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SCSL-03-01-1
(22696-22878)


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SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Freetown – Sierra Leone

Before: Justice Teresa Doherty, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate Judge

Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel

Date filed: 2 December 2008



THE PROSECUTOR

Against

Charles Ghankay Taylor

Case No. SCSL-03-01-T

PUBLIC

**PROSECUTION MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS & OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS**

Office of the Prosecutor:

Ms. Brenda J. Hollis

Ms. Leigh Lawrie

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr. Courtenay Griffiths Q.C.

Mr. Andrew Cayley

Mr. Terry Munyard

Mr. Morris Anyah

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Prosecution files this motion under Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“**Rules**”) to request that the Trial Chamber admit into evidence the portions of documents of certain intergovernmental organizations’ and certain governments identified in **Annex A** and provided in **Annex B** of this motion (“**Documents**”) pursuant to: (i) Rule 89(C); or, in the alternative, (ii) Rules 89(C) and 92bis, should the Chamber find that Rule 92bis is also applicable.
2. The Prosecution is mindful of this Chamber’s decision that, where a document is not being tendered through a witness, then the application should be made under Rule 92bis.¹ The Prosecution’s motion for leave to appeal that decision is pending.²
3. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the first instance, the Prosecution maintains that the Documents are admissible under Rule 89(C) alone for three reasons: Rule 89(C) is the general rule governing admission of evidence and has been used to tender documents absent a witness in other proceedings;³ Rule 92bis has been amended such that it is now limited to witness statements and transcripts; and Rule 92bis as amended and limited does not apply to documents which were not prepared for the purposes of legal proceedings. In the alternative, Rules 89(C) and 92bis allow the admission of the documentary evidence discussed herein.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Admission under Rule 89(C)

4. The Prosecution relies on and incorporates by reference its submissions made under this heading in its recent similar filing.⁴

Alternative request for relief: Admission under Rules 89(C) and 92bis

5. Assuming, *arguendo*, Rule 92bis is applicable to the admission of the Documents, then the requirements of Rules 89 and 92bis must be satisfied. For evidence comprising public

¹ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Transcript, 21 August 2008, page 14253, lines 1-6.

² *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T-568, “Confidential Prosecution Application for Leave to Appeal Decision Regarding the Tender of Documents”, 25 August 2008.

³ *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-620, “Decision on Prosecution Motion to Admit into Evidence a Document Referred to in Cross-Examination”, 2 August 2006, p. 4 (“**Sesay 89(C) Decision**”).

⁴ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-01-03-T-650, “Public Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents of the United Nations & United Nations Bodies”, 29 October 2008, paras. 4 – 13 (“**UN Documents Motion**”).

documents to be admitted pursuant to both Rules, the evidence must be relevant, its reliability susceptible of confirmation and its admission not unfairly prejudice the Accused.

6. The Prosecution relies on and incorporates by reference its submissions made under this heading at paragraphs 15 to 17 of the UN Documents Motion.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

7. As required by SCSL jurisprudence,⁵ the Prosecution has made every effort to save the Court from wading through a mountain of material⁶ or a mass of undigested paperwork.⁷ **Annex A** includes a table describing each Document and indicating the relevant portions to be admitted.⁸ **Annex B** contains copies of the actual Documents, generally in their entirety to provide context, with notations in the margins to highlight the relevant passages in respect of which admission is sought. To further assist the Chamber in evaluating the evidence in light of both the primary and alternative requests for relief, those portions of the Documents that would be accurately considered acts and conduct of the Accused are identified in **Annex A** by underlining the relevant summarized text and in **Annex B** by underlining the actual text. Admission of this evidence is requested under Rule 89(C) or, in the alternative, under Rule 89(C) and Rule 92bis (based on the interpretation of Rule 92bis advanced in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the UN Documents Motion).

Application for Admission under Rule 89(C)

8. The Documents are on their face relevant to the current proceedings. Further, the relevance of each Document to the current proceedings and the Second Amended Indictment is

⁵ See the Separate Opinion of Justice Robertson to *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR73, “Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against “Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence”, 16 May 2005 (“**Fofana Appeals Decision**”) at para. 31: “All relevant material is admissible, but that is not an invitation to the parties to deluge the court [...] The wider admissibility provisions in the SCSL carry a concomitant duty to the parties to narrow the documentary material they seek to introduce and to identify only those passages which are relevant to the case [...]”. See also the direction of this Chamber given in *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T-369, “Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Admission of Material Pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92bis”, 7 December 2007, at p.3.

⁶ See *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T-423, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence, 25 October 2005, para. 71.

⁷ See Separate Opinion of Justice Robertson to the *Fofana Appeals Decision*, para. 30.

⁸ **Annex A** provides (where applicable) the exhibit number of the document given in the Pre-Trial Conference Materials (see the Exhibit Lists provided as part of the filing *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-PT-218, “Public Rule 73bis Pre-Trial Conference Materials”, 4 April 2007), describes the document, summarises the relevant information, sets out the relevance of the document or section thereof, relates this relevance to the Indictment and states which portion of the document the Prosecution seeks to have admitted into evidence.

identified in **Annex A**. As noted therein, the documents relate to: (i) the chapeau requirements of the crimes charged; (ii) the several forms of liability alleged by the Prosecution in this case; (iii) the crime base; and (iv) evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct admissible under Rule 93. The Documents are also relevant as they corroborate and so lend weight to evidence on the court record.

9. The Documents are public and originate from certain governments and certain intergovernmental bodies. Therefore, the material does not impact adversely and unfairly upon the integrity of the proceedings nor is it of such a nature that its admission would bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute. In accordance with the AFRC Judgment,⁹ copies are provided as an accurate reproduction of the original.
10. This Chamber has noted that it “has a discretion under Rule 89(C) to admit any relevant evidence” and “the inability of the Defence to cross-examine such witnesses is a matter that goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.”¹⁰ In addition, at the ICTY, a report from a member of a commission of experts was admitted despite defence complaints that they were being: “denied the right to cross-examine a paper witness.”¹¹ In the face of such objections, the Chamber did “take entirely the point made by the Defence, that they cannot cross-examine the 400 witnesses on whose statements this evidence will be based.” But found that “in this Tribunal we admit all types of evidence. The hearsay rule does not apply, but the issue of how much weight is given to this evidence is very much a matter for the Tribunal.”¹² Trial Chamber I has also admitted evidence on a similar basis as the “Chamber is composed of professional judges who are certainly capable of not drawing inferences without proper evidentiary basis or foundation and that the matter of weight to be given to any piece of evidence will be determined at the appropriate time in light of all of the evidence adduced at trial.”¹³ It is, therefore, clear that no undue prejudice to the

⁹ *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, 20 June 2007, para. 140 relying on *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL 04-14-T, “Fofana – Appeal against Decision Refusing Bail”, 11 March 2005, para. 24.

¹⁰ See *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T-543, “Decision on Defence Application to Exclude the Evidence of Proposed Prosecution Expert Witness Corinne Dufka, or in the alternative, to Limit its Scope And on Urgent Prosecution Request for Decision”, 19 June 2008, para. 25, in relation to Defence objections regarding the admission of witness testimonies collected by Ms Dufka.

¹¹ *Prosecutor v. Kovačević*, IT-97-24, Trial Transcript, 6 July 1998, pp. 74-75 where the Defence elaborated that “We cannot cross-examine a piece of paper, 600 or whatever amount of pages in this record or this tendered exhibit, is nothing more than a paper witness. It's not this witness that is testifying. She has no knowledge of any fact contained in the document.”

¹² *Ibid*, p. 75.

¹³ *Sesay* 89(C) Decision, p. 4.

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Accused arises from the fact that a document is produced without calling a witness.¹⁴

Alternative request for relief: Application for Admission under Rules 89(C) and 92bis

11. Assuming, *arguendo*, Rule 92bis is applicable, the Prosecution seeks in the alternative to have the Documents admitted under Rules 89(C) and 92bis.
12. In relation to relevance, the Prosecution refers to paragraph 8 above and to **Annex A**.
13. As regards susceptibility of confirmation, the Prosecution is not required to prove that the evidence is in fact reliable at this stage, only that the reliability of the evidence is susceptible of confirmation.¹⁵
14. In relation to “undue prejudice to the Accused”, the Prosecution refers to paragraphs 9–10 above.
15. Assuming further, *arguendo*, that the qualification regarding evidence going to proof of the acts and conduct of the accused is still applicable to documents not prepared for the purposes of legal proceedings notwithstanding the May 2007 amendments, then those portions of the Documents that would be accurately considered acts and conduct of the Accused (as defined and limited by the jurisprudence) are identified in the Annexes as noted in paragraph 7 above.
16. As regards issues of proximity, while the Documents do concern the acts and conduct of those who might be considered the Accused’s immediately proximate subordinates, the Prosecution relies on its arguments incorporated above at paragraphs 4 and 6. Further, the Documents are not being presented to a lay jury, and so will not “impact adversely and unfairly upon the integrity of the proceedings.” Rather, it is in the interests of justice that this relevant evidence is brought before the Chamber, and that the Chamber be allowed to assess the appropriate weight to be given to it at the conclusion of the case.

IV. CONCLUSION

17. The Prosecution requests that the Trial Chamber admit into evidence the portions of the Documents identified in **Annex A** and provided in **Annex B** pursuant to: (i) Rule 89(C) as this rule alone has been used at the SCSL to tender documents absent a witness and Rule

¹⁴ See Judge Richard May and Marieke Wierda, *International Criminal Evidence* (Transnational Publishers, Inc., New York: 2002), para. 7.97 which notes that the “procedure [of producing documents without calling a witness] has the advantage of expediting the trial without being detrimental to fairness.”

¹⁵ *Fofana Appeals Decision*, para. 27.

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92bis has been amended such that it is now limited to witness material and does not apply to documents not prepared for legal proceedings; or, in the alternative, (ii) Rules 89(C) and 92bis, as Rule 92bis is interpreted in paragraphs 15-16 of the UN Documents Motion.

Filed in The Hague,

2 December 2008,

For the Prosecution,



Brenda J. Hollis
Principal Trial Attorney

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LIST OF AUTHORITIES

SCSL

Prosecutor v. Taylor – Case No. SCSL-03-01

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-218, “Public Rule 73bis Pre-Trial Conference Materials”, 4 April 2007

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-369, “Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Admission of Material Pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92bis”, 7 December 2007

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-543, “Decision on Defence Application to Exclude the Evidence of Proposed Prosecution Expert Witness Corinne Dufka, or in the alternative, to Limit its Scope And on Urgent Prosecution Request for Decision”, 19 June 2008

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Transcript, 21 August 2008

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-568, “Confidential Prosecution Application for Leave to Appeal Decision Regarding the Tender of Documents”, 25 August 2008

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-01-03-T-650, “Public Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents of the United Nations & United Nations Bodies”, 29 October 2008

Prosecutor v. Brima et al. – Case No. SCSL-04-16

Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-04-16-T-423, “Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence”, 25 October 2005

Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, 20 June 2007

Prosecutor v. Norman et al. – Case No. SCSL-04-14

Prosecutor v. Norman et al., SCSL-04-14-AR65, “Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail”, 11 March 2005

Prosecutor v. Norman et al., SCSL-04-14-AR73-398, “Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against ‘Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence’, 16 May 2005

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al. – Case No. SCSL-04-15

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T-620, “Decision on Prosecution Motion to Admit into Evidence a Document Referred to in Cross-Examination”, 2 August 2006

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ICTY Cases

Prosecutor v. Kovačević, IT-97-24, Trial Transcript, 6 July 1998
<http://www.un.org/icty/transe24Kovacevic/980706.htm>

Academic Text

International Criminal Evidence (Transnational Publishers, Inc., New York: 2002), Judge Richard May and Marieke Wierda
(Copy of Chapter 7 provided in previous filing - see Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-510, "Public Prosecution Motion for Admission of Document Pursuant to Rule 89(C)", 19 May 2008)

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ANNEX A

TABLE DESCRIBING DOCUMENTS TO BE ADMITTED

ANNEX A

ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS & OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C)
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
1.	1.091	Sierra Leone, The Forgotten Crisis	23.04.1999	Defines terms of reference for rebel or rebels, i.e. the Revolutionary United Front or RUF, mission locations and sources.	00020911- 00020913	ICR ² : relevant to identified perpetrators	Counts 1-11 (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28) ICR (33, 34)
				Notes that women and children have borne the worst of the atrocities inflicted by rebels, and reports on amputations and kidnapped children.	00020915	Chapeau requirements of CAH ³ , CA3 ⁴ & OSV ⁵	Specific Count 9 (22)
				Reports that during the peace talks in Abidjan rebel attacks resumed; Foday Sankoh refused	00020923- 00020924	ICR: ongoing conflict, RUF gains from Abidjan Peace	

¹ All text underlined in this column indicates text which might be considered acts and conduct of the Accused or sufficiently proximate to the Accused.
² "ICR" – Individual Criminal Responsibility.

³ "CAH" – Crimes Against Humanity.
⁴ "CA3" – Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. However, in relation to the chapeau requirements for CA3, it should be noted that Judicially Noticed Fact C states that "There was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone from about March 1991 until about 18 January 2002".

⁵ "OSV" – Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. See comment in footnote above regarding Judicially Noticed Fact C which is also relevant to the chapeau requirements of OSV.

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
				to sanction a 720 member UN Peacekeeping Force.		Agreement	
				Notes crimes committed by AFRC/RUF forces against civilians after ouster from Freetown and during attack on, and retreat from Freetown, beginning in January 1999; Sam Bockarie says that unless RUF has a share of the power, they will make the country ungovernable.	00020924- 00020925	Chapeau requirements of CAH, CA3 & OSV; ICR: intent, knowledge, awareness, of Accused; JCE including reasonable foreseeability of crimes.	
				RUF control of diamond mining areas, use of diamonds to obtain arms and ammunition, foreign sources for arms and ammunition – small arms come from Eastern	00020927, 00020935	ICR: including JCE, to include existence of plan and plurality of persons; aiding and abetting	

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				Europe through Libya, Burkino Faso and Liberia to RUF, ECOMOG command structure. <u>Liberia denies involvement.</u> Reports amputations, looting, capture and use of child soldiers, rape and sexual slavery, enslavement (forced labor) committed by RUF.	00020943– 00020945, 00020947– 00020948	Chapeau requirements of CAH, CA3 & OSV	
2.	1.095	Report of U.S. Department. of State, “Human Rights Practices for 1998 Report”, Sierra Leone	26.02.1999	Notes AFRC and RUF rebels’ crimes against the civilian population, including killings, mutilations, rape – including in Freetown and Koidu, abductions and sexual slavery and forced labor, child soldiers, looting.	00025071, para 4, 00025072, para 6, 00025073, paras 3, 4, 00025074, para 9, 00025075, para 2, 00025077, para 5,	Chapeau requirements of CAH, CA3 & OSV; rapes in Koidu	Counts 1-11 (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28) ICR (33, 34) Specific Counts 2, 3 (9, 10, 11), 4, 5 (14, 15), 9 (22)

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
3.	1.192	Final Communiqué of ECOWAS Extraordinary Meeting of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone	28.12.1998	Notes March killings of civilians by RUF Sam Bockarie in Kenema, including of Bockarie S. Massaquoi, March RUF killings of civilians in Koidu; RUF killings of civilians in other locations in Sierra Leone	00025072, para 3	Chapeau requirements of CAH, CA3 & OSV; killing of BS Massaquoi and others in Kenema in March 1998; killing of civilians in Koidu in March 1998	Counts 1-11 (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28) ICR (33, 34)
				Review of recent developments in Sierra Leone, attendees included Republic of Liberia; included Togo as member and thus created Committee of Six on Sierra Leone; notes renewed fighting by junta and the RUF; reports received	Entire document (3 pages)	Chapeau requirements of CAH, CA3 & OSV ICR: to include intent, knowledge, awareness of Accused; and JCE including participation,	

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				<p>indicated that the rebels (AFRC/RUF) had upgraded troop strength equipment; in para 10 (i) strongly condemned the atrocities particularly the mutilations being committed by the rebels against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.</p> <p>At para 7 the Communiqué notes that the ECOMOG Force Commander and the Sierra Leone Foreign Minister implicated Liberia in providing military support to the rebels. <u>The Liberian Foreign Minister denied any involvement of his country in Sierra Leone.</u></p>		reasonable foreseeability of crimes, plurality of persons; and aiding and abetting	

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
4.	---	U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Liberia 2001	04.03.2002	<p>Reports that regular security forces include Armed Forces Liberia (AFL), Liberian National Police (LNP) which has primary responsibility for internal security, Antiterrorist Unit (ATU) also called the Antiterrorist Brigade (ATB) composed of an elite special forces group, and the Special Security Service (SSS) a large, heavily armed executive protective force.</p> <p>Notes that the ATU absorbed Taylor's most experienced civil war fighters, including undisciplined and untrained loyalists.</p>	00101975, para 2	ICR: Liberia's security forces – names, composition, function of some	ICR (33, 34)

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
				There are also numerous irregular security forces attached to certain key ministries and parastatal corporations whose responsibilities appear to be poorly defined.			
				The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press: it detained, threatened, harassed, assaulted, intimidated, arrested journalists and human rights workers including Thomas Ade-Bayer	00101976, para 1, 00101978 para 6, 00101980 para 5, 00101982 paras. 4, 5, 7, 00101983 paras 2, 7 - 11	Rebuts Defence assertion in cross-examination that the Accused allowed freedom of expression and of the press and also the expression of contrary ideas	
				Special Operations Division (SOD) of the police	00101976, para 2 under Respect for Human Rights, Section 1.a.	ICR: to include command structure - units within the police	

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
				Notes reports of attacks by fighters based in Liberia on Guinean border towns, which caused numerous deaths. The attacks generally were perpetrated by a combination of government security forces, RUF rebels from Sierra Leone, and some Guinean rebels.	00101977, para 6	ICR: to include JCE, including plurality of persons; superior authority	
				Notes in January in response to mounting international pressure, the Government of Liberia announced it would expel former RUF leader, Sam Bockarie, and his followers from the country, where they had	00101986 para 6	ICR: relevant to JCE, including participation, plurality or persons; aiding and abetting	

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
				<u>taken refuge early in</u> <u>December 1999.</u> <u>President Taylor denied</u> <u>the Government was</u> <u>training the RUF</u> <u>fighters or that it has</u> <u>been supplying them</u> <u>with arms. In March</u> <u>the Government</u> <u>announced that</u> <u>Bockarie had departed</u> <u>the country; however</u> <u>Bockarie's actual</u> <u>whereabouts are</u> <u>unknown and it is</u> <u>believed that hundreds</u> <u>of RUF personnel</u> <u>remain as part of the</u> <u>Government security</u> <u>forces.</u>			
5.	---	U.S. Department of State, Sierra Leone: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000	23.02.2001	Information on ongoing conflict	page 1, paras 1 and 2, page 13, para 2	Chapeau requirements of CA3 & OSV	Counts 1-11 (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28) ICR (33,

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
				Reports on crimes committed against civilians by RUF and ex-SLA rebels, including killings, mutilations, rape, looting, abductions and forced labor, sexual slavery, child soldiers, killing of demonstrators outside Sankoh's residence in Freetown	page 2, last para - page 3, first para; page 3, paras 6 - 7; page 4, paras 1 - 3, 5, 7 - 8; page 5, paras 1 - 2, 5 - 6; page 6, paras 7 - 9; page 9, para 8; page 15, paras 2 - 3; page 17, paras 4 - 5; page 18, para 6	Chapeau requirements of CAH, CA3 & OSV	34) Specific Count 9 (22)
6.	----	African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights; Ratification/Accession by Liberia	Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986; ratified/acceded to by Liberia on 31 January 1983	Refers to every human being's right to respect for his or her life and integrity of his or her person; exploitation and degradation, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and	Articles 1, 4 - 6, 14	ICR: notice of individual human rights - intent, knowledge, awareness of Accused	Counts 1-11 (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28) ICR (33, 34)

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Tab #. Annex B	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date	Summary of Info. contained in highlighted text in Document ¹	Reference Page & Para.	Relevance	Indictment
7.	---	U.S. Department of State: Liberia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999	25.02.2000	<p>treatment prohibited; no unlawful deprivation of freedom; right to property</p> <p>Notes regular security forces include Armed Forces Liberia (AFL), Liberian National Police (LNP) which has primary responsibility for internal security, Antiterrorist Unit (ATU) composed of an elite special forces group, and the Special Security Service (SSS) a large, heavily armed executive protective force. There are also numerous irregular security forces attached to certain key ministries and parastatal corporations whose responsibilities appear</p>	00100782, para 2	ICR: Liberia's security forces – names, composition, function of some	ICR (33, 34)

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				to be poorly defined. The many newly created security services absorbed Taylor's most experienced fighters, including undisciplined and untrained loyalists.			
				Security forces detention at Gbartala base; charges of torture of detainees at Gbartala base, held in water filled holes in the ground	00100785, paras 2, 3	ICR: relevant to JCE including participation and plurality of persons	
				1998 flogging of journalist Hasan Billity	00100790, para 6	Rebuts Defence assertion in cross-examination that the Accused allowed freedom of expression and of the press and the expression of contrary ideas	

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ANNEX B

COPIES OF DOCUMENTS

ANNEX B

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& OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS
PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

Tab #.	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date
1.	1.091	Sierra Leone, The Forgotten Crisis	23.04.1999

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00020909

Sierra Leone:
The Forgotten Crisis

**Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P.
from David Pratt, M.P., Nepean-Carleton,
Special Envoy to Sierra Leone**

April 23, 1999

Note: This is not a Government of Canada report. It is the report of a private Member of Parliament who has, with the help of Foreign Affairs staff and working within some tight time frames, directed a fresh pair of eyes and ears to the current crisis in Sierra Leone.

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SIERRA LEONE: THE FORGOTTEN CRISIS

INTRODUCTION

In a controversial essay that appeared five years ago in *The Atlantic Monthly*, American writer Robert D. Kaplan wrote about nations breaking up under a tidal flow of refugees, borders crumbling and war becoming a continuation of crime on a massive scale. This, he wrote, was a preview of the first decades of the twenty-first century. One of the many areas Kaplan focussed on was Sierra Leone. He wrote that: "*Tyranny is nothing new in Sierra Leone or in the rest of West Africa. But it is now part and parcel of an increasing lawlessness that is far more significant than any coup, rebel incursion, or episodic experiment in democracy.*"

In a remarkably prescient concluding paragraph to this 1994 essay, Kaplan noted that: "*We ignore this dying region (West Africa) at our own risk. When the Berlin Wall was falling, in November of 1989, I happened to be in Kosovo, covering a riot between Serbs and Albanians. The future was in Kosovo, I told myself that night, not in Berlin. The same day that Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat clasped hands on the White House lawn, my Air Afrique plane was approaching Bamako, Mali, revealing corrugated-zinc shacks at the edge of an expanding desert. The real news wasn't at the White House, I realized. It was right below.*"

In many respects, Kosovo and Sierra Leone are two sides of the same coin which is intra-state conflict in the late 1990's. The conventional "Rules for Armed Combat" have essentially disappeared. With both the Serbs and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group in Sierra Leone, civilian populations, rather than being afforded protection, have become both targets and tools of war. In Sierra Leone and Kosovo, war has taken on the appearance of crime on a massive scale as Kaplan predicted. In Sierra Leone, it has resulted in human rights violations on a staggering scale. Murder, rape, mutilation, looting, abductions, human shields, child soldiers, land mines, property destruction; Sierra Leone is rife with human security issues. Interestingly, the number of refugees that have been generated by both conflicts is roughly the same.

My personal interest in Sierra Leone goes back to 1990 when I made my first visit to the country as part of a municipal development program administered by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) and funded by CIDA. At the time, I was a local councillor with the City of Nepean. Our municipality was linked with Bo, the second largest city in Sierra Leone. With the assistance of a local NGO called Nepean Outreach to the World (NOW), we were able to build a new marketplace, buy much needed equipment for the town hall and conduct various types of training for the municipal staff, among other things. Under this program, I made a total of three trips to Sierra Leone, the last being in 1993. In 1995, with the security situation worsening, it became necessary to suspend activities under the program. However, with each trip I made to Sierra Leone, my fascination for the country, its people and its rich culture grew.

Knowing of my interest and previous involvement in Sierra Leone, in late February, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked me to take on the role of

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Special Envoy. With more than a little trepidation, I accepted. I was asked to lead a fact-finding mission and to examine the security, humanitarian and political situations in Sierra Leone. Following the mission, I was to prepare a report for the Minister's consideration.

In preparation for my mission, I visited the United Nations on March 12 for meetings and briefings with U.N. officials and Heads and Deputy Heads of Missions. On March 20, I departed for Africa with Mr. Jacques Crête, Director of the West and Central Africa Division of the Foreign Affairs Department. We later linked up with Lt-Col. Stephen Moffat, Head of the Peacekeeping Section of Foreign Affairs.

Our mission took us initially to London where we met with the U.K. Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Right Honourable Tony Lloyd, the Head of the African Department, FCO, Mr. James Bevan, and Mr. Moses Anafu, a senior official of the Commonwealth Secretariat, among others. From London, we travelled to Conakry, Guinea, where we met with senior officials including the Prime Minister, Mr. Lamine Sidime. During our stay in Guinea, we also visited a refugee camp at Forecariah not far from the Sierra Leonean border.

Our next stop was Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone where we met with a number of senior officials including President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and the Chief of the Defence Staff for the Sierra Leonean Army, Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, a Nigerian, and British High Commissioner, Peter Penfold. We toured various parts of Freetown including the facilities for displaced people, the main hospital, an amputee camp and the largely destroyed east-end of the city. We also met with various representatives of NGO's. After a brief stop in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire and a meeting with a senior Foreign Ministry official, we concluded our visit to the sub-region in Accra, Ghana where we met several other ministers and the Vice-President of Ghana John Atta Mills.

It is worthwhile emphasizing that the contents of this report should not be viewed as the future framework for Canadian foreign policy on Sierra Leone. This is not a Government of Canada report. It is the report of a private Member of Parliament who has, with the help of Foreign Affairs staff and working within some tight time frames, directed a fresh pair of eyes and ears to the current crisis in Sierra Leone. Should this report result in some actions being taken by the Canadian Government to increase the assistance we provide this devastated country, I will of course, be very, very pleased. Because, God knows, Sierra Leone needs our help.

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There are a number of people whose efforts in this undertaking should be acknowledged. Mr. Jacques Crête, Director of the West and Central Africa Division of Foreign Affairs and Lt.-Col. Stephen Moffat, Head of the Peacekeeping Section of Foreign Affairs, were tremendous assets to this mission because of their background, experience, knowledge and dedication to duty. I believe we worked well as a team both on the ground as observers and back in Ottawa debating some of the issues and their implications as we prepared this report. We started our mission as colleagues and we ended it as friends.

Throughout this process, I received a great deal of assistance and support from Heidi Hulan, Eric Hoskins and Debora Brown of Minister's Axworthy's office. In New York, during my visit to the United Nations, I was aided immeasurably by our Ambassador, Robert Fowler, and his very capable and skilled First Secretary for Political Affairs, David Angell. Thank you as well to the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development for the kind and quick response to our request for the research necessary for this report and our mission.

In Africa, our job was made easier by a well-planned and executed itinerary of meetings with key officials and tours of specific sites. The bulk of this responsibility fell on our Ambassador to Guinea, Denis Briand, who also serves as our High Commissioner to Sierra Leone. He was our host at several meetings which produced some very helpful background information and candid assessments of the situation. He made us feel as though his home was ours.

In Freetown, British High Commissioner Peter Penfold opened his home to his Canadian cousins and provided Ambassador Briand and I with a safe and secure room for the night. His hospitality and his insights into the situation in Sierra Leone were absolutely invaluable. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Melrose was also kind enough to assist us in various ways including transportation to and from Freetown. In Abidjan, Ambassador Don McMaster also opened his home to us for meetings and again in Accra, our High Commissioner Janet Graham, welcomed us into her home and organized a productive schedule of excellent meetings with senior Ghanaian officials.

A few other words of thanks are perhaps in order - to Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy who entrusted me with this mission, to Mr. Des Garvey, who through Nepean Outreach to the World (NOW) got me interested and involved in Africa in the first place, to my staff for all their encouragement and support and to Sylvie Gachnang of Foreign Affairs for her excellent computer work. Last but not least, I thank my wife Joan, who has endured no doubt with some nervousness, my four trips to Sierra Leone.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The stark reality is that war and suffering are not new phenomena in Sierra Leone. Since gaining its independence in 1961, this tiny African nation has experienced almost every known political system from totalitarianism to democracy and everything in between, with the past eight years being particularly savage by any standard. This report examines three broad themes that are central to the current crisis in Sierra Leone - the security situation, the humanitarian situation and the political situation. It attempts to better understand this brutal conflict and identify areas of greatest need so that Canada and others might focus what resources they might muster to assist a desperate nation.

The Security Situation

The overall situation in Sierra Leone is extremely tense. The government and ECOMOG, nearly defeated in January 1999, are now firmly in control of Freetown. ECOMOG, a multinational force consisting of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, can guarantee freedom of movement on the Freetown Peninsula, but there continues to be significant rebel activity throughout the rest of the country. ECOMOG is in desperate need of a significant amount of logistical support, both lethal and non-lethal, and it appears that the rebels are re-arming themselves in preparation for the next round of hostilities.

Foreign involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict is a serious problem, and there is clear evidence that Liberia and Burkina Faso are supporting the rebel efforts. The diamond mining industry provides the rebels with potential revenue of approximately \$300 million per year. Precisely how much is spent on small arms and ammunition is unknown. What is known is that arms are apparently procured in eastern Europe and staged through Burkina Faso and then continue on to Liberia for eventual delivery to rebel forces in Sierra Leone.

Security in Sierra Leone and the region also covers the role of civilian police. The Sierra Leone police require instruction in most modern police skills, ranging from crime detection to investigation to prevention for both policemen and police trainers. The police problem is equally serious in Guinea and they also need significant levels of support.

This section of the report concludes that any activities taken with respect to security would have to take into consideration not only the situation in Sierra Leone but of neighbouring states as well, in particular francophone Guinea. As well, both humanitarian efforts and the peace process itself have little hope of success without an extension of ECOMOG's security envelope.

The Humanitarian Situation

The scope for humanitarian assistance is immense. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone is critical and has the potential to get much worse. There are 700,000 displaced people internally and another half a million refugees outside Sierra Leone's borders. More specifically, there are

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400,000 Sierra Leone refugees in Guinea, approximately 100,000 in Liberia and the estimates of displaced people in Freetown alone are 250,000. Neither the Government of Sierra Leone nor international non-governmental organizations have any idea what the humanitarian situation is beyond the Freetown peninsula or the towns, and unofficial estimates put the number of people living in rebel-controlled areas with no access to humanitarian aid at close to 1.5 million.

Of particular note is the plight of women and children, who have borne the worst of the atrocities inflicted by the rebels. Refugee camps and hospitals are full of victims who have had one or more limbs amputated, the youngest witnessed (a girl) being less than four years old. Approximately 3,000 kidnapped children are still unaccounted for, and for those that have survived, there are no schools to attend. Most of the schools in the Freetown area were destroyed and many teachers have left the country.

The needs range from the immediate provision of shelter, food assistance and the provision of prostheses to long term rehabilitation for victims of the war and education assistance. Following a careful review of the requirements, Canada could provide significant bilateral humanitarian support in those areas where resources permit, and work with various partners (federal, provincial, municipal, non-governmental institutions and other governments) to meet those aims where resources could best be pooled with others.

The Political Situation

The Government of Sierra Leone is committed to its two track strategy for peace, which calls for enhancing security while promoting dialogue. However, both the government and the rebels face internal and external obstacles in their pursuit of a negotiated peace. The rebels do not appear to have a formal political agenda and are divided between those who believe in a military victory and those who would opt for a negotiated settlement. The same divisions also exist within President Kabbah's government, which is as well under pressure from ECOMOG sources to seek a negotiated peace.

Regional neighbours have played an important role in the pursuit of peace in Sierra Leone. In 1996, the President of Côte d'Ivoire, Henri Konan Bédié, brokered the Abidjan Accord which, despite its lack of implementation or monitoring mechanisms, could still provide a sound framework for any future peace agreements. Other organizations also have a significant role to play in the Sierra Leone peace process. The United Nations Security Council has authorized the deployment of a UN Observers Mission to Sierra Leone and has established a sanctions regime against the rebels and their supporters. ECOWAS and its Group of Six (Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria and Togo) is well placed to assist in the peace process. However, it will require international support to do so. Finally, there is the Contact Group on Sierra Leone, an *ad hoc* grouping of nations, including Canada, whose aim is to sustain and promote international support for Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.

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The third track identified in this report provides Canada with a broad menu of options for political action, particularly with respect to working through or with other organizations. As a member of the Security Council, Canada could provide added impetus to Security Council activities dealing with Sierra Leone. Membership in both the Commonwealth and La Francophonie provides Canada a unique opportunity to bridge the gap between Anglophone and Francophone Africa. As well, Canada could consider becoming more directly involved in the sub-region through attendance as an observer at future ECOWAS meetings.

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PART 1 - BACKGROUND

Introduction

The Republic of Sierra Leone covers an area of 72,000 square kilometres, roughly the size of New Brunswick. It has a population of about 4.2 million people. Since the 'rebel war' began in 1992, statistics in Sierra Leone have lost much of their meaning, but one calculation is striking. For several years Canada has been rated highest on the UNDP Human Development Index, which measures life expectancy, educational attainment and standard of living. For much of the past decade, out of 174 countries, Sierra Leone has been last.

Sierra Leone before Independence

Sierra Leone has two major language groups - the Mende and the 'Mel', although there are as many as seven or eight sub sets of these languages. With the exception of the Limba and the Sherbro, most of today's ethnic groups entered the country after 1400 as the result of disturbances elsewhere in the region. The first European visitors were the Portuguese who gave the country its name - 'Lion Mountain' - after the shape of the mountains on the Freetown peninsula.

In 1787, 356 'Black Poor' and 100 whites left Britain to establish a colony in Sierra Leone, although few survived their first two years. In 1792, 1,200 freed slaves, many of them refugees from the American War of Independence, arrived from Halifax and established a permanent settlement they called 'Freetown'. Today their descendants are still sometimes referred to as 'Nova Scotians'. The settlers became known as Creoles, over time developing their own language based on English, 'Krio'.

The Sierra Leone Company which managed the colony in its first years was dissolved in 1808, and Sierra Leone became a Crown Colony. It was thus the first modern political state in sub-Saharan Africa. British colonial authorities were slow to extend their political influence into the interior, however, and it was not until 1896 that a "protectorate" was declared over the territory that encompasses modern day Sierra Leone. Between 1895 and 1908, a narrow gauge railway was built between Freetown and eastern parts of the country. But it was not until World War II that roads were constructed to the provinces. Sierra Leone boasted the first university in Sub-Saharan Africa - Fourah Bay College, founded in 1827 - but health and education services were left largely to missionaries. In 1939, only three of the country's 12 secondary schools were directly operated by the government.

In the early part of the 20th century, palm kernels became the chief export crop. Diamonds, discovered in the eastern Kono District in 1930, had become the largest export earner by 1938. In 1933 an iron mine was opened at Marampa in Port Loko District, earning almost 30% of the colony's export revenue by 1938. These two commodities, iron and diamonds, were instrumental in bringing Sierra Leoneans outside of Freetown into the modern cash economy.

Between 1951 and 1961, power gradually devolved from British officials to elected Sierra Leoneans who took responsibility for some ministries in 1953, and for all but external affairs and defense in 1958. A medical doctor, Sir Milton Margai, became Chief Minister in 1954, Premier in 1958, and upon independence in 1961, Prime Minister.

The Post Independence Years: 1961-8

The years immediately before and after independence were marked by optimism and high expectations. Roads were being built, clinics and hospitals opened, and everywhere new schools were springing up. Primary school enrolment tripled between 1948 and 1958, and in the Northern Province, the number of children in primary school rose from 3,291 in 1948 to 24,034 in 1963.

Milton Margai was the first leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), formed in 1951. A close early colleague was Siaka Stevens, who had been General Secretary of the Mineworkers Union at Marampa in the 1940s and was later Minister for Mines and Labour. Shortly before independence, Stevens broke with Margai and formed a new party, the All Peoples' Congress (APC). Milton Margai died only three years after independence and was succeeded by his brother, Albert. Within two years, beset by charges of corruption and mismanagement, Albert Margai was beginning to talk about creating a one-party state.

The general elections of 1967 were pivotal. Although he had by then disavowed the idea of a one-party state, Albert Margai introduced proposals for a new republican constitution, and was widely mistrusted. He charged that an army coup was in the making, and this served as grounds for a purge of the officer corps, creating a turmoil of competing factions within the military. Registration and balloting in the March 1967 general election were badly mismanaged and there were widespread rumours of vote-rigging and corruption. Unofficial results gave the APC 32 seats, the SLPP 28, and independents six, four of whom said they would support an APC government. The Governor General, therefore, asked Siaka Stevens to form a new government.

On the same day, however, Army commander David Lansana declared martial law and arrested both the Governor General and Stevens, on the constitutional grounds that all election results had not been tallied. Three days later, when it became apparent that his intention was to restore Margai, junior officers arrested him and established a military government known as the National Reformation Council. A year later the NRC itself was overthrown by noncommissioned officers who invited Siaka Stevens, then in exile in Guinea, to return and form a government.

The Stevens Years: 1968-85

Until 1968, politics in Sierra Leone were marked by two cleavages. The first, which had largely played itself out by the late 1950s, was between the Freetown Creoles, who had dominated economic and political life in the Colony's first 150 years, and people in the much more populous and less developed "protectorate." The second political cleavage was between the northern part of the country and the more developed south which was largely Mende-speaking.

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The SLPP had been strongly supported by the Mende, one of the reasons that Stevens - a Limba from the north - had formed his own party, appealing to anti-Mende sentiment and to social discontent among a growing number of unemployed urban youth.

Within two months of assuming office, Stevens purged the army of its senior Mende officers, placing northerners in charge. He also closed the railway on economic grounds, although many believed this was an effort to cut off parts of the country that had voted against the APC. Following an abortive coup attempt in 1971, Stevens established an Internal Security Unit (ISU). This was a brutal, personally managed paramilitary force made up of young men recruited largely from the slums of Freetown. The 1973 general elections were marked by violence and vote rigging, but the elections of 1977 were much worse, with armed ISU gangs disrupting the process throughout the country and violently suppressing student demonstrations. A year later, a referendum on the establishment of a one-party state passed, with 97% of the voters expressing their support.

