



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 18 FEBRUARY 2010
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Ms Maya Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Thursday, 18 February 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:28:23 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. Before I take appearances,
6 may I inquire why the central curtain is down,
7 Madam Court Officer?

8 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are advised by the AV booth that
9 there appears to be a technical problem with the central blind
09:32:59 10 and they are trying to see if it can be fixed from the booth,
11 preferably. For now, nothing can be done about it,
12 unfortunately.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated].

14 MS IRURA: Your Honour, it is electronically regulated. It
09:33:19 15 is taken up by a set of switches.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated]. This is less
17 than desirable, but in the circumstances there is not much that
18 we can do. We need to keep this trial going. I will now take
19 appearances.

09:33:52 20 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
21 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J
22 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura and our case manager, Maja Dimitrova.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,
24 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay
09:34:15 25 Griffiths, with me Mr Terry Munyard of counsel.

26 Madam President, can I make this observation: I am
27 concerned that the public at large may take the view that there
28 is some reason associated with the defendant for the blinds being
29 down and perhaps if could be stated on the record that it's a

1 technical issue and it has nothing to do with any measure taken
2 to disguise the identity of the accused.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

4 For the members of the public sitting in the gallery, you
09:34:49 5 will note that the curtain immediately behind Mr Taylor is down.
6 That would normally be the position where a witness is testifying
7 in a closed or private session. Actually, Mr Taylor is
8 testifying in open session and the reason for the curtain being
9 down is that there is a technical fault. This curtain has not
09:35:14 10 been able to be put up again. This is reasons beyond our own
11 control and so that is why you cannot see Mr Taylor. We really
12 hope that this will be fixed quickly because there is going to
13 come a time when witnesses need to come in and have a proper open
14 session or a proper closed session. We need this curtain fixed.

09:35:41 15 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we do apologise on behalf of the
16 Registry and the directive of the Chamber will be conveyed to the
17 appropriate parties.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, because, you see, we are obligated
19 under the rules to conduct an open and public trial and this is
09:35:57 20 now not an open and public trial with a curtain screening off a
21 third of the court. This is less than desirable. And I would
22 instruct the Registrar to ensure that this is addressed speedily,
23 please.

24 MS IRURA: Much obliged, your Honour.

09:36:19 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, just to remind you of your
26 declaration to tell the truth before Mr Griffiths continues.

27 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

28 [On former affirmation]

29 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

1 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday afternoon when we adjourned we were
2 looking at the Twenty-First Progress Report of the
3 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
4 Liberia, dated 29 January 1997, and we concluded by looking at
09:36:54 5 some statistics at the back of that document, and you will be
6 pleased to know that I have no intentions of going back to that
7 today. But I wonder if we could now, please, look behind divider
8 5. This is MFI-63. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, I do.

09:37:46 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you were asked about this document and I
11 would like us now, please, to look in a little bit more detail at
12 this document. You will see that it's dated 16 December 1998.
13 Is that correct?

14 A. That is correct.

09:38:10 15 Q. Now, this would then be shortly before the Freetown
16 invasion in January 1999, yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. And we see that it's the Third Progress Report of the
19 Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
09:38:34 20 Sierra Leone. Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Can we start, please, at paragraph 2:

23 "Since my second progress report, the Government of Sierra
24 Leone has continued its efforts to consolidate its position, to
09:38:54 25 restore the stability of the country and to improve relations
26 with its neighbours."

27 Did that include you, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That is correct, yes.

29 Q. And what were those efforts taken by the Government of

1 Sierra Leone to improve relations?

2 A. Discussions with the President, meeting at different fora
3 and holding discussions.

4 Q. "The government has launched initiatives to strengthen the
09:39:32 5 civil service and to fight corruption. Sierra Leone is also
6 increasingly active in the regional and international arena.

7 On 30 October 1998, the government launched a nationwide
8 consultative exercise, organised with the support of the United
9 Nations Development Programme, aimed at enhancing the capacity of
09:39:57 10 government ministries, other national institutions and civil
11 society to take charge of the development process. The
12 consultations exercise is expected to conclude on 14 December
13 with the adoption of a national consensus on major policy issues,
14 including national reconciliation."

09:40:21 15 Now this:

16 "The government has also pursued legal proceedings against
17 both military and civilian supporters of the illegal coup of May
18 1997 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. On 19 October
19 1998, after a court martial had sentenced 34 officers found
09:40:50 20 guilty of treason to death, 24 of them were executed by firing
21 squad. The executions took place despite appeals from the United
22 Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and others, including
23 myself, for a stay of execution and the grant of the right of
24 appeal."

09:41:16 25 Now, Mr Taylor, what was your position as a member of the
26 Committee of Five and a President within ECOWAS on that decision
27 to execute the 24 officers without a right of appeal?

28 A. I was opposed to it.

29 Q. Why?

1 A. Because at that particular time in the very middle of the
2 crisis to engage in such, I just felt it would just exacerbate
3 the situation and just cause a continuation of the conflict.

09:42:01 4 Q. Now, were you alone in those views amongst your colleagues
5 in ECOWAS?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Who else shared that view?

8 A. Most of ECOWAS. Of course the five members of the
9 committee opposed it, and most other - I would say about
09:42:19 10 two-thirds or more of the member states opposed the execution.

11 Q. Now, did the Committee of Five make known to
12 President Kabbah their opposition to this move?

13 A. On the individual level, yes.

14 Q. "On 23 October 1998, a jury at the High Court in Freetown
09:42:47 15 found Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary
16 United Front, guilty of treason and related offences and
17 sentenced him to death by hanging. Corporal Sankoh, who had not
18 been legally represented during his trial, has now selected legal
19 advisers to undertake his appeal following efforts by the
09:43:12 20 government, with UNOMSIL assistance, to secure legal
21 representation for him."

22 Mr Taylor, what was your personal view regarding the trial
23 of Foday Sankoh at that point in time in October 1998?

24 A. Not really. I felt that it was just the wrong - probably
09:43:40 25 the right step at the wrong time, generally.

26 Q. Let's take that in two stages then. Why the right step?

27 A. Well, if the Government of Sierra Leone had some problems
28 with Sankoh that - in fact, most of these were all political-type
29 problems. We felt that the government should have secured peace

1 and then pursue whatever legitimate or legal concerns it had.
2 That's what I mean. The right step would be to pursue legal
3 points. The wrong time would be, you don't do that until you
4 have secured the peace and stabilised the country.

09:44:29 5 Q. Now, were you alone in those views on the Committee of
6 Five?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Who else shared that view?

9 A. All members of the committee and most other members of
09:44:41 10 ECOWAS.

11 Q. "At their summit meeting in Abuja on 30 and 31 October
12 1998, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community
13 of West African States agreed to combine the strengthening of its
14 monitoring group ECOMOG with efforts at dialogue to achieve
09:45:04 15 lasting peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone."

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, Mr Griffiths. Ms Hollis.

17 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Madam President. Madam President, I
18 rise to find what this relates to in cross-examination. The
19 Prosecution did refer to this document in cross-examination. Our
09:45:24 20 records indicate we referred only to paragraph 15 of this
21 document. It is an MFI that the Defence introduced, and I
22 believe they read it almost in toto during their direct
23 examination. So the Prosecution is not sure what part of
24 cross-examination this part of the document is referring to.

09:45:42 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, are you repeating yourself?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I am not. The point being this: This
27 was a document included by the Prosecution in the bundle of
28 documents served on us for the cross-examination of the
29 defendant, and yes, paragraph 15 was referred to in

1 cross-examination. But in our submission, to rely on one
2 paragraph without placing that paragraph in context is totally
3 misleading, and in our submission we are entitled in
4 re-examination to correct that misleading position, and that's
09:46:23 5 all I am seeking to do, and I am not repeating myself.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think you are entitled to do that.
7 I will overrule the objection.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you attend that meeting in October?

09:46:40 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Let's go now then to the next paragraph, paragraph 6:

12 "On 7 December 1998, the chairman of the Security Council
13 Sanctions Committee and permanent representative of Sweden,
14 Ambassador Hans Dahlgren, arrived in Freetown for a four-day
09:47:08 15 assessment mission."

16 Let's go to the bottom of the paragraph. "Ambassador
17 Dahlgren also visited Monrovia." Did you meet with him,
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, I did.

09:47:18 20 Q. So this was in early December 1998, yes? 7 December 1998?

21 A. Yes, that is correct.

22 Q. What did you discuss with him?

23 A. Oh, naturally, the peace process in Sierra Leone, the
24 fighting and Liberia's own unique role, and urging us to continue
09:47:45 25 to do everything that we could to continue to push the peace
26 process.

27 Q. Now, you were still on the Committee of Five --

28 JUDGE LUSSICK: Just one question on that, Mr Griffiths.
29 Mr Taylor, you were asked - you asked him did he meet

1 Mr Dahlgren, and then you went on to say this was on 7 December
2 1998. Well, if you look at that passage, Mr Dahlgren spent four
3 days in Sierra Leone from 7 December 1998. So when was it that
4 Mr Taylor met him?

09:48:19 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

6 Q. When was it?

7 A. After the trip to Sierra Leone.

8 Q. After the trip to Sierra Leone. Can you now recall the
9 date?

09:48:24 10 A. Well, that would be - naturally, four days later would be
11 about [Microphone not activated].

12 Q. Now, one other matter, Mr Taylor. When we look at
13 paragraph 7, you will see that President Kabbah went to The
14 Gambia on 9 December, so that's two days after Ambassador

09:48:51 15 Dahlgren arrived, and accepted an offer from the President of The
16 Gambia to mediate a peace agreement with the rebels. Now, help
17 us with this: What was the role of the Committee of Five?

18 A. To do exactly that. That was the role of the committee, to
19 mediate.

09:49:07 20 Q. Was Gambia a member of the Committee of Five?

21 A. No, Gambia not a member of the Committee of Five.

22 Q. Were you aware that President Kabbah had done this?

23 A. No, I was not aware that he had done that. But it would
24 not have mattered, because the appointment to that committee is

09:49:25 25 done by the Heads of State. So while the gesture is good on the
26 part of The Gambia and his acceptance, it really did not have any
27 weight because it would still have to go to the committee. And
28 may I just add, it is more than likely - in fact, probable - that
29 if such a submission had gone to the Heads of State, it would

1 have been accepted, because you wouldn't turn a colleague down.
2 But it really didn't have any weight.

3 Q. The document goes on to deal with a meeting held in the
4 United Kingdom. We will skip that and can we now go, please, to
09:50:09 5 paragraph 12 so that we can place paragraph 15 in context. We
6 see that this section of the report is entitled "Relations
7 between Sierra Leone and its Neighbours", yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Paragraph 12:

09:50:25 10 "On 12 November 1998, at the invitation of President
11 Lansana Conte of Guinea, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra
12 Leone and President Charles Taylor of Liberia participated in an
13 extraordinary summit meeting of the Mano River Union in Conakry.
14 The summit was also attended by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, the
09:50:50 15 presidential special envoy for the promotion of democracy and
16 human rights in Africa, as well as my special representative for
17 Sierra Leone and my representative for Liberia, Mr Felix
18 Downes-Thomas.

19 In a communique issued after the meeting, the three Heads
09:51:11 20 of State announced their decision to rejuvenate the
21 Mano River Union. They further pledged to ensure the strict
22 observance of the 1986 Non-aggression and Security Cooperation
23 Agreement between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea that had been
24 signed and ratified by the three member states."

09:51:35 25 Now, do you recall that, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. And Non-aggression and Security Cooperation Agreement, what
28 was the thrust of that agreement?

29 A. It had to do with, on the security side, that if any

1 citizen of any of the member states were involved in subversive
2 activities in their country and escaped and came over to the
3 other country, that individual would be arrested and sent back to
4 that country. Economically, the borders would be open to permit
09:52:22 5 free trade.

6 Q. "Three Heads of State agreed to work collectively to
7 restore peace in Sierra Leone and maintain stability in the
8 sub-region.

9 After the summit, in a meeting with President Kabbah in
09:52:38 10 Freetown, Reverend Jackson stressed the advantage of negotiations
11 over confrontation and called for a negotiated settlement to the
12 conflict in Sierra Leone. A Liberian delegation, led by the
13 Minister of National Security, concluded a two-day visit to
14 Sierra Leone on 9 December."

09:53:04 15 Now, that delegation, Mr Taylor, who went on it? Can you
16 recall?

17 A. Yes, it was led by retired General Philip Kamah, former
18 chief of staff of the armed forces that was Minister of National
19 Security in my government.

09:53:20 20 Q. What was the purpose of that delegation going to Sierra
21 Leone?

22 A. Again, trying to allay the fears and the rumours of
23 possible attacks from Liberia and the movement of arms and
24 manpower across the border, just to assure them that we needed to
09:53:42 25 work together closely and that between and amongst the security
26 agencies, such cooperation would enhance the ability of either
27 government in determining what was factual and what was just
28 based on speculation.

29 Q. Now, you see then that it says:

1 "The Liberian government subsequently announced that
2 President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for
3 cooperation on joint border patrols."

4 Had he done that, Mr Taylor?

09:54:21 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, when you came to that agreement with him, Mr Taylor,
7 about joint border patrols, did President Kabbah express any
8 misgivings about that?

9 A. No, he didn't.

09:54:39 10 Q. I ask for this reason: If we keep our hand in that page
11 and just go behind divider 11 to remind ourselves of the contents
12 of a letter written by President Kabbah to the Secretary-General
13 on 5 January. Do you recall that letter?

14 A. Yes.

09:55:01 15 Q. So keep one hand in divider 5 and let's open divider 11,
16 yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Remember this letter dated 5 January 1999? Last paragraph,
19 do you see it?

09:55:17 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Middle of the paragraph:

22 "However, we cannot allow ourselves to be swayed by denials
23 and unworkable proposals about border surveillance and joint
24 patrols."

09:55:34 25 Now, can you help us as to why it is that at the beginning
26 of December President Kabbah agreed with you on joint border
27 patrols, but by 5 January he was writing to the Secretary-General
28 suggesting that these border patrols were unworkable? Can you
29 help us?

1 A. Well, the only thing I can say is that he was not being
2 sincere to me in December when he agreed to the proposal.

3 Q. Now, let's go back to behind divider 5, shall we. And we
4 are now at paragraph 15, which you were cross-examined about,
09:56:51 5 yes:

6 "While reaffirming its commitment to end the ongoing rebel
7 war as soon as possible, the government has expressed its
8 readiness to address any grievances the rebels might have on
9 condition that they first stop fighting, lay down their arms and
09:57:16 10 surrender to ECOMOG or UNOMSIL. There has also been discussion
11 in government circles of a possible offer to provide safe passage
12 to five persons identified as leaders of the two factions
13 comprising the rebel forces - Johnny Paul Koroma and SAJ Musa of
14 the AFRC and Sam Bockarie, Dennis Mingo, and Eldred Collins of
09:57:49 15 the RUF - to leave the country for a non-neighbouring country of
16 their choice."

17 Now, Mr Taylor, did you know about this?

18 A. At the time, yes, we were aware - I was aware.

19 Q. And what was the full nature of the proposals?

09:58:10 20 A. It was mostly for these individuals to contact governments
21 outside that would add in some way to the promotion of peace in
22 Sierra Leone.

23 Q. Yes. And why these five named individuals?

24 A. Well, these were the important - in fact, this constituted
09:58:38 25 almost the leadership of the important leaders in the two groups.

26 Q. Now, did President Kabbah discuss this with you, Mr Taylor?

27 A. No, he did not discuss it with me.

28 Q. Did he discuss it with any representative of the Committee
29 of Five?

1 A. I can't say. But in terms of the general briefing, when I
2 say he did not discuss it with me, Kabbah and I didn't talk about
3 it. The information reached to Heads of State through our
4 various Foreign Ministries that these individuals were
09:59:24 5 individuals that were being discussed as the leaders that would
6 be given permission to travel outside in the pursuit of peace.

7 Q. And these individuals, Mr Taylor, at the time did you know
8 of SAJ Musa?

9 A. No, I didn't. I didn't know the person SAJ Musa, no.

09:59:52 10 Q. Now, by this stage, Mr Taylor, had you met Sam Bockarie?

11 A. This is 1998?

12 Q. This is December 1998.

13 A. I had met Sam Bockarie.

14 Q. Did you discuss with Bockarie at this stage, in late 1998,
10:00:21 15 at or about the time of this report to the Security Council, the
16 possibility of him moving to Liberia?

17 A. No. 1998? No. December 1998, no. It was about bringing
18 about a cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone and coming to
19 the peace table.

10:00:49 20 Q. Now, what about Dennis Mingo, did you know this man?

21 A. No, I didn't know Dennis. I understand he was Liberian,
22 but I didn't know him at all.

23 Q. And what was Eldred Collins?

24 A. No, I did not know him.

10:01:08 25 Q. Now, on this same note of these men possibly leaving Sierra
26 Leone, let's look at the next paragraph:

27 "In this context, UNOMSIL has cooperated closely with the
28 government and with ECOMOG in following up indications that
29 SAJ Musa, along with several of his supporters, might be prepared

1 to surrender to UNOMSIL. Despite suspicions that this reported
2 offer might be a feint, UNOMSIL has made provisional preparations
3 to accept the surrender of individuals or groups of rebels if
4 this can be arranged under proper security conditions. UNOMSIL
10:01:58 5 has also been in contact with SAJ Musa to try to secure the
6 release of a Catholic priest, Father Mario Guerra, who was
7 kidnapped near Makeni on 17 November by elements of the AFRC."

8 Now, was the kidnapping of that priest brought to the
9 attention of the Committee of Five, Mr Taylor?

10:02:22 10 A. I can't say if the others knew, but this was widely
11 reported. But it was not a formal thing presented to the
12 committee.

13 Q. Now, in relation to SAJ Musa, who is mentioned in
14 paragraphs 15 and 16, and we see from paragraph 15 that he is
10:02:49 15 referred to as AFRC, let us look at paragraph 18 to 23:

16 "On the basis of the information received by UNOMSIL on the
17 strength, organisation and activities of the rebels, there appear
18 to be six rebel battalion-type formations comprising
19 approximately 300 fighters each. Two of these are primarily AFRC
10:03:21 20 and are based in the north. The other four, believed to be RUF
21 with some AFRC elements, are deployed around Kailahun."

22 Now, Mr Taylor, at this time, as a member of the Committee
23 of Five, were you following developments in Sierra Leone?

24 A. Yes, we were developing - excuse me, we were following the
10:03:52 25 development across the border, not in the minute details, but
26 there were reports of clashes here and there. We were.

27 Q. Now, were you aware of this deployment of primarily AFRC
28 battalions in the north and RUF battalions in the Kailahun
29 District? Were you aware of that?

1 A. Not in this kind of detail, but we knew that there was a
2 division between these groups and they were separated, okay. And
3 the northern part of Sierra Leone as mentioned here, that would
4 be the AFRC. And around Kailahun, Kailahun would be toward, I am
10:04:44 5 not sure if it's the east, that would be the RUF. So we were
6 aware that there were conflicts between these two groups and they
7 were not getting along since the intervention.

8 Q. And going on to paragraph 19: "In the north of the
9 country" - so that's where the AFRC are located according to
10:05:04 10 paragraph 18?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "... and especially in the northwest, rebel attacks against
13 civilians have persisted and have recently intensified. In the
14 first few days of December 1998, a large rebel force moving
10:05:22 15 southwards and westwards launched coordinated and well-planned
16 attacks on several locations near the road from Freetown to the
17 Guinean border, including Mange, Lunsar and Masiaka, inflicting
18 heavy casualties on civilians and property damage and causing
19 thousands to flee and take refuge in the capital and surrounding
10:05:51 20 districts. This rebel force is believed to be under the command
21 of SAJ Musa.

22 There is much speculation concerning the motive behind
23 these attacks, which have taken place at a time when Musa has
24 publicly offered to surrender to UNOMSIL. These atrocities are
10:06:18 25 taking place against the background of a rift which appears to
26 have arisen between the AFRC remnants in the north and the RUF in
27 the east. ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces have done much to
28 disrupt the supply of arms and ammunition from Kailahun to the
29 rebels in the north.

1 In the northeast, the rebel capacity to concentrate and
2 coordinate their forces appears to have eroded since the time of
3 their attack on Kabala in July. The rebel concentration in
4 Koinadugu area was broken up by combined efforts of reconstituted
10:07:10 5 battalions of former soldiers of the Republic of Sierra Leone
6 military forces and ECOMOG, thus reducing the threat to Makeni
7 and to the Koidu-Lunsar road. Repeated rebel attempts to gain
8 control of the diamond-rich Koindu area have been unsuccessful.
9 However, the situation remains unpredictable and the area is
10:07:38 10 still in danger from rebel attacks.

11 In the southeast, rebel attacks during October and November
12 1998 seemed designed to surround and cut off Kenema both from
13 Freetown and from the Liberian border by controlling the road
14 that links Daru with Joru and Zimmi. UNOMSIL, in close
10:08:06 15 collaboration with ECOMOG and CDF units based at Kenema, is
16 standing by in case the rebels' failure to achieve their
17 objective should lead some of them to open talks with the
18 government.

19 The south and southwest of the country, including Freetown,
10:08:24 20 have remained calm, though tension in the capital rose during
21 December following a rebel attack on the road linking Masiaka and
22 Rogberi."

23 Now, Mr Taylor, before moving from this document, were you
24 at any stage in contact in any way with that AFRC element led by
10:08:53 25 SAJ Musa which was based in the north of Sierra Leone at any time
26 in 1998?

27 A. No, not at all. But I think there is something more
28 interesting here, because if we look at paragraph 19, based on
29 your question, it is very clear even from this report now as I am

1 Looking at it that the northern part of the country that was
2 controlled by the AFRC and SAJ Musa and their movement - for me,
3 there is no question in my mind that the activities that occurred
4 as they moved against civilians must be attributed to them. So,
10:09:46 5 in fact, I have no contact with the AFRC whatsoever and so I was
6 neither in contact with the AFRC as an organisation, nor with
7 SAJ Musa as the leader.

8 So all of this stuff that we see here coming down that we
9 even see - because some of the towns here leading from the north
10:10:15 10 are towns have been brought about throughout this case as where
11 atrocities came about, so now we can see that it's actually a
12 result of the AFRC. I have no contact with them at all.

13 Q. At any stage in 1998, Mr Taylor, did you have any contact
14 with the AFRC?

10:10:46 15 A. None. None whatsoever.

16 Q. Do you accept, Mr Taylor, that in 1998 you had contact with
17 the RUF?

18 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

19 Q. Now, you were aware, were you not, Mr Taylor, that at some
10:11:13 20 stage following the coup in May 1997, the RUF had joined with the
21 AFRC?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. When you met with Bockarie in 1998, did you discuss with
24 him his links, if any, with the AFRC?

10:11:40 25 A. Yes, we talked about it.

26 Q. And what was the nature of that conversation?

27 A. Exactly what was going on, why was all this conflict and
28 still fighting against the government. And what we said, if I
29 recall correctly, was that the links had been really broken with

1 the AFRC and that the AFRC were insulting them, calling them bush
2 people, they were not trained soldiers. And the professional
3 ones had - you know, had separated themselves from the RUF and
4 there was in fact a division. That's what he told me.

10:12:28 5 Q. Well, we can put that document away now. That's all I'll
6 ask you about that. Now, Mr Taylor, I want to ask you about
7 another document that was placed before you by the Prosecution
8 during the course of your cross-examination, and it's MFI-316.

9 Can I inquire - this document, I had not included it in the
10:13:06 10 original bundle through an oversight. Could I ask that it be put
11 right at the end of the bundle behind the last divider, please?
12 It's MFI-316.

13 Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall being asked questions about
14 selected passages of this document?

10:13:56 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, we see, don't we, that the document is headed "Charles
17 M Taylor", yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And if we could just quickly, first of all, skim through
10:14:22 20 the document, we see that we have pages 3, 4, 5, then 10, 11 and
21 12. So we are missing in this bundle disclosed for
22 cross-examination purposes pages 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9. They are
23 missing, yes?

24 A. Yes.

10:14:50 25 Q. Now, it was suggested to you, Mr Taylor, that the contents
26 of this document is what you told Ramsey Clark, your then lawyer,
27 yes?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Now, remind us, who was Ramsey Clark?

