Enclosed are clippings of local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Outreach and Public Affairs Office as at: Thursday, 24 October 2013

Press clips are produced Monday through Friday. Any omission, comment or suggestion, please contact Martin Royston-Wright Ext 7217
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CHARLES TAYLOR: HOW HE REACHED HIS WATERLOO

(PART 1)

BY GEORGE KONUOMMA

A saga once said "most wars fought begin with a little man's quarrel magnified a thousand times." Let us take an example: Charles Taylor's war against his own Liberian people that he extended to the people of Sierra Leone.

Charles Taylor was Director-General of the General Services Agency (GSA) in the government of his friend-turn-enemy, the late President Samuel K. Doe. The position of Director-General of General Services Agency carried with it a cabinet minister's status, and was indeed a very enviable position in the Liberian government at the time. The office of the GSA was responsible for the procurement, supply and maintenance of all Liberian government properties and logistics – housing, vehicles, furniture, power generating products and stationery among others.

The late President Doe offered Taylor the plum job as compensation for the role he played as President of the Liberian Students Union in the United States of America that helped to disciplined the government of the late President William R. Tolbert, who was eventually assassinated in a bloody military coup in 1980. At the time this author was Chief Reporter on the government-owned New Liberian newspaper and he covered most of Charles Taylor's activities at any time he visited Liberia.

As Director-General of GSA Taylor lived a fulfilled life – fashionable, expensive and free. He basked in flambouyancy and extravagance. He fancied Italian shoes and procured a set of pairs that cost not less than US$60,000 a pair. He sponsored the latest and most valuable French and English suits, dark glasses and often chewed Havana cigars.

As part of government properties and logistics, Taylor was chauffeur driven in sleek model vehicles that were unique. He introduced the use of tinted car glasses in Liberia that became fashionable; sometimes he drove his Mercedes Model S218. Taylor had great admiration for Sierra Leone's longest serving president, the late President William V. Tubman when he visited him in 1990.

Liberia's military, the Ghanaian military, the Nigerian military and other high places in the country, and was subsequently unerringly removed from the GSA and transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, this time round in an unenviable position as Deputy Minister.

Taylor's sentence at the GAIC, Clarence Monrovia no sooner he took office than he unveiled the secret that was behind the billion-man's conspicuous consumption. Monrovia through an audit report uncovered that Taylor had defrauded the Liberian tax payers hundreds of thousands of dollars of GSA funds. It was further discovered that Taylor had secretly diverted a huge sum of US$1 million in a two-year period for the procurement of government logistics into his foreign account in the United States of America.

Investigation into the theft had hardly begun when Taylor ran, ambling the cat in the long arm of the law that was about to deprive him, took to his heels and fled the country. He went to the USA where the long arm of the Liberian law sought and forced him up pending extradition to Liberia to face criminal charges. Maliciously, Taylor broke the American jail and disappeared into the wide world. That was in 1994.

Liberians are by nature a humble people. They have not been in the habit of proclaiming their roles in the world. But since the fall of Taylor and the emergence of the G S R, the Liberians' role in the world has become a matter of discussion.

Most countries have some, in fact, the whole truth in them. Throughout the months of December 1999, there was a rumor along the rounds in Liberia to the effect that on Christmas day that month there would be a downpour of rain which upon contact with the human body would burn like a rash on the raw nerves. The rumor spread like fire in the stable.

It was at the time of this rumor that this author lost his 19-year-old daughter, Florence Konyooyen on December 13, 1999. (May her soul rest in perfect peace). Immediately the rumor I left for home at Manowa, Kailahun district, Republic of Sierra Leone for vacation.

It was while at Manowa that we heard about the 1999 Christmas 'live rebel attack on Batala, a border town in Nimba County in Liberia. Ask the author's late father George J. Konyooyen who was in August 1989 whisked from his sick bed by Charles Taylor's rebel and buried to death: "Son, are you still returning to Liberia with all the news about rebel war in that country?" I told him that Monrovia where I lived and worked was far removed from the area of the rebel attacks. And therefore, there was no cause for worry. Two weeks later I returned to Liberia with my family.

Brdarking over the fear of the rebel attack on our way back to Liberia it only dawned on me that it was in last what was stripped in that Christmas day yellow min mare.

FURTIVE

The news of rebel attack on Batala so牢固树立 the name of a man who had been declared by both the Liberian and USA governments as a fugitive to be the rebel leader. That man was Charles Taylor. After a year on the run Charles Taylor started the Liberian people in that million dollar BBC Interview on Focus On Africa following the show that he was leading the rebels to come and meet President Samuel R. Doe. Taylor because according to him, Doe was corrupt.

