



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

FRIDAY, 23 APRIL 2010
9.34 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Ms Kathryn Howarth
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Friday, 23 April 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.]

09:28:07 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MR BANGURA: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours
8 and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this morning, myself
9 Mohamed A Bangura, Kathryn Howarth and Maja Dimitrova. Thank
09:34:17 10 you.

11 MR ANYAH: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,
12 your Honours. Good morning, counsel opposite. Appearing for the
13 Defence this morning are Terry Munyard, Morris Anyah and Michael
14 Herz.

09:34:30 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr George, this morning you
16 continue with your testimony and I would like to remind you of
17 your oath to tell the truth; it's still binding on you.

18 WITNESS: DCT-062 [On former oath]

19 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR ANYAH: [Continued]

09:34:51 20 Q. Good morning, Mr George. Yesterday afternoon before court
21 adjourned we were considering the events surrounding the 1996
22 elections in Sierra Leone, in particular at about 4.30 yesterday
23 you were telling us about your lack of knowledge about any
24 reports that Morris Kallon made to Foday Sankoh regarding an
09:35:23 25 attack on Kenema. Do you remember our discussions yesterday
26 afternoon, Mr George?

27 A. Yes, that was the discussion at which we stopped yesterday.

28 Q. And you also recall that yesterday in connection with the
29 topic of Operation Stop Election and this report by

1 Morris Kallon, I was reading the transcripts of the evidence of
2 Augustine Mallah. Do you remember that?

3 A. Yes, I remember that.

4 Q. This morning I want to continue with the evidence of

09:36:06 5 Mr Mallah. This is the transcript from 12 November 2008. For
6 purposes of this morning I would like to start at page 20109.

7 Mr George, I will read to you more evidence that was heard from
8 Augustine Mallah and I will ask for your comments. Line 14 on
9 that page, Mr Mallah was asked a question:

09:36:45 10 "Q. During the time you were at Zogoda with Foday Sankoh,
11 '94 to sometime in '96, were you aware of any
12 communications Foday Sankoh had outside of Sierra Leone?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And what were those communications?

09:37:14 15 A. The communication, because I myself had access to Foday
16 Sankoh at any time, at any hour, as a strike force
17 commander, so I was there when a radio man came to call
18 Foday Sankoh. He said they wanted to talk to him.

19 Q. Who wanted to talk to him?

09:37:43 20 A. Charles Taylor. I myself will be there where we would
21 take Foday Sankoh and we would sit by just like that white
22 man there, sitting down, and we will be here whilst they
23 are talking. That used to take place for over a day, every
24 day, or some time once or twice a day. We used to see him

09:38:11 25 asking and they would greet each other. He would ask for
26 Foday Sankoh. He would inquire about Foday Sankoh's
27 health. Foday Sankoh too would respond in the same way to
28 Charles Taylor. Foday Sankoh would explain about his
29 health, or explain about some security operations,

1 everything. I used to hear those when I was there at
2 Zogoda with him."

3 Let's pause. Mr George, you told us you were assigned to
4 Ngolahun Vaama starting in 1994. You recall telling us that
09:38:55 5 yesterday?

6 A. Yes, that's my statement.

7 Q. You recall telling us at page 39717 of yesterday's
8 transcript that you were in Ngolahun Vaama in 1994, 1995 and
9 1996? Do you recall telling us that?

09:39:21 10 A. Yes, I remember all those statements.

11 Q. Do you recall also telling us that during that period of
12 time while you were at Ngolahun Vaama, and this is also at the
13 same page I just gave from yesterday's transcript, page 39717,
14 you recall telling us that you would go to Zogoda from time to
09:39:41 15 time from Ngolahun Vaama to make reports to those in Zogoda?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Lastly, do you remember telling us that at Ngolahun Vaama
18 you had radio communication equipment and that Daf was your radio
19 man?

09:40:04 20 A. Yes, that was my radio operator in Ngolahun Vaama.

21 Q. How far from Zogoda was Ngolahun Vaama or is Ngolahun
22 Vaama?

23 A. It's a long distance because it's a forest, you walk
24 through the forest.

09:40:28 25 Q. With the benefit of your radio communication equipment,
26 were you able, when you were at Ngolahun Vaama, to monitor radio
27 communications between those in Zogoda and elsewhere?

28 A. When Foday Sankoh used to talk to various commanders,
29 especially Zino, that is CO Mohamed, we monitored the

1 conversation.

2 Q. And that being the case, it was the fact that there were
3 radio communication equipment in Zogoda at that time, yes?

09:41:15

4 A. Yes, he had his radio communication in Zogoda and we also
5 had ours at the front line where we were.

6 Q. Do you know who were some of the radio communication staff
7 or men working for Foday Sankoh in Zogoda?

09:41:43

8 A. Yes. I called Zedman. Zedman was the most senior man in
9 Zogoda that I remember. Although he had some other junior men
10 under him, but Zedman is the main - the major person that I
11 remember who was his radio communicator at Zogoda.

12 Q. Did you just mention the name of any other radio operators
13 besides Zedman? Who else were radio operators working with
14 Zedman in Zogoda, if you know?

09:42:09

15 A. There were people who were radio men there, but it's a long
16 time now. I have forgotten the names of most of them except for
17 those who were assigned with me at my assignment grounds. For
18 those, I can remember their names.

09:42:30

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, can I remind you of the
20 arrange that you are to speak a little slower than you normally
21 would speak.

22 THE WITNESS: Okay. Sorry, ma'am.

23 MR ANYAH:

09:42:39

24 Q. Now, you heard what I read from the evidence of Augustine
25 Mallah. While you were at Ngolahun Vaama, and in light of your
26 statement that you would monitor conversations Foday Sankoh had
27 on the radio, did you ever hear any conversation between Foday
28 Sankoh and Charles Taylor?

29 A. To be very frank, no, I never monitored Foday Sankoh and

1 Charles Taylor talking over the radio.

2 Q. Your radio man, Daf, tell you that he ever heard of a radio
3 communication between Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh when you
4 were in Ngolahun Vaama?

09:43:21 5 A. No. He only used to brief me on operations around our
6 controlled territories.

7 Q. Did you know of the person who we referred to yesterday as
8 OG being a strike force commander in Zogoda?

9 A. They had a strike force at Zogoda, but I did not know him
09:43:51 10 to be a commander of the strike force. But of course he was a
11 member of the strike force.

12 Q. So when he said in the transcript I have just read that
13 because I myself had access to Foday Sankoh at any time, at any
14 hour as a strike force commander, the reference there to himself
09:44:15 15 being a strike force commander, is that true, to your knowledge,
16 or is that false?

17 A. To my thinking, I believe he was a strike force member, but
18 he was not a strike force commander.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Shall we go to page 20111 of the
09:44:48 20 same transcript from 12 November 2008. Mr Mallah's evidence
21 continues. A question was posed on that page at line 20 to
22 Mr Mallah:

23 "Q. Mr Witness, you have said that you remained at Zogoda
24 until Zogoda was overrun. What happened when Zogoda was
09:45:14 25 overrun?

26 A. Well, after that, while Pa Sankoh had gone to the Ivory
27 Coast and left CO Mohamed Zino to take over, the Kamajors
28 and the Sierra Leone soldiers attacked the RUF there and
29 Zogoda came under some suppression. We hadn't enough

1 ammunition to fight the Kamajors and the Sierra Leone
2 soldiers. So CO Mohamed contacted Foday Sankoh. Foday
3 Sankoh ordered him that the armed group that was in Zogoda
4 should be divided into two. CO Mohamed should take one
09:45:58 5 group to Kailahun for us to defend the place where we had
6 before we opened Zogoda. The other group should be taken
7 by Mike Lamin to Pujehun District. So that was how it
8 happened."

9 Let's pause there. Mr George, were you still at Ngolahun
09:46:25 10 Vaama when Zogoda was overrun?

11 A. Yes, I was in Ngolahun Vaama when Zogoda was overrun.

12 Q. At that time when Zogoda was overrun, do you agree with the
13 sentiments expressed by Augustine Mallah that the RUF did not
14 have enough ammunition at that time?

09:46:52 15 A. Oh, yes, I agree with him. It's true. The Kamajors and
16 the Sierra Leone Army overran us because of ammunition; that's
17 true.

18 Q. Were you affected in any way after Zogoda was overrun, that
19 is, those of you who were at Ngolahun Vaama?

09:47:14 20 A. Yes, I was affected, because in fact they started hitting
21 from my back. So I was in the front and I was affected, but I
22 managed to get to Jui Koya close to Zogoda.

23 Q. And when you got to Jui Koya, did you go somewhere else or
24 did you remain there?

09:47:39 25 A. From Jui Koya, because of the population that was there and
26 there was no ammunition, there was no understanding, everybody
27 went their own way. It's true that Mike Lamin went to Pujehun,
28 yes. But for me, I went to the Northern Jungle together with
29 Manawai and few men because it was not easy on us. Some other

1 people crossed into Kailahun for defensive purposes.

2 Q. Those that crossed to Kailahun, was it the case that they
3 were led by CO Mohamed?

4 A. That was the time we lost CO Mohamed. That was the time he
09:48:29 5 got missing, and up to this moment we don't know his whereabouts.
6 He never reached Kailahun. He was captured by enemies and he was
7 killed. That was how Foday Sankoh gave the command structure to
8 Sam Bockarie.

9 Q. When you went to the Northern Jungle, you said together
09:48:48 10 with Manawai and a few men, who was the commander of your group?

11 A. The commander we met there was Superman. Superman was on
12 the ground. Isaac Mongor was there and some other officers.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, it would be helpful to have
14 some time frames for some of these movements as you go along.

09:49:19 15 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President:

16 Q. Mr George, what year was Zogoda overrun by the enemy?

17 A. In 1996.

18 Q. In what year did you, Manawai, and others go to the
19 Northern Jungle?

09:49:40 20 A. It was in that same 1996, because Manawai and I were
21 assigned together. We were assigned on the same operation.

22 Q. Was it the early part of the year, the middle part, or the
23 later part of the year?

24 A. It was the middle part. It was the middle part.

09:50:01 25 Q. Where was Foday Sankoh at the time Zogoda was overrun?

26 A. At that time Foday Sankoh went on the peace talks in
27 Abidjan.

28 Q. So you are now at the Northern Jungle with Dennis Mingo,
29 Isaac Mongor, Manawai and others. What happened to those of you

1 at the Northern Jungle?

2 A. That was the same thing. We did not have ammunition, but
3 there we were in a Jungle. We stayed in the jungle. We put up
4 defensive where we were until we were called out in 1997 to join
09:50:41 5 the AFRC.

6 Q. Are you saying that from the middle part of 1996 to the
7 time when you were called to join the AFRC in 1997 you were in
8 the Northern Jungle?

9 A. We were still in the Northern Jungle, because where we were
09:51:01 10 was far off from the Kailahun District.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, there is a name that appears
12 like "Manawa" in the LiveNote transcript and I think this is not
13 what the witness is saying. I don't know if this individual is -
14 already has their name spelt on the record, but I think you
09:51:22 15 should address it. It's consistently "Manawa."

16 MR ANYAH: The name is "Manawai", which is M-A-N-A-W-A-I,
17 and that name is in the record. It's in the transcript. There
18 was, in respect of that name, issued an errata sheet by the
19 former supervisor of the stenographers, Michael Laidlaw, and this
20 errata was issued on 13 November 2008 correcting the spelling of
21 the name from Manawa to Manawai, and a second errata was - well,
22 that's the relevant errata that was issued. So the spelling
23 that's on the record is M-A-N-A-W-A-I.

24 Mr Munyard has corrected me. A single one is called an
25 erratum, he tells me, and the plural is errata. Thank you,
26 Mr Munyard:

27 Q. Now, Mr George, the question had to do with the period of
28 time you spent at the Northern Jungle. Was it the case that for
29 almost a year, 1996 into 1997 when you were called to join the

1 AFRC, you were at the Northern Jungle?

2 A. Well, because that was where I met Superman, Isaac Mongor
3 and other soldiers, they were based there. They were all in the
4 jungle whilst we were at Zogoda.

09:53:02 5 Q. Yes, I appreciate your response. I am trying to understand
6 the time frame. A few minutes ago you told us Zogoda was overrun
7 around the middle part of 1996, and you said that was when you
8 went to the Northern Jungle. Now I am trying to find out how
9 long as in weeks, months, or years, you spent at the Northern
09:53:23 10 Jungle. Is it the case that you were at the Northern Jungle
11 until you were called to join the AFRC in 1997?

12 A. That was just what I said. I said, yes, I was there until
13 the time AFRC called us to join them in 1997.

14 Q. During that entire period of time, what was the state or
09:53:50 15 status of the RUF ammunition supply?

16 A. In fact, during that time I am talking about we never used
17 to go on offensive, because the ammunition we had we could not
18 carry an offensive. We only had it on us in the jungle where we
19 were based until, by the grace of God, the AFRC called us to join
09:54:17 20 them.

21 Q. When you were at the Northern Jungle, did you and the
22 others there have radio communication equipment?

23 A. Yes. All the jungles had radio communications. We
24 communicated with one another.

09:54:37 25 Q. Why could you and the others not have radioed for
26 ammunition to be sent to you from Kailahun or somewhere else in
27 Sierra Leone?

28 A. Even the Kailahun you are talking about, they did not have
29 ammunition there. They only had ammunition for defensive.

1 Things were bad.

2 Q. Were there any RUF members based in Buedu at the time?

3 A. Yes, Buedu was occupied by the RUF soldiers, Pendembu,
4 Koindu.

09:55:21 5 Q. Why couldn't you ask through the radio for ammunition to be
6 sent to you at the Northern Jungle from Koindu - I think you said
7 Koindu?

8 A. Yes, Koindu.

9 Q. Why didn't you ask for those in Koindu to send you
09:55:41 10 ammunition when you were at the Northern Jungle?

11 A. In the first place, from Koindu to where I am talking about
12 is a long distance. And then they would not have allowed the
13 little ammunition they had with them just to put up defensive for
14 themselves to send it to us to the Northern Jungle. Who would
09:56:02 15 have carried it, in fact?

16 Q. Did they have enough ammunition in Koindu at the time, 1996
17 into 1997?

18 A. Well, I can't tell whether they had an ammo dump because I
19 was not there.

09:56:21 20 Q. That's fair enough. During the time period when you were
21 in the Northern Jungle, was there any radio communication contact
22 with anyone in Liberia?

23 A. No. We never had radio communication with anyone in
24 Liberia. If we had radio communication with someone in Liberia -
09:56:41 25 I mean, like, they're saying that we were getting support from
26 Liberia - I think they would have helped us with support. They
27 would have helped us with ammunition so that we would have been
28 able to carry out our mission.

29 Q. Are you saying you were not receiving support from Liberia

1 during this time?

2 A. I am telling you we were not receiving any support from
3 Liberia, nor Burkina Faso, and not even Libya.

09:57:23

4 Q. What year and - well, what month in 1997 were you called to
5 join the AFRC?

6 A. It was in 1997 when Isaac Mongor called for a formation.
7 They told us that Foday Sankoh said we should join Johnny Paul
8 Koroma, the AFRC, to join together and form the People's Army.
9 The kind of way we were happy, the kind of joy that we had around
10 us, I can't even remember the particular date, the particular
11 time.

09:57:51

12 Q. Who, when you refer to the AFRC, are you referring to?

13 A. I am talking about the Johnny Paul Koroma regime.

09:58:19

14 Q. Now, this Court, Mr George, has found some events to be
15 factual. That is, the Court has admitted for purposes of this
16 trial that these events are facts that happened. One of those
17 that the Court has said happened is that the Court said, and this
18 is from CMS 227, from 26 April 2007, these are admitted facts and
19 law that were entered into by the parties here present, number 17
20 reads: "The AFRC seized power from the elected government of the
21 Republic of Sierra Leone via a coup d'etat on 25 May 1999."

09:58:55

22 Mr George, this Court has found it to be a fact that on 25
23 May 1997, the AFRC, through a coup d'etat, took power in Sierra
24 Leone. Having heard that, do you agree that it was sometime in
25 May or after May 1997 that you were called to join the AFRC?

09:59:27

26 A. I don't want to lie to you. I said I do not remember the
27 month. I cannot tell you whether it was in June, August or
28 September, because of the suffering that we were going through.
29 My brother, if you were there, if only someone went and told you,

1 say, come out of this bush, you would be happy.

2 Q. Was it in the early part of the year, the middle part or
3 the late part of the year 1997 that you joined the AFRC?

10:00:18

4 A. I remember going to Bo in the dry season, during the dry
5 season. It was not during rainy season.

6 Q. And what months in Sierra Leone make up the dry season?

7 A. We have January, February, March, April, those are mostly
8 dry season. Even in Liberia.

9 Q. So it was one of those months in 1997 that you went to Bo?

10:00:44

10 A. Yes, I can remember, during the dry season.

11 Q. Now, you were telling us about a formation. You said:

12 "It was in 1997 when Isaac Mongor called a formation. They
13 told us that Foday Sankoh said we should join Johnny Paul Koroma,
14 the AFRC, to join together and form the People's Army."

10:01:10

15 Did Isaac Mongor say where Foday Sankoh was when he asked
16 the RUF to join Johnny Paul Koroma and the AFRC?

17 A. Even me sitting here, I knew where Foday Sankoh was.

18 Q. Please tell us, where was he at the time?

19 A. Foday Sankoh was in Nigeria. He was arrested in Nigeria.

10:01:36

20 That was where he was. And passed the instruction to Isaac
21 Mongor junior.

22 Q. Do you know how he gave that instruction? Was it by
23 letter? Was it through a courier, a person? Do you know how
24 Foday Sankoh gave that instruction while he was in Nigeria?

10:02:00

25 A. I never saw a strange person in the zoebush who brought
26 letters, but I believe it was through communication.

27 Q. So you don't know how?

28 A. I don't know how.

29 Q. You mentioned going to Bo. How is it that you came to go

1 to Bo after this information was received from Foday Sankoh?

2 A. After we receiving the information, they called a meeting
3 and it was during that meeting that they briefed all the RUF
4 soldiers who were based in the Northern Jungle. Isaac told us
10:02:49 5 that we should join the AFRC government to form one group, one
6 force, by the name of People's Army.

7 From there, the following day, we packed up our things and
8 we took a journey to get on the tarmac road to a town where we
9 were to meet the receiving team that was coming to receive us.

10:03:25 10 Isaac Mongor was the first man who left with 200 men and the
11 rest, the first men just moved together with him to make sure
12 whether that was true.

13 So we went, we were in ambush. We were observing the
14 activities. We saw the soldiers coming in vehicles, trucks.

10:03:51 15 They put on their communication set. They contacted Isaac Mongor
16 to ask about his location and he told them he was close to them.
17 But then they said, "Come up. It is time for us to join
18 together." And he said, "You said Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday
19 Sankoh have already discussed for us to join and form one army."

10:04:23 20 And he said, "Praise God, that should be the People's Army." And
21 he said we should not be afraid, "We are not here to harm you
22 guys, so you can tell your men to come up, to come out of the
23 bush." Isaac walked with few men on the tarmac road and they met
24 - they met the soldiers in the trucks and the trucks were parked
10:04:49 25 by the tarmac road. And that was how we were briefed to join the
26 line.

27 When we joined them, they called for the other people to
28 come from out of the bush and Superman came up with the other
29 troops. Morris Kallon came out. And the groups were divided and

1 some groups were going to Freetown and some were going to Bo and
2 that was how I found myself in Bo.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr George. There are a few clarifications
4 regarding the answer you just gave I wish to pursue. Let's
10:05:32 5 consider some of what you've said. You said that after you and
6 the others had a meeting in the Northern Jungle, on the following
7 day you parked your things and you undertook a journey and you
8 said you saw some soldiers coming in vehicles and trucks and this
9 happened on some kind of tarmac road where Isaac Mongor met those
10:06:02 10 soldiers. The soldiers who were coming in vehicles and trucks,
11 to which group did they belong?

12 A. They were from the Sierra Leone Army. They were the AFRC
13 boys. They came in joy to us. And we too were very happy
14 because of the situation we found ourselves in at that particular
10:06:25 15 time.

16 Q. You also said after Isaac Mongor and them spoke, that they
17 called for the other people to come from out of the bush and
18 Superman came with the other troops and Morris Kallon also came.
19 These other people that were called from the bush, were they RUF
10:06:49 20 or AFRC?

21 A. Those were the remaining RUF men, because not all the
22 troops came together. Because in guerilla tactics your enemy
23 cannot just call on you because of - because you have had
24 interviews with him and then you just tote all your loads and go.
10:07:13 25 So we left some men in our zoebush. Isaac Mongor initially came
26 with about 200 men.

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
28 to slow down.

29 MR ANYAH:

1 Q. Mr George, we were following your answer, then you sped up
2 a little bit too much for the interpreter to follow. You were
3 saying that the enemy cannot just call on you and, because you
4 have interviews with him, then you tote all your loads and go.
10:07:45 5 And then you said, "So we left some men in the zoebush." And
6 then you went on to say Isaac Mongor initially came with about
7 two something. Is this the 200 men you referred to before in
8 your evidence?