The Stevens years were marked by a systematic subversion of the formal state apparatus and by the growth of a large informal economy, much of it based on an illicit diamond trade. In 1933, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust Ltd. (SLST) had been given an exclusive 99-year prospecting and mining lease over the entire country. In 1955 the tax rate rose to 60% and SLST relinquished its rights to all but 450 square miles of territory. Because the Kono deposits are alluvial, heavy equipment - although more efficient than individual digging - is unnecessary. During the 1930s and 1940s, SLST was largely able to control the mining areas, but a diamond rush in the 1950s brought an influx of illicit diggers, known as 'san san boys' into the area. Between 1953 and 1957 the number of illicit diggers grew from 5,000 to as many as 70,000. Despite an SLST paramilitary force with helicopter support, violence and criminal anarchy became the dominant characteristic of the district, with a vast network of smugglers channelling diamonds to Liberia where taxes for buyers were lower and profits higher.

By the late 1970s, SLST had been disbanded and the diamond trade nationalized. Over the years, Siaka Stevens allied himself with a group of powerful Lebanese merchants who controlled some of the official diamond trade, much of the unofficial trade, and the trade in virtually all other essential imports and exports. In the ensuing years, diamonds continued to attract the attention of young Sierra Leonean diggers, government officials, rebel forces and their Liberian backers, and a range of companies that ignored or sought to overcome the danger associated with the trade.

By the mid 1980s, the country was descending into insolvency. Growing foreign debt, rampant inflation, currency devaluation, budget deficits, corruption and declining exports led to chronic fuel, power and food shortages. Youth unemployment grew, along with student radicalism at Fourah Bay University. In 1985, a year marked by violent labour and student unrest, Stevens - then over 80 - retired, handing power to Joseph Momoh, head of the army.

The Momoh Years: 1985-92

Joseph Momoh came to power on a wave of popular enthusiasm. It was hoped that he might be able to revive the collapsing state and revitalize the economy with his 'Constructive Nationalism'. Corruption and indiscipline continued, however, with high inflation, repeated devaluations, blackouts and shortages of food and fuel. Official diamond exports fell from two million carats in 1970 to 48,000 in 1988 - a result of mismanagement and corruption rather than declining mineral resources.

During the Momoh years there were two trends, largely unnoticed at the time, that would have important ramifications later. One was the continued and dramatic growth in the number of unemployed and disaffected youth. They drifted from the countryside in one of two directions: either to Freetown and other urban centres, or to the diamond fields of Kono. In either case, they became socialized in a climate of violence, drugs and criminality. The other trend was a growth in student militants. During the second half of the 1980s, many university students had become radicalized, in part by the violence of the government's suppression of their demonstrations, and in part by exposure to new ideas, including the thoughts of Col. Qaddafi, as expressed in *The Green Book*. Initially, Libyan sponsorship of Sierra Leonean student groups and student trips to Libya was open, but following the violent expulsion of 41 university students with alleged Libyan links in 1985, *The Green Book* and its author took on more symbolic importance, and the tangible connection went underground. Between 1987 and 1988, between twenty-five and fifty Sierra Leoneans were taken to Libya for training in the "art of revolution" (Gberie).

Among the students was a functional illiterate who had become part of a 'revolutionary cell' in Kono. Foday Sankoh was a gray-haired former army corporal and photographer who had been jailed for seven years for alleged implication in the 1971 coup plot against Siaka Stevens. Ironically, only three of those trained in Libya showed up later in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the only survivor after a year or so was Foday Sankoh (Gberie).

In the late 1980s, events were taking place in Liberia that would soon have a profound effect on Sierra Leone. At the end of 1989, Charles Taylor launched an attack on Samuel Doe's government with a small band of men, several of them, including Taylor himself, with Libyan training or connections. Taylor also received support from the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, in part through political, family and personal relationships that some have described as 'like the dynastic marriages and alliance of European princes of old' (Ellis). Burkinabè support for Taylor was later extended to Foday Sankoh and the RUF.

Operating initially out of the Ivory Coast, Taylor's rebellion quickly took on ethnic overtones and within a year had become a major humanitarian disaster. In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) put together an intervention force made up of troops from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and the Gambia. Known as the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), it thwarted Taylor's drive to an early military victory. Because Taylor had earlier been refused support by Momoh (and was briefly arrested in Freetown using a

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Burkinabè passport), and because ECOMOG used Freetown as a staging ground, Taylor spoke frequently during 1990 and 1991 of plans to attack Sierra Leone.

By 1991 the Momoh regime was in serious difficulty. Beset by a crumbling economy, growing popular agitation and factional turmoil within the government, Momoh announced a return to multi-party politics, and general elections were planned for 1992. Before the elections could be held, however, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked. With the assistance of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Foday Sankoh and a small band of men crossed from Liberia into Sierra Leone's Eastern Province in March 1991, with the express aim of ending the APC's 24 year grip on power. Raids on several border towns over the next few days demonstrated the weakness of the Sierra Leone military, and within a month, most of Kailahun District was under rebel control.

A humanitarian crisis quickly resulted from the RUF's tactics, which involved brutal attacks on unarmed civilians and children. Attempting to copy the ethnic incitement that had served Charles Taylor well in Liberia, the RUF at first targeted Fula and Madingo traders, murdering more than 100 in its first two months of operations. It also targeted Lebanese traders, beheading five in Bo District. The atrocities never sparked an ethnic divide, but they created alarm among the civilian population and caused rapid and widespread displacement. Panicked, President Momoh quickly doubled the size of the army from 3,000 men to almost 6,000, drawing most of his new recruits from vagrants in Freetown - the 'rural...unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves' - as his foreign minister at the time later put it. Further confusion was added to the mix by the formation in Sierra Leone of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), a coalition of anti-Taylor Liberians who, with Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) support, initially fought both the RUF and Taylor's NPFL.

Because of corruption and mismanagement, Sierra Leone's front line troops were badly underpaid and demoralized. In April 1992, a group from the Eastern front travelled to Freetown to protest their situation. Within a day, the mutiny became a coup and Joseph Momoh fled to Guinea. A military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was formed, with 29-year-old army paymaster, Capt. Valentine Strasser as Chairman.

The NPRC Regime: 1992-6

Initially, the NPRC was enormously popular, especially among Sierra Leone's youth. The leadership itself was young and many had grown up in the slums of Freetown. Young people in Freetown embarked on a voluntary cleanup and beautification campaign, and a new 'youth volunteer' force was recruited to prosecute the war. Many of the newcomers were not volunteers, however, and one estimate places the number of child soldiers under the age of 15 at more than a thousand by 1993. Soon the NPRC came to resemble the regime it had ousted.

During 1992 and 1993 the fortunes of the RUF fluctuated. On occasion, they overran the diamond areas were pushed back and retook the area again. Civilians accused by the government

of collaboration were arrested and some were executed. But the penalty for not collaborating with the RUF was as severe, or worse. The RUF had two major calling cards: dead civilians, and hundreds, possibly thousands, of living civilians with their hands, feet, ears or genitals crudely amputated. The latter served as living and constant warnings to anyone in their path, and rumours of an impending RUF attack became enough to clear entire towns and villages.

Any force with access to the diamond areas also had access to diamonds, and it is likely that all parties on occasion took advantage of whatever was available. It gradually became unclear who was responsible for a particular ambush, or for starting a rumour that cleared the way for a looting spree. In some cases attacks were carried out by soldiers and blamed on the RUF. Soldiers by day and rebels by night, they became known as 'sobels'. The RUF added to the sobel story by carrying out raids in stolen army uniforms.

Towards the end of 1992, a new force entered the picture, the 'kamajors'. *Kamajor* is a Mende word meaning hunter. In traditional Mende society, the hunter was a guardian of society and part of a mystical, 'invincible' warrior cult. Joined by a number of educated individuals and retired military personnel, the Kamajors soon became a force to contend with, fighting back not only against the RUF, but against the excesses of the NPRC government.

By 1995, however, the military situation had become desperate, with hit and run raids throughout the country giving the RUF an appearance of great strength. Early in the year, the RUF overran the country's last remaining economic assets, the SIEROMCO bauxite mine and the Sierra Rutile titanium mines, allegedly with the assistance of soldiers commanded by Major Johnny Paul Koroma.

Until about 1995, it was unclear what the RUF stood for, who Foday Sankoh was, and what he wanted. Although he had given the occasional BBC radio-telephone interview, it was not until the 1995 appearance of the RUF's *Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone*, that any consistent ideals or purpose were enunciated. Allegedly drafted by an employee of International Alert, *Footpaths* contains words and phrases lifted directly from Mao Zedong, Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon (Abdullah).

While it is true that the RUF is made up of disaffected young men, a very high proportion of them were already alienated and dangerous before the RUF opportunity arose. Only a tiny fraction of Sierra Leonean youth has joined the RUF of their own volition. The main RUF recruits have been drawn from the ranks of *san san boys* and from the same Freetown slums where Siaka Stevens recruited his brutal ISU and where Joseph Momoh found the material to double his army. Others were children who were kidnapped, drugged, and forced to commit atrocities. The 'radical intellectual' roots of the RUF were extinguished in its first year of operation, and its brutal attacks on civilians stand in contradiction to its ostensible aim of creating a 'revolutionary egalitarian system' (Bangura, Abdullah, Abdullah & Muana).

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By early 1995, the RUF was only miles from Freetown, as much a result of the army's incompetence as of RUF prowess. In fact at the time, the RUF was estimated by some to have an overall strength of three to four thousand, with a hard core of only five to six hundred soldiers (Douglas). Part of the NPRC problem was its calculation that at least 20% of its own troops were disloyal. In May 1995, the NPRC turned to Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African security firm that had successfully repelled UNITA rebels on behalf of the Angolan government. The introduction of EO to the NPRC was made by a Director of Branch Energy and Heritage Gas and Oil, Anthony Buckingham, who negotiated the contract with EO and who allegedly made advance payments to EO in return for government concessions related to Sierra Rutile and the diamond areas.

The first EO contingent arrived in Sierra Leone in May 1995. Within ten days of their operational startup, they had beaten the RUF back from Freetown, and within a month had cleared the diamond areas. Part of their success was due to their own combat skills, although they never totalled more than 200 men in all. They brought with them excellent air support, first-rate communications equipment and good trainers, working with a small group of Sierra Leonean soldiers, and later with Kamajors who were by then 2,000 - 3,000 strong. By early 1996, the RUF had been seriously damaged, and had been pushed away from the diamond areas that had helped to pay for their efforts.

The NPRC, under strong pressure from both the public and donor agencies to return Sierra Leone to civilian rule, announced that elections would be held in February 1996. In January, however, Valentine Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Brig. Julius Maada Bio. Thought to be an attempt to prolong the military government, public pressure to hold elections mounted. Hard-pressed by continuing EO attacks, the RUF announced a cease-fire and sought unconditional peace talks with Bio's government. These began in Abidjan only a few days before the elections were held. After two rounds of voting, the SLPP formed a government, with Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former UNDP official, sworn in as President.

The Period after 1996

The peace talks in Abidjan went on for almost nine months, during which RUF attacks resumed, only to be fended off with devastating effect by EO and Kamajor forces. When Foday Sankoh and the GOSL signed a peace agreement at the end of November 1996, it looked as though the RUF was a spent force. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that President Kabbah agreed to the expulsion of Executive Outcomes within five weeks of signing the agreement (although LifeGuard, an EO offshoot remained behind to protect the diamond areas). It is also not surprising, in view of subsequent events, that Foday Sankoh refused to sanction a 720-member UN Peacekeeping Force.

The RUF gained most from the peace agreement. It was given an on-going political role and legitimacy, and was absolved of responsibility for its past activities. More importantly, it gained militarily in the sense that the government was left exposed with little reliable security beyond

the Kamajors and a new contingent of Nigerian troops sent to bolster the ECOMOG force. RUF attacks continued, in part because of disagreement in the leadership over the peace agreement, while in Freetown, a number of army officers were arrested in a suspected coup plot.

In May 1997, a group of soldiers attacked the central jail, releasing the coup plotters and an estimated 600 criminals. President Kabbah fled and Major Johnny Paul Koroma, freed in the prison break, became head the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC invited the RUF to join them, declaring the war to be over. The period of joint AFRC-RUF rule was characterized by a complete breakdown of law and order, and by a collapse of the formal economy. Schools, banks, commercial services and government offices ceased to function, while rape and looting became the order of the day. As Amnesty International puts it, *"The rule of law completely collapsed and violence engulfed the country"*, with Kabbah allies, students and journalist targeted for torture, rape and murder.

During this period, exiled President Kabbah made contact with a British security firm, Sandline International, which had connections with Executive Outcomes, Branch Energy and Diamond Works, a company traded on the Vancouver Stock Market. The apparent aim was to obtain Sandline assistance in ousting the AFRC and liberating the diamond areas. Finance was reportedly provided by a Vancouver-based Indian national, Rakesh Saxena (Douglas). In February 1998, 28 tons of small arms arrived in Sierra Leone as a part of this deal, and was impounded by ECOMOG as a contravention of a UN arms embargo.

Later that month, ECOMOG forced the AFRC/RUF out of Freetown in a fierce battle that took the lives of many civilians. By then, estimates of the number of dead in the rebel war ranged upward from 50,000. At different times in the previous six years, estimates of the number of displaced people were as high as 2.5 million - more than half of the entire population.

Restored to office, President Kabbah took steps to begin demobilizing the entire army. Courts martial were held, following which 24 convicted military personnel were executed. Between August and November 1998, several civilian trials were held. A total of 47 individuals were convicted of treason and other charges associated with the AFRC/RUF administration, and sentenced to death. Foday Sankoh, who had been arrested in Nigeria and returned to Sierra Leone, was also tried, found guilty and sentenced to death.

During this period, the AFRC/RUF forces conducted a violent rampage throughout the country, chased from one place to another without great success by ECOMOG forces. In a November 1998 report, Amnesty International said, *"Since their removal from power, the AFRC and RUF have wreaked a campaign of terror against unarmed civilians and human rights abuses have reached unprecedented levels. Several thousand civilians have been brutally killed or mutilated. Hundreds of others have been abducted from their villages and forced to join their attackers."* The RUF referred to this period as 'Operation No Living Thing'.

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With Foday Sankoh and other AFRC/RUF defendants appealing their convictions, the RUF again appeared at the gates to Freetown in January 1999, catching both the government and ECOMOG off guard. Using women and children as a human shield, some RUF troops were able to bypass ECOMOG troops and join comrades who had already infiltrated the city. Among their number were Liberians and a small number of European mercenaries. In the fighting that ensued, an estimated five thousand people died, including cabinet ministers, journalists and lawyers who were specifically targeted. Before the rebels were beaten back, large parts of the city were burned and 3,000 children were abducted as they retreated. While many of the convicted AFRC/RUF collaborators were freed, Foday Sankoh remained in government custody. RUF commander Sam Bockarie, a former *san san boy*, said at the end of January that *"No government can succeed in this country if it doesn't include Foday Sankoh."* Unless the RUF was given a share of power, he said, *"No government can rule. We'll make the country ungovernable."* (Sierra Leone News). He later announced that Johnny Paul Koroma had been named deputy leader of the RUF.

The RUF and its newfound army colleagues defy all definitions and typologies of guerilla movements. Abdullah and Muana argue that the RUF "is neither a separatist uprising rooted in a specific demand, as in the case of Eritrea, nor a reformist movement with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to overthrow. Nor does it possess the kind of leadership that would be necessary to designate it as a warlord insurgency. The RUF is a peculiar guerilla movement without any significant national following or ethnic support. Perhaps because of its social base and its lack of an emancipatory programme to garner support from other social groups, it has remained a bandit organization solely driven by the survivalist needs of its predominantly uneducated and alienated battle front and battle group commanders. Neither the peasantry, the natural ally of most revolutionary movements, nor the students, amongst whose ranks the RUF-to-be originated, lent any support to the organization during the eight years of fighting."

PART 2 - THE SECURITY SITUATION

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Overview

At first glance, the security situation in Sierra Leone seems quite simple – a democratically elected government facing a somewhat loose rebellion of disgruntled former soldiers. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. To begin to understand the true complexity of this conflict, one must understand several fundamental facts.

First, the Sierra Leone conflict is inextricably linked to the security of the entire sub-region, and thus cannot be examined in isolation. Any actions taken with respect to the conflict in Sierra Leone will inevitably have a significant impact on the security situation in and policies of Guinea, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Nigeria.

Second, there is no purely military solution to this conflict. It is a counter insurgency war; total victory, if at all achievable, would take years if not decades of costly bush guerrilla warfare. The best any side can hope to achieve is a modicum of military superiority over their opponent. Given the tactics and strategies employed by both sides, it appears that all parties to the conflict accept this limitation and consequently are continually vying for even the smallest of tactical advantages.

Third, the conflict in Sierra Leone is not solely a military one – there is a significant police dimension to the problem that must be addressed in conjunction with the military aspects of the conflict if peace is to truly take hold in Sierra Leone.

Finally, the security dimension of the conflict in Sierra Leone must be addressed as soon as possible. Without peace and stability, the relief so desperately needed by so many people cannot be delivered. Without security, followed by aid and assistance, there is virtually no hope for economic reconstruction and rehabilitation for this war-torn nation.

At present the overall situation in Sierra Leone is extremely tense. The GOSL and ECOMOG are firmly in control of Freetown proper, which can best be described as secure but not necessarily safe. Both the GOSL and ECOMOG insist that the entire Freetown Peninsula is secure, but this appears to be a somewhat optimistic claim. ECOMOG can guarantee freedom of movement on the peninsula, but current information indicates that there continues to be significant rebel infiltration and information gathering activities throughout the Freetown Peninsula.

Beyond the peninsula, ECOMOG and the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force (CDF), the Kamajors, continue to operate in the southwest one-third of the country and hold several towns in the country, including Bo, Kenema, Port Loko, Mile 91 and Makeni. However, access to these locations is by helicopter only. The transportation system has been severely damaged and those

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roads still serviceable are very vulnerable to rebel attack. As well, ECOMOG forces in these locations are still subject to harassing attacks by the rebels.

The RUF control the northeastern one third of the nation which includes the diamond mining regions. The area in between ECOMOG/GOSL-held territory and those regions held by the RUF is *terra incognita* from a security standpoint. Very little (in fact almost nothing) is known about the situation in rebel-held territories, and information on the situation in these areas is spotty at best. This makes sound operational planning all but impossible. Consequently, progress by ECOMOG and GOSL has to date been painstakingly slow.

There is evidence of foreign military involvement in the RUF from Liberia and Burkina Faso. As well, both GOSL and ECOMOG sources claim that Ukrainian mercenaries are also involved in training rebel forces. There is certainly a significant amount of small arms trafficking in support of rebel forces. Recent events and evidence indicate that small arms are coming from Eastern Europe through Libya, Burkina Faso and Liberia for delivery to the rebels just across the Liberia-Sierra Leone border. Financial support for rebel operations comes from revenue generated by the RUF (either directly or indirectly) from the mining of diamonds in the interior of the country.

It appears for the moment that rebel forces are pausing to re-group following their January offensive. However, this is but a brief respite. Most evidence points to the fact that both sides are furiously re-arming themselves in preparation for the next round of hostilities. The rainy season in Sierra Leone starts in May, after which military operations will likely all but cease until September.

Rumours abound about the next rebel attack, and given the shaky state of the GOSL, chances are reasonable that the rebels may try one more push before the rainy season in the off chance that they just might topple President Kabbah's government. If they do attack but fail to defeat ECOMOG/GOSL, in the absence of a peace agreement, both sides would possibly use the rainy season to prepare for the next round of hostilities in the fall.

ECOMOG

ECOMOG barely escaped a disastrous defeat and ejection from Freetown in January 1999, a fact that has seriously affected the morale of the organization. There have just been major changes in the hierarchy of ECOMOG (to include a new commander, Major-General Felix Mujakperuo). Both the GOSL and ECOMOG troop contributing nations hope these changes will provide the necessary spark for the organization to recover lost ground, both literally and figuratively.

ECOMOG is a multinational force consisting of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, with the overwhelming majority of ECOMOG troops coming from Nigeria. Both President Kabbah and the GOSL Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a Nigerian soldier, Brigadier-General Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, describes ECOMOG relations with the GOSL as "cordial". That said,

the conduct of ECOMOG troops witnessed in Freetown was at times heavy-handed. There were, however, no overt signs of human rights abuses by ECOMOG forces, and the alleged incidents of human rights abuses cited in the recent UN report were flatly denied by both ECOMOG and President Kabbah.

There are signs of tension within the alliance. Relations with the CDF, or Kamajors, appear to be deteriorating. Reliant on ECOMOG for logistical support, the CDF apparently retain a good working relationship with the Guinean contingent of ECOMOG, but their relationship with the Nigerian contingent can best be described as strained. In Freetown, the CDF and ECOMOG now operate their own check points, rather than jointly as was past practice, and there are rumours of overt hostility between the two groups in GOSL/ECOMOG controlled areas outside of Freetown.

As well, there have been some problems with integrating the various contingents into ECOMOG. Upon deployment the Ghanaian contingent, presently guarding Lungi Airport, apparently had some difficulties with initial ECOMOG attempts to employ the contingent piecemeal throughout Freetown and vicinity. They also raised concerns that the entire command structure of ECOMOG was Nigerian. This situation has been addressed and continues to evolve. The Deputy Commander of ECOMOG is a Ghanaian officer, as is one of the senior operations officers in HQ ECOMOG, and all indications are that ECOMOG is making every effort to integrate its various national contingents into the command structure as the Nigerians become more comfortable with coalition operations.

ECOMOG supports the GOSL two-track policy for peace in Sierra Leone, with "track one" being negotiations and "track two" being the establishment of a favourable security situation for these negotiations. (This two-track approach will be described in greater detail later in this report). However, if ECOMOG is to achieve any success in the security track, they will require extensive logistical support. At present this support is provided by a private American firm, Pacific Architecture and Engineering (PA&E). Funded almost entirely by the US government, PA&E provides an effective infrastructure and delivery capacity and significant non-lethal logistical support (i.e., fuel and rations), but overall is insufficient to support the types of operations envisaged by ECOMOG and the GOSL.

ECOMOG and the new Sierra Leone Army (SLA) need significant infusions of logistical support, both lethal and non-lethal, if they are to have any hope of success in executing the security track of the GOSL two-track strategy. Requirements for the SLA will be addressed later in this section. For ECOMOG, all contingents require materiel to fight, move and communicate - activities that they can barely undertake at this time.

More specifically, they need small arms ammunition, light and medium support weapons and ammunition (60mm and 81mm mortars), hand held anti-tank weapons (RPG-7 type) and grenades. They also need transportation equipment, ranging from small trucks to helicopters, the latter being necessary for movement 'up country' where the road systems have been destroyed. Finally, they need the requisite communications means, from the sub-tactical to the Task Force

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level, to permit them to exercise effective command and control of military operations. In addition to all this, they also need continued support with other essential but non-lethal commodities such as rations and medical supplies. Without significant logistical support in these types of materiel, future ECOMOG/GOSL operations will be severely hampered. A list of the requirements to support operations for a three-month period are attached as Appendix 4 to this report.

Government of Sierra Leone

As mentioned above, the GOSL is pursuing a two-track strategy for peace. In addition to their support of ECOMOG, they are also working towards the re-establishment of the new SLA. The GOSL CDS had originally planned for a new SLA of 10,000 troops. However, the Parliament of Sierra Leone only authorized a strength of 5,000 which the UK has undertaken to train and equip (details of the UK training initiative are discussed later in this section).

There are a myriad of problems facing the new SLA, some of the more important ones being recruitment, employment, intelligence and logistical support. There are two dimensions to the recruiting issue. The first is whether the approximately 2,000 demobilized members of the former Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (AFRSL) should be re-integrated into the new SLA and, if so, how to go about doing that. The second concerns the Kamajors and their future in the new SLA. Their leader, Paramount Chief Hinga Norman, would like to see as many of his followers integrated into the new SLA. However, the Nigerians are not at all keen to have a significant portion of the new SLA coming from the Kamajors. The percentage of the recruits presently undergoing training who are from the former AFRSL is not known at this time, but there are few, if any, former Kamajors amongst this first group of recruits.

Employment of the new SLA has also been a somewhat contentious issue. The CDS of the GOSL and ECOMOG wanted to take these troops, give them a bare minimum of training and then, armed with the weapons and ammunition provided by the UK for training the new SLA, ship them off to Waterloo, a town at the base of the Freetown peninsula which also happens to be the forward edge of the GOSL/ECOMOG controlled part of the country. The UK did not agree with this plan of action, and as of the end of March 1999 had suspended training activities with the new SLA and halted a shipment of arms and ammunition destined for the new SLA. These activities have since recommenced.

Both GOSL officials and the CDS bemoaned the lack of intelligence available to them and requested assistance in this area. GOSL officials stated that the UK and US have indicated an interest in helping with the intelligence issue, but this has yet to be independently corroborated. They seem to have absolute faith in the high-tech intelligence capacity they believe the West possesses. Interestingly, they also seem to ignore the considerable indigenous resources available to them (for instance the Kamajors and other parties and groups loyal to the government) and the potential that exists for training the new SLA in intelligence and information management.

The most serious problem facing the new SLA is equipment and logistics. It has virtually nothing. As stated earlier, the UK has undertaken to train and equip a 5,000-man force with basic weapons, clothing and personal equipment. However, they still need ammunition, light and medium support weapons, transportation and communications equipment. A detailed list of the requirements for a new SLA are attached at Appendix 5 to this report.

Other Factors - Friends and Foes

RUF

Although still fundamentally a bush army, the RUF remains a formidable foe. They are well armed and very wily. In December, for instance, they smuggled arms into Freetown in caskets as part of funeral processions which they buried and then dug up just prior to the January attack on the city. More recently, they are now beginning to show sophistication in weaponry and tactics not previously seen.

The RUF still rely largely on hit and run tactics, moving quickly by foot on bush trails to strike at unarmed villages or lightly protected targets of opportunity. They still use terror and mutilation as a weapon, and do not hesitate to use women and children as human shields in their operations. However, their last offensive into Freetown demonstrated a significant capacity to command, control and coordinate rapid offensive operations using a combination of pre-planned operations and good communications at various levels of operation.

Of particular significance is their newly demonstrated ability to site and place obstacles. ECOMOG engineers have reportedly encountered and cleared well-sited antipersonnel minefields (as opposed to scattered nuisance minefields) in the Freetown peninsula as well as anti-tank minefields between Lungi and Port Loko whose purpose was quite obviously to deny and/or canalize ECOMOG movements. ECOMOG personnel have also reported sightings of anti-tank ditches directly east of the Freetown peninsula that appeared to be professionally sited and constructed and, in some instances, covered by fire.

There is little reliable information on the morale of the RUF. There continue to be rumours that some of the former SLA soldiers who joined the RUF are now ready to come home, but there has been no wholesale defection of rebels to the GOSL recently.

Finally, it has been reported that the RUF are in possession of several anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) platforms (12.7mm and 14.5mm) and are beginning to show signs of deploying them together in mutual support as opposed to single platforms or using them in a ground support role. Perhaps of even greater significance is a report that the RUF has captured several SA-7 shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile systems. This information has not been corroborated. However, if this is true, and the RUF begin to employ a gun-missile mix in support of their ground operations, they will possess a significant anti-air capability and will have taken the first steps in the evolution from bush army to an embryonic conventional force.

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Guinea

Apart from Sierra Leone itself, of all the nations in the region Guinea is arguably the one most affected by the conflict. From a pure military standpoint, Guinea has been supporting its ECOMOG operations in both Sierra Leone and Liberia on its own for almost seven years. When war erupted in Sierra Leone, Guinea, a francophone nation, not only provided a battalion to a predominantly anglophone ECOMOG, but also was required to deploy the better part of its military ground forces as well as police resources to secure its border with Sierra Leone. This has placed considerable strain on both the financial resources and security infrastructure of Guinea.

As will be detailed in the humanitarian section of this report, there are approximately 400,000 refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia in Guinea. This influx of humanity and the fact that most of the refugee camps are very close to the border have presented Guinea with almost insurmountable security problems, both external and internal. Externally, these refugees are now the targets of increasingly regular rebel attacks (usually coincidental with food deliveries in the camps). Internally, Guinean security forces are all but overwhelmed with an increase in criminal activity - in volume, in types of crime and in levels of violence - in both the regions of the refugee camps and the capital city of Conakry, which Guinean security officials largely attribute to the influx of refugees from both Sierra Leone and Liberia.

CDF/Kamajors

The CDF/Kamajors (their active strength is unofficially estimated at approximately 35,000) generally operate outside of Freetown and exercise varying degrees of control over areas in the south and southeastern part of the country. They can be an effective fighting force, as demonstrated in their recent (07 April 1999) recapture of the eastern town of Bunumbu. Their command structure is, however, somewhat less structured than a traditional military force, and coordination with ECOMOG is at best marginal. There are reports of occasional Kamajor dealings with the rebels at the local level and of friction with ECOMOG forces. The CDF/Kamajors are largely reliant on ECOMOG for logistical support and have claimed on numerous occasions in the past that they have deliberately been the last to receive material and other forms of support.

The relationship between President Kabbah, the head of the Kamajors (and Deputy Minister of Defence) Paramount Chief Hinga Norman and ECOMOG are reportedly not very good. In addition to being concerned about the sporadic nature of ECOMOG logistical support and the issue of integration of the CDF/Kamajors into the new SLA discussed earlier, the Kamajors are deeply suspicious of perceived Nigerian regional hegemonic designs and commensurate attempts to isolate their organization from future influence in the Sierra Leone government. Thus, post-conflict demobilization and disarmament of the Kamajors could well be a potential future security concern.

The presence of troops from neighbouring countries of the sub-region in support of the rebels as well as foreign mercenaries has had a significant impact on the nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone. In the case of the former, this has provided the rebels with experienced fighters, and in the latter case it may be manifesting itself in training as well as the provision of logistical support.

There is ample evidence that Liberian fighters are an integral part of the rebel force and that the rebels have been receiving substantial support from Liberia and President Charles Taylor. There are no accurate numbers, but they appear to comprise a significant part of RUF field commander Sam Bockarie's forces that are operating in the south of Sierra Leone. The Liberian Government at first denied the involvement of its nationals in the Sierra Leone conflict, but have since admitted that there are Liberians fighting on the side of the RUF, albeit without official Liberian government support or backing. All information indicates that they are involved both in combat operations as well as in the provision of logistical support and the trafficking of small arms.

There were also widespread allegations of the involvement of troops from Burkina Faso in rebel operations, but these allegations have proven somewhat difficult to substantiate. Sources from ECOMOG vary drastically in their views on Burkinabè involvement, with some saying that two of every ten captured rebels are Burkinabè, whereas others claim that no Burkinabè troops have been captured. There seems to be strong evidence of Burkinabè complicity in the shipment of small arms to the rebels, and it is therefore possible to speculate that in support of this operation there may have been Burkinabè military personnel deployed in Sierra Leone. To date, however, there has been little hard evidence of the involvement of Burkinabè combat troops in the Sierra Leone conflict.

There is also compelling evidence that there are foreign mercenaries operating with the rebels. Since the return to power of the Kabbah government, most foreign mercenary involvement appears to have been limited to the provision and delivery of small arms both into and within Sierra Leone, using small planes and helicopters. Nationals from the Ukraine have apparently been the most active in this area, and all parties visited by the Canadian delegation unanimously cited their involvement. There were also uncorroborated reports of nationals from France and Angola being seen in the country connected with shipments of small arms. Recent information, however, points to the distinct possibility that foreign mercenaries may now be involved in limited training of rebel forces, and again the Ukrainians were named by various sources as being part of this effort. It is not known at this time whether the Government of the Ukraine is aware of the level of involvement of its nationals in the conflict in Sierra Leone.

Finally, there is the possibility that private security firms, which are likely still operating in the diamond mining regions of the country, may be providing some form of training to the rebels as part of a cooperative deal with them. This is all but impossible to verify given the lack of access to this region.

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UK

The UK had undertaken to arm, equip and train a 10,000 strong army for the GOSL. The original plan was to create a three-brigade force, with each brigade having three infantry battalions. As discussed above, this figure has subsequently been reduced to 5,000 and there are now approximately 2,500 troops undergoing basic training for the new SLA. There is at present a seven-person UK Army training team in Sierra Leone setting up and conducting this training.

The first shipment of 2,500 uniforms, 2,500 rifles and 2.5 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition for the new SLA was recently delivered. The UK plan to provide personal weapons and some battalion level weapons, to include light support weapons (i.e. light and medium machine guns and 60mm mortars) for the new SLA.

The UK has also recently decided to provide both lethal and non-lethal support for ECOMOG to support their continued operations for a period of three months, a change in their policy from the recent past. Types of support now being considered for ECOMOG includes vehicles and ammunition for mortars and small arms.

US

The US is becoming increasingly active both in the Sierra Leone conflict and the sub-region. The US ambassador to Sierra Leone, Joseph Melrose, still resides in Conakry but has regular and close contact with both President Kabbah and the presidential National Security Advisor. As well, there was a high level visit to Guinea of senior officials from Washington that coincided with the visit of our delegation.

US support for security has been solely through PA&E, the private US firm providing logistic support to ECOMOG. The US government has provided over 2 million \$US to PA&E for non-lethal support. As well, the US has provided training for ECOMOG troop contributors under the auspices of their African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).

The US government is also now actively considering the provision of significant support to Guinea in three areas: environmental protection, anti-terrorist assistance for Guinean internal security forces and military equipment and supplies for 1,000 Guinean soldiers. This will include soft support items such as boots, uniforms and helmets, hard support items such as vehicles, and lethal items such as weapons and ammunition.

UNOMSIL

The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established on 13 June 1998 and its mandate has been extended to 13 June 1999. UNOMSIL staff was significantly reduced following the rebel attacks in January 1999, but have since been slowly increased as the security situation improved. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Mr.

Francis Okelo, has just recently returned to Freetown with some of his staff. His activities and those of the civilian component of UNOMSIL are described later in this report. 22744

The military component of UNOMSIL was mandated to monitor the military and security situation in the country as a whole; monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country including the role of ECOMOG in the provision of security and in the collection and destruction of arms in those secure areas; assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law including at disarmament and demobilization sites; and monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of members of the Civil Defence Forces. At its peak, it consisted of a total of 61 uniformed personnel, including five civilian police monitors.

In January 1999, the UNOMSIL military component was reduced to eight personnel who were moved to Conakry with the intention to return to Sierra Leone as soon as the security situation permitted. They have recently returned to Freetown with the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Subhash Joshi of India. If the security situation allows, the UN plans to increase that number to 14 military observers and one human rights monitor.

UNOMSIL activities have been severely restricted due to the security situation and their reduced numbers. They are, at present, an organization without a job. Prior to their departure, the military observers had good working relations with ECOMOG and many of their current efforts are focussed on re-establishing those relations. Brigadier-General Joshi has as well made numerous personal interventions with the rebels, and appears to be dedicated to committing his scarce resources to support the peace process.

Other Security Issues

The Diamond Connection

There are two vital pillars of support for rebel forces in Sierra Leone – the support provided by Liberia in the procurement and provision of small arms and the financial support to the rebels provided by the diamond trade. There are three important characteristics of this diamond trade. The first is how lucrative this trade is and the amount of money it generates for the rebels. With estimates of the annual value of the diamond trade at approximately \$300 million, diamonds are the financial "fuel" for rebel forces. The second is how very little is known about the mining and trading of Sierra Leone diamonds. Finally, given these two factors, it perhaps should not come as a great surprise to discover just how little is being done by the international community to deal with this crucial source of income for rebel forces.

According to President Kabbah, this frustrating lack of knowledge is partially attributable to the actions of former regimes in Sierra Leone. For huge sums of money, previous governments sold a large number of diamond concessions to numerous international mining companies along with a promise not to interfere in their business. As a result, these rather shadowy companies are now

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firmly entrenched in the diamond mining regions, with well-established communications and transportation networks. The nature of their relationship with rebel forces is not known. It is believed that private security firms protect many diamond mining companies. They will likely prove to be difficult to move out of the way to make room for the reforms in the industry envisaged by GOSL. That said, it is interesting to note that no one with whom our delegation met viewed any form of immediate military operations to recapture or control the diamond mining region as in any way feasible.

Of particular interest is the fact that diamonds from this region are apparently quite unique and can readily be identified as coming from Sierra Leone. Moreover, they are very easy to transport - hence moving them to markets, legally or otherwise, is not a major problem. As well, the diamonds in Sierra Leone are alluvial and thus relatively easy to acquire.

The diamonds and the revenues they generate fund appear to move through a network of middlemen of Lebanese descent who are now indigenous to the region and have been involved in the diamond industry for over 60 years. Sierra Leone diamonds have allegedly turned up on the diamond markets of Beirut as recently as March 1999. Little, if any, action has been taken to control or regulate the trade of Sierra Leone diamonds, which has permitted rebel forces to re-arm and re-equip themselves with new and modern weaponry not often seen in a bush army.

Trafficking in Small Arms

There is ample evidence to show that several nations in the sub-region are heavily involved in the procurement and transfer of small arms and ammunition to the conflict in Sierra Leone, and that this trade is closely linked to the diamond mining industry in Sierra Leone.

It appears that arms are procured in eastern Europe (either Bulgaria or Ukraine) and moved to Tripoli, Libya where they are transferred to ships or charter aircraft for shipment into the region. Air shipments are staged through Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and then continue on to Liberia, where they are transferred to smaller aircraft or trucks for delivery into rebel-held territory in Sierra Leone.

Both Liberia and Burkina Faso have denied any involvement in the trafficking of small arms, but solid evidence exists that firmly implicates both nations. In late March, 1999 there was an air shipment (in a Ukrainian chartered aircraft) of over 68 tonnes of small arms that was recently delivered to Sam Bockarie in southeastern Sierra Leone. This shipment was flown to Ouagadougou, where the aircraft sat for several days on the presidential tarmac, as the Ukrainian crew refused to fly to Monrovia, saying their job was to simply deliver the arms to Burkina Faso. The shipment was transferred to another aircraft and flown to Monrovia, where it was subsequently delivered to Bockarie in Sierra Leone. This latest shipment was announced by ECOMOG on April 8, 1999, but our delegation had been made aware of its existence during its trip to the region.

Libyan involvement seems to be more as a conduit as opposed to a source of small arms. Both Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh were trained in Libya, but given the fact that there is a ready source of income, it is unlikely that Libya is providing their services for free. It is interesting to note that it appears there are no arms going into Sierra Leone through Guinea. The Guinean armed forces have apparently effectively sealed their borders to all but the smallest of smugglers, but at a tremendous cost to that small nation.