BATTLING

Liberians today may be considered to be a rebel leader, but they also have their own problems in the country.

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Liberians today may be considered to be a rebel leader, but they also have their own problems in the country.
POPE JOHNNY PAULI TO RE-SURFACE
AFTER CLOSURE OF SPECIAL COURT

AFRC junta. JPK [the ANGEL]. The man has been a FUGITIVE since 2004, when he was indicted by the Special Court and was presumed dead, for the better part of that period. Now, WHAT’S UP knows the ANGEL is lurking somewhere, waiting to bounce back, now that that USELESS Special Court has folded up. But, what will JPK be doing once he is BACK? Let’s find out...

1. He’ll be made COMMANDER of those ex-junta KILLERS, now working as Close-Protection Bodyguards, to Prezo and his ministers. That way, the rule of Owari Orsi would be GUARANTEED uninterrupted. Plus, they know how to AMPUTATE and dismember opponents of the shit-storm, so why not bring back their former BOSS?

2. After the Lome PEACE Accord was signed in 1999, Pa Kabbba made him Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP). Now, peace has been "consolidated", why not bring him back and make him CHAIRMAN for the Consolidation of Tribalism, Regionalism and NEPOTISM (CCTR)?

3. You know, of course, where he HAILS from.

4. His AFRC knew how to deal with STUBBORN journalists. Ask SLAJ boss Kelvin, media analyst Ojukwu Makauley and even JONATHAN Leigh [who you have detained]. The AFRC beat them up and had them locked in containers, with soldiers and REBELS urinating on them routinely. Frankly, you’ll save time, with JPK here, on how to DEAL ruthlessly, with perceived opposition JOURNALISTS.

5. Remember the symbol of his Peoples LIBERATION Party [PLP], in the 2002 elections? It was an angel and DOVES. Now, the man is coming from HEAVEN, to admonish our thiefing and DIVISIVE politicians, to change their WAYS... or face the wrath of GOD.
REVEALED!!

How Johnny Paul Koroma was gradually implicated

THE REAL REBELS AND TORMENTORS

Our eleven years old war - [the orchestrators and beneficiaries] After the rebel had been repelled, the following morning, I heard an announcement over the radio that the Chief of Staff Brigadier Kelly Conteh had been killed. That was a surprise to us and we kept wondering as to what was going on in this country. This man was here yesterday giving instructions that if the orders were carried out the rebels would have entered Freetown without fail. Because of the wise decision taken by Johnny Paul Koroma in refusing to move and his bold action in stopping them from entering Freetown that would have been the beginning of trouble in the country. People should have read between the lines and made their own conclusions.

During the operation at Waterloo - Newton Johnny Paul Koroma was promoted to the rank of Major. He was then posted as Commanding Officer at that time.

As Commanding Officer at 7th Battalion, your first duty in your new battalion is to inspect every fortnight. This is necessary so that the authorities may know your good work. Johnny Paul Koroma received an impromptu message from the Army Headquarters that the Commander at Cockrell Colonel Mondeh was heading to his Battalion for an inspection. The Colonel came with his team and inspected every area and finally promised the Battalion Commander and his troops a longer period to do another inspection.

The 7th Battalion Commander was surprised to receive a message for another inspection. His entire team was in doubt because this has never happened in the past. This was a witch hunt to the nothing. Johnny Paul Koroma obeyed the last order whether harmful or not. He was also given an additional responsibility. He had the task of providing security for the Peninsular, Guma Valley Water and the pending General Elections of 1996.

Johnny Paul Koroma thought that time was not on their side, so he was always on his toes. He decided to suspend most engagements till his battalion was inspected.

He waited up to 3pm according to military standards; they were supposed to be inspected by 5pm. In this regard, he was fully satisfied that his battalion was well organized. He delegated part of his duties to his Second In Command to wait for their arrival.

As Johnny Paul Koroma was moving towards Milton Margai College of Education, he heard from his handset radio that they were approaching his battalion and that if he was not present in his battalion, he was going to be charged "indicted" in the army. By the time he turned off his vehicle around, he heard on the radio again that he should appear at the Army Headquarters at Cockrell for orders. Johnny Paul heard all the charges levied against him on his radio. This was a deliberate witch hunt meant to tarnish his inspection and that Johnny Paul Koroma should appear for orders that same night. It was this very man Col. Mondeh who was so instrumental in ordering charges and also the high court judge. Col. Mondeh took the orders and awarded six months loss of superiority "cannot be promised until they are pleased". Johnny Paul Koroma was further posted to 22nd Battalion at Mekanji as Second In

seasoned officer as a Brigade Major.