1 A. Ramsey Clark - well, I don't know how to put the verb now,
2 but - is/was former Attorney General of the United States. He
3 served during the Johnson Administration and was secured as my
4 Defence counsel in the case of extradition of my person to
10:15:42 5 Liberia.

6 Q. Now, in your dealings with him, Mr Taylor, did you consider
7 him to be a corrupt, unscrupulous lawyer?

8 A. Ramsey? No, no, no.

9 Q. Now, let's have a look at this document in a bit more
10:16:01 10 detail, shall we. Going back to page 4 - the first page, I am
11 sorry:

12 "This profile of Charles Taylor is based on information
13 from court records in US v Charles M Taylor, Magistrate's Docket
14 No. 84-1251R in the United States District Court for the District
10:16:30 15 of Massachusetts and attorney files."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, which court records are they?

17 A. United States Court.

18 Q. Yes. Do you know what's contained in those court records?

19 A. No. I did not get copies of the court records.

10:16:51 20 Q. What about the attorney files which is mentioned, what are
21 the contents of those files?

22 A. I didn't have access to Ramsey's files.

23 Q. Now, let's read the sentence again: "This profile is based
24 on court records and attorney files." Does it say it's based on
10:17:16 25 information provided by you?

26 A. No.

27 Q. "For additional information or inquiries, contact Ramsey
28 Clark or Lawrence W Schilling, 36 East 12th Street, New York."

29 Now, it sets out what's contained in the document, so we

1 might get an idea of what the missing pages contained:

2 "I. General background, studies and activities in the
3 United States;

4 II. Charles Taylor's return to Liberia and service as a
5 Cabinet member;

10:18:07

6 III. Charles Taylor's flight from Liberia and the
7 fabrication of embezzlement charges against him;

8 IV. The attempted extradition of Charles Taylor and his
9 escape to fight for the overthrow of General Doe."

10:18:31

10 Let's move to page 3. The top of the page is obviously
11 talking about the - an organisation that you were a member of,
12 Mr Taylor. Do you see?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "It had 50,000 members in 1979." What was the name of the
15 organisation?

10:19:02

16 A. The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas.

17 Q. "Mr Taylor was a very active chairman of the union and
18 focused its activities on conditions in Liberia, primarily the
19 absence of democratic institutions, the stagnant economy and
20 political repression.

10:19:25

21 II. Charles Taylor's return to Liberia and service as a
22 Cabinet Minister.

23 On January 8, 1980, Mr Taylor returned to Liberia with a
24 widely published delegation from the Union of Liberian
25 Associations to discuss democratisation, economic reforms and
26 human rights with the Tolbert government.

10:19:50

27 At the time of his return to Liberia, Mr Taylor had never
28 heard of Samuel K Doe, who was then a sergeant in the Liberian
29 army. Whilst his delegation was in Monrovia, Sergeant Doe staged

1 a coup d'etat and seized power."

2 The first sentence in that paragraph, Mr Taylor, "At the
3 time of the his return to Liberia, Mr Taylor had never heard of
4 Samuel Doe", is that right?

10:20:33 5 A. 100 per cent. I had never heard of him.

6 Q. When did you first come into contact with him?

7 A. After the coup in April 1980.

8 Q. "Mr Taylor began immediately after the coup to try to stop
9 the wave of executions that shocked the world." Is that true?

10:20:53 10 A. That is true.

11 Q. "President Tolbert was killed in the Executive Mansion.
12 His ministers were tied to poles and publicly executed on the
13 beach front without trials. A son was dragged from the French
14 embassy and killed in the streets.

10:21:13 15 Because of his long, outspoken opposition to the Tolbert
16 government, his preeminence amongst Liberians in the
17 United States, his organisational skills and his education in
18 economics were well known, Charles Taylor was quickly recruited
19 by the Doe military government. He was made director of the
10:21:37 20 General Services Administration in June 1980, a position he held
21 until August 1983.

22 While in the United States Mr Taylor had always planned to
23 return to Liberia, hoping to help it establish democratic
24 institutions and achieve economic progress under the rule of law.

10:22:09 25 Because of his activities in the United States protesting the
26 Tolbert government, it was not safe for him to return while it
27 was in power. Even his trip with the Union of Liberian
28 Associations involved personal physical risk."

29 Is that true?

1 A. That is true.

2 Q. "When the coup d'état occurred, Mr Taylor felt a patriotic
3 duty to remain in Liberia and help his people at a very
4 difficult, dangerous, but hopeful time of change. He was
10:22:44 5 appalled by the violence of the coup and acts in its aftermath.

6 Like everyone living there, he was aware of the executions,
7 disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests and exile inflicted by
8 the military government, but he chose to stay and try to help.

9 As Director of the GSA, a major a Cabinet-level position
10:23:13 10 which conducted all government purchasing, Mr Taylor wielded
11 significant power. He was one of only three Americo-Liberians in
12 a top or middle level position."

13 Is that true?

14 A. Yes.

10:23:28 15 Q. Who were the other two?

16 A. The Foreign Minister, the late G Bacchus Matthews, and I
17 would have to think quickly about the third person, but there
18 were about - we were about three.

19 Q. "The Americo-Liberians, descendants of the American slaves,
10:23:50 20 while less than 3 per cent of the population of the country, had
21 dominated the country politically, economically and socially
22 since the 1840s. Sergeant Doe executed most Americo-Liberian
23 leadership that did not flee the country. Despite his known
24 opposition to the Tolbert regime and his valuable skills,
10:24:13 25 Mr Taylor remained in Liberia at great personal risk. His wife
26 gave birth to their two children in the United States in the
27 early 1980s for safety as well as health reasons."

28 Which wife was that, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Enid, E-N-I-D.

1 Q. "As director of GSA, Mr Taylor became painfully aware not
2 only of the violent lawlessness of the military government, which
3 was general knowledge, but also of official corruption which he
4 observed firsthand because purchases and investments were made
10:24:54 5 through his office. He had close regular contacts with Doe, not
6 only as a Cabinet Minister, but as the person through whom Doe
7 made extravagant purchases and investments."

8 Is that true?

9 A. That is true.

10:25:15 10 Q. "Mr Taylor was under suspicion as an American.
11 This prejudice grew because of his criticisms of purchases by Doe
12 and his military colleagues and because of his well known
13 positions on democracy, economic reform and human rights. In a
14 well publicised - if not unusual - episode, in 1981 Mr Taylor was
10:25:48 15 arrested in his office, stripped naked, paraded through the
16 streets, beaten, and placed in a maximum security jail for
17 allegedly spreading anti-revolutionary documents against the
18 government."

19 Is that true?

10:26:05 20 A. Not all of it is correct. I was arrested, I was stripped,
21 paraded, but I was not - well, "beaten". I was hit a few times,
22 but "beaten" for me - I wouldn't say beaten, but I was struck a
23 few times.

24 Q. "While Mr Taylor denied publishing the documents, they were
10:26:34 25 similar to what he had said in opposition to the Tolbert
26 government. He was released on the intervention and order of
27 General Thomas Quiwonkpa, among others, a close personal friend
28 and relative of his wife."

29 Is that true?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. That's - which wife is that?

3 A. Same Enid. There is a nickname, Tupee. Enid/Tupee.

10:27:05 4 Q. "After three weeks of medical treatment for injuries, cuts
5 and bruises, he was reinstated at GSA, through he required
6 continuing medical care.

7 It was later discovered that Dhillon Brothers had
8 transferred \$100,000 from the \$900,000 to an account maintained
9 by Taylor in the United States to cover unrelated monies they had
10:27:29 10 received from Taylor in Liberia for transfer to his account in
11 New York. These monies" - we are now on page 10, you see, so we
12 have moved from 5 to 10, pages 6 to 9 not having been served?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I do want to correct the record on this. In
10:28:00 15 fact, the Defence was served the entire document on 4 December
16 and then your Honours gave us an order to provide to your Honours
17 and the Defence the portions of documents we were going to use,
18 marked portions, and so the portions we were actually going to
19 refer to were again served on 11 December. So the Defence has
10:28:24 20 had the entire document since 4 December and all of the entire
21 documents are available for inspection. The Defence has made no
22 request to inspect any document.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, is that correct?

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I have not seen the whole document. I don't
10:28:42 25 know if Mr Munyard has.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think Ms Hollis would be mistaken
27 in this regard.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: It may have been an oversight, but I don't
29 recall seeing the whole document.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, then this appears to be the record,
2 what Ms Hollis has stated.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I am sure my learned friend wouldn't have
4 made that statement if it was not correct.

10:29:03 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay. Please proceed.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. "It was later discovered that Dhillon Brothers had
8 transferred \$100,000 from the \$900,000 to an account maintained
9 by Taylor in the United States to cover unrelated monies they had
10:29:26 10 received from Taylor in Liberia for transfer to his account in
11 New York. These monies belonged to a number of people whom
12 Taylor refused to identify because their lives would be
13 endangered in Liberia if the government knew who they were and
14 that they were transferring money out of the country through
10:29:46 15 Taylor. Apparently Dhillon Brothers had retained the \$100,000
16 received from Taylor in Liberia, or transferred it elsewhere, and
17 replaced it with \$100,000 from the \$900,000 on the parts
18 contract. The Government of Liberia never claimed the \$100,000
19 was illegally transferred to Taylor. It claimed Taylor took the
10:30:17 20 entire \$900,000, a fact disproved by bank records."

21 Now, Mr Taylor, those bank records, who provided them?

22 A. The bank, Citibank.

23 Q. Where?

24 A. In New York.

10:30:35 25 Q. And what did those bank records show?

26 A. That in fact the monies as transferred by the National Bank
27 of Liberia did in fact go to the account of Dhillon Brothers and
28 Dhillon Brothers did receive the money.

29 Q. Now, that sentence was not put to you in cross-examination,

1 but, Mr Taylor, is it right that the bank records disproved the
2 suggestion made by the Doe government that you had embezzled this
3 money?

4 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely.

10:31:12 5 Q. "In the extradition proceedings, Taylor urged the obvious;
6 that the reason for the extradition was political and that he
7 would be killed if returned to Liberia. Indeed, he specifically
8 declined to seek release on bail for reasons of safety of himself
9 and his family. He presented volumes of evidence including
10:31:42 10 United States State Department country reports, Amnesty
11 International reports, scores of newspaper clippings, letters,
12 documents, video tapes and testimony including that of J Thomas
13 Womeiyu, then chairman of the Union of Liberian Associations, to
14 prove Head of State Doe would kill him if he were extradited to
10:32:11 15 Liberia."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, help us. Does the United States of
17 America, like the United Kingdom, refused to extradite on
18 political grounds where the extraditee is likely to be killed?

19 A. Definitely, yes, they do.

10:32:30 20 Q. "In contrast, the Government of Liberia presented only a
21 handful of documents, bolstered later by bank records secured by
22 the FBI in an unprecedented effort to assist the foreign
23 government in an extradition proceedings."

24 Now, were the FBI so involved on behalf of the Government
10:32:59 25 of Liberia, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Oh, yes.

27 Q. "The importance of the extradition to Liberia was
28 underlined by the presence in the back of the courtroom of its
29 Justice Minister Scott Jenkins who did not participate in the

1 proceedings. "

2 Do you know this Scott Jenkins?

3 A. Jenkins, very well.

4 Q. Where is he now?

10:33:29 5 A. He's in Monrovia.

6 Q. Doing what?

7 A. Really, nothing. In fact, subsequent - during my
8 administration, Jenkins Scott was employed by me.

9 Q. To do what?

10:33:38 10 A. He was made ambassador to Saudi Arabia. A very good friend
11 of mine. Right now he is very ill - he has - he is very ill
12 right now.

13 Q. "There can be no question that the motive for the
14 extradition was to secure the return of a political enemy. There
10:34:07 15 was no merit to the money claim. While Charles Taylor was in
16 jail in the United States, Doe increased repression in Liberia.
17 In August scores of protesting students were shot on the campus
18 of the University of Liberia by Doe's soldiers."

19 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

10:34:30 20 A. This is what was reported. I was --

21 Q. How many were shot?

22 A. They talked about maybe a dozen or two.

23 Q. And this happened on the campus of the university?

24 A. That is correct.

10:34:46 25 Q. What were the students doing at the time when this
26 occurred?

27 A. Well, according to what I heard - at this particular time I
28 am incarcerated - is that they were demonstrating for rights
29 in Liberia.

1 Q. "Taylor was kept in jail in Plymouth, Massachusetts, for
2 over six months while the extradition proceeding droned on.
3 During this time he spoke by telephone with General Thomas
4 Quiwonkpa who was in Aberdeen, Maryland."

10:35:18 5 Is that true?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. "He was visited by scores of friends, supporters and
8 family.

9 Before the United States District Court ruled on his
10:35:30 10 petition, he escaped on September 15, 1985. The escape was
11 almost surely accomplished through the efforts of United States
12 intelligence agents. Neither the United States, which arrested
13 Mr Taylor only on an extradition request for Head of State Doe,
14 nor the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has ever charged Mr Taylor
10:36:00 15 with any offence, including escape, to the knowledge of counsel."

16 Within months of his escape, Taylor was in West Africa
17 assisting General Quiwonkpa in a major military effort to
18 overthrow Doe" - were you in Africa, Mr Taylor?

19 A. For this, no. I was not in Africa at the time of this.

10:36:27 20 Q. "... one of the most violent military dictators in recent
21 African history. General Quiwonkpa appears to have actually
22 seized key military positions including the government TV-radio
23 station and the Doe executive headquarters when he was killed in
24 a surprise attack. He was beheaded, castrated, his body cut into
10:36:54 25 pieces and publicly eaten by Doe troops. A large force waiting
26 to invade Liberia to consolidate his victory was disbanded when
27 key leaders were assassinated. In the wake of this failure
28 thousands of Gio and Mano Liberians were killed. Charles Taylor
29 escaped, but continued efforts to overthrow Doe" - is that true,

1 Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. "... which led four years later to his invasion of Liberia
4 in December 1989 which seems destined to remove Samuel K Doe from
10:37:37 5 power."

6 Now a couple of questions I would like to ask you,
7 Mr Taylor. First of all, we see below the name, the typed name
8 Ramsey Clark, the date July 27, 1990. Where were you on 27 July
9 1990?

10:38:01 10 A. I was in Gborplay, Nimba County, inside Liberia.

11 Q. So were you present in New York with your lawyer, giving
12 instructions for the completion of this document?

13 A. No. No, no, no. No.

14 Q. And for what purpose was this document created, this legal
10:38:39 15 document?

16 A. I have no idea. I had not spoken to Ramsey since I came
17 out of the United States into Africa and so I do not know the
18 reason for the creation of this document.

19 Q. There is one other matter I want to ask you about before I
10:39:09 20 move on. You were cross-examined about this document, Mr Taylor,
21 on 11 January 2010, and I am looking at page 33131 of the
22 transcript. I wonder if we could put that up, please. Do we
23 have it?

24 A. Yes.

10:40:17 25 Q. And we see you were asked this question by Ms Hollis:
26 "Q. So he, that being Ramsey Clark, just made this up out
27 of thin air then, it wasn't based on what you told him?

28 A. If you give me a chance I will answer your question.
29 And we have all the chances still in this trial to ask

1 Ramsey why he said this and who represented this to him,
2 because I was still in New York when General Quiwonkpa was
3 killed. I was still in the United States. After I reached
4 Africa I called my counsel and informed him and he said,
10:40:59 5 'Well, Mr Taylor, I will inform the United States
6 government that you are out of the United States.' So I
7 did not in 1990, when I'm already fighting a war in
8 Liberia - in 1990 I am already fighting a war in Liberia.
9 When Ramsey constructed this statement I want to say that
10:41:20 10 he probably made an error about this. This is constructed
11 long after. So I did not tell Ramsey this and at the time
12 he wrote this, which is when I'm already fighting in
13 Liberia, he probably construed that this is a continuation.
14 But I'll tell you, because you've raised this, I'll make
10:41:44 15 sure we get an affidavit from Ramsey Clark stating that I
16 did not represent this to him and I would not lie about
17 this and I'll make sure we do this.

18 Q. We suggest you did lie about it and whatever you get
19 from him will be to cover up your lie."

10:42:05 20 Now, Mr Taylor, were you suggesting that you were going to
21 get a former Attorney General, a well respected lawyer in the
22 United States, to lie on your behalf?

23 A. No, not at all. I mean, it was just outrageous for counsel
24 on the other side to even suggest - because Ramsey is very, very,
10:42:27 25 very well known and respected. I guess what I am trying to
26 emphasise here is that a man like Ramsey would not lie; whatever
27 he represented was not based on what I had told him or spoken to
28 him about.

29 Q. We can put that document away now. Now, Mr Taylor, I want

1 to ask you now, Mr Taylor, about one or two specific matters that
2 were put to you on Tuesday, 2 February; Thursday, 4 February; and
3 Friday, 5 February of this year. Okay?

4 A. Yes.

10:43:43 5 Q. And there are about - there are 14 topics which I would
6 like to cover with you. The first is this - and it might be
7 helpful - can we put up the transcript for 2 February 2010 at
8 page 34548. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10:44:30 10 Q. Now, you see at the top of that page - it actually begins
11 on the previous page, but it matters not. But just to put it in
12 context, you were asked on a previous page:

13 "Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday afternoon at the close of the
14 proceedings we were talking about your relationship with General
10:44:50 15 Robert Yerks. Do you recall that?"

16 And you replied in the affirmative, and then we come to the
17 top of the page.

18 A. And we had talked about General Yerks's association
19 with ITC and, Mr Taylor, General Yerks was also associated
10:45:07 20 with LISCR, correct?

21 A. To the best of my knowledge, I would think so, yes.

22 Q. ...he was a senior official in LISCR...

23 A. ...yes.

24 Q. ...General Yerks was a business associate of yours,
10:45:22 25 wasn't he?

26 A. ...no.

27 Q. And you had common business interests...

28 A. No...

29 Q. General Yerks was working to advance your public

1 message. . .

2 A. No. . .

3 Q. Indeed, Mr Taylor, you, through your government, used
4 LISCR as a way to obtain arms, isn't that correct?

10:45:44 5 A. Never, ever used LISCR to obtain arms ever.

6 Q. Indeed, you had funds diverted from LISCR that should
7 have gone to the regular channels, through the banking
8 system in Liberia. You had those funds diverted as payment
9 for arms, didn't you?"

10:46:05 10 Now, Mr Taylor, General Yerks, what nationality was he?

11 A. He is American.

12 Q. And a general. A general in which army?

13 A. The United States army. A former lieutenant general.

14 Q. And when you got to know him, was he still a member of the
10:46:32 15 armed forces of the United States?

16 A. No. He had retired.

17 Q. And what was he doing?

18 A. General Yerks was working with the original registry, the
19 International Registry Incorporated that changed to LISCR. He
10:46:52 20 had been working with them before.

21 Q. And just where he mind us, what does the acronym LISCR
22 stand for?

23 A. Liberian International Shipping --

24 Q. Don't worry. Where was it based?

10:47:17 25 A. In the United States, in Maryland.

26 Q. In Maryland. And help us: Which laws governed its
27 operation?

28 A. Laws of the United States.

29 Q. Could LISCR then have been subject to investigation by, for

1 example, the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

2 A. Most definitely, yes.

3 Q. And also by American police authorities?

4 A. Yes.

10:47:57 5 Q. To your knowledge, Mr Taylor, has LISCR ever been so
6 investigated by the American authorities?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Has it ever been brought to your attention that such an
9 investigation has taken place?

10:48:13 10 A. No.

11 Q. Have any court proceedings ever been taken against LISCR,
12 to your knowledge, for corruption, involvement in shady dealings,
13 or anything like that?

14 A. No.

10:48:30 15 Q. So help me: As far as you are aware, was General Yerks
16 ever subjected to any such investigation?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what is being hinted on that page is that
19 you were involved with a former United States general in buying
10:48:56 20 arms which were surreptitiously imported into Liberia. Is there
21 any truth in that suggestion?

22 A. None whatsoever. None. None whatsoever.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, your government has been subjected to various
24 inquiries by the Security Council of the United Nations, hasn't
10:49:22 25 it?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Tell me, on any occasion has it been suggested to you that
28 you were involved with General Yerks and LISCR in illegal,
29 illicit arms importations?

1 A. No. Not with General Yerks, no.

2 Q. Let's go over the page, please, to page 34549. Do you have
3 it, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, I do.

10:50:17 5 Q. Your attention was drawn on the penultimate line on that
6 page to MFI-105, which is a letter to General Yerks from Susan
7 Rice. You remember us introducing that document?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Can we go over to the next page, please. It is headed
10:50:38 10 "United States Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State
11 for Africa Affairs" and it is dated September - it looks like 8,
12 September 1999. It says, Mr Taylor:

13 "Dear General Yerks: Thank you for your fax letter of
14 August 14 and your observations about Liberia and the sub-region.

10:51:05 15 We are pleased that Liberia has friends who can help guide
16 it in the right direction."

17 And then this question is asked:

18 "Q. So General Yerks was having some success working on
19 behalf of the Government of Liberia, correct?

10:51:20 20 A. That is correct. As a friend of Liberia, yes.

21 Q. And we note, of course, that this is a September 1999
22 letter. And if we look at the third paragraph from the
23 bottom beginning 'the International Monetary Fund', we see
24 part way down that paragraph, 'The IMF recommends action on
10:51:44 25 three key economic issues'. We see two, the rice monopoly,
26 the petroleum monopoly and then the third one 'compensation
27 of Mobil Oil for losses suffered in 1996'. So, Mr Taylor,
28 in this letter there is no mention of Mobil Oil losses in
29 1999, is there?"

1 Now, there is a couple of things I want to ask you about
2 that passage of testimony. The first is this: Who is - who was
3 Susan Rice?

4 A. At the time she was Assistant Secretary of State for
10:52:22 5 African Affairs at the State Department.

6 Q. In which government?

7 A. That was in the government of former President William
8 Jefferson Clinton.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, given Susan Rice's position, you say she
10:52:48 10 was what again? Remind me.

11 A. The Assistant Secretary of State For African Affairs.

12 Q. As the holder of that position, did she ever inquire of you
13 regarding General Yerks, to whom she was writing, involvement in
14 illegal arms shipments?

10:53:11 15 A. No.

16 Q. Did she?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Can you help us as to why a member of the US government was
19 writing to this alleged arms dealer? Can you help us?

10:53:29 20 A. Well, the way you put it, I would just say the reason why
21 she never - by "she" I mean the assistant Secretary of State -
22 did not ask is because there was nothing unique about friends of
23 countries writing the State Department to inquire or to ask
24 certain issues on behalf of certain governments. There was
10:53:56 25 nothing unique about this.

26 Q. Now, help us with this, Mr Taylor: As we see in the middle
27 of that page, you were asked - it was suggested that General
28 Yerks was having some success working on behalf of the Government
29 of Liberia. Now, in light of a topic to which I will be coming

1 to a moment, was General Yerks paid for his efforts on behalf of
2 the Liberian government?

3 A. No. This is why I quickly interjected "as a friend of
4 Liberia".

10:54:38 5 Q. Now, I ask for this reason, Mr Taylor, you see. Because
6 the next passage of cross-examination, beginning on page 34551,
7 you were asked about various companies employed by the Liberian
8 government for public relations purposes. Do you recall this?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10:55:05 10 Q. The first such company at line 4 is Hill & Knowlton, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. At line five, Swidlers, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. At line 29, Cohen & Woods, yes?

10:55:25 15 A. That is correct, yes.

16 Q. And I don't ask that we move there yet, but on page 34553
17 you were also asked about a fourth company, James Waterman
18 International, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

10:55:42 20 Q. And then on page 34555, about a fifth company called Valis
21 Associates; do you recall that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, can you help us with this:
24 Did you employ those five firms?

10:56:05 25 A. Yes. The government did, yes.

26 Q. Why?

27 A. For the purposes mentioned: Public relations; lobbying on
28 behalf of my government. These were the reasons.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you consider that you had an image

1 problem why you needed to embark on this?