The small arms issue has recently taken on added gravity. The recent (08 April 1999) threat by the ECOMOG commander to launch air strikes into Liberia and Burkina Faso if the flow of small arms into Sierra Leone through those two nations is not curbed immediately is a new and highly volatile dimension of this conflict with region-wide and perhaps global implications.

Police

Sierra Leone

The other critical dimension of security for the GOSL is civilian police. The capacity of the Sierra Leone police was virtually destroyed during the rebel offensive in January 1999. An estimated 200-300 police officers were murdered by the attacking RUF, and the Sierra Leone Police Headquarters was totally destroyed. The Police Academy in the town of Hastings, just south of Freetown, was also apparently destroyed.

There is a police presence on the ground in Freetown but no police activity outside the capital city was reported. Police duties in Freetown appear to be restricted to unarmed traffic control and manning (along with armed ECOMOG soldiers) some but not all of the myriad of roadblocks in the city. Although contact with Sierra Leone police officials was severely limited, it appeared evident that the police presently do not possess the capability to conduct anything but the most rudimentary of police tasks. They did not seem to have any form of criminal investigative, counter-drug or anti-fraud capacity. They also lack the means and ability to provide training in any of the aforementioned police skills. As well, like the new SLA, the Sierra Leone Police do not have any of the equipment needed by a police force.

There did not appear to be concerted effort to train or restructure the Sierra Leone police force - all efforts seemed focussed on the military. President Kabbah did say that he has approached the Commonwealth for assistance in strengthening the police force, not only in police skills but personnel matters such as recruiting. Last fall, the Commonwealth provided a needs assessment for the police (an RCMP officer participated as a member of the Commonwealth team) and was also involved in the provision of training and equipment for the Sierra Leone police. Any future Commonwealth police training will, however, likely have to wait until the security situation has improved.

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Guinea

As stated earlier, Guinea has borne the brunt of the exodus of refugees from both the Sierra Leone and Liberian conflict, and this has caused serious external and internal security problems for this small and impoverished country. The Guinean authorities have a clear understanding of the external threat and have reacted by strengthening their border security, which has stretched their military forces to their very limit. However, what they were not prepared for was the staggering increase in crime - not only in volume but in the variety of crimes as well as the associated levels of violence - that they believe is directly linked to the dramatic increase in the refugee population in Guinea.

The needs of the Guinean police force are significant. They require not only general logistical support (communications equipment and vehicles) but also specialized equipment such as fingerprint kits, special equipment to protect them from criminal weapons (vests and helmets) and drug testing equipment. Perhaps of even greater importance is their need for training. They require instruction in most modern police skills, ranging from crime detection to investigation to prevention. They need to train policemen and police trainers. Moreover, this training must be conducted in French.

Conclusion

As mentioned at the outset of this section of this report, the conflict in Sierra Leone is extremely complex and inextricably linked to the security of the entire West African sub-region. Indeed, the complex nature of this deadly regional conflict, combined with the limited duration of our delegation's visit, precludes the formulation of thorough and in-depth conclusions. That said, it is certainly possible to draw three very general conclusions about the situation in Sierra Leone.

First, it is safe to conclude that currently there is no peace to keep in Sierra Leone, and therefore no role for a peacekeeping force or operation. Granted, there is at present a bit of a lull in the action, but it is not peace. Unless there is a military victory (unlikely) or a negotiated armistice or peace agreement, the military mission of the GOSL and ECOMOG (a war fighting or counter insurgency operation) will remain unchanged. Only if hostilities were to cease could a peacekeeping or peace support operation be contemplated.

Second, it is evident that there is no purely military solution to the Sierra Leone conflict. Further, the GOSL two-track policy is the course of action that, with goodwill and good faith, has the best chance of success.

Finally, without adequate security, none of the activities so desperately needed in Sierra Leone - political, humanitarian or economic - can take place. Any potential Canadian initiatives in the security sector should accordingly concentrate on enhancing security in Sierra Leone in two ways - the provision of political support and/or pressure aimed at reducing external support for or

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involvement with rebel forces, and the provision of materiel and/or training support to
ECOMOG troop contributing nations and the GOSL.

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PART 3 - HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

The scope of the humanitarian tragedy in Sierra Leone is absolutely staggering. Eight years of war has resulted in 75,000 dead. As mentioned above, a horribly destructive rebel offensive on Freetown in January has virtually completed the disintegration of this tiny, impoverished nation of 4.2 million. The state structure of Sierra Leone and the democratically elected government of President Kabbah are hanging by a thread. The country has been traumatized by violence, human rights abuses and atrocities on a massive scale. Very large portions of the population are now relying on international assistance for the provision of the basic necessities of life such as food, shelter, clean water and medicine. And as horrendous as the human tragedy is now, it could get worse.

One of the problems in understanding the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Sierra Leone is that the country has effectively been divided into two areas. As mentioned above, the Freetown peninsula and a few of the major towns are controlled by the GOSL, ECOMOG or the Kamajors. The rest of the country is under varying degrees of control by the RUF or other rebel factions. In the words of a Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) report released at the end of March: *"The real tragedy of Sierra Leone may not be the horrors already reported, but those as yet unreported from the interior, and which could be taking place at this moment. In a country of already scant resources, malnutrition and disease are serious threats, particularly for the children. Sadly, but bluntly, neither MSF nor anyone else really knows what is going on inside much of Sierra Leone today."*

The two principal challenges facing humanitarian actors in Sierra Leone are the questions of security and of access to those in need, particularly the displaced who are by far the most vulnerable. In fact, the United Nations agencies estimate that over one million Sierra Leoneans have been displaced. Other relief agencies such as MSF suggest that the figure is much higher, between one and three million. In any country, the movement of these numbers of people would be disastrous. In Sierra Leone, the poorest country in the world according to the United Nations, it has produced indescribable suffering.

The hard statistics of Sierra Leone's refugees and internally displaced persons cannot convey the personal misery of this national nightmare. According to the most recent report of the Secretary General to the United Nations Security Council after eight years of war, there are now 700,000 people internally displaced within Sierra Leone - 250,000 of whom are in Freetown. In addition, there are 400,00 refugees in Guinea and another 100,000 in Liberia. The most recent fighting in January resulted in thousands of additional refugees in Guinea. While it is very difficult to get a precise figure, officials at the UNHCR and the Government of Guinea are in the process of trying to conduct a census of refugees.

During our stay in Guinea, our delegation travelled to the southern border of Guinea and Sierra Leone to visit the sprawling refugee camp at Forecariah. We were surprised to find Liberian refugees in this camp, who had fled from their own country to Sierra Leone, only to have to flee

the latter. In Guinea, the situation is complicated by the movement of some Sierra Leonean refugees back across the border during the day to farm their lands, returning to the safety of the camps in Guinea by night. Also, many Sierra Leoneans are now living with relatives in Guinea and, as a result, are not officially registered. This massive influx of refugees has placed an unmanageable financial burden on Guinea, which is also one of the poorest countries in Africa.

Most importantly from a humanitarian standpoint, since the January offensive by the RUF, virtually all international relief workers have evacuated the interior of Sierra Leone because of security concerns. In addition, most relief activities by national staff have also ceased. There is a very serious concern on behalf of agencies operating in Sierra Leone that the fundamental principles of humanitarian law and respect for human rights are not being observed. Foremost among these is the principle of access to those who are in need of assistance and that of political neutrality, the strict non-involvement by the relief agency on one side or another.

In recent months, there have been serious problems between ECOMOG and some relief agencies, namely the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which was expelled from Sierra Leone in mid-January. ECOMOG claimed that the careless use of two-way radios by the ICRC gave away the positions of some of their soldiers and resulted in 20 Nigerian casualties. The ICRC has strongly denied the accusation. As a result of the ICRC controversy, the Government placed serious restrictions on the use of communications equipment which NGO's insist they need for logistic and security reasons. Also, ECOMOG has not facilitated access to the interior by relief agencies. Although the communications equipment issue appears to be in the process of being resolved, there remains a considerable amount of distrust between the Government authorities, ECOMOG and the NGO community.

As a result of the adverse security environment in rebel held areas, there is evidence that suggests assistance provided by non-governmental organizations is in some instances being diverted or stolen by the rebels. This had led to Government concerns that food and medicine are not reaching those in need, and has unfortunately added to the Government's suspicion of NGO efforts.

While there have been problems between the Government, ECOMOG and the NGO community with respect to the delivery of relief assistance, it must be emphasized in the strongest possible terms that the primary responsibility for the humanitarian disaster currently taking place lies with the RUF and their supporters. The complete and utter disregard by the rebel forces of any of the most basic rules of warfare or humanitarian law has left the civilian population in the interior of the country, especially those in the north and the east, completely vulnerable.

While the humanitarian assistance needs of Freetown have generally been well-defined, many of the needs in the hinterland outside of Bo and Kenema are largely unknown. If and when the security situation improves as ECOMOG is able to extend the areas over which it has authority, it is very likely that the humanitarian needs will significantly increase as aid agencies discover what are expected to be conditions of extreme hardship. In some areas, the problem of starvation

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is real. Whether it is food aid, medicine, shelter, assistance for amputees, women and children, it is very probable that the humanitarian requirements will be enormous.

Although there has been considerable bilateral aid (see Appendix 7), the results of the UN Consolidated Appeal for Sierra Leone has been underwhelming. The appeal requested \$27.9 million U.S. dollars in funding but has to date received only four million dollars.

The Shelter Problem

A very serious shelter crisis is emerging in Freetown which is based on two factors. First, a tremendous number of Sierra Leoneans have sought refuge in Freetown as a result of the conflict. Indeed, Freetown is one of the few safe havens in Sierra Leone. Second, the RUF attack on Freetown in January resulted in the devastation of large parts of the eastern areas of Freetown near the Wellington Industrial Park and the Kissy area. The crowded urban landscape of Freetown - the fact that there seems to be an extraordinary number of people on the streets - is perhaps the most visible evidence that Freetown's infrastructure is strained to the breaking point in terms of handling this additional population. A complicating element is the impending onset of the rainy season.

The United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that between 65-80 percent of the homes in the east of Freetown were destroyed. Our delegation toured the eastern areas of Freetown where we saw the massive destruction - burned out and destroyed homes and businesses - that the rebels had caused. Although eastern Freetown was hit hardest, there were pockets of devastation from the eastern edges of the city through to the centre. Only areas in the western portion of Freetown, which the Nigerian troops in ECOMOG held throughout the fighting in January, remain without damage.

While the number of internally displaced persons in Freetown is estimated at 250,000 people, it is extremely difficult to determine a precise number. Many of the internally displaced have sought accommodation with relatives, neighbours and friends. While some facilities in Freetown, such as the stadium, housed as many as 64,000 people during the January attack, that number has been reduced to 5,000. The National Workshops, an old railway repair facility, houses approximately 13,000. The balance of the internally displaced in Freetown are in other smaller facilities or have been absorbed in this city which now has at least one million people.

The visit our delegation made to the National Stadium was instructive in helping us understand the challenges faced by the relief personnel in the provision of shelter. Our group was met by the stadium camp administrator, who accompanied us on a brief tour. There were children all over. During the day, blankets, towels and clothes were hung everywhere. The vast majority of people who are housed here sleep on towels or blankets under the seating area on the bare concrete. While we were there, some people were eating their noon meal, which consisted of corn meal, eaten from plastic bowls and without utensils.

There is a medical clinic in one of the rooms in the stadium and some limited special facilities have been put in place for pregnant women and new mothers. There is a birthing area and a room with a few extra blankets on the floor for mothers and their newborns. When our group went through, there were probably about a dozen new mothers. The doctors at the clinic must deal with many illnesses, but the most common appear to be children's ailments - measles, malnourishment and diarrhea. In regard to the problem of diarrhea, which is one of the leading killers of young children, the clinic is equipped to provide rehydration therapy. As many as 2,000 children have undergone rehydration therapy. Surprisingly, given the large number of people who had and were using the stadium for shelter over a three-month period, only one fatality occurred. The doctor who accompanied the delegation told us of a stillborn child who was delivered only a few hours before our group arrived.

While the concrete facilities at the National Stadium appeared tidy but uncomfortable for the masses of people that have called them home over the last three months, the "National Workshops" are cramped, dusty, dirty and squalid. Built earlier this century as maintenance sheds for Sierra Leone's long gone railway locomotives and cars, these facilities looked as though they have not been in service for decades.

Slightly larger than a community hockey arena, these "workshops" were home to about 13,000 people. When the fighting broke out in Freetown in January, some of the people who arrived at this facility had fled from other internally displaced persons camps in other areas of Sierra Leone. Our delegation was told that some had been housed in two, three and, in some cases, four other camps. When they arrived, there was one tap, which produced hardly more than a trickle of water and one lime pit toilet for 9,000 people. The provision of food, water and sanitation has since improved significantly at the workshops since they were first established.

We were advised that one of the most difficult aspects of the camp, especially for the women, was the complete absence of privacy. As our group walked through this facility, it was not unusual to see a family of five or six people occupying a space about three metres by three metres. It is very difficult to understand how these people have sustained this lifestyle for the past three months. It is bare subsistence, nothing else. As with the National Stadium, our group noted the tremendous number of children everywhere.

Efforts are being made to construct new shelters adjacent to the National Workshops and in eight other areas around Freetown. While we were not in a position to see the other areas where new shelters are being constructed, the progress at the National Workshops certainly appears slow. These new shelters are constructed with long poles about 7-10 cm in diameter. The frame is covered with a plastic sheeting and in some cases the structure sits on a concrete base. Opaque plastic dividers separate spaces of approximately three metres by three metres. Some of the ones that we saw had merely a dirt floor, but we were told that gravel would be used to ensure proper drainage and to keep the floor dry. Suffice it to say that those of us who saw the shelters are somewhat sceptical that they will be sufficiently durable and rainproof to withstand the torrential rains that Sierra Leone can expect next month.

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The plans of the OCHA for shelter at the National Workshops and the eight other camp sites show only enough shelter for 16,800 people. However, at the present time, approximately 50,000 families are targeted for shelter and non-food assistance in Freetown and areas in the hinterland such as Bo, Kenema and Kambia. Since February, the U.S. Office of Foreign Development Assistance has provided approximately 1,600 rolls of plastic sheeting and 50,000 blankets which has the potential to provide shelter and non-food items to about 10,000 families. However, it is going to take a herculean effort by all concerned to ensure that the population of Freetown has adequate shelter with the onset of the rainy season.

In addition to the basic shelter needs, our group also heard a plea for additional non-food assistance. In particular, officials with the National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation (NCRRR) told us that there is an urgent need for household items - goods such as cooking utensils, pots, pans, bowls, dishes, plates, cutlery and soap well as jerry cans for water. It was also apparent to us that, if possible, cots would be far preferable to sleeping mats in these shelters especially in the rainy season.

In the longer term, the housing stock of much of the eastern portion of Freetown must be rebuilt. During our tour of the devastated eastern sections, we did see evidence of reconstruction. Residents are struggling against the deadline that the rainy season imposes. Mud bricks are being used to build small new shelters although it appears that many types of building material such as tin for roofing, windows, etc. may be in short supply. Access to credit in order to acquire loans for rebuilding has also been very restricted as only a very small number of banks have re-opened since the fighting in January. Interestingly, during our meeting with President Kabbah, he mentioned Canada's expertise in the area of pre-fab low-cost housing and spoke of Maurice Strong's involvement in the UN Habitat project. He added that "We don't want it for free, but need repayments organized over several years."

Amputees

While it is hoped that the serious shelter problem in Sierra Leone can be addressed with building materials and financial resources, some of the physical and emotional scars that are borne by the men, women and children of Sierra Leone will be present for generations. The practice of amputating and mutilating civilians has become the trademark of the RUF, their calling card. As a terror tactic, the practice began in the early 90's but seemed to have attracted international attention during the first free democratic elections in 1996. To discourage people from voting during those elections, RUF leader Foday Sankoh issued orders to his men to cut off the hands of people who had cast a ballot. (Those who had voted received an ink mark on their hands.) The tactic was not successful. Often voting at great personal risk to themselves, the people eventually elected President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. For those in the rural areas, the amputations were particularly cruel since they destroyed the livelihoods of many rural subsistence farmers who were rendered incapable of working the soil.

MSF currently reports treating hundreds of civilians who have had one or more hands, arms, legs or ears amputated by rebel forces. Many of the victims are young children, even some infants. It was also noted that instances of amputations and mutilations by the rebels increased dramatically when they were forced to retreat from Freetown in January. MSF has also publicly stated that their experience in 1998 indicates that for every amputee victim who makes it to hospital, there are several others who never receive medical care and die from their wounds.

A visit to the Connaught Hospital in Freetown and the ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) amputee camp at Murray Town brought our delegation face to face with the horrible atrocities this conflict has produced. The ADRA camp contained about 250 amputees as well as other family members who had fled areas in the interior of the country that had come under rebel attack. At the camp, our delegation was met by the assistant administrator and escorted on a tour of the camp by a spokesperson chosen from among the amputees - a young man in his early twenties.

The camp's accommodation consists of mud dwellings, old sheds and some new plastic shelters which had been constructed, similar to the ones we had seen at the National Workshops. The camp spokesman explained to us how he had become a victim. He said that he was from the north of Sierra Leone, but that he was studying in the eastern area of the country when the rebels arrived. In addition to robbing and looting the area, the rebels inflicted death and mutilation upon the inhabitants. They then demanded that the young man's uncle hold his arm while they chopped it off. When the uncle refused, they shot him. These rebels severed the young man's right arm with a machete about half way between his elbow and his wrist. His right ear was also sliced off.

The camp administrator led us outside where the young man explained the purpose of our visit to the amputees and their families. It was here that our delegation saw a little girl four years old - probably the youngest amputee victim in the camp. The RUF rebels had cut this little girl's arm off at the shoulder. She was accompanied by both parents - each of whom had a hand chopped off. The horrific brutality that was inflicted on that poor child and her parents is in many ways symbolic of the nihilistic violence that has brought Sierra Leone to the brink of complete destruction.

A few hours later, our delegation was at the Connaught Hospital in the centre of Freetown. There were another fifty amputees, male and female, being treated in two wards. Dr. Kamara, the chief surgeon of the hospital and a nurse matron accompanied us with a TV crew from a local station. The doctor explained to the patients in Krio that our delegation was from Canada and that our mission was to assess the condition of the people in Sierra Leone, so that Canada could provide assistance.

The doctor also explained that during the crisis in January Connaught Hospital was flooded with victims. The hospital has 250 beds, but treated upwards of 350 people when the fighting broke out. Amputees and people with gunshot wounds were treated in some cases on the grass in the

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little courtyard. Our delegation observed bed after bed of young and old with bandaged limbs and blank stares. It is in the faces of the people who have been the victims of this tragedy that one sees utter despair - like the man whose both hands had been cut off by the rebels.

Judging from the age and gender of those occupying the hospital beds, there appeared to be no rhyme or reason to who was chosen as a victim. The violence certainly appeared to be completely indiscriminate. Once again, our delegation saw more evidence of the victimization of children - another little girl with her left leg amputated a few inches above her knee. She was about eight years old. The doctor advised that the youngest amputee he had treated was two and a half years of age.

It is difficult to determine with any precision the number of amputees in Freetown or indeed Sierra Leone as a whole. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the number in the Freetown area is between 1,000 and 1,500. There are also hundreds of amputees among the refugee population who have fled Sierra Leone. Because of the state of medical care in the country, reliable statistics are virtually non-existent.

Although we were advised that the situation concerning the amputees would improve with the provision of prosthetics by groups like Handicap International (HI), our delegation does not recall seeing one prosthetic device while touring either the camp or the hospital. At a meeting of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in Brussels at the end of March, it was noted by HI that whatever service was being delivered in Freetown was being done on an *ad hoc* basis by non-experts because of security limitations. The problem is particularly difficult for children, who, because they are growing, need to be refitted periodically with new devices. In addition, it is also extremely important that psychological assistance be provided to the victims of atrocities at the earliest opportunity.

Food Aid

A March 15 assessment of the food supply in Sierra Leone contained in a report by the OCHA stated that *"unless food security agencies are given access to get the population started on food production, the country is likely to slide further into a major food emergency in the coming months."* The report goes on to say that: *"The outlook for agricultural input is grim given the present circumstances. End of year projections in 1998 by food agencies in Sierra Leone forecasted a yearly requirement of 483,000 metric tons for the entire population. Approximately half of this was to come from commercial imports, 17 percent from food aid, ten percent from milled rice from the 1997-98 harvest with a projected 23 percent food deficit."*

These projections have been overtaken by events to the extent that the existing situation is now much more pessimistic. The rainy season is already known as "the hungry season" in Sierra Leone. This year, it could be even more so. For instance, the harvesting of inland valley swamp rice which should have occurred between November and January was severely disrupted due to rebel activities. In addition, land preparation, which is normally done during February to get the

land ready for the planting of upland rice, cassava, maize and groundnuts in April and May has also be seriously disrupted. If the planting season is not successful, the year end harvest will be insufficient to meet Sierra Leone's needs.

The total value of food aid being shipped into Sierra Leone on an annual basis is \$50 - 55 million U.S. per year. The main agencies involved include the World Food Program, CARE, the Catholic Relief Service and World Vision. CIDA has contributed \$5.6 million (CDN) toward the Sierra Leone Emergency Food Support which began in April 1997 and continued through to November 1998. World Vision Canada has been at the forefront of this effort procuring and shipping 3,800 metric tons of Canadian commodities valued at over \$3 million including wheat, lentils and canola oil. As of October 1998, over a quarter of a million people had received World Vision Canada / CIDA food aid commodities.

The current situation poses serious challenges. The March, 1999 report of the Secretary General on Sierra Leone noted that: *"The suffering of vulnerable civilian populations is exacerbated by increasing levels of malnutrition especially among children under five years of age. Preliminary surveys show that in some areas as many as 25 percent of the children are suffering from acute malnutrition."* The Secretary General's report also drew attention to a warning issued by the World Food Program that, if the roads to Freetown were not opened soon allowing the free flow of commercial imports and food from upcountry, food shortages were possible in the city in the near future. The situation in Freetown seems to have eased somewhat. In the last week of March, approximately 3,000 metric tons of food aid arrived from CARE of the United States. The shipment included wheat, corn, vegetable oil and lentils.

In other parts of the country, however, adequate food remains a serious concern. In January and February, aid workers had described the situation in Bo and Kenema as desperate with some people dying of starvation. Recently, however, some traders in Guinea and Freetown have been able to transport supplies to the two towns by ignoring the government's ban on boat traffic. They have transported both food and fuel by sea to the coastal and estuary towns of Shenge and Gbangbatok avoiding roads which are rebel held. While it is a very risky business (it is estimated that 400 people have drowned in boat sinkings since the beginning of March), the profits are considerable. A 100 pound bag of rice which sells for 38,000 leones (about \$38 Canadian) in Freetown will fetch 90,000 leones in Bo and 100,000 in Kenema.

Still, the situation in Bo and Kenema remains critical. The latest report from OCHA states that 80,000 people in these two towns are facing severe food shortages. It goes on to say: *"The situation worsens day by day as the SRSG and food agencies explore ways in which they can safely bring food in sufficient quantities to the people of Bo and Kenema."*

However, the reports that are getting out about conditions in the interior, such as one on March 20 from the town of Makeni, indicate that food, fuel, medicine and other essential commodities are in very short supply and that serious hardship is being caused for local inhabitants. Another

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recent report out of the northern town of Kamakwie stated that at least 20 people per day were dying from starvation, lack of medical attention and rebel atrocities.

Our delegation heard from one NGO official involved in food aid that, once security is restored in Sierra Leone, the country will be in need of assistance with a long-term strategy for food production. Sierra Leone has the capacity to feed itself and produce enough for export. In fact, the country was self-sufficient in food in the 1960's and it is said by some that if its arable land was properly utilized it could feed all of West Africa. Another food NGO representative that our group spoke with indicated that it was not unreasonable to believe that with the proper conditions Sierra Leone could return to self-sufficiency in food production in two to three years.

Unfortunately, distortions in the marketplace as a result of monopolistic practices that have developed (arrangements between businesses and politicians) have also caused serious problems. In order for food security to be re-established once again, the small producer must be encouraged. Until the security situation changes substantially, it is likely that Sierra Leone will be in a position where it must rely on a substantial amount of outside food aid.

The Children

The children of Sierra Leone have borne the brunt of the conflict. Whether it is in the refugee camps of Guinea, the displaced persons camps in Freetown, the malnutrition and disease that is everywhere or the child soldiers, it is the children of Sierra Leone who are the victims. It is estimated that the eight years of conflict have resulted in the separation of 12,000 children from their families. UNICEF is struggling to put in place programs which will re-unite children with their families. While they have had some success with the National Family Tracing and Reunification Network, it continues to be an uphill battle. One of the most disturbing facts of the rebel invasion of Freetown in January was that it resulted in the 3,000 children reported missing. It is believed that they were abducted by the rebels and that they are not receiving sufficient food or care. Of this figure, the most recent information available for this report indicated that 256 children had been re-united with their families including 51 recently released by the rebels. The location of the other children is simply not known.

Certainly one of the most high profile issues that has come out of the war in Sierra Leone has been the issue of child soldiers. The Secretary General's March report to the Security Council noted that *"A significant number of the rebel combatants were children. Reports were received of death and injuries being inflicted by boys as young as eight to 11 years old."* One of the means by which these young children are drawn into the conflict is through a process called "de-institutionalization." In many cases, these children are forced by the rebels at gunpoint to kill family members or neighbours. By committing an act of violence against people close to them, not only are they traumatized, they also cannot go back to their families or their communities because of fear of retribution.

The rebels have found this to be a very useful method of socializing these children into a life of extreme violence. In fact, the children also begin to "attach" or bond with their commanders. Their blind obedience, combined with the effects of alcohol, drugs and a popular belief in juju spirits, convince them of their own invincibility and make them some of the most courageous and disciplined fighters within the rebel factions. The rebels' widespread use of child soldiers - and the countries that sustain their activities - deserve the strongest condemnation by the international community. Unfortunately, our delegation also saw evidence on the streets of Freetown of under-aged combatants who were evidently part of the Kamajor forces. While the Kamajors are supportive of the Government of Sierra Leone, it would seem the Government is able to exercise very little control over Kamajor activities.

Yet another one of the tragedies of this conflict has been the massive numbers of victims of sexual abuse. Many reports both by the media and international agencies have corroborated instances of individual and gang rape of girls and young women who have been rounded up by the rebels. Many rape victims were said to have been subsequently mutilated or murdered. Others have been abducted and have been forced into service as porters, cooks, sex slaves and spies. When our delegation met with NGO's in Freetown, it was evident they believed that this was a problem of significant proportions which was not being adequately addressed. The strong stigma attached to a victim of sexual abuse in West African society meant that many young women and girls were simply not coming forward for psychological treatment.

Also of great concern is the issue of education. The Ministry of Education has reported that 300 schools were damaged or destroyed throughout Sierra Leone in the period following the May, 1997 military coup. After the January fighting in Freetown, 64 government schools, both primary and secondary, were closed because of damage. Another 30 schools are currently being used for shelter. There are no schools functioning in the interior of the country even in towns that have Kamajor protection like Bo, Kenema and Makeni.

The full school population of Sierra Leone is between 600-700,000. The primary population is estimated at 350,000. The number of primary school age children now receiving some form of education is estimated at about 30-35,000. In many of the schools in Freetown, instruction occurs for only a few hours per day since a large number of teachers have left the country. Textbooks, benches and desks have been looted or burned as fuel. Many children have lost up to three years of education, and as a result, are losing their future. One encouraging project worthy of note is an initiative that was launched recently by Mr. Peter Penfold, the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone. Through this project, schools in Britain will donate educational materials and equipment to Sierra Leone.

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PART 4 - POLITICAL AND PEACE PROCESS

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The Two (Three) Track Policy

The situation in Sierra Leone should be viewed as a test of the global community's commitment to democracy, human rights and human security. A last minute reaction by ECOMOG and the arrival of new troops was necessary in early January to prevent the rebels from seizing Freetown and the fall of the democratically elected government of President Kabbah. The official policy of the GOSL and its allies has not changed since the unfortunate events of January 1999. On the one hand, peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and negotiation is encouraged, and on the other, continued military pressure on the rebel forces is felt to be necessary, to force them to negotiate. As has been mentioned earlier, this is the two track policy.

Our delegation is of the view that this policy is sound and should be encouraged. To improve its chances of success, a third track should be added - the determined involvement of the international community. Without external support, be it diplomatic, military or humanitarian, the conflict in Sierra Leone, which actually is a regional conflict, has the potential to destabilize the whole of Western Africa.

Obviously, the GOSL and ECOMOG are now attempting to win points in the field and better position themselves so as not to negotiate from a position of weakness. This suggests to certain doubtful observers that the government is favouring the military solution over peaceful negotiation. Our delegation does not share this view. The recent three day meeting of the National Consultative Conference on the Peace Process (NCCPP) is a further proof, if one was required, that the GOSL is genuinely committed to the double track policy.

The Rebels Agenda

The true intentions of the rebel forces are not clear, but we know that the rebels are diverse and multi-faceted. Composed of the RUF of Foday Sankoh, the AFRC, warlords that are more or less autonomous, foreign combatants (Liberians and possibly Burkinabè), and even Ukrainian mercenaries - it is a complex mix of individuals and organizations. Some of their ranks clearly believe in a military victory, which just eluded their grasp last January. Other rebels apparently see no need to negotiate and are satisfied with the present situation since they control the diamond area, the principal source of the country's wealth. Some would be happy to leave the bush and end the guerilla warfare if only they could be sure they could rejoin the Sierra Leone army or benefit from the rehabilitation program. In short, the rebels are driven by various motives. Apart from a general rejection of a corrupt political class referred to in their only major political statement "Footpaths to Democracy" published in 1995, the rebels appear not to have a formal agenda. Indeed, one could argue that since then the RUF has engaged in such gross human rights violations, mutilations, amputations, sexual assaults, and murders, that they have lost any legitimacy that they might have been able to claim based upon any previous political platform.

Since the events in January, all the allies of the legitimate government, with the exception of a few hawks around President Kabbah, recognize that a military victory is impossible and acknowledge the necessity of opening a dialogue, if not negotiation, with the rebel forces. President Kabbah has clearly been under strong pressure to do this from Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea. While they are resolved not to let the rebels win, these countries do not want to get bogged down in Sierra Leone in perpetuity. They want a negotiated regional solution which will put an end once and for all to the pillaging of rebel troops in the sub-region.

Everyone also considers that the first stage in the peace process is a meeting between Foday Sankoh, in jail since 1997, and his men. This meeting is scheduled to take place in Togo in late April. It is expected to last about a week.

In addition to allowing the rebels to develop a common platform with a view to negotiations, the Togo meeting will also serve other purposes. It will serve to identify the different leaders of the rebellion, particularly the ones who matter. Apart from Sam Bockarie ("Maskita") and Omrie Golley, little is known of the other protagonists, since Sankoh's principal commanders were sentenced to death and executed last November.

This meeting will also be a means of gauging Sankoh's hold over his troops. Some believe that Sankoh no longer has the control over the rebels that he did in 1996. This is disturbing, as Sankoh is regarded as a lesser evil. There even appears to be an effort by the GOSL to reinforce his legitimacy as spokesman for the rebels.

Finally, this meeting will help establish whether Sankoh is truly sincere in his desire to make peace. Thus far he has said from prison everything that had to be said, but there are questions as to his sincerity. Some feel that, in jail and with a death sentence (against which he is appealing) hanging over his head, Sankoh had no other option than to cooperate with the GOSL. This uncertainty explains Kabbah's insistence that Sankoh return to prison after the Togo talks. Kabbah wants to see what will happen in Togo and how Sankoh will behave before deciding, if the appeal fails, to pardon and release him.

The Negotiators

The representative of the UN Secretary-General, Francis Okelo, and the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) are the two stakeholders at the origin of the Togo meeting. Both have met with Kabbah and Sankoh and apparently established relations of trust with the two leaders. It is their intervention that has allowed Sankoh radio contact with Bockarie. The IRCSL will also be attending the Togo meeting at Sankoh's request. Both Okelo and the IRCSL should be supported.

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The Abidjan Accord

A document prepared by the government in consultation with the NGOs will be submitted to the attention of Sankoh and his supporters. It is reasonable to believe that this document will reiterate the essential elements of the Abidjan Accord, for all agree that the latter must constitute the basis for any new agreement, especially since Foday Sankoh accepted the legitimacy of President Kabbah. But that was in 1996. Given recent developments, it is unclear whether Bockarie will continue to support Sankoh's position on recognition.

Moreover, the Abidjan Accord has many flaws that will have to be addressed. As it is now, it is almost a dangerous document. It has no implementation, monitoring and dispute resolution mechanism. One will have to be incorporated in any new deal. Given the enormous mistrust between Kabbah and Sankoh, it will also be necessary to provide for a series of confidence-building measures. President Kabbah has said that he expected a peace accord to be reached before the end of April. This statement appears overly optimistic.

Striking a political deal with the rebels will not be an easy task. The situation can be resolved ultimately only by a negotiated settlement. That the RUF has to be a party to the solution is self-evident. This does not mean, however, that they will want to be part of it; more so in the light of the conclusions of the recently held NCCPP. Indeed, at this meeting, the NCCPP reaffirmed the resolve of the population to oppose any idea of power-sharing with the rebels before the next election. They also insisted that RUF leader Sankoh's appeal should go through the due process of law. The debate around the amnesty issue will also prove to be a delicate balancing exercise to manage. Some are of the view that the RUF could, in a first instance, be cooperative if it had the promise and the support to transform itself into a political party. But, as seen above, the RUF is but one component of the conflict.

Moreover, most of the NGO's our delegation met have insisted on the necessity of not setting any artificial deadline for the talks. They believe a sustainable peace will require all the protagonists to take a hard look at what has happened in Sierra Leone, what has gone wrong, the type of values that should guide reconstruction of the country, and the nature of the institutions the country will want. From their perspective, the best that can emerge from the Togo talks is a cease-fire agreement combined with a commitment to undertake (a) an in-depth examination of the real, deep-rooted causes of the conflict, and (b) a dialogue on the type of country desired.

The Regional Dimension of the Conflict

Concurrently with this national effort, it is clear that a sustainable peace cannot be achieved in Sierra Leone without the involvement of the countries in the region, both those that support President Kabbah (Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea) and those that support the rebels (Liberia and Burkina Faso). In fact, without Liberia collaborating actively with the RUF, the rebels would have undoubtedly faltered after the ECOMOG offensive in February 1998, which resulted in the restoration of the Kabbah government. The rebellion has certainly benefited from important

outside support, and the peace process would have to take into account the regional dimension of the conflict.

There is undoubtedly a francophone-anglophone dimension, and malaise, to this conflict. The francophone countries as a whole are uncomfortable with Nigeria, a regional power that they claim tends to act unilaterally. They criticize Nigeria for doing whatever it pleases, with no dialogue with the other players. They criticize it in particular for having transformed ECOMOG from a neutral response force into a partisan occupying force. Nigeria and Ghana, on the other hand, are suspicious of former sympathies that some francophone countries had for Charles Taylor at the time of the civil war in Liberia.

Politically, it would be desirable for other francophone countries in the region to supply troops for ECOMOG. Many of the people that our delegation met felt that France should be more involved in the search for a lasting peace in the sub-region. For instance, it could be asked to use its influence to convince Senegal and/or Benin to send troops to Sierra Leone. This may require that a "western" country (e.g. Canada) provides logistical support. It was suggested that France might also be convinced to use its influence with both President Taylor and Compaoré to curb Liberia and Burkina Faso's assistance to the rebels.

The Mechanisms

Supported by SRSG Okelo, ECOWAS, which already has the Group of Six (Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria and Togo) mechanism in place is probably in the best position to pilot any discussions. But it will need the continued support of the international community, of countries like U.K., USA, France and Canada, of international organizations like the UN, the Commonwealth and the francophonie, to deal with the regional dimension of this conflict, among other things. It is in fact difficult to see how ECOWAS could by itself arbitrate a resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The mediation of a neutral and respected outside party will likely be necessary.

There is another *ad hoc* mechanism, the Contact Group on Sierra Leone, an initiative of the UK, which met in New York on April 19 for the second time in recent months. It is a group made up of donor countries as well as multilateral agencies (the UN family, the World Bank, the Commonwealth, the European Commission and ECOWAS). Its purpose is to sustain, widen and help co-ordinate international support for Sierra Leone and ECOMOG. Eventually, when peace and stability return to Sierra Leone, it is intended that this group will help to mobilize the necessary financial resources towards the reconstruction of the country.

The Security Council, although it spends roughly 60% of its time dealing with African issues, has come under criticism for a lack of substantive action on security issues on the continent. In this regard, the Security Council, with its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, has an important role to play in the search for a solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. To date, this has included the establishment of a sanctions regime, in addition to the existing

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sanctions on Liberia; the establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission, UNOMSIL; and the authorization of ECOMOG's presence in Sierra Leone. Earlier attempts to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation were blocked by the RUF. The security situation in Sierra Leone is such that UNOMSIL's mandate cannot be delivered at present. The authorization remains active, and a small number of personnel remain in Conakry and Freetown, so that the UN presence can be increased rapidly when circumstances permit.

The Council's inability to act more vigorously on Sierra Leone can be attributed to: i) the absence of key conditions for a 'classic' UN peacekeeping deployment (i.e. cease-fire, consent of the parties); ii) the difficulty associated with deploying a UN peacekeeping operation given the great danger to peacekeepers and the great difficulty of access and supply; iii) the fact that ECOMOG's presence lessens or eliminates the requirement for a more robust UN peacekeeping operation; and iv) the reluctance of some Council members (especially the US) to commit additional resources to new and/or invigorated peace support operations.

ECOWAS countries providing troops to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone would welcome greater attention from the Security Council including financial assistance to underwrite the cost of the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone.

Canada's Role

If Canada decides to become more involved, it is clear that our contribution would be most welcomed. Many senior officials in the region, including the President of Sierra Leone, the Prime Minister of Guinea and the Vice President of Ghana, made this point very clear to our delegation. In addition, some noted that our membership in both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie could help bridge the gap between Anglophone and Francophone Africa. Our first move should be to request to participate as an observer at meetings of the ECOWAS Group of Six. The US and the UK are already doing it. Ambassador Traoré of Côte d'Ivoire has assured us of his government's support in this regard. Canada could play an important support role in the dialogue/negotiations process since it is perceived as "neutral" and with no "hidden agenda" in this matter. For example, through its Peacebuilding Fund, Canada could provide competent NGOs with the financial support to assist in the peace process and the national reconciliation effort.