The Commanding Officer had to release him in keeping with the momentum. Johnny Paul Koroma was in Bo as Brigade Major for a period of four months. What I saw and noticed as Commanding Officer of 22nd Battalion. I was able to get a first hand report a few months after the SLPP won the elections. The Kamajors shifted their loyalty to the government. They were exposed in deploying their double agent for the past years. The Sierra Leone Army took care of them. The Army led them, assisted medically and financially as well. As soon as former President Kabbah was sworn in, the Kamajors got on the offensive. They started beating soldiers on their way out of Mokanji and also on their return to their battalion. This was more often a routine under taken. The beating of soldiers did not stop despite a strong message was sent as a warning. The Kamajors knew they had a savior, the then Deputy Defense Minister in the person of Samuel Hinga Norman. Their attitude was hastily increased by the mounting of road blocks and also attacks on sub unit deployments. The Kamajors finally interfered with vehicular movements in our main supply routes. I reported this development and no action or reply was received. I acted by sending a robust patrol and the attacks stopped. We were immediately deployed to protect not only ourselves but civilians who were being brutalized by some kamajors.

One fateful morning, the kamajors attacked our deployment area and killed five soldiers. I conducted a patrol with the help of civilians and was able to arrest fifteen of the kamajors. The main supply route was the base of a notorious Kamajo leader called Kondowa now in jail convicted by the International Criminal Court [ICC].

[To be continued next edition! More intriguing details.]
ICJ To Unveil New Investigation Strategy

By Bernard Mamanji, Blake Evans-Pritchard and Simon Jennings

Opinions vary on whether there is sufficient evidence to begin a new investigation.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) needs to address longstanding issues about evidence-gathering that have left multiple trials on an uncertain footing.

Full details of the guidelines, sent to the ICC’s 122 member states last week, have yet to be released, but they focus on ways to ensure that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) can present a watertight case at trial.

Key elements include plans for prosecutors to ensure that cases are ready at an earlier stage of proceedings, and for court investigators to corroborate evidence that is collected by third parties. The need to safeguard the security of both investigations and witnesses also remains a serious challenge.

In its first 11 years of operation, the ICC has often struggled to sufficiently convincing evidence against defendants.

The conviction of Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in 2012 in the prosecution’s only success to date was a milestone for the court, but judges were scathing about the way the OTP handled the investigation, particularly its reliance on intermediaries and its failure to properly probe evidence that later turned out to be false.

The Lubanga judgement also highlighted a tendency for investigators to rely too much on third-party information such as reports from human rights groups and academic.

Similar flaws in the ICC’s investigative procedures have been uncovered elsewhere.

When Carlile Mumbwimba, a senior figure in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Angola (DFLA), known as the October 319, was killed in 2011 for alleged human rights abuses in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), judges ruled that there was not enough evidence to send the case to trial.

More recently, judges at the ICC declined to confirm charges against the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, in March of this year.

The OTP had to present compelling evidence linking him to crimes on the ground.

Kony remains in custody while the prosecution appeals against this decision.

In the court’s investigations in Kenya, prosecutors were forced to drop their case against former military chief Francis Muthuria after it emerged that one key witness had lied to investigators.

Since, prosecutor Fatou Bensouda made that decision in March, it has emerged that several witnesses have withdrawn from the cases against Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and deputy president William Ruto since charges were confirmed in January 2012.

Bensouda has repeatedly highlighted “unprecedented levels” of interference in her cases in Kenya.

On October 2, judges unsealed an arrest warrant against a former journalist who is accused of bribing witnesses.

The succession of setbacks has prompted widespread concerns over how the OTP conducts its investigations and whether it has found the same level of evidence to secure convictions.

RUSH TO CONFIRM CHARGES

One former investigator who spoke to IWPR on condition of anonymity noted that many witnesses were under a lot of pressure to get cases under way, and to come up with a piece of evidence for the OTP to build its case.

That often meant they overlooked other information that might have been useful at a later date.

Monsef Carboni, permanent representative to the ICC for the International Federation for Human Rights, told IWPR that the OTP had a tendency to gather just enough evidence to secure an arrest warrant.

This would then be built on to confirm the charges, and then worked on again, rather than focusing on other evidence to secure convictions.

“The investigation is like going fishing. In the beginning, you cast your line to try to catch a fish. You catch a fish, and then you cast your line again.”

“The OTP has a tendency to investigate more, but it has not always managed to secure convictions.”

This is the reason why the court’s investigation into crimes in Mali, which that country’s government referred to the court in July 2012, has not yet generated requests for arrest warrants or led to evidence being placed before ICC judges.

The ICC launched a formal investigation into Mali at the start of this year at a time when large parts of the north of the country were still in the hands of Islamist extremists.