9 A. Yes, I said 200 men.

10:08:02 10 Q. Yes. Carry on from there. Initially Isaac Mongor came
11 with the 200 men, and then what else did you want to tell us?

12 A. After Isaac Mongor had come with the 200 men - because the
13 question was whether they were AFRC or RUF soldiers. After Isaac
14 Mongor had brought the 200 men and we wanted to ensure that, yes,
10:08:33 15 it's true, and we needed to join these guys to form one army
16 because by then Morris Kallon, Superman, they too brought the
17 other groups from the bush to join us on the tarmac road.

18 Q. Very well. Mr George, just watch the pace again. Slow
19 down as you go along. We are grateful for the response. Now,
10:08:56 20 you said the groups were divided and some groups were going to
21 Freetown and some were going to Bo and you went with the group
22 going to Bo, yes?

23 A. Exactly so.

24 Q. Who was the commander of the group going to Bo?

10:09:18 25 A. The commander in charge was Morris Kallon.

26 Q. Was it only RUF members that were under his command at this
27 time as you went to Bo?

28 A. Only RUF members. That was the first time for us to join
29 the AFRC. It was only RUF members that were going to Bo and

1 there were soldiers already assigned in Bo that we were supposed
2 to go and mix with.

3 Q. The soldiers in Bo you are referring to, are those AFRC
4 soldiers?

10:09:53 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. The group that went towards Freetown, who was the commander
7 of that group?

8 A. Isaac Mongor was the commander.

9 Q. Did he have only RUF members under his command in that
10:10:10 10 group as they went to Freetown?

11 A. They were all RUF soldiers with him.

12 Q. Do you know whether Mongor and the others eventually
13 reached Freetown?

14 A. Yes, they arrived in Freetown, because we had access to the
10:10:33 15 communication that the men had. So they reached Freetown safely.
16 There was no problem.

17 Q. Was Isaac Mongor the most senior RUF commander in Freetown
18 when the AFRC was there?

19 A. Isaac Mongor, his going to Freetown was through an escort.
10:10:56 20 But the most senior man was Issa Sesay, and he was deputised by
21 Dennis Mingo.

22 Q. Where was Mike Lamin at this time?

23 A. Mike Lamin was in Freetown. He went to Liberia during the
24 retreat in '96 and later he found himself back. When they called
10:11:24 25 upon the RUF I saw him. I saw him at Mile 91 in 1997. That was
26 where I met him since the time we retreated in Zogoda.

27 Q. You said Mike Lamin was in Freetown. The record then has
28 you as saying he went to Liberia during the retreat in '96 and
29 later he found himself back when they called upon the RUF.

1 Mr George, help me clarify this: When the record says Mike Lamin
2 went to Liberia during the retreat, what retreat is that?

3 A. I am talking about the '96 retreat.

10:12:20

4 Q. Was there a retreat into Liberia in 1996, the time or the
5 year Zogoda was overrun?

6 A. I am talking about the time Zogoda was overrun. That was
7 the time he retreated, and he crossed the border and went into
8 Liberia.

10:12:38

9 Q. Did Mike Lamin go alone when he retreated, or did he
10 retreat with other RUF members?

11 A. He went with a large group. In fact, Monica Pearson was
12 among. By then she was pregnant. So he went with a large group.

13 Q. Do you know the approximate number of RUF that retreated
14 into Liberia?

10:12:59

15 A. I can't tell the total. There were civilians, children,
16 men, and RUF soldiers. There were many.

17 Q. Do you know for how long they stayed in Liberia, those that
18 retreated into Liberia?

10:13:28

19 A. Well, I can't tell whether they spent two months or three
20 months, but I only saw Mike Lamin back in Sierra Leone. I saw
21 Monica back in Sierra Leone in 1997. I saw Monica in Kenema
22 where Sam Bockarie was based. Yes, I can remember that.

23 Q. This retreat into Liberia, do you know what parts of
24 Liberia they retreated to, what county or town?

10:14:06

25 A. Let me make this very easy. According to them, after the
26 retreat they first got into Grand Cape Mount County where ULIMO
27 was controlling. And when I am talking about ULIMO, I am talking
28 about Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO. They were controlling the border
29 all the way to Lofa, Bopolu, yes.

1 Q. You said you were referring to Alhaji Kromah as ULIMO. Was
2 there another ULIMO besides Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO?

3 A. Yes, we learnt that they had two ULIMO groups. They had
4 ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K.

10:15:00 5 Q. You also said that they were controlling the border all the
6 way to Lofa, Bopolu --

7 A. Lofa bridge.

8 Q. What counties were they controlling in Liberia at that
9 time?

10:15:18 10 A. Grand Cape Mount County and part of Lofa County.

11 Q. And what year was this?

12 A. It was in the same 1997 that I am talking about. '96 to
13 '97.

14 Q. You said you saw Monica Pearson in Kenema where Sam
10:15:43 15 Bockarie was based. Did you find out how it is that they came
16 back from Liberia into Sierra Leone?

17 A. In fact, when they crossed, according to them, the
18 international community told Alhaji Kromah to be careful with
19 those men who crossed - the RUF who crossed. He said they should
10:16:11 20 not be harassed, and they were provided - the ECOMOG troops in
21 Bopolu, those who were based there, they were encamped there.
22 The ICRC was issuing supplies of food, and from there a note was
23 sent to them by Sam Bockarie that they should go back to Sierra
24 Leone to join - to rejoin the movement because the AFRC and the
10:16:45 25 RUF are now one force. That was what I heard from most of them
26 who came back.

27 Q. The group ICRC that you referred to that was issuing
28 supplies and food to Monica Pearson and others, was this an
29 international group, to your knowledge?

1 A. Yes, it was an international group.

2 Q. Did Monica Pearson tell you whether they received any
3 assistance from the Liberian government officials when they found
4 themselves in the territory of Alhaji Kromah in Liberia?

10:17:36 5 A. No, no. They did not tell me anything about that. They
6 only told me that they were based at Bopolu and ECOMOG was
7 deployed there, they were guarding them in case of any
8 harassment, and the ICRC was supplying them with rations. That's
9 what I was told.

10:17:56 10 Q. Do you know whether those who retreated to Liberia and
11 returned to Sierra Leone returned with any arms or ammunition
12 from Liberia as they returned into Sierra Leone?

13 A. I never saw even a pistol with all of them who crossed back
14 into Sierra Leone.

10:18:18 15 Q. But did they tell you whether they brought anything like
16 arms or ammunition from Liberia?

17 A. No, no.

18 Q. Now, you find yourself in Bo. You have told us that Sam
19 Bockarie, Monica Pearson are in Kenema. You have told us that
10:18:38 20 Isaac Mongor, Issa Sesay, Dennis Mingo and others were in
21 Freetown. In Bo, was Morris Kallon your commander?

22 A. Yes, Morris Kallon was my commander. He was the senior man
23 on the ground for the RUF soldiers.

24 Q. Who else was a senior RUF member on the ground in Bo when
10:19:10 25 you were there being commanded by Morris Kallon?

26 A. I was there as the second senior man to Morris Kallon
27 because I was the second vanguard to him. Next to me was Bai
28 Bureh - the Short Bai Bureh.

29 Q. How long did you say in Bo?

1 A. I said in Bo until the intervention, when we were pushed
2 out of Bo.

3 Q. Who pushed you out of Bo?

4 A. Both the ECOMOG and Kamajors.

10:19:56 5 Q. When you say "intervention", does that word have a
6 particular meaning or significance in the context of Sierra Leone
7 during this time period?

8 A. Yes. For me, it's meaningful because it was the ECOMOG - I
9 think it was an arrangement between Kabbah and the ECOMOG to come
10:20:23 10 and push us out of the various places that we were in combat. So
11 it was again another wonderful day for the junta.

12 Q. You said, "It was again another wonderful day for the
13 junta." The junta you are referring to there is who or what?

14 A. The junta is the combined force. The combined force, the
10:21:06 15 AFRC/RUF soldiers. They comprised the junta, who were called the
16 People's Army. That is the combined force I am referring to.

17 Q. Very well. You mentioned previously that you met Mike
18 Lamin at Mile 91. Was that during the time period when you were
19 pushed out of Bo?

10:21:39 20 A. Yes, it was the time they pushed us out of Bo when they
21 came from Freetown and they met us at Mile 91.

22 Q. Those who came from Freetown included whom?

23 A. I saw Mike Lamin, I saw Base Marine - Jonathan Parker.
24 That is Base Marine. I saw Kolo Moriba and other soldiers, but
10:22:12 25 those are the senior officers that I remember.

26 Q. Was Issa Sesay among those who came from Freetown to
27 Mile 91?

28 A. Sorry, yes. Issa Sesay was amongst them, yes.

29 Q. How about Isaac Mongor?

1 A. No, no. I did not set eyes on Isaac Mongor.

2 Q. Why had they left Freetown to Mile 91?

3 A. Because as the incident was going on, whilst we were being
4 attacked by the men, we sent a report about things we were faced
10:22:53 5 with on the ground. And when we retreated to Mile 91, they came
6 and met us so that we could reorganise ourselves to go back on
7 the offensive in Bo. That was the purpose he came for.

8 Q. Do you know whether those who were in Freetown who came to
9 Mile 91 could have stayed in Freetown if they wanted to; that is,
10:23:20 10 were they in control in Freetown before they left to join near
11 Mile 91?

12 A. Yes. Because we were the first people they started hitting
13 before they were hit.

14 Q. Who was hit, to use your phrase, after you and your group
10:23:43 15 were attacked by the Kamajors and ECOMOG?

16 A. Who was hit during the attack, you mean?

17 Q. Did the People's Army, this combined force of AFRC and RUF,
18 maintain control of Freetown while you were at Mile 91? Did they
19 continue to have control of Freetown at that time?

10:24:16 20 A. They had control over Freetown, but there was rumour going
21 on that ECOMOG had plans to attack them in Freetown.

22 Q. Did ECOMOG in fact attack them in Freetown?

23 A. Yes. ECOMOG pushed them out of the city.

24 Q. When ECOMOG pushed them out of the city, where did they go
10:24:39 25 to?

26 A. All of us met in Makeni.

27 Q. And from Makeni where did you go?

28 A. We were again heading to Kono with Johnny Paul Koroma.

29 Every one of us, we were now going to Kono. That was going to be

1 the last point. Maybe after that we decided to go into the bush
2 again.

3 Q. You have mentioned Johnny Paul Koroma. You have mentioned
4 Makeni. Was Issa Sesay in Makeni at the time?

10:25:17 5 A. All the RUF staff were in Makeni. The only person who was
6 not in Makeni was Sam Bockarie. He had already made his way to
7 Kailahun with the group that was in Kenema. They retreated to
8 Kailahun.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr George. From Makeni you said we were now
10:25:42 10 going to Kono. Did you in fact go to Kono?

11 A. Surely that was our target, because it was the only big
12 town that we knew that if we got rid of there, we will be able to
13 get connection with the men from - in Kailahun. So that was the
14 only big town that was left to us.

10:26:09 15 Q. When you got to Kono Town, who was in command of these
16 troops who had retreated from Makeni to Kono?

17 A. Um, I cannot tell whether there was actually a special
18 commander, but everybody fought hard to get to Kono because that
19 was now a joint force. From Bo, Freetown, there were a lot of
10:26:37 20 commanders, SLA generals, colonels, so we had a lot of officers.
21 So our target was to get to Kono, and that was the most important
22 thing for us. That was our main focus.

23 Q. What month and what year did you arrive in Kono with the
24 troops who had retreated from Makeni?

10:27:02 25 A. We arrived in Kono in 1997.

26 Q. The same year that you formed the People's Army?

27 A. No, let me think. Let me think. Because, you see, as we
28 are giving this information here, it's not something we kept
29 records of. We don't have documents to the effect. It's a long

1 time ago, so it's difficult. We have to think before we give the
2 actual story.

3 It was in 1998 because I remember when we talk about the
4 Black December when they got their operation, that intervention
10:28:06 5 was in December, if I am not mistaken.

6 Q. Very well. So you are in Kono in 1998. You are a joint
7 group, AFRC and RUF. Sam Bockarie you say is in Kailahun Town
8 having gone there with the group that came from Kenema.

9 Mr George, what was your rank and assignment when you were in
10:28:33 10 Kono in 1998?

11 A. First I told you that when I was in Ngolahun Vaama in 1994
12 I was a lieutenant. In '96, when we were called upon, I was
13 promoted to a captain and I maintained that position as captain
14 as a front line officer fighting at the front until 19 - how do
10:29:08 15 we call it? Until 1998, '99. 2000, I was promoted to a colonel.
16 I was still maintaining my captain rank in Kono.

17 Q. So is it the case that from 1996 when you were made a
18 captain until your promotion to colonel in 2000 you remained at
19 the same rank of captain?

10:29:40 20 A. From '94 I was a lieutenant. When they called us out, when
21 the AFRC called us, we joined them, I was promoted to a captain
22 and I maintained that position as captain from '97, '98, '99,
23 2000, before I had another rank, that was colonel.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr George. In Kono, while a captain in 1998,
10:30:06 25 did you have a particular assignment?

26 A. Yes, I had an assignment.

27 Q. And what was your assignment after your retreat from Makeni
28 to Kono?

29 A. Bai Bureh and I were assigned at Bumpe.

1 Q. The Bai Bureh you just referred to, is it the Short Bai
2 Bureh or another Bai Bureh?

3 A. That is the Short Bai Bureh. The one I was assigned with
4 to Morris Kallon, that is the one I am talking about.

10:30:43 5 Q. How far from Kono Town is Bumpe?

6 A. If I am not mistaken, from Bumpe to Kono it could be about
7 seven or ten minutes' drive. Excuse me, and the Bumpe I am
8 talking about is the road that leads to Tongo, that was my
9 assignment, to ensure that from Njaiama Nimi koro, Tongo, those
10:31:15 10 areas should be my assignment from Bumpe.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr George. The others who came with you from
12 Makeni to Kono, the RUF and AFRC, did they remain in Kono when
13 you went to Bumpe? I am speaking of Kono Town.

14 A. We remained in Kono and other people were on assignment and
10:31:44 15 at that time Johnny Paul was with us and we were finding ways how
16 to get to Kailahun. And it was not again another easy task with
17 the encounters with the Kamajors. There was a place called
18 Gandorhun we had Bandajuma, yes. That was - those were serious
19 targets for us. So we had to be faced with that target before
10:32:08 20 Johnny Paul Koroma could be taken to Kailahun. So some other
21 people were on the target there whilst engaging the enemies and I
22 was assigned at Bumpe. That is Bai Bureh and I.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Remember to go slowly as you give
24 your evidence. You have told us that, "Johnny Paul Koroma was
10:32:33 25 with us and we were finding ways to get to Kailahun." Did he,
26 Johnny Paul Koroma, go to Kailahun?

27 A. Yes, Johnny Paul Koroma went to Kailahun. We tried by all
28 possible means for him to get to Kailahun.

29 Q. And was Sam Bockarie in Kailahun when Johnny Paul Koroma

1 went to Kailahun?

2 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie was based in Kailahun.

3 Q. Between the two of them, Johnny Paul Koroma and Sam
4 Bockarie, who was above whom in the command structure at the
10:33:17 5 time?

6 A. You see, let me be very frank with you, I won't mind
7 because I was fighting for the RUF or what have you. There was a
8 power greed, that was where the misunderstanding came from. You
9 know, we have to say the truth. The way Johnny Paul Koroma
10:33:38 10 called us to join them whilst we were suffering, when we were
11 thrown back into the bush and they said they were all cooperating
12 together, there was a power greed. Mosquito never wanted to take
13 command from Johnny Paul Koroma and Johnny Paul Koroma never
14 wanted to take instructions from Mosquito. So that was a problem
10:33:59 15 between the RUF and the AFRC.

16 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Anyah, I understood the interpretation
17 to be power greed as in greedy but I see it's not recorded that
18 way.

19 MR ANYAH: Yes, Justice Doherty, it is recorded as power
10:34:25 20 grade:

21 Q. Mr George, you've heard the question from Justice Doherty.
22 What did you say, is it power greed?

23 A. What I'm talking about is they were fighting for power, who
24 was to become the leader. That's what I mean, power greed.

10:34:44 25 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Who eventually became the leader
26 after this power struggle?

27 A. We were finally taking instructions from Sam Bockarie.

28 Q. What happened to Johnny Paul Koroma?

29 A. Johnny Paul Koroma was set aside.

1 Q. When you were in Bumpé where was Issa Sesay?

2 A. Everyone who was in Kono was with Dennis Mingo and other
3 senior officers, everyone who was based in Kono at the time
4 ECOMOG had not flushed us out of Kono.

10:35:32 5 Q. When Issa Sesay was there with Dennis Mingo was there any
6 diamond mining activity taking place in Kono?

7 A. No, at that time, no, there was no diamond mining going on
8 in Kono. I mean '98 there was no diamond mining going on in
9 Kono.

10:35:56 10 Q. Were the RUF able to maintain Kono for the remaining part
11 of 1998?

12 A. No, they pushed us out again and we went into the bush.

13 Q. Who pushed you out from Kono?

14 A. ECOMOG and the Kamajors.

10:36:18 15 Q. Do you know what month in 1998 the RUF was pushed out of
16 Kono?

17 A. No.

18 Q. When they were pushed out of Kono you said they went into
19 the bush. The bush that they went into, what was the nearest big
10:36:38 20 town close to this bush?

21 A. We went into the bush. I mean not ECOMOG. We went into
22 the bush, the surrounding villages, and we created a jungle
23 around the Kono township. That's what I mean.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr George. We are following you. You created a
10:37:00 25 jungle around the Kono township. Were you yourself in that
26 jungle in 1998 after ECOMOG and the Kamajors pushed the RUF out
27 of Kono?

28 A. Yes, I was in Kono. I was in the jungle around Kono.

29 Q. Were any steps or efforts made by the RUF to fight their

1 way out of the jungle and to retake Kono?

2 A. That plan came later, but at the time we were in the jungle
3 we forgot about them. So an enemy cannot just hit you and you
4 respond. So we gave them time to forget and then overrun them.

10:37:49 5 That was how we used to fight.

6 Q. How much time did you spend in the jungle before you began
7 to take steps to retake Kono?

8 A. We were in the jungle mid-August, almost - we re-attacked
9 in December 1998. In December, yes. Because I can remember we
10:38:17 10 spent Christmas, '98 Christmas, in Kono after we had captured
11 Kono.

12 Q. Very well. Before you re-attacked, did you make any plans
13 regarding how to go about this attack? Did you have meetings?
14 Did you exchange information? What plans, if any, did you make

10:38:41 15 before attacking Kono?

16 A. In the first place, the first plan was how to set up a
17 defensive around Kono. That was the first plan. Before even
18 thinking about re-attacking Kono, that was the first plan we had;
19 how to set up a defensive and protect the civilians that we had
10:39:11 20 brought out of the town. That was the first plan we had.

21 Q. How was this plan generated? How was it put together?
22 Which people in the RUF put it together and how did you know
23 about it?

24 A. I was senior man in the RUF. It's not because I am small
10:39:35 25 in stature. All important agreements or arrangements I always
26 took part in. There were other officers like Kailondo, Boston
27 Flomo, Superman, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Leather Boot, Akim.
28 You know, we had some other people who joined us. So it was a
29 joint forum. We had to share ideas as to how to tackle

1 situations.

2 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Anyah, just so that I am following this
3 evidence I would like to ask the witness a question.

4 Mr Witness, you just said you were a senior man in the RUF,
10:40:26 5 but in 1998 up to 2000 you were just a captain, weren't you?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was a captain, but I was a vanguard.

7 JUDGE LUSSICK: Go ahead, Mr Anyah.

8 MR ANYAH:

9 Q. When you say you were a vanguard, were those in the RUF who
10:40:51 10 were vanguards held to a certain type of status?

11 A. All vanguards were senior officers. Regardless of your
12 rank, you were a senior officer. Any important meeting would
13 involve you. Whether you were small or not, you would be
14 contacted.

10:41:15 15 Q. You said a few minutes ago that it was a joint forum, you
16 had to share ideas as to how to tackle the situations. This
17 forum, are you referring to a meeting or meetings, Mr George?

18 A. Meeting. How to meet and arrange.

19 Q. I want to talk about this meeting or meetings you are
10:41:42 20 talking about. You have told us you were in the Kono jungle.

21 You told us that there was a re-attack on Kono in December 1998.
22 You are now telling us that there were meetings where you shared
23 ideas. Tell us about these meetings. When was the first one?
24 Where did you have it?

10:42:04 25 A. We have a town called Jagbwema Fiama in Kono. Before you
26 get to Jagbwema Fiama there is a town there but I can't remember
27 the name, but the name we called it was Superman Ground. That
28 was where we had the meeting.

29 Q. Now, Mr George, you said you had a meeting at Superman

1 Ground. Who was present for this meeting at Superman Ground?

10:43:36 2 A. Issa was at that meeting, Dennis Mingo, Morris Kallon,
3 myself, Boston Flomo with Big Daddy. We were many. We were many
4 at that meeting. All the commanders, even down to the fighters,
5 they shared in that meeting.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr George. This place Superman Ground, was it
7 in the Kono bush, or was it in another part of Kono District?
8 Sorry, let me rephrase that. The Kono Jungle where you were at
9 that you referred to previously, is that where the Superman
10:44:01 10 Ground is? Or is it in another part of the Kono District?