Canada has the potential to play a significant and meaningful role in the resolution of the crisis in Sierra Leone. However, in order to become an active participant in the diplomatic effort, Canada must be prepared to make a substantial contribution to the security and humanitarian needs of the country.

CONCLUSION

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Although in the region for a relatively short time, two facts became readily apparent to our delegation. First, the crisis in Sierra Leone parallels in many respects the crisis in Kosovo in terms of the scale of the human tragedy. Regrettably, it has received little international attention.

The precarious nature of the situation and its potential impact on the entire region of West Africa cannot be stressed enough; the country is on the brink of becoming a West African version of Somalia. If this happens, there is every chance that it will drag the rest of the region down with it. Urgent action is required by Canada and other members of the international community now.

Second, despite the seriousness of the circumstances, there is in fact a glimmer of hope for the country and the region as a whole. There exists now a narrow window of opportunity for the international community to assist Sierra Leone to back away from the abyss. The breadth and depth of assistance required is daunting but not unattainable, and it will require a concerted and coordinated effort in the political, security and humanitarian arenas on the part of the international community. It but remains to galvanize that support so desperately needed by the people of the region to start Sierra Leone and its neighbours back on the path of democracy, reconstruction and long-term stability.

The degree of destruction in this tiny West African nation (the poorest on the face of the Earth according to the UN Human Development Index) and the depth of suffering of its people alone are enough to merit our collective global compassion. There are, however, other equally compelling reasons for continued and even expanded Canadian involvement in the region.

Like Canada, Sierra Leone is a member of the Commonwealth and, in fact, traces its origins back to 1792 when freed slaves from Nova Scotia helped establish Freetown. Like Sierra Leone, we share a colonial past and many similar traditions and institutions in terms of our legal, political and administrative structures. Moreover, as the top-ranked nation of the UN Human Development Index, Canada has a certain special obligation to help those at the opposite end of the scale. The protection of civilians in conflict and the plight of women and children in war torn societies, both serious issues in Sierra Leone, are two pillars of the human security agenda championed around the globe by Canada and reflect the fundamental values and respect for humanity that characterize Canadian society today.

The GOSL's two-track strategy is the only realistic option under the circumstances. With the necessary commitment from all parties concerned, it has some chance of success. This report has tried to outline a third supporting track involving the more active, concerted and direct involvement of the international community. Whether it is the provision of financial support to those regional organizations involved in the negotiations for peace, political support for the Government of Sierra Leone's first (or negotiation) track through international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council or acting as a link between the anglo- and

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francophone African nations, there could well be an important political role to be played by Canada in both Sierra Leone and in the sub-region.

However, it became quite apparent to our delegation that political support was not going to be enough to stave off a further deterioration in the situation. Indeed, success in the government's second track (security) appears to be almost a prerequisite for success in the first. Our delegation shared the view of the GOSL, and virtually every other government visited, that there is no military solution to the conflict in Sierra Leone. The security track is best dealt with by a regional force such as ECOMOG which is responsive to the problems of the region. If ECOMOG is to succeed in doing what is expected of it, however, it will need both the political and logistical support of the international community. To that end, Canada should continue to support ECOMOG and seriously consider expanding that support to include some form of lethal support as well.

Security issues are not restricted to military matters. There is a serious need for all types of support for civilian police activities, both in Sierra Leone and in neighbouring Guinea. Canada was involved in the Commonwealth police initiatives in Sierra Leone last year, and should this initiative be reactivated, future Canadian involvement might well be both warranted and desirable. As well, the expertise resident in numerous Canadian police forces and the ability of Canadian police forces to provide training in French puts Canada in a good position to investigate the feasibility of providing equipment and training to police forces in Guinea.

The scope of the humanitarian dimension of the conflict in Sierra Leone is huge, and the potential for it to expand is even larger - there is so much to be done. In the short term, shelter, food and medicine are the most immediate needs, and of special note is the desperate need for both physical and psychological treatment of the non-combatant victims of the Sierra Leone conflict, particularly the children. Short term assistance will not be enough, for the very infrastructure of Sierra Leone society has been severely damaged. The country must have the ability to absorb and make best use of the assistance provided, so to that end there is a need now to begin rebuilding the capacity to implement long term activities in areas such as agriculture. Lastly, long term development aid is not often considered at the forefront of peace negotiations. In Sierra Leone, however, there is considerable potential for longer term aid to be used as an effective tool in the ongoing peace process.

The scale of suffering and the needs of Sierra Leone are truly astounding, particularly when experienced first hand. One does not have to be there long to realise just how fragile the situation is in both the nation and indeed the region. Yet, despite all the dangers, there is hope among the people of Sierra Leone that peace and stability may be within their grasp.

Canada has the potential to play an important leadership role and to make a significant contribution to the peace and security of this impoverished and war torn part of West Africa.

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APPENDICES

- Appendix 1 - Terms of Reference (Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs)
- Appendix 2 - Map of Sierra Leone
- Appendix 3 - List of Meetings and Participants
- Appendix 4 - List of Requirements to support ECOMOG operations for a three month period
- Appendix 5 - List of Requirements for a new SLA
- Appendix 6 - The Abidjan Accord
- Appendix 7 - National Contributions to Sierra Leone

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Appendix 1

March 22, 1999

Mr. David Pratt
M.P. House of Commons
Room 325
Confederation Building
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Dear Colleague,

Thank you for your letter of February 22, 1999, in which you kindly forwarded your suggestions concerning your role as my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone.

I found your comprehensive views very insightful, and I agree that the overall objective of your mission is a fact-finding one with particular areas requiring special attention. I propose that your mission should focus primarily, as you rightly pointed out, on the political situation faced by Sierra Leone both internally and in relation to its neighbours, on negotiating prospects, on the support for the rebels, as well as on the flow of arms in the region. While it should be easy to meet with President Kabbah's government, it would be premature at this difficult and delicate juncture to meet with the RUF and AFRC.

As you are engaged in the preparatory stages for your mission, I would take this opportunity to encourage you to look carefully at the humanitarian situation and the conditions of Sierra Leonean refugees and displaced persons and the UN Secretary-General's report, released on March 5, 1999, which paints a bleak picture of the situation in Sierra Leone. The Director General of Humanitarian Assistance at CIDA, Mr. Hunter McGill, has been recently in Freetown, and he should be in a position to give you good advice on human security issues including the role of the various humanitarian agencies in Sierra Leone.

I believe it will be helpful to identify the actors in the conflict and their objectives (what has driven all the parties in the conflict and how Sierra Leone got to where it is today), the role of neighbouring countries, the consequences on children involved in the conflict, the impact of mercenaries and evidence of their countries of origin, the role of the diamond industry on the current situation, and, above all, possible scenarios for the future of Sierra Leone.

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The issue of the flow of arms into Sierra Leone should be examined seriously since it will continue to have a major impact on the peace and stability of that country. In this connection, I would recommend that you explore how arms control initiatives, such as the Mali experiment on small arms, could be applied to Sierra Leone.

I would be most interested in your candid assessment of the efficacy of current UNT involvement, including the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Okelo, in promoting a negotiated settlement among all parties, as well as the overall effectiveness of the UN mission, UNOMSIL. Moreover, I would ask you to assess how best to integrate the protection of children and children's rights in all efforts to restore peace and security in Sierra Leone, including peacemaking and peace-support operations. I also hope you are able to gain a sense of how ECOMOG forces are managing, and how they are viewed by the local population.

As you know, I am interested in exploring options for a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) role in peacebuilding, for Sierra Leone. The information and insights you gather will therefore be of particular relevance for my participation in the CMAG meeting at the end of April. For example, are there neglected areas or opportunities for peacebuilding where CMAG or the Commonwealth could play a useful role?

Another area that you may want to explore is how the current UN sanctions regime militia be strengthened. What are the views of international staff based in the country in this regard?

In light of the objectives outlined above, short time lines, and, may I say, budgetary constraints, I would see your subsequent visit limited to Accra, Conakry, and Freetown with a possible stop in London for meetings with the Commonwealth Secretariat. I would propose that two officials from this Department accompany you on your trip -- an officer familiar with regional security issues and a political advisor.

Thank you again for sharing your concerns with me.

Sincerely,


Lloyd Axworthy

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Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2



LIST OF MEETINGS AND OFFICIALS MET**UN - 19 MARCH 1999**

John Hirsh, VP International Peace Academy, US Ambassador to S/Leone, August 1995-June 1998

Francis Okelo, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in S/Leone

H.E. Fode Dabor, Ambassador and Chargé d'Affaires of S/Leone

H.E. John Leigh, High Commissioner for Sierra Leone to Canada and Ambassador of S/Leone to UN

H.E. Stewart Eldon, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of the UK

Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN

Luncheon Hosted by H.E. Nancy Stodenburg, U.S. Ambassador and Representative for Special Political Affairs:

Ambassador Melrose, U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone

Ambassador Sklar, Responsible for Administrative and Budgetary matters

H.E. J.E. Wilmot, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the UN

Ibrahim Fall, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs

Heidi Anabi, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Felix Downes-Thomas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia and

Head of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, Monrovia

LONDON - 22 MARCH 1999

David Lord, Director of Conciliation Resources and

Ron Fennell, Associate of RR

Dr. Moses Anafu, Special Advisor, Political Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat

James Bevan, Head of African Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Tony Lloyd, MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONAKRY-GUINEE - 24 MARCH 1999

Prime Minister: H.E. Mr. Lamine Sidime

Minister of Defence: H.E. Mr. Dorank Assifat Diassény

Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (also Minister of Interior):

H.E. Mr. Moussa Solano

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Minister of Foreign Affairs: H.E. Mr. Zaïnoul Abidine Sanoussi
Prefet of Forecariah: Mr. Mamadouba Bangoura

FREETOWN SIERRA LEONE - 25/26 MARCH 1999

President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah
Hon. Sahr Mattari, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Dr. S.V.M. Jah, Commissioner of the National Commission for Resettlement,
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (NCRRR)
General Kobe, Chief of Defence Staff
Dr. Julius Sonny Spencer, Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture
H.E. Peter Penfold, British High Commissioner to S/L.
Sheku Mohamed Fadril Kutubu, Speaker of the House
Mrs. Zanda Bangura, Head of the Campaign for Good Governance
Members of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone
Kade Sesay, National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights
Nigerian High Commissioner to Sierra Leone: Ambassador Abubakar

At Connaught Hospital:

- Medical matron / Mrs. Jbow
- Medical Officer: S.I. Kamara

At the National Workshop (IDP) Camp:

Care representative Mr. Mohamed Lukman
Adventist Development and Relief Agency - ADRA: Mr. Prince Cummings

CONAKRY-GUINEE - 27 MARCH 1999

Ambassador of Ghana to Guinea: H.E.Mr. James Ernest Akrong Kotei
Ambassador of Cote d'Ivoire to Guinea: H.E. Mr. Armel Koudou Aziegbo
Chargé d'Affaires of Nigeria: Mr. B.P. Fadumiyo
FAO representative: Mr. Moorosi Raditole
UNDP representative: Mrs. Tamba Balde
UNICEF representative: Mr. Ahmed Nasin
WHO representative: Dr. Nsu Milang

UNHCR representative: Mr. K.O. Amaning
USAID representative: Mrs. Mary Mertens
European Union representative: Mrs. Marie-Pierre Auger
HACU representative: Mr. Robert Painter

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ABIDJAN-COTE D'IVOIRE - 28 MARCH 1999

Amadou Traoré, Directeur, Département Afrique, Ministère des Affaires étrangères

ACCRA-GHANA - 28/29 MARCH 1999

Atta Mills, Vice-President
Annan Cato, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence, Lt-Col Enoch Donkor
Dr. Baffour Agyeman-Duah, Associate Executive Director,
Centre for Democracy and Development
Lt.General Arnold Quainoo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution
Ole Blicher-Olsen, Ambassador of Denmark
Kwame Karikari, Director, School of Communications, Legon
Kabral Blay-Amihere, President, West African Journalists Association

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Appendix 4

ECOMOG SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR THREE MONTHS OPERATIONS

1. HELI HRS. REQ'T IS FOR M126 HRS AT 80 PER MONTH IE 240 HRS.
2. AMMO. RPG7 RDS X 4500
BOMB 60MM HE X 2000
BOMB 60 MM ILLUM X 500
BOMB 81MM HE X 2000
BOMB 81MM ILLUM X 500
7.62MM BALL BELTED X 20000000
7.62 MM BALL NATO X 1000000
105MM HE FOR PACK HOW X 1000
3. WEAPONS. 7.62MM GPMG X 81
60MM MORTAR X 36
81MM MORTAR X 18
THEODOLITE ARTY SURVEY (MILLS) X 1
4. VEHS/GENERATORS. CARGO TRUCK/TCV 4 TON X 30
3/4 TON LAND ROVER X 30
AMBULANCE LAND ROVER X 3
25 -30 KVA GENERATOR X 10
5. CLOTHING/STORES GS. PONCHOS/RAIN SUITS X 10000
COMBAT SUITS X 10000
BOOTS X 10000
TOWER SAWS X 20
COMPOSITE FIELD RATIONS X 20000

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Appendix 5

LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REQUIRED BY REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
MILITARY FORCES FROM CANADA

Serial No.	Items	Quantity Required	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
	NON_LETHAL ASSISTANCE		
1.	5 Ton Cargo Truck	84	Diesel Engine
2.	3/4 Ton Jeep (FFR)	44	Petrol/Diesel Engine
3.	3/4 Ton Jeep (GS)	55	Petrol/Diesel Engine
4.	Ambulances	19	Petrol/Diesel Engine
5.	Recovery Vehicles	19	Diesel Engine
6.	Fuel Tankers	17	Diesel Engine
7.	Water Tankers	17	
8.	Low Loaders	16	
9.	3.5 KVA Generator	30	
10.	5 KVA Generator	30	
11.	20-30 KVA Generator	20	
12.	65 KVA Generator	6	
13.	HF Radio (On Static Role)	28	
14.	HF Manpack Set	112	
15.	VHF Manpack Set	140	
16.	Hand held Radio	490	
17.	Fit For Radio Vehicles (FFR)	21	
18.	Public Address System	14	
19.	PABX System with 250 Lines	14	

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20.	Field Telephone Switch Board	70	
21.	Linesman Telephone Sets	140	
22.	Fast Photocopying Machine	140	
23.	Electric Typewriter	280	
24.	Manual Typewriter	280	
25.	Duplicating Machine	140	
26.	Fax Machine	140	
27.	Slide Projector (35mm)	20	
28.	Overhead Projector	20	For Viu-Foil
29.	Film Projector	13	
30.	Field Binoculars	400	
31.	Tents (Marque/16 Pounder)	100	
32.	Desktop Computer Set	240	Preferably 32 KB
33.	Scanner Machine	5	
34.	Risograph Machine	3	150 pages per minute
35.	Video Camera	20	Betamax/VHS
	<u>UNIFORM ITEMS</u>		
36.	Uniforms	20,000 Pairs	7,000 - Medium 4,000 - Large 2,000 - X-Large 1,000 - XX-Large
37.	Boots	20,000 Pairs	8 - 5,000 9 - 4,000 10 - 3,000 11 - 2,000
38.	Web equipment	15,000	

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39.	Ponchos	15,000	X-Large - 2,500 Large - 5,000 Medium - 5,000 Small - 2,500
40.	Socks	15,000	
41.	Hats	15,000	Large - 5,000 Medium - 5,000 Small - 5,000
	<u>MEDICAL EQUIPMENT</u>		
42.	Hospital Beds/Mattresses		
43.	Hospital Beds/Mattresses		
44.	Surgical Operating Table		
45.	Urine Collection Bags		
46.	General Surgery Sets		
47.	E.C.G. Machine And E.C.G. Papers		
48.	Cabinet Surgical Instruments		
49.	Male Patients Pajamas		
50.	Wooden Clutches		
51.	Cabinet Bed Side		
52.	Dressing Drugs (All Sizes)		
53.	Food Trolley		
54.	Medicine Trolley		
55.	Splints (Hand and Leg)		
56.	Pillow Covers		
57.	Bed Covers		
58.	First Aid Field Dressing Kit		
59.	Holder Chart		
60.	Flex Testing Hammer		

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61.	Gown Hospital Patient		
62.	Blankets		
63.	Bed Pans		
64.	Drip Stand		
65.	Sphygmomanometer		
66.	Stethoscope		
67.	Stretcher (Amb. Wheeled)		
68.	Stretcher (Hospital Wheeled)		
69.	Examination Couches		
70.	Instrument Trays		
71.	Sterilizer		
72.	Auto Clave		
73.	Wheel Chair		
74.	Catheters (All Sizes)		
75.	Burns Pack Emergency		
76.	Suture Materials (All Sizes) (a) Dexon (b) Vincryl (c) Catgut (d) Silk		
77.	Fac Mask (Disposable)		
78.	Theatre Caps		
79.	Body Bag		
80.	Operating Gowns		
81.	Surgical Blades		
82.	Auroscope		
83.	Kocher Thyroid Forceps		
84.	Cheattle Sterilizer Forceps		

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85.	Mitchel Clips Extracting Forceps		
86.	Kocher Artery Forceps		
87.	Cocker Towel Clipos		
88.	Barnes-Episiotomy Scissors Angled		
89.	Spencer Wells Artery Forceps		
90.	Ramply Sponge Forceps		
91.	Littanther Ligature Scissors		
92.	Cutting Scissors		
93.	Probe General		
94.	Bryants Dressing Forceps		
95.	Lister Sinus Forceps		
96.	Single Oxygen Flow Metre Tubing		
97.	Nipple and MK402 Prole		
98.	Kidney Dishes		
99.	Diagnostic Set		
100.	Resuscitator		
101.	D X Set		
102.	Laboratory Refrigerator		
103.	Cold Chain Kit		
104.	Blood Refrigerator		
	<u>LETHAL ASSISTANCE</u>		
	<u>ARMS</u>		
105.	G3 Rifle	1,000	
106.	RPG7 Launcher	250	
107.	60MM Mortar Tube	400	
108.	120MM Mortar Tube	80	

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109.	Gren 30mm Launcher (AGL)	432	
110.	A Twin Barrel	12	
111.	Night Sight for RPG 7	300	
112.	Bags for RPG 7	300	
113.	105mm HOWIZITER	15	
	<u>AMMO</u>		
114.	Carts 7.62 x 51mm	2,000,000	Ball
115.	Carts 7.62 x 39mm	2,000,000	
116.	Carts 7.62mm Tracer	500,000	
117.	Carts 12.7mm Tracer	200,000	
118.	Carts 12.7mm Ball	500,000	
119.	Carts 14.5mm Ball	2,000,000	
120.	Bomb ML 60mm Mor HE	25,000	
121.	Bomb ML 82mm Mor HE	20,000	
122.	Gren Hand No 36 HE	10,000	
123.	Gren Hand Stick Type	5,000	

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Appendix 6

Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUFISL).

Moved by the imperative need for a just and durable peace in Sierra Leone;

Inspired by the equally imperative need for Genuine national unity and reconciliation to end the fratricidal war in Sierra Leone;

Committed to promoting, popular participation in governance and full respect for human rights and humanitarian laws;

Dedicated to the advancement of democratic development and to the maintenance of a socio-political order free of inequality, despotism and corruption

Convinced that a sense of common purpose and patriotism is the need of the hour;

HEREBY AGREE as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two foes will ensure that a total cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE 2

The Government and the RUF/SL undertake that no effort shall be spared to effect the scrupulous respect and implementation of the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement to ensure that the establishment and consolidation of a just peace becomes a priority in Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE 3

A national body to be known as the commission for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established within two weeks of the signing of this Agreement. The Commission shall be a verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement.

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The Commission, in fulfilment of this task during the period of consolidating the peace, shall co-ordinate and facilitate the work of the following bodies which" will proceed to establish:

- (i) Socio-economic Forum; (ii) Citizen's Consultative Conferences; (iii) Multi-partisan Council;
- (iv) Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace; (v) Demobilization and Resettlement Committee;
- (vi) National Budget and Debt Committee.

The Commission shall **comprise representative of the Government and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone**, drawing on the resources of state and civic institutions as and when necessary.

The Commission shall have the power to recommend the preparation of enabling measures contained in this Peace Agreement. It shall have the power to issue publicly its conclusions. The parties undertake to comply with the conclusions of the Commission.

The Commission shall have the power to prepare preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the implementation and development of the provisions contained in the present Peace Agreement.

The Parties undertake to consult the Commission before taking decisions on measures relating to the present Peace Agreement.

The Commission may similarly consult the Parties at the highest level whenever it is appropriate.

The Commission shall have access to and may inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Peace Agreement. The Commission shall have full powers to organise its work in the manner in which it deems most appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it may deem useful in the discharge of its functions.

The Commission shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and adequate secretariat support staff.

A Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established to provide funding for the implementation of the present Peace Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Citizens' Consultative Conferences shall be organised once a year the first of which shall be organised within one hundred and twenty days of the signing of the present Peace Agreement in order to encourage people's participation and to invite recommendations for the formulation of guidelines and their implementation that will ensure truly fair and representative political processes.

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ARTICLE 5

The disarmament of combatants will be effected upon their entry into the designated assembly zones, and demobilization and reintegration as soon as practicable thereafter.

The upkeep and welfare of the encamped combatants shall be the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, assisted by the international community.

ARTICLE 6

The Parties commit themselves to a well planned national effort on encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement linked to national development objectives. To that end, a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall be established within a month of the signing of the present Peace Agreement.

The Committee shall coordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of RUF/SL combatants. The Committee shall work in coordination with all the relevant institutions and agencies.

Both Parties shall consult on the nomination of the membership of the Committee which shall not exceed seven persons.

The Committee shall be provided with adequate funding.

ARTICLE 7

The Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall identify assembly zones and camp areas for RUF/SL combatants where they shall be registered, encamped and disarmed. The movement into the Assembly Zones shall commence within once month of the signing of this Agreement and be completed as soon as practicable but no later than three months from this date.

ARTICLE 8

The Parties shall request the international community to help supervise and monitor the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The Joint Monitoring Group shall have observers at any of these processes.

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ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, as a priority, make recommendations on the restructuring and re-orientation of the military as well as its leadership. In this context, members of the RUF/SL, who may wish to be part of the country's military can become part of the new unified armed forces within a framework to be discussed and agreed upon by the Commission.

ARTICLE 10

The Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure the return to barracks of those units of the army not required for normal security duties and the downsizing of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (RSLMF), taking into account the security needs of the country.

ARTICLE 11

A Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) from the international community shall be responsible for monitoring breaches provided under this Peace Agreement.

Both Parties upon signing this Agreement shall request the international community to provide neutral monitors. Such monitors when deployed shall be in position for an initial period of three months.

The Neutral Monitoring Group shall report any violations of the ceasefire to its headquarters which shall in turn communicate the same to the headquarters of the Joint

Monitoring Group comprising of representative of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF based in Freetown.

ARTICLE 12

The Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group. Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier.

ARTICLE 13

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The Parties agree that immediately following the signing of the present Peace Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to function as a political movement with the rights, privileges and duties provided by law; and that within thirty days, following that, the necessary conditions shall be created to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political movement according to law.

ARTICLE 14

To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization up to the time of the signing of this Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee former RUF/SL combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE 15

The mandate and membership of the existing National Unity and Reconciliation Commission shall be expanded in consultation with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to enable it to undertake a sustained and effective campaign of civic education aimed at enhancing, national unity and reconciliation, taking into account the imperative need to heal the wounds of the conflict.

ARTICLE 16

The Parties agree that the standards of accountability, integrity and probity in the public services of Sierra Leone shall be raised. To that end, immediate steps shall be taken to establish the office of Ombudsman to promote the implementation of a professional code of ethics, and the integrity and patriotism of all public servants. . shall also seek to eradicate all forms of corruption. .

ARTICLE 17

The Parties shall approach the international community with a view to mobilizing resources which will be used to establish a trust fund to enable the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party.

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ARTICLE 18

The Parties agree to the principle of reforming the present electoral process in Sierra Leone. There shall, in that regard, be the full participation of citizens and their organizations in formulating electoral reforms.

The independence and integrity of the National Electoral Commission shall be guaranteed to ensure fair and acceptable electoral exercise.

In reconstituting the National Electoral Commission, the President shall consult all political parties and movements including the RUF/SL to determine the membership and terms of reference of that Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field 'm the nation's electoral politics.

Both the Government and the RUF/SI, shall, together with other political parties, nominate men and women of professionalism, integrity and objectivity to the National

Electoral Commission, not later than three months after the signing of the present nt Peace Agreement.

It is hereby agreed that no member of the National Electoral Commission shall be eligible for appointment to a political office by any government formed as a result of an election they were mandated to conduct.

ARTICLE 19

The Parties agree that the basic civil and political liberties which are recognized by the

Sierra Leone legal system and are contained in the Declarations and Principles on Human Rights adopted by the UN and the OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, shall be fully guaranteed and promoted within Sierra Leone society.

These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture; the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.

To foster national reconciliation and ensure the full and unrestricted participation of the RUF/SI, in the political process, the RUF/SI, shall enjoy:

- (i) freedom of the press and access to the media in order that they may be heard and informed.
- (ii) freedom of association, expression, assembly and the right to mobilise and demonstrate freely, and to communicate politically in order that they may organise effectively and set up appropriate infrastructure.

All political prisoners and prisoners of war, if any, shall be released.

ARTICLE 20

To monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement, as well as to promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including schools, the media, the police and the military, an independent National Commission on Human Rights shall be established.

In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN Special Commission on Human Rights, UN Centre for Human Rights, African Commission on Human and People's Rights and other relevant international organisations.

The National Commission on Human Rights shall have the power to investigate human rights violations and to institute legal proceedings where appropriate.

Further, a consortium of local human rights groups shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights observance.

ARTICLE 21

The Parties undertake to respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

ARTICLE 22

In the pursuit of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development of Sierra Leone as a matter of the utmost priority, special attention shall be given to rural and urban poor areas, war victims, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups. The Government in conjunction with the Committee for Demobilization and Resettlement shall co-operate with all political parties and movements, including the RUF/SL, to raise resources internationally for these objectives during the initial phase of the consolidation of peace.

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ARTICLE 23

The Government shall do all in its power to mobilize resources internally and externally to meet the needs of the post-war reconstruction and socio-economic development.

ARTICLE 24

The Parties agree that the independence of the Judiciary shall be strengthened in accordance with its role of ensuring the fair and impartial dispensation of justice in a democratic order. The composition of the present Judicial and Legal Service Commission shall be determined so as to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the other organs of state as well as the political parties. Its membership shall include, in addition to judges and representatives of the legal profession and public services, representatives of other sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice.

ARTICLE 25

The Police Force shall be strengthened to ensure that the rule of law is upheld throughout Sierra Leone. To that end, the present Police Force shall be vetted. Furthermore, the professional training of the Police Force shall henceforth assure a new orientation, by emphasizing professionalism, the importance of human dignity and democratic values and respect and protection of human rights. It shall, further, emphasise that the conduct of members of the Police Force shall be free from all partisan considerations of politics, ideology and social position and that the Police Force shall avoid and combat corruption.

Nominations for the Police Council will come from wider sectors of society prior to their appointment so as to ensure their truly civilian and non-partisan character.

ARTICLE 26

It is recognised that there is a socio-economic dimension to the conflict which must also be addressed in order to consolidate the foundation of peace. Accordingly, the socio-economic policy of Sierra Leone shall be guided among other things, by the following principles, taking into account available resources:

- a. **Enhancement of the nation's productive capacity through meaningful grassroots participation in the reconstruction and development of the country;**
- ii. **The provision of equal opportunities to all Sierra Leoneans especially those in the countryside**

and the urban poor, with the aim of equitable distribution of the nation's resources thereby empowering them to contribute effectively to decision-making and implementation of policies which affect their lives;

iii. Improving the quality of life of the people through the provision of,

- a. primary health care in all villages and towns;
- b. affordable and quality housing, especially in the countryside and poor urban areas;
- c. improved educational services to enable all children of primary and junior-secondary school age to receive free and compulsory schooling as well as provide the opportunity for the youth and all other Sierra Leoneans to receive affordable quality education;
- d. clean drinking water and sewerage system in every village and town;
- e. provide job opportunities in a systematic and sustainable way for the people, especially the youth;
- f. promote and sustain rural development and support agriculture in terms of technical, credit and marketing facilities;
- g. provide support for production and provision of basic food and nutritional requirements of the people and food security in general;
- h. protect the environment and regulate the exploitation of natural resources in the interest of the people, as well as prohibit monopolies;
- i. provide the required infrastructure such as roads, transport and communications, energy and rural electrification, for improved living conditions, especially of the rural people;
- j. seek to obtain debt relief in order to transfer funds from debt servicing to meet the urgent requirements of rebuilding a war-torn society.

ARTICLE 27

A broad-based Socio-economic forum, in which the RUF/SL shall participate, shall be established with a view to enriching policy formulation and execution in the socio-economic sector.

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ARTICLE 28

The Government of Cote d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth shall stand as moral guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

Annex to this Agreement:

A nationwide sensitization program for the peace process shall be pursued by the Parties, using all available means of communication to impress upon their combatants and the nation at large:

- the fact that hostilities have ended; - the reasons for demobilization; - the opportunities for reintegration of combatants; and - the need for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Done in Abidjan this 30 day of the month of November, 1996.

Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Henri Konan Bedie
President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire

Perhanu Dinka
Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Sierra Leone

Adwoa Coleman (NYS)
Representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Moses Anafti (DR)
Representative of the Commonwealth Organization

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Appendix 7

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO SIERRA LEONE SINCE 1 JANUARY 1999

COUNTRY	COMMITMENT (\$CAD)	DESCRIPTION
Australia	193,129	Humanitarian aid via UNICEF
Canada	1,000,000	ECOMOG - for Ghanian contingent demolition kits, mine detectors search lights, generators, lighting systems, portable water purification plant and spare filters
China	1,502,787	Military aid to Nigeria and Guinea specifically for their operations in Sierra Leone
France	144,000	To NGO Handicap International
Germany	480,892	Radio equipment for Ghanian contingent of ECOMOG
Ireland	401,545	For WFP and Concern NGO
Italy	2,855,295	Food aid via WFP
	150,279	Relief items via UNOCHA
	150,279	For ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau
Japan	1,651,664	Humanitarian aid via UNHCR and UNICEF for refugees and IDPs
Netherlands	1,502,787	To UN Trust Fund for S.L.
	N/A	Use of 70 DAF trucks
New Zealand	79,347	To UNICEF for child soldier and rape victim programmes
Russia	N/A	Use of two helicopters (for UNOMSIL and delivery of humanitarian assistance
Sweden	2,404,459	Humanitarian aid via UNICEF, WFP, OCHA and UNHCR

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UK	4,808,918	Logistical and humanitarian support for ECOMOG and GOSL: emergency medical supplies, rice, disinfectant, trucks, field ambulances, transport of Ghanaian contingent, communications equipment
	961,784	Ration packs, tents
		Humanitarian and logistical assistance in kind provided by British naval vessels deployed to Freetown for nine weeks
	24,044,590	Assistance to ECOMOG: three month helicopter contract, trucks and spares, ammunition and light weapons
		Train and equip democratically accountable Sierra Leone Armed Forces: training of trainers, uniforms, personal equipment, tents, rifles and training ammunition for 2,500
		Assistance to facilitate political dialogue/negotiations
	2,154,396	Humanitarian projects through NGOs
	240,446	Local, small-scale humanitarian assistance
	1,923,568	Replacement of Freetown/Lungi ferry
	961,784	Ministry of Health requirements (cesspit emptiers etc.)
	360,669	To UNOCHA
USA	480,892	To MSF for non-food assistance for IDPS in Kenema
	1,240,701	To NGO Merlin for emergency healthcare, and blankets and plastic sheeting for IDPs in Freetown
	6,142,191	Logistical support to ECOMOG - PAE logistics contract, helicopters, vehicle maintenance, spares, drivers, rations, uniforms

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	1,502,787	Medical assistance to Nigerian soldiers wounded in Sierra Leone
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS		
EU COMMISSION /ECHO	8,295,385	Humanitarian assistance
WFP	14,426,756	Food aid
POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS IN PIPELINE		
Belgium	1,106,051	BFr 20 million for logistical support to Malian contingent of ECOMOG
TOTAL HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT:		37,964,780
TOTAL SECURITY SUPPORT:		43,600,061

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ANNEX B

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ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
& OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS
PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

Tab #.	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date
2.	1.095	Report of U.S. Department. of State, "Human Rights Practices for 1998 Report", Sierra Leone	26.02.1999

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 Great Seal

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NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as endorsement of the views contained therein.

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U.S. Department of State

Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999.

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature; however, this democratically elected Government did not control the whole country effectively at any time during the year. In March the Government, led by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected in 1996, was returned to power after 9 months in exile. The President's party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has had a majority in the Parliament since 1996. The Government's return followed the February ouster of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had overthrown the Kabbah Government in 1997 and assumed power. The RUF had conducted an insurgency against successive governments; the AFRC originated in a 1997 coup by elements of the Government's armed forces. The AFRC and RUF junta forces were defeated and driven out of Freetown by forces of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by the armed forces of Nigeria. In February and March there was fierce fighting throughout the country as ECOMOG and members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) continued to fight remnants of the AFRC and RUF, particularly in the larger cities outside the capital. However, government and ECOMOG forces failed to gain control of the whole country, and the civil conflict continued throughout the year. In December AFRC AND RUF rebels infiltrated Freetown and, at year's end, controlled areas close to the capital. The officially independent judiciary functioned only in part of the country and only during part of the year, but demonstrated substantial independence in practice when it did function.

Among the Government's security forces, the police officially had primary responsibility for internal order. However, due to the continuing insurgency, the newly constituted army, the CDF and ECOMOG

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shared de facto responsibility with the police in security matters. Government forces, particularly poorly trained CDF units that included child soldiers, committed numerous serious human rights abuses, and ECOMOG forces also committed some abuses.

Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, with a market-based economy and a per capita income of less than \$100 per year. It is estimated that only one-fifth of adults are literate. Although it is rich in natural resources and minerals (particularly diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite), and has large areas of fertile land suitable for farming, the junta period and the continuing insurgency have brought normal extraction and agricultural production almost to a standstill. There is little manufacturing, and there are few exports; approximately 70 per cent of the Government's budget comes from external assistance. Years of corruption and mismanagement have resulted in a crumbling infrastructure; many schools, hospitals, government buildings, roads, and bridges have been damaged or destroyed in the fighting and through neglect.

The Government's human rights record was characterized by serious problems. Some members of the security forces, including the Civil Defense Forces, committed extrajudicial killings, and tortured and beat suspected rebels and rebel collaborators. Prison and jail conditions remained harsh and sometimes life-threatening. Government forces sometimes interfered with humanitarian relief efforts. The Government arrested and detained persons under emergency decrees approved by Parliament that authorized indefinite detention without trial. Pretrial detention often was prolonged. The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press, and harassed, arrested and detained journalists for their coverage of security-related issues. Government forces limited movement within the country due to the civil conflict. Violence and discrimination against women, and prostitution remained problems. CDF units inducted child soldiers and female genital mutilation continued to be a widespread practice. Discrimination against ethnic minorities persisted. There was some forced labor in rural areas. Child labor persists. ECOMOG forces operating in support of the Government occasionally beat and detained noncombatants. In the period directly following the removal of the junta from power, there was a significant number of vigilante-style extrajudicial killings by citizens; upon being restored to power, the Government, with ECOMOG support, acted forcefully to end these killings.

Throughout the year, AFRC and RUF rebels committed numerous egregious abuses, including brutal killings, severe mutilations, and deliberate dismemberments, in a widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population known as "Operation No Living Thing." While still in power in January and February, junta forces continued their previous pattern of abuse, which included assaults and other acts of intimidation against political opponents, nongovernmental and other civic and humanitarian organizations, and citizens. During the fighting for Freetown in February, their retreat to the interior in March, and their advance on the capital in December, junta forces were responsible for killings, kidnappings, mutilation, rape, and destruction of property. One particularly vicious practice was cutting off the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants who were unwilling to cooperate with or provide for the insurgents. The victims ranged from small children to elderly women; in some cases, one limb was cut off, in others two limbs, typically two hands or arms. Rebel forces also detained, decapitated, burned alive, and inflicted bullet and machete wounds on civilians; many died from their wounds before they could obtain any form of treatment. The rebel forces abducted missionaries and aid workers, ambushed humanitarian relief convoys and raided refugee sites. The junta forces continued the long-standing practice of abducting villagers and using them as forced laborers, as sex slaves, and as human shields during skirmishes with Government and ECOMOG forces. Boys were forced to become child soldiers. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic against women. Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. As many as half a million persons fled to neighboring countries to escape the civil conflict, and remain outside the country on their own or in refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and Liberia.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

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Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:**a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing**

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There were persistent reports that some elements of the CDF refused to take prisoners and, after torture or other acts of physical abuse and interrogation, often killed captured insurgents and AFRC and RUF sympathizers. In November a senior CDF spokesman confirmed that the CDF had executed seven individuals who had been searching illegally for diamonds in the Tongo fields in the eastern part of the country, an area long contested by both the CDF's Kamajoh militia and the RUF.

In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the rebel junta in February, there were dozens of reports of torture and vigilante-style executions in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, and other cities. Some of these abuses were committed by citizens in reprisal against junta members and their alleged supporters. Victims were stabbed, beaten, and in some cases burned to death; there is no evidence that any of those responsible for the deaths were ever formally charged or prosecuted. AFRC and RUF forces also committed such abuses as they were driven out of their strongholds.

Many of the hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians killed by AFRC AND RUF insurgent forces in the conflict were executed deliberately for political motives. In March RUF leader Sam Bockarie summarily executed 10 prominent residents of Kenema, including former cabinet minister Bockari S. Massaquoi and paramount chief Momoh Tarawlie, for opposing the rebels. Also in March, RUF forces executed 32 youths in Koidu for supporting Kamajoh CDF forces that previously had taken the town. In September rebel forces shot 50 individuals execution-style in Kamalu, and on October 4, RUF forces shot and killed contract employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were traveling in clearly-marked trucks, in an ambush near Joru. On December 15, rebel forces killed a number of noncombatants in the village of Masiaka on the approach to Freetown.

Government security forces retaking areas discovered mass graves of those killed by rebel forces in Bo (over 100 bodies) and on Bonthe island (more than 550 bodies); the latter had been considered a Kamajoh CDF stronghold, and the killings apparently were reprisals against islanders for supporting the Kamajohs.