2 A. Well, I will take "you" in the plural. Yes.

3 Q. Well, I was going to come to your government in a minute,
4 but I'm starting with you personally to begin with.

10:56:44 5 A. I would say yes. I would say yes.

6 Q. Did you consider that your government had an image problem?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And what was the purpose, then, of hiring these public
9 relations companies?

10:57:01 10 A. To be able to put across the views of the government,
11 straighten out some of the misconceptions about the governments
12 and what was going on, policies, programmes, keeping us in touch
13 with certain basic laws of the United States that affected the
14 United States' own ability to doing certain things outside. For
10:57:31 15 example, I did not know at the time of the so-called Brooke, that
16 is B-R-O-O-K-E, late Senator Brooke of Massachusetts - during the
17 early years there was a Brooke amendment that barred the
18 United States from giving any specific assistance to the
19 Government of Liberia unless certain things were met. And so
10:57:55 20 what these firms do, they go in, they dig up what the laws are
21 and how they affect certain things, find ways to correct them.
22 So they are very essential.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you had an ambassador in the United States,
24 didn't you?

10:58:14 25 A. Yes. The ambassador has a function to represent the views
26 of the government - or the President to that particular
27 President, but some of the other economic and other issues that
28 you find between states, you really, for the United States and
29 its powers throughout the world and how very busy they are

1 dealing with things across the board, you need to have your
2 interests sought after vigorously. It is not just as simple as
3 having an ambassador. It's a little deeper than that.

4 Q. Now, was Liberia unique in employing such assistance?

10:59:00 5 A. Oh, no, no. Even major European countries that are major
6 European countries pay lobbyists in Washington. There are just
7 certain things that you need them. No, this was not unique to -
8 for Liberia.

9 Q. And tell me, is it merely countries who employ such
10:59:24 10 lobbyists or do other legal entities to your knowledge employ
11 such lobbyists in Washington?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Like who?

14 A. Corporations do. Mostly public corporations. Major
10:59:46 15 private corporations do that because - and there could be laws
16 that could be put into place that could affect the business
17 interests of those corporations, so they also employ lobbyists
18 too.

19 Q. Now, are we still on page 34551? Now I want to take these
11:00:11 20 firms in turn, Mr Taylor, and seek your assistance with various
21 matters. First of all, do you recall now when your government
22 first employed Hill & Knowlton?

23 A. My government? That would be after I come to office, I
24 would put that in about '97, late, when I come to office, when my
11:00:43 25 government employs Knowlton.

26 Q. We see from line 14 that it was put to you that the
27 services of that firm costs some \$55,000 US, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when you came to power, the government

1 coffers in Liberia were somewhat bare, weren't they?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. So why were you spending this kind of money on a public
4 relations firm?

11:01:19 5 A. We came to power - because it was very necessary. We came
6 to power on the very first note being opposed by the
7 United States government. Individuals that ran in the
8 presidential campaign, the present President of Liberia was
9 assisted by the United States government in violation of our
11:01:45 10 election laws. I was the candidate that was not wanted. So we
11 were going uphill from day one and what we sought to do was the
12 smart thing, to invest - we call this an investment into the
13 future of my government.

14 Q. Now, the second firm we see at line 21 was Swidler, yes?

11:02:15 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And we see that some \$680,000 were paid to them during your
17 presidency?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. Now, can I ask another question, Mr Taylor. Were these
11:02:31 20 firms hired consecutively or were they working in parallel with
21 each other?

22 A. Some of them were working in parallel and some
23 consecutively. Depending on what administration is in power. So
24 you will see this is why they keep changing. If there is a
11:02:52 25 Democrat administration in Washington, certain lobbyists are
26 stronger. If there is a Republican administration, some of them
27 become weaker and others become stronger. So that's why you will
28 see sometimes we went along consecutively and sometimes in
29 parallel.

1 Q. Now, the third firm we see on the bottom line is Cohen &
2 Woods, yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And if we go to the next page, please, that was a firm of
11:03:34 5 which one of the partners was Herman Cohen, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Former United States Assistant Secretary of State for
8 Africa, lines 4 and 5, do you see that?

9 A. Yes, I do.

11:03:49 10 Q. Now, we know that you had met Howard Cohen during the
11 course of the Liberian war, hadn't you?

12 A. Well, I think you meant to say Herman.

13 Q. Herman Cohen.

14 A. Yes, that is correct.

11:04:02 15 Q. Herman Cohen, during the course of the Liberian war. Is
16 that correct?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Did you become friends at that time, Mr Taylor?

19 A. No. In fact, he was in office and he was very - we felt
11:04:19 20 that he was very hard unnecessarily on the NPFL.

21 Q. So why employ his firm?

22 A. Well, this meeting, if we recollect correctly, is around,
23 what, '90, '91?

24 Q. Yes.

11:04:40 25 A. And this here is around I think - this is about '98 or so
26 when we employ him, several years later. We felt that out of
27 office, some of these officials having looked back, formed
28 different opinions and were better suited to stating the facts
29 after the fact. That in fact what we saw at the time, there is a

1 different side to this. Some people are blinded by this when
2 they are in office because of different pressures, so we saw him.
3 After serving as Assistant Secretary of State For African Affairs
4 and having developed certain expertise on Africa, who would best
11:05:34 5 be suited to go back and begin to lobby for any African country
6 than he who was in charge and probably was in place when most of
7 the bad decisions were made anyway.

8 Q. Now, we see from line 27 on that page that his firm - the
9 contract with his firm was worth some \$300,000, yes?

11:06:01 10 A. Yeah, he personally took care of that portfolio. He,
11 Herman.

12 Q. He personally took care of the portfolio, yes?

13 A. That is correct. Yes.

14 Q. Can we go to the next page, please, quickly. Bottom line.
11:06:18 15 The fourth firm employed was James Waterman International, yes?

16 A. Well, I'm not sure because the Waterman situation is a
17 little different.

18 Q. Why is it different?

19 A. Because Waterman worked, if I am not mistaken, for an
11:06:43 20 individual, on behalf of the Government of Liberia, but he was
21 not paid for by the Government of Liberia.

22 Q. Can we go to the next page, please. We see that it's put
23 to you at line 3, they weren't actually working for the
24 Government of Liberia. Line 6, they were working instead for a
11:07:11 25 company known as AmLib United, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. So when we go to line 24, that payment of \$750,000, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Was that paid by the Government of Liberia or was it paid

1 by AmLi b?

2 A. It was paid by AmLi b.

3 Q. AmLi b is what?

4 A. American Liberian - there was something like a little
11:07:46 5 consortium wanting to do business in Liberia.

6 Q. What kind of business?

7 A. They were interested in rail, rail, rail movement. The
8 building of rail links in Liberia and bringing in trains for the
9 transport of heavy items throughout the country.

11:08:11 10 Q. Now, was that business project ever initiated?

11 A. Yes, it was initiated.

12 Q. So they paid the \$750,000 sum, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Then can we go over the page, please, to look at the last
11:08:35 15 such company. That's line 13, Valis Associates, do you see it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, what's your recollection of this fifth company,
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. I still have tried to get into my head - wrap around my
11:08:55 20 head Valis. I don't really remember what Valis was all about.
21 In a case like this and probably the reason why I don't recall is
22 because sometimes you get a good recommendation and I will just
23 say, "Okay, well go ahead and get it done." But I didn't have
24 any interaction with Valis and really can't recall what this was
11:09:19 25 all about.

26 Q. In any event, when we go to page 34557, we see at line 8
27 that they were paid some half a million dollars, it was put to
28 you, by the Government of Liberia, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, do you have any basis to dispute that they were paid
2 this money by the Government of Liberia, Mr Taylor?

3 A. None. None whatsoever.

4 Q. And we see, beginning at line 22 through line 25 on that
11:10:00 5 page that, having done the sums, somewhere in the region of \$1.5
6 million was expended by the Liberian government during your
7 presidency on public relations. Mr Taylor, did you consider that
8 money well spent?

9 A. I would say yes, it was well spent. Very well spent, yes.

11:10:27 10 Q. What do you say to the suggestion that why, as President of
11 an impoverished country, spend \$1.5 million on this which could
12 have been spent on schools, roads and other such beneficial
13 projects? Why?

14 A. Well, maybe if that is suggested the parties would not
11:10:55 15 understand the workings of governments and what countries have to
16 do to secure their interests. I look at this, like I said
17 earlier, as an investment. And quite frankly had we not done
18 this, there were just so many other things coming down the road.
19 For example, the Clinton administration imposed a travel ban on
11:11:21 20 certain Liberian government officials a few months before the
21 United Nations Security Council did. And our understanding was,
22 because of the rumours and all of these things circulating in
23 Washington, that the Clinton administration had planned to carry
24 out more extraneous measures against our government, and it is
11:11:45 25 because of the constant lobbying and explaining that those
26 actions were in a way stayed and in some cases diluted.

27 So these are worthwhile investments on the part of almost
28 every government, no matter how impoverished you are, you either
29 do this or you sink. So if it was not essential I think they

1 would close it down in the United States. But I considered this
2 an investment and the suggestion from the Prosecution that it
3 could have been spent better I think is nonsense.

4 Q. Now, when we go quickly to the next page, which is page
11:12:30 5 34558, you were reminded, the bottom of that page, beginning at
6 or about line 22, that during the time of the NPFL you had also
7 engaged such companies, hadn't you?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Why?

11:12:53 10 A. Again, we were fighting a war and we were busy trying to
11 get the United States - once you get the United States to
12 something, my dear - excuse me - it's okay. Once the
13 United States understands, you have free sailing. That's the way
14 it works. And so while we were fighting as the NPFL - if we go
11:13:18 15 back, you know, the first statement that we made was to show the
16 United States government that this was not one of those crazy
17 people - you know, groups going about. It was important. The
18 world's only superpower, it's important to get these things
19 straight. So we started from the NPFL to keep informing them all
11:13:35 20 the way along that: Look, we are not some wild forest bunch just
21 shooting all over the place. Here our goals, here are our
22 objectives. It's important to do that, and we did.

23 Q. Well, I am going to put a blunt suggestion to you,
24 Mr Taylor, in anticipation of a possible future argument. Is it
11:13:57 25 the case that you employed these public relations companies in
26 order to disguise your own corruption, your abuse of human
27 rights, your links with the RUF, and your generally destabilising
28 presence in West Africa; is that why you did it?

29 A. Oh, no, no. These - no. And it has to be no because, in

1 fact, the individuals that run these firms are decent, honourable
2 individuals. They are covered by American law, and these are
3 people of value and would not - in fact, some firms, from what I
4 have been told in the future, would turn down certain requests to
11:14:41 5 represent, you know, a government or an individual if they felt
6 that it was not in their best interest. So I would categorically
7 say no. These are well known, well positioned firms with a long
8 history of decency. I would disagree.

9 Q. I am going to move on to a third topic now that I would
11:15:16 10 like you to deal with. Can we go to page 34571, please. Do we
11 have it?

12 A. Yes, we do.

13 Q. Now, the point I want to deal with here, Mr Taylor, is
14 encapsulated in a submission made by Ms Hollis on 2 February
11:16:06 15 beginning at line 3:

16 "...lead to the point I am making, and that is the
17 limitations on ECOMOG as of 5 June 1998 which meant that their
18 movements were known by the government, their frequencies and
19 other things were known by the government."

11:16:28 20 Do you see?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, do you recall us yesterday going through three
23 reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council in
24 January, March and June 1998 setting out ECOMOG troop numbers in
11:16:55 25 Liberia and the extent of their deployment?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Do you remember us going through that?

28 A. Uh-huh, yes.

29 Q. Now, help us with this, Mr Taylor: What limitations were

1 placed on their ability to do their job?

2 A. None whatsoever.

3 Q. Help us, Mr Taylor. What control did you, as President of
4 Liberia, have over them?

11:17:25 5 A. None.

6 Q. Could you have, for example, dictated to the force
7 commander where they were to be deployed?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Could you, for example, have dictated to the force
11:17:45 10 commander what radio frequencies --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis, you are on your feet.

12 MS HOLLIS: I apologise for interrupting, but it took me a
13 time to find the documents that defense counsel is referring to.
14 The January, March and June documents to which he was referring
11:18:05 15 were 1997, not 1998.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: My fault, and I am grateful to my learned
17 friend, as ever, for the correction. 1997:

18 Q. 1998, Mr Taylor, my fault. In 1998, Mr Taylor - no, will
19 let me start again and let me now go back to 1997.

11:18:32 20 Do you recall us looking at those three documents,
21 Mr Taylor, relating to 1997, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. The lead-up to the election?

24 A. The second - we looked at the second and third reports.

11:18:47 25 Q. And we looked at January, March and June reports 1997
26 leading up to the elections, didn't we?

27 A. Well - it looks a little later to me though. Because we
28 started from the third report and came to the second. The third
29 report was about, I think, October-November, and then we came

1 back down.

2 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, I am not going to waste time now talking
3 about the details of them. But in general terms --

4 A. I remember the reports.

11:19:20 5 Q. -- do you remember us looking at some documents in that
6 regard, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And remember you explaining to us that that situation
9 obtained until the last quarter of 1997, do you remember, in
10 terms of deployment, troop numbers, and so on, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, what happened in terms of troop numbers and deployment
13 after October-November 1997? Let's start with troop numbers.
14 Did they remain in the same in 1998?

11:20:04 15 A. No. If my recollection is correct, we are up to 11,000 for
16 the elections. After that, by September, the date you are
17 talking about, we are - beginning 1998, we are beginning to see
18 the drawdown into Sierra Leone, so there is a - so the reduction
19 starts.

11:20:24 20 Q. Right. And when does the reduction start, Mr Taylor?

21 A. I would put it to about the - beginning the end of 1997 and
22 progressing we begin to see some movement.

23 Q. Yes. And by about the middle of 1998, Mr Taylor, what kind
24 of troop strengths are we talking about with ECOMOG in Liberia?

11:20:59 25 Can you assist?

26 A. Yes. I mean, it's - I can't give the exact number, but
27 there are still a few battalions in Liberia.

28 Q. Yes. And where are they located?

29 A. They are located in Monrovia, the environs, all major

1 entries into the city limits. They are deployed, if I am not
2 mistaken, still in the - along the Cape Mount-Sierra Leone border
3 area. They are still that general area.

4 Q. What about Roberts International Airport?

11:21:43 5 A. Oh, yes, they are at the airport. That's what I mean by
6 the environs. The airport is just about 25 miles --

7 Q. What about The Freeport in Monrovia?

8 A. They are in The Freeport. They are at Spriggs Payne
9 Airport, the second airport in the city.

11:21:55 10 Q. What about in Lofa?

11 A. At this time, by 19 - yes, we do have a few soldiers still
12 there mostly on the Sierra Leonean border side; that is, Lofa, I
13 mentioned, Cape Mount. Coming along that area there are some
14 soldiers deployed there.

11:22:14 15 Q. Now let's go back to my theme. What control did you have
16 over them in 1998?

17 A. None. I did not have control over ECOMOG and could not
18 order the commanding general of ECOMOG at all.

19 Q. And tell me, Mr Taylor - and I hope that page 34571 is
11:22:37 20 still up on the screen - before ECOMOG troops could move, did
21 they have to inform you of such movement?

22 A. Yes. In some cases they would inform the Defence for
23 coordinating purposes. Defence would be informed. Our Defence
24 Ministry would be informed, not me personally. But I would say
11:23:05 25 that's informing me. If the Defence Ministry is informed, we can
26 assume that's informing me.

27 Q. And just help us as to how that procedure would operate.

28 A. It would be - it would be - it's not a process of consent;
29 it's a process of information. On this date we are moving for

1 this, this, this. They don't have to - and sometimes it was
2 announced at the very last minute. It's not like seeking
3 permission. Would you please give me permission to go to X place
4 or Y place? No. It was a process of informing, for the purposes
11:23:38 5 of coordination, that security forces would not get mixed up.

6 Q. Could you - did you have the power to say to them, if they
7 so informed you: No, we are not going to allow you to go there?

8 A. Well, that's a little - I would say yes and no. And let
9 me - you know, it sounds crazy, but it's yes and no. Did I have
11:24:10 10 the power? Yes. But would that have been something that they
11 would have listened to? No. So the power would not have meant
12 anything, so I would have to say no.

13 Q. Now, going back to that proposition that was put to the
14 Court on that date, their frequency and other things were known
11:24:33 15 by the government, were they?

16 A. The frequencies?

17 Q. Line 5 and 6, their frequencies and other things were known
18 by the government?

19 A. Yeah, the frequencies were known by the government.

11:24:46 20 Q. How did that operate procedurally?

21 A. What the government would do - and I am glad they say
22 frequencies - there would be about maybe 15, 20. They would
23 submit and - that we will be operating on these frequencies and
24 because these frequencies are - frequencies are given to server
11:25:12 25 entities in the country. In order that you do not cross or lap
26 over, you have to inform so the government would be able to say
27 you can operate from this place to this place. That's different
28 from trying to seek permission. No, it doesn't - it's for matter
29 of control in terms of making sure there was no overlapping of

1 frequencies, as you will do, for example, in like the air traffic
2 controllers. You want to make sure that certain people know
3 where they operate in certain limits that you do not cross over.
4 So to the extent that the government would know, that's their
11:25:55 5 knowledge of certain number of frequencies and it should not be
6 construed as even monitoring. Just knowing that - let's say
7 between - let's say - just five numbers. 70100, so you will be
8 told you can operate from 70100 to 70125. Like, you have about
9 25 frequencies in that range, okay? That's - this is what they
11:26:26 10 are referring to here.

11 Q. Now, so we have this situation. They inform you of
12 movement, yes?

13 A. Uh-huh, yes.

14 Q. You have access to their frequencies?

11:26:40 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. The blunt question I am going to ask you is this,
17 Mr Taylor: Did you take advantage of that knowledge to
18 facilitate the transfer of arms and ammunition to Sierra Leone?

19 A. No.

11:26:51 20 Q. Do you follow me?

21 A. I follow you. No, not at all.

22 Q. And help us. During what period did those arrangements
23 operate; provision of information, sharing of frequencies?

24 A. This came about from the beginning of my government, but it
11:27:19 25 had been in place from the Council of State. These frequencies
26 were just a continuation of what had been approved by preceding
27 Councils of State. So this is a long range thing.

28 And for the sake of the record and the Court, these are not
29 scrambled frequencies. These are ordinary radio frequencies that

1 anyone knowing can go into. So the suggestion that we could go
2 out, anybody could monitor any frequency at anytime.

3 Q. And can we go - I think I have enough time - quickly to
4 page 34573, please. I want to finish this topic. Are we there?

11:28:23 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. On that page you will see at line 13 this proposition is
7 put to you:

8 "Mr Taylor, the ability for ECOMOG to function
9 independently was very restricted during its time in Liberia.

11:28:36 10 Isn't this correct?"

11 Mr Taylor, you answer not correct. Mr Taylor, who
12 commanded the ECOMOG troops in Liberia?

13 A. The forces commander of ECOMOG.

14 Q. And to whom was the forces commander answerable?

11:28:55 15 A. I would say two persons: To the chairman of ECOWAS and his
16 home President.

17 Q. And the majority of ECOMOG troops in Liberia came from
18 where?

19 A. Let me just - from Nigeria. All, except one, the first
11:29:13 20 one. So major is even an understatement. All, except one.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: How much time do I have, Madam President,
22 can I inquire?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated].

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Two minutes.

11:29:24 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated].

26 MR GRIFFITHS: One minute. Could I reserve the conclusion
27 of this category, because I won't be able to conclude it in a
28 minute, until after the break?

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's fair enough. We will take our

1 mid-morning break and resume at 12 o'clock.

2 [Break taken at 11.29 a.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:01:51 5 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were considering
6 ECOMOG, its role and independence in Liberia, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Before we move on to another topic, Mr Taylor, can I ask
9 you this: You told us a couple of days ago about being provided
12:02:21 10 with, when you were on the council, a platoon of ECOMOG soldiers?

11 A. A company.

12 Q. A company, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Now, the soldiers in that company, where were they from?

12:02:39 15 A. Nigeria.

16 Q. Apart from that assistance, did the Nigerians provide you
17 with any other assistance?

18 A. Yes, they did.

19 Q. What was that?

12:02:49 20 A. They also - this is following my election, in addition the
21 Secret Service of Nigeria, President Abacha provided for me about
22 35 to 40 members of the Nigerian Secret Service to provide Secret
23 Service close quarter security for my person.

24 Q. And when was that?

12:03:20 25 A. As of 1997, August when I took the oath of office.

26 Q. And for how long did they stay?

27 A. They remained there throughout 1998.

28 Q. Now, the fourth topic arising from your cross-examination
29 on 2, 4 and 5 February that I want to deal is this.

1 Madam Court Manager, could we please go to page 34573,
2 transcript for 2 February. Now, Mr Taylor, the fourth topic I
3 want to talk to you about is Sam Bockarie, okay?

4 A. Yes.

12:04:12 5 Q. Now, if we look just below where we concluded just before
6 the break at line 17, do you see that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "Mr Taylor, you talked to this Court about Sam Bockarie's
9 presence in Liberia." Do you see that?

12:04:33 10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. Then can we move to the next page, please, Madam Court
12 Manager. You go on on the next page to deal with when Bockarie
13 moved to Liberia. Do you see that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

12:04:54 15 Q. And then a suggestion is put to you at line 6, Mr Taylor:
16 "Sam Bockarie first comes to visit you in Liberia in February or
17 early March 1998. Isn't that correct?" And you say, "We
18 disagree." Yes?

19 A. That is correct.

12:05:30 20 Q. Help us, Mr Taylor, when was the ECOMOG intervention?

21 A. The intervention was on the - from my knowledge, 14
22 February 1998 it ended.

23 Q. And, Mr Taylor, as far as you're aware, what was happening
24 in Sierra Leone in February and March 1998?

12:05:58 25 A. The intervention takes place, massive problems, a series of
26 meetings. March, if I'm not mistaken, March, April, Kabbah
27 returns. So there were a series of activities, conflict going on
28 at the time.

29 Q. Now, during that period of conflict, Mr Taylor, do you

1 recall Bockarie coming to Liberia?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did he, for example, come to seek advice?

4 A. No.

12:06:51 5 Q. Did you, for example, ask him to come to Liberia to provide
6 him with information?

7 A. No.

8 Q. At this stage in February or March, Mr Taylor, were you in
9 contact with the RUF?

12:07:11 10 A. Not at all. Not at all.

11 Q. What about by radio, say?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Now, having put that suggestion, you were then asked this
14 question starting at line 10, and I paraphrase: Whether

12:07:43 15 Bockarie's movement to Liberia in December 1998 was with the
16 knowledge of President Kabbah of Sierra Leone. Do you see that?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you answer that Kabbah knew?

19 A. Yes.

12:07:58 20 Q. And then you go to say at line 17: "Kabbah was not
21 consulted", yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. When you say that Kabbah knew,
24 firstly, how do you know that?

12:08:22 25 A. Well, when Obasanjo came and the decision was taken,
26 Obasanjo said that he was going to take upon himself to inform
27 Kabbah, so I believe that he did. I know he did, I mean. He
28 wouldn't lie about it.

29 Q. Why didn't you tell him, given that he was coming to

1 Liberia and not Nigeria?

2 A. Simply because again the powerful role of Nigeria in West
3 Africa. Some of these matters when you have problems and
4 accusations, sometimes it was better for Obasanjo, who was the
12:09:01 5 powerhouse of the biggest West African country, to convey that -
6 that a decision had been taken for this happen.

7 Q. Now, the other word used in the two questions asked of you
8 on this topic was "was Kabbah consulted". Was he consulted?

9 A. No, he was not.

12:09:23 10 Q. Why not?

11 A. Kabbah - there was no need to - he was a party - Kabbah was
12 a party to the conflict in Sierra Leone and his government, and
13 when you are mediating and dealing with people, you don't go
14 about going through all of these things - what was at stake at
12:09:41 15 this particular time was the disarmament of the parties in Sierra
16 Leone. A conflict had arisen. Sam Bockarie was immaterial, as
17 far as all of us were concerned, because don't forget Foday
18 Sankoh is on the ground. Foday Sankoh is the leader at this
19 particular - excuse me. He is the leader, and so if you want -

12:10:05 20 if you were dealing with Foday Sankoh, then fine, it would have
21 been logical to talk to Kabbah. But this confusion between
22 Sankoh and Sam Bockarie that lead to the decision to extract Sam
23 Bockarie from the RUF where Foday Sankoh is present, I didn't
24 see, neither did Obasanjo see, any need to inform him - I mean,
12:10:28 25 to consult him. Because consultation, for me, would mean seeking
26 his advice and/or acquiescence, and we didn't see it at that time
27 as being necessary.