11 A. It's the same Kono within the Kono Township. That was
12 where we had the Superman Ground going towards Jagbwema Fiama.
13 That Jagbwema Fiama is a town leading to the Guinea border.

14 Q. What was discussed at this meeting in relation to attacking
10:44:31 15 Kono?

16 A. The meeting was held, and it was meant to discuss how to
17 capture Kono, and I told you that the first plan was to how to
18 set up a defensive; secondly, how best we can maintain our
19 civilians. That was the first meeting. And the second meeting
10:45:09 20 that was in '98 was to capture Kono. That too was held at the
21 same Superman Ground. That was a large meeting that we held
22 before capturing Kono.

23 Q. Besides those two meetings - incidentally, was Sam Bockarie
24 in attendance at either of those two meetings?

10:45:34 25 A. Sam Bockarie was the boss. He was based in Buedu, but
26 whatever was going on, they would furnish him with information.
27 Issa furnished him and --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the second
29 name of the person who furnished him?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, you spoke of Issa furnishing
2 him. What was the second person? Who was the second person that
3 you mentioned apart from Issa?

4 MR ANYAH: Perhaps I can inquire:

10:46:12 5 Q. Mr George, when you say "Issa furnished him", what do you
6 mean? Issa was furnishing what to whom?

7 A. Issa Sesay was furnishing Sam Bockarie about all plans and
8 information that we wanted to implement.

9 Q. When you say "furnishing", do you mean he was telling him
10:46:36 10 about it?

11 A. Yes, he was telling him about how we planned to attack or
12 how we were planning to do so and so. That's what I mean.

13 Q. During this time when these meetings were taking place, did
14 you receive any instructions from Sam Bockarie regarding
10:47:05 15 re-taking Kono?

16 A. Yes. That instruction was there, because that was the only
17 target we had. That was our major plan, in fact. Whether you
18 had instruction or not, those of us who were on the ground,
19 sometimes we do make moves to take chances.

10:47:30 20 Q. Was there ever a meeting held near the Dawa crossing point
21 regarding the re-take of Kono?

22 A. Exactly so.

23 Q. But you just told us there were meetings at Superman
24 Ground, one and two. Is this a third meeting regarding Kono at
10:47:54 25 the Dawa crossing point?

26 A. The meeting at Dawa crossing point was headed by Sam
27 Bockarie. That was the first meeting he ever called. The
28 meetings which were held in the Kono Jungle was among we, the
29 commanders who were in the Kono Jungle, and it was meant to

1 discuss how to maintain the ground.

2 Q. Well, let's talk about this meeting Sam Bockarie held. You
3 said it was the first meeting he ever called. Was it before the
4 two meetings at Superman Ground, or was it after those two
10:48:37 5 meetings?

6 A. After all our two meetings at Superman Grounds, that was
7 the time that he called the meeting - the general meeting. The
8 general meeting was held in Kailahun - I mean, in Buedu at
9 Waterworks.

10:48:57 10 Q. Now, this is the third meeting, you said, held in Kailahun.
11 That is Kailahun District, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You referred to a place called Waterworks. Is that a place
14 that is different from the Dawa crossing point, or are they one
10:49:15 15 and the same area?

16 A. Dawa crossing point is far off, but it's the same road from
17 Buedu Town to Waterworks, it's just like from here and outside.
18 But Dawa crossing point is far away.

19 Q. We have now talked about three meetings, maybe four, and I
10:49:37 20 want to clarify. You have mentioned two meetings amongst
21 commanders at Superman Ground; you have mentioned a general
22 meeting called by Sam Bockarie in Buedu, Kailahun District, in
23 the vicinity of a place called Waterworks. Was there a fourth
24 meeting held at the Dawa crossing point in relation to the
10:50:01 25 re-taking of Kono?

26 A. The fourth meeting we had was in Kono for the recapture of
27 Kono.

28 Q. Well, let's talk about the Waterworks meeting. Sam
29 Bockarie called this meeting. Did you go for that meeting?

1 A. I went there. I was not the only person who went. We were
2 many who went.

3 Q. Who were some of the senior RUF commanders present at that
4 meeting?

10:50:35 5 A. John Vincent, some AFRC soldiers like Leather Boot, Akim,
6 Superman, Issa Sesay. A lot of commanders went. Because all the
7 commanders wouldn't leave their front line, some stayed behind to
8 maintain the situation.

9 Q. What happened at the meeting?

10:51:15 10 A. Sam Bockarie called this meeting. We all assembled there.
11 We passed the night, and the following morning we went to
12 Waterworks on the road leading to Dawa crossing point. The
13 purpose of this meeting was how to re-attack Kono.

14 Q. Why did you and the others in the RUF want to re-attack
10:51:58 15 Kono? Why?

16 A. We wanted to be based in the town, and we were based there
17 before and we were dislodged, so we want to recapture there. It
18 wasn't just Kono. We wanted to advance as far as Makeni and
19 Lunsar.

10:52:20 20 Q. Very well. What was the significance of Kono? You wanted
21 to be based there, but was Kono of some particular significance
22 or importance?

23 A. Kono, as people know, is a mining area. When you talk
24 about capturing Kono, people would only think that you want to
10:52:54 25 mine diamond. But Kono was a target ahead of us. We cannot jump
26 over Kono and go to Makeni. We had to start from Kono to
27 establish a base before we spread out. That was the more reason
28 why we wanted to capture Kono first.

29 Q. You said you also wanted to advance as far as Makeni and

1 Lunsar. What was the purpose of advancing to both of those
2 places?

3 A. We wanted to gain grounds. We controlled the ground before
4 and we were pushed out, so we needed to regain it from the enemy.

10:53:35 5 That was what we were fighting for.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Was an attack on Freetown discussed
7 at this Waterworks meeting?

8 A. No, no, no, no.

9 Q. Where were you to get the arms or ammunition - well, arms
10:53:55 10 and ammunition - to re-take Kono? Was that discussed at this
11 meeting?

12 A. I said it was one of the most important things for the
13 meeting. What we were to do to capture Kono, where would we get
14 the arms and ammunition from to capture Kono? Because we had a
10:54:17 15 lot of arms. We had captured from it from the enemy, but we
16 needed ammunition. That was the most important part of the
17 meeting.

18 Q. And what was said in relation to ammunition that was to be
19 used to re-take Kono during the meeting?

10:54:37 20 A. During the meeting I met a guy - we met a guy. It was not
21 me alone, because it was a meeting called by Mosquito. He was
22 called Abu Keita, a former general for ULIMO or Alhaji Kromah's
23 general. We met him at that meeting.

24 Q. Meeting this fellow Abu Keita at that meeting at the
10:55:09 25 Waterworks, had you met him before whilst serving with the RUF
26 from 1991?

27 A. That was my first time of meeting him, because he never
28 fought for my unit, so I did not know him. I was not used to
29 him. It was at that meeting that I got to know him and other

1 officers that he took along with him.

2 Q. What is the nationality of this person Abu Keita?

3 A. Abu Keita is a Mandingo man from Liberia.

4 Q. You said he was a former general for ULIMO, that is, Alhaji
10:55:53 5 Kromah's ULIMO. When you met him at the Waterworks in 1998, do
6 you know if he was attached or connected with any group, whether
7 in Liberia or Sierra Leone?

8 A. When we met him at that meeting, he was introduced to us by
9 Sam Bockarie.

10:56:22 10 Q. What did Bockarie say about the person he was introducing,
11 Abu Keita?

12 A. Sam Bockarie told us that the operation to recapture Kono,
13 that the ammunition for that was got from Abu Keita.

14 Q. Did he say what kind of ammunition this was?

10:56:57 15 A. Yes. He told us how many boxes Abu Keita had brought to
16 him. How many boxes of RPG. He told us everything.

17 Q. Well, please tell us. What amount of ammunition and types
18 of ammunition did Abu Keita bring to Sam Bockarie?

19 A. Abu Keita brought 20 boxes of AK in Buedu.

10:57:42 20 Q. 20 boxes of AK. Is this a weapon? Is this ammunition? 20
21 boxes of AK what?

22 A. 20 boxes of AK rounds, AK bullets, let's put it that way.

23 Q. Besides the 20 boxes of AK bullets, was there any other
24 form of ammunition brought by Abu Keita to Sam Bockarie in Buedu?

10:58:08 25 A. Yes. He also brought five boxes of RPG rockets.

26 Q. Was that all he brought?

27 A. Yes. That's what I know about.

28 Q. The 20 boxes of AK rounds and five boxes of RPG rockets,
29 were those a significant or large amount of ammunition at that

1 time for the RUF?

2 A. The place that we were at that time, the situation in which
3 we were, to have gotten that 20 boxes of AK, it was plenty for
4 us. Those 20 boxes can give us how many rounds of AKs? Yes,
10:59:06 5 because we trusted ourselves.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Did you find out from where Abu
7 Keita got these ammunitions?

8 A. I told you initially that Abu Keita was a general for
9 ULIMO. There was no need for me to ask him. He controlled - he
10:59:25 10 was in control of men. He controlled - he was in control of an
11 area.

12 Q. My question is not whether you had a need to ask him. Did
13 you hear from somebody, such as Sam Bockarie or any other person
14 there, where this man got these ammunitions from?

10:59:45 15 A. This ammunition he had gotten from Liberia where he was
16 commanding at the Lofa bridge. He was the commander at the Lofa
17 bridge according to Sam Bockarie. When the election took place
18 in Liberia in 1997, ULIMO lost that election, and they were
19 keeping this ammunition to re-attack.

11:00:16 20 Q. Are you saying that the ammunition was ULIMO ammunition?

21 A. Exactly so. That particular ammunition that he carried was
22 from ULIMO. He was a commander for ULIMO and he took that
23 ammunition along after the elections in Liberia in 1997, after
24 they had lost the election. And there was something called
11:00:41 25 research and this research was conducted by ECOMOG to look out
26 for arms and ammunition at the various points. So he was afraid
27 and he took the ammunition and brought it to us for sale.

28 Q. Did you yourself ever see this ammunition that you are
29 referring to brought by Abu Keita?

1 A. I saw the ammunition. It was the ammunition that we used
2 to recapture Kono.

3 Q. Where did you see it? Was it at the Waterworks meeting or
4 somewhere else?

11:01:19 5 A. I saw the ammunition in Sam Bockarie's house. From there,
6 when they took it to us again in the Kono Jungle, I saw it there
7 again. We opened it. We used it. I mean, I know about it.

8 Q. Sam Bockarie's house, was this in Buedu?

9 A. Yes, in Buedu, Dawa Road. That was where he stayed.

11:01:46 10 Q. At this meeting at the Waterworks where you first saw Abu
11 Keita, were there any other new faces that you were seeing for
12 the first time at the meeting?

13 A. Yes. I saw different faces. I can remember the two
14 commanders, the two senior officers who came with Abu Keita. I
11:02:12 15 can remember them. I know their names.

16 Q. And who are those people? What are their names?

17 A. One of them is called Jungle. Give me some time. Let me
18 call the other guy's name. The other one's name was Leo.
19 Colonel Leo and Colonel Jungle. They are all from the Mandingo
11:02:53 20 ethnic group.

21 Q. Did you know either of them before that day to have been
22 members of the RUF?

23 A. Since I was fighting with the RUF that was my first time of
24 seeing them in the RUF territory.

11:03:09 25 Q. During the meeting at the Waterworks, did Sam Bockarie say
26 anything about receiving instructions from Charles Taylor to
27 attack Kono?

28 A. Sam Bockarie never told us anything in relation to
29 Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor had his own problem to solve. He

1 never told us anything about Charles Taylor giving us ammunition
2 or sending us ammunition to recapture, no.

3 Q. What do you mean by Charles Taylor had his own problems?
4 What problems are you referring to?

11:03:50 5 A. The man was in control of his country --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly take his
7 answer again slowly.

8 MR ANYAH:

9 Q. Mr George, you must slow down. We were following you and
11:04:09 10 we lost you at some point because of how fast you were going.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you repeat your entire answer? Can
12 you explain the kind of problems you are referring to that
13 Charles Taylor had, please?

14 THE WITNESS: What I mean about Charles Taylor having his
11:04:23 15 own problem, he was elected in Liberia in 1997. He was not
16 fighting. There was no war going on in 1997. How could he have
17 given us instruction? How could he have given us ammunition?
18 That's what I'm saying.

19 MR ANYAH:

11:04:40 20 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Now, you saw the ammunition that Abu
21 Keita brought in Buedu. You saw it again when you were in the
22 jungle. You told us you took part in the attack on Kono. Can
23 you tell us how this attack unfolded, starting with who was the
24 commander for the attack?

11:05:09 25 A. When we talk about Kono, Kono is not a village to say that
26 you would only have one commander. We had various front line
27 commanders, but we had one command structure.

28 Q. Who were some of the front line commanders for this attack
29 on Kono?

1 A. Boston Flomo, alias Rambo.

2 Q. Was he the only one or were there others, I am speaking of
3 commanders?

4 A. I want to give you time so that I can call out the names.

11:05:57 5 I don't want to start talking and you tell me I'm talking fast.

6 Kailondo, alias Vanicious Vandj, but Kailondo was his nickname.

7 Tikeke.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, that was alias who? Kailondo was

9 alias who?

11:06:18 10 THE WITNESS: Vanicious Varney, alias Kailondo. That's his

11 full name. But the name that he was using in Sierra Leone as a

12 fighter is Kailondo. That was his fighting name.

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, did you say Vanicious or did you say Valicious?

11:06:46 15 What did you say?

16 A. Vanicious K Varney.

17 Q. I believe that's on the record already, Vanicious Varney.

18 Mr George, you mentioned some names, Boston Flomo, Vanicious

19 Varney, Tikeke. This T, is that the first initial of this

11:07:14 20 person's name?

21 A. Yes. They called him Tikeke. I think it should be a Mende

22 name.

23 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I am not sure how to spell it.

24 I would spell it K-E-K-E, but maybe the interpreters can assist

11:07:39 25 us?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, do you have a different

27 spelling of the name Keke?

28 THE INTERPRETER: Well, to my mind it should be a single

29 name Tikeke, T-I-K-E-K-E. It's not an initial T and Keke. It's

1 a Mende name for my father, or their father.

2 MR ANYAH: Very well:

3 Q. Mr George, Boston Flomo, Vanicious Varney, also know as
4 Kailondo, and Tikeke. Who else were some of the front line
11:08:22 5 commanders for the attack on Kono in December 1998?

6 A. We had Akim. Superman, I mean Dennis Mingo.

7 Q. Anybody else?

8 A. Morris Kallon. Issa Sesay. And the soldiers they were in
9 control of.

11:09:06 10 Q. Amongst those various front line commanders who was the
11 overall person in the command structure that was at the top?

12 A. The senior officer among them was Issa Sesay.

13 Q. You told us you took part in this attack on Kono. Tell us
14 what happened, as in how long the attack took and who you were
11:09:31 15 fighting.

16 A. I was fighting against ECOMOG and the Kamajors who were
17 based in Kono.

18 Q. Were you successful in your attack on Kono?

19 A. Oh, yes. We overran them.

11:10:05 20 Q. How long did it take you to overrun them?

21 A. We fought from the evening hours to the following morning
22 around 8 o'clock before we could capture Kono.

23 Q. When you captured Kono, how long were you based in Kono?

24 A. I based there in 2002 after the election. We were still
11:10:46 25 controlling the ground until disarmament, election, when the
26 government took over the ground.

27 Q. So you're telling us from December 1998 when the RUF
28 captured Kono, the RUF continued to maintain Kono until
29 disarmament in the year 2002. Is that what you're telling us,

1 Mr George?

2 A. Exactly so.

3 Q. Let's consider that period of time now, 1998, after Kono
4 has been recaptured, through 2002, the disarmament. Immediately
11:11:22 5 following the recapturing of Kono, what was your assignment?

6 A. After capturing Kono - Kono was not the only ground that we
7 targeted. We had places like Tongo, Makeni, Lunsar. If it was
8 possible for us to have captured Freetown, we would have captured
9 Freetown.

11:11:50 10 Q. Is it the case then that some RUF remained in Kono after it
11 was recaptured while others went to these other places, Makeni,
12 Lunsar and Tongo?

13 A. Kono - the RUF soldiers maintained Kono. After Kailahun,
14 Kono was a base for RUF soldiers. Whilst others were taking the
11:12:18 15 route to Tongo, other men were advancing to Makeni. That was how
16 we planned it.

17 Q. Did you stay it in Kono, or did you join some of those
18 others who were going to either Tongo or Makeni?

19 A. Oh, yes I found my way to Tongo with Akim.

11:12:39 20 Q. And what was your assignment at that time with Akim?

21 A. My assignment with Akim was as an adviser. Excuse me, Base
22 Marine was also with us. Let me not leave his name out.

23 Q. Very well. You were with Akim, you were with Base Marine,
24 you were serving as an adviser to Akim. Did --

11:13:08 25 A. And also Vanicious Varney.

26 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Did all of you make your way to
27 Tongo? Did you get to Tongo?

28 A. We got to Tongo. We attacked Tongo and we captured Tongo
29 and we based there.

1 Q. What year were you based in Tongo?

2 A. I told you earlier that we spent Christmas in - we spent
3 December Christmas in Kono. In '99 we were in Tongo.

4 Q. Between the time when you were in Kono in December 1998
11:13:58 5 through into 1999 when you were in Tongo, did you hear about
6 anything happening in Freetown?

7 A. Yes, I heard about it, but I was not there.

8 Q. What did you hear in relation to Freetown?

9 A. I heard about attacking Freetown from the SLAs, SAJ Musa
11:14:30 10 and his group. But unfortunately, SAJ Musa died on the highway
11 and another person took over as a commander and they entered
12 Freetown. But I was not there, so I can't say much about that.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Just remember to take your time.
14 Slow down as you speak so we can keep up with the interpretation.

11:14:50 15 Your statements a few minutes ago was that you heard about
16 attacking Freetown from the SLAs, SAJ Musa and his group. Who
17 was SAJ Musa?

18 A. SAJ Musa was a senior officer for the SLA.

19 Q. [Microphone not activated]?

11:15:23 20 A. They are the national army for Sierra Leone.

21 Q. I have heard this - I have seen this notation "Microphone
22 not activated" --

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't know what is going on, Madam
24 Court Officer, I think it is the switching on and off between the
25 interpreters. Someone is not switching on, you know, in time, or
26 switching off in time, as a result of which part of the record
27 goes missing. I hope you can address this.

28 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we will address this during the
29 break.

1 MR ANYAH:

2 Q. Mr George, the question I had asked you - and it might seem
3 as a silly question, but I will just ask it again: Who are the
4 SLAs? And you said they were the national army for Sierra Leone.

11:16:12 5 Now, you said you don't know much about this attack on Freetown
6 by SAJ Musa, but you also said unfortunately SAJ Musa died on the
7 highway, and another person took over as commander and they
8 entered Freetown. Do you know who took over as commander when
9 SAJ Musa died?

11:16:36 10 A. Not really. I can't tell lies to you. I don't want to be
11 saying they said, they said, they said. I wouldn't be giving the
12 right information. I want to say what I know and what I saw.

13 Q. That's fair enough. We certainly want you to give the
14 Court the right information. But one other question about this
11:17:01 15 whole episode. You were in the RUF at the time. You have told
16 us about the meeting at the Waterworks where there was discussion
17 about re-taking Kono, advancing to Makeni, advancing as far as
18 Lunsar. Did you ever hear of the RUF participating in this
19 attack on Freetown between December 1998 into January 1999?

11:17:27 20 A. No, RUF never took part. Because as I told you about the
21 power greed, there was a group of SLAs that were based in a
22 separate area from the RUF. They found themselves into Freetown
23 while RUF was still in Kono and Makeni. That's what I know
24 about. RUF never took part in that operation. If RUF took part
11:17:55 25 in that operation, really, that's not to my knowledge.

26 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Let's go back to you in Tongo with
27 Akim, Base Marine, Vanicious Varney. What were you, them, and
28 others belonging to the RUF doing in Tongo at the time?

29 A. Please repeat your question.

1 Q. When you captured Tongo with Akim, Base Marine, Vanicious
2 Varney, was there any sort of mining taking place in Tongo at the
3 time?

4 A. No, no, there was no mining activity going on.

11:18:45 5 Q. How long did you stay in Tongo for?

6 A. We stayed in Tongo till after the elections, yes. In
7 Kono - after the elections, the government took over Kono, took
8 over all the country, and everybody started normal life.

9 Q. Yes, my question was: How long did you stay in Tongo for?
11:19:13 10 and you said you said in Tongo until after elections. When was
11 after elections, what year?