There were also several reports of indiscriminate, mass killings as villagers tried to escape from contested towns; for example, 50 persons reportedly were killed while fleeing fighting in Kabala in March, 22 in Malima, and 80 in Ngolahun. In May U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunno described the continuing conflict as the "deliberate targeting of civilians," and described that strategy as "part of the objective of conflict fare, not just indiscipline on the part of fighters."

b. Disappearance

AFRC and RUF forces continued the RUF's long-standing practice of kidnapping youngsters and women and compelling them to work for the troops and, at times, act as "shields" in battles with government and ECOMOG forces. Women were also forced to act as sexual slaves. A conference sponsored by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) noted that the RUF had captured children as young as 4 and 5 years of age. Seven girls between the ages of 7 and 15 were abducted in March from the Ben Hirsh childcare center in Kenema. During the rebels' retreat, the insurgents kidnapped five medical missionaries and two French medical aid workers in the Lunsar area and held them captive for 2

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weeks. In November RUF forces kidnapped an Italian priest, father Mario Guerra, from his mission in Kamalu in the Northern District; he still was held at year's end.

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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits torture; however, some of the security forces, in particular the CDF, routinely tortured suspected insurgents upon capture to gather information.

AFRC and RUF forces continued to use rape as a terror tactic against women. In February during their retreat from Freetown, rebel forces raped female patients at the Lunsar Eye Hospital. In March rebel forces gang-raped several teenage girls in Koidu after retaking the town from Kamajoh control. In May several women who had fled to Guinea reported that they were sexually assaulted by junta forces before they were able to escape. ECOMOG forces operating in support of the government occasionally beat and detained noncombatants. Rebel forces also were responsible for many cases of deliberate mutilation, including the chopping off of hands, arms, ears and legs; attempted decapitations; and severe cuts with machetes. The victims have ranged from babies

10 months old to elderly men and women. Humanitarian organizations estimated that at least 2,000 individuals had one or both limbs amputated, and that for every one of these wounded who eventually succeeded in securing medical aid, at least three or four died en route from their wounds, shock, and the hazards of the journey. Some victims who secured treatment in Freetown indicated that at times the junta members forced civilians to take part in macabre lotteries, in which the victim picked a piece of paper which indicated the sentence--from the loss of one limb to scalping or death. In other cases, rebel forces cut off the arms of men who refused to rape relatives.

The rebel campaign, known as "Operation No Living Thing," drove thousands of persons from their homes into the countryside, where many have died from untreated wounds, disease, and starvation. Over 250,000 citizens crossed the borders of Guinea and Liberia to escape the conflict; many thousands of others were displaced internally, and fled their homes to hide in wooded areas, or to towns where there are security forces and some degree of protection from rebel forces. In November Amnesty International published a report that detailed rebel abuses and atrocities during the first 10 months of the year.

Prison conditions and those in police lockup facilities generally are harsh; at best they are Spartan, and at worst life threatening. The Pademba Road maximum security prison, which was designed for 325 prisoners, housed almost three times that number at year's end. Diet and medical care were inadequate; only a handful of toilets was available for use by the prison population. Although male and female quarters were separate, adults and juveniles were incarcerated together. Convicted felons, those in the middle of the judicial process, and those who had not yet been charged formally also were incarcerated together. Other prison facilities were equally rudimentary; the holding cells in police offices are even further from compliance with international standards.

The Government allowed the ICRC, U.N. human rights officials, and other observers to visit the prisons, assess conditions, and see inmates.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile

The Public Emergency Regulations enacted by the Parliament in March at President Kabbah's request provide for indefinite detention without trial. In the immediate aftermath of its restoration, the Government arrested and detained without specific charges persons suspected of collaborations in crimes committed by the desposed junta. Although the Constitution and law provide for a speedy trial,

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in practice the lack of judicial officers and facilities often produced long delays in the judicial process. Due to the civil conflict, the judicial system did not function in some parts of the country at any time during the year, and functioned in other parts of the country only during part of the year. Many prisoners were held for months on suspicion of criminal activity before their cases were examined or formal charges were instituted.

ECOMOG forces at times detained noncombatants (see Section 1.c.) In January and February, while still in control of the capital, the rebel junta continued its practice of detaining individuals suspected of supporting the Government in exile and criticizing junta policies. The junta arrested three journalists from The Herald Guardian and detained them for several weeks in apparent retaliation for publishing a statement urging children to remain home rather than go to school because of the security situation. Several other persons were released after shorter detentions.

The Government does not use forced exile.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in practice.

Although there are often lengthy delays between arrest, detention, the imposition of charges, and judicial proceedings, trials are usually free and fair. Traditional justice systems continued to supplement the central government judiciary extensively in cases involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure, especially in rural areas.

After the overthrow of the rebel junta, the Government detained several hundred individuals on suspicion of treason and other charges stemming from their involvement with the junta. Some eventually were released; some remained in detention at year's end; and at least 103 persons were tried in four civilian trials and one court-martial proceeding. The trials and court-martial were open to the public, and were extensively monitored by U.N. personnel, foreign diplomats, and human rights observers from both within and without the country. Observers generally agreed that these high profile proceedings were conducted in an open and fair manner, and that the defendants had adequate opportunities both for counsel and to make their cases. The verdicts ranged from acquittals on all charges to guilty; the sentences given ranged from 5-years imprisonment to execution. However, some observers from international human rights organizations questioned the appropriateness of the treason prosecutions or death sentences in the cases of five journalists and one 75-year-old woman. Twenty-four former army officers convicted on treason charges subsequently were executed.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Constitution and law prohibit such practices, and government authorities generally respected these prohibitions.

Throughout the year, there were numerous instances in which rebel forces invaded, looted, and destroyed private property and terrorized civilians. Homes and businesses associated with former government members and supporters of the elected Government were particular targets, but many homes of ordinary were citizens also looted, burned, or destroyed.

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g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

During the year, there were reports that government security forces or ECOMOG forces hindered the safe passage of relief supplies on two occasions by commandeering vehicles that belonged to relief organizations. The CDF continued to accept, train, and induct children into its ranks.

AFRC and RUF rebel forces routinely committed numerous serious abuses, and sought to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize those who either refused to cooperate with them or supported the Government. They massacred groups of persons fleeing fighting; maimed and cut off the limbs and ears of noncombatants; kidnapped children and women to work for them, and men to carry equipment; raped women as a means of punishment and to inspire fear and cooperation; forced individuals to commit atrocities under penalty of their own mutilation or death; commandeered relief supplies; and vandalized religious institutions, hospitals, and schools.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**a. Freedom of Speech and Press**

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted these rights during the year. The Government has attempted to regulate the press through registration, and attempts to control the publication of information on security-related topics.

There are over 50 newspapers published in Freetown alone, covering a wide spectrum of interests. Their number fluctuated weekly; many contained sensational, undocumented stories and repeated items carried by other newspapers. Newspapers openly and commonly criticized the Government and its officials, as well as the rebel forces.

Due to low levels of literacy and the relatively high cost of newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of public information. There were several government and private radio and television stations; both featured domestic news coverage and political commentary. The government-controlled Sierratel communications company provided Internet access in Freetown, although the condition of its land lines often made Internet reception problematic.

The Junta arrested three journalists and detained them for several weeks (see Section 1.d.).

The Government generally respected academic freedom. All institutions of higher learning were wholly or partly closed during the year; most had been looted, burned, or used as quarters by rebels.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this right in practice. The Government was not known to deny requests to use public areas for meetings or demonstrations, many of which took place throughout the year. The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the government respected this right in practice. There were numerous civic, philanthropic and social organizations, and the registration system was routine and apparently nonpolitical. There were more than a dozen opposition parties, and there were no known restrictions on their formation or organization.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.

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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. However, numerous ECOMOG and government roadblocks throughout the country due to the security situation hindered free movement. Citizens were required to get a police clearance within the 72 hours before international travel, but such clearances were issued nonrestrictively; the Government did not attempt to limit citizens' departure or return for political or discriminatory reasons. There were reports of attempts by troops manning roadblocks to extort food or money from travelers.

At year's end, more than one million citizens, more than one-quarter of the population, either were displaced internally or had fled the country to escape the continuing insurgency. More than 500,000 persons were in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia; others had fled to The Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, and other destinations in Africa, and still others were in countries outside Africa. Although thousands returned from abroad after the restoration of the Kabbah Government, most remained outside the country because of continuing security concerns.

There is no formal process for granting political asylum. The Government cooperated with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations on repatriation matters, and continued to provide first asylum to over 5,000 Liberians who had fled to Sierra Leone because of conflict in their home country in earlier years of the decade. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared persecution.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their government, and the 1996 elections won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People's Party were the first free and fair multiparty elections held in the country in 30 years. In March the democratically elected Kabbah Government, which had assumed power in 1996 and which was deposed by the combined AFRC and RUF forces in May 1997, was restored to power. Several political parties were represented in the unicameral legislature. Local government was controlled by locally elected councils and a traditional chieftancy system. Preparations for local elections were in progress at year's end.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were generally cooperative and responsive to their views. Representatives of various local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and U.N. human rights officers were able to monitor freely and fully the major treason trials, and visit prisons and custodial facilities.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women and provides for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, except for the long-time prohibition against citizenship for persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks citizenship for much of the sizable Lebanese community, and for other persons with non-African fathers.

Women

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Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common. Police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases involving severe injury or death. Domestic violence is not recognized as a societal problem. However, rape is recognized as a societal problem punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment. There is a significant amount of prostitution: Many women, especially those displaced from their homes and with few resources, resort to it to secure income for themselves and their children. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).

The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, but in practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. In particular, their rights and status under traditional law vary significantly depending on the ethnic group to which they belong. The Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which gives preference to male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a number of female paramount chiefs. Women are nevertheless very active in civic organizations and NGO's, and were instrumental in pressuring the previous government to allow free and fair multiparty elections in 1996.

Women do not have equal access to education, economic opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas, women perform much of the subsistence farming, and have little opportunity for formal education. The average educational level for women is markedly below that of men; only 6 percent are literate. At the university level, men predominate.

Children

Although the Government is committed to improving children's education and welfare, it lacks the means to provide basic education and health services for them. Schools, clinics, and hospitals throughout the country have been looted and destroyed during the 8-year RUF insurgency, and most have not been replaced. Although in November, the Government began a program to pay the fees for 3 years of schooling for all children, lack of schools and teachers still place even this much education out of the hands of many. Schools are financed largely by formal and informal fees that many families cannot afford.

The recruitment for military service by the CDF and the kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces were a serious problem; an estimated 5,000 youthful soldiers served alongside adults during the civil conflict. While the CDF forces accept children as volunteers, most children who join the insurgent ranks do so under duress: For years rebels have kidnapped young boys and girls to serve them and augment their forces. In some cases they have forced these children to commit atrocities involving family members. There are now several programs to deal with former child combatants, including those who have escaped from rebel forces. However, even children who escape and wish to leave the ranks sometimes are rejected by their families and communities for their perceived involvement in rebel activities.

Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widely practiced among all levels of society, although with varying frequency. The form practiced is excision. Some estimates of the percentage of women and girls who undergo the practice range as high as 80 to 90 percent. While UNICEF estimates the percentage of females who have undergone this procedure to be as high as 90 percent, local groups believe this figure is overstated. There is no law prohibiting FGM. There are a number of NGO's that are working to inform the public about the harmful health effects of FGM and to eradicate it; however, an active mass campaign by secret societies countered the

well-publicized international efforts against FGM.

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Occasional instances of ritual murders of boys and girls, as well as adults, associated with illegal secret societies, have been reported in the past. There were no reported cases this year.

People with Disabilities

Questions of public facility access and discrimination against the disabled have not become public policy issues. No laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide for other assistance for the disabled. Although a few private agencies and organizations attempted to train the disabled in useful work, there was no government policy or program directed particularly at the disabled. There does not appear to be outright discrimination against the disabled in housing or education. Given the high rate of general unemployment, however, work opportunities for the disabled appear to be few.

Some of the many individuals who were maimed in the fighting, or had their limbs amputated by rebel forces, are receiving some special assistance from various local and international humanitarian organizations. Such programs involve reconstructive surgery, prostheses, and vocational training to help them acquire new work skills.

National/Ethnic/Racial Minorities

The country's population is ethnically diverse, and consists of members of at least 13 ethnic groups. These groups generally all speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated regionally outside urban areas. However, all ethnic groups use Krio as a second language, there was little ethnic segregation in urban areas, and interethnic marriage is common. The two largest ethnic groups are the Temne in the northern part of the country and the Mende in the southern part; each of these groups is estimated to make up about 30 percent of the population.

Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the military, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute appreciably to the RUF rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict during the year. There was no identifiable ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular support for the rebels, who controlled territory by terror and coercion rather than by popular consent.

Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction effectively denies citizenship to many long-term residents, notably the Lebanese community.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution provides for the right of association and, in practice, under the restored Government, workers had the right to join independent trade unions of their choice. About 60 percent of the workers in urban areas, including government workers, are unionized, but there has been little success in organizing agricultural and mine workers. All labor unions by custom join the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC), but such membership is voluntary.

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The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade union by applying to the Registrar of Trade Unions, who has statutory powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The Registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry already serviced by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If the Registrar rejects an application, his decision may be appealed in the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action.

There is a right to strike, although the Government can require 21 days' notice. Union members may be fired for participating in even a lawful strike. There were no reported strikes during the year.

Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act provides the legal framework for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining must take place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparations for negotiations; in case of a deadlock the Government may intervene.

No law prohibits retribution against strikers. An employee fired for union activities may file a complaint with a labor tribunal and seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against trade unions are made to a tribunal. Individual trade unions investigate alleged violations of work conditions to try to ensure that employers take the necessary steps to correct abuses.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by children. However, under the Chiefdom's Council Act, compulsory labor may be imposed by individual chiefs, who may require members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no penalty for noncompliance. The last Saturday in each month is declared a National Cleanup Day; in Freetown traffic is proscribed before 10:00 a.m. so that everyone may clean their immediate area. There have been reports of security forces publicly humiliating citizens to ensure compliance; however, social and community values and pressures largely unrelated to the State were chiefly responsible for widespread compliance. There were no legal or formal governmental consequences of noncompliance.

The AFRC and particularly RUF rebels forcibly impressed young boys and girls into their ranks and forced them into involuntary servitude, and to perform as sexual slaves. Many later become fighters with the rebel forces

(see Section 5).

d. Status of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, but in practice there is no enforcement of this law because there is no government entity charged with the task. Children routinely assist in family

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businesses and work as petty vendors. In rural areas, children work seasonally on family subsistence farms.

Because the adult unemployment rate remains high, few children are involved in the industrial sector. Children have been hired by foreign employers to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose.

School attendance through primary school is required by law. However, there is a shortage of schools and teachers, due both to inadequate government funding of public education, and to widespread destruction of educational facilities by rebel forces. Consequently, a large number of children receive little or no formal education. Many consequently enter the workforce with few skills and with limited, if any, literacy. The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by children; however, there was some compulsory labor possibly including labor by children in rural areas (see Section 6.c.).

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no minimum wage. Purchasing power continues to decline through inflation. Most workers support an extended family, often including relatives who have been displaced by the insurgency in the countryside, and it is common both to pool incomes and to supplement wages with subsistence farming.

The Government's suggested work standard is 38 hours per week, but most workweeks for those who are employed exceed that figure. Although the Government sets health and safety standards, it lacks the funding to enforce them properly.

Trade unions provide the only protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions. Initially, a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous working condition. If this complaint is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.

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ANNEX B

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ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
& OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS
PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

Tab #.	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date
3.	1.192	Final Communiqué of ECOWAS Extraordinary Meeting of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone	28.12.1998

22809

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

**Extraordinary meeting of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone.
Abidjan, 28 December 1998**

Final Communique

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone met in extraordinary session on 28 December in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, to review recent developments in Sierra Leone. They were joined by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Togo, the current ECOWAS chair.

2. The following members of the committee attended the meeting:

- Republic of Cote d'Ivoire
- Republic of Ghana
- Republic of Guinea
- Republic of Liberia
- Federal Republic of Nigeria
- Togolese Republic
- Burkina Faso in its capacity as OAU Chairman
- The ECOWAS Executive Secretary

3. Also attending the meeting as observers were:

- Republic of Sierra Leone, represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
- The Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Representative of the United Nations Observers Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)
- The Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees
- The US President's Special Envoy to Liberia
- The Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom
- ECOMOG Force Commander

4. Speeches were read at the opening session by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Togolese Republic and the ECOWAS Executive Secretary.

5. All speakers were unanimous in their commendation of the initiative taken by His Excellency, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria and His Excellency General Gnassingbe Eyadema to Togo, current chairman of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government in convening this extraordinary session of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone. They stressed the need to find a speedy solution to the alarming situation in Sierra Leone posed by the renewed fighting by men of the junta and the RUF. They stated that the new development should be viewed with grave concern by all ECOWAS countries and the international community, given its attendant potential for engulfing the entire sub-region in crisis and compromising the development efforts of ECOWAS Member States.

6. A message of support from the OAU Secretary-General to the Committee of Five was read. The meeting took note of the reports presented by the ECOMOG Force Commander, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Sierra Leone, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, the representative of UNOMSIL, the representative of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Special Representative of the President of the United States.

7. These reports indicated that the rebels (AFRC/RUF) had upgraded both their troop strength

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and equipment in violation of the embargo on arms importation and now had more mobile forces on the ground. Both the Force Commander and the Sierra Leone Foreign Minister implicated Liberia in providing military support to the rebels. The Liberian Foreign Minister denied any involvement of his country in Sierra Leone and called for an international investigation.

8. The meeting was also informed that mercenaries were fighting alongside the rebels, in contravention of international law.

9. After deliberation, the Committee decided to revive its activities which had been suspended since the return to constitutional order in Sierra Leone on 10 March 1998. It was also agreed that Togo should have automatic right of membership of the Committee and preside over the Committee of Six thus created, for the duration of the country's tenure as the Chair of ECOWAS.

10. The Committee of Six on Sierra Leone:

- a. appealed to the AFRC/RUF rebels to cease fighting immediately, to lay down their arms and to recognise the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as the legitimate government in Sierra Leone.
- b. expressed total support for the legitimate government of Sierra Leone and for its efforts to restore peace and stability to Sierra Leone.
- c. called on the UN Security Council to reaffirm support for the legitimate Government in Sierra Leone and for full compliance with its resolutions on Sierra Leone.
- d. urged the international community to leave the rebels in no doubt that their activities are doomed to failure as they would never be accorded recognition as the legitimate government of Sierra Leone.
- e. commended Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria for having committed troops to ECOMOG Forces in Sierra Leone.
- f. launched an appeal to all ECOWAS countries which had pledged troops to honour their commitments without delay.
- g. called on the UN, OAU, European Union, and the Contact Group on Sierra Leone to expedite the provision of logistic support, particularly transport and communication equipment to ECOMOG, to improve its mobility and effectiveness.
- h. expressed grave concern at the aggression being perpetrated against the Republic of Sierra Leone and strongly condemned the activities of the countries which are providing support to the rebels in Sierra Leone, in violation of the decisions of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government and the United Nations Security Council.
- i. condemned the presence of mercenaries in Sierra Leone, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all mercenaries from that country, the sub-region and the African continent.
- j. strongly condemned the atrocities, particularly the mutilation being perpetrated by the rebels against the civilian population in Sierra Leone.
- k. called on the Chairman of ECOWAS to embark on initiatives to develop true and genuine rapprochement between the Heads of State of Sierra Leone and Liberia in order to create mutual confidence and commitment to ensuring stability in the sub-region.
- l. resolved to resume its activities and to deploy all measures necessary to re-establish dialogue, as prescribed in the Abidjan accord and the Conakry peace plan, between the government and the rebels.
- m. called on the rebels to immediately cease hostilities, participate in dialogue, and take up the offer of amnesty made by the government of Sierra Leone.
- n. expressed warmest congratulations and support to ECOMOG for the bravery and courage shown by the force despite the arduous conditions in which it operates.

11. The meeting called on all ECOWAS countries and the international community not to support the rebellion.

12. The meeting expressed appreciation and deep gratitude to President Henri Konan Bedie, and to the Ivorian government and people for the warm welcome accorded to participants and for the facilities made available towards the success of their deliberations.

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DONE AT ABIDJAN THIS 28TH DAY OF DECEMBER 1998

ANNEX B

**ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
& OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS**

PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

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Tab #.	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date
4.	---	U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Liberia 2001	04.03.2002

AUTHOR:

U.S. Department of State

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TITLE:

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Liberia 2001

SOURCE:

U.S. Department of State

TEXT:

Liberia

Liberia is a centralized republic, dominated by a strong presidency. The Constitution provides for three branches of government, but no effective system of checks and balances, and presidents traditionally have wielded extraordinary power. Charles G. Taylor, who is of both indigenous and Americo-Liberian ancestry, has led the Government since 1996, when forces under his command emerged dominant after a 7-year civil war. In 1997 Taylor won the presidential election, and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) won three-quarters of the seats in the legislature. The elections were administratively free and transparent, but were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most voters believed that Taylor's forces would have resumed fighting if he had lost. Most other leaders of the former warring factions subsequently left the country. The bicameral legislature exercises little independence from the executive branch. The judiciary is subject to political influence, economic pressure, and corruption.

The regular security forces include: The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the Liberia National Police (LNP), which has primary responsibility for internal security; the Antiterrorist Unit (ATU), also called the Antiterrorist Brigade (ATB), composed of an elite special forces group; and the Special Security Service (SSS), a large, heavily armed executive protective force. The ATU absorbed Taylor's most experienced civil war fighters, including undisciplined and untrained loyalists. There also are numerous irregular security services attached to certain key ministries and parastatal corporations, the responsibilities of which appear to be defined poorly. The national army, which fought against Taylor's faction during the civil war, has yet to be downsized and restructured as required by the Abuja Peace Accords, due primarily to a lack of funding. In late 2000, a commission to downsize and restructure the army was established with funding allocated at approximately \$100,000 (5 million Id). Several thousand troops deployed in northern counties were fighting armed dissidents; however, there were few troops deployed to maintain security in other rural areas of the country. Fighting intensified during the year between the security forces and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebels. President Taylor called up 15,000 former fighters from the faction he had led during the civil war to combat the growing rebel threat. In 2000 the Government revived the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which had become defunct during the civil war. Security forces frequently acted independently of government authority, particularly in rural areas. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.

Liberia, with a population of approximately 3,164,000, is a very poor country with a market-based economy that has yet to recover from the ravages of the civil war. Average per capita income is estimated at less than \$200 (10,000 Id). An estimated unemployment rate of 70 percent, a 30 percent literacy rate, the internal displacement of civilians in Lofa and Nimba counties, and the absence of infrastructure throughout the country continued to depress productive capacity, despite the country's rich natural resources and potential self-sufficiency in food. Government officials and former combatants continued to exploit the country's natural resources for personal benefit. Extortion is widespread in all levels of society.

The Government's human rights record remained poor, and there were numerous, serious abuses in many areas. The security forces committed many extrajudicial killings, and they were accused of disappearances of numerous persons. Security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused or humiliated citizens. The Government investigated some of the alleged abuses by the security forces; however, offenders rarely were

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charged or disciplined. Prison conditions remained harsh and sometimes life threatening. Security forces continued at times to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained common. The judicial system, hampered by political influence, economic pressure, inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of resources, was unable to ensure citizens' rights to due process and a fair trial. In some rural areas where the judiciary had not been reestablished, clan chieftains administered criminal justice through the traditional practice of trial-by-ordeal; authorities tacitly condoned this practice. Approximately 20 political prisoners remained in jail, although some were released during the year. Security forces violated citizens' privacy rights, conducted warrantless searches, harassment and illegal surveillance, and looted homes. The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press; it detained, threatened, and intimidated journalists. Police forcibly dispersed one student demonstration. Security forces restricted freedom of movement, using roadblocks to extort money from travelers and displaced persons fleeing fighting, primarily in Lofa County. Security forces frequently harassed human rights monitors. Violence and discrimination against women remained problems. The welfare of children remained widely neglected, and female genital mutilation (FGM) continued to increase. Societal ethnic discrimination remained widespread, ethnic differences continued to generate violence and political tensions, and the Government continued to discriminate against indigenous ethnic groups that had opposed Taylor in the civil war, especially the Mandingo and the Krahn ethnic groups. Forced labor persisted in rural areas. Child labor remained widespread, and there were reports of forced child labor. Ritualistic killings also persisted.

Rebels fighting in the north also committed serious human rights abuses.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Human rights organizations estimate that such killings numbered in the hundreds during the year. Many of the abuses were linked to ongoing violence in Lofa County between security forces and antigovernment dissidents who launched a series of crossborder incursions from Guinea. Fighting intensified during the year between the security forces and the LURD. No perpetrators were arrested or convicted for any of these killings.

In July officers of the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the police allegedly killed an immigration officer in Bong County while attempting to arrest him for extortion. In August three SOD officers were arrested and charged with involvement in the incident; they remained in detention at year's end.

In July the commander of the Kakata town police and another officer were arrested for murder and armed robbery following the ambush of a rubber plantation vehicle. No additional information was available at year's end.

In late October, members of the ATU reportedly detained and tortured two Nigerian men; both men died as a result of their injuries. On November 2, Deputy Minister of Labor Bedell Fahn and five members of the ATU were arrested, and they remained in detention awaiting trial at year's end; two ATU suspects remained at large at year's end. Fahn reportedly had accused the men of stealing the jewelry from his house.

On December 7 in Gbarnga, the police commander shot and killed a fourth grade boy; the police officer said the boy was a thief and announced the shooting publicly. Students rioted to protest the killing; on December 10, police killed two more students during a demonstration in front of the police station. The National Chief of Police ordered the arrest of the police commander who shot the fourth grade student. The Government reported that the police commander remained in detention at year's end; however, human rights NGO's were not granted access to the police commander and were unable to confirm his arrest by year's end.

There were credible reports that government forces as well as members of the Lorma ethnic group continued to harass, intimidate, and kill members of the Mandingo ethnic group in Lofa County. Human rights monitors reported that hundreds of Mandingos were killed during the year. In May Amnesty

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International reported that security forces, especially the ATU, committed widespread abuses, including killings, torture, and rape, against civilians suspected of supporting armed dissidents in Lofa County (see Section 1.c.). Minister of Information Reginald Goodridge stated he was unaware of any abuses committed by security forces, and he asked Amnesty International to provide more information about the abuses committed by the armed dissidents (see Section 1.c.).

No action was known to have been taken against the police officers responsible for the killing of Nyanqui Luoh in 2000.

At year's end, the Government had not released a report on its November 1999 investigation of the reported killing of as many as 30 Mandingos in Lofa County in August 1999. There was no investigation into nor action taken in the May 1999 death of a security officer allegedly while in detention.

In August unknown persons killed the Chief Financial Officer of the Police Training Academy outside of Monrovia. Police officers were suspected of involvement; however, there was no reported action taken against the responsible persons by year's end.

On January 30, Defense Minister Daniel Chea reported that a Guinean helicopter gunship attacked Solumba, a northern border town, killing at least 10 persons.

There continued to be reports during the year of attacks by fighters based in Liberia on Guinean border towns, which caused numerous deaths. These attacks generally were perpetuated by a combination of government security forces, Revolutionary Front United (RUF) rebels from Sierra Leone, and some Guinean rebels; however, some attacks also were launched by armed Liberian dissidents based in Guinea. In January there was at least one attack reported on a Guinean town close to the Sierra Leonean border.

Rebel forces fighting the Government in Lofa County killed, tortured, and raped civilians. In April in Lofa County, armed dissidents killed Youth and Sports Minister Francois Massaquoi when they shot at his helicopter.

There were no further developments in the November 2000 attacks reportedly in northeastern Nimba, which resulted in numerous deaths; it was unclear whether the rebel incursion was from Guinea or Cote d'Ivoire.

There were no reported developments in the October 2000 case of 12 men arrested for the burning of a mosque and other buildings and the death of 4 persons in a property dispute in Nimba County; the 12 men reportedly remained in detention pending a trial at year's end.

Incidents of ritualistic killings, in which human body parts used in traditional rituals are removed from the victim, continued to be reported (see Section 5). The number of such killings is difficult to ascertain, since police often describe deaths as accidents even when body parts have been removed. Deaths that appear to be natural or accidental sometimes are rumored to have been the work of ritualistic killers (see Section 5). There were no reported developments in the case of two suspects charged with killing and mutilating a 10-year-old girl. A police investigation launched in August 1999 into alleged ritual killings in Harper resulted in the acquittal of one of four defendants; no information was available on the status of the three remaining defendants.

b. Disappearance

Security forces were responsible for numerous disappearances.

For example, a human rights organization reported that security forces detained 24 persons from a truckload of internally displaced persons fleeing fighting in Lofa County in May. It was suspected they were transported to the Gbatata military base in Bong County; however, they have not been seen since.

The whereabouts of seven refugees who were arrested on their return from Guinea in June 2000 remained

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unknown at year's end. The authorities claimed they were members of an armed dissident faction based in Guinea and were plotting to overthrow the Government and charged them with treason. The men have not been seen since their arrest, and NGO's and relatives believe that they were killed.

Security forces produced suspects whom they had held without charge when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the applications of human rights organizations. Their disappearances often were the result of prolonged illegal detention at the Gbatata base (see Section 1.c.).

There were no indications by year's end that the Government carried out its promised investigation of the reported disappearance of Mandingos following the violence in Lofa County in 1999.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, government police and security forces frequently tortured, beat, and otherwise abused and humiliated citizens. In some cases, security forces produced suspects whom they had held without charge when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the applications of human rights organizations. Such detainees continued to charge that they were tortured while in detention, especially at a security training base in Gbatata. Victims and witnesses reported beatings, torture, killings, and sexual abuse at the base. Despite calls by human rights organizations for the closure of the base, the base remained opened at year's end. A local NGO, the Catholic Affiliated Justice and Peace Commission, tried to investigate claims; however, the Government blocked their efforts and continued to deny them access to Gbatata. There also were continued reports of beatings and torture by both government security personnel and armed dissidents in Lofa County.

On several occasions, government security personnel harassed, assaulted, and arrested journalists (see Section 2.a.). According to Amnesty International, the security forces targeted and sometimes tortured critics of the Government, including students, journalists, and human rights activists.

Law enforcement personnel, including the security forces, were implicated in numerous reports of harassment, intimidation, and looting. According to Amnesty International, security forces tortured criminal suspects. In May and June, ATU personnel fired on vehicles at security checkpoints in Monrovia; at least one person was shot and injured (see Section 2.d.). In July in Monrovia, officers of the Police Special Operations Division beat and attempted to rob marketers; the National Director of Police intervened and apologized to the marketers. In July the commander of the Kakata town police and another officer were arrested for murder and armed robbery following the ambush of a rubber plantation vehicle. In August in separate incidents, police beat and flogged Congresswoman Ellen King and Senator Armah Jallah, two members of the legislature. Several policemen were arrested after the August incident; however, there was no further action reportedly taken against the policemen by year's end. In September in response to the high incidence of police abuse, the Government held special training seminars on officer conduct and public relations. Also in September, the ATU commander publicly demanded that ATU officers improve their behavior with civilians at checkpoints and stated that offenders would be punished; however, there was no subsequent improvement in police behavior at checkpoints, and no action was known to have been taken against any police officers responsible for such abuses.

In March police forcibly dispersed a student demonstration; numerous persons reportedly were beaten, flogged, or raped (see Section 2.a.). No action was known to have been taken against the responsible police officers by year's end. A panel appointed by university officials completed an investigation into the beatings; however, the panel's findings were not released publicly by year's end.

In late October in Monrovia, members of the ATU reportedly detained and tortured two Nigerian men suspected of stealing jewels from the Deputy Minister of Labor; both men died as a result of their injuries (see Section 1.a.). On November 2, Deputy Minister of Labor Bedell Fahn and five members of the ATU were arrested, and they remained in detention awaiting trial at year's end; two ATU suspects remained at large at year's end. Fahn reportedly had accused the men of stealing the jewelry from his house.

Paul Mulbah, director of the LNP, ordered that off-duty armed security men be removed from the streets and

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ordered police to shoot on sight any robbers resisting arrest; however, there were no reports of such incidents during the year.

There was no known action taken against the members of the security forces responsible for shooting, harassing, injuring, assaulting, or otherwise abusing the persons in the following cases from 2000: The June assault of a local embassy employee; the March beating of a local embassy security guard; the February assault of a foreign diplomat; and the February shooting of an LNP officer.

There were credible reports that government forces as well as members of the Lorma ethnic group continued to harass, intimidate, and, on occasion, kill members of the Mandingo ethnic group in Lofa County (see Section 1.a.). In May Amnesty International reported that security forces committed widespread abuses, including killings, torture, beatings, and rape against civilians suspected of supporting armed dissidents and other detainees in Lofa County (see Section 1.a.).

There continued to be reports that rival security personnel clashed violently during the year. For example, in June security officers shot at each other at the port of Monrovia.

Security force personnel in rural areas generally were paid and provisioned inadequately and often extorted money and goods. There were many credible reports that security forces harassed returning refugees and displaced persons, especially in the border areas.

The international community publicly criticized the Government's support for the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone.

Clan chieftains continued to use the traditional practice of trial-by-ordeal to resolve criminal cases in rural areas. The Supreme Court ruled that trial-by-ordeal--commonly the placement of a heated metal object on a suspect's body in an attempt to determine whether the defendant is telling the truth--is unconstitutional; however, the practice continued under an executive order. A local human rights organization sponsored a conference in March 2000 to urge that trial-by-ordeal be abolished throughout the country; however, no further action was taken.

Prison conditions remained harsh and in some cases life threatening. There were credible reports of unofficial detention facilities, including one at the Executive Mansion, in which detainees were held without charge and in some cases tortured. The Government did not provide detainees or prisoners with adequate food or medical care. Cells at Monrovia Central Prison are overcrowded, mostly with detainees awaiting trial. Only approximately 10 percent of the total prison population has been convicted of criminal offenses. Convicted prisoners and detainees awaiting trial are not held in separate facilities. Similar conditions exist in the Barclay Training Center military stockade. In some counties, the structure that serves as a jail is a container with bars at one end. In May 2000, the wives of 13 Krahn political prisoners held at Monrovia's Central Prison publicly complained about denial of medical care and other abuse of the detainees (see Section 1.e.). There also were reports that local officials forced convicted prisoners to work for them.

Women, who constituted approximately 5 percent of the prison population, were held in separate cells. Their conditions were comparable to those of the male prisoners and detainees. There were no separate facilities for juvenile offenders. Women and particularly juveniles were subject to abuse by guards or other inmates.

In a number of cases, human rights groups and interested individuals achieved the release of detainees and prisoners. However, for the most part, these cases tended to be nonpolitical in nature.

The Government generally permits the independent monitoring of prison conditions by local human rights groups, the media, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); however, visits to unofficial detention centers often are denied. However, in June the Government allowed members of the U.N. Security Council Expert Panel on Liberia to visit Gbatata base, where victims have been detained and tortured; the Panel did not publish its findings by year's end. The ICRC is allowed to visit persons held in prison facilities and police detention centers without third parties present and to make regular repeat visits.

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d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. The Constitution provides for the rights of the accused, including warrants for arrests and the right of detainees either to be charged or released within 48 hours. Although the Government generally adheres to these standards, warrants were not always based on sufficient evidence, and detainees, especially those without the means to hire a lawyer, often were held for more than 48 hours without charge. In some cases, persons were detained secretly at unofficial detention centers including one at the Executive Mansion (see Section 1.c.).

The Constitution provides for the right of a person who is charged to receive an expeditious trial; however, lengthy pretrial and prearrest detention remained a serious problem. In some cases, the length of the pretrial detention equaled or exceeded the length of sentence for the crime in question. For example, a Ministry of Defense intelligence director, who was arrested and charged with espionage in October 2000, and Auditor General Raleigh Seekie, who was arrested and charged with treason in August 2000, remained in detention at year's end. Police searched Seekie's home and office for subversive documents, arms, and ammunition, but found no incriminating evidence; however, Seekie still was charged with aiding armed dissidents and trying to overthrow the Government. Five detained soldiers awaiting court-martial for desertion during the September 1998 incident have been incarcerated in the stockade since November 1998. Their court-martials still are pending; should they be convicted, the maximum sentence would be 6 months' imprisonment.

The police only have limited logistics and forensic capabilities and cannot adequately investigate many crimes, including murder cases. When the courts release known criminals for lack of evidence, police officers often arrest them again on false charges.

In late September, Liberian Bar Association President Emmanuel Wureh was detained for contempt of Congress for insulting a House member during House Speaker Nuyndeuh Morkonmana's corruption hearing. In October he was released from custody following a 1-week boycott of the courts by lawyers. In October National Bar Association Vice President Marcus Jones and Montserrado County Bar President Ishmael Campbell also were detained for contempt of Congress after describing the arrest of Wureh as unconstitutional. On December 24, President Taylor ordered their discharge and they were released.

Security forces arrested and detained a number of journalists and human rights activists during the year (see Section 2.a.). For example, in February the Government arrested and charged with espionage four reporters of the News newspaper for reporting on the purchases of military helicopter spare parts. In response to local and international pressure, the Government released the journalists in March and no trial occurred. On September 13, the Government arrested and detained for 6 days human rights activist Thomas Ade-Bayer after he criticized the ATU. In an effort to induce the activist to surrender to authorities, the police first detained his wife and 3-year-old child. The activist was released without charge after his lawyer filed a writ of habeas corpus.

Government security forces and the LURD detained, tortured, and killed hundreds of civilians during the year (see Section 1.a.).

The Government did not use forced exile; however, as a result of frequent harassment and threats by the security forces, a number of student activists, opposition figures, and human rights activists fled the country due to fear for their personal safety or that of their families (see Sections 2.a. and 5). In April former Deputy Minister of Information and Presidential Media Advisor J. Milton Teahjay fled the country after he publicly criticized the activities of companies that had been granted concessions by the Government. In May Alphonse Nimene, the leader of the University of Liberia Student Union, and several others also fled the country. In the early part of the year, following the 2000 attack on their office by former civil war combatants, Conmany Wesseh, a prominent NGO Director, and Amos Sawyer, former president of the interim national government in the 1990's, both fled the country; many believe the combatants were acting on orders from the Government or ruling party (see Sections 1.f. and 4). Human rights activist James Torh and Muslim organization leader Lartin Konneh remained outside the country at year's end (see Sections 1.e. and 5). In

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2000 President Taylor publicly alleged that some of these opposition figures had gone abroad to conspire in the overthrow of his Government. However, in August the Government announced formally that it had dropped treason, sedition, and terrorism charges against exiled political opponents, including a number of former armed faction leaders of the civil war era, as part of its national reconciliation efforts. In September Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the exiled leader of the Unity Party, who was charged with treason in 2000, visited the country without harm (see Section 3).