28 Q. Yes. But, Mr Taylor, it might have avoided a lot of
29 misunderstanding later if you had said to President Kabbah,

1 "Look, we think it's in the best interests of peace to bring this
2 obstacle to peace to Liberia", and that could have saved a lot of
3 future misunderstanding between the two of you, couldn't it? So
4 why didn't you do that?

12:11:09 5 A. Well, I could agree with your assumption there, but it was
6 for Foday Sankoh, the Vice-President, to tell his President what
7 action he had agreed with in line with other ECOWAS leaders to
8 move one of his commanders. That's - for us, who was Sam
9 Bockarie? Sam Bockarie was Foday Sankoh's commander. Foday
12:11:27 10 Sankoh is the Vice-President. He's in this meeting when this
11 decision is taken. So what is there again? It is Foday Sankoh's
12 responsibility, if anything, to go back and his President and say
13 well look, I have removed my - you know, we met, you know, with
14 two West African leaders and the decision had been taken, and I
12:11:43 15 agree, to move my commander to Liberia. So quite frankly, in the
16 afterthought, of course anyone can sit now and say: Maybe you
17 should have done it. Maybe we should have, but we didn't see it
18 that way at the time.

19 Q. Let's go back to that page, shall we, yes? Of course
12:12:06 20 Kabbah knew, you say. And that he was in agreement with this,
21 you were asked.

22 "A. Well, Kabbah was not consulted, they didn't take his
23 agreement. I said but he knew. But I would disagree that
24 it was done with his - his participation, where we're
12:12:23 25 leading, no, it did not take his agreement.

26 Q. Was he in agreement with Sam Bockarie coming to Liberia
27 with his men in December 1999?

28 A. I don't know. He was told that Sam Bockarie will be
29 moving. ECOWAS told and everybody else so I --

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, Mr Taylor, who told President
2 Taylor that Sam Bockarie was moving?

3 THE WITNESS: I told him. Obasanjo told him.

4 MS HOLLIS:

12:12:53 5 Q. When you told him this, you didn't ask for his response
6 to that?

7 A. We did not ask for his acquiescence. We told him what
8 the decision had been because he was a party to this - he
9 was a party to the conflict, and at that particular time

12:13:08 10 within the RUF, once it had been agreed by Sankoh and
11 ECOWAS, we told him what the decision was. We didn't ask.

12 I didn't ask his opinion. I told him that we had had a
13 meeting in Monrovia, that President Obasanjo had come over
14 and we had met and we had decided, in the presence United

12:13:27 15 Nations, a representative to Liberia, that the best way to
16 move forward with the peace was for Sam Bockarie to be
17 removed from Liberia and that's what I told him."

18 A. But that's an error. I misspoke there again.

19 Q. What?

12:13:42 20 A. I said that's an error because I misspoke there in the
21 records. It should have been "removed from Sierra Leone".

22 Q. "Removed from Sierra Leone"?

23 A. Yes, it's an error in the record.

24 Q. "Q. Mr Taylor, is it your testimony that while Sam

12:13:56 25 Bockarie was in Liberia, you kept President Kabbah apprised
26 of his presence in Liberia?

27 A. I didn't have to. No, I'm not - that's not my
28 testimony to this Court."

29 Now, Mr Taylor, let's pause there for a minute. So what

1 you're saying there, putting it all together, firstly, Kabbah
2 wasn't consulted in the first place, yes.

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. He's only informed after the event, yes?

12:14:25 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And, thirdly, it would appear you didn't keep him up to
7 date as to what was happening with Bockarie whilst in Monrovia.
8 Is that true?

9 A. Yes, that is true. I didn't report to him. I didn't keep
12:14:42 10 him informed.

11 Q. When, for example, Mr Taylor, Bockarie's men were granted
12 Liberian citizenship and incorporated into the - recruited into
13 the ATU, why didn't you tell Kabbah about that?

14 A. I didn't feel it necessary. And let me just straighten up
12:15:06 15 what I just said earlier. To an extent, Kabbah was - we talked
16 about the Bockarie situation because it was arranged for even
17 Bockarie to speak to Kabbah. In fact, Sam Bockarie spoke to
18 Kabbah from Liberia. That's a part of the evidence here before.
19 So I did not report to him on a monthly or something basis, but
12:15:26 20 from time to time we talked about it, and Kabbah and Bockarie
21 spoke on the telephone from Liberia.

22 So, I can understand the questions, but to simplify it, we
23 have to look at the process. Sam Bockarie - Foday Sankoh is in
24 Freetown. Foday Sankoh gets permission from his President, who
12:15:55 25 is aware of an internal conflict that's about to break the entire
26 peace process. Sankoh comes to Liberia with the approval of
27 Kabbah to hold discussions on what to do about Sam Bockarie and
28 this was not the first trip. This is the second trip. So in a
29 way it is Sankoh's responsibility with his President to keep him

1 advised.

2 The thing that's so tense, where I invite Obasanjo to come
3 down, Obasanjo comes down. We sit with Sankoh, Obasanjo. We
4 discuss the problem. There's an impasse. Sam Bockarie is also
12:16:32 5 in Liberia at this time. There is an impasse. The impasse is of
6 such that we decide that, look, the best thing to move this peace
7 process forward is for Sam Bockarie to be removed from the
8 situation. Sankoh agrees. Obasanjo informs Kabbah and we move
9 on. As far as we are concerned, that's the way the decision was
12:16:56 10 taken at the particular time.

11 Q. As a preface to the next point that I want to ask you about
12 on this page, Mr Taylor, can I ask you this: Do you agree that
13 after December 1999 Bockarie's presence in Liberia becomes a
14 matter of international discussion and concern?

12:17:27 15 A. Yes, at some point.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the question is: Surely, by the
19 application of a little foresight, the involvement of Kabbah
12:17:52 20 could have forestalled such future concerns. Do you follow me?

21 A. I follow you, but I don't quite agree.

22 Q. Because thereafter you could say to the international
23 community raising these concerns, "Look, it was all done with his
24 approval, so what are you complaining about?" Do you follow?

12:18:11 25 A. I follow and you are correct. I follow very much, but I
26 don't think it could have forestalled it because of most of these
27 things were not coming from Kabbah himself. Well, let's not
28 forget the record. The United States special envoy for Africa,
29 Jesse Jackson, and the United States official delegations that

1 come to Liberia, they meet with Bockarie, okay. They discuss
2 with Bockarie. Bockarie in Liberia speaks to Kabbah. The issue
3 is only coming from some level of propaganda after things begin
4 to hot up a little bit, but I don't think it's even coming from
12:18:50 5 Kabbah. But if Bockarie's situation was of such that it was not
6 understood, why after the meeting with Jesse Jackson and Howard
7 Jetter and all these senior United States government officials
8 did they not say, "He's got no business being here," okay, and
9 let him leave?

12:19:08 10 So this thing was just a matter of propaganda and people,
11 you know, hotting things up at different points. Senior American
12 officials know, the United Nations know, the decision to extract
13 Sam Bockarie and bring him to Liberia is known. The United
14 Nations representative is present. It's not - so there is very
12:19:27 15 little I have to know in terms of informing Kabbah. I doubt if
16 Kabbah could have made any difference anyway because the bulk of
17 the controversy developing is not mostly from Kabbah. It's
18 coming from these little external sources, "Oh, it's because of
19 this." People are trying to whip up flames of discord in West
12:19:48 20 Africa. So sufficient people knew. The United Nations knew.
21 The United States government knew. Jesse Jackson, the special
22 representative for Africa, met with Bockarie in Monrovia. What
23 else could I have done?

24 Q. Mr Taylor, would you agree with this at the very least
12:20:05 25 though: That the propositions I've put to you, they do appear
26 commonsense and obvious, don't they?

27 A. Commonsense, yeah.

28 Q. And obvious?

29 A. Well, okay.

1 Q. Let's go back to page 34575, line 17:

2 "Q. And, Mr Taylor, while Sam Bockarie was in Liberia,
3 the Government of Sierra Leone made requests that he be
4 returned to Sierra Leone, didn't it?"

12:20:48 5 A. At some level, yes. My Foreign Minister did tell me
6 that - I think he had spoken to someone and President
7 Kabbah had said that he wanted Sam Bockarie returned to
8 Sierra Leone and the position of the Government of Liberia
9 was no.

12:20:59 10 Q. Actually, Mr Taylor, on 28 January 2001 you had a
11 telephone conversation with President Kabbah in which it
12 was discussed handing Sam Bockarie over to Sierra Leone.
13 Isn't that correct?"

14 I am not sure of your answer, Mr Taylor, because there's a
12:21:23 15 no and yes in that answer, do you see, on the page?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. So I'm going to ask you the question. Did you on 28
18 January 2001 have a telephone conversation with President Kabbah
19 in which the return of Sam Bockarie to Sierra Leone was
12:21:40 20 discussed?

21 A. We did discuss. I'm not sure if it's on the 28th; that's
22 my birthday, I don't think President Kabbah would have called me
23 to discuss politics. I did hold a discussion in January - I
24 don't remember the exact date - where Kabbah raised the issue as
12:21:56 25 to whether what had been discussed with my Foreign Minister had
26 reached my attention and I told him yes and I told him what the
27 position of the government was.

28 Q. Now, I just want a few more details on that so that we're
29 certain about the position. Was this the first discussion you

1 had with Kabbah in which Bockarie's return to Sierra Leone was
2 discussed?

3 A. That is correct, yes.

4 Q. Do you accept as put to you, whatever the precise date,
12:22:28 5 that it was in January 2001?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You accept that it was in January 2001?

8 A. I can accept that.

9 Q. That being so, Mr Taylor, putting the pieces together, this
12:22:43 10 was slightly over a year after Bockarie had moved to Liberia?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Can we take it then that throughout the year 2000 Kabbah
13 had not made such a request?

14 A. That is correct.

12:23:12 15 Q. And as I understand, and we can see this from page 34576,
16 you refused to return him, didn't you?

17 A. I told Kabbah the decision, yes, that is correct, that the
18 decision of the government was no.

19 Q. Did you consult with the other members of the Committee of
12:23:33 20 Five or with ECOWAS before you made that decision?

21 A. I discussed that I can say with - I probably mentioned it
22 to Obasanjo. This was - I did not discuss it with too many
23 individuals. Sam Bockarie, as far as I'm concerned, was in
24 Liberia and we took that decision, but I discussed it with
12:23:55 25 Obasanjo, I'm more than certain.

26 Q. What was his position as to the return of Bockarie?

27 A. To the best of my recollection, Obasanjo didn't see and he
28 did not understand what would be the problem, I mean, why would
29 Kabbah request for Sam Bockarie to be returned and when, in fact,

1 Sam Bockarie had been brought out of Sierra Leone, not because he
2 had committed some crime or anything but because ECOWAS had
3 extracted him. So he didn't understand it and he left that up to
4 the decision that we had taken.

12:24:30 5 Q. Now, contained within your answer is a question which I'll
6 ask you directly. Why did Kabbah want Bockarie back in terms of
7 what he told you in that telephone conversation?

8 A. Quite frankly - Kabbah said that he had information that
9 Sam Bockarie was training in Liberia and preparing to lead an
10 attack. And under the non-aggression treaty with the Mano River
11 Union --

12 Q. We discussed that this morning?

13 A. Yeah. I had a responsibility to send him. So I said that
14 cannot be. He's not training here. He's not planning to launch
12:25:15 15 an attack. So this treaty cannot be invoked at this particular
16 time. So I know of no criminal thing that you are calling
17 Bockarie back. If you're calling him back because you say that
18 he is planning to launch an invasion on Sierra Leone and so he is
19 wanted by the Sierra Leonean government, I know that there is no
12:25:34 20 such thing being planned, I know why he came over here, so we are
21 not going to return him. This is the basis of our conversation,
22 as I recollect.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, are you prepared to concede that perhaps
24 there was good reason why President Kabbah might have raised such
12:25:59 25 a concern --

26 A. I'm not sure --

27 Q. -- that Bockarie was training a force to invade Sierra
28 Leone. Are you willing to concede there might have been a
29 factual basis for that concern?

1 A. I'm not prepared to concede that, no, because there was no
2 such factual basis, and so, no, I'm not prepared to concede that.

3 Q. Because Bockarie's men were in fact being trained as part
4 of the ATU, weren't they?

12:26:33 5 A. Well, if you put it that way --

6 Q. His former men.

7 A. His former men, yes.

8 Q. So are you prepared to concede that if information about
9 that had filtered back to Kabbah he might have had grounds for
10 such a concern?

12:26:46

11 A. Well, no, I would still say logically I would not concede
12 it, because if we look at it in a logical fashion that the former
13 men that came with him are training with the Liberian ATU and
14 that that is supposed to pose a threat to the Sierra Leonean

12:27:12

15 government, then logically you would not only want for Sam
16 Bockarie to be returned for whatever reason you want, you would
17 want to tell me, "Mr President, or my friend and brother, the
18 Sierra Leoneans - Sam Bockarie and the men that went to Liberia,
19 I want them returned to me for X, Y reason." To call for only

12:27:35

20 the leader and leave the men, if there was such an operation it
21 would go on. So I still do not concede that because I don't see
22 any logic. If he had taken such a decision, looking at it
23 logically, I would say I would disagree and I would not concede
24 that.

12:27:51

25 Q. Very well. I want to now look at just another couple of
26 aspects of this which were raised with you in cross-examination
27 before we move on. Madam Court Manager, can we go to page 34580,
28 please. Are we there?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Line 6, Mr Taylor, it's put to you that the arrangement for
2 Bockarie to come to Liberia in 19 December 1999 was your idea.
3 Was it? Was it your idea?

4 A. I thought you were reading "wasn't it" as it's asked there.

12:28:40 5 Q. No. I am asking you now, was it?

6 A. I participated, yes.

7 Q. No, no, no. All right, let me pose the question
8 differently. Who originated the idea?

9 A. I suggested it. I.

12:28:51 10 Q. To whom did you suggest it?

11 A. Obasanjo.

12 Q. In what way was that communicated; in writing, at a meeting
13 or what?

14 A. We talked about it on the telephone before Obasanjo came
12:29:11 15 and throwing the problem around, and Obasanjo reminded me of what
16 had happened to Sankoh when they picked him up in Nigeria. And
17 so Obasanjo - I told him, I said, "Well, look, then the best
18 thing to do is what do you think if we just move him?" And he
19 said, "Well, okay, I'll come down and we can talk about it." And
12:29:32 20 so he came down and we threw it around.

21 Q. Now, I just want to be clear about the actual procedure
22 which was adopted, Mr Taylor, in light of a further question you
23 are asked on the same page, which we'll come to. Can we be sure
24 about what actually happened; you have the idea, yes?

12:29:57 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Now before you had that idea, what had actually transpired?

27 A. There is an initial meeting in Monrovia.

28 Q. Who with?

29 A. Between Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh before December on

1 Bockarie's submitting to Sankoh as his boss.

2 Q. Yes, we've gone through that, Mr Taylor, so let's deal with
3 it briefly.

4 A. So that's that. They return and find out that nothing is
12:30:28 5 working. Sam Bockarie is even more belligerent. But by this
6 time, I'm also discussing this with other members of the
7 committee and dealing with Obasanjo. But, like I said,
8 Obasanjo's the most important. So that's the genesis of it.

9 Q. And then you have the idea which you communicate to
12:30:47 10 Obasanjo?

11 A. Exactly.

12 Q. To bring him to Liberia?

13 A. And invite him to come down, yes.

14 Q. Now, when you speak to Obasanjo about it, was it already a
12:30:59 15 concrete idea; it was going to happen whether or not Obasanjo
16 agreed to it or not?

17 A. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. No. No. No.

18 No. It was only going to happen if Obasanjo agreed. Because the
19 process on that committee - and mind you, Nigeria now - it's on
12:31:21 20 the committee. I would never have taken that decision if
21 Obasanjo had said no. No, no, no. I was not in position to
22 unilaterally take such a decision, no.

23 Q. I ask for this reason. Let's go to line 26:

24 "And in fact, it was after you had reached this conclusion
12:31:40 25 that you appealed to President Obasanjo and others to assist you
26 in carrying this out?"

27 Now, Mr Taylor, was that the reality of things?

28 A. Totally, totally, totally incorrect. That was not the
29 reality of things. In fact, it's insulting to some of these

1 African leaders to believe that these powerful leaders are a
2 bunch of donkeys that Taylor is just dictating to. It's total
3 nonsense. Total nonsense, and I reject that. It's total
4 nonsense. This process Obasanjo is - I keep referring to it as
12:32:18 5 the powerhouse. Obasanjo comes down, we discuss this, and even
6 as we go further - I think it's in the records here - where
7 Obasanjo even says that he's going to communicate with some of
8 the other leaders to try to get some assistance to me for the
9 sustenance of these people. So no, they are not just pulled
12:32:40 10 around by me like they're a bunch of donkeys.

11 Q. Can we go over the page, please, to page 34581. It's put
12 to you there, Mr Taylor, that in fact President Obasanjo was on a
13 stopover at Roberts International Airport when you filled him in
14 on what you'd already decided, in effect.

12:33:18 15 A. Total nonsense. Total nonsense. Obasanjo came
16 specifically from Abuja to Monrovia for that meeting and back.
17 It was not a stopover. So if the Prosecution suggests a
18 stopover, where was he coming from and where was he going to
19 beyond that? So "stopover" cannot just be applied in this - in
12:33:43 20 this illogical way.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in relation to this Sam Bockarie issue,
22 yes, how many times did you actually discuss the matter with
23 Obasanjo face to face?

24 A. Before Bockarie comes, or during his stay in Liberia?

12:34:17 25 Q. No, before he comes.

26 A. That was the first time when he comes to Liberia in late
27 December that we discuss it face to face. We had discussed on
28 the telephone, but face to face once.

29 Q. Where in Liberia?

1 A. We met at Roberts International Airport. Obasanjo came, he
2 stayed at the airport. The airport's a distance from Monrovia,
3 that's where we discussed it.

4 Q. And I ask this because of the use of the word "stopover" on
12:34:44 5 this page. How long did Obasanjo stay in Liberia on that
6 occasion?

7 A. Oh, I can't remember. We had lunch at the airport. He
8 stayed there for about three - about three to four hours we were
9 discussing. We had lunch and all.

12:35:06 10 Q. Was anybody present apart from you and him? Was anybody
11 else present?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Who else was present?

14 A. Sankoh was present.

12:35:13 15 Q. At the airport?

16 A. At the airport. Sankoh was there.

17 Q. What about Bockarie?

18 A. Bockarie was there but he was not in this meeting, okay.
19 He was outside.

12:35:24 20 Q. Who else was there?

21 A. Well, my officials of government: The Foreign Minister,
22 outside; Defence Minister; other officials of government; and
23 Obasanjo's own staff, whoever came with him. These were people
24 that were there. His Foreign Minister, if I'm not mistaken, was
12:35:44 25 there at the time. Because it was like what we call a working -
26 a working visit to Liberia.

27 Q. And so Sankoh was present at that meeting?

28 A. Very present. Personally there.

29 Q. And after the meeting what happened to Sankoh?

1 A. Sankoh returned to Freetown.

2 Q. Did he return on the same day?

3 A. Oh, I can't recall. In a case like this, I doubt if he
4 would have returned the same day, but I don't know. I really
12:36:16 5 don't know.

6 Q. What about Bockarie; did he return?

7 A. Bockarie returned to - I think on the next day, because he
8 was driving back to his area. Bockarie was not in Freetown. He
9 drove back to his area in - across the border from Liberia.

12:36:37 10 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, just before we move off, I
11 note that Mr Taylor said his Foreign Minister was outside and
12 Obasanjo had his own staff. Were Obasanjo's staff in the
13 meeting, or was it just these three people alone in this meeting
14 with the others all outside?

12:36:53 15 THE WITNESS: To answer you, your Honour, the others were
16 outside. You know --

17 JUDGE DOHERTY: [Microphone not activated].

18 THE WITNESS: Exactly, yes.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:37:04 20 Q. The final matter I want to ask you on this topic,
21 Mr Taylor, is this: What was Bockarie's reaction when he was
22 told that he - let me rephrase the question. Was Bockarie told
23 that he was - he had to move to Monrovia, or was it given to him
24 as an option?

12:37:31 25 A. No, no, no. The discussions went on. Bockarie at some
26 point was in the meeting, and Bockarie had said that he had a
27 problem with taking orders from Sankoh, that Sankoh was ignoring
28 him, and that Sankoh had forgotten the contributions that he had
29 made and in fact was threatening him, and that he did not see

1 disarmament as an option and that before that happened he would
2 have to take matters on in the way he saw fit. He now leaves the
3 meeting and the decision is taken, "Well, the best thing to do
4 now is to remove this man," and we give him an option to either
12:38:27 5 come out - the only option was to come out voluntarily, or he
6 would have to face the full weight of ECOWAS, that we will go in
7 there and force things. He is called back into the meeting and
8 then he is practically read the riot act. I tell him. Obasanjo
9 tells him very clearly that, "Based on these discussions here
12:38:43 10 today and what you've said, the best thing that has been decided
11 is that unless you agree for the disarmament to start in line
12 with the Lome Agreement, you will have to leave, and we will help
13 you along the way to try to get a scholarship to go and study and
14 whatnot. But you cannot stay in Sierra Leone and obstruct this
12:39:06 15 process."

16 Q. What was his reaction?

17 A. He was - he was upset a little bit, but he saw very red
18 faces. But he was not totally happy, but later on he calmed down
19 when the option of travelling to the United States to, you know,
12:39:29 20 take training and whatnot would be done, which we said we would
21 pursue, which we later pursued it after the fact. But first it
22 was anger and then he calmed down.

23 Q. Very well. I'm going to leave the topic of Sam Bockarie
24 now, and I want to deal with another topic that you were asked
12:39:53 25 about at some length, Mr Taylor.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, before you proceed, I just
27 note that the question earlier put by Justice Doherty was not
28 recorded because apparently her microphone was not activated. I
29 think it's important that this question should be reflected.

1 JUDGE DOHERTY: I had said, in the light of the answer, "So
2 there was just three people at the meeting?" and Mr Taylor
3 replied in the affirmative.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:40:36 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the fifth topic that I want to ask you
6 about in relation to your cross-examination on those three days
7 is the issue of human right, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can we go, please, to page 34614.

12:41:24 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, your record on human rights was questioned
12 at some length, wasn't it?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. I'll start with the general before we come to the
12:41:41 15 particulars. What's your attitude towards human rights,
16 Mr Taylor?

17 A. I respect human rights.

18 Q. Do you consider them important?

19 A. Extraordinarily important, yes.

12:41:58 20 Q. Why?

21 A. They are basic to all human beings. Irrespective of law,
22 it's basically - in our own system, our own culture, our own
23 environment, the love for the human being and the man is
24 important. And so I think it's extraordinarily important.

12:42:30 25 Q. Did you as President, Mr Taylor, or indeed generally, given
26 your background as an economist - do you see a link between human
27 rights and the respect for the individual, and economic and
28 political development?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. What do you see as the link?

2 A. Well, if you have rights of people respected, the utility
3 of their own production in society and the participation of such
4 utility and such utility benefits the state. So economically,
12:43:24 5 politically you benefit in general from a satisfied, cared for
6 populati on.

7 Q. Now, on the page which I've asked to be put up you see that
8 at line 3 reference is made to The Perspective, yes?

9 A. Yes.

12:43:45 10 Q. A newspaper, is that right?

11 A. No, it is not.

12 Q. What is it?

13 A. The Perspective is an oppositi on opini on paper devel oped by
14 the oppositi on in Li beria that was published frequently on the
12:44:07 15 internet, written, for the most part, sometimes with real names,
16 sometimes with pen names, by a gentleman called Tom Kamara, that
17 is the editor-in-chief now of the New Democrat in Monrovia. This
18 is an opini on paper devel oped by the oppositi on in Li beria.