French troops regained control of the north’s main town, Timbuktu, by the end of January, but other areas remained unstable. Despite this, investigators arrived in the country in early June.

A report by Dr Geert van der Steert, ICC prosecutor’s chief of investigations, was swiftly given the green light.

Although investigators moved quickly, Dr Smedt said great care had been taken to make sure that the evidence would stand up to scrutiny by ICC judges before arrest warrants were requested, and before any hearing to have charges confirmed.

The Mali case is expected to be ready by the end of this year or early 2014.

While the OTP acknowledges that it has sometimes rushed to bring cases before the judges, there have been times when there has been good reason to press ahead before amassing all the necessary evidence.

When the indicted former vice-president of Congo, Jean-Pierre Bemba, visited Belgium in 2008, the authorities were ready to cooperate with the court and the ICC knew that it had to move fast to secure his arrest.

At the time, the ICC lacked enough evidence to bring the case to trial, but the then prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, made a decision to go with what they had and try to gather more at a later date.

Moreno-Ocampo also took the decision to move early on in his investigations in Kenya, arguing that in doing so he could isolate alleged perpetrators and prevent further violence at the next election.

In the fact that the court is in its early days is also seen as a motivation for making arrests and getting charges confirmed quickly.

Alex Whiting, a law professor at Harvard Law School who recently left the ICC’s investigation team, said such pressure was understandable within an institution that was set up in 2002 and that has been trying to establish itself as a force in the world.

“By the time all the tribunals’ ad hoc tribunals and the ICC had established their presence in the early years to bring cases, to show that the court can be effective,” Whiting said.

De Smedt recognised that there may be legitimate reasons for proceeding with a case before all the evidence is available, but he insists that the overarching consideration must be to secure a conviction.

“The discussion has sometimes been framed as: do we want to have an impact on the ground or an impact in court?” De Smedt said. “The question is, by achieving the second, we can often realise the first.”

De Smedt did not rule out the option of proceeding with a case before all the evidence has been accumulated, but he said he would have to be assured if it was the right thing to do, if he thought it was the right thing to do.

If it is determined that an accused is to move early, before we have all the evidence that we need, then we must be able to ensure that it is the right thing to do, he said.

“If it is too early, we will have to move to the next stage. If the evidence is not there, we will have to move to the next stage.”

De Smedt added: “Sometimes years pass by before there is a proper process of evaluating whether or not what they say is reliable, and credible.”

Lord Justice Fulford described the conventional model of bringing witnesses to court in order to testify in front of judges as a sometimes “time-consuming and laborious means of establishing the truth.”

He instead advocates a system which is based on an independent rapid assessment of evidence, including the use of independent expertise, and the giving of evidence at trial outside the presence of the accused.

The OTP has tended to prepare and use expert evidence from the early stages and then later put forward a different case at trial, particularly in terms of the witnesses that are relied on,” Lord Justice Fulford said.

This way, if the prosecution has collected the evidence and it has been tested in a comprehensive way before the confirmation of charges, the OTP can then make an informed decision as to
Next to forensic evidence, we will always have to also rely on witness testimony or first-hand sources to prove that crimes took place in the first place," said De Smidt. "But in order to demonstrate a pattern behind the crimes, then we should be able to rely on other evidence, such as third-party reports if they are based on a proper methodology and independent from each other."

The OTP is often forced to rely on evidence gathered by a third party because of the need to protect witnesses, as well as providing security for its own staff.

For De Smidt, witness safety is a bigger priority than staff security, and the key reason that the ICC has chosen to tread softly in some areas.

"We can manage staff security, and I have seen very few serious threats against [ICC] staff," said De Smidt. "Witness security, on the other hand, is far harder to deal with. We have a duty to protect witnesses under the [ICC's treaty] Rome Statute. Investigators can always leave, but witnesses and their families are caught up in the country. We shouldn't risk the lives of people to build a case. It is much better to lose a case than the life of a witness."

Witness protection is also a matter of credibility for the court.

"If witnesses are put in severe danger in one case, then we may face difficulties in getting witnesses to testify for another one," De Smidt said.

Bassoumis accepts such concerns, but underscores the importance of getting investigators on the ground as early as possible, since key pieces of evidence can disappear over time.

"Injuries may heal or they may take on a different form," he said. "If people have been put in a mass grave, then the bodies might decompose and the trace of the bullet may not be so evident."

In response to such concerns, the ICC is looking at establishing a permanent field presence in certain countries. But it does not have the luxury of being welcomed everywhere it needs to work.

"Of course this depends on two crucial things - security and state cooperation so we wouldn't be potted everywhere," De Smidt said. "In Mali, I am mindful that we are dealing with terrorist organisations which could be a real threat to investigators. In Sudan, it seems unlikely that the government will ever let us have an office in Darfur."

NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Experts are generally in agreement that an effective investigation strategy does not depend on the court alone. The international community also has a huge role to play. Evidence from other international tribunals would seem more to support this.

"Remember that the ICTY succeeded in part because the United States and the European Union conditioned aid and acceptance into the EU on cooperation with the court, which allowed the ICTY: have access to witnesses, documents, and accused persons," Wilting said. "Unfortunately, the ICC will have to be more realistic about whether countries - situation countries or other influential countries - will really help the court when there is a case. Sometimes they will, but sometimes they won't."

In countries where the ICTY launched investigations, there are often few political incentives to ensure that required level of cooperation is forthcoming. This is an area where states committed to international justice can provide meaningful support.

"Governments need to provide real and practical assistance that is long-lasting in favour of or against particular individuals, groups or factions," Lord Justice Fulford said. "Witnesses frequently require relocation and protection, and generally substantive help is necessary for the process of gathering evidence in complex and sometimes dangerous situations."

"This inevitably involves money, manpower and diplomacy. These investigations are so vast and complicated that it is very difficult for the court to do it all by itself."

As well as cooperation and diplomatic backing, the ICC also needs resources. The OTP says a larger budget from member states would help it collect evidence more quickly and develop the court's forensic capacity.

De Sr. not says that there are plans to double the number of in-house forensic experts from four to eight.

Member states will meet in The Hague in November to discuss whether to increase the court's budget. The proposal currently on the table is to increase the budget from 115 million to 126 million euros, with an additional 7.5 million going to the OTP. This would put the OTP's budget at just under 36 million euros.

The international community has often been accused of failing to back the ICC fully, both with funding and on broader issues. De Smidt accepts that the actions of member states are often governed by national considerations rather than their obligations under the Rome Statute. But he believes their full support is essential if the court is to have any meaningful impact.

"If the international community is not willing to stand up for justice, then justice will not happen," he said.

Blake Evans-Pritchard is an IPW contributor in The Hague. Simon Jennings is IPW's Africa Editor in London.
Lenaola Appointed Judge In Sierra Leone Special Court

High Court Judge Isaack Lenaola has landed himself a job as a Judge in a Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Lenaola was appointed Judge by the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon.

The appointment follows the establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone by the UN in conjunction with the Government of Sierra Leone.

Lenaola will serve alongside other Judges in the roster of Judges for the Residual Court.

The High Court Judge will serve for a 6-year term and a possible re-appointment upon the expiry of the term.

The court is mandated to prosecute persons who bear greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30th November 1996.

The court was set up to carry out the functions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone that must continue after the closure of the Special Court.

By Daniel Korir
Internationalizing the War Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh

Dr. Ali Al-Ghamdi

I have borrowed the title of this article from a working paper prepared by Sir Desmond de Silva, former Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In it, De Silva speaks about Bangladesh, saying that the country was born in violence, as those who wanted the country to remain as East Pakistan fought against those who sought independence. According to many estimates, the Liberation War, as it is now known, left nearly three million dead, a death toll higher than the Rwandan Genocide, the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and the Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars all put together.

As it is beyond doubt, De Silva says, that crimes were committed on a massive scale in Bangladesh and as many of the victims as well as perpetrators of serious crimes are still alive, it is still possible to bring to justice those from both sides accused of committing atrocities during the conflict. He continued: “As for the trial of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for which I was Chief Prosecutor, it underlines the need to ensure that the hammer of international justice is brought down on those who commit the most egregious crimes by means of trials by impartial and independent judges.”

The well-known prosecutor indicated that in 2010, he was approached by Stephen Rapp, the US government’s Ambassador for War Crimes and the colleague who succeeded him as Chief Prosecutor in Sierra Leone, to enquire if he would assist the efforts to learn whether a new, locally formed “International Crimes Tribunal” in Bangladesh met international standards or not. “After reviewing the laws and regulations of this new court, I declined,” he said.

According to De Silva, what was clear then, and is even clearer now, is that Bangladesh does not have the independent judicial and investigative capacity to conduct trials of international crimes. The rules and procedures of the court are simply not consistent with international standards as followed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and similar bodies. Far from this being a personal view, many others, including international legal and human rights organizations have reached the same conclusion. Human Rights Watch, to take but one example, has described the tribunal as “riddled with questions about the independence and impartiality of the judges and fairness of the process.” This is a deeply disturbing assessment, de Silva pointed out.