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Although the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, judges are subjected to political, social, familial, and financial pressures, leading to the corruption of the judiciary. Some judges and magistrates are not lawyers. The judiciary has determined that it is not feasible to retire all judicial personnel who are not legally trained, but intends to replace those currently sitting with lawyers as they retire. By statute members of the bar must be graduates of a law school and pass the bar examination. The executive branch continued to exert undue influence on the judiciary. For example, in June the Supreme Court issued an injunction against the Government's plan to monopolize cargo services at the Port of Monrovia; however, the Government disregarded the injunction.

The judiciary is divided into four levels, with the Supreme Court at the apex. All levels of the court system in Monrovia, including the Supreme Court, functioned sporadically. The Government's efforts to revitalize the court system outside of Monrovia continued to be hindered by a lack of trained personnel, a lack of infrastructure, and inadequate funding. Although judges were assigned throughout the country, in some cases they were unable to hold court due to lack of supplies and equipment. Traditional forms of justice administered by clan chieftains remained prevalent in some localities (see Section 1.c.).

Under the Constitution, defendants have due process rights that conform to internationally accepted standards; however, in practice these rights are not observed always. Defendants have the right to a public trial and timely consultation with an attorney; however, there is no effective system to provide public defenders, especially in rural areas. Some NGO's provide legal services to indigents and others who have no free representation.

Courts regularly received bribes or other illegal gifts out of damages that they awarded in civil cases. Defense attorneys often suggested that their clients pay a gratuity to appease judges, prosecutors, and police officers to secure favorable rulings. In 2000 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court stated publicly that delays in salary payments to judicial personnel contributed to corruption in the judiciary.

There were long delays in deciding cases involving juveniles.

Human rights organizations reported that 24 political prisoners, including AFL personnel, were sentenced for treason in 1999; however, this number reportedly includes a few political detainees who have not yet been convicted of a crime (see Section 1.d.). In July the Government conferred executive clemency on 3 of 13 ethnic Krahn AFL prisoners, who were convicted in 1999 of treason and sentenced to 20-year sentences. Former presidential adviser Bai Gbala, former senator James Chelley, and former Deputy Justice Minister David Gbala then were released from custody; the cases of the 10 remaining prisoners were under review at year's end. In response to an appeal of the 1999 treason convictions of 13 ethnic Krahn AFL members, the Government demanded in 1999 that their sentences be changed from 10 years' imprisonment to death. In December 2000, 10 years was added to their sentences for a total of 20 years' imprisonment. The Government permits access to political prisoners by international humanitarian organizations.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and the sanctity of the home; however, authorities regularly infringed on these rights. The Constitution provides that the police must obtain a warrant, or have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress, or is about to be committed, before entering a private dwelling. In practice police and paramilitary officers frequently entered private homes and churches without warrants to carry out arrests and investigations. Police also raided the offices of a newspaper during the year (see

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Section 2.a.).

The security forces harassed and threatened perceived opposition figures and their families by conducting illegal surveillance. In some cases, they entered the homes of opposition figures, usually at night. In March the director of a human rights NGO and an opposition party leader both declared publicly that security forces had threatened to kill them (see Section 1.d.). Some journalists and human rights activists resided in the homes of friends or relatives at times due to fear that the security forces might follow through with their threats against them. Incidents of harassment and threats increased with the continuing violence in Lofa County. In rural areas, particularly in remote parts of Lofa County, armed security forces illegally entered homes, most often to steal food, money, or other property (see Section 1.c.). There were reports that government security forces and rebels forcibly conscripted men and boys to fight in the conflict in Lofa County (see Section 1.a.). Several student leaders remained under surveillance at year's end.

On November 30, ATU members forcibly entered and looted a private residence in Monrovia. Two ATU members reportedly were found with stolen items from the residence; they were arrested and remained in custody at year's end.

On at least one occasion during the year, the Government arrested family members in order to persuade a suspect to turn himself in (see Section 1.d.).

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted these rights in practice. Security agents threatened, detained, and assaulted journalists and intimidated many journalists into practicing self-censorship.

On September 13, the Government arrested and briefly detained human rights activist Thomas Ade-Bayor after he criticized the ATU (see Section 1.d.).

In September the Government deployed police across the country to arrest anyone found selling or buying photographs of Usama Bin Ladin.

The trial of human rights activist James Torh on charges of sedition for criticizing President Taylor, which began in January 2000, continued during the year. Decisions made on motions during his trial indicated that an impartial judgement was not possible and, fearing for his safety, Torh fled the country in March 2000. Muslim organization leader Lartin Konneh, charged with treason for calling on Muslim government officials to resign their positions, also fled the country in 2000. In August the charges against Torh and Konneh were dropped as part of a general amnesty that President Taylor announced for exiles; however, they remained abroad.

In Monrovia eight newspapers were published during the year, although some published very irregularly. Two are independent dailies and five generally appeared once or more a week; they vary in their political balance. The Public Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism publishes one newspaper, and the communications network owned by the President publishes one weekly newspaper. The ruling party also publishes a newspaper.

With some notable exceptions, government officials reluctantly are tolerant of the press; however, they frequently rebuked the media publicly for what they considered negative reporting of events. In April the Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism publicly urged journalists to portray the country in a positive light; however, there were no reports that the Government acted against journalists who did not do so. The Government also announced the creation of a media advisory committee to reduce tensions between the Government and the press; however, there were no reports that tensions were reduced following its creation. In May the Government announced new requirements for foreign journalists, arguing that the

international media were carrying out a propaganda campaign against the country. The requirements included a minimum 72-hour advance notice of intent to enter the country and a 24-hour waiting period for accreditation after arrival. The Government also ordered local journalists to clear with the Ministry reporting on fighting in the border areas.

Reporting that criticized the Government brought threats of violence, closure, or directives from powerful government figures to advertisers that they should discontinue business with that media outlet.

Management of the one printing facility capable of producing newspapers is subject to pressure from the Government. To meet costs of production, the typical newspaper's eight pages include two or three pages of advertisements or paid announcements, further reducing the amount of news reported. Some articles included are the result of "cadeaux," gifts or money that supplement reporters' meager salaries. The Press Union of Liberia, an independent association of journalists, attempted to open its own printing press; however, the Government did not issue a license and negotiations continued during the year.

In general journalists are outspoken and even provocative; however, journalists also practice self-censorship, especially in regard to information about the President and his immediate family members and particularly after being threatened or harassed.

Newspaper availability fluctuated during the year. The Government in February closed four newspapers because of delinquent tax payments. All reopened by year's end after paying their tax arrears. In July the News newspaper shut down for 2 weeks reportedly because its management feared a raid by police in response to critical reporting on the Government.

Security personnel sometimes interpreted criticism as a license to harass, threaten, arrest, and even assault targeted persons; the Government often required journalists it had arrested to apologize in writing prior to releasing them.

On February 21, the Government arrested and charged with espionage four local journalists for publishing a story on government purchases of helicopter spare parts in 2000 (see Section 1.d.). The four were denied bail; however, after 1 month in detention and before their trial started, the Government released them after receiving written apologies.

In May police raided the offices of the Analyst newspaper, detained for 2 weeks a computer technician, and sought to detain Hassan Bility, the Managing Editor, for alleged contacts with an exiled faction leader. Bility remained in hiding for several weeks until the authorities stated that they had found no evidence of such contacts.

On August 20, the police arrested and detained for 2 days Sam Dean, the Managing Editor of the Monrovia Guardian newspaper, after the publication of an article regarding LNP Director Mulbah's summons to appear for congressional testimony. On August 22, Dean was released after apologizing in writing to Mulbah.

In July journalist Alphonso Toweh charged that police at the port of Monrovia flogged him when he tried to report on the sinking of a cargo ship in the harbor.

On November 20, Wilson Tarpeh, the chairman of The News newspaper, was arrested and detained for 4 days.

Due to the high price of newspapers, the high rate of illiteracy (estimated at 75 percent), high transportation costs, and the poor state of roads elsewhere in the country, newspaper distribution generally is limited to the Monrovia area. As a result, radio is the primary means of mass communication. There are four principal FM stations in Monrovia: Star Radio; two private commercial stations (DC-101); and Radio Veritas, which operated under the Catholic Archdiocese. Star Radio remained closed during the year. There also is the state-run national station (ELBC), and FM and short-wave stations operated by President Taylor's private Liberia Communications Network (LCN). Throughout most of the year, the President's radio station was the

only station with a short-wave frequency strong enough to reach all parts of the country. ELBC acquired short-wave equipment in August and planned to begin broadcasting in September; however, by year's end, it had not begun broadcasting on that frequency in spite of the Government's promises. There is a French broadcast through the national radio facility, a religious station (with limited short-wave capacity), and a growing number of small local stations in cities around the country. Unlike in the previous year, there are no religious stations outside Monrovia. Media practitioners believe that the ruling party funds many of these stations.

In March the Government moved to shut down the short-wave broadcasts of Radio Veritas, citing "illegal operation." The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications claimed that Radio Veritas applied for and was refused a short-wave license, while the management of Radio Veritas claimed to have documents from the Ministry that granted the station a short-wave license. On September 18, a Monrovia civil court dismissed a suit filed by Radio Veritas against the Government over the denial of the station's short-wave license. Radio Veritas continued to broadcast on the FM band during the year.

Call-in radio talk shows are popular and frequently a forum for both government and opposition viewpoints; however, they sometimes resulted in threats generally from the Government, party leaders, and security agents to the radio hosts and station managers. Interviews with prominent persons are broadcast frequently. In February the ECOM fined the opposition New Democratic Alternative for Liberia Movement (New Deal) \$114 (5,000 Ld) for appearing on a radio call-in show, during which it supported the imposition of sanctions against the country. In September the police detained a leading radio talk show host and suspended the station's broadcast for several hours when some callers voiced sentiments contrary to the Government's official policy of sympathy for the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. The talk show host was released the next day.

Due to the economic situation in the country and the dependence on generators requiring expensive fuel purchases, most stations limited broadcasting hours and in some cases ceased operation for short periods.

Television is limited to those who can purchase sets, the generators, and fuel to provide electricity. For those persons and businesses with satellite capability, the Cable News Network is available. There are two television stations: the LCN owned by President Taylor, and the Ducor Broadcasting Corporation, which is privately owned but assisted by President Taylor's generator.

Several new Internet cafes opened in Monrovia; however, access was limited by relatively high fees. The Government continued to charge that its opponents used the Internet to wage a propaganda war; however, in August the Minister of Information stated that the Government would use the Internet to promote a positive image of the country. Many observers believe that the Government blocked the operation of potential Internet service providers (ISP's). In October 2000, another ISP began operating; the head of the ruling party is the chairman of its board of directors.

Because of the ties between the provider and the Government, some potential patrons believed that their use of the Internet was monitored by government security personnel and chose not to use it.

The Government generally respects academic freedom at the University of Liberia; however, in March at the Monrovia campus, police and ATU officers forcibly dispersed what the Government stated was an unauthorized demonstration in support of four detained journalists (see Section 1.d.). Approximately 40 students were beaten and some reportedly were raped (see Section 1.c.). The university administration suspended the leaders of the university student union for 1 year and banned student political activity until the end of July. In May the president of the student union and several others fled the country because of concern for their safety (see Section 1.d.). More than 15 student leaders from the University went into exile following the Justice Minister's public claim that rebel collaborators operated from their campus. Students occasionally protested the lack of resources, which they blamed more on central government appropriation practices than on the university administration.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in practice; however there were some exceptions. In May the Government allowed journalists and supporters to march in Monrovia to commemorate World Press Freedom Day.

In 2000 President Taylor warned that while the Government would tolerate different views, it would not tolerate anarchic demonstrations in the streets.

In March police forcibly dispersed a planned student demonstration (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).

The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government's Electoral Commission (ECOM) threatened several times during the year to take action against the Collaborating Political Parties (CPP), an association of opposition parties, arguing that the Constitution barred such "coalitions" except during official election campaigns; however, the ECOM did not take any action by year's end.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there were some exceptions.

There is no established state religion. However, government ceremonies invariably open and close with prayer and may include the singing of a hymn. The prayers and hymns are usually Christian but occasionally are Muslim. In March President Taylor sponsored the travel of more than 100 pilgrims to Mecca. Some non-Muslims criticized this action as a waste of scarce resources.

All organizations, including religious groups, must register their articles of incorporation with the Government, along with a statement of the purpose of the organization; however, traditional indigenous religious groups are not required to register, and generally do not register. Registration is routine, and there have been no reports that the registration process is burdensome or discriminatory in its administration.

The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, Islamic leaders complained of discrimination against Muslims. Although there are some Muslims in senior government positions, many Muslims believe that they are bypassed for desirable jobs. Many Muslim business proprietors believe that the Government's decision to enforce an old statute prohibiting business on Sunday discriminated against them. Most Mandingos, and hence most Muslims, allied with factions that opposed Taylor during the civil war and still belong to opposition parties.

Two FM radio stations, one operated by the Roman Catholic archdiocese (Radio Veritas), the other an evangelical station, broadcast Christian-oriented religious programming from Monrovia to the capital and the surrounding area (see Section 2.a.). There are no Islamic-oriented radio stations in the country due to the lack of financial resources in the northern and western counties, where the Islamic population is concentrated.

Government forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses against suspected rebels and sympathizers in fighting in Lofa County during the year. The Government contends that the insurgents largely are Mandingo Muslims of the ULIMO-K faction that fought against President Charles Taylor's forces during the civil war. The Government has not taken actions openly against Muslims in Lofa County; however, its inaction over reports of abuses in Lofa County contributed to ethnic tension between Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic groups in that area of the country.

In 2000 Muslim activist Lartin Konneh was arrested on charges of treason after he called upon Muslims to resign their government jobs in protest of the Government's inaction since the burning of five mosques in Lofa County in 2000 (see Section 1.e.).

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

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The Constitution provides for these rights; however, the Government restricted them in practice. Security forces maintained checkpoints where travelers routinely were subjected to arbitrary searches and petty extortion. Security forces were also accused of beating and robbing internally displaced persons (IDP's) fleeing fighting in Lofa County. Security forces also extorted money from returning refugees. In February and October, units of the ATB, citing security concerns, set up temporary checkpoints that interdicted traffic and visitors to a foreign embassy in Monrovia; at year's end, the checkpoints remained in operation.

On June 17, a local embassy employee was shot and injured at a checkpoint; he received medical treatment abroad.

In 2000 ostensibly in order to curtail the illegal use of national travel documents, President Taylor ordered that passport applicants be cleared by the National Security Agency (NSA). Opposition parties and human rights organizations criticized this directive, arguing that it violated the constitutional right of freedom of travel. Reportedly this executive order was not enforced during the year. In 2000 the Government announced that it would no longer accept Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) safe conduct documents as valid travel documents for entering the country; however, reportedly this was not enforced.

As a result of the civil war, there were nearly 157,000 IDP's in approximately 36 camps in 1997. International agencies and the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) have been able to resettle approximately 126,000 displaced persons since 1998. In October the fighting in northern Lofa County further increased the number of displaced persons. There were an estimated 30,000 IDP's in the country at year's end. International and local NGO's had limited funding and resources to assist these IDP's. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that, at year's end, there were approximately 81,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea, 120,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, 10,000 in Ghana, 7,000 in Sierra Leone, and 2,000 in Nigeria.

The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylum status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government continued to provide first asylum to nearly 86,000 refugees, the vast majority of whom were from Sierra Leone. The Government generally cooperated with the Office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.

In January in response to mounting international pressure, the Government announced that it would expel former RUF leader Sam Bockarie and his followers from the country, where they had taken refuge early in December 1999. President Taylor denied that the Government was training the RUF fighters or that it has been supplying them with arms. In March the Government announced that Bockarie had departed the country; however, Bockarie's actual whereabouts remained unknown and it was believed widely that hundreds of RUF personnel remained part of the Government's security forces.

The whereabouts of seven returning refugees arrested in June 2000 by security personnel remained unknown (see Section 1.b.).

In 1999 after a series of raids and attacks by security forces and dissidents bases in Guinea, a group of Sierra Leonean refugees migrated south from northern Lofa County towards another established refugee camp in Sinje. The Government cooperated with the UNHCR's efforts to assist the migration to the new location. International donors remained unwilling to send any further assistance to Lofa County, and the international and domestic NGO's are reluctant to resume operations there because of security concerns. The Government and the UNHCR established a second refugee camp in Sinje, a location easily accessible from Monrovia, to accommodate the refugees from Lofa County. At year's end, approximately 34,000 refugees from Sierra Leone remained in refugee camps in the country. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The Constitution provides for the right to vote in free and fair elections, and citizens exercised this right in

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1997 in elections that international observers deemed administratively free and transparent; however, the elections were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most voters believed that military forces loyal to Charles Taylor would have resumed the civil war if Taylor lost the election. Since the legislative elections were held on the basis of proportional representation, Taylor's National Patriotic Party won control of the legislature by the same 75 percent majority that he received in the popular vote for the presidency. The 1997 legislative and presidential elections were held under a special election law in accordance with the terms of the Abuja Peace Process.

The legislature did not exercise genuine independence from the executive branch. There were 16 opposition parties, most of which had little popular support outside of the capital, and opposition legislators, who held only one-quarter of the seats in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, generally were more passive than members of the ruling NPP. Congressional committees failed to develop expertise in their respective areas of responsibility. No major legislation was enacted during the year. In September the House of Representatives suspended its Speaker, pending investigation of corruption charges against him by another representative. The Speaker admitted wrongdoing and resigned; however, in October he was reinstated. The House also charged the Speaker's lawyer with contempt, which resulted in his detention (see Section 1.d.).

Constitutionally the Senate must approve presidential nominees; however, in April the executive branch confirmed a new Deputy Minister of Rural Development for Community Services even though the Senate had rejected her.

In August the Government announced the dropping of treason, sedition and terrorism charges against exiled political opponents, including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Alhaji Kromah, and Roosevelt Johnson (see Section 1.d.).

The State is highly centralized. The President appoints the superintendents (governors) of the 15 counties; the Government created 2 new counties during the year. Municipalities and chieftaincies are supposed to elect their own officials, but elections, postponed in 1998 due to lack of funds and disorganization, were not held by year's end for the same reason. Local governments at all levels have no independent revenue base and rely entirely on the central Government for funds. Education, health services, and public works are provided by the central Government. Local officials serve mainly to lobby the central Government.

The percentage of women in government and politics does not correspond to their percentage of the population; however, there are no restrictions on the participation of women in politics, and several women held ranking positions in the Government. Five of the 26 senators and 5 of the 64 members of the House of Representatives are women. Of the 20 cabinet positions, 4 are held by women, including the Minister for Gender and Development, a position created in April. A woman serves as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and another chairs the National Reconciliation Commission. There are no women's caucuses, but the ruling party has a women's organization.

The percentage of Muslims in government and politics does not correspond to their percentage of the population; one cabinet minister is a Muslim.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases; however, members of the security forces often harassed domestic democracy and human rights activists. For example, in March the director of a domestic human rights NGO reported receiving threats after his organization issued a report critical of the Government's human rights record. In June President Taylor stated that he may force some NGO's to leave the country, charging that some NGO's, under the guise of providing food relief for IDP's from Lofa County, were conducting intelligence operations; however, there were no reports that he forced any NGO's to leave the country during the year. In September the Government arrested activist Thomas Ade-Bayer when he criticized the ATU (see Section 1.d.).

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Domestic human rights organizations are underfunded and understaffed, and their personnel lacked adequate training. There are three coalitions of human rights groups: The National Human Rights Center of Liberia has eight member organizations; eight other groups comprise the Network of Human Rights Chapters; and four belong to the Federation of Human Rights Organizations. All of these organizations sought to increase public discussion of human rights problems.

Some human rights groups paid regular visits to detainees at police headquarters and prisoners at the Monrovia Central Prison (see Section 1.c.). Several domestic human rights organizations have established branches outside of the capital and perform similar monitoring functions there. No discernible pattern of government interference with these activities emerged.

There were no further developments in the prosecution of eight former civil war combatants who were arrested after the November 2000 ransacking of the offices of the Center for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE) and the beating of former interim president and human rights defender Amos Sawyer and the organization's executive director, Conmany Wesseh. Both Sawyer and Wessen left the country during the year (see Section 1.d.).

The Government permits international NGO's and human rights organizations to operate in the country, and a few international organizations did so during the year. However, the Government strongly criticized Amnesty International's findings of widespread abuses by security forces fighting dissidents in Lofa County. In November the Carter Center, an international democracy and human rights organization, requested a formal invitation to return to the country; however, the NGO did not receive a formal invitation by year's end. In November 2000, the Carter Center terminated its programs in the country and stated in a letter to President Taylor that it was leaving the country because of conditions in the country and the Government's poor human rights record.

The Government's Human Rights Commission remained inactive throughout the year. It received no funding from the Government, and the Senate again failed to confirm the appointments of three of its five commissioners. The chairman of the Commission fled the country in August 1999. In July commission members publicly called for the Government to provide funding and approve the appointment of independent commissioners.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnic background, race, sex, creed, place of origin, or political opinion; however, discrimination exists. There are no laws against gender discrimination, ethnic discrimination, or female genital mutilation (FGM). Differences involving ethnic groups, notably the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups, continued to contribute to serious political violence and abuses.

Women

Domestic violence against women is extensive; however, it was not addressed seriously as a problem by the Government, the courts, or the media. Several NGO's in Monrovia and Buchanan continued programs to treat abused women and girls and increase awareness of their rights.

FGM, which is condemned widely by international public health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, traditionally was performed on young girls in northern, western, and central ethnic groups, particularly in rural areas. Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1989, approximately 50 percent of women in rural areas between the ages of 8 and 18 were subjected to FGM. A local organization, Human Rights Watch Women and Children, which does not receive government funding, launched a campaign during the year to eradicate FGM. The Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) also has spoken out against FGM.

Social structures and traditional institutions, such as the secret societies that often performed FGM as an initiation rite, were undermined by the war. While many experts believe that the incidence of FGM dropped to as low as 10 percent by the end of the war, traditional societies are reestablishing themselves throughout

the country, and the increase in the incidence of FGM continued. The most extreme form of FGM, infibulation, reportedly is not practiced. The Government has taken no action against FGM.

The status of women varies by region, ethnic group, and religion. Before the outbreak of the civil war, women held one-fourth of the professional and technical jobs in Monrovia. On the whole, women have not recovered from the setbacks caused by the civil war, when most schools were closed, and they could not carry out their traditional roles in the production, allocation, and sale of food.

Women married under civil law can inherit land and property; however, women married under traditional laws are considered the properties of their husbands and are not entitled to inherit from their husbands or retain custody of their children if their husbands die. Women's organizations continued to press for legislation on behalf of inheritance rights in traditional marriages. There continued to be few programs to help former combatants reintegrate into society, and there were none specifically to benefit former female combatants. However, several women's organizations advanced family welfare issues, helped promote political reconciliation, and assisted in rehabilitating both former female combatants and women who were victims of the civil war. The Liberian chapter of the Mano River Women's Peace Network visited neighboring countries during the year to promote regional peace and stability.

Throughout the year, professional women's groups—including lawyers, market women, and businesswomen—remained vocal about their concerns regarding government corruption, the economy, security abuses, rape, domestic violence, and children's rights. Government officials often responded negatively to public criticism. There were credible reports of harassment and possible surveillance of outspoken critics (see Section 1.f.). In March the Government created the Ministry for Gender and Development, whose mandate included the promotion of the well-being of women and girls.

Children

The Government generally was unable to provide for the education and health of children, although it continued its nationwide anti-polio vaccination campaign during the year. Due to the poor condition of government schools, many children, particularly in Monrovia, who attended school went to private institutions. Since many private schools still need to be refurbished due to wartime damage, school fees were increased significantly, thereby making education unattainable for many school-age children. In both public and private schools, families of children often were asked to provide their own books, pencils, and paper. At the end of 2000, 741,816 out of an estimated 1.5 million school age children were enrolled in primary and secondary schools, less than half of whom were girls. Expenditures on education were estimated at \$6.3 million (247 million Id). In 1995 the literacy rate for boys was 53.9 percent for boys and 22.4 percent for girls.

Young persons were victimized seriously during the civil war. An estimated 50,000 children were killed; many more were injured, orphaned, or abandoned. Approximately 100 underfunded orphanages operate in and around Monrovia; however, many orphans live outside these institutions. The National Military Families Association of Liberia (NAMFA) tries to provide for orphaned military children; it has registered 650 street children. These institutions do not receive any government funding, but rely on public donations. Nearly all youths witnessed terrible atrocities, and some committed atrocities themselves. Approximately 21 percent (4,306) of the combatants who disarmed under the provisions of the Abuja Peace Accords were child soldiers under the age of 17. Many youths remain traumatized, and some still are addicted to drugs. The number of street children in Monrovia and the number of abandoned infants increased significantly following disarmament. NGO's and UNICEF continued retraining and rehabilitation programs for a limited number of former child fighters; however, these children were vulnerable to being recruited in subregional conflicts, since most had no other means of support. The armed forces continued to recruit forcibly underage soldiers.

FGM is performed primarily on girls (see Section 5, Women).

Child advocacy groups reported forced child labor in the rural areas of the country (see Section 6.c.).

A well-known 17-year-old child rights activist, who fled the country in January 2000 to escape persistent

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harassment of himself, his family, teachers, and high school classmates by security personnel, remained in self-imposed exile at year's end.

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Persons with Disabilities

As a result of the civil war, a large number of persons have permanent disabilities, in addition to those disabled by accident or illness. It is illegal to discriminate against persons with disabilities; however, in practice they do not enjoy equal access to public buildings or government services. No laws mandate accessibility to public buildings or services. Persons with disabilities face discrimination, particularly in rural areas. Deformed babies often are abandoned. Some NGO's provide services to persons with disabilities.

Religious Minorities

Some tensions exist between the major religious communities. The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, Islamic leaders complained of societal discrimination against Muslims. The private sector in urban areas, particularly in the capital, gives preference to Christianity in civic ceremonies and observances, and discrimination against followers of other organized religions spills over into areas of individual opportunity and employment. There is an interfaith council that brings together leaders of the Christian and Islamic faiths.

Tensions continued in Lofa County between the predominantly Muslim Mandingo ethnic group and the Lorma ethnic group. By year's end, the Government had not yet released a report on the burning of five mosques in Lofa County in January 2000.

Ritual killings, in which body parts used in traditional indigenous rituals are removed from the victim, continued to occur. The number of such killings is difficult to ascertain, since police often describe deaths as accidents even when body parts have been removed. Deaths that appear to be natural or accidental sometimes are rumored to be the work of ritual killers. Little reliable information is readily available about traditions associated with ritual killings. It is believed that practitioners of traditional indigenous religions among the Grebo and Krahn ethnic groups concentrated in the southeastern counties most commonly engage in ritual killings. The victims are usually members of the religious group performing the ritual. Body parts of a member whom the group believes to be powerful are believed to be the most effective ritually. Body parts most frequently removed include the heart, liver, and genitals. The rituals involved have been reported in some cases to entail eating body parts, and the underlying religious beliefs may be related to incidents during the civil war in which faction leaders sometimes ate (and in which one faction leader had himself filmed eating) body parts of former leaders of rival factions. Removal of body parts for use in traditional rituals is believed to be the motive for ritual killings, rather than an abuse incidental to killings committed for other motives. Ritual murders for the purpose of obtaining body parts traditionally were committed by religious group members called "heart men." However, since the civil war, common criminals inured to killing also may sell body parts. In August 1999, the Government sent a high-level delegation of the National Police to the southeastern counties to investigate reports of ritual killings. There were no reports released from this investigation. In July the Government deployed units of the ATU to Maryland County to help stem a wave of ritual killings, and the reported incidence of ritualistic killings had decreased by year's end.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Although the Constitution bans ethnic discrimination, it also provides that only "persons who are Negroes or of Negro descent" may be citizens or own land. Many persons of Lebanese and Asian descent who were born or have lived most of their lives in the country are denied full rights as a result of this racial distinction.

The country is ethnically diverse. The population is made up of 16 indigenous ethnic groups. The Americo-Liberian minority--descendants of freed slaves from the United States and the Caribbean--dominated the government and the public sector through the True Whig party until 1980. The indigenous ethnic groups generally speak distinct primary languages, and they are concentrated regionally. No ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population.

Many members of the predominantly Muslim Mandingo minority encountered hostility when they sought to return, after the end of the civil war, to their villages in Lofa, Bong, and Nimba counties. Many Mandingos were unable to reoccupy their homes, which had been taken over by squatters. Members of the Lorma, Gio, and Mano minorities generally held all Mandingos responsible for atrocities committed by the ULIMO-Mandingo faction during the civil war. The lack of competent security forces and a fully functioning judiciary in these areas prevented many Mandingos from seeking redress. Mandingo citizens faced growing discrimination, arbitrary arrests, and violence based on their ethnicity (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).

The continuing cross-border violence in Lofa County exacerbated ethnic tensions between the Mandingos and the Lormas (see Section 1.a.).

Recent tension with the Guinean Government aggravated unrest in Nimba between the Manos and Mandingos; however, there were no new reports of tension between Manos and Mandingos during the year.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution provides that workers, except members of the military and police, have the right to associate in trade unions, and workers are allowed to join unions in practice. The Constitution also provides that unions are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity. However, government interference in union activities, especially union elections and leaderships struggles, was common both before and during the civil war.

Although most economic activity was interrupted by the war, unions proliferated. There are approximately 30 functioning unions organized loosely under two umbrella groups--the Federation of Liberian Trade Unions and the Congress of Liberian Trade Unions--with the common objective of protecting the rights of their 60,000 members, who largely were unemployed. The actual power that the unions exercise was extremely limited. Since the country's work force is largely illiterate, economic activities beyond the subsistence level were very limited, and the labor laws tend to favor management.

During the year, the Government strictly enforced the union registration requirements that fell into disuse during the war.

Labor laws provide for the right to strike. A decree passed by the People's Redemption Council in 1984 outlawed strikes, but it was not enforced during the year. Due to the destruction of the economy and the estimated 85 percent unemployment rate, strikes were infrequent.

On January 29 in Monrovia, taxi and commercial drivers staged a peaceful 1-day strike to protest rising gasoline prices.

Labor unions traditionally have been affiliated with international labor groups such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

With the exception of civil servants, workers (including employees of public corporations and autonomous agencies) have the right to organize and bargain collectively. In the past, agreements were negotiated freely between workers and their employers without government interference; however, these rights were largely moot during the year because of the lack of economic activity.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, this prohibition was ignored widely in many parts of the country, such as rural areas where farmers were pressured into providing free labor on "community projects" that often benefited only local leaders. There were allegations that large logging companies in the southeast forcibly recruited workers. There also were reports that local officials forced convicted prisoners to work for them. There were reports during the year that local government officials forced persons to work without compensation on President Taylor's farm.

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, there were reports that it occurred (see Section 5). Some former combatants, including some in the security forces, were accused of forcing children to work in the mining industry. In 1999 a child rights advocacy group released a report on forced child labor in the southeastern counties. The advocacy group's report and that of another prominent human rights group contradicted an earlier government report that failed to find any conclusive evidence of forced child labor. Subsequently legislators from three counties sued the child rights advocacy group for defaming the counties' reputations. At year's end, the case still was pending.

d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment

The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16 during school hours in the wage sector, but enforcement traditionally is lax. The Ministry of Labor did not make any inspections during the year and lacks the resources to carry out its mandate. Throughout rural areas—particularly where there were no schools—small children continued to assist their parents as vendors in local markets or on the streets, to take care of younger brothers and sisters, and to work on family subsistence farms.

The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor.

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, there were reports that it occurred (see Section 6.c.).

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The law provides for a minimum wage, paid leave, severance benefits, and safety standards, but enforcement was targeted solely against profitable firms that generally observed these standards. Due to the country's continued economic problems, most citizens were forced to accept any work they could find regardless of wages or working conditions. The Ministry of Labor did not have the resources to monitor compliance with labor laws.

The law requires a minimum wage of approximately \$0.25 (10 ld) per hour not exceeding 8 hours per day, excluding benefits, for unskilled laborers. The law requires that agricultural workers be paid \$1.50 (60 ld) for an 8-hour day, excluding benefits. Skilled labor has no minimum fixed wage, but industrial workers usually received three or four times the wage paid to agricultural workers. The much-sought-after minimum wage jobs provided a minimal standard of living for a worker and family; however, there were very few such jobs. Families dependent on minimum wage incomes also engage in subsistence farming, small-scale marketing, petty extortion, and begging. By mid-year the Government owed civil servants 9 months worth of salary arrears; however, in June the Ministry of Finance began paying the arrears.

The law provides for a 48-hour, 6-day regular workweek with a 30-minute rest period per 5 hours of work. The 6-day workweek may extend to 56 hours for service occupations and to 72 hours for miners, with overtime pay beyond 48 hours.

There are government-established health and safety standards, enforced in theory by the Ministry of Labor. Even under the law, workers do not have a specific right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without risking loss of employment.

f. Trafficking in Persons

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The law does not prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, or within the country.

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ANNEX B

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ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
& OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS
PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

Tab #.	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date
5.	---	U.S. Department of State, Sierra Leone: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000	23.02.2001



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Sierra Leone

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Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 23, 2001

Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature; however, due to continuing civil conflict, the democratically elected government did not control the whole country effectively at any time during the year. This situation continued despite a cease-fire that went into effect on May 24, 1999, and the July 7, 1999 signing of a peace accord by the Government and insurgents led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who have fought successive governments since 1991. The President's party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has held a majority in the Parliament since the 1996 elections. In May 1997, a group of army officers, which called itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), overthrew the elected government in a coup, driving it into exile in Guinea. The AFRC then invited the RUF to join the junta. The RUF/AFRC junta then was driven out of Freetown by forces of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), composed mainly of units from the armed forces of Nigeria, in February 1998. The Government was restored to power in March 1998, but fighting between government and rebels continued. Government-insurgent fighting, albeit on a significantly reduced scale, continued after the July 1999 Lome Accord, which included the RUF in a power-sharing arrangement in the Government. Following the signing of the Lome Agreement, many RUF leaders and fighters moved into Freetown.

In 1999 the U.N. Security Council approved a peacekeeping operation, the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and approved strength increases several times during the year. ECOMOG completely withdrew its forces from the country in April. During the year, there were several armed clashes between government forces and rebel forces, including the RUF. In the first half of the year, tensions rose between the Government and the RUF, and in a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents and at other times during the year. In May RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested after demonstrators were killed outside of his residence, and he remained in government custody at year's end. In November the Government and the RUF signed the Abuja Agreement, which included a 30-day cease-fire that largely still was being observed at year's end; however, the RUF did not respect other terms agreed to in the Abuja Agreement, including disarming and allowing peacekeepers into the part of the country under their control. At year's end, the RUF still controlled almost two-thirds of the country. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program called for in the Lome Accord includes provisions to protect the human rights of the former combatants. Prior to May, nearly 25,000 ex-combatants of an estimated 45,000 had disarmed and entered the demobilization process. With the de facto withdrawal by the RUF from observance of the Lome Accord in May, many of the demobilized combatants rearmed and rejoined either the RUF or the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the ex-SLA. The officially independent judiciary functioned only in part of the country but demonstrated substantial independence in practice.

Among the Government's security forces, the police officially had primary responsibility for internal order; however, due to the continuing insurgency, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and ECOMOG shared de facto responsibility with the police in security matters until the April withdrawal of ECOMOG troops from the country when UNAMSIL assumed responsibility. The CDF were traditional hunting societies loyal to paramount chiefs—traditional leaders with administrative and judicial powers—which formed into independent militias under a national structure. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which staged a 1997 military coup, no longer exists. During the year, SLA units were reorganized and began undergoing a training program provided with the assistance of a foreign government; the program was ongoing at year's end. While government, ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL forces committed serious human rights abuses, the incidences of abuses were significantly less than during the previous year.

Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, with a market-based economy and a per capita income of less than \$150 per year. Only an estimated 15 percent of adults are literate. Although the country is rich in natural resources and minerals (particularly diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite) and has large areas of fertile land suitable for farming, the 9-year insurgency brought mineral extraction and agricultural production almost to a standstill, except for illicit diamond mining. There is little manufacturing, and there are few exports; approximately 70 percent of the Government's budget comes from foreign assistance. Years of fighting, corruption, and mismanagement have resulted in a crumbling infrastructure.

The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas; while there were significant improvements in some areas, serious problems remained. Poorly trained or poorly led members of government forces and international forces committed most serious abuses. There were reports that government and ECOMOG forces operating in support of the Government committed extrajudicial killings and reportedly summarily executed suspected rebels and their collaborators. Government, ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL forces at times beat noncombatants; however, there were fewer reports of human rights violations involving the SLA in the latter half of the year due to

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training and reorganization. Prison and jail conditions remained harsh and sometimes life threatening. Government and ECOMOG forces continued to occasionally arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. Prolonged detention and long delays in trials, due to the inability of the judicial system to function in some parts of the country and during some parts of the year, remained problems. Government security forces on a few occasions harassed, arrested, and beat some journalists and used libel laws against journalists; however, the Government took significant steps to end the restrictions on press freedom from the previous year. Violence and discrimination against women and prostitution remained problems. CDF units continued to induct child soldiers. Female genital mutilation continued to be a widespread practice. Discrimination against ethnic minorities persists. There was some forced labor in rural areas. Child labor persists.

During the year, an ex-SLA splinter group called the West Side Boys and RUF rebels committed numerous serious abuses, including killings, abductions, deliberate mutilations, and rape. Rebel forces abducted civilians, missionaries, aid workers from nongovernmental agencies, and U.N. personnel; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided refugee sites; and extorted and stole food. The RUF forces continued the longstanding practice of abducting villagers (including women and children) and using them as forced laborers, child soldiers, and sex slaves. Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians over the past several years; however, such displacement was reduced significantly during the year. As many as half a million persons fled in past years to neighboring countries to escape the civil conflict and remained outside the country on their own or in refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and Liberia.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

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a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were reports that both government forces and ECOMOG forces operating in support of the Government committed extrajudicial killings. There were reports in the first half of the year that both SLA and CDF forces summarily executed suspected rebels and rebel collaborators; however, because of the insecurity in most of the country, it was difficult to gather detailed information on abuses or to corroborate reports. There also were reports in the first quarter of the year that ECOMOG soldiers summarily executed suspected rebels. There were no reports of extrajudicial killings after July by the newly trained and reorganized SLA units or CDF forces.