19 Q. When you say "the oppositi on", we know there were many
12:44:29 20 facti ons in Li beria, so who are you talking about?

21 A. I'm talking about the Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Amos Sawyer
22 side of the political arguments in Li beria.

23 Q. Now, if we could just go back quickly to page 34610. It
24 was put to you on the second line of that page, Mr Taylor, that
12:45:01 25 the testimony of Hassan Bility, the things that were done to him
26 was because of his reporting and associating this accused with
27 the RUF. Is that true?

28 A. That is not true.

29 Q. Why was Hassan Bility arrested?

1 A. At the time that I know of the arrest of Hassan Bility, he
2 was arrested for carrying on covert actions not as a journalist,
3 as an unlawful combatant providing information and preparing in
4 Monrovia for an attack on my residence in Congo Town. That's why
12:45:51 5 he was arrested.

6 Q. Let us now please go to page 34646, because starting on
7 that page, Mr Taylor, you were asked about a number of particular
8 instances. Do you follow?

9 A. Yes.

12:46:12 10 Q. Now, you will see that on the third line from the bottom of
11 that page the first name mentioned is that of John Tarnue, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. But before we get to that, a number of propositions were
14 put to you beginning at line 2. Do you see? Torture was not
12:46:47 15 uncommon during your presidency and you disagree.

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. The specific suggestion is then put to you about the
18 behaviour of your son Chucky, yes?

19 A. Yes.

12:47:04 20 Q. And also at line 13 the behaviour of the ATU, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And then the specific testimony of an individual was put to
23 you. So that contextualised the various individuals you were
24 later asked about.

12:47:27 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Now, you're then asked about a number of individuals:
27 "John Tarnue," bottom line, "was tortured by your son Chucky,
28 wasn't he?" Now, Mr Taylor, who was John Tarnue?

29 A. John Tarnue was a brigadier general who served at the time

1 as adviser to the commander of the ATU.

2 Q. A brigadier general in what force?

3 A. In the Armed Forces of Liberia.

4 Q. Had he been in the NPFL?

12:48:16 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was he a Special Forces?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Did you appoint him to the rank of brigadier general?

9 A. Yes.

12:48:34 10 Q. Now, when asked about the torture of that man, you answered
11 on page 34547: "Not to my knowledge. I know there was a
12 conflict between them, but not to my knowledge." What was that
13 conflict?

14 A. Chucky and Tarnue did not apparently get along and so they
12:49:02 15 were always having little arguments because he was advising the
16 unit in his training working alongside the South Africans.

17 Q. And so how was that conflict, as you described it - how was
18 that resolved, if at all?

19 A. Whenever these things came up, either some of their
12:49:27 20 colleagues would talk to them and resolve it. This was not
21 something that was at an arms level that would reach to me, but I
22 knew that fuss sometimes. I would tell Chucky to work along with
23 the general because he was the adviser. But I understand
24 everything broke down and they got into a fist fight.

12:49:49 25 Q. So you personally intervened in this, did you?

26 A. At one point - at one point of the conflict, yes, I had
27 said to Chucky that I had heard that he and Tarnue always had
28 problems and that he should give Tarnue an opportunity to do his
29 advisory job that he was sent there to do.

1 Q. Did anything happen as a consequence of the first fight
2 between the two of them?

3 A. Tarnue was injured.

4 Q. Yes?

12:50:22 5 A. To the best of my knowledge.

6 Q. Seriously or what?

7 A. No, I don't think Tarnue was - he was not injured
8 seriously, to the best of my knowledge, but he was sent to the
9 hospital. I think he had some bruises.

12:50:37 10 Q. What did you do following that incident?

11 A. Nothing. Sent him to the hospital. Soldiers fight all the
12 time. From all I knew, two officers had a fight, which is normal
13 in the army. You put down everything, fight. We sent him to the
14 hospital. I'm sure - in fact, Chucky had some scratches and
15 bruises too and that was the end of it for me.

16 Q. Did Tarnue continue in his advisory role thereafter?

17 A. He continued, yes.

18 Q. When you stepped down as President in August 2003 was
19 Tarnue still fulfilling that role?

12:51:19 20 A. No. Tarnue had - when the war intensified earlier, he
21 left. He left during the intensification of the war.

22 Q. He left and did what?

23 A. He just went AWOL. When we asked, we heard that he had
24 travelled to Ghana. I don't know how he got to Ghana.

12:51:44 25 Q. Now, the next person you were asked about is Tiawon
26 Gongloe, line 22, yes?

27 A. Tiawon, yes.

28 Q. How do you pronounce it?

29 A. Tiawon.

1 Q. Who is he?

2 A. Remember I just talked about that side, that Amos Sawyer,
3 Ellen Johnson side of the political friction that we had in
4 Liberia. I was on one side with other people and that was that
12:52:20 5 side. Tiawon Gongloe is a lawyer, not very well versed in
6 practice, that during my presidency took on the role as - and
7 Liberians did this at this time - as a human rights activist. He
8 and many others, but you've only asked about him. On that part
9 of the political divide, he was an opposition activist for that
12:52:51 10 Ellen, Sawyer side of the political divide in Liberia, an
11 opposition to my government, in total opposition to my
12 government.

13 Q. Opposition in government can be a healthy thing, Mr Taylor.

14 A. Oh, I agree, but let's not be misled here, we're in
12:53:12 15 Europe. In some of our little African countries, adversarial
16 relationships are not adversarial. They become - you become not
17 an adversary; you become an enemy. We haven't reached that
18 advanced thing where, for example, David Cameron and Gordon Brown
19 can stand across and discuss. That's not what really happens in
12:53:43 20 these little countries. People that are in - some people that
21 are in opposition become cold-blooded enemies, and if they could
22 kill you they would do that. So it's not in terms of a party.
23 There were many opposition parties. This was an activist that
24 was out, writing, speaking, doing everything to bring down the
12:54:02 25 government, Tiawon Gongloe.

26 Q. Now, it is suggested that he was severely beaten and kicked
27 by police officers.

28 A. I don't know. Police beat and kick people in Britain and
29 America. I don't know, but this is what these boys did at that

1 time, okay. And Tiawon then was working strictly in this
2 so-called human rights atmosphere and they were doing and saying
3 everything to make the government look bad. This is why he ends
4 up in Ellen Johnson's government as Solicitor General. And, you
12:54:46 5 know, I hate to do this, but I have to point out to this Court:
6 In dealing with some of these names, there is a political context
7 here in dealing with certain people that have been raised here,
8 and Tiawon Gongloe is no exception. I know this man personally.
9 But these were people that were involved in the process of
12:55:00 10 spreading information, disinformation, misinformation, doing
11 everything to bring my government down, just as they used this
12 stuff we just talked about here, this newspaper - not newspaper,
13 this clip here on the internet, The Perspective with Tom Kamara.
14 That's the group we're talking about.

12:55:23 15 Q. So you had a motive to have him beaten up then?

16 A. No, no. I mean, why would I want to beat Tiawon? These
17 are boys that come, talk and go and do danger. No. I mean, I
18 wouldn't tell - but I'm trying to say it's possible. I'm not
19 going to sit here and say - it's possible. If the police went to
12:55:36 20 pick up Tiawon Gongloe and he put up a fight - anywhere in the
21 world police come for you and you put up a fight, you're going to
22 get a few knockings. That happens everywhere. So I don't say
23 that he did not get probably hit by the police. I would be lying
24 to these judges if I said that. But I - that was not brought to
12:55:52 25 me, that Tiawon Gongloe was beaten up by the police. So this is
26 what I'm saying to you.

27 Right now, after being Solicitor General, Tiawon Gongloe is
28 still Minister of Labour in Liberia now as we sit here in the
29 Ellen Johnson government. His first position was Solicitor

1 General and he worked with this Prosecution. From there he was
2 moved and he's Minister of Labour now in that government. That's
3 the first man, Tiawon.

12:56:29 4 Q. What are you saying about him working with this
5 Prosecution?

6 A. He was Solicitor General from the election of Ellen
7 Johnson-Sirleaf. And the information - the Ministry of Justice
8 worked very closely with this Prosecution on collecting
9 information in Liberia, even obtaining search warrants and
10 everything, including the second search warrant at my house. He
11 was Solicitor General when that occurred.

12 Q. The third person you were asked about, page 34651, please,
13 Thomas Nimley, line 17. Who's he?

14 A. Thomas Nimley was - the late Thomas Nimley was senator for
15 the NPP-led government.

16 Q. Now, it was put to you that Thomas Nimley - I'm sorry, this
17 is the next page, Madam Court Manager - that Nimley had written
18 that human rights groups were enemies of the state. Were you
19 aware of that?

12:57:42 20 A. No, I was not aware. Thomas Nimley, like I said, was a
21 senator and --

22 Q. Was he a member of your party?

23 A. Yes, of the NPP, yes.

24 Q. Had he been a member of the NPFL?

12:57:56 25 A. NPFL/NPRAG, yes.

26 Q. Did you share those sentiments that human rights groups
27 were enemies of the state?

28 A. Well, in all earnesty, not in that way. I would say no.
29 Not in that sense. In a different way. The way the Liberian

1 human rights people were operating, I would say that the
2 senator's own assessment at the time would have some validity.

3 Q. Line 28, Koffi Woods.

4 A. Hmm.

12:58:48 5 Q. What's that comment for, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Koffi Woods, the creme of the opposition crop, Ellen
7 Johnson and Amos Sawyer. This man from the Doe government
8 practically never lived in Liberia. He would go in and come out.

9 He called himself a human rights activist. He never, from the
12:59:14 10 Doe administration throughout my government, practically never
11 lived in Liberia. He was just in and out, in and out. Where is
12 he right now? First position held in Ellen Johnson's government,
13 principal, principal, Minister of Labour. Second position that

14 he holds right now, Minister of Public Works. That's the other
12:59:36 15 protege to them. That's the opposition bunch. The first one we
16 talked about, still in government. He now has held two
17 ministerial positions. They're still there.

18 Q. Was he placed under surveillance, as suggested to you?

19 A. Koffi Woods very well could have. I would say if he
12:59:56 20 wasn't, I would be surprised he wasn't.

21 Q. Was it on your instructions?

22 A. No, no, not necessarily. The intelligence people would do
23 that. That's why I'm saying I would be surprised if he wasn't.
24 Because it would be a part of the intelligence - because Koffi
13:00:12 25 Woods had been operating for many, many years - like I said, from
26 the Doe years - and he had always been a question for the
27 security to monitor his movements in and out. So I would be
28 surprised if, during my government, the same was not going on.
29 Because the same people, the same security people, have come down

1 over the years.

2 Q. Yes, you might not have ordered it; was it brought to your
3 attention that he had been placed under surveillance?

4 A. No, it was not brought to my attention.

13:00:42 5 Q. That concluded 2 February, Mr Taylor. Can we go to the
6 transcript for 4 February, please, and in particular to page
7 34659. We're still looking at particular individuals you were
8 asked about in relation to human rights abuses. Do you follow
9 me?

13:01:05 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. 34659, line 9. Mr Adebayo, who's that?

12 A. I don't know him.

13 Q. Very well. Over the page to page 34660, James Torh,
14 T-O-R-H, line 14. Who is he?

13:01:36 15 A. I don't know James. I don't know him. I didn't know him
16 then. I don't know James.

17 Q. Page 34665, line 24. Aloysius Toe?

18 A. I don't recall Toe.

19 Q. Okay, let's go to page 34673 then, please. The next person
13:02:31 20 you were asked about was Yegbeh Degbon, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Line 19?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What happened to him, Mr Taylor?

13:02:41 25 A. He was executed.

26 Q. Why?

27 A. He was tried for putting - helping to put together the
28 group called Black Kadaffa to take over the leadership of the
29 NPFL and assassinate us.

1 Q. So you accept that he was executed?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Line 26, Oliver Varney, what happened to him?

4 A. He was also executed for the same Black Kadaffa situation.

13:03:08 5 Q. And over the page, Sam Larto?

6 A. Sam Larto, I know him. He was a Special Forces. He was
7 executed for the killing of many civilians in Maryland County and
8 the shooting of another civilian for allegedly stealing a
9 television.

13:03:32 10 Q. Now, Degbon was an opponent of yours?

11 A. At that point, yes.

12 Q. And he was executed, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Varney was an opponent of yours?

13:03:45 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And he too was executed?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. What about Larto, was he an opponent of yours?

19 A. In part, yes. But he was executed for a different reason.

13:03:54 20 Q. Why "in part"?

21 A. Well, he was a part of the group in Libya that had planned
22 to bring about this insurrection to remove the leadership. But
23 at the time of this investigation he was only held for the murder
24 of the dozens of civilians that were killed in, I think, Maryland
13:04:18 25 County.

26 Q. Page 34677, please, line 24. Cooper Teah, what happened to
27 him?

28 A. Cooper Teah, I'm not too sure. I think Cooper Teah died in
29 combat or something.

1 Q. Was he not executed?

2 A. I don't remember Cooper Teah being executed. I'm not sure
3 about that.

4 Q. Very well. Page 34679, Gabriel Kpolleh?

13:04:53 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What happened to him?

7 A. Gabriel Kpolleh, I know him very. To the best of my
8 knowledge, I think Kpolleh was trying to get from Monrovia into
9 the NPFL area when he was killed, most probably maybe in a

13:05:21 10 crossfire or something.

11 Q. When you say you know him very well, how so?

12 A. Gabriel Kpolleh was one of those individuals - he was from
13 Bong County - that was very politically active in Liberia prior
14 to the revolution. He was very active in Liberia.

13:05:47 15 Q. Page 34680, line 9, Jackson Doe?

16 A. Jackson Doe, I know him. Jackson Doe was - he ran - in
17 fact, he was the individual that ran against Samuel Doe in, I
18 think, '95 that it was believed that he won the presidency at
19 that time.

13:06:15 20 Q. Did you have him killed, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, I did not. No. Nimba man - he's from Nimba County,
22 no, I did not.

23 Q. Is he alive today?

24 A. No, Jackson Doe is not alive.

13:06:34 25 Q. How did he die?

26 A. My understanding is that Jackson Doe finally reached some
27 of his people from Nimba, and in fact, I still don't know in
28 details how he died, but it was reported to me that Jackson Doe
29 was killed also crossing from Monrovia into our area. But

1 another report reached me that some of the Nimba people killed
2 him, and I was not sure which of the two stories was correct.

3 Q. Page 34681, line 26, Moses Duopu?

13:07:18 4 A. Moses Duopu, a good friend of mine and almost like a
5 brother-in-law. He was killed in Nimba County when he came into
6 the country by some people in Nimba County that I think he had
7 some problems with. He was killed in Nimba.

8 Q. Was it on your orders?

9 A. No, no, Moses was a good friend of mine.

13:07:45 10 Q. Page 3468 line, line 19, Samuel Dokie?

11 A. Very sad case.

12 Q. How so?

13 A. Samuel Dokie was one of those individuals that broke away
14 from me. There were three: Tom Woveiyu, Counsellor Lavalie
13:08:03 15 Supuwood, and Samuel Dokie - and had returned. He had returned,
16 Woveiyu had returned. But I understand that there was some
17 problems that Samuel Dokie had with certain individuals. Samuel
18 Dokie was from the Mano tribe in Nimba, and he had some problems
19 with certain elements. And eventually we learned that - I was in
13:08:31 20 South Africa when he was arrested.

21 Q. Who by?

22 A. I understand by some security individuals near Gbarnga, and
23 he and his wife were killed and those involved - some of them
24 were arrested and put on trial.

13:08:50 25 Q. Were you responsible for his death, Mr Taylor?

26 A. No, not at all. Not at all.

27 Q. Did you order it?

28 A. No, I did not.

29 Q. Page 34693, please. Isaac Vaye - have I pronounced that

1 correctly - line 8?

2 A. Yeah, that is a correct. A minister in my government too.

3 Isaac Vaye was arrested in --

4 Q. Who by?

13:09:35 5 A. By the security forces involving Benjamin Yeaten in 2003

6 and was killed, I understand, by the orders of Benjamin Yeaten.

7 Q. Was he an opponent of yours?

8 A. No, no, no, no. Vaye had worked with me in Gbarnga all the
9 way to Monrovia.

13:09:54 10 Q. In what capacity?

11 A. As Deputy Minister For Public Works.

12 Q. For how long had he held that position?

13 A. Vaye was with me in Gbarnga from about 1991. He had
14 followed me from 1991 all the way down through my election.

13:10:08 15 Q. Line 12, John Yormie?

16 A. Deputy Minister of National Security. He was one of those
17 that was killed by Benjamin Yeaten.

18 Q. So you accept that those two men were killed by Benjamin
19 Yeaten?

13:10:25 20 A. Yes, I accept that from what I have understood - even after

21 I left Liberia, I understand that Benjamin Yeaten admitted to
22 that.

23 Q. Now, before you left Liberia, were you aware that Benjamin
24 Yeaten was responsible for these killings?

13:10:44 25 A. No, he had denied it, and he had said that the security

26 that took the people away killed them. But later on during the

27 reign of Moses within the two months an investigation was

28 launched and he finally admitted and fled the country.

29 Q. Moses who?

1 A. Blah. During the two months of Moses Blah, he admitted and
2 fled the country.

3 Q. I just want a few more details about this, please. The
4 killing of these two men took place in which year?

13:11:15 5 A. 2003.

6 Q. How long before your departure?

7 A. I would say about a month.

8 Q. About a month?

9 A. Yes.

13:11:25 10 Q. Did you launch an inquiry before you left?

11 A. No, I did not.

12 Q. Why not?

13 A. We were - we're talking about July of 2003. There was war
14 going on. We were fighting on the streets of Monrovia for almost
15 the entire month of July.

13:11:43

16 Q. Now, when these killings took place, at that point was the
17 finger pointed at Benjamin Yeaten?

18 A. Yes, the finger was pointed and he --

19 Q. "Yes" will do. So what did you do about Benjamin Yeaten?

13:12:02

20 A. He was - you know, we asked questions. In fact, he was
21 mostly out. And he said no, he was not responsible, and pointed
22 out that the security that he had placed these people in their
23 custody were responsible.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you mean by "he was mostly out"?

13:12:27

25 THE WITNESS: Benjamin Yeaten was a general that was
26 commanding all the forces of the war, and he was leading all the
27 forces fighting on the streets of Monrovia.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: So how does that explain the phrase "he
29 was mostly out"?

1 THE WITNESS: "Out", that means he was not performing his
2 duty as SSS director at the time.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Mr Taylor, to what extent did you, as President of Liberia,
13:13:06 5 monitor the deaths which undoubtedly took place of individuals
6 like the last two we've mentioned?

7 A. To what extent did I monitor them? Oh, I wouldn't know.
8 These were officials.

9 Q. What about the treatment or mistreatment of individuals?

13:13:38 10 A. Well, it depends. I wouldn't - I wouldn't - I wouldn't be
11 able to monitor those, no. If it was something that was serious
12 it would be brought to the President's attention, but it was not
13 something that I monitored.

14 Q. Now, the next topic you were asked about, Mr Taylor, I have
13:14:05 15 put under the general title of "Corruption", yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can we go to page 34701, please. Line 25:

18 "Q. During your presidency, you, Belle Dunbar, Ghassan
19 Basma and Jamal Basma entered into a contractual agreement
13:14:54 20 relating to the import of fuel into the country."

21 Did you do that, Mr Taylor?

22 A. No, I did not.

23 Q. Now, first of all, who is Belle Dunbar?

24 A. She was the managing director of the Liberian petroleum
13:15:11 25 corporation - refinery corporation.

26 Q. Who had appointed her to that position?

27 A. I as President with the advice and consent.

28 Q. And who is Ghassan Basma?

29 A. A businessman in Liberia.

1 Q. And Jamal Basma?

2 A. Another businessman. They are two brothers.

3 Q. Were they involved with the Liberian petroleum company?

4 A. Yes, they were.

13:15:42 5 Q. In what capacity?

6 A. They were given a licence to import petroleum products in
7 the country.

8 Q. Who granted them that licence?

9 A. The LPRC.

13:15:55 10 Q. Did you have a role within the LPRC?

11 A. No. The LPRC has a board of directors. The President - it
12 is an autonomous agency. The President has nothing to do with
13 the functions. The board of directors preside over the functions
14 of the LPRC.

13:16:13 15 Q. Is it a nationalised company?

16 A. I wouldn't put it that way. Nationalised would mean
17 something else for me. Maybe --

18 Q. All right. Is a publicly owned company --

19 A. That is correct.

13:16:25 20 Q. -- that is owned by the government?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. So does the government have a say in the appointment of the
23 managing director?

24 A. Yes. You're nominated by the President with the advice and
13:16:37 25 consent of the senate and then that corporation is managed by a
26 board.

27 Q. So did you nominate Belle Dunbar?

28 A. Yes, I did.

29 Q. Now, no doubt the LPRC generated a lot of tax revenue for

1 the government?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Was any of it diverted to you, Mr Taylor?

4 A. None whatsoever, no.

13:17:08 5 Q. For example, through Kadiatu Diarra?

6 A. No. Not diverted to me, no.

7 Q. Mr Taylor - can we go to page 34709, please, line 3.

8 Tradevco Bank.

9 A. Yes.

13:17:44 10 Q. Where is that situated?

11 A. When I left Liberia it was situated on Ashmun Street in
12 Monrovia.

13 Q. Is it a Liberian owned bank?

14 A. Tradevco, no. It's either Spanish or Italian. Tradevco -

13:18:07 15 I don't speak either of those languages, but I think it was
16 either Spanish or Italian.

17 Q. Did you have an account there?

18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. Was it a personal account?

13:18:17 20 A. A personal account, yes.

21 Q. Was it the same as that other account that we discussed
22 earlier this week?

23 A. No. Totally, totally different.

24 Q. What kind of account was this?

13:18:32 25 A. This account? This bank? It was my personal account as
26 President.

27 Q. What monies were paid into it?

28 A. I would deposit my presidential salary cheques in that
29 particular account.

1 Q. On that note, Mr Taylor, how much were you paid as
2 President per month?

3 A. The presidential salary, I said before, I think it was
4 about 2,500; \$2,000 or \$3,000 --

13:19:04 5 Q. A month?

6 A. -- United States.

7 Q. Pardon?

8 A. United States dollars.

9 Q. United States dollars. And you say that was paid into this
10 bank?

11 A. Yeah, I would pay it into it, yes.

12 Q. Was money from any other source paid into this account?

13 A. None whatsoever. The amount in that bank never exceeded I
14 would say \$15,000, ever. No monies from any other source were
13:19:34 15 deposited in that bank.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, have you seen or been shown in recent times any
17 bank statements for that account?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Has any evidence been produced to you of what funds passed
13:19:57 20 through that account?

21 A. None. I haven't seen it.

22 Q. Let's go to page 34710, please. The Oriental Timber
23 Company, line 8, Mr Taylor, what was your relationship with them?

24 A. None.

13:20:18 25 Q. Did you receive money from them?

26 A. By "you", now, you mean me personally?

27 Q. Yes, I'm talking about you personally.

28 A. No.

29 Q. Did they pay tax in Liberia?

1 A. They did.

2 Q. To whom was that tax paid?

3 A. It was paid to the Government of Liberia.

13:20:53 4 Q. Yes. And did you have an improper relationship with that
5 company, Mr Taylor?

6 A. None whatsoever, no.

7 Q. Who was the owner of the company?

8 A. The Oriental Timber Company was owned by - all I know is -
9 I just call him - we call him - I just called him Dato. Like I
13:21:10 10 said he was a billionaire Indonesian, but it was managed by his
11 son in Liberia. I just know him to call Dato. I don't know his
12 real name.

13 Q. Now, you'll see that line 19 that another company was
14 mentioned, Maryland Wood Processing Industries, yes?

13:21:33 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. MWPI. What was your relationship with them?

17 A. None, nothing. They just did - for some 35 or more years,
18 this family --

19 Q. Which family?

13:21:49 20 A. The Fawaz brothers. Abbas which is on the record and I
21 mentioned Kassem. They had done- they grew up - in fact these
22 Lebanese boys were born in Liberia. They grew up in Liberia and
23 had been doing timber business for more than 30 years.