12 A. You are talking about myself, or how long RUF stayed in
13 Tongo?

14 Q. I am talking about you, Martin George. How long did you
11:19:33 15 yourself stay in Tongo?

16 A. I never spent a year in Tongo. I was in Tongo with Akim,
17 and then we received an instruction from Sam Bockarie that we
18 should attack Kenema. We went to Kenema and we couldn't make it.
19 On our way back, we received another instruction that we should
11:20:07 20 go to Mano Junction. We went to Mano Junction and we did not
21 succeed because there was a heavy ECOMOG presence there, so we
22 couldn't make it and the order changed that we should go back to
23 our same main ground in Tongo. When we got to Tongo, I asked my
24 boss Akim for a pass that I wanted to go to Kono to see my
11:20:36 25 children. Then he granted me the pass. That was how I left
26 Tongo and went to Kono.

27 Q. Thank you, Mr George. When you started your response you
28 said "I never spent a year in Tongo", and you finished by telling
29 us how you received a pass from your boss Akim to go to Kono to

1 see your children. Now, how many months did you spend in Tongo
2 in 1999?

3 A. I was in Tongo for three months.

4 Q. When you went to Kono to see your children after having
11:21:29 5 received the pass, were you still a member of the RUF at that
6 time?

7 A. Oh, yes, I was a full member of the RUF.

8 Q. And after - incidentally, did you get to see your family
9 when you went to Kono?

11:21:50 10 A. Yes, I met them and I was with them.

11 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Anyah, what does the witness mean by "a
12 full member of the RUF"? Did they have associate members?

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, you've heard Justice Lussick's question. My
11:22:08 15 question was, were "You still a member of the RUF at the time you
16 went to Kono to see your children?" You said, "Yes, I was a full
17 member of the RUF." Can you elaborate? What you do you mean,
18 you were a full member?

19 A. That means I was a member of the RUF from the base as a
11:22:29 20 vanguard where I was trained for the RUF, and when I was still
21 fighting for the RUF I was still a member of the RUF. I never
22 left RUF to joined any party outside. That's what I mean.

23 Q. Very well. After you saw your family, did you take up any
24 assignment for the RUF?

11:22:53 25 A. Yes. It was at that time that I was assigned to Kono as a
26 brigade commander. That's the time I started taking up
27 responsibility by controlling a large group of men.

28 Q. Who gave you this assignment as brigade commander?

29 A. The assignment was given to me by Issa Sesay and it was

1 approved by Sam Bockarie.

2 Q. What year were you given this assignment as brigade
3 commander?

4 A. It was in that same 1999 in the same month of March. I was
11:23:42 5 given that assignment when I came from Tongo.

6 Q. What was your rank at that time?

7 A. I said colonel. It was colonel.

8 Q. So you are a brigade commander in Kono; you are a colonel;
9 it's March 1999. How many RUF fighters did you command? How
11:24:10 10 many were under your command?

11 A. In the first place, a brigade controls four battalions. In
12 these battalions, each battalion controls four companies, and
13 those four companies, one company comprises 248 men. So --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he take his calculation
11:24:45 15 slowly again.

16 MR ANYAH:

17 Q. Mr George, you were trying to explain for us the
18 constituent make-up of battalions companies and the like. You
19 said that a brigade has four battalions, yes?

11:24:59 20 A. Yes, yes.

21 Q. And each battalion is made up of four companies, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How many fighters make up each company?

24 A. 248.

11:25:19 25 Q. How many battalions did you have under your command when
26 you were brigade commander?

27 A. I was controlling four battalions.

28 Q. Did you have approximately 4,000 fighters under your
29 control when you were in - well, I see some questions arising,

1 perhaps, from the Bench. Let me try the math this way:

2 Mr George, if each company has about 248 men, four such companies
3 will come close to a thousand men; do you agree?

11:26:13

4 A. If the figure is right, yes, 248 times four. You can check
5 it.

6 Q. And if each battalion is made up of four companies, then
7 each battalion would have about a thousand men, yes? Mr George,
8 I don't wish to put words in your mouth. Is that the case? How
9 many men, fighters, make up each battalion?

11:26:43

10 A. That's what I am telling you. You can times the four
11 companies to a battalion. When you know the figure, you would
12 know how many men are in a battalion. Because I don't have a
13 calculator to calculate it, that's what I said, that you should
14 do it for me and know the figure. Four companies make a

11:27:05

15 battalion, and those four companies, you check the manpower and
16 times it by the battalion, and then you would know the figure.

17 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Anyah, I have been trying to follow the
18 time frames here just so that the evidence is clear to me.

19 MR ANYAH: Yes, your Honour.

11:27:21

20 JUDGE LUSSICK: Now, I note the evidence just given by this
21 witness. He says he was a colonel in March 1999. Now, the
22 previous evidence was that he was not promoted to a colonel until
23 2000. And I am going back to the transcript at page 28, line 24
24 onwards where you asked him, so is it the case that from 1996
25 when you were made a captain until your promotion to colonel in
26 2000 you remained at the same rank of captain, and the witness
27 answered:

11:27:50

28 "From '94 I was a lieutenant. When they called us out,
29 when the AFRC called us, we joined them, I was promoted to a

1 captain and I maintained that position as captain from '97, '98,
2 '99, 2000. 2000, before I had another rank, that was colonel."
3 And now we have him commanding four battalions in March 1999. I
4 can't reconcile that with his previous evidence.

11:28:32 5 MR ANYAH: Your Honour, I picked up the same discrepancy,
6 if you will, in the evidence. You are entirely right. That was
7 the response given by the witness previously and I will attempt
8 to clarify. I also know that we are almost out of time, but
9 perhaps I can continue until we are out of time.

11:28:52 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Before we break we were doing that
11 mathematics, which according to my calculator, that is, four
12 battalions comprising four companies, each company comprising 248
13 personnel gives a figure of 3,968.

14 MR ANYAH: I have 992 for each battalion and I suppose
11:29:19 15 multiplying that by four will equal exactly what Madam President
16 has said, 3,968.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: So is that what the witness was
18 commanding, thereabouts?

19 MR ANYAH: I will pursue both issues with the witness:
11:29:34 20 Q. Now, Mr George, starting with Justice Lussick's
21 observations. You told us a few minutes ago when I asked you
22 questions about your rank, you said you were first made a
23 lieutenant in 1994 and at some point you were made a captain, and
24 you specified a period of time when you remained a captain. You
11:29:54 25 said you were a captain from 1997 until the year 2000. A few
26 minutes ago in relation to your appointment as brigade commander
27 in Kono, you said the appointment was in March 1999 and your rank
28 was colonel. So the question is this: What year did you become
29 a colonel?

1 A. I am telling you what I know. I served as a brigade
2 commander in 1999. I was promoted to a colonel. From the time
3 that we retreated from the bush in Freetown and we got to Kono,
4 in that first meeting - it was a rank, but I did not put there.
11:30:46 5 So I am just cutting it short. I was recommended to become a
6 major when I captured Tongo. I think if you check my something
7 you will see it. You cannot just move from captain and become a
8 colonel. You go by steps. I know that. From captain you go to
9 major before becoming a colonel.

11:31:05 10 MR ANYAH: Can I proceed this after the break?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. We are going to take the
12 mid-morning break. We'll reconvene at 12 o'clock.

13 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

14 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

12:02:54 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Bangura, you're on your feet.

16 MR BANGURA: May it please, Madam President, your Honours.
17 I wish to announce a change in representation. We've been joined
18 by Mr Nicholas Koumjian on the Prosecution side.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. That's noted. Mr Anyah?

12:03:17 20 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

21 Q. Mr George, before the Court adjourned at 11.30 we were
22 considering the question of when it was that you were promoted to
23 the rank of colonel. Do you recall that?

24 A. Yes, I remember.

12:03:39 25 Q. Now let's have a brief overview of your various promotions.
26 And we shall do so quickly, but with enough care to advise these
27 justices of what rank you had during what period of time. Is it
28 correct that in 1994 you were made a lieutenant?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. You've mentioned this morning that you were promoted to the
2 rank of captain. In what year were you promoted to the rank of
3 captain?

4 A. We are talking about 1997 when we joined the soldiers in
12:04:20 5 Freetown.

6 Q. So you were promoted to captain in 1997?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Before the break, one of the responses you gave was to this
9 effect. You said, "I am just cutting it short. I was
12:04:41 10 recommended as major when I captured Tongo." You were
11 recommended as major when you captured Tongo. Is that when you
12 were with Akim?

13 A. Before we went for the meeting in Buedu for the attack on
14 Kono, some officers were promoted before the Kono operation. And
12:05:13 15 as I was capturing, I had my promotion where I was based at
16 Woama. That was before the Kono operation.

17 Q. You say at the meeting in Buedu. You're referring to the
18 Waterworks meeting, yes?

19 A. Yes, that was the meeting that Mosquito convened.

12:05:37 20 Q. Did you receive a promotion during that meeting?

21 A. I received promotion with other people - a promotion paper.

22 Q. To what rank were you promoted?

23 A. I was promoted to a major, and Vanicious Varney was
24 promoted to lieutenant colonel when he was serving as battalion
12:06:04 25 commander. I brought his promotion paper. Major Ambush
26 Commander, Amara Ambush Commander.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, were these promotions by - the
28 ones in 1997, were they promotions by the RUF, or promotions by
29 the junta?

1 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President, I will clarify. But let
2 me ascertain the year first, because that might assist:

3 Q. The promotion to captain in 1997, Mr George, was that by
4 the RUF?

12:06:45 5 A. It was the RUF. The AFRC or Johnny Paul Koroma never
6 promoted me. All promotions I got was from Sam Bockarie through
7 Issa Sesay.

8 Q. Remind us again of when the meeting at the Waterworks took
9 place. I'm referring to the year.

12:07:11 10 A. The meeting at the Waterworks? It was held in 1998 at
11 Waterworks. That was where we had the last meeting with Mosquito
12 on how we should attack Kono.

13 Q. And was it during that meeting you received a slip of paper
14 promoting you to major?

12:07:35 15 A. Yes, I was not the only person. Even Vincent had a
16 promotion.

17 Q. Mr George, we appreciate that, but let's set aside Vincent
18 for a second. Let's side aside Vanicious Varney and others.

19 We're just focusing on you: Martin George. When you received
12:07:56 20 this paper promoting you to major, was that rank to take effect
21 from the date of that meeting, or was it to take effect sometime
22 in the future?

23 A. The day they gave me the promotion was the day that I was
24 supposed to exercise that promotion. It was not after that. The
12:08:17 25 same day I received my major rank was the same day I started
26 exercising my major rank.

27 Q. What was your rank after being promoted to major? Your
28 next rank, what was it?

29 A. I said I was a captain in 1997. That was what I said.

1 When we left the city, I was a captain.

12:09:00 2 Q. Okay, that was the rank you had before the Waterworks
3 meeting. You then go to the meeting, you receive a slip of paper
4 promoting you to major. After major, did you attain any higher
5 rank than major?

6 A. After the major rank, when I came from Tongo I was serving
7 as adviser to Akim. And when I came back to Kono, that was the
8 time I was recommended to take over the brigade as a colonel.

12:09:25 9 Q. Very well. Mr George, just bear with us. We're following
10 you. We're not questioning you as far as the facts of what
11 you're saying.

12 You're now in Kono; you're a brigade commander; you're a
13 colonel. You told us it was in 1999, and you remember one of the
14 issues we were trying to ascertain before the break was how many
12:09:46 15 persons or fighters were under your command as a brigade
16 commander. Now, you said each company had 248 fighters. You
17 said four companies made a battalion. You said you were in
18 charge of four battalions. Is all of that right, Mr George?

19 A. Yes, it's correct. And I know I had the position, so I
12:10:21 20 cannot lie here to say that I did, when I did not.

21 Q. When we did the math, the President of the Court assisted
22 us. Adding those figures, it totalled 3,968 persons. Does that
23 sound right to you, Mr George? Was that the number of persons
24 that were under your command when you were a brigade commander in
12:10:49 25 Kono in 1999?

26 A. That is the full manpower of the brigade. The --

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be
28 advised to slow down and repeat what he said.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Firstly, Mr Witness, we have now gone

1 beyond the mathematics. The question on the table before you is
2 whether you commanded 3,968 persons. This is now the question.
3 It's either a yes or a no --

12:11:35

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was the manpower that I controlled
5 as a brigade commander.

6 MR ANYAH:

7 Q. Who did you replace as brigade commander in Kono?

8 A. I replaced The Big.

9 Q. What is that person's name? You referred to a Big?

12:12:00

10 A. That is the name I know, The Big. He was in charge of the
11 Kono brigade and he was being deputised by Gasimu.

12 Q. Do you know somebody named Banyah?

13 A. Yes, it was Banyah who replaced me. He took over the
14 brigade when my assignment was changed.

12:12:31

15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, is "The Big" a name?

16 MR ANYAH:

17 Q. Mr George, this person, The Big, is that their full name or
18 real name, or is that a nickname?

19 A. It could be a nickname, because I don't know his full name.

12:12:52

20 But people knew him to be The Big in Kono whilst he was serving
21 there, and as I am explaining now, other people who know the
22 story, they would know that is Martin who is speaking now.

23 Q. Very well. Where was Base Marine when you were assigned as
24 brigade commander in Kono?

12:13:22

25 A. Base Marine was in Tongo. When we went on the Kenema
26 attack he was injured, and he was taken to Buedu for treatment.

27 Q. Was Base Marine, also known as Jonathan Parker, even under
28 your command when you were a brigade commander in Kono?

29 A. Yes. Jonathan, that is his name, that is his full name.

1 It was later that he took that name in Masingbi, like I said,
2 Sherif, Sherif Parker.

12:14:08 3 Q. What I wish to know is, did he at some point come under
4 your command in Kono? We know his name now. When you were
5 brigade commander in Kono, did he come under your command,
6 Mr George?

7 A. Yes. I remember one time when he left Kailahun from the
8 sick - from his sick bed, he came to me from - to Kono and he
9 told me he wanted to go back to Kailahun. And I told him that,
12:14:31 10 "It's not always that I will get food to send for you in
11 Kailahun, but what I will do for you is, I will give you an
12 assignment area so that you will be able to manage your own life
13 also." So that was how I sent him to Masingbi.

14 Q. What was Jonathan Parker's rank when you sent him on
12:14:54 15 assignment to Masingbi?

16 A. Jonathan Parker had already had his rank from - because he
17 was already recommended by Sam Bockarie as major. When he went
18 to Masingbi, he went there as a major. I did not give him the
19 rank.

12:15:12 20 Q. How old, if you know, was Jonathan Parker, also known as
21 Base Marine, by the time he reached the rank of major in the RUF?

22 A. No, I can't tell. I was not that particular about his age.
23 But I knew the age he was when he was at the base.

24 Q. Was he still a young man in 19 - well, let me ask you this:
12:15:46 25 Was it in the year 1999 he was made a major in the RUF?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And you said you knew him when you were at Crab Hole in
28 1991 to be how old?

29 A. I said he could have been between nine to ten years old, if

1 I am not mistaken. I think I said that in my statement, nine to
2 ten years.

3 Q. By 1999, when he was made a major, do you know whether he
4 had engaged in any fighting on behalf of the RUF?

12:16:26 5 A. I said he engaged in fighting in 1997 at the Sewafe Bridge.
6 That was the time he first faced battle. And after there, he
7 still continued battling.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr George. That is helpful. Now, your time in
9 Kono as brigade commander, was there any diamond mining taking
12:16:52 10 place in Kono while you were brigade commander there?

11 A. Diamond mining was organised.

12 Q. Who organised it?

13 A. Issa Sesay organised it and he formed a unit to take care
14 of the diamond mining and I was focused on my front line, but he
12:17:21 15 had people who were in charge of that.

16 Q. Do you remember the names of those who were in charge of
17 diamond mining in Kono?

18 A. Yes, I remember them because they were part of my brigade.
19 I remember Kennedy.

12:17:41 20 Q. Anyone else?

21 A. Peleto, Amara Peleto. Major Alpha. Abdul, Pa Abdul.
22 Those were the people in charge of mining activities.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Amongst these names you've given us,
24 Peleto, you also mentioned Kennedy, Pa Abdul and Major Alpha, who
12:18:12 25 was the most senior person amongst them?

26 A. The most senior person was Kennedy. He was the most senior
27 person.

28 Q. The Kennedy you just mentioned, is that the same person you
29 mentioned previously in relation to diamond mining elsewhere in

1 Sierra Leone?

2 A. Yes, that is the same Kennedy I'm referring to.

3 Q. Were diamonds recovered when they were mined for by the RUF
4 when you were brigade commander in Kono?

12:18:46 5 A. They were getting diamonds from the various sites, but I
6 can't tell - I don't know how many carats. I don't know how many
7 pieces because that was not my area of operation.

8 Q. Do you know who was doing the mining for the diamonds? Was
9 it exclusively done by RUF members or were civilians also asked
12:19:14 10 to mine for diamonds?

11 A. Civilians were mobilised to dig for the diamonds.

12 Q. Do you know to whom the diamonds that were recovered were
13 given?

14 A. Yes. The commander in charge, Issa Sesay, he was the one
12:19:40 15 who received the diamonds. I mean in Kono. He was in charge in
16 Kono. He was receiving the diamonds from the various sites. He
17 received them from Kennedy.

18 Q. Do you know what Issa Sesay did with the diamonds that he
19 received from Kennedy?

12:20:02 20 A. Issa Sesay had his own board to whom he reported. At any
21 time they gave him a parcel, he would - and according to him, he
22 said he reported - presented those diamonds to Sam Bockarie.

23 Q. Where was Sam Bockarie based at this time?

24 A. Sam Bockarie was still based in Buedu.

12:20:30 25 Q. Have you ever heard of the name Benjamin Yeaten?

26 A. Say that again.

27 Q. Yes. Have you ever heard of the name Benjamin Yeaten?

28 A. No.

29 Q. When you were brigade commander in Kono, did somebody named

1 Benjamin Yeaten pay a visit to the RUF in Kono?

2 A. No, not to my knowledge.

3 Q. When you were brigade commander in Kono, did the RUF have
4 radio communication contact with anybody in Liberia named

12:21:12 5 Benjamin Yeaten?

6 A. We never had radio communication with anybody in Liberia by
7 the name of Benjamin Yeaten.

8 Q. Do you know whether any of the diamonds recovered by the
9 RUF when you were brigade commander in Kono were sent to somebody
10 named Benjamin Yeaten in Liberia?

12:21:41

11 A. I am saying, no, never. All I know, all diamonds were
12 given to Issa and from Issa to Sam Bockarie. But I never heard
13 that a particular set of diamonds packed were sent for that
14 particular person whose name you are calling.

12:22:06

15 Q. How about Charles Taylor? Did you ever hear anyone say
16 diamonds that were recovered by the RUF in Kono, when you were
17 brigade commander there, were being sent to Charles Taylor in
18 Liberia?

12:22:30

19 A. Never. Nobody ever told me that they were taking diamonds
20 to Charles Taylor for arms or ammunition or food or what have
21 you. All I knew was that I was focused on my front line and the
22 miners were focused on their mining. I did not have anything to
23 do with the mining activities. I only had business with my front
24 line.

12:22:49

25 Q. Mr George, when you were based in Kono in 1999 where was
26 Foday Sankoh?

27 A. In 1999, if my memory serves me right, I think Foday Sankoh
28 was at first in Nigeria and he was later transferred to Freetown,
29 yes.

1 Q. Was Foday Sankoh a free person at that time in 1999?

2 A. Say that again.

3 Q. Was Foday Sankoh a free person, that is, somebody not in
4 custody, prison or jail, in 1999 when you were brigade commander
12:23:47 5 in Kono?

6 A. Well, I can't say he was a free person, because if he was
7 free he would have come to us. He was not with us. He was still
8 in the hands of the people.

9 Q. Still in the hands of which people?

12:24:06 10 A. The people who arrested him, like the Nigerians. We knew
11 that he was with them. And from there, they turned him over to
12 the Tejan Kabbah government. So he was not with us.

13 Q. At any time in that 1999, did you have communication
14 contact with Foday Sankoh, you yourself, Martin George?

12:24:35 15 A. The only time I saw Foday Sankoh was in Magburaka and that
16 was in 2000 when Banya took over the brigade. It was in 2000
17 when he left Freetown to come and talk to us. That was when we
18 had the infighting, when the late Van Damme was killed in Makeni.
19 That was the time I saw Foday Sankoh in Magburaka talking to us,
12:25:04 20 in 2000. From '96 to 2000, it was in Magburaka that I set eyes
21 on Foday Sankoh.

22 Q. Very well. Have you heard of the Lome Peace Accord that
23 was signed between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone?

24 A. Yes, I heard about it and it was working.

12:25:31 25 Q. Do you know when that accord was signed, the year?

26 A. No, I don't recall the year, but I know about the Lome
27 Peace Accord and it was working. The UN were based at various
28 points in 2000.

29 Q. Do you know whether Foday Sankoh was given any positions in

1 the Government of Sierra Leone after the Lome Peace Accord was
2 signed?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What do you know about that?

12:26:09 5 A. What I know about that is that they said he was now taking
6 care of the mineral resources, if I'm not mistaken, because he
7 was in control of all the strategic points, the mining points,
8 Tongo and Kono, he was in control, so I think that was why he was
9 given that promotion.