There is credible evidence that on several occasions throughout the year a government helicopter gunship fired on possible RUF positions within urban areas, including one market area, causing many civilian deaths (see Sections 1.g. and 2.d.). For example, there were reports that on July 9, the SLA attacked suspected rebel positions in Bunumbu with a gunship and killed a number of civilians, along with several RUF rebels. In attacks in May and June, there were reports that a gunship killed 27 persons and wounded 50 persons in the towns of Makeni, Magburaka, and Kambia.

On July 17, there was an unconfirmed report that CDF soldiers executed a RUF fighter who allegedly had been trying to surrender.

There were reports that ECOMOG soldiers committed human rights abuses, including killings, during the first quarter of the year. In January an ECOMOG soldier reportedly stabbed a civilian in a market without provocation; the man later died from his injuries. On April 28, ECOMOG personnel shot and killed one ex-SLA soldier and wounded another during an argument over a stolen vehicle; a riot ensued, and several persons were injured.

There were credible reports that the RUF and ex-SLA rebels committed a substantial number of summary executions of civilians in rebel-held areas throughout the country. However, because of the insecurity, access to rebel areas has been difficult, and in most cases the identities of the victims were difficult to establish. There were credible reports of persons being tortured or killed for attempting to flee RUF-occupied areas (see Section 2.d.).

On May 8, RUF rebels shot and killed at least 20 demonstrators outside of Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown, including a journalist, and injured at least 80 others (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).

In a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents and at other times during the year.

On May 25, RUF rebels shot and killed two journalists, Kurt Schork of Reuters and Miguel Gil Moreno of Associated Press Television Network and injured two others during an attack on a SLA patrol. There were reports that on June 15, rebels attacked Port Loko; reportedly there were 15 casualties, and 10 rebels were captured. In August there were unconfirmed reports that suspected RUF rebels killed 9 civilians and abducted 15 others in an attack on the village of Folloh.

Some victims of rebel kidnap attempts also were killed (see Section 1.b.).

There were unconfirmed reports that RUF rebels also summarily executed other RUF rebels. For example, on February 4, RUF rebels stopped UNAMSIL vehicles and relieved the soldiers of their weapons. There were

unconfirmed reports that the rebels may have been executed by other RUF rebels for disobeying orders not to interfere with UNAMSIL vehicles.

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Over the course of the decade-long conflict, rebel mutilations caused hundreds if not thousands of deaths; however, there were fewer reports of mutilations during the year.

At the beginning of November, the Guinean army bombed several villages in the northern part of the country in a bombing campaign against rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberia. In December Guinean troops attacked Rosint village in the northern part of the country, killed several civilians, abducted over 50 persons, and burned over 30 houses.

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b. Disappearance

The RUF and West Side Boys continued to detain illegally individuals as part of a wide-scale harassment and terror campaign against the civilian population in certain areas of the country where they operated. Ex-SLA and RUF forces also continued the longstanding practice of kidnaping children, women, and men and compelling them to work as slave labor (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). Women also were forced to act as sexual slaves. Unlike in the previous year, there were no confirmed reports that rebels kidnaped persons to use them as shields to prevent government attacks. The United Nations estimates that rebel forces abducted some 20,000 persons throughout the country during the 1991-1999 period. Only about 1,400 of them have been released and have gone through a formal reintegration process; most of those released were children. Many others have escaped, but the U.N. believes that many of those abducted still remain prisoners despite the Lome Accord's directive that all captives and prisoners of war be released.

On January 18, RUF rebels abducted a group of four aid workers from CARITAS and their driver, held them for several hours, and accused them of being spies. On January 31, armed rebels detained some UNAMSIL soldiers for several hours and relieved them of their weapons. There were reports that in February rebels attacked a bus near Masiaka and abducted 11 persons. On March 7, RUF rebels abducted five humanitarian workers but released them the following day.

In a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents. By August 1, all of the peacekeepers had been rescued or released.

On July 24, West Side Boys rebels reportedly abducted 18 passengers during a bus attack. At the end of July, the West Side Boys attacked a group of foreign workers and detained one person. On August 25, the West Side Boys abducted 11 foreign soldiers and 1 SLA officer. Five soldiers were released several days later; the remaining hostages were rescued during a mission that resulted in the death of a British paratrooper, injuries to 11 foreign soldiers, the deaths of 25 rebels, and the capture of 18 other rebels. In August there were unconfirmed reports that suspected RUF rebels killed 9 civilians and abducted 15 others in an attack on the village of Folloh.

There were reports that at the beginning of June, pro-government militiamen released approximately 140 children, many of whom were ex-soldiers, to the U.N. Children's Fund.

According to the U.N. Children's Fund, as of December approximately 4,000 children registered as missing during the war had yet to be located. Rebels released a number of child soldiers during the year. For example, in January ex-SLA rebels released approximately 150 children.

In addition to demanding ransom payments for civilians they abducted, in past years, rebel forces targeted Roman Catholic priests and nuns, largely on the assumption that the Church would pay ransom for their return and because troops from ECOMOG used their missionary radio network in support of the Government (see Section 2.c.).

There were reports that Guinean troops abducted persons from Sierra Leone after attacks by RUF and Guinean dissidents.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were credible reports that government entities, including the SLA, the CDF, and ECOMOG forces occasionally tortured, beat, and otherwise abused noncombatants suspected of being rebels. According to human rights observers, the conduct of the SLA improved during the second half of the year after training and reorganization.

There were reports that attacks during the year by a government helicopter gunship on possible RUF positions in urban areas caused civilian and rebel injuries and deaths (see Section 1.a.). For example, there were reports that in attacks in May and June, a gunship killed 27 persons and wounded 50 persons in the towns of Makeni, Magburaka, and Kambia.

Reports of abuses by the CDF continued to rise throughout the year. There was an increase in the number of rapes committed by CDF forces, which in past years reportedly had not engaged in rape. For example, in July some CDF

members raped three women that they accused of transporting goods to rebel-held areas. There were reports that on October 10, four CDF members beat and detained a journalist and released him after 2 days (see Section 2.a.).

There were reports that CDF forces manned roadblocks and bridges and routinely extorted large sums of money from travelers. Drivers often were subjected to abuse, including beatings, when they were unable to pay. For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that on August 15, CDF forces severely beat two truck drivers and detained one of them for several hours because they could not produce the requested bribe.

On April 28, ECOMOG personnel killed one ex-SLA soldier and wounded another during an argument over a stolen vehicle; a riot ensued, and several persons were injured (see Section 1.a.).

There were reports that UNAMSIL soldiers committed human rights abuses against suspected rebels in May. An investigation was ordered by UNAMSIL; however, no further information was available by year's end.

On May 17, British paratroopers reportedly injured at least one civilian during a confrontation with RUF rebels at Lungi Lo.

On February 4, ex-SLA rebels allegedly became angry after not receiving the payment promised to them for disarming and began throwing stones at vehicles. The rebels robbed several passengers and pulled at least one person from a vehicle and beat him.

RUF and ex-SLA combatants such as the West Side Boys also committed numerous abuses against civilians during the year. On February 24, foreign observers visited 15 RUF combatants who were being held by their RUF colleagues for having tried to join the disarmament process and who were severely beaten. On March 8, rebels abducted Aaron Kargbo and Aruna Sherif, both Adventist Development and Relief Agency staff members, and left them in critical condition on the side of a road. In a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents. On May 8, RUF rebels injured at least 80 demonstrators outside of Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown and killed at least 20 others (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). On July 24, the West Side Boys attacked a bus, injuring three passengers.

RUF forces and ex-SLA combatants such as the West Side Boys continued to use rape as a terror tactic against women. There were many credible reports of gang rapes and that groups of women were raped.

During the year, although there were fewer reports of deliberate mutilation, including the chopping off of hands, arms, ears, and legs; attempted and successful decapitations; and severe cuts with machetes by the RUF, there was no indication that the practice was discontinued completely. U.N. officials and humanitarian organizations estimated that hundreds if not thousands of individuals, including children, had one or both limbs amputated over the decade-long conflict. During the overall course of the conflict, it has been estimated that for every one of those wounded who eventually succeeded in securing medical aid, at least three or four died en route from their wounds, shock, the hazards of the journey, or from lack of adequate medical assistance. There were credible reports that the RUF continued the practice of carving the initials "RUF" into the skin of civilians it abducted.

There were reports of injuries sustained in RUF-held areas that were attributed to landmines; however, observers believe that they were caused by unexploded ordnances.

On October 7, there were reports that relatives of the Minister of Transport and Communication beat a journalist, Mustapha Bai Attila (see Section 2.a.). No police or judicial action was taken against the individuals.

Prison and police lockup facilities conditions generally are harsh; at best they are Spartan, and at worst life threatening. The Pademba Road maximum security prison, which was designed for 325 prisoners, routinely houses hundreds more. Diet and medical care were inadequate, and only a handful of toilets were available for use. Male and female quarters were separate. Adults and juveniles were incarcerated together; however, there were no reports of the abuse of juveniles in prison. Convicted felons, those in the middle of the judicial process, and those who had not yet been charged formally also were incarcerated together. Other prison facilities were equally rudimentary, and conditions in the holding cells in police offices were extremely poor.

The Government generally has permitted prison visits; however, the Government did not allow the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), U.N. human rights officials, and other observers to visit the prisons, assess conditions, and see inmates between May and August. UNAMSIL human rights officials were permitted to visit Pademba Road Prison in August; during their visit they found 30 minors, 13 of whom were suspected RUF child combatants, incarcerated with adults. The ICRC declined to visit Pademba Road Prison because the Government would not accept ICRC conditions, including private visits with prisoners.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile

Government and ECOMOG forces continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. Although the Constitution and the law provide for a speedy trial, in practice the lack of judicial officers and facilities often produced long delays in the judicial process. Due to the civil conflict, the judicial system did not function in some parts of the country at any time during the year and functioned in other parts of the country only during part of the year. Many

criminal suspects were held for months before their cases were examined or formal charges were filed.

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In May officers from the Criminal Investigation Department arrested editor Abdul Kouyateh for endangering state security by requesting an interview with Foday Sankoh; he was released on October 11 (see Section 2.a.).

The CDF, which does not have arrest and detention authorities, in particular was criticized for having arrested and detained prisoners. On August 15, HRW reported that CDF forces severely beat two truck drivers and detained one of them for several hours because they could not produce the requested bribe. On October 10, four CDF members beat and abducted a journalist after he published an article about the Kamajors, one of the ethnic groups in the CDF, and the SLA, but released him after 2 days.

There were credible reports that ECOMOG forces detained civilians fleeing rebel-held territory and subjected them to harsh treatment in the belief they were rebel collaborators (see Section 1.c.).

It was reported that a large number of RUF rebels were held in detention without charge throughout the country. Over a hundred suspected RUF in detention were released in August; however, many others still were believed to be held, including suspected child combatants (see Section 1.d.). For example, on April 8, there was a skirmish between RUF rebels and UNAMSIL, and there were reports that at least one RUF member was detained. At the end of July, 23 suspected RUF women and girls were arrested and detained at the Lungi police station.

As of December 1, 568 persons were detained in Pademba Road Prison, including 22 women and 13 children. A total of 291 persons, mostly RUF members and supporters of other armed groups, remained in detention without charge at year's end under emergency powers declared by the Government. Reportedly these detainees have been held incommunicado, have not been informed of their legal status, and do not have access to legal advice.

The Government does not use forced exile.

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e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in practice; however, the judiciary functioned only in part of the country, but demonstrated substantial independence in practice when it did function.

The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, appeals courts, and a high court whose justices are chosen by the Head of State. Local courts administer traditional law with lay judges; appeals from these lower courts move to the superior courts.

Although there often are lengthy delays between arrests, the impositions of charges, and judicial proceedings, trials are usually free and fair; however, there is evidence that corruption has influenced some cases. Traditional justice systems continued to supplement the central government judiciary extensively in cases involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure, especially in rural areas.

The right of appeal from a court-martial to the Court of Appeal was deleted from the Armed Forces Act of 1961 by the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces Act of 1971; however, in July Parliament approved the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, which reinstated the right of members of the armed forces to appeal a sentence handed by a court-martial to the Court of Appeal.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Constitution and law prohibit such practices, and government authorities generally respected these prohibitions.

Throughout the year, there were numerous instances in which rebel forces invaded, looted, and destroyed private property and terrorized civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).

The kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces were serious problems (see Sections 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). For years rebels have kidnaped young boys and girls to augment their forces and at times forced them to abduct other children. Frequently commanders also had boys act as bodyguards. The RUF utilized "Small Boy Units" (SBU's) and "Small Girl Units" (SGU's), which served in combat.

There were reports that Guinean troops destroyed private property and burned homes (see Section 1.a.).

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

There were reports that Government, UNAMSIL, and ECOMOG troops, which continued to perform a peacekeeping role in the country until April, committed some human rights abuses against RUF collaborators and suspected rebels. There were reports that a government helicopter gunship reportedly fired on possible RUF positions within

urban areas, causing rebel and civilian casualties and contributing to the displacement of some of the population from RUF-held areas (see Section 1.a.).

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The CDF continued to accept, train, and induct children into its ranks despite having pledged in June 1999 to stop the practice.

RUF rebel forces and West Side Boys routinely committed numerous serious abuses, and sought to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize those who either refused to cooperate with them or supported the Government. While these abuses continued during the year, reports were significantly lower than in previous years. In large parts of the country outside the effective control of the Government, these groups kidnaped children and women to work for them and men to carry equipment; raped women as a means of punishment and to inspire fear and cooperation; and forcibly inducted children into their ranks under penalty of their own mutilation or death (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., and 5). They forced individuals to commit atrocities under penalty of their own mutilation or death; harassed peacekeepers; and seized peacekeepers' weapons. The RUF continued its practice of amputations and mutilations, although at a greatly reduced rate from the past year (see Section 1.c.). There were reports of injuries from unexploded ordnances laid by RUF rebels (see Section 1.c.).

Relief organizations suspended activities in parts of the country at several times during the year due to increased fighting and the obstruction of access by rebels. For example, in early March, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) suspended activities in parts of the country due to the hostage taking by rebels and other instances of looting, threats, detention of staff, and extortion (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).

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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, Government security forces on a few occasions harassed, arrested, and beat some journalists and used libel laws against journalists. The Government took some steps to end the restrictions of the previous year. The written press and radio reported freely on security matters, corruption, and political affairs generally without interference.

On February 16, authorities arrested the managing editor of Rolyc Newspaper, Ayodele Lukobi Johnson, and reporter Ayodele Walters charged them with "sedition, libel, and publishing false news" after they published a negative article about President Kabbah. In May officers from the Criminal Investigation Department arrested Abdul Kouyateh, the acting editor of the private Freetown weekly Wisdom Newspaper, for endangering state security by requesting an interview with Foday Sankoh. He was released on October 11.

On October 7, relatives of the Minister of Transport and Communication beat Mustapha Bai Attila, a blind reporter from the radio station Voice of the Handicapped, who on several occasions had exposed corruption at the parastatal company Sierratel.

Joseph Mboka, a journalist who was detained in May 1999, was released after 2 weeks. Emmanuel Sanossi, a journalist from Cameroon who was detained in August 1999, was released after several weeks.

On October 10, four CDF members beat and detained a journalist for the Standard Times newspaper after he published an article about the SLA and the Kamajors, one of the ethnic groups in the CDF. He was released 2 days later.

Over 50 newspapers were published in Freetown alone, covering a wide spectrum of interests. Most of the newspapers were independent of the Government, and several were associated with opposition political parties. The number of newspapers fluctuated weekly; many contained sensational, undocumented stories and repeated items carried by other newspapers. Newspapers openly and routinely criticized the Government and its officials, as well as the rebel forces.

Due to low levels of literacy and the relatively high cost of newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of public information. Several government and private radio and television stations broadcast; both featured domestic news coverage and political commentary.

The parastatal Sierratel communications company provided Internet access in Freetown, although the condition of its telephone lines often made Internet connectivity problematic.

On May 8, a local journalist was killed by RUF rebel gunfire during a demonstration outside of Foday Sankoh's residence. At least one other journalist was injured and another threatened during the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). On May 25, rebels shot and killed two journalists and wounded two others during an attack on a SLA

patrol (see Section 1.a.).

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The Government generally respected academic freedom. All institutions of higher learning were open during most of the year; however, infrastructure destroyed during the conflict has not yet been restored fully.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. While in general the Government did not deny requests to use public areas for meetings or demonstrations, many of which took place throughout the year, the Government did not allow RUF meetings and rallies because of the declared State of Emergency, which was enacted in February 1998 following the ousting of the AFRC and was renewed in August 1999.

On May 8, 8,000 to 9,000 persons, including doctors, lawyers, teachers, petty traders, union leaders, and others marched through Freetown and demonstrated outside Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown to protest the behavior of the RUF, the detention of hundreds of U.N. peacekeeping troops, and Foday Sankoh. Peacekeepers fired into the air but were unable to keep the demonstrators from continuing toward Sankoh's house. RUF members opened fire on the demonstrators, killing at least 20 persons and injuring at least 80 others.

The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the Government respected this right in practice. There were numerous civic, philanthropic, and social organizations, and the registration system was routine and apparently nonpolitical. No known restrictions were applied to the formation or organization of the 18 opposition political parties and 60 registered civic action nongovernmental organizations (see Section 4).

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c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.

In the past, rebel forces have attacked both churches and mosques and targeted Christian and Muslim religious leaders. In addition to demanding ransom payments for civilians they abducted, in the past, rebel forces have targeted Roman Catholic priests and nuns, largely on the assumption that the Church would pay ransom for their return and because troops from ECOMOG used their missionary radio network in support of the Government. On March 8, rebels abducted Aaron Kargbo and Aruna Sherif, both Adventist Development and Relief Agency staff members and left them in critical condition on the side of a road. On July 21, rebels from the West Side Boys abducted 4 church workers allegedly because they feared an attack by the Government and released them after 10 days. On September 7, RUF insurgents abducted two missionary priests, Father Victor Mosele and Father Franco Manganello, in Pamalap, Guinea, and brought them to Sierra Leone. The priests were not mistreated and were allowed some freedom of movement; they later escaped.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice; however, according to occasional reports, government troops manning roadblocks attempted to extort food or money from travelers (see Section 1.c.). Citizens were required to get a police clearance within 72 hours before international travel, but such clearances were issued nonrestrictively; the Government did not attempt to limit citizens' departure or return for political or discriminatory reasons.

RUF rebels and West Side Boys also manned roadblocks to extort money and goods from travelers.

More than an estimated 1 million citizens—almost one-quarter of the population—still either are displaced internally or have fled the country to escape the continuing insurgency. Reported attacks by a government helicopter gunship on possible RUF positions within urban areas contributed to the exodus of the population from RUF-held areas (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). More than 500,000 persons remain in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia; others remain in The Gambia, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, and other African nations, while still others are in countries outside of Africa.

There were reports that due to the exodus of a large number of persons from RUF-occupied areas, the RUF attempted to terrorize the remaining population to prevent them from leaving. There are credible reports of persons being tortured or killed for attempting to flee (see Section 1.a.).

At year's end, thousands of Sierra Leoneans returned to the country from Guinea because of attacks and ill treatment by RUF forces and Guinean forces. Some of these internally displaced persons (IDP's) were housed in camps, but many live in Freetown. The large influx of IDP's and the lack of resources caused tension between local residents and the returning IDP's. In one instance in November, a fight broke out between the IDP's and local residents at an IDP camp in Bo. At least 13 persons were injured seriously.

There is no formal process for granting political asylum or refugee status. The Government cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations on repatriation matters and continued to provide first asylum to over 5,000 Liberians who fled to Sierra Leone because of conflict in their home country in earlier years. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared persecution.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change their Government

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The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their government, and the 1996 elections won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People's Party were the first free and fair multiparty elections in the country in 30 years. Several political parties were represented in the unicameral legislature and in the cabinet. Locally elected councils and a traditional chieftancy system control local government. Preparations for local elections, which were to have taken place in 1999, were postponed in accordance with the 1991 Constitution because of continued fighting. The July 1999 Lome Accords included the RUF in a power-sharing arrangement in the Government, and in July 1999, the Parliament ratified a bill allowing the RUF to transform itself into a political party. Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, was offered and accepted the chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development with the status of vice president. In November 1999, the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF) received a provisional registration certificate from the interim National Election Commission. In May the RUF broke away from its agreements under the Lome Accord, returned to insurgency, and ceased to interact in a political capacity.

Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are relatively few women in senior government positions: Only 2 of the 18 cabinet positions were filled by women, and of the 80 members of the unicameral legislature, only 7 were female.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were generally cooperative and responsive to their views; however, due to insecurity caused by the rebel insurgency, the activities of human rights monitors were limited to government-held areas. Representatives of various local and international NGO's, foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and U.N. human rights officers were able to monitor trials and to visit prisons and custodial facilities during most of the year; however, between May and August the Government did not allow the ICRC, U.N. human rights officials, or other observers to visit prisons to assess conditions or meet with inmates (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC declined to visit Pademba Road Prison because the Government would not accept ICRC conditions, including private visits with prisoners.

On February 22, Parliament approved the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Bill which would create a TRC to provide a forum for publicly airing the grievances of victims and the confessions of perpetrators from the civil war; however, the Commission had not been established by year's end.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women and provides for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, except for the long-time prohibition against citizenship for persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks citizenship for much of the sizable Lebanese community and for other persons with non-African fathers.

Women

Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common. The police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases involving severe injury or death. Domestic violence is not recognized as a societal problem; however, rape is recognized as a societal problem and is punishable by up to 14 years' imprisonment. There is a significant amount of prostitution: Many women, especially those displaced from their homes and with few resources, resort to prostitution as a means to secure income for themselves and their children. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.) and forced women and girls to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.). There are almost no medical or psychological services for women who were raped after they were abducted.

The Constitution provides for equal rights for women; however, in practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. In particular their rights and status under traditional law vary significantly depending upon the ethnic group to which they belong. The Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which gives preference to male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a number of female paramount chiefs. Women are nevertheless very active in civic organizations and NGO's, were instrumental in pressuring the previous government to allow free and fair multiparty elections in 1996, and were vocal representatives of civil society during the peace talks in Lome in 1999.

Women do not have equal access to education, economic opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas, women perform much of the subsistence farming and have little opportunity for formal education. Women are very active in civic and philanthropic organizations, and a significant number are employed as civil servants.

Children

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Although the Government is committed to improving children's education and welfare, it lacks the means to provide basic education and health services for them. The law requires school attendance through primary school; however, schools, clinics, and hospitals throughout the country were looted and destroyed during the 9-year insurgency, and most have not been rebuilt. A large number of children receive little or no formal education. Schools are financed largely by formal and informal fees, but many families cannot afford to pay them. The average educational level for girls is markedly below that of boys, and only 6 percent of women are literate. At the university level, male students predominate. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs has primary responsibility for children's issues.

Up to an estimated 5,000 child soldiers at a time served alongside adults on both sides during the civil conflict, but in greater numbers on the RUF side; some observers place the number at almost double that figure. The recruitment of children for military service by the CDF remained a problem, and there is credible evidence that the CDF forces continued to accept children as volunteer soldiers.

The kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces were serious problems (see Sections 1.b., 1.f., 6.c., and 6.f.). For years rebels kidnaped young boys and girls to augment their forces and to abduct other children. Girls are forced to perform as sexual slaves (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). In some cases rebel forces have forced these children to commit atrocities involving family members. However, even children who escape and wish to leave the ranks sometimes are rejected by their families and communities because of their perceived involvement in rebel activities.

Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widely practiced among all levels of society, although with varying frequency. The less severe form of excision is practiced. Some estimates, including by UNICEF, of the percentage of women and girls who undergo the practice range as high as 80 to 90 percent; however, local groups believe that this figure is overstated. FGM is practiced on girls as young as 5 years old. No law prohibits FGM. A number of NGO's are working to inform the public about the harmful health effects of FGM and to eradicate it; however, an active resistance by secret societies countered the well-publicized international efforts against FGM.

People with Disabilities

Public facility access and discrimination against the disabled are not considered to be public policy issues. No laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide for other assistance for the disabled. Although a few private agencies and organizations attempted to train the disabled in useful work, there was no government policy or program directed particularly at the disabled. There does not appear to be outright discrimination against the disabled in housing or education. However, given the high rate of general unemployment, work opportunities for the disabled are few.

Some of the many individuals who were maimed in the fighting, or had their limbs amputated by rebel forces, are receiving special assistance from various local and international humanitarian organizations. Such programs involve reconstructive surgery, prostheses, and vocational training to help them acquire new work skills. The Lome Accord also called for the creation of a special fund to implement a program for rehabilitation of war victims, although the fund had not yet been established by year's end. Attention to amputees increased the access of others with disabilities to health care and treatment.

National/Ethnic/Racial Minorities

The country's population is ethnically diverse and consists of at least 13 ethnic groups. These groups generally all speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated outside urban areas. However, all ethnic groups use Krio as a second language, little ethnic segregation is apparent in urban areas, and interethnic marriage is common. The two largest ethnic groups are the Temne in the northern part of the country and the Mende in the southern part; each of these groups is estimated to make up about 30 percent of the population.

Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the armed forces, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute appreciably to the RUF rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict. No ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular support for the rebels was identifiable, and they controlled territory by terror and coercion rather than by popular consent.

Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction effectively denies citizenship to many long-term residents, notably the Lebanese community.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution provides for the right of association, and in practice workers had the right to join independent trade

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unions of their choice. About 60 percent of the workers in urban areas, including government workers, are unionized, but attempts to organize agricultural workers and mineworkers have met with little success. All labor unions by custom join the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC), but such membership is voluntary. Police and members of the armed services are prohibited from joining unions. There are no reliable statistics on union membership, but the membership numbers have declined as a percentage of all workers because of the virtual collapse of the small manufacturing sector.

The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade union by applying to the registrar of trade unions, who has statutory powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry already served by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If the registrar rejects an application, the decision may be appealed in the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action.

Workers have the right to strike, although the Government can require 21 days' notice. No strikes were reported during the year. No laws prohibit retaliation against strikers, even a lawful strike. An employee fired for union activities may file a complaint with a labor tribunal and seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against trade unions are made to a tribunal.

Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

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b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The 1971 Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act provides the legal framework for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining must take place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparations for negotiations; in case of a deadlock the government may intervene. The Industrial Court for Settlement of Industrial Disputes, as required by Section 44 of the 1971 Act, was created and began hearing cases during the year.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children; however, forced labor remains a problem. Under the Chiefdom's Council Act, individual chiefs may impose compulsory labor and may require members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no penalty for noncompliance. There were reports of some compulsory labor, possibly including labor by children in rural areas.

Ex-SLA and RUF rebels forcibly impressed young boys and girls into their ranks and forced them into involuntary servitude and to perform as sexual slaves. Many became fighters with the rebel forces. Women were also forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.f.).

Rebel forces also forced civilians, including children, to labor as porters and as workers in diamond fields under their control despite the signing of the peace accord in July 1999.

d. Status of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, although children between the ages of 12 and 18 years may be employed in certain nonhazardous occupations, provided they have their parents' consent. In practice this law is not enforced because there is no government entity charged with the task. Children routinely assist in family businesses and work as petty vendors. In rural areas, children work seasonally on family subsistence farms.

Because the adult unemployment rate remains high, few children are involved in the industrial sector. Foreign employers have hired children to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose.

The law requires school attendance through primary school; however, there is a shortage of schools and teachers (see Section 5). Many children consequently enter the work force with few skills and with limited, if any, literacy.

The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor.

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by children; however, such practices exist (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

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A 1997 law set the minimum wage at approximately \$12 (21,000 Leones) per month; it has not been adjusted since then. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most workers support an extended family, often including relatives who have been displaced by the insurgency in the countryside, and it is common to pool incomes and to supplement wages with subsistence farming.

The Government's suggested workweek is 38 hours, but most workweeks for those who are employed exceed that figure.

Although the Government sets health and safety standards, it lacks the funding to enforce them properly. Trade unions provide the only protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions. Initially a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous working condition. If this complaint is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.

f. Trafficking in Persons

No law prohibits trafficking in persons, and there were reports that rebel forces kidnaped young boys and girls, forcibly impressed them, and forced the children to serve them and to perform as sexual slaves (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Women also were forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.c.). Rebel forces also forced civilians, including children, to work as porters and in diamond fields (see Section 6.c.). The Government is attempting to combat this practice through its efforts to compel the RUF to disarm and demobilize.

[End.]

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ANNEX B

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ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
& OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS
PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

Tab #.	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date
6.	----	African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights; Ratification/Accession by Liberia	Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986; ratified/acceded to by Liberia on 31 January 1983

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**African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21,
1986: [excerpts] . . .**

Preamble

The African States members of the Organization of African Unity, parties to the present convention entitled "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights",

Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of a "preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and peoples' rights";

Considering the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples";

Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights;

Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings which justifies their national and international protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of peoples rights should necessarily guarantee human rights;

Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone;

Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights;

Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are still struggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and all forms of discrimination, particularly those based on race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion or political opinions;

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Reaffirming their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other instrument adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations;

Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and people' rights and freedoms taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa;

Have agreed as follows:

Part I: Rights and Duties

Chapter I -- Human and Peoples' Rights

Article 1

The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.

Article 2

Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.

Article 3

1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.

Article 4

Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.

Article 5

Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.

Article 6

Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.

Article 7

1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized

and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal. 2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.

Article 8

Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms.

Article 9

1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.

Article 10

1. Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law. 2. Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in 29 no one may be compelled to join an association.

Article 11

Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.

Article 12

1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality. 3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws of those countries and international conventions. 4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law. 5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.

Article 13

1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law. 2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country. 3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all persons before the law.

Article 14

The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public

need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.

Article 15

Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work.

Article 16

1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. 2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.

Article 17

1. Every individual shall have the right to education. 2. Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his community. 3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State.

Article 18

1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral.
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community.
3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.
4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs.

Article 19

All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.

Article 20

1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural.

Article 21

1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation. 3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based

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on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law. 4. States parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity. 5. States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources.

Article 22

1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.

Article 23

1. All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. The principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African Unity shall govern relations between States. 2. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, States parties to the present Charter shall ensure that: (a) any individual enjoying the right of asylum under 12 of the present Charter shall not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or any other State party to the present Charter; (b) their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any other State party to the present Charter.

Article 24

All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development.

Article 25

States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood.

Article 26

States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.

Chapter II -- Duties

Article 27

1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the international community. 2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.

Article 28

Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without

discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.

Article 29

The individual shall also have the duty: 1. to preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need; 2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service; 3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is; 4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened; 5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defence in accordance with the law; 6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the society; 7. to preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society; 8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African unity.

Part II: Measures of Safeguard

Chapter I -- Establishment and Organization of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights

Article 30

An African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, hereinafter called "the Commission", shall be established within the Organization of African Unity to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa.

Article 31

1. The Commission shall consist of eleven members chosen from amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples' rights; particular consideration being given to persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity. . . .

Article 41

The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall appoint the Secretary of the Commission. He shall also provide the staff and services necessary for the effective discharge of the duties of the Commission. The Organization of African Unity shall bear the costs of the staff and services. . . .

Chapter II -- Mandate of the Commission

Article 45

The functions of the Commission shall be:

1. To promote Human and Peoples' Rights and in particular:
 - (a) to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights, organize seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights, and should the

case arise, give its views or make recommendations to Governments.

(b) to formulate and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African Governments may base their legislations.

(c) co-operate with other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights.

2. Ensure the protection of human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter.

3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organization recognized by the OAU.

4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Chapter III -- Procedure of the Commission

Article 46

The Commission may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; it may hear from the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity or any other person capable of enlightening it.

Communication From States

Article 47

If a State party to the present Charter has good reasons to believe that another State party to this Charter has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written communication, the attention of that State to the matter. This communication shall also be addressed to the Secretary General of the OAU and to the Chairman of the Commission. Within three months of the receipt of the communication, the State to which the communication is addressed shall give the enquiring State, written explanation or statement elucidating the matter. This should include as much as possible relevant information relating to the laws and rules of procedure applied and applicable, and the redress already given or course of action available.

Article 48

If within three months from the date on which the original communication is received by the State to which it is addressed, the issue is not settled to the satisfaction of the two States involved through bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure, either State shall have the right to submit the matter to the Commission through the Chairman and shall notify the other States involved.

Article 49

Notwithstanding the provisions of 47, if a State party to the present Charter considers that another State party has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to the Commission by addressing a communication to the Chairman, to the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity and the State concerned.

Article 50

The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure that all local remedies,

if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious to the Commission that the procedure of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.

Article 51

1. The Commission may ask the States concerned to provide it with all relevant information.
2. When the Commission is considering the matter, States concerned may be represented before it and submit written or oral representation.

Article 52

After having obtained from the States concerned and from other sources all the information it deems necessary and after having tried all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution based on the respect of Human and Peoples' Rights, the Commission shall prepare, within a reasonable period of time from the notification referred to in 48, a report stating the facts and its findings. This report shall be sent to the States concerned and communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Article 53

While transmitting its report, the Commission may make to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government such recommendations as it deems useful.

Article 54

The Commission shall submit to each ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government a report on its activities.

Other Communications

Article 55

1. Before each Session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the communications other than those of States parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of the Commission, who shall indicate which communications should be considered by the Commission.
2. A communication shall be considered by the Commission if a simple majority of its members so decide.

Article 56

Communications relating to human and peoples' rights referred to in 55 received by the Commission, shall be considered if they:

1. Indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity,
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or with the present Charter,
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and its institutions or to the Organization of African Unity,
4. Are not based exclusively on news discriminated through the mass media,
5. Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged,
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter, and
7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by these States involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter.

Article 57

Prior to any substantive consideration, all communications shall be brought to the knowledge of the State concerned by the Chairman of the Commission.

Article 58

1. When it appears after deliberations of the Commission that one or more communications apparently relate to special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights, the Commission shall draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to these special cases.
2. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report, accompanied by its findings and recommendations.
3. A case of emergency duly noticed by the Commission shall be submitted by the latter to the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government who may request an in-depth study.

Article 59

1. All measures taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide. . . .
2. The report on the activities of the Commission shall be published by its Chairman after it has been considered by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Chapter IV -- Applicable Principles**Article 60**

The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members.

Article 61

The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with international norms on human and people's rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and doctrine.

Article 62

Each state party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter. . . .



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**List of Countries Who Have Signed, Ratified/Adhered to the African Charter On
Human And Peoples' Rights
(as of January 7, 2005)***

NO.	COUNTRY	DATE OF SIGNATURE	DATE OF RATIFICATION/ACCESSION	DATE DEPOSIT
1.	Algeria	10/04/86	01/03/87	20/03/87
2.	Angola		02/03/90	09/10/90
3.	Benin		20/01/86	25/02/86
4.	Botswana		17/07/86	22/07/86
5.	Burkina Faso	05/03/84	06/07/84	21/09/84
6.	Burundi		28/07/89	30/08/89
7.	Cameroon	23/07/87	20/06/89	18/09/89
8.	Cape Verde	31/03/86	02/06/87	06/08/87
9.	Central African Republic		26/04/86	27/07/86
10.	Comoros		01/06/86	18/07/86
11.	Congo	27/11/81	09/12/82	28/07/87
12.	Congo (RD)	23/07/87	20/07/87	28/07/87
13.	Côte d'Ivoire		06/01/92	31/03/92
14.	Djibouti	20/12/91	11/11/91	31/03/92
15.	Egypt	16/11/81	20/03/84	03/04/84
16.	Equatorial Guinea	18/08/86	07/04/86	18/08/86
17.	Eritrea		14/01/99	15/03/99
18.	Ethiopia		15/06/98	22/06/98
19.	Gabon	26/02/82	20/02/86	26/06/86
20.	Gambia	11/02/83	08/06/83	13/06/83
21.	Ghana		24/01/89	01/03/89
22.	Guinea	09/12/81	16/02/82	13/05/82
23.	Guinea Bissau		04/12/85	06/03/86
24.	Kenya		23/01/92	10/02/92
25.	Lesotho	07/03/84	10/02/92	27/02/92
26.	Liberia	31/01/83	04/08/82	29/12/82

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27.	Libya	30/05/85	19/07/86	26/03/87
28.	Madagascar		09/03/92	19/03/92
29.	Malawi	13/11/81	17/11/89	23/02/90
30.	Mali	13/11/81	21/12/81	22/01/82
31.	Mauritania	25/02/82	14/06/86	26/06/86
32.	Mauritius	27/02/92	19/06/92	01/07/92
33.	Mozambique		22/02/89	07/03/90
34.	Namibia		30/07/92	16/09/92
35.	Niger	09/07/86	15/07/86	21/07/86
36.	Nigeria	31/08/82	22/06/83	22/07/83
37.	Uganda	18/08/86	10/05/86	27/05/86
38.	Rwanda	11/11/81	15/07/83	22/07/83
39.	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	10/04/86	02/05/86	23/05/86
40.	Sao Tome & Principe		23/05/86	28/07/86
41.	Senegal	23/09/81	13/08/82	25/10/82
42.	Seychelles		13/04/92	30/04/92
43.	Sierra Leone	27/08/81	21/09/83	27/01/84
44.	Somalia	26/02/82	31/07/85	20/03/86
45.	South Africa	09/07/96	09/07/96	09/07/96
46.	Sudan		03/09/82	11/03/86
47.	Swaziland		15/09/95	09/10/95
48.	Tanzania	31/05/82	18/02/84	09/03/84
49.	Chad	29/05/86	09/10/86	11/11/86
50.	Togo	26/02/82	05/11/82	22/11/82
51.	Tunisia		16/03/83	22/04/83
52.	Zambia	17/01/83	10/01/84	02/02/84
53.	Zimbabwe	20/02/86	30/05/86	12/06/86

*ADOPTED: by the eighteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, June 1981.

*REQUIRES: ratification/adherence of a simple majority of Member States to come into force.

*ENTERED : into force on 21st October, 1986.

Registered with the United Nations on 10/09/1991, No. 26363.