24 Q. Now the next page, page 34711, mention was also made of
13:22:17 25 Firestone. Now, Mr Taylor, are you okay?

26 A. Yes, I'm fine.

27 Q. Who owns the Firestone company?

28 A. Firestone is owned by Bridgestone tyre and rubber company
29 of Japan. Bridgestone tyre and rubber company.

1 Q. Did you have an improper relationship with them, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No, none whatsoever.

3 Q. Mr Taylor, let's just pause for a minute. Is it the case,
4 Mr Taylor, implicit in the various questions you were asked on
13:23:03 5 this topic, that in effect no major business could operate in
6 Liberia without bluntly giving you backhanders? Is that the
7 case?

8 A. That's totally not the case. That's how the Prosecution
9 wants to portray me but that's totally, totally - we dealt with -
13:23:32 10 well, I'll put it this way: We dealt with American companies and
11 if these - now while I said that Firestone is owned by
12 Bridgestone of Japan, Firestone was bought - it was owned by an
13 American group, it was bought by Bridgestone, they still have -
14 in fact it is still being managed by Americans, then they are in
13:23:55 15 violation of American laws. So it would be irrational to say
16 that companies are paying Taylor which involved American
17 companies, then this Prosecution should go and then bring those
18 people up in court in the United States. I mean then they are
19 breaking the law.

13:24:13 20 Q. Now it was always suggested to you, Mr Taylor, and this was
21 at page 34732, line 5, that you were involved in rice and fuel
22 imports from which you benefitted personally. Is that true?

23 A. That is not true.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's just have a quick overview of how
13:24:41 25 this is put against you. Improper relations with Oriental Timber
26 corporation, Maryland Wood Processing Industries, Firestone,
27 involvement with the import of petroleum through LPRC, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Also involved in personally benefitting from rice and fuel

1 imports, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Also receiving diamonds from Sierra Leone, yes?

4 A. Yes.

13:25:21 5 Q. Also raping the timber resources of Liberia, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. For your own personal benefit, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Where's the money, Mr Taylor?

13:25:36 10 A. Well, that's - you ought to ask the Prosecution, because
11 that's why we're in this Court for. There's all of this - I
12 don't know why they gave such big opportunities like this to me.
13 Where is it? Nothing, nothing but talk, talk, talk every day.
14 We've come here; nothing. Everything that I did as President is
13:26:02 15 being done exactly as I did it. These very same people, Maryland
16 Wood is operating in Liberia right now. The same procedure used
17 by LPRC is being used right now by Ellen Johnson. Everything.
18 There's nothing unlawful and nothing illegal. The same procedure
19 of designating and permitting an oligopoly for rice - because
13:26:30 20 rice is a matter of life and death in Liberia - is going on the
21 same way right now. There's nothing but just allegations and
22 just mere allegations. That's it. And that's what's going on in
23 Liberia right now.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've looked at some length during this
13:26:47 25 trial at the account held at the Liberian Bank For Development
26 and Investment. Do you recall that?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. Now, apart from those banking records, have you been
29 presented at any stage with any other banking records?

1 A. No. No.

2 Q. Mention was made of a Swiss bank account, yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Have you seen the records for that?

13:27:18 5 A. No.

6 Q. The next topic that was raised with you, Mr Taylor, that I
7 want to deal is Pat Robertson.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. When did you first meet him? This is page 34736. When did
13:27:54 10 you first meet him, Mr Taylor?

11 A. I have not met him before. I've never met him before.

12 Q. Have you ever met him?

13 A. No, I've never met Pat Robertson personally.

14 Q. Have you ever spoken to him?

13:28:08 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. On the telephone?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. How did that come about?

19 A. Pat Robertson is represented by a lawyer in a business - in
13:28:21 20 a gold business venture in Liberia. He wanted to invest in gold
21 mining in Liberia, and he was represented by a United States
22 Liberian-American lawyer, Mr Padmore. And also, in fact, Pat
23 Robertson's very close to Tom Woveiyu at the time, and I remember
24 on one occasion the lawyers came - the lawyer came to Liberia,
13:28:58 25 and I spoke to him very briefly just to tell him that we welcomed
26 his investment in Liberia.

27 Q. Did Pat Robertson himself come to Liberia on that occasion?

28 A. No, no. He did not.

29 Q. Whilst you were President did he ever come to Liberia?

1 A. No, he never did.

2 Q. How many times did you speak to him on the phone?

3 A. Just once, very briefly. Once.

4 Q. How long before your departure as President was that?

13:29:38 5 A. Long, long, long. This discussion could have happened very
6 briefly in I would put it to about '98 and I left in 2003, so
7 long before I left.

8 Q. And that was the only occasion you spoke to him?

9 A. That is correct.

13:30:00 10 Q. And how did that venture proceed?

11 A. In fact, Mr Robertson lost money on that venture because he
12 had to shut down because of the fighting and he actually lost
13 money.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, did you ask Pat Robertson to speak to George
13:30:22 15 Bush on your behalf?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. When did you do that?

18 A. Not personally. When you said "did you", again when I
19 spoke to Pat it was about the investment. Did I cause a
13:30:40 20 discussion to be held with Pat about that, that's what I'm
21 talking about, yes.

22 Q. Well, let's take it in stages. Did you personally request
23 him to speak to George Bush on your behalf, you personally?

24 A. Okay, I don't know how to put it.

13:30:56 25 Q. Did you get on the phone to him and say, "Hello,
26 Mr Robertson. This is President Charles Taylor" --

27 A. No, I did not.

28 Q. -- "could you have a word with George Bush for me?"

29 A. No, I did not, but I personally instructed that he be

1 spoken to, so.

2 Q. Right. When?

3 A. That was sometime I would put it again to back in about
4 early '98. At the time he was considering looking at this

13:31:27 5 investment in Liberia - in fact, no, I'm recalling --

6 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm sorry, we're going to have to cut you short
7 there.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps we could pick up this line of
9 evidence after the lunch break at 2.30.

13:31:47 10 [Lunch break taken at 1.31 p.m.]

11 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Right. Not far to go now, Mr Taylor. But before lunch we
14:33:47 15 were asking you about Pat Robertson, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Now, you had told us that you had caused him to be
18 approached to speak to President George Bush, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

14:34:12 20 Q. What did you hope to gain from that?

21 A. Well, putting it bluntly, when administrations change in
22 Washington, everything changes. Everybody changed. And so

23 President Bush, if I recollect properly, came into office in I
24 think 2001 taking over from a Democrat. The Republicans come

14:34:39 25 into office. Pat Robertson is a conservative Republican. He ran
26 for the presidency before, and a personal friend of George Bush.

27 So, obviously, little countries - and I took advantage of that -
28 scrambled to try to make some new - and create some new alliances
29 in Washington. So because he knew George Bush personally and we

1 were experiencing problems with the outgoing Democrat
2 administration, we asked him to speak to the incoming President
3 and he said he did.

14:35:22 4 Q. Now, did you give Pat Robertson - did you do any favours to
5 him in return?

6 A. No, no, no. None whatsoever. None whatsoever. No.

7 Q. Because it was suggested to you, was it not, page 34738,
8 that the contract that you granted to his company actually
9 violated Liberian law?

14:35:38 10 A. Total nonsense. Total nonsense. It was not a contract.
11 The concession that was granted was granted under Liberian law,
12 issued through the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy. It was
13 done legally, and Pat Robertson's lawyer - and he had a very -
14 they would never have accepted anything less than that. This is
14:36:07 15 a very, very decent man and - I mean, it's even - it's disgusting
16 to even discuss him in that light.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you personally handle the granting of
18 that concession to his company?

19 A. No.

14:36:22 20 Q. Who did?

21 A. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy under Minister
22 Jenkins Dunbar, the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.
23 These are three ministries responsible for granting that type of
24 working and prospecting rights in Liberia.

14:36:37 25 Q. And, Mr Taylor, did you - did you instruct Jenkins Dunbar
26 to treat this application more favourably because Pat Robertson
27 was in turn doing a favour for Liberia?

28 A. No, I did not. No.

29 Q. So, Mr Taylor, that being your answer, what was in it for

1 Pat Robertson to speak to George Bush on your behalf?

2 A. The only thing I can say was it in was that, because he was
3 about to invest a large amount of money in a gold mining
4 operation, it was in his interest to see peace and stability
14:38:03 5 within Liberia. So I think his only interest was to make sure
6 that a long-standing friend of the United States should be looked
7 at and the policies that had been initiated should be reviewed
8 with the view of changing some minds in Washington. That's all.

9 Q. Very well. That's all I will ask you about him, but before
14:38:30 10 I move to my next topic can I just clear up one matter which I
11 omitted to deal with this morning when I was dealing with your
12 alleged record on human rights. Do you recall when I went
13 through various names, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, I do.

14:38:45 15 Q. One name that I omitted to ask you about, and perhaps we
16 can deal with this quickly, Frances Johnson-Morris. Who is that?

17 A. Frances Johnson-Morris is the cousin - if you just the
18 Morris off it's Frances Johnson; the cousin of Ellen Johnson, the
19 present President. At the time Frances worked at the Catholic
14:39:14 20 Justice and Peace Commission as its chairperson. She is
21 presently - at first in the Johnson-Sirleaf government was named
22 the first Justice Minister and is presently the Minister of
23 Commerce. That's Frances Johnson.

24 Q. Was she critical of your government, Mr Taylor?

14:39:36 25 A. Yes. She was very, very - she was very critical at the -
26 at the commission where she was and this is - but once she was
27 doing human rights activities I didn't bother her. I was a
28 little shocked when the Prosecution stated here that she was
29 stripped and beaten and naked in the prison. That I didn't know

1 of, and that sounded impossible to me to have happened to
2 Frances. Even though we had our differences, but we had a long
3 association also because I said she had lived with my sister in
4 la Cote d'Ivoire during the war, so that would have been shocking
14:40:17 5 for me if anybody had done that to Frances.

6 Q. The next topic I want to move on to is the RUF fighting on
7 behalf of you. Now on 4 February this year, beginning at page
8 34742 of the transcript do you recall being cross-examined on
9 this issue?

14:40:57 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, taking things in stages, you accept that there
12 was a time in the early 1990s, don't you, when you assisted the
13 RUF?

14 A. That is correct.

14:41:18 15 Q. Why?

16 A. We had mutual interests. I was trying to protect my border
17 from the infiltrating ULIMO forces that had been trained and
18 armed by the Government of Sierra Leone.

19 Q. Later ULIMO morphed, in a sense, into LURD, didn't it?

14:41:53 20 A. Very later, yes.

21 Q. Give us a date on that, please; a framework for our further
22 discussion?

23 A. Well, factually speaking ULIMO ceased to exist as of
24 January of 1997.

14:42:12 25 Q. Yes?

26 A. This whole LURD issue resurrects around January 1999.

27 Q. Around 1999, Mr Taylor, we know we have the Lome Agreement
28 in the middle of the year, yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And we're not going to go through that period of evidence
2 again, but during the course of that year incursions commence
3 over the border from Guinea, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

14:42:58 5 Q. Did there come a time, Mr Taylor, when you enlisted the
6 support of the RUF to assist in your fight against LURD?

7 A. No.

8 Q. To your knowledge, Mr Taylor, were the RUF ever engaged in
9 conflict with LURD?

14:43:18 10 A. No, not to my knowledge, no.

11 Q. Was it ever brought to your attention that units of the RUF
12 had engaged militarily with LURD?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Did you at any stage order the RUF to fight alongside your
14:43:46 15 men against the LURD?

16 A. No, not at all. No.

17 Q. Did you employ RUF combatants as mercenaries against LURD?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Because one topic we've discussed on more than one
14:44:11 20 occasion, Mr Taylor, is this pool of ex-combatants circulating in
21 the Mano River region, yes? We've discussed that on more than
22 one occasion?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Now, post Lome, you have an RUF which is planning to change
14:44:36 25 into a political party, don't we?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Did you take advantage of the situation, Mr Taylor, to
28 employ these hardened combatants in your battle against LURD?

29 A. No.

1 Q. Did you at any stage do that?

2 A. No.

3 Q. The next topic I want to deal with, Mr Taylor, is
4 disarmament. You were asked about this on 4 February commencing
14:45:27 5 at page 34749 in the transcript. Now, do you recall, Mr Taylor,
6 that it was put to you that in reality there was virtually no
7 disarmament in 1996. Do you remember that being put to you?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. This is at line 27 on page 34749. Do we have it?

14:45:56 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, question number one is this, Mr Taylor: Is it your
12 position that disarmament in Liberia was total and complete?

13 A. No, I wouldn't say - as you put the question I just have to
14 answer your question. I would say total, no. That's not how it
14:46:45 15 is looked at when it comes to that. I can say based on the bar
16 set at that particular time one can say total, but in looking at
17 the real analysis of what would be called total disarmament,
18 that's virtually impossible to be total. But I mean according to
19 the bar set I would say it was satisfactory. That's the way I
14:47:16 20 can put it.

21 Q. Now, you will see, Mr Taylor, that the question posed by my
22 learned friend on 4 February was a very specific one: "In
23 reality there was virtually no disarmament in 1996." Do you see
24 that?

14:47:40 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Do you agree with that proposition?

27 A. I fully, fully disagree.

28 Q. Now, just remind us, when in 1996 did disarmament commence?

29 A. I would put that again around the last quarter into

1 February of '97. So I would put that to --

2 Q. And the process should have been completed by early 1997.

3 Isn't that right?

4 A. Yes, it should have been actually completed, yes, before

14:48:13 5 May which was the first date for election. Before then, yes.

6 Q. Now, do you recall yesterday, Mr Taylor, we looked at,
7 right at the end of the day, the Twenty-First Progress Report of
8 the Secretary-General of the United Nations Observer Mission,
9 dated 29 January 1997. Do you remember us looking at that?

14:48:39 10 A. That is correct, I do.

11 Q. And you recall us looking at the statistics at the back of
12 that document, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Which suggested that, on their estimates, over 50 per cent
15 of the NPFL had disarmed, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. By 26 January 1997?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I appreciate that you say that there were
14:49:12 20 more members of the NPFL than estimated by the United Nations. I
21 appreciate that that's your position, yes?

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. But help us. Are you in a position to suggest to these
24 judges what you say would be a reasonable percentage of your
14:49:36 25 estimate of NPFL combatants who in fact disarmed? Are you in a
26 position to suggest something to us?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And what would your estimate be?

29 A. I would put it to about 80 to 90 per cent of our forces

1 di sarmed.

2 Q. Now can I ask you the same question, Mr Taylor, in respect
3 of other factions in Liberia. What about ULIMOs J and K? What
4 would you say about them?

14:50:17 5 A. I would - and this is not being selfish at all. I would -
6 because of the amount of material that ULIMO sold after the
7 disarmament process, I would say ULIMO probably disarmed - and
8 then again, the two or three truckloads of ammunition that
9 General Malu subsequently captured from Alhaji Kromah's house, I
14:50:49 10 would say maybe 40 to 45 per cent disarmament.

11 Q. When you say, Mr Taylor, "Because of the amount of material
12 that ULIMO sold," what do you mean?

13 A. Well, following my election and throughout 1998, we have
14 '97, '98 where there's sufficient evidence that ULIMO kept
14:51:19 15 selling ammunition across the border, so they were not importing
16 the ammunition.

17 Q. Across the border to where?

18 A. To Sierra Leone to the RUF, which meant that they had
19 hidden a substantial amount of ammunition on the border with
14:51:35 20 Sierra Leone.

21 Q. When you say they weren't importing, how do you know?

22 A. Well, I guess I'm presumptuous there. Because it was not
23 coming through Robertsfield, it was not coming through any of our
24 borders, no one was bringing any weapons so - and then the
14:51:55 25 weapons that apparently were being sold were not brand new, so
26 they had no means of getting it into Liberia because they would
27 have had to use the airports or the seaports and we didn't see
28 that.

29 Q. In the context of this part of your cross-examination you

1 recall, don't you, that reference was made to that Daniel Chea
2 interview which we examined earlier this week?

3 A. I agree, yes.

4 Q. In your assessment, Mr Taylor, was disarmament in Liberia a
14:52:35 5 fiasco?

6 A. No. Totally, totally no. No.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, did you speak, for example, to ECOMOG commanders
8 as to their view on the success or otherwise of disarmament?

9 A. Not individually, no. But as the report came to us on the

14:53:04 10 Council of State, because all of the disarmament reports were

11 done and made and then we started resigning and leaving the

12 council. The report that came to us and that reached to ECOWAS,

13 AU and United Nations officials, with the participation of the

14 United Nations, was that the disarmament that had been conducted,

14:53:30 15 while not total, because they realised that there were still a

16 few arms around, it was substantial and satisfactory that the

17 elections could go on. This was the report that was circulated

18 in the international community.

19 Q. Mr Taylor, had disarmament been a fiasco, would the

14:53:55 20 elections have still gone ahead?

21 A. No, no, no, no, never. They would have never gone ahead.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Because it would have then been a fiasco. The

24 international community was not going to fund an election and

14:54:15 25 then after the election, deem it free and fair, if they thought

26 that disarmament on the ground was at a level that would have

27 caused almost immediately a renewed upsurge of conflict in the

28 country. This was carefully weighed by all sides of the

29 international community, that it had been done, and it was a good

1 job. I think the comment by Daniel Chea is a political comment
2 and if you look he makes that in 2005.

3 Q. Why do you say it's political, Mr Taylor? He was your
4 Defence Minister?

14:54:57 5 A. But, you know - you know, things change. I leave office in
6 2003, Daniel Chea is Defence Minister throughout that time, and
7 if he did this statement, he's talking during a period where he
8 is Defence Minister in another government. Daniel Chea is aware
9 of the circumstances around. He's a smart man. I think he
14:55:28 10 spoke, as a politician would do, dealing with the time that he
11 was involved in in trying to impress whoever. But I'm sure every
12 one in the international community would disagree that it was a
13 fiasco and that's why I think he is described as a political
14 survivor.

14:55:46 15 I mean, I wouldn't want to say anything negative about
16 Daniel because I don't know for real that he made this statement.
17 But if he made the statement, I would have - I would say that -
18 then I would really say that he's an opportunist. I don't want
19 to go that far yet because I can not ascertain that he made it -
14:56:06 20 he made the statement. But if he did, then he would be a real
21 political opportunist and I would be very shocked.

22 Q. Now, on the same - on a similar note, Mr Taylor, I now want
23 to go on and ask you about another topic that you were
24 cross-examined about, and that is arms shipments, okay?

14:56:34 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Can we go, first of all, please, to page 34760, transcript
27 for 4 February 2010, yes. Now, Mr Taylor, I am dealing with this
28 topic for two reasons. First of all, as we've just dealt with,
29 it was suggested to you that disarmament in 1996 - there was

1 virtually no disarmament in 1996, okay?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And that - and reliance is placed on the suggestion made by
4 Mr Chea, yes?

14:57:40 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. That it was a complete fiasco, okay?

7 A. Uh-huh. Yes.

8 Q. And I also want to ask you now about particular arms
9 shipments that you were asked about, okay?

14:57:56 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, first of all, Mr Taylor, page 34760.

12 A. Yes, I am.

13 Q. You will see that at line 14 it was put to you:

14 "Shortly after you assumed the presidency you received
14:58:21 15 weapons after you had returned from a trip to South Africa.

16 Isn't that correct?"

17 Do you see that?

18 A. I do.

19 Q. Now, when did you go to South Africa?

14:58:33 20 A. Late 1997.

21 Q. Right. So this was within months of your inauguration and
22 the elections, yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Now, help me, Mr Taylor. If in 1996, as suggested, there
14:58:53 25 was hardly any disarmament and if it was a complete fiasco, why
26 did you need arms - an arms shipment so soon after you assumed
27 the presidency?

28 A. Now you see? So we all see where the twisted logic comes
29 from. So, in other words, if that was the case, you wouldn't

1 need to import arms because you had all the arms you needed.

2 Q. So did you on your return from South Africa in 1997 receive
3 a shipment of arms?

4 A. None whatsoever. No.

14:59:44 5 Q. Do you know of a company called Peco?

6 A. Peco? No.

7 Q. P-E-C-O.

8 A. No, I don't.

9 Q. Can we now go, please, to page 34762. Yes?

15:00:15 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. The next suggestion was this: That in December 1998 - do
12 we see at line 27 - there was a further shipment to Liberia. In
13 fact, you were questioned about this twice, firstly by
14 Mr Koumjian and then again on 4 February by my learned friend.

15:00:33 15 Do you see that?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. And we will see on the next page, page 34763, that what was
18 being suggested, beginning at line 4, was that on 22 December
19 1998, you returned from Burkina Faso having attended the

15:01:01 20 inauguration of Blaise Compaore. Do you see?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And it is suggested that an aeroplane, a BAC-111, brought
23 back arms into Liberia, yes?

24 A. Yes.

15:01:19 25 Q. Now, you recall we were shown photographs of an aeroplane,
26 do you recall that, during the course of the Prosecution case?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. Do you recall that?

29 A. I do.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you return with arms from Burkina Faso
2 on that occasion?

3 A. No, I did not.

4 Q. Have you received arms from Burkina Faso?

15:01:49 5 A. Have I ever received arms from Burkina Faso?

6 Q. Yes, please.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. When?

9 A. Around 2002 I received a small amount of arms from Burkina
15:02:01 10 Faso.

11 Q. Did you receive any other arms from Burkina Faso?

12 A. No.

13 Q. In particular, what do you say about this allegation in
14 relation to the 22 December 1998?

15:02:16 15 A. Well, if we put that into perspective, what is the case?

16 The first case is that Sam Bockarie went to Burkina Faso in
17 December and brought arms that were used for the January 6
18 invasion of Sierra Leone. That didn't work. Now it has jumped
19 to, "Well, 22 December, you went and you brought arms that were
15:02:48 20 also used for the January 6 invasion." So, I mean, they keep
21 moving the goalposts. This is total nonsense.

22 Q. Well, I'm not interested in moving goalposts. I'm
23 interested in your evidence. So which of the two propositions is
24 right?

15:03:05 25 A. Neither.

26 Q. Was it Sam Bockarie brought arms in for the January 6
27 invasion, or was it you?

28 A. Neither. I did not bring any arms in, and to the best of
29 my knowledge, Sam Bockarie on that trip did not bring any arms

1 in.

2 Q. Now, on page 34765, Mr Taylor, it was specifically
3 suggested to you at line 23 that an instruction that the aircraft
4 go - line 22, rather - go to Niamey to pick up these arms and
15:03:53 5 ammunition was provided to the crew by Talal el-Ndine. What do
6 you know about that?

7 A. Absolute - that's what I said in my other - nonsense. That
8 never happened.

9 Q. Can we go over the page, please, to page 34766. Yes?

15:04:30 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You see that at line 10:

12 "In addition to this shipment on 22 December 1998, you
13 received a shipment in September 1998, didn't you?"

14 Is that true?

15:04:50 15 A. That is not true.

16 Q. And then it's put to you that ECOMOG gave information to
17 the United Nations about a September 1998 shipment into Liberia.
18 What do you know about ECOMOG doing that?

19 A. I have no - I have no - no knowledge of what ECOMOG said to
15:05:12 20 the United Nations. Maybe the report could have stated that "it
21 is reported", as they normally would say, "it is reported".

22 Q. Now, just so that we keep things in perspective, remember -
23 so we get the chronology - the first one is following the trip to
24 South Africa, yes?

15:05:34 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Give me the month and the year again, please.

27 A. I would put it, like I've always said, the last quarter of
28 1997, November, December or thereabouts.

29 Q. Okay. So that's sometime in late 1997. We now have this

1 one in September 1998, and we've just discussed a third one on
2 22 December 1998. Yes?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. What did you do with all these weapons, Mr Taylor?

15:06:08 5 A. That's the whole point. Nothing. I just didn't have them,
6 so nothing.

7 Q. Now, thereafter, can we go, please, to page 34767, line 18.
8 You see there's a suggestion of a further shipment on 13 March
9 1999, yes?

15:06:37 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So having received that shipment on 22 December, there is
12 this further shipment, it is suggested, on 13 March 1999. What
13 was that for, Mr Taylor?

