebanese why they thought this was so - and whether reports that a politician is to be included in a revised indictment might make any difference.

Hazem Saghieh, journalist at Al-Hayat: I think the main reason is that people are now more concerned with what’s going on in Syria - the uprising and the savage treatment of the Syrian people by the regime. Secondly, the tribunal issue has become part and parcel of the routine, monotonous political life in Lebanon. There’s no longer anything exciting in it. The rumors about including a politician in a new indictment might stir some interest, but I’m not sure to what extent.

Ali al-Amin, journalist at Al-Balad: There are many reasons, but the most important one is the current cabinet itself. The different parties within the cabinet are colluding to ensure their own survival. They don’t want to make any moves that could cause them problems with the international community. For example, we saw that [Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan] Nasrallah did not create a problem when [PM Najib] Mikati decided to approve the funding. Had the [Saad] Hariri cabinet been in place, we might have seen different positions between opposing parties.

Secondly, the Syrian events have become more important because of the huge repercussions for Lebanon if the regime should fall.

Thirdly, everyone has reached the conclusion that internal debate about the STL has no effect on its path or course. Moreover, it is clear that the path is a long one. No one is expecting an indictment tomorrow.

Elias Muhanna, academic and author of Qifqa Nabki blog: I think there are two reasons for the side-lining of the
STL. Most obviously, there’s the situation in Syria, which is so much more immediate and has the potential to impact Lebanon in a far more dramatic way than the STL. There’s also the simple fact that nothing has really come out of Leidschendam in several months besides the odd press release about procedural developments - defense counsel being sworn in, changes to evidentiary standards, and the like. Not very newsworthy. Once the trial starts and the public gets a look at the evidence that’s actually on the table, there will be a revival of interest, I’m sure. But it could still take back seat to the crisis in Syria.

Asad Ghsoub, chemist and Campaign to Boycott Supporters of Israel in Lebanon activist: To be honest, I don’t have much to say as it’s the last thing I care about or follow. We have a thousand more important issues than knowing who killed this guy. Both his role in Lebanon and the consequences of his death proved catastrophic to the country. So I am really not interested to know who killed him, especially since truth and justice are never served in this country. The whole thing is a farce. And anyhow, it seems that with what is going on in Syria, the STL will not be needed anymore, it’s an outdated method. Let the Hariri crowd go on weeping over him and soon on the STL.

Dima, student: It’s not that we don’t care, but it’s been so long without anything happening that I think most people just lost interest. And nowadays there are many other problems - with our leaders, for example, we barely have a government. We barely have electricity. So we can’t sit around waiting forever on this STL.

Nadine Elali contributed reporting on this article.
ICTR to Deliver Ruling against Military Officers in May

By Gashegu Muramira

The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will render judgment in the cases of former military officers Aloys Ntabakuze and Lt Ildephonse Hategekimana in May 8.

In 2010, ICTR's Trial Chamber 1 sentenced the two former officers to life imprisonment after they were found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Ntabakuze was convicted of conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity.

Hategekimana was found guilty of genocide specifically in the massacre of civilian Tutsis in Ngoma, former Butare prefecture, Southern Province and raping Tutsi women.

In 2011, Ntabakuze's defence asked the Appeals Chamber to enter a judgment of acquittal and order the immediate release of its client for lack of "strong evidence", but this was contested by the Prosecution.

"The indictment as reinforced by further communications provided by the appellant with adequate notice and material facts that enabled him to prepare his defence," said Prosecuting attorney George Mugwanya.

"There was information clearly and timely provided on involvement of Para-Commando soldiers in crimes throughout Kigali," he said, adding," Ntabakuze suffered no prejudice because throughout the trial, he prepared and mounted his defence."

Ntabakuze was charged in a joint trial known as Military I alongside two other officers, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and Lieutenant Colonel Aloys Nsengiyumva.

During the appeal process, his case was separated from that of his co-accused, after the resignation of his defence attorney.

Just like Ntabakuze, the two former officers were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on first instance, but their sentences were subsequently reduced on appeal.

Ntabakuze was arrested in Kenya on July 18, 1997 and transferred to Arusha on the same day. His trial opened on April 2, 2002.

Hategekimana was apprehended in Congo Brazzaville in 2003 and transferred to ICTR custody three days later. His trial started on March 16, 2009.
The struggle to control the term “genocide” has become a contested conceptual space, turning cautionary lessons in how bad we can be into disputes over just how bad things really were.