12:26:34 10 Q. Where was he based when he was given this promotion? Which
11 part of Sierra Leone was his base?

12 A. In fact, when he left Nigeria and came to Freetown, he was
13 based in Freetown on Spur Road. That was where I met him in
14 2000. That was where I met him and that was where I left him and
15 I went back to Kono.

12:27:01 16 Q. Okay. Let's consider what you've just said, and you also
17 said something earlier that I wish to revisit. We'll do it one
18 at a time. We'll come to your visit to Freetown and Foday Sankoh
19 at Spur Road. A few minutes ago you said, "The only time I saw
12:27:22 20 Foday Sankoh was in Magburaka in the year 2000 when Banya took
21 over the brigade." Let's consider that. The brigade you're
22 referring to, is it the brigade you were in charge of in Kono
23 starting in 1999?

24 A. Yes.

12:27:40 25 Q. What year did Banya take over from you as brigade
26 commander?

27 A. I left the brigade in 2000. Banya took over in February
28 2000.

29 Q. How is it that you went to Magburaka? For what purpose did

1 you go to Magburaka?

2 A. Magburaka was a ground for every one of us. RUF soldiers
3 were based there. I had right to patrol any part of the
4 RUF-controlled territories. I had that full right at that time.

12:28:25 5 So that prompted me to go and visit the other brothers and
6 friends that I had in Makeni and Magburaka.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Just remember to speak slowly. We
8 are following you. So you went to visit RUF friends and
9 colleagues in Magburaka and Makeni and you met Foday Sankoh

12:28:46 10 there. What was Foday Sankoh's purpose in being in Magburaka at
11 that time? What did he come to do there?

12 A. Foday Sankoh entered Magburaka. At first he entered
13 Makeni. When he heard about the infighting that took place, he
14 was not pleased. He came to find out what actually brought about
12:29:16 15 the infighting. That was what brought him to Makeni and
16 Magburaka.

17 Q. What infighting? What does "infighting" mean? Can you
18 tell us what you mean by "infighting that took place"?

19 A. When I am talking about infighting, there was an infighting
12:29:36 20 amongst us, we, the RUF soldiers. It happened this way: There
21 was an instruction given to Boston Flomo and some other soldiers
22 to go and arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi. And Gibril
23 Massaquoi and Superman were both based at Lunsar, and at the same
24 time Superman had his own self based in Makeni. I was not

12:30:12 25 there - I was in Kono - but they left. They went, they saw
26 Superman and Gibril, according to what I heard. When they saw
27 Superman and Gibril, they told him that - they told them that
28 they were under arrest. And Gibril said, "If Issa wanted to see
29 me, he shouldn't send a team to arrest me. He should either

1 invite me, we will go and discuss what he wanted us to discuss."
2 And that was the same thing that Superman too said. And then
3 Superman said, "Okay. If that is the case, Gibril, we shouldn't
4 go anywhere. If Issa wanted to see us, at least he should send a
12:31:00 5 proper order. But he shouldn't send men to come and have
6 confrontation with us." So Van Damme and the group that he
7 carried, they wanted to force issues. So there was an outbreak
8 of riots and he said they are --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
12:31:25 10 to slow down.

11 MR ANYAH:

12 Q. Mr George, you were saying something about Van Damme and
13 the group that he carried. Continue from there and just go
14 slowly.

12:31:35 15 A. I said the group that Van Damme, Boston Flomo, took with
16 him to go and arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi, they escaped
17 from Lunsar because of the outbreak of chaos that took place
18 because the manpower he took with him was not enough. The
19 Superman and Gibril Massaquoi group overran them, so most of them
12:32:08 20 escaped.

21 Q. Let's pause there. Let me ask you questions. The manpower
22 was not enough; are you referring to the manpower taken by Boston
23 Flomo, also known as Van Damme?

24 A. Exactly so. That is what I am talking about.

12:32:26 25 Q. Let's pause. This infighting you started out explaining to
26 us occurred, and you said there was an instruction given to
27 Boston Flomo and soldiers to go and arrest Superman and Gibril
28 Massaquoi. Did that instruction come from Issa Sesay?

29 A. The instruction came from Issa Sesay.

1 Q. Why was it necessary, if you know, to have those two
2 persons arrested? What did they do to Issa Sesay?

3 A. That was the same thing I said about at the earlier stage.
4 It had to do with this same power issue. This person wanted to
12:33:08 5 be the boss and that wanted to be the boss, nobody should say
6 "yes, sir" to the order. So that was what brought about that.
7 According to Issa, Gibri I Massaquoi and Superman should be based
8 in Makeni. They shouldn't be based out of Makeni.

9 Q. Very well. Initially earlier on in your response you said
12:33:42 10 Superman himself was based in Makeni. And in respect of both
11 Superman and Gibri I Massaquoi, you said Massaquoi and Superman
12 were both based in Lunsar. At the time of this infighting just
13 clarify for us - Mr George, just hold on. Let me finish. Let
14 the interpreter also finish. One second. Clarify for us first
12:34:07 15 where Superman was based at the time of this infighting; was it
16 Makeni or Lunsar?

17 A. I said Superman had his - one of his base in Lunsar where
18 he and Gibri I Massaquoi were based, but he had his self base in
19 Makeni. He spent some time in Lunsar and he would spend some
12:34:36 20 time in Makeni. But it was in Lunsar that they went to attack
21 them when Rambo and the few manpower that he took with him went
22 to arrest them.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. That helps. Now, Boston Flomo, also
24 known as Van Damme, is he the same person you referred to as
12:34:55 25 Rambo?

26 A. That is the same person that I have been referring to as
27 Rambo and later Van Damme. I told you that initially he was
28 using the name Rambo. His actual name is Boston Flomo, but it
29 was later that he started using the name Van Damme.

1 Q. Where was Sam Bockarie when Issa Sesay gave this
2 instruction for these two persons to be arrested, Superman and
3 Gibril Massaquoi?

4 A. Sam Bockarie was in Buedu. There was nothing Issa did
12:35:37 5 without the knowledge of Sam Bockarie, so I knew that it was a
6 connected thing between both of them. If Sam Bockarie did not
7 agree, Issa Sesay wouldn't have carried out that action. You see
8 the point?

9 Q. Mr George, you said this happened in the year 2000, is it?

12:36:00 10 A. The infighting? Yes, the infighting, I am talking about
11 2000.

12 Q. Was Sam Bockarie still a member of the RUF in 2000?

13 A. Sam Bockarie was still a member of RUF. It was later in
14 2000 that Sam Bockarie left the RUF, if my memory serves me
12:36:30 15 right.

16 Q. Very well. You mentioned earlier on that this fellow Van
17 Damme died right before or around the time Foday Sankoh spoke to
18 you and others in Magburaka. Was it in relation to this order to
19 arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi that Van Damme died?

12:37:01 20 A. I said earlier that it was as a result of the death of Van
21 Damme, because it was - because of the infighting that we had in
22 2000, that was what brought Foday Sankoh to Makeni and Magburaka.
23 Van Damme died before Foday Sankoh entered Makeni and Magburaka.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr George.

12:37:29 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: That doesn't answer your question.
26 Perhaps you should ask more clearly. Maybe something was lost in
27 the interpretation.

28 MR ANYAH: I will. Thank you, Madam President:

29 Q. Mr George, let me read your answer again. Now, my question

1 was this: Essentially, I'm trying to ascertain when Van Damme
2 died. Did he die before Foday Sankoh came to Magburaka to speak
3 to you and others?

12:38:10 4 A. That is what I'm saying. I said yes, Van Damme died before
5 Foday Sankoh came. He was still in Freetown. That was just what
6 I said.

7 Q. The second part of the question was under what
8 circumstances did he die? Was it connected to the order to
9 arrest Superman and Gibril Massaquoi?

12:38:28 10 A. It was the same order that connects the arrest of Gibril
11 Massaquoi and Super. When they went to arrest Gibril Massaquoi
12 and Super and they failed, Super and Gibril too left with their
13 troops to Makeni. When they entered Makeni, Van Damme came from
14 Mile 91, according to the story, and he was lying in front of his
12:39:01 15 house sleeping when Super and Gibril Massaquoi entered Makeni.

16 They rushed into Van Damme's house with their manpower, and they
17 met Van Damme lying down on the sponge in front of his house and
18 an argument broke out. They did not shoot at Van Damme. I
19 learned that he was stabbed with a knife. But Superman later
12:39:33 20 denied; that he was not responsible for the killing.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr George.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps what the witness meant,
23 Mr Interpreter, was he denied that he was responsible for the
24 killing.

12:39:53 25 THE WITNESS: Superman denied that he was responsible for
26 Van Damme's death.

27 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

28 Q. Mr George, we have you in Magburaka listening to Foday
29 Sankoh speak or talk, and you said earlier that at some point you

1 went to see him at Spur Road in Freetown. In what year and in
2 what month did you go to Freetown to see Foday Sankoh?

3 A. I went to Freetown in February with Peter Vandí who was --

4 Q. [Overlapping speakers]

12:40:45 5 A. -- 2000.

6 Q. Yes, carry on.

7 A. A message was sent from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay that I
8 should go to Freetown. I then went with Peter Vandí --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
12:41:06 10 to repeat the last thing he said.

11 MR ANYAH:

12 Q. Mr George, the interpreter would like some clarification.
13 You said you went with Peter Varney. Is it Varney or Vandí?

14 A. Peter Vandí. Peter Vandí. He is a Mende. He is a Mende
12:41:25 15 man. That is a Mende name. He is not Varney. I am not talking
16 about Vanicious Varney. I'm talking about Peter Vandí. That is
17 a Mende name. He is a Mende man.

18 Q. Okay. Who else besides Peter Vandí did you go to Freetown
19 with?

12:41:41 20 A. I went with another guy who was called Eagle. That was his
21 popular name, Eagle, in the RUF. That was the most popular name
22 by which he was called. Eagle and I travelled to Freetown.

23 Q. How is it that you came to go to Freetown? Were you
24 requested to go to Freetown? Were you just going on your own
12:42:06 25 volition? What was your purpose in going to Freetown?

26 A. I said Foday Sankoh sent instruction to Issa Sesay that I
27 should report to Freetown. I did not just go on my own; I was
28 being sent for.

29 Q. Thank you, Mr George. When you got to Freetown, what

1 happened?

12:43:03 2 A. When I got to Freetown, I met with Foday Sankoh at
3 Spur Road. And at first I briefed him about the ground that I am
4 coming from. The first thing I told him was, "Pa Sankoh, since
5 '96 you left us and we did not see you until the time we saw you
6 in Makeni and Magburaka and I am from Kono. The civilians in
7 Kono, they want you to go and talk to them and inform them about
8 what is actually going on so that you will be able to explain to
9 them the things that are actually going on about the war, because
10 it's long time they have not seen you." That was my first
11 request I made of him.

12 Q. At this time you were speaking to Foday Sankoh in Freetown,
13 was he a member or part of the Sierra Leonean government?

14 A. Yes. I said yes. At that time he and Tejan Kabbah were
12:43:58 15 working hand in glove. Johnny Paul Koroma too. All of them,
16 they were just moving around the town, moving from here to there.

17 Q. And what did Sankoh say, if anything, in response to what
18 you told him?

19 A. He told me yes. He said, "I will go to Kono." And,
12:44:19 20 indeed, he went to Kono.

21 Q. Did he go to Kono immediately after your visit with him?

22 A. After I had visited him, Gibriil Massaquoi was instructed to
23 give me 300 bags of rice to take them to Kono for the soldiers
24 who were based there, including salt, Maggi and some other
12:44:49 25 provisions. And it was after that, a week after that, that he
26 went to Kono.

27 Q. That who went to Kono? Foday Sankoh?

28 A. Foday Sankoh went to Kono.

29 Q. How long did you spend in Freetown when you went to see

1 Foday Sankoh?

2 A. Actually, I spent ten days in Freetown.

3 Q. Were any UN observers or forces present in Freetown in the
4 ten days you were there?

12:45:22 5 A. In fact, it was ECOMOG that was keeping guard on Foday
6 Sankoh in his compound. There were no RUF soldiers there
7 guarding him with arms. He was being guarded by ECOMOG soldiers
8 at the time I am talking about.

9 Q. Yes, besides ECOMOG, my question was about United Nations,
12:45:43 10 UN. Were there any UN observers or forces present in Freetown in
11 the ten days you were there when you went to visit Foday Sankoh?

12 A. Let me tell you, I was not walking around. From where I
13 used to sleep with Peter Vandi, I will go to Spur Road. I spend
14 the whole day there and from there I would go back to where I was
12:46:09 15 lodged. I was not moving about in the city because I did not - I
16 was not familiar to the city. That was my first time being
17 there. I don't want to lie to you.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Was Sam Bockarie still a member of
19 the RUF at the time you met with Foday Sankoh in Freetown?

12:46:29 20 A. Thank you very much. When the instruction was given to
21 Gibriil for me to receive the rice, that was the time I knew that
22 there was a misunderstanding between Foday Sankoh and Sam
23 Bockarie.

24 Q. How did you learn of this misunderstanding?

12:46:55 25 A. Foday Sankoh had a set - a radio set where he was based and
26 it happened this way: Sam Bockarie arrested some white people, I
27 think some NGOs, because I was in Freetown and I got the story
28 from the old man. And Sam Bockarie was asked to release those
29 people whom he had arrested. He refused bitterly. He told Foday

1 Sankoh bitterly, he said no. He said Foday Sankoh should leave
2 Freetown and come and establish a base either in Kailahun or
3 Buedu and he refused too. So he said he should just forget -
4 leave him alone.

12:47:43 5 Q. Who refused to go establish a base in Kailahun or Buedu?

6 A. I am talking about Sankoh. Sam Bockarie suggested that
7 Sankoh should not sit in the middle of his enemies because he
8 considered Kabbah and his soldiers as enemies. He said he was
9 just from jail in Nigeria and he went and settled in Freetown and
12:48:07 10 by rights he was supposed to go and establish his headquarters in
11 our own zones. But Foday Sankoh said no, he was going to be
12 based in the city, and Sam Bockarie did not like the idea, so
13 that was where the misunderstanding came from. So he refused
14 releasing the people he had arrested.

12:48:26 15 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Just remember to go slowly. These
16 persons that you say Sam Bockarie arrested, do you know who they
17 were?

18 A. They were NGO workers.

19 Q. Do you know how this misunderstanding between Sam Bockarie
12:48:49 20 and Foday Sankoh was resolved? How was it settled?

21 A. After receiving the rice, I was given some ECOMOG to escort
22 me to Kono and that was from the ECOMOG commander. So we drove
23 down to Kono with the rice and I went to Issa directly together
24 with the ECOMOG and the food that I was taking to Kono. I gave
12:49:25 25 him the rice that Foday Sankoh sent for the soldiers on the
26 ground. I showed him the strangers that I took to the ground,
27 the ECOMOG, and he received us with --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness was not very
29 clear in that area.

1 MR ANYAH:

2 Q. Mr George, let's pause for a second. You showed Issa Sesay
3 the strangers that you took with you, you were referring to the
4 ECOMOG, and you said he received all of you. Continue from
12:49:58 5 there, please.

6 A. After he received the strangers, I was instructed to take
7 the rice to Ngaiya, a place called Ngaiya.

8 Q. Mr George, can I stop you there for a second. We will come
9 back to it. You were instructed to take the rice to a place
12:50:21 10 called Ngaiya. The question I asked you before you started
11 explaining how you took the rice to Kono, I asked you how the
12 misunderstanding between Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie was
13 resolved, how was it settled. You've now taken us with the rice
14 to Kono and you're now going towards Ngaiya. Can you ask that
12:50:46 15 question first: How was that misunderstanding settled?

16 A. But before the settlement, I think I need to explain. I
17 did not stay in Freetown until it was settled. Certain things
18 happened before that, so I cannot just leave those things out to
19 say they said this or they did that, so I have to clarify things.
12:51:10 20 I have to explain the things that happened before that took
21 place. So am I allowed to explain?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: As long as you speak slowly. If you
23 start speaking, running, running, we will not understand what
24 you're saying, you see? If you listen to the way your lawyer is
12:51:27 25 speaking, he is speaking slowly so that whatever he's saying is
26 being written. You should do the same, please.

27 THE WITNESS: Okay.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, please continue, Mr Anyah.

29 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

1 Q. Mr George, you were explaining how you got to Issa Sesay
2 with the rice and he welcomed you. Slowly now can you continue
3 with your evidence.

4 A. The first question you asked me was how the matter was
12:52:00 5 resolved. The matter was never resolved until Sam Bockarie
6 finally left the RUF. If there is any further question that will
7 come up from that point, then I know what explanation I will
8 give.

9 Q. Okay. You said the matter was not resolved until Sam
12:52:21 10 Bockarie left. When did Sam Bockarie leave the RUF, if you
11 remember?

12 A. Sam Bockarie left the RUF in the same 2000.

13 Q. To where did he go after he left the RUF, if you know?

14 A. He crossed into Liberia and I was in Sierra Leone.

12:52:47 15 Q. Did he go alone to Liberia, to your knowledge, or did he go
16 with others?

17 A. What I understood was that he went with some men.

18 Q. The men that he went with, were they members of the RUF?

19 A. Yes.

12:53:09 20 Q. Do you know whether he crossed into Liberia with his family
21 when he left Sierra Leone?

22 A. Yes. I was told that he crossed into Liberia.

23 Q. With his family?

24 A. With his family.

12:53:31 25 Q. Now, do you know why it was the case that he had to leave
26 Sierra Leone?

27 A. It was the same case of disobedience to the leadership of
28 Foday Sankoh, because he did not want to agree with what Foday
29 Sankoh told him, so that was where the misunderstanding came

1 from.

2 Q. Mr George, do you remember what month and year you took the
3 rice to Issa Sesay in Kono?

4 A. I can't remember the month, but I think it was in that same
12:54:17 5 month that I went because I only spent ten days there. I never
6 spent a month in Freetown. I only spent ten days there.

7 Q. Is it in the early part of 2000 that you went back with the
8 rice to Kono?

9 A. The same month I left Kono and went to Freetown, that was
12:54:41 10 the same month that I brought the rice. I have just forgotten
11 that particular month.

12 Q. Very well. What was your rank and assignment when you made
13 this trip to Freetown after you had been replaced by Banya as
14 brigade commander in Kono?

12:55:12 15 A. First of all, when I went to Freetown, they had a joint
16 team. If there were two men from RUF and two men from the
17 Kamajors. That was the first disarmament. If they wanted to go
18 and disarm the Kamajor group, two representatives of the RUF
19 should be with the UN to monitor the activities, how the
12:55:44 20 disarmament was going on. And when I went to Freetown, I was
21 part of that group. I was still serving as a colonel. I still
22 carried my rank.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, the witness said earlier, I
24 think at page 75, with regard to the time frame, he said he went
12:56:07 25 to Freetown in February of 2000.

26 MR ANYAH: Yes, I recall that.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: And so I would imagine he's saying in the
28 same month of February 2000 he got the bags of rice and returned
29 to Kono. Yes?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes.

2 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

3 Q. Now, you're a colonel. You spoke of the first disarmament
4 around the time you went to Freetown. You spoke of the Kamajors
12:56:36 5 as well. And I had asked you about your rank and assignment.

6 Now, after the trip to Freetown, you're now back at Kono with
7 Issa Sesay. You are still a colonel, yes?

8 A. Yes, I still maintained my rank.

9 Q. What assignment did you receive, if any, after you handed
12:57:08 10 the bags of rice to Issa Sesay?

11 A. I said after presenting the bags of rice to Issa Sesay,
12 there was a joint team to join the UN, that is, two
13 representatives from the Kamajors and two representatives from
14 the RUF. And if the UN were going to disarm somewhere, those two
12:57:32 15 groups would join together. If they were going to the Kamajor
16 areas to disarm, the RUF will be there so that they will know how
17 many weapons are being disarmed. If it was the RUF area, two
18 representatives from the Kamajors will come and join this team
19 and they will go so as for them to know how many weapons the RUF
12:57:54 20 were disarmed with.

21 Q. Were you assigned as an RUF representative to monitor the
22 disarmament of Kamajors? Is that what you're trying to tell us?

23 A. I was assigned with the UN as representative from the RUF
24 to monitor the disarmament programme between the two sides.

12:58:17 25 Q. Thank you, Mr George. That's helpful. How long did you
26 have this assignment for?

27 A. When Issa and I and Foday Sankoh got to Segbwema, the first
28 day they were disarming our men in Segbwema I was there with a
29 team. Issa Sesay was there, Foday Sankoh was there and the

1 disarmament went on. From there after the disarmament Foday
2 Sankoh was going back. He told Issa that I should go to Kailahun
3 to change - to replace Rogers, Momoh Rogers, because he was sick
4 and he needed treatment. That was how I left the unit and - how
12:59:19 5 do they call him? Eagle. Eagle replaced me and I went to
6 Kailahun to take up another assignment.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr George. We understand how you now replaced
8 Momoh Rogers in Kailahun. I had asked about the length of time,
9 that is, how many months, weeks or days, you were this monitor
12:59:49 10 for the disarmament programme with the United Nations. Do you
11 remember how many months you served in that capacity as an RUF
12 representative with the UN to monitor disarmament?