He noted that the current government of Bangladesh led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League party are the heirs of those who fought for the independence of Bangladesh while those on trial opposed independence. Therefore, it is evident from these trials that the victors of the Liberation War are attempting to crush those who lost the conflict. For such a process to be considered just, it must be aimed at independently and impartially bringing to justice all those who are individually responsible for the crime, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity or affiliation. Nothing less will suffice. Justice can only be served for victims and survivors of the atrocities of 1971 if perpetrators from all sides are brought to trial.
De Silva also emphasized that it is clear to many people inside and outside the country that the government of Bangladesh is not attempting to use the tribunal to deliver justice for victims, as was their election pledge, but to target its political rivals that it repeatedly labels as anti-liberation.

To emphasize this point, he also quoted the report published by the British magazine The Economist last December. The magazine published articles based on intercepted Skype calls which revealed collusion between Bangladeshi judges, ministers and their legal advisers over sentencing suspects even before the trials had finished. Despite the international criticism these reports triggered, the tribunal has now handed out death sentences to three suspects and life imprisonment for several others.

De Silva stressed the need for removing passion and politics from this issue so that fair justice can be delivered. For this reason, world powers such as the US and UK – the biggest aid donors to Bangladesh – as well as the UN, should seek to pressure Bangladesh’s leaders to commit to internationalizing the trials. The Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal should be reformed and those cases already heard should be reviewed. If necessary, retrials should be ordered in an international arena. Given the severity of the atrocities committed and the importance of the closure of this chapter for the people of Bangladesh, a stand-alone international tribunal similar to those set up for the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda might be the most appropriate, he suggested.

Whichever route is taken, De Silva stressed, it is only through internationalization of this tribunal - with international legal standards assured, reliable investigations conducted, and credible evidence presented - that both sides of the political divide will see justice delivered. If this is not done, the current politicized International Crimes Tribunal will only have the effect of creating further violence and division without the reconciliation the people of Bangladesh deserve. If the nation of Bangladesh is to heal, both sides need to see justice done and move on from their painful history to a brighter future where impartial justice will prove to be the cornerstone of a real peace, De Silva cautioned.

I have deliberately quoted these observations of the international legal expert De Silva to draw attention to the serious anomalies in the war crimes trials being conducted in Bangladesh. The same observations and criticisms have been articulated by international human rights organizations, as well as criminal law experts and specialist international lawyers. I have pointed out all these factors in previous articles published in this newspaper, and these articles included an appeal addressed to Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, by virtue of my knowledge of her and her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, father of the nation. In the appeal, I asked her to reconsider the issue of the trials as no one sees credibility in them, and as it is clear that they will not help achieve justice.

I also mentioned that her father had rolled up the page of the past and looked to the future by issuing a general amnesty as he was fully aware of the difficulty of achieving justice under the conditions that prevailed at that time and that still prevail.

I hope that Sheikh Hasina will listen to those whose only concern is the best interests of herself and the people and judiciary of Bangladesh because history will neither forget such things nor show mercy for those doing them.

— Dr. Ali Al-Ghamdi is a former Saudi diplomat who specializes in Southeast Asian affairs. He can be reached at algham@hotmail.com
Is there an African alternative to the International Criminal Court?

Last June, the African Union moved its summit to Ethiopia. Malawi, the planned host, had refused entry to Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Africans have often accused the ICC of targeting African leaders excessively and unfairly. SIMON ALLISON examines whether a new court formed by Africans for Africans will bring about impartial justice on the continent.

Africa and the ICC do not get along very well. This is a problem for the ICC considering that all their investigations are centred on African countries and all their suspects are African men. It is even more of a pity for Africa, because let us face it: there are many warlords and leaders on our troubled continent who deserve a stern dose of criminal justice.

The African Union (AU) is tired of grappling against the ICC’s perceived racial and colonial biases, of ignoring ICC arrest warrants that are not politically expedient and of losing all control of the judicial process. Perhaps scared of whom the ICC intends to try next, it is looking for an alternative, an African alternative, naturally.

They think they have found one. In May this year, a group of legal experts convened by the continental body discussed ways to broaden the remit of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, better known as the African Human Rights Court. The idea was to add an international justice section to the court with the explicit intention of making the ICC superfluous.

Their discussions were followed a week later by a meeting of justice ministers who incorporated the legal experts’ recommendations into a draft protocol combining the African Human Rights Court with the African Court of Justice. This new court, to be called the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, would have the broadest of jurisdictions, overseeing everything from individual war crimes to state responsibility for human rights violations.

There are a few problems with this protocol: the African Court of Justice does not exist, except in theory. The merged court, therefore, would be merely an extension of the African Human Rights Court—a court that does exist, although it has yet to overcome its teething issues.