14 A. I don't know why they thought - I don't know what they are
15:06:59 15 talking about here.

16 Q. Now, we note, of course, this fourth alleged shipment is
17 after the Freetown invasion. This is March 1999, right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. It was then suggested to you, further down the page, a few
15:07:24 20 lines on, at line 25 - do you see?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. That there was a fifth importation in April 1999; that is,
23 a shipment of arms to the rebels in Sierra Leone in March 1999.
24 Do you see that?

15:07:45 25 A. I see that.

26 Q. So you see what the suggested link is? You get an
27 importation on 13 March. A day later it's over the border in
28 Sierra Leone. You get it?

29 A. I see that.

1 Q. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. It did not happen. Never happened. And, you know, don't
3 forget we see April, March and April. This is - what is going on
4 in this period of time? This is the period of time of what?

15:08:34 5 Preparing for what? For Lome.

6 Q. Because the transfer starts in April?

7 A. In April.

8 Q. We've already discussed that?

9 A. Exactly. It starts in April, so now here I am, I'm

15:08:48 10 supposed to be in March transferring arms to Sierra Leone when
11 I'm working with the United Nations and everybody else trying to
12 get the programme together to move to Lome for the peace
13 agreement, to begin peace talks and at least get a ceasefire and
14 then peace talks. It just did not happen.

15:09:10 15 Q. Well, perhaps the alternative suggestion, Mr Taylor, is
16 that you were playing a double game. What do you say to that
17 suggestion?

18 A. That would be totally, totally, totally unfounded and
19 nonsensical.

15:09:23 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the next alleged shipment in time, over the
21 page, please, to page 34768. Now, this is shipment number 5.
22 Are we there?

23 A. Yes, I am.

24 Q. Line 26, "A shipment to Liberia in November 2000." Do you
15:09:51 25 see that?

26 A. What line did you say?

27 Q. Line 26. Bottom of the page. Do you see that?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. So that's number 5. So five is November 2000, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, why the inactivity between March 1999 and
3 November 2000?

4 A. I don't understand it. Because there is no such thing, so
15:10:18 5 you see you - it appears as inactivity but there's nothing going
6 on. And then look at this date again. November 2000. November
7 2000 in Sierra Leone what is going on?

8 Q. Tell us.

9 A. Issa Sesay is now in charge and the discussions are going -
15:10:40 10 in fact meetings are being held on the disarmament process and
11 carrying the peace process forward and there are reports and in
12 conjunction with the United Nations of meetings. One of them, we
13 saw a report here done by - I think Gibril Massaquoi's report.
14 There's another report that was shown to the judges. I think
15:11:01 15 this one may have been signed by either Kposowa or Womandia.
16 There's no conflict in Sierra Leone so why would anybody, even if
17 - why would anybody be sending weapons to Sierra Leone in
18 November 2000? I'm entrenched in a war by November 2000 with
19 LURD. It's impossible. It did not happen.

15:11:30 20 Q. Now, it is said, Mr Taylor, that this shipment in November
21 2000 - yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And this is at page 34769, the top, that firstly the
24 weapons were flown to Monrovia from Uganda and secondly, at page
15:11:53 25 34771, that you received some 1,000 weapons - 34771 at line 6,
26 that you received some 1,000 weapons in that shipment. Is that
27 true?

28 A. That's not true.

29 Q. Who is your contact in Uganda, Mr Taylor?

1 A. I had no contact for weapons in Uganda. No contacts, none.
2 No weapons ever came from Uganda. Ever.

3 Q. Now, the next matter you were tested about is at page
4 34773, yes?

15:12:57 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Line 18, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. February 2002, a plane crashed on approach to RIA. The
9 aircraft was carrying weapons into your country. So on the
10 sequence of events that's the sixth one. So that's February
11 2002?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, LURD began attacking in 1999, you told us
14 earlier this afternoon, yes?

15:13:33 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Why, on this suggestion, the inactivity in terms of
17 shipments between November 2000 and February 2002? Do you
18 follow?

19 A. Why the inactivity?

15:13:46 20 Q. Yes.

21 A. I really can't - I don't know why it is suggested that way,
22 but I don't know why there are these inactivities. I'm very - I
23 know I'm very busy on the ground, so - fighting, so I don't know.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, that shipment in February 2002 when the
15:14:12 25 plane crashed, was that shipment intended for Liberia?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Was it purchased through that covert account?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Operated by yourself and Kadiatu?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. From where had that shipment come?

3 A. That shipment - I think it came through - it came through
4 Serbia into - through Chad and then to Liberia.

15:14:57 5 Q. Okay. So, Mr Taylor, we're now on the sixth shipment put
6 to you and we can put a tick next to that because you accept
7 that, don't you?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, apart from that shipment where the plane crashed,
15:15:31 10 Mr Taylor, were there other shipments which you accept entered
11 Liberia?

12 A. Oh, yes.

13 Q. When? Tell me the years.

14 A. Beginning 2000, 2001 going into 2002 I've said there was
15:15:57 15 several --

16 Q. So beginning in 2000?

17 A. 2000, 2001.

18 Q. Into 2002?

19 A. Yes. The final shipment that I - into 2003. All the way,
15:16:10 20 2003.

21 Q. Into 2003?

22 A. Because that's when the --

23 Q. Now, based on that acceptance by you, Mr Taylor, can we now
24 revisit the chronology of events that emerges?

15:16:27 25 A. Okay.

26 Q. The Prosecution allege: November 1997 there's a shipment,
27 yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. September 1998 there's a shipment, yes?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. 22 December '98 there's a shipment, yes?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. 13 March 1999 there's a shipment, yes?
- 15:16:51 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. November 2000 there's a shipment, yes?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. And the next suggestion that was put to you was this crash
- 9 in 2002, yes?
- 15:17:04 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. But you accept between their assertion of a shipment in
- 12 November 2000 and that crash which you accept in February 2002 --
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. -- there were indeed shipments in 2001?
- 15:17:22 15 A. That is correct.
- 16 Q. How many?
- 17 A. There could have been as many as two shipments in 2001. In
- 18 total I can calculate about five, a maximum of six, shipments.
- 19 Q. Five to six shipments --
- 15:17:43 20 A. Between 2000 and 2003. In 2001 I would put it to about
- 21 two. 2000, probably one. We got three already in 2002. I would
- 22 say maybe another two. And there was one in 2003.
- 23 Q. Can I just recap to make sure I understand. One in 2000?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 15:18:03 25 Q. Two in 2001?
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 Q. Three in 2002?
- 28 A. No, no, no, no, no.
- 29 Q. How many?

1 A. I say about two.

2 Q. Two in 2002, yes?

3 A. And one --

4 Q. And one in 2003?

15:18:18 5 A. Yes. Now, to be sure about this, I can't recall whether
6 there were five or six. I'm saying there were five or six, okay.
7 I can't - I don't know precisely any more the exact numbers, but
8 there were not less than five that came within that period of
9 2000 to 2003.

15:18:48 10 Q. And, Mr Taylor, those five or six shipments, were they all
11 paid for out of that covert account?

12 A. Yes, they were all paid for out of there.

13 Q. And were all those transactions in cash?

14 A. All in cash.

15:19:18 15 Q. Who organised them?

16 A. Well, there were several people. The End User Certificate
17 was arranged through the Defence Ministry of Liberia.

18 Q. Who was the Defence Minister?

19 A. Daniel Chea.

15:19:36 20 Q. Yes.

21 A. Then his part was cut off. The cash movement and
22 arrangement for the movement of the arms were done by Musa Cisse.

23 Q. Were diamonds ever involved as payment for any of those
24 shipments, Mr Taylor?

15:19:57 25 A. No. All cash. United States dollars.

26 Q. Now, the next topic that I want to move to, Mr Taylor, is
27 again somewhat related. And your discussions with my learned
28 friend regarding this issue commences at page 34782 of the
29 transcript and the question is when did you inform the Security

1 Council that you were taking measures for your legitimate
2 self-defence. Do you follow?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. When?

15:20:50 5 A. I would really put this to about 2000. 2000, 2001.

6 Q. Well, let me ask the question differently. Mr Taylor,
7 we've just spent a few minutes sorting out the sequence of
8 shipments, haven't we?

9 A. Yes, we have.

15:21:15 10 Q. And you've accepted that the first shipment you accept came
11 in in the year 2000?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So I'm going to ask you a simple question: Did you inform
14 the Security Council before or after that shipment? Do you
15:21:31 15 follow?

16 A. I would say before. I would say before the shipment we
17 informed them.

18 Q. And explain to us, please, precisely how you did inform
19 them.

15:21:45 20 A. A letter. In fact, the first thing we did was to consult
21 with our - to consult with our lawyers and the advice that came
22 was that because of the intransigence on the part of the United
23 States and Britain that had refused to go along with the other
24 countries to lift the arms embargo that we should inform the
15:22:11 25 Security Council under Article 51 of the charter and provide all
26 the relevant information to them and inform them. That is giving
27 them the quantity of arms, where it was being purchased from, the
28 cost of it and to inform them that we were bringing these arms
29 for legitimate self-defence since the United Nations Security

1 Council had recognised the fact that Liberia was under attack.

2 And so I personally signed that letter.

3 Q. Who was it addressed to?

4 A. It was addressed to the President of the Security Council.

15:22:59 5 Q. Who delivered the letter?

6 A. That letter was delivered by our diplomatic mission in
7 New York, the charge or whoever was there, the ambassador,
8 delivered that letter.

9 Q. And that person is who?

15:23:16 10 A. In 2000, that looks like I would say Ambassador Lamin Kawa.
11 That's K-A-W-A. It would be Ambassador Lamin Kawa.

12 Q. Now, is page 34728 on the screen, can I inquire? Now,
13 Mr Taylor, do you see at line 23, yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:23:45 15 Q. It's put to you:

16 "The truth is, Mr Taylor, that it was not until March 2002
17 that your Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Security
18 Council that Liberia had taken measures to provide for its
19 legitimate self-defence."

15:24:06 20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, taking matters in stages. Firstly, is the proposition
23 true that it wasn't until March 2002 that the Security Council
24 was informed?

15:24:21 25 A. No, but that's not true. Even if you look at the
26 proposition posed by the Prosecution, even if in 2002 he had said
27 that - the way how the Prosecution puts it and how the word "had"
28 is used, that's not the point of informing the Security Council.
29 You see, "had taken". So the Prosecution would still be wrong.

1 This is not the point of the origin of the information. The
2 information occurs in 2000. And even if the Foreign Minister
3 said, as the Prosecutor put it, that Liberia had taken, it looks
4 like to me in the English language that something has occurred.

15:25:04 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: But, Mr Taylor, you haven't answered the
6 question, which was simply: Was it March 2002 when your minister
7 informed the Security Council? That is the question.

8 THE WITNESS: If you look there, your Honour, I had said no
9 and I'm qualifying why it has to be no, even - I did say no, and
15:25:27 10 I qualified the "no".

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. And again at page 34783, we see at line 5 that the
13 suggestion is put to you again that you had taken measures to
14 provide for your legitimate self-defence. This was a letter -
15:25:54 15 this was information, your Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided
16 to the Security Council in March 2002. Do you see that,
17 Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, but that's not correct here. Yes, I see that.

19 Q. Now, there's a second aspect to the proposition that I want
15:26:07 20 to put to you.

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. I've already asked you the question, whether it wasn't
23 until March 2002 and the learned justice asked you the question
24 again, yes?

15:26:18 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. And you've said no. The second part of the question is
27 this: Did your Foreign Minister, in March 2002, make a statement
28 in these terms to the Security Council?

29 A. Yes, he did.

1 Q. Why?

2 A. Well, the issue - he had gone there in 2002 to talk about
3 the different sanctions regime and the issue came up about arms
4 in Liberia, because the Security Council did not approve the
15:26:56 5 letter. Did not approve. They were informed. They did not give
6 approval. So all he did again, based on the question, was to say
7 that, "We have taken measures."

8 Q. I'm sorry, Mr Taylor. I'm sure it's my fault. When you
9 say "the Security Council did not approve the letter", what did
15:27:14 10 you mean?

11 A. We wrote a letter to the Security Council stating to the
12 Security Council that Liberia, exercising its rights as a member
13 state under Article 51, would import arms. That was it. The
14 Security Council did not reply and say, "You may bring in arms."
15:27:35 15 So when he's before the council now and this arms issue come up
16 again, he states that, "We have taken measures." That's what I
17 mean.

18 Q. So, Mr Taylor, just so that we can close this particular
19 chapter and understand the reasoning, if as you say you had been
15:28:19 20 upfront with the Security Council and written this letter, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Why did you still have to nonetheless adopt surreptitious
23 means to purchase these weapons?

24 A. Because the Security Council had not approved of the
15:28:39 25 purchases. So, in other words, we were in violation of the
26 Security Council resolutions imposing the arms embargo. So to
27 buy in the name of the Government of Liberia, it would have been
28 stopped by member states executing the will of the Security
29 Council under Chapter VII, so we couldn't, okay. Let's - I'm

1 really being bold about this and, really, it's factual. Over the
2 years of dealing with the United Nations by member states,
3 whether we're talking about South Africa that was under arms
4 embargo for many years but succeeded in building a nuclear bomb,
15:29:22 5 South Africa did, or whether we're talking about other countries
6 of Asia and other countries, Security Council resolutions are
7 this way. There's some - so many of them that countries have not
8 executed.

9 Liberia, even though we were small, we exercised our rights
15:29:39 10 under chapter 51. So the United Nations was there, and because
11 they had not approved it, it simply meant that member states that
12 chose, okay, to carry out the order of making sure that the
13 embargo was in place would have stopped it. As simple as that.
14 They would have stopped it.

15:30:14 15 Q. Now, I want to close that chapter, but just revisit the
16 arms shipment chapter which we closed previously, just briefly,
17 because of something I omitted.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can we go to page 34800, please. Are we there?

15:30:52 20 A. In a minute. Yes.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've gone through the arms shipments, yes,
22 as suggested by the Prosecution. Now, having dealt with the
23 question of you informing the Security Council, on this page you
24 will see that at line 4 it's put to you:

15:31:23 25 "Q. You told the Court that you never brought in any
26 shipments of weapons or war materials into your country by
27 sea. Do you recall telling the Court that?

28 A. Yes."

29 Line 13:

1 "Indeed, Mr Taylor, you brought weapons into Liberia by
2 sea, both through the Buchanan port and also the port at Harper."

3 And it goes on at line 18 to suggest that Mr Abbas Fawaz
4 was responsible for the port at Harper. And on the next page,
15:31:59 5 page 34801, line 1, that Abbas Fawaz used Harper Port to import
6 arms and ammunition for you when you were the leader of the NPFL.
7 Now, is that true, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Totally untrue. Totally untrue.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, it is not clear - it is not clear from my
15:32:30 10 reading of these pages - and given the errors I've made, I am
11 open to correction on this.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. It's not clear on my reading that these supposed shipments
14 by sea were limited to the period of the NPFL. I don't know if
15:32:52 15 that is the suggestion. So I don't know if the suggestion is
16 broad enough to encompass your time as President. Do you follow
17 me?

18 A. Yes. But let's see the question then.

19 Q. But I'm helpfully told by eagle-eyed Mr Munyard that if we
15:33:15 20 look at line 8 on the same page, indeed, he, that being Abbas
21 Fawaz, used Harper to import arms and ammunition for you during
22 your presidency as well. Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, I see that.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the five to six shipments that you accept,
15:33:37 25 how did they enter Liberia?

26 A. All flew in. All of them flew in.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you have explained to us how they were
28 done. You have explained to us that they were clearly in breach
29 of the UN arms embargo, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So, Mr Taylor, help us. Why are you unwilling to admit
3 that they were also coming in by sea through Harper and Buchanan?

4 A. That beats me. It doesn't make sense, does it? It doesn't
15:34:18 5 make sense. It beats me. If I as President of Liberia can tell
6 these judges that I brought arms in, what's the difference if I
7 brought it by sea? I was President of Liberia. I had the
8 authorisation. Why would I have to lie about that? It just
9 doesn't make sense on some of the way - how these - these
15:34:34 10 propositions are put by the Prosecution. I never brought arms
11 into Liberia by sea, ever, from NPFL days up until I left office.
12 Ever. I don't know how to make it any clearer than that. I
13 brought arms in by air, and I did. Never by sea, ever.

14 Q. Was there a particular reason for that, Mr Taylor?

15:34:59 15 A. Yes. We were always afraid that - it was easier to
16 intercept a shipment of arms by sea than by just a flight path
17 into the country. And so, in fact, it would have been cheaper if
18 we brought them in by sea because it's cheaper, because to
19 charter a plane, what are we talking about, 20, 30 tons. You
15:35:26 20 could put as many tons as you want on a ship. But to put all
21 your eggs in one basket, we felt, was going to be a big mistake.
22 It was easier for Britain or the United States or anybody out
23 there in the Atlantic ocean - as soon as you go 20 - I mean, 100
24 miles, you would be surprised at what you see out there, from
15:35:48 25 what military people tell me.

26 So - and once these things are being loaded in ports, eyes
27 are all over the place. So all they do, they wait it's loaded
28 and wait for you out there and get it. A plane can move into
29 these areas quietly, load up and fly. So we never took that

1 chance throughout because we knew that the possibility existed
2 that it could be intercepted. That's why we never used the sea.
3 Even when I became President simply because, what, the embargo,
4 which should have ended upon my taking office in 1997, when three
15:36:22 5 other permanent members suggested it. Russia, France and China
6 had no objection. Britain and America said no. We were still
7 under their - so we had to use the safest means to get arms to
8 us. And that is the fact.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, indeed, the proposition on this point put
15:36:48 10 to you was particularised at page 34803 where it was put to you
11 that the company responsible for these shipments by sea was the
12 Oriental Timber Company who had a timber concession in Liberia.
13 Do you see that, line 12?

14 A. I see that.

15:37:11 15 Q. And then at line 21:
16 "They used the Port of Buchanan to bring in arms and
17 ammunition for you during your presidency. Isn't that correct?"
18 Do you see that?

19 A. I see that.

15:37:24 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, is it the case that not only were you
21 receiving corruptly backhanders from the Oriental Timber Company,
22 but they were also bringing in arms and ammunition by sea for
23 you?

24 A. Never did. They never, never brought any arms for me into
15:37:51 25 Buchanan. Ever. Oriental timber never did.

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you will have noted that it was not
27 suggested to you that Guus Kouwenhoven was likewise involved in
28 shipping arms and ammunition into Liberia for you. That was not
29 put to you in cross-examination, was it?

1 A. It was not.

2 Q. But that allegation has been aired consistently in the
3 public arena over the years, hasn't it?

4 A. Yes, it has been.

15:38:30 5 Q. So, just so that we get the picture, knowing as we do now
6 that Mr Kouwenhoven was acquitted by a Dutch Court --

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

8 MS HOLLIS: I'm going to object to this. If Mr Kouwenhoven
9 had been convicted would we have been able to use that in this
10 Court to prove this allegation? It's no different with an
11 acquittal. It's a different Court, it's different judges, it's
12 different witnesses, different evidence, and we don't think this
13 is proper.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not sure exactly what you are
15:39:11 15 objecting to, the question being put or the reference to
16 Mr Kouwenhoven being acquitted?

17 MS HOLLIS: Kouwenhoven's acquittal, yes.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Which is a fact, I think.

19 MS HOLLIS: But it's not of relevance here, Madam
15:39:24 20 President, or else a conviction would be binding or of relevance
21 to your Honours as well and we don't think either are if it's
22 from a different Court.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Although the question wasn't complete.
24 Was the question complete?

15:39:35 25 MR GRIFFITHS: No, it wasn't.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: But in any event could you please respond
27 to the objection.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I respond in this way: We've already
29 adverted in these proceedings to the acquittal of Mr Kouwenhoven.

1 In fact, I introduced a newspaper article into these proceedings
2 which proved that fact. Having thus been admitted, it seems to
3 us perfectly capable of reference at any other point in the
4 trial. And we say it's relevant because we say it's relevant in
15:40:08 5 this way: We have on the one hand the Prosecution making an
6 allegation about one timber company, the Oriental Timber Company,
7 and we all know that over the years in the public arena it has
8 been suggested that Mr Kouwenhoven was involved in the same
9 practice. We submit that it's a matter which this Court can take
15:40:30 10 into account that the Prosecution choose to rely upon one such
11 allegation and not the other, and it seems to be a matter upon
12 which Mr Taylor can quite properly comment during the course of
13 his testimony.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just give me a moment, please.

15:40:47 15 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, I beg your indulgence. The
16 article that the Defence refers to was provided to your Honours
17 under the guise of identifying a person in a picture. They just
18 supposedly so happened to have the picture and an article that
19 talked about the acquittal, but it was not about the acquittal.
15:41:07 20 It was the picture of a person that was the guise under which
21 this information was provided to your Honours.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is the article in exhibit D-14, I
23 would imagine you are talking about.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: As I recall at the time, and I hope not to
15:41:23 25 prolong this, because I would like to finish this re-examination
26 - at the time when it was marked for identification I do not
27 recall any objection being made to the contents of the article or
28 any suggestion that the admissibility of the document was limited
29 to the photograph alone.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Just allow me
2 to consult.

3 [Trial Chamber conferred]

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: We are of the view that the opinion of
15:42:29 5 another Court is not really relevant. What is relevant is the
6 fact that this character or individual Guus Kouwenhoven has been
7 mentioned before in these proceedings, in this evidence in this
8 trial, and we're of the view that in re-examination the accused
9 has every right to comment on this character, Mr Guus
15:42:58 10 Kouwenhoven, and his dealings, if any, with him. So we overrule
11 the objection.

12 THE WITNESS: Guus Kouwenhoven was the general manager of
13 Oriental Timber Company. He is the general manager. He ran the
14 company and in fact the accusation was against him as bringing in
15:43:30 15 the arms through oriental company for - he was the general
16 manager of Oriental Timber. That's who Guus is.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. And was Guus Kouwenhoven importing arms on your behalf,
19 Mr Taylor?

15:43:47 20 A. No. He never imported any arms on my behalf. And may I
21 just add, it is based on the information of this - of alleged
22 arms shipment that the issue of Guus Kouwenhoven was charged with
23 war crimes in the Dutch Court because it was alleged that he
24 brought arms into Liberia through Oriental Timber and gave it to
15:44:14 25 me that was used to prolong or to keep the war going in Sierra
26 Leone, and that was found not to be true. These very arms, he as
27 general manager at the Port of Buchanan.

28 Q. Just four more topics that I want to cover, Mr Taylor. The
29 next topic, Mr Taylor, is this. Mr Taylor, do you recall on the

1 Last day of your cross-examination, Friday, 5 February 2010, it
2 being suggested that you used various logging companies to
3 stockpile arms for you along the border with Sierra Leone. Do
4 you remember that?

15:45:20 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. Can we go to page 34810, please. Mr Taylor, before we go
7 to deal with the detail of these allegations, do you recall a
8 number of witnesses being called by the Prosecution who spoke of
9 ferrying arms to Sierra Leone?

15:45:52 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. For example, Zigzag Marzah, yes?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall any witness speaking of
14 stockpiles of arms being kept by logging companies along the
15 border with Sierra Leone? Do you recall that?

15:46:05 15

16 A. I don't. None whatsoever.

17 Q. Let's have a look at the detail of this suggestion then,
18 shall we. Beginning at line 20:

19 "Q. Mr Taylor, ULC was the name for the United Logging
20 Company, correct?

15:46:29 20

21 A. That is correct."

22 Line 26:

23 "Q. And the ULC concession included the area along the
24 border between Sierra Leone and Liberia in Lofa County. Do
25 you recall that?

15:46:41 25

26 A. Yes, it sounds like the area."

27 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Who own the United Logging
28 Company?

29 A. A gentleman called Kassem Fawaz.

1 Q. Now there's been mention of another Fawaz in relation to
2 the Port of Harper?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. That was - what's his first name again, remind me?

15:47:06 5 A. Abbas.

6 Q. Now, this Fawaz, are they related?

7 A. They are brothers.

8 Q. They are brothers?

9 A. That is correct.

15:47:15 10 Q. What nationality are they?