13 A. I did not even serve for a month and I was replaced. I was
14 asked to go and replace Momoh Rogers in Kailahun because they
13:00:14 15 said he needed treatment.

16 Q. What year was that when you were assigned to Kailahun to
17 replace Momoh Rogers?

18 A. It was in the same 2000. Momoh Rogers left Kailahun in
19 2000 and he went to Freetown.

13:00:35 20 Q. What was your title or rank when you went to take over from
21 Momoh Rogers?

22 A. Momoh Rogers was serving in Kailahun as the CSO, security
23 commander, as a colonel. And likewise me, I was a colonel and I
24 went to take over as CSO, the security commander.

13:01:02 25 Q. How many persons did you have under your command as CSO or
26 security commander?

27 A. There as CSO I had a brigade under my control, but it was
28 controlled by someone else. I was not the commander. I was just
29 a security commander. They had their brigade commander.

1 Q. Who was the brigade commander when you were CSO in Kailahun
2 in 2000?

3 A. The brigade commander was Sam Kolleh. He was the brigade
4 commander, and he was based in Pendembu and I was based in
13:01:59 5 Kailahun.

6 Q. What nationality is Sam Kolleh?

7 A. Sam Kolleh is from Liberia. He is a vanguard.

8 Q. Were there any ECOMOG or UN forces present in Kailahun
9 during the period of time when you served as CSO or security
13:02:30 10 commander?

11 A. Yes, the UN was there. The UN was based there. About two
12 companies were based there.

13 Q. What was the size of the UN contingent? Was the size of a
14 UN company the same as you just told us earlier this morning,
13:02:50 15 about --

16 A. The same, 248. The same 248 for each company.

17 Q. Mr George, just remember to slow down. I know you can also
18 understand some English perhaps, but wait for the interpreter to
19 finish. You said there were about two UN companies based there
13:03:12 20 in Kailahun. Do you know the nationalities of those UN service
21 personnel?

22 A. They were Indians. They were from the Indian contingent.
23 They were Indian troops who were based in Kailahun.

24 Q. Where was Issa Sesay based at the time you were security
13:03:33 25 commander in Kailahun?

26 A. Issa Sesay was based - he was based between Makeni, Kono -
27 Makeni and Kono. He would come and spend some time in Makeni and
28 later go and spend some time in Kono, so just like that.

29 Q. What relationship did the RUF under your command in

1 Kailahun have with these UN peacekeepers? Well, let me withdraw
2 the word "peacekeepers", because I don't believe you have said
3 that. You said it was the Indian contingent. What sort of
4 relationship did you, as security commander, have with the Indian
13:04:36 5 contingent from the UN in Kailahun?

6 A. When I got there I did not have any problems with them, and
7 they did not have no problems with me. But it came a time when
8 problem erupted between the Kenyan troops and the RUF. By then
9 fighting broke out, and it was from there that they started
13:04:57 10 having problems with me and I too started having problems with
11 them.

12 Q. We will come back to this problem you say that arose
13 between the Kenyan troops and the RUF. You mentioned earlier the
14 first disarmament. The period of time when you were in Kailahun,
13:05:21 15 was that when there was disarmament in Sierra Leone?

16 A. Yes, that was the first peace that I was talking about
17 before Jetley - no, how do they call him - Opande came and they
18 finished it.

19 Q. Who is Opande?

13:05:49 20 A. Daniel Opande was the one who was in charge of the
21 disarmament process in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

22 Q. Was he a civilian or was he a military person?

23 A. He was the peacekeeping force commander, and I believe he
24 was a military man.

13:06:10 25 Q. Do you know when, as in what year, the first disarmament
26 started in Sierra Leone?

27 A. No, I don't remember.

28 Q. Was it - well, you've told us it was during the time you
29 were in Kailahun as security commander. Now, this - I'm sorry,

1 you wanted to say something, Mr George?

2 A. Yes. I said I was given assignment to go and take care of
3 Kailahun, to take command from Momoh Rogers. The first
4 disarmament process happened when Foday Sankoh left Freetown and
13:07:05 5 came to Segbwema for the first disarmament, and it was in
6 Segbwema that the disarmament took place. And from there they
7 sent me to Kailahun, and they replaced me with Eagle.

8 Q. Okay. When Foday Sankoh and you were in Segbwema when
9 there was the first disarmament - you've now told us that was
13:07:31 10 before you went to Kailahun - do you remember the year you were
11 in Segbwema?

12 A. It was in 2000 that I was in Segbwema. And after that
13 disarmament, there was no other disarmament that took place then
14 until Opande did the last disarmament.

13:07:49 15 Q. Very well. The last disarmament, had it happened - had it
16 started to happen when you were security commander in Kailahun?

17 A. No. The last disarmament started, I think, in 2001, if my
18 memory serves me right. By then I had left Kailahun. And it was
19 in late 2000 when Sam Kolleh changed me from my command and I
13:08:26 20 went back to Kono as an ordinary man, and I was there till that
21 disarmament.

22 Q. Very well. You've just told us Sam Kolleh replaced you.
23 The word you used was "changed me from my command". Are you
24 saying that Sam Kolleh took over from you as security commander
13:08:50 25 in Kono?

26 A. Not Kono.

27 Q. Sorry, Kailahun?

28 A. Yes. He took over command from me in Kailahun to become
29 the security commander.

1 Q. And you said that took place in late 2000, yes?

2 A. Exactly so.

3 Q. Now, let us talk about your time as security commander in
4 Kailahun from sometime in early 2000 to late 2000, when you were
13:09:24 5 replaced by Sam Kollah. You told us that your relationship with
6 the Indian contingent of the UN there was fine until there was a
7 problem between the RUF and Kenyan troops. What was the nature
8 of this problem between the RUF and Kenyan troops?

9 A. The problem did not start between the Indian troops and me.
13:09:56 10 I said the problem started between the RUF and the Kenyan troops,
11 the Kenyans who were assigned in the north. The Kenyans who were
12 assigned in the north had problem with the RUF soldiers who were
13 assigned in the north. That was where the problem started, and
14 that was what I said.

13:10:11 15 Q. Yes, that is what you said. Now, when you say "the north",
16 was there a town in the north where this problem was happening?

17 A. Magburaka, Makeni.

18 Q. What was the nature of this problem? What was the problems
19 that happened between Kenyan troops and the RUF in Magburaka and
13:10:39 20 Makeni in 2000?

21 A. I was in Kailahun, and I received a message from Issa Sesay
22 informing all front lines that the Kenyan UN who were deployed in
23 Magburaka and Makeni were disarming the RUF soldiers by force
24 without the knowledge of the RUF commanders.

13:11:23 25 Q. Yes, carry on.

26 A. So and he said as he was speaking, he said they had already
27 disarmed five of the RUF soldiers and he said they were presently
28 in the hands of the UN in Makeni. So when they went to request
29 from those people --

1 Q. Mr George, there is something on the record I want to stop
2 you now to see if we can correct. The record reads you as saying
3 that you received a message from Issa Sesay to all front line
4 commanders that the Kenyan UN troops who were deployed in
13:12:17 5 Magburaka and Makeni were disarming the RUF soldiers by force.
6 Now, your response continued by you saying:

7 "So he said as he was speaking, he said they had already
8 disarmed five of the RUF soldiers and he said they were presently
9 in the hands of the UN in Makeni."

13:12:41 10 So carry on from there. Who disarmed the RUF soldiers?

11 A. I am talking about the UN who were based in Makeni. We are
12 now talking about the UN. We are not talking about government
13 troops any more. We are now talking about the UN.

14 Q. I understand. Continue with your response. This is the
13:13:04 15 message from Issa Sesay. Carry on.

16 A. So later in the evening, Augustine Gbao, Morris Kallon and
17 other soldiers went to Makeni, to the UN base in Makeni, and I
18 was still in Kailahun, but I was monitoring the activities of our
19 men, I was monitoring the activities of the UN. So Morris
13:13:47 20 Kallon, Augustine Gbao and others went to the UN base requesting
21 the release of the five men who had been disarmed. From there,
22 according to Morris Kallon, fighting broke out from amongst them.
23 And we were still peaceful with our own UN men in Kailahun. We
24 did not have problems. We were doing things in common. And
13:14:17 25 after two days, the fighting escalated and it became serious.

26 Q. Mr George, sorry to interrupt you, but let me just ask a
27 few questions. You said that according to Morris Kallon fighting
28 broke out from amongst them. The fighting that broke out was
29 between whom and whom?

1 A. It was between the UN and the RUF soldiers.

2 Q. And then continuing you said, "We were still peaceful with
3 our own UN men in Kailahun." Are you referring to the Indian UN
4 contingent in Kailahun?

13:15:08 5 A. Exactly so. That is what I am talking about.

6 Q. Now, when the fighting escalated, because your last
7 response before I interrupted you was, "And after two days the
8 fighting escalated and it became serious", when the fighting
9 escalated, are you referring to the fighting that was taking
10 place in Makeni?

13:15:31

11 A. The fighting in Makeni and Magburaka. The UN were not just
12 based in Makeni. They were based in Magburaka and Makeni. So
13 those two places, there was serious fighting going on there.
14 After two days Issa sent me a message.

13:15:52

15 Q. What was the nature of the message you were sent by Issa
16 Sesay?

17 A. I was at my house when he sent message to my senior
18 command, Kawa, and it was Kawa who received the message and he
19 called me and I went to the radio room. He read the message and
20 he was saying that I should arrest the UN whom I had in Kailahun.

13:16:15

21 Q. Mr George, we understood what you just said. This Kawa
22 fellow, is it the same Kawa you referred to previously as being
23 your signal commander in a previous assignment?

24 A. When I took over command in Kailahun, that is the same Kawa
25 man that I am referring to. Daf was my signal man when we were
26 in Ngolahun Vaama. The second person was Kawa, my signal man in
27 Kailahun, where all the UN activities took place. He was the
28 signals commander.

13:16:43

29 Q. Thank you. And just remember to go slowly. You are now

1 telling us about the other message from Issa Sesay relayed to you
2 from Kawa. Kawa read the message to you and you said the message
3 asked you to arrest the UN that you had in Kailahun. Now, can
4 you continue from there?

13:17:27 5 A. I read the message. But what I did was, I called the
6 various commanders with whom I was sharing orders and I showed
7 them the message, and that included Jonathan Kposowa because he
8 was still on the ground with me in Kailahun. And there was
9 another old man called Pa Binda. Jonathan Kposowa was my general
13:17:59 10 adjutant. He was still with me. Pa Binda was my adviser and
11 other commanders who were assigned under me, like Tom Sandy. Tom
12 Sandy, he too was assigned under me. I showed them the message.

13 Q. Just a minute. We will continue. This Jonathan Kposowa,
14 is that the same person that was with you at Crab Hole?

13:18:25 15 A. Exactly so. That is the same person I'm still talking
16 about.

17 Q. What was Kposowa's rank at the time you say he was your
18 general adjutant?

19 A. Kposowa was a colonel, just like me.

13:18:41 20 Q. What was his responsibility or function? What did a
21 general adjutant do in the RUF?

22 A. Normally I told you that from the base he was responsible
23 for the taking of records on the activities of the recruits. And
24 even when we got to Zogoda, he was still the general adjutant to
13:19:04 25 Foday Sankoh. He was taking records, doing the writings, writing
26 of letters, so he was in charge.

27 Q. You mentioned Tom Sandy as being one of the commanders
28 assigned under you. What were the responsibilities of Tom Sandy
29 in Kailahun when you were there as chief security commander?

1 A. Tom Sandy was the MP commander. He was the MP commander,
2 the reinforcement commander. They called it the MP and the MP
3 was a unit on its own. He was the commander for that particular
4 unit.

13:19:50 5 Q. And MP, does it have the same meaning it had at Crab Hole,
6 Military Police?

7 A. Exactly so.

8 Q. The person you mentioned as your adviser, Pa Binda, was
9 that person a civilian or a member of the RUF?

13:20:08 10 A. He was member of RUF.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do we have a spelling of that person on
12 the record?

13 MR ANYAH: Phonetically I will spell it B-I-N-D-A:

14 Q. Mr George, you were at a point where you were telling us
13:20:58 15 that you showed them the message. You were referring to
16 Pa Binda; your general adjutant Jonathan Kposowa, and persons
17 like Tom Sandy. What did you discuss with them when you showed
18 them the message you received from Issa Sesay. And let's go
19 slowly. Just take it slow for us. What did you discuss at that
13:21:16 20 point?

21 A. I showed them the message. I wanted to get their views and
22 I told them that this was the instruction given to me and all of
23 us were working together, so what are we going to do? They gave
24 their views. Some said, "Oh, let's go and attack them", this and
13:21:45 25 that. But looking at the attacking of them, yes, you can attack
26 them, that is one thing, but look at the position of the men you
27 are supposed to attack. That should be another thing. After
28 some of them said, "Oh, let's go and attack", I said, "Okay, what
29 we should do here" --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness is not clear
2 there.

3 MR ANYAH:

4 Q. Mr George, let's review what you just said. You said some
13:22:11 5 of them said you should attack. Are you referring to some of the
6 persons in the RUF you showed the message?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And the persons they said you should attack, are you
9 referring to the Indian UN contingent in Kailahun Town?

13:22:30 10 A. Exactly so.

11 Q. In response to them suggesting that you should attack you
12 said you told them to review something. Can you carry on from
13 there. What did you say in response to the suggestion that you
14 should go and attack this UN contingent?

13:22:51 15 A. After they brought up their suggestions --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, firstly you are not listening
17 to the interpretation obviously. Secondly, you're still rushing.
18 Now do two things: Listen to the interpretation and then slow
19 down as you're giving your evidence, please. Now repeat your
13:23:12 20 answer.

21 MR ANYAH:

22 Q. Mr George, you're the CSO, you've showed them the message,
23 they've said you should go and attack, you had a response for
24 them. Take us through what you told them, and just do it slowly.

13:23:29 25 A. I said I told them to go and relax, they should go to bed.
26 I said the following day I will know what to do.

27 Q. What happened on the following day?

28 A. The following day - but even before that happened the two
29 commanders, Major Puni a and Major Nair, they came to me.

1 Q. Two commanders, Major Puni a and Major Nai r?

2 A. Nai r, yes.

3 Q. Were these RUF members?

4 A. They were UN commanders, the company commanders. The two
13:24:17 5 company commanders, Major Nai r and Major Puni a.

6 Q. Were they part of the Indi an UN contingent in Kailahun that
7 you referred to before?

8 A. Yes, they were the two company commanders, the two senior
9 officers.

13:24:33 10 Q. You said before, the follo wing day the two company
11 commanders came to you. Why did they come to you?

12 A. They came to me with an intention of disarmament first in
13 Kailahun. They said they wanted me as the commander to disarm
14 first. They said I should be the first person to disarm. And

13:25:04 15 before - and that this I am saying happened before I received the
16 message for me to arrest them.

17 Q. I will let you carry on with your answer but I need to ask
18 a few questions. You just said that these two commanders, Puni a
19 and Nai r, came to you before you received the message to arrest
13:25:27 20 them. Are you saying these two persons came to pay you a visit
21 and asked you to disarm before Kawa received the message from
22 Issa Sesay asking you to arrest the UN contingent?

23 A. Yes. Before they used to go to town, they would visit me,
24 we sit together, I never had problems with them and they too
13:25:54 25 never had problems with me.

26 Q. Who used to visit you and not have problems with you
27 before?

28 A. The two commanders, Major Puni a and Major Nai r. They used
29 to visit me. They visit me.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, the question was not answered,
2 the first question that you asked. Which came first, their
3 coming to disarm the witness or the message from Issa Sesay?
4 That question has been left hanging.

13:26:27

5 MR ANYAH:

6 Q. Mr George, can you help us. You were telling us now of
7 several visits by Punia and Nair. Let's break them down. The
8 President wants to know the visit they came to ask you to disarm,
9 did that happen before your signal man Kawa read you this message
10 from Issa Sesay to arrest the Indian contingent?

13:26:50

11 A. I said yes, those people came to me first before I received
12 the instruction from Issa to arrest them. They came to me to
13 disarm me first, me being the commander in charge in Kailahun,
14 and I had said yes.

13:27:18

15 Q. Second question: How many days or weeks or months passed
16 from the day they came to ask you to disarm until the day you
17 received the instruction from Issa Sesay? How much time passed
18 between those two events?

13:27:40

19 A. It was a week. Just a week. Just a week passed and I
20 received instruction.

21 Q. You were telling us of other visits by Punia and Nair to
22 you and you said you had no problems with them. Those visits
23 that you used to make to you, were those visits before they came
24 to ask you to disarm?

13:28:04

25 A. These visits were before. It was before they asked me to
26 disarm. Because we used to mingle with them. We were all on
27 that same ground. They used to visit me, we sit and discuss.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, when the witness says, "They
29 came to me to disarm me first, me being the commander in charge

1 of Kailahun, and I said yes," does that mean he disarmed at that
2 stage?

3 MR ANYAH:

4 Q. Mr George, when they came to disarm you first as the
13:28:41 5 commander, did you disarm?

6 A. I never disarmed. The reason why I said yes, I am
7 ascertaining what I had said before, because I had said it
8 before. They came to me with the suggestion, but I did not
9 disarm. I disagreed.

10 Q. Very well. You said that you used to mingle with them
11 before. "We were all on the same ground." Did you have a
12 separate base from them, or were all of you based together in the
13 same place in Kailahun?

14 A. We were based in Kailahun, but they had a separate base.

13:29:28 15 Q. Did you have any social activities that you did with them
16 when all of you were based in Kailahun in separate bases?

17 A. Yes. I remember that at one time we had a volleyball match
18 with them.

19 Q. Okay. We now move forward, and they come and they ask you
13:29:51 20 to disarm, and you refuse to disarm, and then you say a week
21 later a message comes from Issa Sesay to arrest them. You show
22 your commanders the message, you tell them to go and rest until
23 the next day. Before the next day comes, Punia and Nair come and
24 pay you a visit. Can you tell us what happens when those two
13:30:15 25 come and pay you a visit after you receive the message from Issa
26 Sesay to arrest them?

27 A. Please go over that again. Let me see it. Because there
28 is something in there that I have not actually understood.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think this is a good time to take a

1 break and return with fresher minds to this evidence at 2.30.

2 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Anyah, we'll

14:33:20 5 continue.

6 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President. Madam President,
7 there's a change of appearance on the Defence bar. Michael Herz
8 has left us and it remains Mr Munyard and myself:

9 Q. Mr George, before the luncheon adjournment we were

14:33:39 10 considering a visit that was paid to you by two members of the
11 Indian contingent of UN forces in Kailahun Town, Majors Punia and
12 Nair. You told us that Punia and Nair paid you a visit shortly
13 after you had received a message from Issa Sesay ordering you to
14 arrest the UN contingent in Kailahun.

14:34:04 15 Now, can you continue from there and tell us what happened
16 after you held a meeting with your commanders, including persons
17 like Jonathan Kposowa, and you told them to go away for the
18 evening and to come back on the following day. Can you tell us
19 what happened?

14:34:29 20 A. They came back the following day. I mean the following - I
21 mean the following morning I called Kposowa. I told him to write
22 to the two commanders of the UN who were based in Kailahun.

23 Q. Can I stop you there. The two commanders that you asked
24 Kposowa to write to, what were their names?

14:35:00 25 A. He wrote to Punia, Major Nair, and other commanders, but it
26 was only Major Nair and Major Punia whose names I can remember.

27 Q. Now, before we get to this point where Kposowa writes to
28 those two majors, from the time you received the message from
29 Issa Sesay, the message or order to arrest them, did those two

1 commanders come and pay you a visit at your base?

2 A. After they had come - it was after they had come before I
3 received the message. They used to visit me and return.

4 Q. We know they used to pay you visits before you received the
14:35:59 5 message. We know that. After you received the message, did they
6 pay you a visit at your base?

7 A. No, they did not pay me visits.

8 Q. Okay. Carry on from --

9 JUDGE DOHERTY: Sorry, Mr Anyah, I don't wish to be
14:36:21 10 pedantic, but visits and a specific visit relating to that
11 incident I feel are different, so I just want to make sure that
12 we're talking specific rather than general.

13 MR ANYAH: Yes. Thank you, Justice Doherty, we will pursue
14 it further with the witness.

14:36:37 15 Q. Mr George, after you received the radio message from Issa
16 Sesay instructing you to arrest the UN Indian contingent in
17 Kailahun, did either of these two majors, Puna or Nair, pay you
18 a visit, come and see you one time at your base?

19 A. I said before receiving the instruction they used to visit
14:37:10 20 me.

21 Q. And how about after you received the instruction? Did they
22 continue to visit you at your base?

23 A. After I had received the instruction, they were not
24 visiting me at my house at the base.

14:37:32 25 Q. Now, we were at the point where you said Jonathan Kposowa
26 was writing a letter to these two majors. Who asked Kposowa to
27 write the letter?