The African Human Rights Court is the only continental court that exists in Africa today. Established in 2004 with its base in Arusha, Tanzania—which is developing into a legal capital along the lines of The Hague—the court’s first bench of 11 judges began hearing cases in 2006.

Like any court, the African Human Rights Court is dependent on cases being referred to it. Mostly, cases are passed along by the African Human Rights Commission, when the commission feels unable to deal with the matter satisfactorily. Alternatively, five countries have made optional declarations allowing their citizens to approach the court directly: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali and Tanzania.

When it does reach a verdict, the court has a limited range of options available to it. Most significantly, the court can determine state responsibility for human rights violations and order states to pay compensation or amend legislation. Alternatively, it can order a state to investigate and prosecute a particular incident or individual. The court does not have the authority to prosecute individuals itself.
According to Professor Magnus Killander, a legal expert with the University of Pretoria’s Centre for Human Rights, the human rights court has yet to make a real impact. It has been slow to pass judgments, spending more time and resources on sensitisation visits designed to increase its profile. Many of the court’s rulings have been on inconsequential issues usually dealt with by a court registrar. Other rulings have been against countries that have not ratified the court (28 of 54 AU member states), making them legally unenforceable. Finally, the court is hamstrung because the commission (which has plenty of its own problems) has been very slow in referring important cases.

It is on this wobbly foundation that the AU’s draft protocol envisages this home-grown alternative to the ICC. The new court, however, would be fraught with legal, diplomatic, political and most significantly, financial problems that, far from improving the continental judiciary, could destroy the fragile progress made already.

Legally, there is no precedent for an international court that deals with both state and individual criminal responsibility. “There are good reasons why such distinct functions have never before been merged into a single judicial entity or organ at the international level,” writes Professor Frans Viljoen, director of the South Africa-based Centre for Human Rights. One such reason is that different evidentiary standards are used for each function: a determination of individual guilt requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, while state responsibility cases are judged on a balance of probabilities. More generally, the two functions are just different, requiring completely different approaches, evidence and procedure; combining both would create a schizophrenic court with judges constantly changing roles.

Diplomatically, there is the ratification problem. It has been a long, tough process to get the protocol for the African Human Rights Court ratified by just 26 states. That process would probably have to be started all over again. Except this time the AU would be asking states to agree to submit to even more judicial oversight, which could potentially implicate important individuals. Worse, it would give states that have ratified the existing protocol the chance to invalidate this and backtrack from their existing human rights commitments.

Politically, issues of international justice are always charged, and—as the ICC has discovered—it is very difficult to prevent courts from becoming politicised. A good example is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal, which was suspended in 2010 after loud complaints from Zimbabwe about rulings that had gone against the country. At its most recent summit in Mozambique last August, the SADC agreed to “negotiate the protocol” of its tribunal and restrict its jurisdiction to disputes between member states, thereby banning complaints from individuals.

Once the current African Human Rights Court does hand down a controversial ruling, it is bound to face a similar reaction. One can imagine an even more severe outcry to a new court attempting to try and sentence the likes of: Charles Taylor, former Liberian president sentenced by the Sierra Leone Special Court to 50 years last May; Laurent Gbagbo, former president of Côte d’Ivoire now in custody in The Hague; or Mr al-Bashir, wanted for atrocities in Sudan’s Darfur region.

Financially, international criminal justice investigations are simply too expensive for any African court to pursue. The budget for the African Human Rights Court was $6m in 2011. By contrast, just two years (2006–2007) of running the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda—exactly the type of thing the new, merged court intends to replace—cost $270m. The ICC operates with an annual budget of $140m. A ten-year expenditure of nearly a billion dollars has yielded only one verdict. The new court would require
these kinds of sums, and would therefore need donors to fund it. But what donors would cough up the money to create an African court that will duplicate what the ICC is already doing?

The financial considerations swayed the heads of state at the most recent AU summit last July in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. They decided not to adopt the draft protocol for the new court because they could not afford it. Nor could they give it any serious attention amidst the chaos of electing a new chairperson.

Effectively, the issue was shelved. Not dismissed was the anger and frustration with the ICC, making it very likely that the draft protocol—or some variation of it—will be revisited every time an ICC arrest warrant is issued or international figures criticise the recalcitrance of African states to comply with international arrest warrants.

Do not be fooled by the high-minded rhetoric about colonial injustice and African solutions to African problems that is inevitably raised on such occasions. Africa is in no position to administer its own criminal justice against war criminals and human rights violators. The African Human Rights Court, still in its infancy, might one day be able to hold states accountable in practice as well as in law, but individuals are another matter entirely. Right now, there is no African alternative to the ICC, and there will not be one for the foreseeable future. If we want the continent’s criminals and warlords tried and convicted, our leaders might have to start playing a little more nicely with the court from The Hague. DM

This article was first published in Africa in Fact, the journal of Good Governance Africa.