By David B. Kanin

One of Thomas Jefferson’s most often cited maxims was that “the earth belongs always to the living generation.” Jefferson urged a new world to avoid the inherited aristocratic structures and incessant warfare that he believed kept the old one’s tyrannical systems in place and held back human progress. Living at the cusp of the nationalist era, he did not have to consider the soon-to-be constructed rivalries of national memories and atrocities – the latter witnessed, recorded, and catalogued – which have ensured that in our current world the dead often have as much purchase as the living.

The Third Reich, with its afterlife in law, entertainment, and the mass media that never seems to end, has reinforced this condition. As points of comparison, “Hitler” and “Nazi” have become clichés called into use when someone is of a mind to put someone else in the worst light possible. Similarly, genocide” has become a blanket epithet used to vilify (often enemy) perpetrators; it also serves as a slogan helping to pay homage to murdered (often co-national) victims. After World War II genocide gained legal status, and certainly stands as a criminal category used by human rights activists and a burgeoning international prosecutorial system dedicated to preventing horrors, if possible, and to enforcing justice, if not. However, the mixture of this concept with rival communal memories, nationalism, and traditional categories of diplomacy and power politics does some harm even while the legal process attempts to do some good.

The problem is that – reasonably enough – many who have suffered through the murder of loved ones in the context of mass slaughter are not satisfied to have these horrors classified as anything but genocide. It is not enough to speak of mass murder, “crimes against humanity” (another legal neologism), or anything else connoting something less than the superlative category in the class of
the worst possible human activities. Any effort to demote horrific events to something less than genocide becomes a new crime against the survivors and the loved ones of those who did not survive.

The necessary identification of the Holocaust as genocide puts a unique semantic fence around the effort to wipe out European Jewry. This is appropriate because of the stated intention, unique industrial evolution, and bestial organization involved in those intentional horrors. Regarding other cases of mass murder, however, the struggle to control the term “genocide” has become a contested conceptual space. Arguments among politicians, officials, lawyers, and commentators turn what should be cautionary lessons in how bad we can be into disputes over just how bad things really were.

Turks and Armenians currently are getting the genocide headlines, with a Constitutional Council decision apparently invalidating legislation in France (which has had its own moral tussle over the extent to which its wartime government contributed to the Holocaust) that would have made it a crime to deny that the mass slaughter perpetrated by Ottoman forces against Armenians during World War I constitutes “genocide.” A Turkish Minister provocatively denied this genocide while on a trip to Switzerland, which has a similar law, and declared “let them come arrest me.” Swiss authorities prepared to do just that. Recent news stories have repeated competing Armenian and Turkish versions of what happened during 1915-16. Rival Armenian and Turkish lobbying groups in various countries have gotten down to work. Azeri commentators have supported the Turks for parochial reasons, blurring the issue.

The good news is that this means the victims are not forgotten. Nevertheless, while this may lead to some sense of justice concerning the fate of the dead, it is hard to see what it does to promote any sort of reconciliation among the living. To be sure, various human rights experts conduct workshops and declare lessons learned, but the competition goes on to capture the word, apply it to an adversary, and reject its application to one’s self.

In the post-Yugoslav Balkans, the contest over the ownership of “genocide” often is linked with the mass murder of thousands of Bosniak men and boys at Srebrenica by Ratko Mladic’s Bosnian Serb troops in 1995. Mladic’s trial will legally define his actions, but in the meantime Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic, legal authorities in the notional Bosnian central state and in the Bosniak-Croat Federation, and relatives of the murdered determined not to permit any downgrading of the definition of Bosnian Serb culpability use genocide as a semantic and moral football. The magnitude
of what happened at Srebrenica sometimes overshadows the other murders, rapes and management of prisoners’ camps that accompanied the worst violence in Europe since World War II. The prospect that Serbs will gain control of local government in Srebrenica in elections later this year has reopened old wounds.

Each trial in The Hague pits the defendants’ national supporters against the victims’ community of loss – trials closer to home of lesser known figures often do not attract as much attention. Some Serbs complain the international legal process unfairly vilifies them; other groups insist Serbian perpetrators have not been punished firmly enough. At times, the formerly warring factions fight battles over whether ambiguous events qualify as war crimes. The Bosnian Serb Republic, which labors under the accusation of some of its Bosnian “partners” that it is a product of genocide, will not let go of the killings of Yugoslav soldiers on Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo in early May 1992. That event was an awful part of a chaotic day in which Alija Izetbegovic was kidnapped and the Yugoslav military commander found himself trapped. A Bosnian Serb spokesman labelled an international prosecutor’s decision last month to suspend the case for lack of evidence as “illegal, tendentious, and biased.” Two decades after the event, there apparently still is no room for a protagonist to acknowledge that someone across the line might just be making a professional, if difficult, decision.