28 A. I told Kposowa to write the letter.

29 Q. What was your purpose for writing the letter?

- 1 A. My purpose was after I had received the instruction I
2 couldn't just walk on them like that. They were military
3 personnel like me. In order to capture them, I had to use
4 military strategies. That was my purpose of writing the letter
14:38:21 5 to them, so that I can invite them in a meeting, then have them
6 arrested.
- 7 Q. Was the letter written on your behalf by Jonathan Kposowa?
- 8 A. Say that again.
- 9 Q. Was the letter written by Kposowa as you requested?
- 14:38:41 10 A. I told them that I wanted to see them in a meeting. I told
11 them I wanted to answer them. They had asked me to disarm, so I
12 told them that I wanted to answer them. That is what I told
13 Kposowa it write in the letter.
- 14 Q. Yes, did he write the letter and did you and Kposowa send
14:39:06 15 it to these majors?
- 16 A. Kposowa wrote the letter and he himself took the letter to
17 the various commanders to whom he had written.
- 18 Q. Was it just Majors Punia and Nair that the letter was
19 addressed to or were there other people the letter was addressed
14:39:29 20 to?
- 21 A. There were other commanders apart from Major Punia and
22 Major Nair, but because they were the two senior officers they
23 are the ones I focused on. But they brought bodyguards as well,
24 so that summed them up to eleven of those whom I arrested.
- 14:39:51 25 Q. Okay, we'll get to your arrest of these eleven persons.
26 The issue now - and just help us - is how many people was that
27 letter addressed to? Was it two people? Was it more than two
28 people? How many people did you send the letter to?
- 29 A. The letter was sent to the various commanders. I think

1 there were about nine in number with some bodyguards making them
2 eleven.

3 Q. These commanders that the letter was sent to, were they
4 members of the UN contingent in Kailahun at the time?

14:40:32 5 A. Yes, they were members.

6 Q. Did they react or respond to the letter when they received
7 it?

8 A. They were happy to come because they wanted me to disarm.
9 So they were happy when they got the message.

14:40:49 10 Q. How many people came to you after receiving this letter?

11 A. I said eleven in number.

12 Q. Were you at your house or base when they came to you?

13 A. I was at my house when they came for the meeting right in
14 Kailahun Town itself.

14:41:12 15 Q. What happened when they came for this meeting?

16 A. When they came for the meeting, we went to the meeting
17 place in the hall and I told them why I had called them. I told
18 them, I said, "Well, Major Puni a, Major Nair," I said, "I am very
19 sorry to tell you guys that you are under arrest because of the
14:41:53 20 situation that was going on in the north. And I don't want you
21 to assist here, so I'm arresting you guys until we see what the
22 situation would look like." That was what I told them.

23 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I notice that the question I
24 posed before that answer was not reflected on the record but the
14:42:16 25 answer of the witness is, and that question was: What happened
26 at the meeting, if I remember correctly.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're having the same problem that we had
28 before the lunch break where somebody doesn't switch their
29 microphones when they should. That is why some questions are not

1 being reflected. I did ask Madam Court Officer to deal with it.
2 I don't know what happened.

3 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I did inform the chief of the
4 interpretation section and apparently the explanation is that
14:42:51 5 sometimes the microphone may be on because they are expecting the
6 witness to continue to speak and then counsel then responds and
7 by the time - and then a small portion may be lost. So if
8 counsel could wait, a pause after the answer before responding.
9 That was the explanation that was advanced.

14:43:16 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Overlapping speakers]. I don't think
11 that is a valid excuse, really. I mean, counsel has to have some
12 kind of control over his case. It's not - the interpreters are
13 not in control here. Counsel knows when to come in, when to ask
14 for a clarification. The interpreters simply have to go with the
14:43:34 15 flow and to pull up to speed.

16 Please continue, Mr Anyah.

17 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

18 Q. Mr George, you were telling us what you told these UN
19 representatives that came for the meeting. You told us
14:43:55 20 previously they totalled 11 in number. Now, after you told them
21 in your words that "I'm arresting you guys until we see what the
22 situation would look like," what was their response, if any?

23 A. They had nothing to say because they were not expecting
24 that.

14:44:23 25 Q. The situation that you referred to that was going on in the
26 north, in which part of Sierra Leone was that situation going on?

27 A. I said Magburaka and Makeni.

28 Q. Did you in fact arrest these 11 members of the UN
29 contingent in Kailahun?

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. Can you give us a time frame for when this arrest took
3 place? What month and what year?

14:45:13

4 A. I can't remember the month, but I arrested them in
5 Kailahun. I can remember that, but I can't remember the month.
6 It's taken some time now. I'm saying this thing - you know, some
7 of us are smart, but it was never recorded.

8 Q. Was it in the year 2000?

9 A. In the year 2000.

14:45:31

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think the witness said he can't
11 remember the month although the record shows the opposite. I
12 hope they will pick it up.

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, how long did they remain under arrest?

14:45:50

15 A. I kept them for two weeks.

16 Q. Where did you keep them?

17 A. They were in one town near Kailahun called Giema. Giema.
18 Giema.

14:46:19

19 Q. Was Issa Sesay aware of the fact that you had arrested 11
20 UN members?

21 A. Yes, I told him. I said, instead of attacking - I was not
22 able to attack, but I arrested them and they were with me. And
23 he said I should keep them.

24 Q. What response, if any, was the UN's after you took these
25 persons under arrest?

14:46:43

26 A. He didn't give me any response. I told them I didn't want
27 fighting. They should advise their men not to attack because if
28 they do, it wouldn't be good for them.

29 Q. It wouldn't be good for whom?

1 A. For the UN. The commanders whom I had arrested, I told
2 them to advise their men that they were on the base until we can
3 find out what the situation was, but if they attacked my
4 position, it won't be good.

14:47:21 5 Q. What did Issa Sesay say after you told him that you had
6 arrested these men?

7 A. His answer was I should hold on to them.

8 Q. Under what sort of conditions did you keep them under
9 arrest in this place called Giema?

14:47:49 10 A. I kept them in Giema. They were not punished. Although I
11 restricted their movement. But they were eating. But I had one
12 other officer who used to take their food to them by the name of
13 Captain Sunie. He was the liaison officer between us. Whatever
14 they needed, he will go to the base and collect it for them.

14:48:15 15 Q. Captain Sunie?

16 A. Sunie.

17 Q. Was he part the RUF or was he part of the UN contingent?

18 A. He was part of the UN contingent.

19 Q. And he was a liaison officer between whom and whom?

14:48:41 20 A. Him and the RUF soldiers, because he was dealing with me
21 more specially.

22 Q. You said that you gave the persons who were arrested food.
23 You said that you restricted their movement, but was it the case
24 that they were not free to leave?

14:49:06 25 A. They were not free to move around because, in the first
26 place, I didn't want - the thing that I was afraid of, not to
27 attack them, just in case my boys see them and they attacked
28 them. That was what I was afraid of. That was why I restricted
29 their movement.

1 Q. Was there news coverage or publicity about the arrest of
2 these Indian UN contingent by you and your RUF colleagues in
3 Kailahun?

14:49:50

4 A. Yes, it was news. And it never went down well with the
5 civilians.

6 Q. What never went down well with what civilians?

7 A. The arrest of the UN in Kailahun Township, it did not go
8 down well with the civilians.

9 Q. What happened after they were in custody for two weeks?

14:50:10

10 A. It was at one time that we called on the civilians where I
11 had kept them for a meeting. I went there and the civilians told
12 me that I should release them because they did not want any
13 problem in their district. Then I went back to Kailahun.

14 Q. And what did you do after meeting with the civilians?

14:50:49

15 A. When I went back to Kailahun, I was still under pressure to
16 release those people. So at one point in time I called Kposowa
17 and other people and I told them that was what the civilians were
18 saying, that they didn't want problem. So I was releasing the
19 people. The 11 people whom I had captured, I was going to
20 release them to go back to their camp where they had come from.

14:51:13

21 I released them in Kailahun and they went back to their men where
22 they were based.

23 Q. Did you release all 11 of them?

24 A. All 11 of them were released and they went back to their
25 base.

14:51:32

26 Q. Was Issa Sesay aware of your intention to release them
27 before you released them?

28 A. When he heard the information, in fact, he called me over
29 the signal. He asked for the 11 men whom I had arrested and I

1 told him that I had already released them because the civilians
2 were pressurising me and he became angry, and he said when he
3 comes from Kono to Kailahun he would want to see those people and
4 these people had already gone to their base. I wouldn't go there
14:52:11 5 to arrest them any longer.

6 Q. Did he know you were going to release them before you
7 released them?

8 A. Whether he knew?

9 Q. Yes. Did Issa Sesay know, that is, did someone tell him or
14:52:29 10 was there a way he knew that you were going to release them
11 before you released them?

12 A. After I had released them, he got the information that I
13 had released the 11 UN that I captured - I mean, that I arrested.
14 So from there he called me in the signal room and asked me for
14:52:51 15 those 11 men and I told him they were under my command. And I
16 told him that I had released those people because the civilians
17 had told me to release them because they didn't want any problem
18 in our district. So he became angry and he told me that when he
19 comes to Kailahun he would want to see the 11 UN that I've spoken
14:53:12 20 about.

21 Q. Mr George, I understand your response, but the question, if
22 you listen closely, was not what Issa Sesay did after you
23 released them. The question was, before you released those men,
24 did Issa Sesay know; before you set them free, did he know you
14:53:30 25 were going to set them free?

26 A. I said, no, I did not inform him. I did it before I
27 informed him.

28 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Now, these UN members that you
29 arrested and detained for two weeks, were they the only ones

1 during that period of time in 2000 that were arrested by the RUF
2 in Sierra Leone?

3 A. As I told you earlier, the incident happened from Makeni to
4 Magburaka. There were a lot of UN who were arrested by Issa and
14:54:15 5 other people in Makeni and Magburaka.

6 Q. Do you know from which contingent or countries some of
7 those other UNs that were arrested in Makeni or Magburaka came?

8 A. Yes. I can remember most of them were Kenyans, although
9 they had some white among them, but they were not many. They
14:54:39 10 were from the Kenyan contingent.

11 Q. Did the arrest of those Kenyan UN members take place also
12 in the year 2000?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you know what happened to those that were arrested in
14:54:57 15 Makeni or Magburaka? I'm referring to the Kenyan members of the
16 UN.

17 A. Those who were arrested in Magburaka and Makeni, Issa took
18 them to Liberia.

19 Q. Do you know why he took them to Liberia?

14:55:19 20 A. No. He never disclosed anything to me.

21 Q. After you released the Indian UN members, did you suffer
22 any penalties or punishment from Issa Sesay by virtue of having
23 released them?

24 A. Yes. Just after I had released those people, the next
14:55:50 25 thing was my assignment. He told me to leave Kailahun and return
26 to Kono.

27 Q. When you left Kailahun, did you go to Kono?

28 A. Yes, I went to Kono. I went back to Kono and that was
29 where I was.

1 Q. What was your assignment when you went to Kono?

2 A. When I went to Kono, I was not taking part in any
3 assignment. I was just on the ground as an officer.

4 Q. Was that a form of punishment, given the position that you
14:56:37 5 had held in Kailahun as chief security officer before going to
6 Kono?

7 A. Yes, I took it to be a punishment because he had said that
8 what I did was without his consent, I had done it on my own. And
9 before that, at one time he went to Pendembu and he sent for me
14:57:03 10 from Kailahun. That was the day that the car that I was using,
11 had it not been giving me hard times - difficulties, if I had met
12 him there he would have flogged me seriously. But the car that I
13 was using was giving me problems. That was why I did not receive
14 the beating, because he actually had gone there to give me some
14:57:25 15 beating.

16 Q. And the "he" you are referring to, is that Issa Sesay?

17 A. I am talking about Issa. Issa Sesay.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Who was the RUF commander in Kono
19 when you returned there?

14:57:44 20 A. Before going - let me clarify something first. After I had
21 released the Indians, it was an operation that the UN put
22 together to go and release - to go and release their men in
23 Kailahun after I had released them from where I had kept them,
24 but their movement was still restricted even after I had released
14:58:19 25 them. So Jetley, who was the UN force commander, he said he
26 wanted a rescue mission. He called for more manpower in Daru,
27 more than 1,000 with some sophisticated weapons, and they came on
28 the rescue mission. It was on a Friday in that same 2000. I was
29 still busy in Kailahun.

1 That morning I saw the movement and I knew something was
2 going to happen. I called Kposowa, I called Pa Binda and I told
3 them I had seen something, the movement of the people was not
4 satisfying to me and that everybody should be careful. Kposowa,
14:59:28 5 Pa Binda said they were going to ask the UN what was going on.
6 On their way going, I only heard the sound of a rocket in the
7 town. They had launched an attack. At the same time where the
8 other troops were advancing were based - they were advancing to
9 Pendembu. The men on our own ground were not enough and where
15:00:04 10 they were based I couldn't have been able to challenge them.
11 They had the advantage over me.

12 Q. Mr George, let's clarify some of the things you've said.
13 I'm sorry to interrupt you, but it's better we do it now. You
14 said after you released these UN representatives their movement
15:00:21 15 was still restricted. How was their movement still restricted
16 after you had released them?

17 A. After I had released them, the place where they were, their
18 movement was restricted because they were in a camp. Their
19 movement was only within the camp. They were not coming to town.
15:00:43 20 Their activities were limited only where they were based. They
21 were not coming to the township of Kailahun. That's what I meant
22 by their movement was restricted.

23 Q. You've mentioned Jetley as the UN force commander. Do you
24 know from which country Jetley came?

15:01:04 25 A. Jetley was an Indian man. He was a commander for all the
26 peacekeepers.

27 Q. You mentioned a rescue mission, more than 1,000 manpower in
28 Daru with sophisticated weapons. Who was going to carry out this
29 rescue mission?

1 A. It was the UN that was carrying out the rescue mission
2 against the RUF in Kailahun.

3 Q. You've mentioned that they launched an attack. The same
4 time where the other troops were advancing were based, they were
15:01:42 5 advancing to Pendembu. Let's consider that in bits and pieces.
6 Who launched an attack?

7 A. I said the UN launched an attack on us in Kailahun.

8 Q. Your reference to Pendembu previously was in connection
9 with what, that attack or another attack?

15:02:08 10 A. It was in connection with the same day that the troops who
11 were attacking in Kailahun that the troops who were Daru were
12 advancing towards Pendembu to receive the ones who were in
13 Kailahun.

14 Q. The troops that were advancing to Pendembu, were they RUF
15:02:30 15 or were they UN troops?

16 A. I said UN.

17 Q. So the UN was advancing to Kailahun and Pendembu at the
18 same time. Is that what you're telling us?

19 A. The UN were advancing to Pendembu whilst the others in
15:02:49 20 Kailahun were advancing towards Pendembu to meet the other men
21 who were coming to receive them.

22 Q. Very well. And the people moving from Kailahun to Pendembu
23 to meet the UN that was advancing to Pendembu, those were also UN
24 members, yes?

15:03:08 25 A. Yes, they were all UN members.

26 Q. Carry on. What happened after the UN launched these
27 attacks - or this attack?

28 A. After the UN had launched this attack in Kailahun, I called
29 the few men whom I had with me in the town and I said,

1 "Gentlemen, the place that we are based now, we cannot engage
2 those men." I looked at the position of the men. "Let us leave
3 them - leave their base and go on the road. On the way going
4 towards Pendembu we can jump behind them, but the suppressive
15:04:00 5 firing on top of that hill" - you know, where they were based,
6 Kailahun is down the hill and where they were based is on top of
7 the hill, so any bullet from there is going to be dangerous and
8 if we challenged them they will burn down the town like what they
9 did in Pendembu, so I thought it wise and said no, we should not
15:04:22 10 engage them there. We left them and they came down. They took
11 the road to Pendembu. Then we jumped behind them, engaging them.

12 We continued engaging them until we got to one town called
13 Giehun. The troop that had left Daru was already in Pendembu.
14 They deployed and some advanced to Giehun to receive the troops
15:04:51 15 that were coming from Kailahun. We were there when the troops
16 that came from Pendembu met with the team from Kailahun and they
17 all advanced and went to Pendembu. When they got to Pendembu --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he just take the last
19 bit of his answer.

15:05:17 20 MR ANYAH:

21 Q. Mr George, you've told us how one set of UN troops came
22 from Kailahun towards Giehun, another set came from Daru and
23 joined the other group that came from Kailahun and you said they
24 then advanced and went to Pendembu. You then started saying
15:05:43 25 something that happened after they went and got to Pendembu. Can
26 you continue from there?

27 A. First in my statement I said there were two companies based
28 in Kailahun. Secondly, I said Jetley put a rescue mission
29 together. He mobilised troops from Freetown to Daru to advance

1 to Pendembu. When they advanced to Pendembu they divided the
2 group. Some stayed in Pendembu while others advanced to Giehun
3 to receive the men who were coming from Kailahun. That was what
4 I said.

15:06:29 5 Q. Thank you. I understand the distinction. Did you continue
6 to engage these UN troops? And by engage, I mean fight them?

7 A. Yes, we were fighting - we engaged each other, it was not
8 just me attacking them, until they got to Giehun where they met
9 with their other troops from Pendembu who had come to receive
10 them.

11 Q. How was this fighting resolved, Mr George? How did it end?

12 A. The fighting ended badly, especially when they were getting
13 to Pendembu. The first thing they did, they went to the hospital
14 where we had our wounded soldiers.

15:07:20 15 Q. Just remember to slow down now. Somebody went to the
16 hospital where you had your wounded soldiers. The persons who
17 went to the hospital, were they UN members?

18 A. UN members advanced to the RUF hospital in Pendembu.

19 Q. What happened when they advanced to the hospital in
15:07:43 20 Pendembu?

21 A. When they advanced to the hospital the wounded soldiers
22 whom they met in the hospital, about eleven of them, they
23 executed every one of them. The UN executed every one of them.

24 Then there was another house where they met civilians after they
15:08:07 25 had entered the town. When the civilians came out to call for
26 peace, they were executed. They burnt down some village - I mean
27 some houses and damaged a lot of things. Then they pulled out
28 and went back to Daru. From there, the UN that was based in
29 Kailahun were now based in Mile 91. That was how the UN left

1 Kailahun to Daru onward to Mile 91.

2 Q. A few questions, Mr George. You told us that the UN was
3 the one that executed the eleven soldiers that were wounded and
4 in the hospital. Who executed the civilians that you just
15:08:59 5 referred to?

6 A. The same UN. It was not something that is hidden. Even
7 those in Pendembu know the story. If they hear me saying it now
8 they will know exactly what I mean.

9 Q. Who burnt down some of the villages that you referred to?

15:09:19 10 A. The UN. The UN did that in Pendembu. People know this.
11 The civilians know. Up until now they know. If I am not
12 mistaken they have started rebuilding. They destroyed with their
13 armoured cars - armoured tanks. If you were there at that time
14 and you saw the people destroying you would feel sorry for the
15:09:45 15 civilians.

16 Q. Mr George, was it after this destruction in Pendembu that
17 you went and based in Kono?

18 A. It was after the rescue mission that I went back to Kono.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, is it possible to have a time
15:10:15 20 frame for this UN attack on the civilian population? Secondly,
21 could we have some of the names of the villages that the witness
22 is referring to, if possible.

23 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President:

24 Q. Mr George, you said, "They burnt down some village - I mean
15:10:30 25 some houses and damaged a lot of things." This is at page 117,
26 my lines 8 and 9, using a 12 point font, of the LiveNote. What
27 village was burnt down, Mr George, if you know?

28 A. Firstly, let's talk about the killing of human beings
29 before going to the village or villages.

1 Q. Mr George, no, let's talk about the village. What name is
2 the name of the village that was burnt down? That's what the
3 Court wants to know.

4 A. I would describe the village on the highway going to Daru
15:11:17 5 but I have forgotten its name. Then the destruction in Pendembu,
6 it's there.

7 Q. Very well. We understand you can't remember the name. You
8 said --

9 A. Yes.

15:11:29 10 Q. You said the village is on the highway going to Daru.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Does that highway have a name?

13 A. Yes. From Pendembu you're going to Daru. From Pendembu
14 you drive to Daru. The first bridge after Pendembu, there was a
15:11:48 15 small village there. From Pendembu going towards Daru, there was
16 a small village on the road. It was burnt down. Then in
17 Pendembu Town itself, some houses were destroyed. More than
18 four, five, six houses were destroyed in Pendembu Town itself.
19 Even today people can attest to that if they hear me saying it.
15:12:11 20 They know the story very well.

21 Q. Mr George, what year and month did these destructions take
22 place?

23 A. That was in 2000 - going towards the end of 2000. But all
24 these things that I'm telling you, the month will give me
15:12:28 25 difficulties, but I can remember the year, the time within the
26 year. It was going down to 1991 - I mean, 2001, down. It
27 happened in 2000 going down to 2001. It's the month that would
28 cause me difficulties because I was under pressure. I'm just
29 doing it because I can remember things.

1 Q. That's helpful, Mr George. This village on the highway
2 going to Daru, in which district of Sierra Leone is it?

3 A. It's the same Kailahun District. It was just a mile from
4 Pendembu. It's the same district.

15:13:14 5 Q. Now, you said after these events you went to Kono, you were
6 based in Kono. And the question I asked you that led to the
7 several previous answers you gave was: Who was your commander in
8 Kono? So who was the commander you were under when you went to
9 Kono?