11 A. They are Lebanese.

12 Q. Then it goes on over the page, please, to page 34811,
13 "There was also another logging concession company that was
14 referred to as SLC. Do you recall that, Mr Taylor?"

15:47:35 15 A. No, I --

16 Q. "No, I don't. I don't remember SLC," Selected Logging
17 Company. And then it's suggested at line 7:

18 "This logging company also had land along the border with
19 Sierra Leone. Do you recall that?"

15:47:58 20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I see that.

22 Q. Then at the bottom of page, beginning at line 28 reference
23 is made to exhibit 32, Prosecution exhibit 32, the UN panel of
24 experts report:

15:48:18 25 "The RUF Liberian relationship is important for President
26 Taylor, but it is also strategic for RUF. The Kailahun region in
27 Sierra Leone constitutes RUF's strategic lifeline into Liberia
28 without which its source of resupply is seriously affected.
29 Liberia offers sanctuary and a location to store weapons and keep

1 armed units active and trained. An area of particular concern is
2 the concession of the Liberian logging company, SLC, along the
3 border with Sierra Leone. The area comprises a road into Sierra
4 Leone and an old military base of the Liberian armed forces, Camp
15:49:08 5 Alpha."

6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Go to line 21:

9 "It is since early 2001 controlled by the son of President
15:49:19 10 Taylor and the Lebanese businessman Abbas Fawaz."

11 Was your son an owner or controller of that company?

12 A. No. Not to my knowledge, no. Abbas Fawaz is not even in
13 that area.

14 Q. Over the page, please:

15:49:44 15 "12. Several sources indicated to the panel that this is
16 an area where weapons for RUF are stockpiled and where RUF can
17 freely enter Liberian territory."

18 Do you see that?

19 A. I see that.

15:50:00 20 Q. Let's go over the page, please, and we'll get the full
21 picture before I ask you some questions about this. Page 34815,
22 line 9:

23 "Do you recall another company that had a timber
24 concession, a company that was referred to as LWMC, Liberia Wood
15:50:31 25 Management Corporation?"

26 Do you know of such a company, Mr Taylor?

27 A. No.

28 Q. So let's put this together. We've got ULC, SLC, and LWMC,
29 yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Three logging companies said to have concessions along the
3 Liberia-Sierra Leone border, yes?

4 A. Yes.

15:50:58 5 Q. Where stockpiles of weapons were being kept, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did such stockpiles exist?

8 A. No. And I think the Prosecution knows that too.

9 Q. Now, let's just go through this slowly, shall we, so that
15:51:18 10 we can get the picture, all right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Bearing in mind, of course, that these three logging
13 concessions are said to be along the Sierra Leone-Liberian
14 border. Do you follow?

15:51:37 15 A. I follow.

16 Q. In or about 1992, and for several years thereafter, who
17 controlled that border?

18 A. ULIMO-K.

19 Q. Until when?

15:51:49 20 A. 1996. End of 1996, I would say.

21 Q. Mr Taylor, would it have been possible for you, during that
22 period, to have stockpiles of weapons in that area?

23 A. Would it have been possible? No. How do you stockpile
24 ammunition in an enemy area? Impossible.

15:52:17 25 Q. Give us a picture, shall we, of the terrain along that
26 border for the most part?

27 A. That entire border area is the rainforest - the two
28 rainforest areas of Liberia. That's the second largest
29 rainforest. This is massive rainforest. Forest canopy that when

1 it rains it takes a few minutes before the water begins to hit
2 the ground. This is - there are three massive forests. You have
3 the Belle forest, the Gola forest, and I think - either the
4 Kpelle or the Gbandi. But when you talk about dense forest as
15:53:06 5 you will see like the Brazilian rainforest, there are elephants -
6 this is the habitat of elephants and leopards. This is massive
7 rainforest.

8 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor, because you have dealt with
9 military people in the past. How do you go about securing arms
15:53:22 10 dumps in that kind of terrain?

11 A. It's not - it's not possible. You - you wouldn't be that
12 stupid to do that. I mean, hunters are going through there and
13 that's enemy area at the time in question that you asked. It's
14 just not - you would just not do that. It would not be possible.

15:53:41 15 Q. Now, disarmament starts in 1996, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And we've heard from several witnesses, have we not, about
18 the transport of arms from Monrovia, in particular from White
19 Flower to the RUF in Sierra Leone, from several witnesses; do you
15:54:08 20 recall that?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we now appreciate the geography of Liberia
23 and the route that would be taken, yes?

24 A. Yes.

15:54:21 25 Q. To travel from Monrovia through Kakata, so on and so forth,
26 Voi njama, to the border, yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. We've gone through it so many times now, we must all have a
29 mental picture of that.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if you had the stockpiles of arms along the
3 border, which would be easier to conceal: The transport along
4 the road leading to Voinjama, or a quick nip through the forest
15:54:56 5 across the border? Which would be the easier to hide?

6 A. A quick nip through the forest.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you, during your presidency, have such
8 stockpiles of arms along the border?

9 A. No.

15:55:11 10 Q. And if so, why did you have Zigzag, Varmuyan and all the
11 rest driving through the roads carrying truckloads of arms? Why
12 did you do it?

13 A. Because I guess somebody might think I'm cuckoo or
14 something, because it just didn't happen; that's what makes it
15:55:33 15 impossible, incredible. It didn't happen.

16 Q. Next topic. Can we go to page 34816, please: Do we have
17 it?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Line 24:

15:56:14 20 "Q. Mr Taylor, first and foremost, your decision to leave
21 the presidency and leave Liberia was based on your failure
22 to receive the arms and war materiel that you were
23 expecting to receive. Isn't that correct?"

24 Do you see that?

15:56:31 25 A. Yes, I see that.

26 Q. And your answer is:

27 "A. No, no. In fact, if that was this case I could have
28 continued to stay and fight. In fact the armed forces that
29 were fighting for me did not want me to leave. And - oh,

1 trust me, I would have never left if it had not been for
2 peace and my observations that it would have probably
3 caused the lives of maybe scores of thousands of other
4 people because of the involvement of the United States
15:57:05 5 offshore supplying weapons to LURD. I would have never
6 left for any other reason. Why would I?"

7 And you were told in no uncertain terms, "We do not trust
8 you on that point." And then next page.

9 A. Yes.

15:57:31 10 Q. No, I'm sorry, my fault. I've missed my reference. Stay
11 on the same page, please. My apologies. Are we on page 34817?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Yes. Let's jump to line 9, please:

14 "Q. Indeed, you had two shipments that you were expecting
15:57:51 15 to receive shortly before you were to depart Liberia.
16 Isn't that correct?

17 A. Oh, that is correct. One of them arrived."

18 When was that, Mr Taylor? How long before your departure?

19 A. A few days.

15:58:11 20 Q. What happened to it?

21 A. The aircraft arrived at the airport and the initial I would
22 say maybe two squads, about 20 men of the advanced peacekeeping
23 unit had arrived at the airport. They arrived at the airport,
24 and when the --

15:58:35 25 Q. Where were they from?

26 A. They're from Nigeria. They arrived and the weapons were
27 being off-loaded. They were off-loaded. They said that they
28 could not let the weapons go because they had instructions to
29 come for the peace process and they would not let the weapons

1 Leave the airport. The weapons were packed in the warehouse. I
2 was called by the Defence Minister and I said to him I had no
3 problems with the weapons staying at the warehouse. I spoke to
4 John Kufuor. He raised the issue. He said, "Well, these weapons
15:59:19 5 have just come?" I said, "Yeah, these were weapons that were
6 paid for and this is a late arrival." He says, "Well, you know,
7 what you going to do?" I said, "Well, I don't have a problem.
8 They can remain in the warehouse at the airport." And they
9 remained there until my departure.

15:59:36 10 Q. Did you have your own troops at the airport, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, close to a battalion.

12 Q. How many men in a battalion?

13 A. I would say about - in Liberia about 400.

14 Q. And how many were in this advance troop?

15:59:55 15 A. There were about 20 Nigerians that had arrived.

16 Q. Were there any other Nigerian personnel at the airport?

17 A. No. That's the only advance group that came.

18 Q. So, Mr Taylor, why didn't you order your men to take the
19 weapons?

16:00:15 20 A. Why didn't I?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Because I had made up my mind that we would be going and I
23 regretted that the weapons were late, and so the decision had
24 been taken for me to leave, and so there was no point in trying
16:00:30 25 to force an issue. If the weapons had come earlier before that
26 decision, of course it would have been put into use. But I just
27 decided there was no point, since I had given my word and agreed
28 that I would be leaving within, what, about two or three days,
29 there was no point in making any trouble. And I called John

1 Kufuor and assured him that the weapons could stay.

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you say at line 5 above, yes, that the
3 United States were offshore supplying weapons to LURD?

4 A. Yes.

16:01:11 5 Q. How do you know?

6 A. Oh, our commanders in the area reported. The helicopters
7 were flying from the ships. There were five massive ships within
8 eyesight of land that were flying into an area called Lott Carey
9 Baptist Mission supplying LURD with materials.

16:01:34 10 Q. Where is that Baptist mission?

11 A. That Baptist mission LURD - Lott Carey is in an area called
12 Brewersville that's just right outside of the - we talked about
13 the Unity Conference Centre here before. I will put it to about
14 4 miles from the centre city of Monrovia.

16:02:04 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was it the case that you decided not to
16 take those arms because you knew, based on what you've just told
17 us, that you couldn't outgun LURD because the United States was
18 supplying them, so it was a pragmatic decision rather than a
19 moral decision which caused you to step down? Do you follow?

16:02:40 20 A. No, no, no. Yeah, I follow, but it's not the case. I
21 decided to step down --

22 Q. You see the distinction I'm seeking to make, yes?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. You realised you were caught between the rock and a hard
16:02:51 25 place and so therefore it was futile to continue the struggle.
26 And so rather than the pious claim - and I'm being deliberately
27 sarcastic - that you were doing it merely to save the people of
28 Liberia, it was prompted by pure pragmatism. Which is right?

29 A. Well, if you look at it in a very logical way, most

1 decisions have to be pragmatic anyway. But it was purely, purely
2 based on the moral decision that I had taken that I would step
3 down and leave. Because, to be very blunt, the type of war we
4 were fighting in Liberia, I could have still been there today
16:03:47 5 fighting. These are not wars that - even the United States with
6 its overwhelming force sitting on the ocean would not have fought
7 in the forests and the bushes of Liberia. So for that, just - it
8 was never just based on the pragmatism or we would be outgunned.
9 No. It was the moral decision that I made. I fought through the
16:04:11 10 bushes from Butuo to Monrovia. And, trust me, there's
11 sufficient fight that was left in me that if it was not for my
12 moral strength to say, "I'm going to save my people," probably I
13 would still be fighting today. It had nothing to do with being
14 outgunned, because the Americans were not expected and would not
16:04:30 15 have gone into the forests of Liberia to fight me in every piece
16 of bush. Never. And we knew that. It was purely on the moral
17 basis.

18 Q. Have you ever regretted stepping down, Mr Taylor?

19 A. No. I think it was the right decision. Lives were saved
16:04:54 20 and that is why up until today the Liberian people still love and
21 respect me as their President - their former President. And
22 while I don't know what my future will be and I have no interest
23 in politics, if God is on my side, but the Liberians always
24 respect me and love me and that's the fact and they know it on
16:05:22 25 the ground today. I have no regrets.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, was there a second shipment as suggested?

27 A. Yes, but it never came.

28 Q. It never came?

29 A. It never came.

1 Q. But there was - so is the position that there was supposed
2 to have been two shipments in August?

3 A. Yes, there was supposed to be, but they were late. In
4 fact, we just lost --

16:05:50 5 Q. And just to further clarify the situation, those two
6 shipments, Mr Taylor, when had they been ordered?

7 A. Oh, there was a long line. There was a list given as far
8 back as 2000 and we would tell what to send based on the need at
9 the time, okay. For example, you have a shipment, a large

16:06:18 10 shipment that cannot come. They were coming in maybe 20 tons, 30
11 tons. And so you would decide - and so they just could not rush
12 everything down. You would decide, "Okay, on this shipment send
13 me X, Y and Z." So they had to wait for instructions. That's
14 why it was spread out so much.

16:06:38 15 Q. Okay. Now, the instruction to send the two shipments which
16 were supposed to arrive in August, when was that instruction
17 conveyed?

18 A. Oh, I would say that was about the - oh, I would say
19 somewhere - that could have been about March, April of - of 2003.

16:07:07 20 Q. Let me pose the question differently. Was the instruction
21 given before or after you made the decision to step down?

22 A. Oh, it was given before. It was given before the - I made
23 the decision to step down in June in Accra. That was placed
24 before June, yes.

16:07:37 25 Q. And did you appreciate when you made that decision in June
26 that this shipment was on its way?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Did it play any part in your decision in any way?

29 A. No, not exactly. From a military perspective, counsel, and

1 I'm sure any military person here will understand, one of the
2 toughest things you have during a period like this, even when you
3 are withdrawing from an area sometimes more force is applied
4 during withdrawal than when you are there, because you are most
16:08:15 5 vulnerable. So even with the fighting around Monrovia, even with
6 stepping down we still had to be strong enough to keep the enemy
7 from overwhelming us, okay, and destroying us before we reached
8 to that point of removal.

9 So no matter what the situation is, once we placed the
16:08:34 10 order and took the decision, the arms coming would not have
11 determined our desire to leave or not leave. What it was
12 important for was to making sure that we were adequately
13 protected while that process took place.

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor - can we please, Madam Court Manager, go to
16:08:59 15 page 34835. Now, Mr Taylor, you recall that earlier I asked you
16 about suggestions made to you that you were in the employ or
17 working with the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can we go to line 19 on that page, please:

16:09:35 20 "Mr Taylor, you of course did acknowledge that there was
21 ongoing assistance to you and your government from the CIA, yes,
22 that the CIA worked with you and even tipped you off to an
23 assassination threat? Isn't that right, Mr Taylor?"

24 A. Yes.

16:09:57 25 Q. Now, is that right?

26 A. Yeah. What - yes. What the CIA would do with friendly
27 governments, they would tell you there is in the work an attempt
28 to assassinate you and they will give you some general
29 information and leave it at that and you can work from that. And

1 you have to be very close and they do this with governments.
2 They will provide certain basic information. They will not come
3 up with names, addresses and all that kind stuff, but they will
4 tell you that you are the subject of an attack, so you begin to
16:10:38 5 follow through.

6 Q. Now, what was being suggested at this point, Mr Taylor -
7 and it's the penultimate point I want to deal with - are you a
8 conspiracy theorist, Mr Taylor?

9 A. No, I'm not.

16:11:02 10 Q. But on your account the whole world is against you?

11 A. No, not the whole word. If the United States is against
12 you, that's it. What's the rest of the world when the United
13 States wants something done? Nothing. So it's got nothing to do
14 with the whole word. It's got something to do with the regime
16:11:21 15 change from the United States and once the United States is for
16 or against, depending on what side you are on, you're home safe.
17 That's bluntly putting it.

18 Q. Well, how do you deal with the underlying suggestion to the
19 passage that I've just put to you, Mr Taylor. On the one hand
16:11:39 20 they are tipping you off. On the other hand, according to you,
21 they are conspiring against you, regime change?

22 A. Oh, but that's easy. That's very easy. Look, people can
23 compartmentalise their activities. That's how these things work
24 out there. It's happening right as we're sitting in this Court.
16:12:05 25 China and the United States are - they are friends but they are
26 fighting now over the Dalai Lama going to meet President Obama.
27 They compartmentalise these things. We provide information.
28 They provide information. If you cut off information from us,
29 you need us too. Liberia is a long-standing friend of the United

1 States and I'm not going to get into the intelligence part of
2 this, but there's a long relationship in terms of training, in
3 terms of expertise. So those people are in place. So, I mean,
4 we can be disagreeing on this side but there are certain points
16:12:44 5 that we cooperate on, and so that's the way it works.

6 Q. Very well. My final point, Mr Taylor. Can we go to page
7 34846, please. Are we there?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, this suggestion, Mr Taylor, was put to you and I
16:13:36 10 apologise, I have forgotten my note, there is just one other
11 topic. But this suggestion is put to you at line 11:

12 "Let's look at some other African leaders in addition to
13 President Kabbah. Leaders who tried to bring you into their
14 circle after you became President in order, we suggest to you,
16:13:52 15 Mr Taylor, to move you away from your criminal misconduct in
16 regard to Sierra Leone. Mr Taylor, in relation to these other
17 African leaders, in fact you betrayed their trust, did you not?

18 Indeed, Mr Taylor you used your position in their circle to
19 advance your criminal interests. Isn't that correct?

16:14:24 20 And also to advance the criminal interests of the AFRC and
21 RUF in Sierra Leone. Isn't that correct?"

22 See that, Mr Taylor?

23 A. I see that.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, nothing could be clearer. You are a mere
16:14:39 25 criminal. Always were, continue to be, even after you became
26 President. That's what's being suggested. What do you say to
27 that?

28 A. Exactly what I said before. I disagree. That's total -
29 that's basic to what the Prosecution - well, let's take him out

1 and shoot him, or do whatever else. This is just total nonsense
2 and in order to make their case that they have not been able in
3 my opinion to prove, they can call me any name, it doesn't make
4 it right. And the facts before this Court, the judges in their
16:15:19 5 decision will determine as to whether this is true. This is all
6 the same - the same fireworks. He's got billions of dollars.
7 We've been in this Court here now, been sitting in this chair
8 here for almost seven months. Where are the billions? This is
9 all - I disagree with them. But I think it's a part of their job
16:15:47 10 to say these kinds of things to try to make me look bad. This is
11 not true. Most of my colleagues still have a lot of respect for
12 me and that is very clear. So I disagree with them.

13 Q. Now put differently, Mr Taylor, did your colleagues,
14 knowing that you were, quote unquote, a criminal, move you on to
16:16:19 15 the Committee of Five to in effect rehabilitate you?

16 A. No. They moved me on the Committee of Five on the Sierra
17 Leonean crisis simply because they felt that my experience and
18 expertise in dealing with revolutionary activities, in dealing
19 with guerilla warfare and having managed the NPFL, the largest
16:16:48 20 fighting force in Liberia, and finally negotiating peace, because
21 peace would have never come in Liberia in 1996 and elections
22 unless the NPFL was on board - that's why they brought me on and
23 they brought me on even on the Ivorian crisis. I was invited to
24 Lome. It's a separate crisis. And I was invited to France by
16:17:12 25 the French government to deal with the question in La Cote
26 d'Ivoire. I also dealt with the question in Guinea Bissau.

27 So I do not know what kind of bunch of stupid fools my
28 colleagues are in West Africa that this criminal Charles Taylor,
29 they kept on calling him. They must have been a bunch of stupid

1 fools and I state to this Court they were not and are not.

2 Q. Did you, Charles Taylor, between November 1996 and January
3 2002 provide assistance, support or any kind of help with
4 war-like materials to either the AFRC or the RUF?

16:18:05 5 A. No. Never.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I have no further questions. Unless your
7 Honours have any questions?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. The judges might have some
9 questions. Judge Doherty has a few questions for the witness.

16:18:27 10 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Taylor, in the course of your evidence
11 you have referred several times to what I understand is called
12 the Uniform Code of Military Justice and its application to the
13 NPFL troops.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes.

16:18:41 15 JUDGE DOHERTY: Is that a law or a regulation of the
16 Liberian Legislature?

17 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour. The military code of
18 military justice is a bunch of laws that are universally approved
19 to be used by the military in dealing with issues of court
20 martial and the conduct of military personnel. And to be very
21 clear with you, as I would say yes because it is adopted - not
22 put into legislation by Liberia, but it is adopted by Liberia
23 under our laws to be used by the military.

16:19:09 24 JUDGE DOHERTY: Did it provide the death penalty among the
25 disciplinary provisions in that code?

26 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour.

27 JUDGE DOHERTY: Did it provide for a right of appeal?

28 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour.

29 JUDGE DOHERTY: Was a right of appeal afforded to the

1 various persons that have been referred to who were dealt with?

2 THE WITNESS: In Liberia at the time, no, your Honour, we
3 did not have a Court of Appeals.

4 JUDGE DOHERTY: You said that the various people, they have
16:20:05 5 been named, I don't think I have to repeat the names, that were
6 dealt with were represented by counsel.

7 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

8 JUDGE DOHERTY: And did counsel and the tribunals have
9 copies of this code?

16:20:17 10 THE WITNESS: Oh, I would hope so, your Honour. That was
11 in Gbarnga. I sure don't have any records. It's very possible
12 that one or more persons may have some records.

13 JUDGE DOHERTY: I have in mind that if you are representing
14 someone or running a trial and this is the code that applies, a
16:20:40 15 copy would have been pertinent and I'm just wondering how you got
16 copies or how copies were supplied given the, as you have already
17 described it, guerilla warfare.

18 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I understand your question,
19 your Honour. I don't want to --

16:20:55 20 JUDGE DOHERTY: How did you get copies to the tribunals and
21 the defence counsel, etcetera?

22 THE WITNESS: Of the codes?

23 JUDGE DOHERTY: Of the Code.

24 THE WITNESS: Oh, we got all our copies of the codes from
16:21:05 25 the United States. The same Uniform Code of Military Justice
26 code, the entire booklet is used by Liberia. So all we have to
27 do is to get one from the United States armed forces. It's 100
28 per cent the same. There's no difference.

29 JUDGE DOHERTY: You also said in the course of your

1 evidence that you had - on one occasion you said there was two
2 orphanages in the Gbarnga area and on another occasion you
3 referred to one orphan and in the Gbarnga area. On an average
4 day how many children would have been in either one or the two
16:21:44 5 orphanages?

6 THE WITNESS: The largest one on an average day would have
7 about close to 400 children.

8 JUDGE DOHERTY: Why was there a need of orphanages?

9 THE WITNESS: There were a lot of orphans. In fact the
16:22:02 10 bulk - the bulk of them had been displaced from the Monrovia and
11 general area that had been brought, runaway kids, individuals
12 that ran away from different regions trying to get involved in
13 the war would be picked up and put in the orphanage.

14 JUDGE DOHERTY: And where were their parents?

16:22:24 15 THE WITNESS: Oh, after the war we located some of them.
16 Some of them were killed. Some of them were displaced or
17 misplaced during the fighting.

18 JUDGE DOHERTY: Those were my questions, thank you.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, those are the only
16:22:41 20 questions from the judges, but do any other questions arise?

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Not from me.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Then it remains for me to thank you,
23 Mr Taylor. I beg your pardon.

24 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, if I may be heard. I know
16:22:53 25 that it does not specifically say in the Rules that there is a
26 right of re-cross-examination, however, there were several areas
27 the Prosecution believes that the questions put to the witness,
28 the materials put to the witness, and the witness's answers, went
29 beyond cross-examination, and the Prosecution would ask leave to

1 ask a very few questions in re-cross-examination.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you referring to the Judge's
3 questions?

4 MS HOLLIS: No, Madam President, I'm not. I didn't want to
16:23:20 5 interrupt when you were talking about Judges' questions.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, please wait. I have to
7 consult on this.

8 MS HOLLIS: Certainly.

9 [Trial Chamber conferred]

16:23:42 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, we're of the view that an end
11 has to come somewhere along the line. The rules are that the
12 witness is examined in chief, which is followed by
13 cross-examination, literally about what he had for breakfast.
14 Anything you could have cross-examined. Thereafter the accused
16:24:16 15 is re-examined, and that is followed usually by the questions
16 from the Bench, if any, and basically that's it. If we open up
17 the questioning again, the Defence will ask to re-examine again,
18 and so I will decline this request.

19 Mr Taylor, it remains for me to thank you for your evidence
16:24:45 20 and to say that you may stand down.

21 Mr Griffiths, in view of the time would you like to address
22 us on how we're going to proceed on Monday?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: On Monday, Madam President, your Honours,
24 there will be a witness available who will be led by Mr Anyah.

16:25:09 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: In that case, there's not much time left.
26 It's about five minutes to the close of the day. Proceedings
27 will adjourn to Monday at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

28 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.25 p.m. to be
29 reconvened on Monday, 22 February 2010 at 3.00 p.m.]

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	35304
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GRIFFITHS	35304