What is the optimal relationship between remembering the victims and developing some sort of process by which living generations in the Balkans can forge constructive relationships? History really does not help much when it comes to this problem. The Nuremberg example sometimes pointed to as the exemplary model actually was an exceptional case in which a portion of the perpetrators – in the emerging West Germany – accepted Germany’s criminal culpability. Communist East Germany never acknowledged any responsibility for the crimes of Fascism (which it insisted only implicated the Fascists).

The Asian counterpart to Nuremberg was an example of the more common post-Tribunal process. Japan buried its war criminals with honor, and some politicians continue to visit the spirits of those commemorated at the Yasukuni shrine. Only decades after the War did Japan grudgingly acknowledge a general responsibility for the acts of its Japanese war criminals, but its apology satisfied few of its victims; relations between Japan and both China and Korea remain tainted by contested versions of what happened.
The West’s Tribunal model incorporates definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other categories in a context containing a fair amount of self-righteousness. In the Balkans, European and American overseers – whose countries benefited centrally by committing all the acts they later defined as crimes and now prohibit others from practicing – permit only rhetoric and actions accommodating their one-size-fits-all teleology of civic, multicultural Democracy. Trials run by international legal bureaucrats may provide an element of justice, but whether they stoke or diminish communal anger is, at best, debatable. Recent books by Jelena Subotic and Lara Nettelfield offer contrasting and interesting views on how the work of the International Criminal Tribunal on former Yugoslavia has affected the region.

NGOs and local activists usefully pay attention to alternatives to Tribunal justice. Truth and Reconciliation commissions seem to have had some constructive impact in Rwanda, but disagreement over who shot down that country’s (Hutu) President in 1994 and allegations of poor behavior by its current (Tutsi) Administration remain on the table. This model has been tried in various Balkan localities with mixed results. It is hard to tell whether direct communication between perpetrators and victims can work constructively while at the same time highly politicized public disputes continue between victims and defenders of the iconic monsters on display in The Hague. It is a good thing that theorists and practitioners continue to consider what combination of Tribunal, Truth and Reconciliation, and other processes might protect the interests of both the living and the dead.

Every now and then something happens that gives cause for a little hope. Recently, Bosniak military veterans announced they would share some of their pension money with Bosnian Serb counterparts. These groups share material interests and a common belief they are being treated badly by the societies they defended (and, no matter the fiction of “Bosnia,” which remain plural). Bosnian Serb veterans expressed surprise, but were grateful for the support and said they would behave the same if the situation was reversed. This communication across the lines was particularly constructive because people who played a central role in the battles of the nineties humanized each other and avoided the poisonous argument over whether the Serb Republic is a congenital product of genocide.

It would be helpful if this positive moment leads to regularized contacts between groups in the two entities who share interests and a willingness to improve inter-communal relations. Such practical arrangements would not provide a magic solution for the many problems inherent in as artificial a construction as the current Bosnia. However, they might at least create constructive experiences in
the present that eventually might enable the trust necessary to reconsider usefully whatever people decide to call the atrocities of the past.

David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
International justice – is it working?

I-talk host Alex Taylor asks: “Since the Second World War, justice has become an international affair, war criminals are tried for crimes not only against their victims, but also for crimes against humanity. But are the cases that bring these criminals to justice effective? And are they really objective? Your questions today to Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia who joins us from The Hague.”

‘Mr Brammertz, hello, thank you for joining us. So you are ready to respond to questions from viewers of Euro-news?”

Serge Brammertz: “Hello”

Alex Taylor: “First question on I-talk to Serge Brammertz.”

“Hello, my name is Miriam. I’m from Belgium. Do you have the legal right to judge all criminals throughout the world? Who has the power to ask you to intervene?”

Serge Brammertz: “Yes the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has jurisdiction limited to the territories of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal was established in 1993 by the Security Council to prosecute and try those responsible for crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the territories of the former Yugoslavia.”

Alex Taylor: “Who can ask you to intervene an individual, a State?”

Serge Brammertz: “No, actually, as this court is an offshoot of the Security Council, theoretically, there is an obligation for all UN member countries to cooperate with our Tribunal, but at the point of referral. It is the prosecutors office which opens the investigation and who decides which files go before the judges and which ones are transferred to national courts.”

Alex Taylor: “Ok, the second question from Brussels to The Hague.”

“Hello Mr. Brammertz. My name is Florence, I am Belgian and I live in Brussels. My question for you is this: Is the tribunal really independent since it is partly funded by NATO how do you prevent it from coming under pressure from NATO?

Alex Taylor: “Are you focusing too much on the interests of the West, there has been criticism in the past.”