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ANNEX B

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ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
& OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS
PURSUANT TO RULE 89(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RULES 89(C) & 92bis

Tab #.	Ex. #	Title/Description	Date
7.	---	U.S. Department of State: Liberia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999	25.02.2000

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00100782

US DoS Report 1999

1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000

LIBERIA

Liberia is a centralized republic, dominated by a strong presidency. Although the Constitution provides for three branches of government, there is no effective system of checks and balances, and presidents traditionally have wielded extraordinary power. Americo-Liberians, descendants of freed African-American slaves from the United States and the Caribbean who make up about 5 percent of the population, dominated the country's government through the True Whig party until 1980. In 1980 Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn ethnic group, seized power in a military coup. Doe was killed by rebels in 1990 early in the 7-year-long, ethnically divisive civil war, which was ended by the Abuja Peace Accords in 1996. Forces led by Charles G. Taylor, who is of both indigenous and Americo-Liberian ancestry, emerged dominant. In July 1997, Taylor won the presidential election, and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) won three-quarters of the seats in the Legislature. The elections were administratively free and transparent, but were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most voters believed that Taylor's forces would have resumed fighting if he had lost. Most other leaders of the former warring factions subsequently left the country. The bicameral Legislature exercised little independence from the executive branch. The judiciary is subject to political influence, economic pressure, and corruption.

The regular security forces included: The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the Liberia National Police (LNP), which has primary responsibility for internal security; the Antiterrorist Unit (ATU), composed of an elite special forces group; and the Special Security Service (SSS), a large, heavily armed executive protective force. There also are numerous irregular security services attached to certain key ministries and parastatal corporations, the responsibilities of which appear poorly defined. The national army, which fought against Taylor's faction during the civil war, has yet to be downsized and restructured as required by the Abuja Peace Accords, although a restructuring plan exists. Only a few contingents have been deployed to maintain security in parts of rural areas. The many newly created security services absorbed Taylor's most experienced civil war fighters, including undisciplined and untrained loyalists. While civilian authorities in Monrovia generally maintained control of the security forces, frequently they acted independently of government authority, particularly in rural areas. Members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.

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US DoS Report 1999

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Liberia is a very poor country with a market-based economy that has yet to recover from the ravages of the civil war. Average per capita income is estimated at only a small fraction of the prewar level. Prior to 1990, the cash economy was based primarily on iron ore, rubber, timber, diamond, and gold exports. Unemployment of 85 percent, a 15 percent literacy rate, the internal displacement of civilians in Lofa and Nimba counties, and the absence of infrastructure throughout the country continued to depress productive capacity, despite the country's rich natural resources and potential self-sufficiency in food. Government officials and former combatants continued to exploit the country's natural resources for personal benefit. Extortion is a widespread phenomenon in all levels of society.

The Government's human rights record remained poor, and there were serious problems in many areas. The security forces committed many extrajudicial killings. They were accused of killing or causing the disappearance of citizens from Lofa county. Security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused or humiliated citizens. The Government investigated some of the alleged abuses by the security forces, but in all cases in which officers were charged, they either were treated leniently or exonerated. Prison conditions were harsh and sometimes life threatening. Security forces continued at times to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained common. The judicial system, hampered by political influence, economic pressure, inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of resources, was unable to ensure citizens' rights to due process and a fair trial. In some rural areas where the judiciary had not been reestablished, clan chieftains administered criminal justice through the traditional practice of trial-by-ordeal; at times the authorities tacitly condoned this practice. Over 1 dozen political prisoners remained in jail. Security forces violated citizens' privacy rights, conducted warrantless searches, harassment, illegal surveillance, and looted homes. The Government restricted freedom of the press and assaulted, threatened, and intimidated journalists into self-censorship. Security forces restricted freedom of movement, using roadblocks to extort money from travelers and returning refugees. Security forces frequently harassed human rights monitors. Violence and discrimination against women remained problems. The education and care of children remained widely neglected, and female genital mutilation (FGM) continued to increase. Societal ethnic discrimination remained widespread, ethnic differences continued to generate violence and political tensions, and the Government continued to discriminate against indigenous ethnic groups that had opposed Taylor in the civil war, especially the Mandingo and the Krahn ethnic groups. Forced labor, including by children, persisted in rural areas. Child labor remained widespread, and there were reports of forced child labor. Ritualistic killings also persisted.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings during the year. Human rights organizations estimate the number of extrajudicial killings to be approximately 100; however, there were no convictions of the perpetrators. Beginning in August when it appointed Paul Mulbah as the new director of the LNP, the Government stepped up its efforts to curb these and other abuses by members of the security forces.

There were credible reports that government forces as well as members of the Loma ethnic group harassed and intimidated members of the Mandingo ethnic group, including the burning of mosques. There are credible reports that during the incursions and counter-attacks in Lofa county, hundreds were killed and thousands of citizens plus refugees from Sierra Leone were forced to flee the area. In July Sierra Leonean refugees began to leave two refugee camps in northern Lofa county because of the instability and harassment by security forces. Many walked for days to reach the help of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Bomi county, which transported them to a refugee camp near the border with Sierra Leone. Lofa county residents complained of constant harassment and intimidation by the police and paramilitary forces used by the Government to quell the incursions.

In May a human rights organization reported that a security officer was beaten to death and called for an investigation. The LNP stated that the officer had died in a traffic accident. President Taylor later told a press conference that the officer died while in detention. No one was charged in connection with the officer's death.

A U.N. team visited in May to investigate the September 1998 violence. No government forces were arrested. The Government arrested 14 Krahn civilians in 1998 and tried them for sedition. Thirteen were convicted in 1999 and are serving 10-year terms. Nine Krahn AFL soldiers were arrested and were standing trial at year's end. Five other Krahn arrested in 1998 in connection with the September 1998 violence were not charged by year's end.

The President Pro Tempore of the Senate told the Inter-parliamentary Union that the investigation into the 1997 killings of opposition political leader Samuel Saye Dokie and three family members continued. However, authorities did not report any results from a promised investigation.

There was no follow-up in investigations of the 1998 extrajudicial killings of Mannah Zekay, John Nimely, or others reported during that year.

There was no report released by the Government following its November investigation of the reported killing of as many as 30 Mandingos in Lofa county in August. Although the authorities subsequently arrested 19 persons, they did not charge anyone with a crime. Mandingo residents of Lofa county continued to be afraid to return to their homes.

Reports of ritualistic killings, in which human body parts used in traditional rituals are removed from the victim, continued to occur. The number of such killings is difficult to ascertain, since police often described deaths as accidents even when body parts have been removed. Deaths that appear to be natural or accidental sometimes are rumored to have been the work of ritualistic killers. Most reported ritual killings were from the southeastern counties. In August the Government sent a high-level national police delegation to investigate alleged ritual killings in Harper, Maryland county.

b. Disappearance

Security forces produced suspects whom they had held without charge when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the applications of human rights organizations. Their disappearances were often the result of prolonged illegal detention at the Gbartala base (see Section 1.c.). There were a number of reports that ethnic Mandingos disappeared following the violence in Lofa county in April and August. Eyewitnesses gave a detailed account, stating that all the men in a Lofa county village were taken away by government security forces. It is not known whether the missing individuals were killed or fled to Guinea or other parts of the world. There were no reports by year's end that the Government carried out its promised investigation of the incident. There were no developments in the 1998 disappearance case of market woman Nowai Flomo.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits torture and other degrading treatment; however, government security forces sometimes tortured, beat, and otherwise abused and humiliated citizens. In several cases, security forces produced suspects whom they had held without charge when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the applications of human rights organizations. The detainees charged that they were tortured while in detention at a security training base in Gbatala. Victims reported being held in water-filled holes in the ground, being injured when fires were kindled on grates over their heads, being urinated on, and suffering beatings and sexual abuse. In October human rights organizations called for the closure of the base because of the reports of torture there. The number of credible claims of such treatment indicates a pattern of abuse at the base. The Government did not report any results of its promised investigation by year's end.

An assistant minister for public security and some security force members were dismissed and tried and convicted of aggravated assault after being charged with forcibly removing a magistrate from his courtroom and torturing him because they took exception to a court ruling.

In March in Dambala, a village near the border with Sierra Leone, a group of armed soldiers reportedly beat and detained men, raped women, and looted homes.

Government security personnel assaulted and injured a few journalists (see Section 2.a.).

Members of the security forces, as well as the ATF, AFL, and the SSS were implicated in numerous reports of harassment, intimidation, and looting. Beginning in August, new LNP director Mulbah took steps to investigate and discipline officers accused of human rights abuses. For example, in October citizens of the southeastern county of Maryland reported harassment and intimidation by officers, including a shooting and beatings of local citizens (see Section 1.e.). In response the director dispatched a team of LNP inspectors to investigate. In October two SSS officers were found guilty in an SSS investigation and imprisoned for harassing and intimidating citizens.

Security force personnel in rural areas were paid and provisioned inadequately and often extorted money and goods from civilians. There were many credible reports that security forces harassed returning refugees, displaced persons, and refugees from Sierra Leone, especially in the border areas. Numerous abuses occurred following the incidents in Lofa county in April and August (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).

Government security personnel were involved in the looting of 1,450 tons of food intended for Sierra Leonean refugees, theft of vehicles belonging to international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and the personal property of foreigners and citizens. The international community publicly decried the Government's support for the Revolutionary United Front rebels in the civil war in Sierra Leone.

During the first half of the year, the police manhandled numerous petty traders and confiscated money and goods in various market areas, while attempting to prevent small traders from operating outside areas designated for them. Paul Mulbah, the police director appointed in August, took steps to end these abuses.

Clan chieftains continued to use the traditional practice of trial-by-ordeal to resolve criminal cases in rural areas. Although the Supreme Court ruled that trial-by-ordeal--commonly the placement of a heated metal object on a suspect's body in an attempt to determine whether the defendant is telling the truth--is unconstitutional, the Ministry of Internal Affairs continued tacitly to condone the practice in an unknown number of cases during the year. A lawsuit filed in 1994 for injuries resulting from trial-by-ordeal was still pending before the Supreme Court at year's end.

The widow of an Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldier reported that after her husband was killed on duty at the Liberia-Guinea border during the April incident, she was beaten severely and abducted by members of the Mandingo ethnic group and taken to Guinea. She later escaped and returned to the country.

Prison conditions were harsh and in some cases life threatening. There were credible reports of unofficial detention facilities in which detainees were held without charge and

in some cases tortured. The Government did not provide detainees or prisoners in official facilities with adequate food or medical care. Cells at Monrovia Central Prison are overcrowded, mostly with detainees awaiting trial. Only about 10 percent of the total prison population have been convicted of criminal offenses. Convicted prisoners and detainees awaiting trial are not confined in separate facilities. Many of the detainees have been subjected to lengthy pretrial detention, and in some cases, the period of detention approximates the length of sentence for the crime in question. Similar conditions exist in the Barclay Training Center military stockade. In some counties, the structure that serves as a jail is a container with bars at one end.

In a number of cases, human rights groups and interested individuals achieved the release of prisoners. In November a legal aid organization obtained the release without bail from Monrovia Central Prison of a pregnant woman charged with theft. The woman, who was 8 months pregnant, had been detained without trial since July.

Women, who constitute about 5 percent of the prison population, were held in separate cells. Their conditions are comparable to that of the male prisoners and detainees. There were no separate facilities for juvenile offenders.

The Government permits the independent monitoring of prison conditions by local human rights groups, the media, and the ICRC. The ICRC is allowed to visit prisoners in prison facilities and police detention centers without third parties present and to make regular repeat visits. However, visits to unofficial detention centers often are denied. For example, despite requests made by NGO's to the Defense Ministry, no independent monitor has been allowed to visit the Gbatala base in which victims have been detained illegally and tortured.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. The Constitution provides for the rights of the accused, including warrants for arrests, and the right of detainees either to be charged or released within 48 hours. Although the Government generally adheres to these standards, warrants were not always based on sufficient evidence, and detainees, especially those without the means to hire a lawyer, often were held for more than 48 hours without charge. In some cases, persons were detained secretly at unofficial detention centers (see Section 1.c.).

The Constitution provides for the right of a person who is charged to receive an expeditious trial; however, lengthy pretrial and prearrest detention remained a serious problem (see Section 1.c.). Five detained soldiers awaiting court-martial for desertion during the September 1998 incident have been incarcerated in the stockade since November 1998. Should they be convicted, the maximum sentence would be 6 months' imprisonment.

The police have only limited logistics and forensic capabilities and cannot adequately investigate many crimes, including murder cases. When the courts release known criminals for lack of evidence, police officers often rearrest them on specious charges. Authorities charged journalists with contempt and detained some journalists (in one case for more than the legal limit of 48 hours, without charge (see Section 2.a.).

The Government did not use forced exile, but the security forces frequently harassed and threatened opposition figures and human rights activists to the point that a number of them departed the country due to fear for their personal safety or that of their families. An internationally renowned human rights activist was forced to leave the country for fear of his life by various security officials. In January 17-year-old child rights advocate Kimmie Weeks fled the country to avoid harassment by security personnel disturbed by his charges that the Government was training child soldiers. Several times during the year, President Taylor publicly alleged that some of these opposition figures had gone abroad to conspire in the overthrow of his Government. The effect of such statements was to keep numerous prominent opposition figures and former warlords out of the country throughout the year.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Although the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, judges are subjected to political, social, familial, and financial pressures, leading to the corruption of the judiciary. Some judges and magistrates are not lawyers. The judiciary determined that it is not feasible to retire immediately all judicial personnel who are not legally trained but intends to replace those currently sitting by lawyers as they retire. The Supreme Court ruled that members of the bar must be graduates of a law school and pass the bar examination. The executive branch continued to exert undue influence on the judiciary. Early in the year, the President's personal aide-de-camp prevented the execution of a Supreme Court decision against a major bank. The aide reportedly feared that its failure would injure the country's fragile economy. The Court was not able to enforce its decision, at least partially because the plaintiff did not inform the Court that its decision was not executed.

The judiciary is divided into four levels, with the Supreme Court at the apex. All levels of the court system in Monrovia, including the Supreme Court functioned erratically. In 1997, for the first time in the country's history, a juvenile court system was established for all 13 counties. However, by year's end, the only functioning juvenile court was in Monrovia. The Monrovia juvenile court has heard 50 cases since its inception. A criminal court established in late 1997 specifically to handle armed robbery cases remains ineffective. The Government's efforts to revitalize the court system outside Monrovia continued to be troubled by lack of trained personnel, infrastructure, and lack of adequate funding. Although judges were assigned throughout the country, in some cases they were unable to hold court due to lack of supplies and equipment. Several localities reverted to traditional forms of justice administered by clan chieftains (see Section 1.c.).

Under the Constitution, defendants have due process rights that conform to internationally accepted standards. However, in practice these rights are not always observed. Defendants have the right to a public trial and timely consultation with an attorney. However, there is no effective system to provide public defenders, especially in the rural areas. Courts regularly received bribes or other illegal gifts out damages that they awarded in civil cases. Defense attorneys often suggested that their clients pay a gratuity to appease judges, prosecutors, and police officers to secure favorable rulings.

There are 13 political prisoners. In September 1998, following Operation Camp Johnson Road, the Government arrested 9 Krahn members of the armed forces and 19 civilians, including some senior Krahn leaders, on charges that included treason and sedition. The Government dropped charges against 5 of the civilian suspects in return for their testimony as state witnesses; the trial of the remaining 14 civilian defendants was completed in April. One defendant was acquitted, and the 13 others were convicted of treason and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment (see Section 1.e.).

The jury trial was public and attended by international observers. Some observers believed that the defendants did not receive due process and that the jury was influenced significantly by ethnic ties. The military trials of nine Krahn AFL officers' remained in progress at year's end.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and the sanctity of the home; however, authorities regularly infringed on these rights. The Constitution provides that the police must obtain a warrant, or have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress, or is about to be committed, before entering a private dwelling. In practice police and paramilitary officers frequently entered private homes and churches without warrants to carry out arrests and investigations. Since Mulbah's appointment as LNP director, the LNP took some steps to address the culture of impunity in the police force, but very little has been done to control the military and paramilitary forces' gratuitous acts of random cruelty against civilians.

The security forces harassed and threatened opposition figures and their families by conducting illegal surveillance. In some cases, they entered the homes of opposition figures, usually at night. Former combatants also harassed citizens with little fear of reprisal for their actions. In July approximately 100 former combatants stormed the home of a democracy advocate while he was out of the country, looting his home and terrorizing his family. No charges were brought against any of the former combatants. This incident and several other illegal entries prompted an opposition party leader to suspend the community development project that she sponsored. Several journalists and human rights activists resided in the homes of friends or relatives for months at a time due to fear that the security forces might follow through with their threats against

them. These incidents of harassment increased significantly in the immediate aftermath of the violence in Lofa county in April and August, particularly against members of the Mandingo ethnic group. In rural areas, armed security forces illegally entered homes, most often to steal food, money, or other property (see Section 1.c.). This problem was especially prevalent in remote parts of Lofa county during the year.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted this right in practice. Security agents threatened and assaulted journalists and intimidated many journalists into practicing self-censorship.

With some notable exceptions, government officials are grudgingly tolerant of the press. However, they frequently rebuked the media publicly for what they considered negative reporting of events. Security personnel sometimes interpreted such criticism as a license to harass, threaten, and even assault targeted persons. Some media executives suspended journalists for broadcasting or writing news articles that were critical of security forces. At times such news reporting that criticized the Government brought threats of violence, closure, or directives from powerful government figures to advertisers that they should discontinue business with that media outlet. Government officials stated that there were no journalists in jail.

Government officials criticized journalists who used the Internet to express opinions that the authorities considered detrimental. Many persons believed that the Government blocked Internet access during the latter half of the year.

Journalists generally are left to print or say what they dare, provided that they are willing to face strong criticism and the possible consequences. Sometimes journalists are brash and even provocative, but they also go through periods of self-censorship after they receive threats, whether perceived or genuine. Government security personnel assaulted and injured a few journalists and security agents confiscated or destroyed some equipment (see Section 1.a.). Journalists were charged with contempt, some were detained (in one known case, more than the legal limit of 48 hours without charge), and some sought asylum outside the country (see Section 1.d.). In July a consignment of *The African Observer* was seized upon arrival at Roberts International Airport because it contained an article that authorities considered critical of the Government.

No action was taken during the year in the case of the police forces' 1998 flogging of journalist Hassan Bility.

The Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism did not apply fee regulations regarding yearly licensure for media outlets uniformly. It changed the deadline for fee

payments, and although it allowed some delinquent media outlets to pay their fees late, it did not accept late payment from one newspaper with the result that the newspaper had to cease publication. Authorities considered a former editor now in exile of the newspaper to be antigovernment and believed that his successors were carrying on his tradition.

There is still only one printing facility capable of producing newspapers, and its management is subject to pressure from the Government. Several editors of the independent media practice self-censorship in order to stay in business and keep their advertisers (who also respond to official pressure). To meet costs of production, the typical newspaper's eight pages include two or three pages of advertisements or paid announcements, further reducing the amount of news reported. Some articles included are the result of "cadeaux," gifts or money that supplement reporters' meager salaries. Production costs force publishers to set the prices of their newspapers beyond the means of most citizens.

Reporters investigated human rights violations and corruption issues, but in some cases, practiced self-censorship due to fear for their physical safety. Several incidents heightened that fear. For example: Repeated detainment and assault (requiring hospital treatment) of a freelance reporter for suspicion of treason because of casual contacts with a member of the diplomatic corps; the assault on the editor of an independent newspaper by a security officer (with no subsequent punishment); and the assault on a reporter who had gone to the office of a ruling party official to seek clarification on a news article. An investigation of the last incident by the Press Union of Liberia determined that the assault was carried out with the party official's acquiescence, in the presence of others, but there was no apology or reprisal. Verbal assaults on the press by government officials have been common but the authorities "justified" them as personal opinions that they freely expressed under the Constitution. One government official accused the entire independent media of being paid by a Western government to write "all kinds of lies" against the Liberian Government. In some cases, there were indications that journalists were entrapped by authorities in order to damage the reputation of the profession in general. Authorities charged 13 journalists and several policemen with conspiracy to confiscate and sell expired, imported frozen poultry after the journalists went to the national port to report on destruction of the meat. Although charges against the policemen were dropped quickly, the journalists were suspended from their jobs and the press union for several months until a grand jury refused to indict them due to lack of evidence.

In Monrovia 10 newspapers were published during the year, although some publish very irregularly. Two are dailies, and five generally appeared once or more a week. One is published by the Public Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism, and one sometimes is published by the communications network owned by the President. The others are produced independently and vary in their political balance.

In addition to the high price of newspapers and the high rate of illiteracy (between 70 and 85 percent), which limits their circulation, newspaper distribution is limited to the Monrovia area by high transportation costs and the poor state of roads elsewhere in the country. Television is limited to those who can purchase sets, the generators, and fuel to provide electricity. For those persons and businesses with satellite capability, the Cable News Network is available. Radio is the primary means of mass communication. Of the seven radio broadcasting stations, two are owned privately (one of these also broadcasts television programs); one is operated by the Catholic Archdiocese; one is an evangelical Christian station; one (Star Radio) is a noncommercial station managed locally but funded primarily through international organizations; one is owned by President Taylor (Liberia Communications Network); and one is the national station (Liberia Broadcasting System). Due to the economic situation in the country and the dependence on generators requiring expensive fuel purchases, most of the stations limited broadcasting hours and in some cases ceased operation for short periods. At the end of the year, the Government continued its refusal to renew Star Radio's short-wave frequency allocation. Although the station, which is allowed to broadcast locally via FM, is politically neutral and now has local management, there has been no change in the government's policy toward the station. The Government's limitation of Star Radio to FM broadcasts prevented its broadcasts from reaching audiences outside the immediate Monrovia area. The only radio station with a short-wave frequency strong enough to reach all parts of the country is owned by the President. Radio Veritas, operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, has a short-wave frequency but a limited broadcast area and antiquated equipment.

Call-in radio talk shows are popular and frequently a forum for both government and opposition viewpoints. Interviews with prominent persons are broadcast frequently. In August former combatants looted a civil rights activist's home in reaction to his comments on a popular radio talk show (see Section 1.f.). Members of a church, whose tenets include free sex among its members, even among members of the same family, were indicted for incest and other crimes after describing their beliefs and practices in detail on the same show. At year's end, they were free on bail pending trial.

Academic freedom continues to be generally respected at the University of Liberia; however, President Taylor replaced the previous university president with a member of the ruling party. At times students reported professors' opinions to various government officials.

Although university administrators have been concerned about the militancy of the student groups on campus, which include a high percentage of former combatants, actual physical violence has been rare. Security forces were not called to intervene on campus.

Students occasionally protested about the lack of resources, which they blamed more on central government appropriation practices than on the university administration.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. The Government used objective criteria to approve or disapprove permits for public meetings. The approval process appeared to be administered fairly. Approvals for marches and gatherings sometimes were made contingent upon rerouting or changes in venue. In September there were clashes between public high school students who protested the Government's failure to pay their teachers and the police. The students attempted to close some public schools. The new LNP director intervened personally and the situation was calmed after only a relatively small number of injuries inflicted by both sides and scattered property damage.

The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. Registration requirements can be onerous but do not appear to be discriminatory towards any specific group.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there were some exceptions.

There is no established state religion. However, government ceremonies invariably open and close with prayer and may include hymn singing. The prayers and hymns are usually Christian but occasionally are Muslim. Although Islam is gaining adherents, as much as 40 percent of the population practice either Christianity or elements of both Christianity and traditional indigenous religions. Although religious ritual killings reportedly occur, there is little reliable information available about them, their perpetrators, their victims, or the religious faiths that are involved (see Section 1.a.). All organizations, including religious groups, must register their articles of incorporation with the Government, along with a statement of the purpose of the organization. However, traditional indigenous religious groups generally need not and do not register. The registration is routine, and there have been no reports that the registration process is either burdensome or discriminatory in its administration.

Early in the year, President Taylor dismissed all but one of his cabinet ministers after they failed to accompany him to a church service. Explaining his action, Taylor initially stated that anyone who did not know God could not serve in his Government. Subsequently Taylor stated that religion is a private matter, but that cabinet ministers are required to be present at public ceremonies that the president attends. Some days later, Taylor rescinded both actions and reinstated the ministers at the urging of several persons and organizations.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for freedom of movement throughout the country as well as the right to leave or enter; however, the Government restricted this right in practice. Security forces' maintained checkpoints where travelers routinely were subjected to arbitrary searches and petty extortion. Security forces also extorted money from returning refugees.

The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. During the year, the Government provided first asylum to 120,000 Sierra Leonean persons living along the western border of the country; it granted asylum to these persons in 1998. The Government continued to cooperate with the Office of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in attempting to assist these asylees. However, inaccessibility due to poor road conditions and the limited capacity of local NGO's severely restricted the amount of relief assistance that could be provided. Violence in Lofa county in April and August led to the suspension of assistance by local and international NGO's in that area (see Section 1.a.).

In April government security personnel looted Voinjama, in northern Lofa county, in the wake of a purported attack by Liberian dissidents who had taken refuge in Guinea. Mandingo residents of Voinjama then fled to Guinea because of the incident and remained unwilling to return because of their fear of harassment by the Liberian security forces. No one was punished. In August in Kolahun, northern Lofa county, where in the aftermath of another incursion from Guinea, security forces once again looted stores of food intended for Sierra Leonean refugees. The refugees, fearing the dissidents and the security forces, migrated south towards another established refugee camp in Sinje (see Section 1.c.). The Government cooperated with the UNHCR's efforts to assist the migration to the new location. International donors remained unwilling to send any further assistance to Lofa county, and international and domestic NGO's are reluctant to resume operations there because of security concerns. The Government and the UNHCR established a second refugee camp in Sinje, a location easily accessible from Monrovia, to accommodate the refugees from Lofa county.

There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The Constitution provides for the right to vote in free and fair elections, and citizens exercised this right in 1997 in elections that international observers deemed free and transparent; however, the elections were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most voters believed that military forces loyal to Charles Taylor would have resumed the civil war if Taylor lost the election. Since the legislative elections were held on the

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basis of proportional representation, Taylor's National Patriotic Party won control of the legislature by the same 75 percent majority that Taylor received in the popular vote for the Presidency. The 1997 legislative and presidential elections were held under a special election law in accordance with the terms of the Abuja Peace Process.

The Legislature did not exercise genuine independence from the executive branch. Opposition legislators, who held only one-quarter of the seats in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, generally were more docile than some independent members of the ruling NPP. In March Senator Charles Brumskine, an NPP member, fled the country expressing fear for his life, after stating that the NPP had forced him to resign from his position as President Pro Tempore of the Senate. He later resigned his senatorial seat and has not returned to the country. A few weeks later, the ruling party manipulated the committee structure such that five opposition figures lost their chairmanships. Congressional committees failed to develop expertise in their respective areas of responsibility. No major legislation was enacted during the year. However, the House of Representatives succeeded in blocking the demolition of the Barclay Training Center military stockade.

The State is highly centralized. The President appoints the superintendents (governors) of the 13 counties. Municipalities and chieftaincies are supposed to elect their own officials, but elections, postponed in 1998 due to lack of funds and disorganization, were not held during 1999 for the same reason. However, a by-election was held in November to fill the seat vacated by Senator Brumskine. Local governments at all levels have no independent revenue base and rely entirely on the central government for funds. Education, health services, and public works are provided by the central Government. Local officials serve mainly to lobby the central Government.

There are no restrictions on the participation of women in politics; however, women remained underrepresented in government and politics. The number of women in high-ranking positions in the Taylor Administration and in the various political parties is low. Only 5 of the 26 Senators and 5 of the 64 members of the House of Representatives are women. Of the 20 cabinet positions, 2 are held by women, a woman serves as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and a woman chairs the National Reconciliation Commission. There are no women's caucuses, but the ruling party has a women's organization.

Muslims also are underrepresented in government; only one cabinet minister is a Muslim.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The Taylor Administration permitted domestic and international human rights groups to operate largely without interference; however, members of the security forces

frequently harassed domestic democracy and human rights activists, and forced some human rights activists to live with friends for months due to fear (see Section 1.f.). Frequently government officials criticized domestic human rights groups publicly. In July an internationally known human rights activist returned to Liberia from study abroad for an extended visit but left abruptly after threats were made against him by members of the security forces. The Government routinely criticized these actions and pledged to investigate them and punish the perpetrators.

In November in response to reports of torture at the Gbatala base, President Taylor stated that the persistent reports of human rights abuses were the result of human rights organizations trying to get funding from the international community (see Section 1.c.). In July former combatants terrorized the family of an activist who was away from home at the time (see Section 1.f.). Legislators from the southeast countries sued a child rights advocacy group for defaming the reputation of the counties in its report on forced child labor (see Section 5).

Domestic human rights organizations are underfunded, understaffed, and their personnel lacked adequate training. There are two coalitions of human rights groups: The National Human Rights Center of Liberia has 12 member organizations, while 6 other groups joined together to form Network. Both of these organizations sought to increase public discussion of human rights problems.

Some human rights groups paid regular visits to detainees at police headquarters and prisoners at the Monrovia Central Prison. Several domestic human rights organizations have established branches outside of the capital and perform similar monitoring functions there. No discernible pattern of government interference with these activities emerged.

The government's Human Rights Commission, created in 1997, remained inactive throughout the year. It received no funding from the Government, and the Senate again failed to confirm the appointments of three of its five commissioners.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnic background, race, sex, creed, place of origin, or political opinion, but discrimination exists. There are no laws against gender discrimination, ethnic discrimination, or female genital mutilation. Differences involving ethnic groups, notably the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups, continued to contribute to serious political violence and abuses.

Women

Domestic violence against women is extensive but has not been addressed seriously as a problem by the Government, the courts, or the media. Several NGO's in Monrovia

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and Buchanan continued programs to treat abused women and girls and increase awareness of their human rights.

The status of women varies by region, ethnic group, and religion. Before the outbreak of the civil war, women held one-fourth of the professional and technical jobs in Monrovia. On the whole, women have not recovered from the setbacks caused by the civil war, when most schools were closed, and they could not carry out their traditional roles in the production, allocation, and sale of food.

Women married under civil law can inherit land and property. However, women married under traditional law are considered the properties of their husbands and are not entitled to inherit from their husbands or retain custody of their children if their husbands die. In July 600 women from a coalition of women's organizations marched on Capitol Hill in Monrovia in support of legislation that would provide women in traditional marriages with inheritance rights. There continued to be few programs to help former combatants reintegrate into society, and there were none specifically to benefit former female combatants. However, several women's organizations advanced family welfare issues, helped promote political reconciliation, and assisted in rehabilitating both former female combatants and women who were victims of the civil war.

Throughout the year, professional women's groups--including lawyers, market women, and businesswomen--remained vocal about their concerns. Government officials often responded negatively to public criticism. There were credible reports of harassment and possible surveillance of outspoken critics (see Section 1.f.).

Children

The Government generally was unable to provide for the education and health of children. Due to the poor condition of government schools, most children who attended school went to private institutions. Since many private schools had to be refurbished due to wartime damage, school fees were increased significantly, thereby making education unattainable for many school-age children. In both public and private schools, families of children often were asked to provide their own books, pencils, and paper. No data was available on either school enrollment or government expenditure on education.

Young persons were victimized seriously during the civil war. An estimated 50,000 children were killed; many more were wounded, orphaned, or abandoned. Nearly all youths witnessed terrible atrocities, and some committed atrocities themselves. About 21 percent (4,306) of the combatants who disarmed under the provisions of the Abuja peace accords were child soldiers under the age of 17. Many youths remain traumatized, and some still are addicted to drugs. The number of street children in Monrovia and the number of abandoned infants increased significantly following disarmament. NGO's and the U.N. Children's Fund continued retraining and

rehabilitation programs for a limited number of former child fighters. A new juvenile court established in Monrovia in 1997 lacked the funds and personnel to function effectively (see Section 1.e.). Children continued to be incarcerated with adults, and there were long delays in deciding cases involving minors.

Child advocacy groups reported forced child labor in the rural areas of the country (see Section 6.c.). Local government officials in three of the counties cited sued one of the groups for defamation. At year's end, the case still was pending.

Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by international public health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, traditionally was performed on young girls by northern, western, and central ethnic groups, particularly in rural areas. Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1989, approximately 50 percent of women in rural areas between the ages of 8 and 18 were subjected to FGM. In some instances, female health professionals in the groups participated in the practice to the extent of providing postoperative care.

The war totally disrupted traditional village life. Most of the population fled to neighboring countries or became displaced within the country. Social structures and traditional institutions, such as the secret societies that often performed FGM as an initiation rite, also were undermined by the war. While many experts believe that the incidence of FGM had dropped to as low as 10 percent by the end of the war, traditional societies are reestablishing themselves throughout the country, and the increase in the incidence of FGM continued. The most extreme form of FGM, infibulation, is not practiced. The Government has taken no action against FGM. In January a well-known 17-year-old child rights activist fled the country to evade persistent harassment of himself, his family, teachers, and high school classmates by security personnel (see Section 1.f.).

People with Disabilities

As a result of the civil war, a large number of persons have permanent injuries, in addition to those disabled by accident or illness. It is illegal to discriminate against the disabled, but in practice they do not enjoy equal access to public buildings. No laws mandate accessibility to public buildings or services.

Religious Minorities

Some tensions exist between the major religious communities. Although the law prohibits religious discrimination, Islamic leaders complained of discrimination against Muslims. There are some Muslims in senior government positions. However, many Muslims believe that they are bypassed for desirable jobs. Many Muslim business proprietors believe that the Taylor Government's decision to enforce old statutes prohibiting doing business on Sunday discriminates against them. Many Muslims were

allied with factions that opposed President Taylor during the recent civil war and still belong to opposition parties.

Discrimination against followers of other organized religions spills over into areas of individual opportunity and employment.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Although the Constitution bans ethnic discrimination, it also provides that only "persons who are Negroes or of Negro descent" may be citizens or own land. Many persons of Lebanese and Asian descent who were born or lived most of their lives in the country are denied full rights as a result of this racial distinction.

The country, although small, is ethnically diverse. The population of about 3 million is made up of 16 indigenous ethnic groups and the Americo-Liberian minority--descendants of freed African slaves from the United States and the Caribbean--which until 1980 dominated the government and the public sector through the True Whig party. The indigenous ethnic groups generally speak distinct primary languages and they are concentrated regionally. No ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population.

Many members of the predominantly Muslim Mandingo minority encountered hostility when they sought to return, after the end of the civil war, to their villages in Lofa, Bong, and Nimba Counties. Many Mandingos were unable to reoccupy their homes, which had been taken over by squatters. Members of the Loma, Gio, and Mano minorities generally held all Mandingos responsible for atrocities committed by the Ulimo-Mandingo faction during the civil war. The lack of competent security forces and a fully functioning judiciary in these areas prevented many Mandingos from seeking redress. The violence in April and August in Lofa renewed ethnic tensions (see Section 1.a.).

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution states that workers, except members of the military and police, have the right to associate in trade unions, and workers are allowed to join unions in practice. The Constitution also states that unions are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity. Government interference in union activities, especially union elections and leaderships struggles, was common both before and during the civil war. Although most economic activity was interrupted by the war, unions proliferated. Thirty-two functioning unions are organized loosely under two umbrella groups--the Federation of Liberian Trade Unions and the Congress of Liberian Trade Unions--with the common objective of protecting the rights of their 60,000 members, who largely were unemployed. The actual power that the unions exercised was extremely limited.

Since the country's work force is largely illiterate, economic activities beyond the subsistence level were very limited and the labor laws tend to favor management.

The Constitution is silent on the right to strike, but labor laws provide for this right. A decree passed by the People's Redemption Council in 1984 outlawed strikes, but it was not enforced during the year. Due to the destruction of the economy and the estimated 85 percent unemployment rate, strikes were infrequent.

During the year, the Government strictly enforced the union registration requirements that fell into disuse during the war.

Public school teachers in several locations, including Monrovia, went on strikes or "go-slows" to protest the Government's failure to pay their salaries. On April 12, the Firestone rubber plantation agricultural workers' union went on strike over a proposed wage increase. The strike was settled 7 weeks later.

Labor unions traditionally have been affiliated with international labor groups such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

The United States suspended Liberia's status as a beneficiary under the generalized system of preference (GSP). The program was suspended in 1990 as a result of the Doe government's failure to provide internationally recognized workers' rights.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

With the important exception of civil servants, workers (including employees of public corporations and autonomous agencies) have the right to organize and bargain collectively. In the past, agreements were negotiated freely between workers and their employers without government interference. These rights were largely moot because of the lack of economic activity.

There were no export processing zones. All those previously existing were destroyed during the civil war.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced labor including that performed by children; however, this prohibition was widely ignored in many parts of the country, such as rural areas where farmers were pressured into providing free labor on "community projects" that often benefited only local leaders. The Government denied allegations that unpaid laborers were forced to harvest crops on President Taylor's private farm. There were reports of forced child labor (see Section 5).

Some former combatants, including some in the security forces were accused of forcing children to work. Early in the year, a child rights advocacy group released a report on forced child labor in the southeastern counties. The advocacy group's report and that of

another prominent human rights group contradicted an earlier government report that failed to find any conclusive evidence of forced child labor. Subsequently legislators from three counties sued the child rights advocacy group for defaming the counties' reputations. At year's end, the case still was pending.

d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see Section 6.c.). Child advocacy and human rights groups reported child labor, but the Government denied that it existed (see Section 6.c.).

The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16 during school hours in the wage sector, but enforcement traditionally is lax. Throughout rural areas, but particularly where there were no schools, small children continued to assist their parents as vendors in local markets or on the streets, to take care of younger brothers and sisters, and to work on family subsistence farms.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The Labor Law provides for a minimum wage, paid leave, severance benefits, and safety standards, but enforcement was targeted solely against profitable firms that generally observed these standards. Due to the country's continued economic problems, most citizens were forced to accept any work they could find regardless of wages or working conditions.

The 1977 Labor Law requires a minimum wage of approximately \$0.25 (10 Id) per hour not exceeding 8 hours per day, excluding benefits, for unskilled laborers. The law requires that agricultural workers are to be paid \$1.50 (60 Id) for an 8-hour day, excluding benefits. Skilled labor has no minimum fixed wage, but industrial workers usually received three or four times the wage paid to agricultural workers. The much-sought-after minimum wage jobs provided a minimal standard of living for a worker and family. However, there were very few such jobs. Families dependent on minimum wage incomes also engage in subsistence farming, small-scale marketing, petty extortion, and begging.

The Ministry of Labor did not have the resources to monitor compliance with labor laws. The Labor Law provides for a 48-hour, 6-day regular workweek with a 30-minute rest period per 5 hours of work. The 6-day workweek may extend to 56 hours for service occupations and to 72 hours for miners, with overtime pay beyond 48 hours. Prior to 1990, there were government-established health and safety standards, enforced in theory by the Ministry of Labor. During the war, these regulations were not enforced. Even under the Labor Law, workers did not have a specific right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without risking loss of employment.

f. Trafficking in Persons

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The law does not prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country