Photo: International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Fatou Bensouda looks on during a news conference at Hotel Pullman in Abidjan July 20, 2013. The ICC has started their investigations in Ivory Coast for additional information to build up their case against former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo, Bensouda said on Friday. REUTERS/Luc Gnago
Rwanda: Govt Seeks Review of Legal Fees On Transferred Cases

By Edwin Musoni

The Ministry of Justice is in talks with the Kigali Bar Association, the professional body of lawyers in the country, to review the legal fees for lawyers representing suspects transferred to Rwanda from other jurisdictions.

So far former Pentecostal priest Jean Uwinkindi, a transferee of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is the only such suspect whose defence fees are covered by the taxpayer.

The standard hourly fee for a lawyer is Rfw30, 000 and it applies both during court proceedings and separate sessions with the defendant. The suspects who qualify for this facility are either juveniles or adults who were proven to be indigents.

Under the special law that paved the way for the transfer of Genocide suspects from the ICTR and other foreign jurisdictions to Rwanda, government is required to meet the cost of legal representation for suspects who are unable to pay for legal fees. In the event that such a transferee qualifies for this assistance (upon request), the Ministry of Justice engages the bar association which then provides counsel for the suspect.

Previously, the law on these referral/transferred cases was ambiguous on whether such suspects were entitled to just one or more legal representatives, but this was rectified in June, with the law now restricting the number to one attorney.

Uwinkindi, who was transferred from the ICTR in April, last year, has two lawyers who were assigned long before the amendment of the special law.

The two attorneys, namely Gatera Gashabana and Jean Baptiste Niyibizi, have since cost the taxpayer tens of millions of Rwandan Francs in legal fees. The lawyers have already received Rwf30 million between themselves for the services offered between May and October, last year. At the moment, the government owes them duo Rwf10 million.

Prosecution recently accused Uwinkindi's defence team of deliberately prolonging pre-trial phase as a tactic to make more money, a charge the latter rejected. These are astronomical figures especially since Uwinkindi's case is yet to start in substance, according to senior officials at the Ministry of Justice.

At Rwf40 million for a case that's still in its pretrial stage, it's clear that this arrangement is not sustainable considering that more transferees might qualify for the same service, sources said. The law does not determine how much lawyers representing suspects transferred from foreign or international jurisdictions would be paid. That means the fee is open to negotiation.

The New Times also understands that Leon Mugesera (deported from Canada) and Bernard Munyagishari (ICTR transferee) are some of the other high-profile Genocide suspects who have claimed to be indigent and have since asked government to meet their legal fees.
Flat fee favoured:

The other transferred Genocide suspect Charles Bandora (from Norway) has not made such a request, according to sources. Normally, the Ministry of Justice sets aside Rwf140 million each fiscal year to facilitate lawyers who provide pro bono services to juvenile and indigent suspects.

Now officials reckon that this facility is under threat should government continue to pay the standard legal fees in cases involving Genocide cases from the ICTR and other jurisdictions. The Minister of Justice, Johnston Busingye, confirmed the government wanted a change in the arrangement, saying they were in favour of a flat rate, other than the standard hourly fee of Rwf30,000.

''Our primary objective is to ensure that the accused is accorded proper justice but we also have a responsibility to ensure proper management of state funds. We need to strike a balance through negotiations,'' said Busingye, who doubles as the Attorney General. But the minister hastened to add that the matter will be settled amicably. ''No case will be taken back. We will definitely find a solution to any issues that may arise.''

The executive secretary of Kigali Bar Association, Victor Mugabe, confirmed to The New Times that the learned friends body was indeed in talks with government over the charges, saying they were open to the latter's proposal. He said discussions centered on the need to come up with a flat fee, as opposed to the current hourly charges.

''Whatever we will agree upon will be captured in the contracts the government signs with the individual lawyers representing the suspects,'' he said. Analysts say a flat fee for an entire case might not only cut back on the overall bill but would also help expedite the cases in this category.

Niyibizi, one of Uwinkindi's lawyers, said they were aware of the ongoing talks between the Ministry of Justice and the bar association, adding that they were not against it. ''We have heard there is a suggestion for a lump sum fee and we are not against the idea,'' he told The New Times yesterday.

Uwinkindi, a former pastor in the Kanzenze area in Bugesera District, is charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, extermination and crimes against humanity. The law related to the cases transferred from ICTR and other jurisdictions generally provides for special treatment of such suspects, including the requirement that they will appear before a special High Court chamber on first instance, and will be detained in a special facility.