Serge Brammertz: “Well, it is certainly not correct to say that we are funded by NATO. We are a creation of the Security Council, so it’s the UN budget that funds the Tribunal, a budget which is discussed and decided every two years. Can it be objective in its work? Certainly. You know, we have lawyers, judges, investigators, analysts from 65 countries and all or mostly all come from the courts and national authorities and they are professionals who work independently and impartially.”

Alex Taylor: “Who do you nominate for example?”

Serge Brammertz: “The attorney is appointed by the Security Council on the proposal of UN Secretary-General.”

Alex Taylor: “Ok a third question for Serge Brammertz at the Hague.”
“Hello, my name is Laurie and I am French. I want to know if the Tribunal could judge the U.S. military for crimes they have committed in Afghanistan, in Iraq, or widen your brief to include for instance, President Bush who decided to invade countries without the backing of strong evidence?”

Alex Taylor: “It’s question not unlike the first two.”

Serge Brammertz: “Yes, as I said at the beginning, in fact, the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has a very limited jurisdiction, namely in relation to crimes committed on the territories of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. In The Hague there is also the International Criminal Court, a permanent court that obviously has a much broader jurisdiction and is responsible for crimes committed in the territories of countries that have ratified the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court, or which are responsible for the records that were transferred, referred by the Security Council to this international court. That has been the case notably for Sudan and Libya.”

Alex Taylor: “Another question now. Do you believe that Croatia has done enough in solving crimes committed to Serbian People?”

Serge Brammertz: “Well, I would say generally that it is very important that in the coming years, both in Croatia but also in Serbia and Bosnia, more investigations are conducted at national level. I’d say it’s the challenge for the coming years. There are hundreds or thousands of files waiting to be investigated and prosecuted and it will be the biggest challenge and this applies particularly to crimes committed in Croatia and of course also includes crimes committed against Serbs, whether in Croatia or in other countries.”

Alex Taylor: “But the Serbs clearly feel that these trials are always against them.”

Serge Brammertz: “Yes, you know in general I would say there is still a lot of nationalism in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and that remains a problem. It is unfortunate that often the people who are prosecuted in The Hague for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and often – even after conviction at trial and on appeal – maintain the support of public opinion. This is a communication problem. Perhaps from us, but there is sometimes a refusal to accept that people who were regarded as heroes for years and during the war actually abused the trust of people in the former Yugoslavia and are now condemned for their responsibility in the crimes.”

Alex Taylor: “Ok another question for Serge Brammertz. What is the purpose of maintaining this International Criminal Tribunal? What is the sense of maintaining it? Will it always have role to play?”

Serge Brammertz: “Its true we have closed one chapter of our work on bringing criminals to justice. As you know the remaining fugitives Mladic and Hadzic were arrested in 2011 but saying that the work is certainly not finished. The trial of Karadzic in particular is in full swing and the trial of Mladic and Hadzic have yet to start this year. So there will certainly be more work for some years to come.”

Alex Taylor: “Ok another question for I-talk.”

“Hello, my name is Joseph, I’m Belgian of Congolese origin, and I often hear of the tribunal on television and I wonder why many defendants do not recognise the powers of the tribunal?”

Serge Brammertz: “Yes, I do not know obviously if the question refers more to the International Criminal Court as it is a Congolese citizen and there is a case or many cases being dealt with at the International Criminal Court that were committed in the former Yugoslavia, committed in the territories of the Congo, but I’m really not convinced that the person asking the question is referring to the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.”

Alex Taylor: “Ok, and the last question for Serge Brammertz in the Hague.”

“My name is Daana, I am Vietnamese. I was a political refugee in Belgium. If we judge war criminals, we must not forget their accomplices! Without accomplices, war criminals cannot do anything, they are all alone … Liberia, and anywhere else, The Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Algeria and even Mubarak. All these people deserve death but, unfortunately there are accomplices and without the accomplices they don’t have the power to do anything.”
Alex Taylor “What is being done about the accomplices who often commit these crimes?”

Serge Brammertz: “Yes, this is certainly a major challenge that requires cooperation between international and national justice. At the international level, it is clear that you can only pursue a limited number of people and generally they are the most senior officials. With regards to our court, there have been indictments charging 161 people who for the most part have been generals, presidents, ministers.

‘It is true it is also very important to prosecute those who have a responsibility at the operational level, even at the intermediate level. We at the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have had rather intense and positive cooperation with the “War crimes” offices in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and at that level everything is under control.

‘But I agree with the person asking the question, for a variety of cases the International Criminal Court – another international court in The Hague – intervenes. There are international prosecutions, but we see very little action at national level and that can be a problem.”

Alex Taylor: “Thank you for listening and answering these questions. We’ll see you soon for another I-talk from the European Parliament here in Brussels.”

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