15:13:39 10 A. I was still under Issa's command, but the commander in Kono
11 was one of Issa's bodyguards by the name of Intelligent. He was
12 the brigade commander by then.

13 Q. Intelligent, is that a nickname or the person's --

14 A. That was his nickname and that was his popular name. Up to
15:14:03 15 now he is using that name, Intelligent. He was a bodyguard to
16 Issa Sesay.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat the last bit
18 of his answer.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, can you repeat the last part
15:14:16 20 of your answer? You said, this person, Intelligent, he was a
21 bodyguard to Issa Sesay, and then you said something after that.

22 THE WITNESS: I said I was under Issa's command, but in
23 Kono, Intelligent was the brigade commander. He was a bodyguard
24 to Issa. He replaced Banyan in command because Banyan was the
15:14:52 25 brigade commander. They removed him and put Intelligent there,
26 so it was Intelligent who replaced Banyan. That was what I said.
27 Because Banyan replaced me and Intelligent replaced Banyan and took
28 over.

29 Q. Thank you, Mr George. For how long did you remain assigned

1 in Kono?

2 A. I was in Kono from - I entered Kono '91 - I mean, 2001.
3 After all the UN disturbances that happened, I disarmed. I went
4 to Magburaka. I voted in 2000. After we had lost the election,
15:15:43 5 I went back to Kono as a neutral man. I was not part of the RUF
6 - there was no RUF activity at that time because Tejan Kabbah had
7 already won the elections.

8 Q. What year was that when there was no longer RUF activity
9 and Tejan Kabbah had won the elections? What year was that?

15:16:11 10 A. We're talking about 2002.

11 Q. When you say you voted, did you vote for a particular party
12 during the elections?

13 A. Oh, yes. I voted for my party.

14 Q. What was your party?

15:16:29 15 A. The RUF.

16 Q. Was the party's name RUF or did it have another name?

17 A. Yes, we still had that name. I think RUF. We had a party
18 office in Magburaka.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr George. After there was no longer RUF
15:16:52 20 activity, did you remain in Sierra Leone?

21 A. Yes. I remained in Sierra Leone until 2005, April 7. Then
22 I found myself in Liberia.

23 Q. When you say you found yourself in Liberia in April 2005,
24 how did you get to Liberia from Sierra Leone?

15:17:14 25 A. From Magburaka, I got into a taxi, and before coming, I did
26 not hide. I left Base Marine and others there and I told them
27 that it was necessary for me to return home now. I went to my
28 old friends that I had in Magburaka. I went to Makeni, boarded a
29 bus, went through Yele to Bo. From Bo, I passed the night in

1 Kenema, and the following day I boarded another bus and I went
2 straight to the Bo Waterside border. I crossed over the Mano
3 River Union bridge safely into Liberia.

15:18:07 4 Q. So it was your own choice to go back to Liberia. You were
5 not forced back to Liberia.

6 A. Nobody forced me to go back, but I found it necessary to
7 return to see my people.

8 MR ANYAH: Madam President, there's a place mentioned by
9 the witness. I think he said it was Yele and I am not sure of
10 the spelling and I don't believe it's been on the record before.
11 Phonetically I suspect it would be spelt Y-I-E-L-E-H, unless the
12 interpreters know the proper spelling for that place.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, [microphone not
14 activated]. Mr Interpreter, do you know how this word is spelt?

15:18:53 15 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. It's Y-E-L-E.

16 MR ANYAH:

17 Q. Mr George, during the trial process in this case there have
18 been witnesses that have come here and made mention of a certain
19 Martin George and I want us to consider some of what has been
15:19:20 20 said about somebody named Martin George in this trial. But
21 before we do so, I want to ask you about another Martin George.
22 Do you know or have you ever heard of somebody named Martin
23 George who served as a member of the government of President
24 Taylor in Liberia?

15:19:50 25 A. Martin George? I was the only Martin George in the RUF
26 from 1991. And when I joined the RUF in 1991, I went back to
27 Liberia in 2005, April 7.

28 Q. So from 1991 until you left the RUF in, you said, 2002, is
29 it the case that you were the only person with the name Martin

1 George in the RUF?

2 A. I was the only person that had the name Martin George.
3 They had Martin, but that Martin was not George. He was a Sierra
4 Leonean by the name of Martin, but his last name was not George.

15:20:37 5 I was the only Martin George that I know about in the RUF.

6 Q. At any point in time, were you the Liberian ambassador to
7 Nigeria?

8 A. No, sir. No. I don't even know about that post. Never.

9 Q. Very well. Were you at any point in time Deputy Minister
15:21:10 10 of State for Liberia?

11 A. No. I never served in Charles Taylor's government. All my
12 activity was in Sierra Leone, from 1991 to 2005, April, when I
13 returned.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Now, let's consider the first
15:21:29 15 transcript I wish to review with you. This is from 16 January
16 2008. Mr George, just listen to what this witness had to say
17 about a certain Martin George.

18 Incidentally, I should ask you this: Do you know somebody
19 by the name of Dennis Koker?

15:21:56 20 A. Dennis Koker? Maybe I know him. Maybe I know him.

21 Q. What do you mean maybe you may know him? Do you know him
22 or do you not know him?

23 A. I don't know. That's why I said maybe. I do not
24 understand the name. I don't know that name. You know we were
15:22:15 25 plenty. When you called OG name, if I knew him, I said, yes, I
26 know OG.

27 Q. Are you suspecting that you may have heard that name in the
28 RUF?

29 A. Which of the names?

1 Q. The name Dennis Koker.

2 A. Yes, I can remember that name, but I can't picture the
3 person. I can remember hearing that name.

4 Q. Very well. Transcript of 16 January, page 1399.

15:22:56 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: The year? This year?

6 MR ANYAH: 2008. 16 January 2008, second week of the
7 trial, page 1399, starting at line 19:

8 Q. Mr George, listen to what I will read. The question was
9 asked of Mr Koker:

15:23:20 10 "Q. Mr Koker, my question is this: When you were
11 describing these responsibilities that you had, were you
12 referring to you, yourself only, or were you referring to
13 the MP office at which you worked?

14 A. I was referring to the MP office's work.

15:23:46 15 Q. Thank you. Now, the next question I have for you: In
16 response to Defence counsel, when he was cross-examining
17 you, he asked you about an individual named Martin George.
18 Do you know who Martin George is?

19 A. Yes.

15:24:11 20 Q. What was his position?

21 A. He was a colonel. He was a commander for the entire
22 Kailahun, the Kailahun area. He was the RUF commander
23 based in Kailahun Town.

24 Q. Yesterday during cross-examination you testified that
15:24:44 25 Liberian English was used frequently at the border between
26 Sierra Leone and Liberia. Who spoke Liberian English?

27 A. The Liberians and some of our brothers. They had been
28 changed. Even Martin George spoke Liberian in Kailahun in
29 our presence."

1 Let's pause there. Mr George, this witness said you were
2 the commander for the entire Kailahun, the Kailahun area, you
3 were based in Kailahun Town. Does that sound right to you?

15:25:32

4 A. Yes, it sounds right because I was based in Kailahun as a
5 commander, like I have said.

6 Q. The witness says that Liberian English was used frequently
7 at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Does that sound
8 right to you?

15:25:53

9 A. Between Liberian border and Sierra Leone? I was not
10 assigned to the border. I had my battalion commander in Koindu
11 that was assigned to the border. I did not go to the border. I
12 was staying in Kailahun. If it's Liberian English, yes, I was
13 Liberian when I joined the RUF and Sam too was a Liberian, so
14 that is why we spoke Liberian English. There were other
15 Liberians who were in Kono when I was serving in Kailahun. They
16 used to come. Like Big Daddy, Morrison. All of them were
17 Liberians. So when we were together we spoke our Liberian
18 English to remember - you know, to crack jokes.

15:26:22

19 Q. The Sam you referred to, what is his last name? You just
20 said now somebody Sam spoke Liberian English with you. What is
21 that person's last name?

15:26:41

22 A. I am talking about Sam Kolléh.

23 Q. Now, continuing at line 10. A question is posed of
24 Mr Koker:

15:27:10

25 "Q. During this morning's cross-examination from Defence
26 counsel you were being asked about how you knew arms came
27 from Liberia and you were being asked about your prior
28 statements and the testimony you gave in this Court ...
29 The language that was being spoken by those that were

1 bringing the materials; you said yesterday in court that
2 because of the dress of the particular individuals and the
3 word 'NPFL Navy Rangers' on yellow polo shirts ... because
4 of conversations and talking to the Liberians that came to
15:27:57 5 Buedu; you said in this Court, and also in prior
6 statements, from the direction which the vehicles came into
7 Buedu ... From a conversation you had with Tom Sandy; and
8 you said ... from your intelligence. Are these all the
9 reasons you know that these arms came from Liberia?

15:28:25 10 A. Yes".

11 Mr George, during the time you served with the RUF, did you
12 ever see any person bringing arms to the RUF wearing yellow polo
13 shirts with the words "NPFL Navy Rangers" written on them?

14 A. No. When I was serving as a commander, no, I never saw
15:28:56 15 anybody bringing arms. We had a lot of arms. RUF was not
16 lacking in arms.

17 Q. How about ammunition? Did you see anyone bringing
18 ammunition wearing a polo shirt with the words "NPFL Navy
19 Rangers"?

15:29:14 20 A. Nobody ever took ammunition to Kailahun when I was serving
21 there as commander. I never saw any NPFL T-shirt in Kailahun
22 whilst I was serving there. No.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr George. May Mr George be shown Prosecution
24 exhibit P-96, please. Perhaps I should ask you a question while
15:30:12 25 the exhibit is being pulled. Mr George, during the period of
26 time when you were with the RUF, did you ever become aware of any
27 intelligence reports or information that said ammunition was
28 being sent from Liberia to the RUF?

29 A. Please repeat your question.

1 Q. Yes. During the time you were with the RUF, did you ever
2 hear of any intelligence reports which said that ammunition was
3 coming over from Liberia to you in the RUF in Sierra Leone?

4 A. I keep saying no. When I was serving in Kailahun as a
15:30:59 5 commander, I never received a single barrel round, not AK round,
6 a single barrel round from Charles Taylor or the NPFL to the RUF.
7 No.

8 Q. What about when you were not serving in Kailahun? When you
9 were serving elsewhere in the RUF, did you ever hear of reports
15:31:18 10 of others, not yourself, that were receiving ammunition from
11 Liberia?

12 A. Nobody ever told me that they were sending you people
13 ammunition by truck or what have you. Nobody sent me ammunition
14 from Charles Taylor. I never saw that movement.

15:31:43 15 Q. Mr George, can you look at Prosecution exhibit 96. And I
16 had asked you when you started your evidence two days ago whether
17 you could read and write and you said not very well. Are you
18 comfortable reading that document, Mr George? Or do you want it
19 displayed and have me take you through it?

15:32:05 20 A. When you read it, read it for me and I will understand it.
21 What I know about any document - whether I know it or not, if I
22 know I'll say yes. If I don't know, I won't know how to answer
23 it.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, do you wish for the witness to
15:32:33 25 first look at the original document and tell the Court, if he
26 knows, what it is and then for you to take him through it?

27 MR ANYAH: Yes. That's fair enough:

28 Q. Mr George, can you look at the document being given to you
29 by the Court Officer. Look at it, open it, review it, look at

1 the cover and the back and when you are done let us know.

2 While the witness is doing that, for the benefit of others
3 could the transcript from 11 April 2008 be pulled up starting at
4 page 7372.

15:33:46 5 A. Yes, I have seen the document. I have seen a lot of names.
6 My name appears in that document.

7 Q. Mr George, have you seen that document before today?

8 A. It's only in this Court that I am seeing this document.

9 MR ANYAH: Madam Court Officer, can you show us the first
15:35:05 10 page first, the cover page. Thank you:

11 Q. Mr George, you see the cover. It says "composition book".
12 Where there's a slot for a name it says "monitoring book"?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, can I stop you. I would like
14 to know if the witness knows what this document is first before
15:35:34 15 you read to him what it is.

16 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President. That's fair enough:

17 Q. Mr George, do you know what this document is?

18 A. I have just seen this book with my name in it. It looks
19 strange to me. I don't know what it is about, except if you read
15:35:51 20 it to me maybe I'll get some idea out of it.

21 Q. It says on the cover, "Composition book, monitoring book,
22 signal unit, out of bound to everyone except operator." That
23 appears to be what's on the cover of the book. Now, a witness
24 came and spoke about this book for this Court.

15:36:20 25 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, just a point of note. I think
26 it says "monitoring" book, not monitoring.

27 MR ANYAH: Counsel is correct.

28 JUDGE LUSSICK: And it also says "out of bands", not "out
29 of bounds". So they are your words, Mr Anyah.

1 MR ANYAH: Yes, that is also correct. Let me try again.
2 "Monitoring book, signal unit, out of band to" what looks like
3 "every" but that's not clear "one except" and what looks like
4 "operator." That appears to be what's on the cover of the book:

15:37:07 5 Q. Mr George, a witness came here and testified about this
6 book. I asked for a page of the transcript to be brought up at
7 page 3772 on April 11, 2008. That witness said that this book
8 was a code book - an RUF code book. The witness was asked:

9 "Q. What would you call it, Mr Witness, code book or
10 operational book, or message book, which one?

11 A. This one is said to be a code book.

12 Q. And that's on the basis of what you've said an RUF code
13 book, right?

14 A. Yes".

15:37:54 15 So a witness has told us that this is an RUF code book.
16 Now, we open the book and we see some entries in the book. We
17 will use the pagination that's in red. Do you see, Mr George, at
18 the top there are numbers in red, eight digits. The one on the
19 left side of the overhead projector ends in 9992. On the right
15:38:35 20 side it's 9993. If we flip the pages from 9993 to the next page
21 we see some more entries and if we turn to the following page we
22 see even more entries. Mr George, do you see the page that ends
23 with the number 9995? Do you see that?

24 A. I am seeing that page.

15:39:17 25 Q. At the top do you see there is there written the phrase
26 "send reinforcement team" and then to its right are initials or
27 an acronym that reads "Z2B"? Do you see that, Mr George?

28 A. I am seeing "Z2B" here.

29 Q. If you go down two lines from what I've just read, you see

1 tick marks as if to say that space should be filled with "send
2 reinforcement" and then you see the word "platoon." Do you see
3 that, Mr George?

4 A. I am seeing it.

15:40:14 5 Q. And next to "platoon" do you see acronym or code that reads
6 "Z4D"? Do you see that, Mr George?

7 A. I am seeing everything here.

8 Q. Now, let's turn the pages and let's go to the page that
9 ends with ERN number 0009. In fact, let's start with the page
15:40:56 10 ending with 0008. Yes, that's the page. If we go down to the
11 bottom of that page, there is there written "part 06". Do you
12 see that, Mr George?

13 A. I am seeing it. I am seeing everything.

14 Q. And if we scroll down a bit, we see some names written
15:41:37 15 below "part 06". Do you see where it says "the leader"? Then
16 there's a word I cannot discern. And then to the far right of
17 the page are written the letters "YRZ". Do you see that,
18 Mr George?

19 A. Yes, I'm seeing it.

15:42:01 20 Q. Below the "the leader", do you see where it says "Gen IH
21 Sesay" and to the right of Sesay at the side of the page you have
22 the letters "YRK"? Do you see that, Mr George?

23 A. I am seeing it.

24 Q. See below "Sesay" is the short form for brigadier, "Brig
15:42:30 25 Morris Kallon" and at the right side of the page is "YRV." Do
26 you see that, Mr George?

27 A. Yes, everything here.

28 Q. If we look at the transcript from 11 April 2008, page 7381,
29 the witness who was going through this code book with the lawyer

1 in Court was asked this question:

2 "Q. I believe it was yesterday you elaborated and you said
3 these code names - I'm sorry. You said these codes came
4 into being both yesterday and the day before" --

15:43:17 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: What line are you reading from?

6 MR ANYAH: Okay. I'm reading from the transcript. I'm
7 reading at line 19 of the transcript of 11 April 2008, and the
8 page is 7381:

9 Q. This document was being reviewed with that witness before
15:43:38 10 this Court. At line 19 a question was posed to that witness:

11 "Q. Indeed I believe it was yesterday you elaborated and
12 you said these codes came into being - both yesterday and
13 the day before you said when General Issa Sesay became head
14 of the RUF, right?

15:44:00 15 A. Yes."

16 Mr George, the witness told this Court that these codes
17 came into being when Issa Sesay became the head of the RUF. Do
18 you follow me?

19 A. I am getting you. I am getting you very well.

15:44:21 20 Q. Shall we go to the next page? No, the page that's next to
21 the one we just looked at. Yes, 0009. Mr George, if you count
22 three lines from the top, the first line has the words "Colonel
23 Gibril Massaquoi" written on it. Below "Massaquoi" is written
24 "Colonel Momoh Rogers" and below "Momoh Rogers", do you see your
15:44:58 25 name there, Mr George?

26 A. Yes, I have seen my name here.

27 Q. Martin George. And to the far right of your name, do you
28 see the letters "YRK"?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Mr George, did you ever have a code name in the RUF that
2 goes by those letters YRK?

3 A. This particular message book in front of me, I'm really
4 surprised about it. My name that I used, apart from my Martin
15:45:38 5 George, is Mao Mao. And when my signal commander in Kailahun,
6 Kawa, was bringing my message, the letter that I see there is -
7 or was MM. But saying why is it that, it's really surprising to
8 me.

9 Q. So the answer to my question is what? Were you ever known
15:46:07 10 by those letters, YRK, when you were in the RUF?

11 A. No. The only letters they knew me for, double mark, that
12 is, MM, Mao Mao. Double mark. They just got it so, double mark.
13 Even the signal men I had in Kailahun, when they are giving my
14 message - when they are bringing my message you will see MM.
15:46:32 15 Double mark.

16 Q. Is it possible that you had a radio code name that you did
17 not know about when you were in the RUF?

18 A. It's not possible. I chose my own code like my Mao Mao
19 name. It was not Foday Sankoh who gave me. I chose that name
15:46:50 20 and it was approved by him and it went to the signal. No
21 signaller gave me a name unknown to me.

22 Q. If we look at the previous page and the reference to Issa
23 Sesay, did you ever know Issa Sesay to have a code name, that is,
24 a radio code name, of YRK after he became head of the RUF?

15:47:17 25 A. Issa Sesay had a code name, but it's not YRK. I've just
26 forgotten. Issa had a code name. This particular document, I do
27 not know where they got it from. I can see my name on this
28 document showing different letters against my name. It surprises
29 me. What I know, I was MM, double mark. Now I'm seeing YRK.

1 It's surprising to me.

2 Q. If we go to the page where your name appears against and we
3 count a few lines down, six lines down, do you see "General Sam
4 Bockarie" written there?

15:48:03 5 A. Yes, I am seeing it.

6 Q. Do you see the initials to the far right of the page "YRW"
7 written there?

8 A. I'm seeing all these YYs and WWs. I'm seeing them.

9 Q. When Issa Sesay took over the leadership of the RUF, was
15:48:24 10 Sam Bockarie still a member of the RUF?

11 A. When Issa took over full command, Sam Bockarie was nobody.
12 He was nowhere to be seen. He had already gone. It was only
13 Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Superman whom we were taking
14 instructions from. Issa Sesay was the senior man.

15:48:59 15 Q. Before Sam Bockarie left the RUF, did you ever know him to
16 have the radio code name of YRW?

17 A. I said the YYs and WWs is surprising to me. I don't know
18 about this. He had a code name, but not this YY. No commander
19 would just have YY, YY. Tell me, what does the "Y" stand for?

15:49:26 20 What does the "R" stand for? What does the "W" stand for? For
21 me Martin George or my Mao Mao, I know - I know about MM. Double
22 mark. Double mark. For JR, for instance, if you want to cut it
23 short, Julia Romeo. Julia Romeo, JR. Very simple. But I'm
24 seeing a lot of RR here. I don't know what it actually means.

15:49:56 25 This is my first time I've seen this book. They just wrote my
26 name here so that they can take chances. I don't know about this
27 book.

28 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Thank you, Madam Court Officer. I'm
29 done with that exhibit. May we have pulled up the transcript for

1 11 June 2008 starting at page 11540, line 18.

2 Mr George, this is the evidence of another witness given to
3 this Court in June 2008. I will read some of it to you and I
4 will ask for your comments. Line 18, a question was asked of
15:51:04 5 that witness:

6 "Q. What force or forces controlled Kono at that time
7 after the signing of the Lome Accord?

8 A. It was the SLA/RUF, or RUF/SLA. We were in control of
9 Kono and it was there that Issa himself had established his
15:51:31 10 base after he left Makeni and at that time the commander
11 was a vanguard called Colonel Martin George. He was the
12 brigade commander.

13 Q. Did Issa Sesay stay in Kono, or did he go anywhere
14 after that, after you arrived?

15 A. Well, he stayed in Kono observing all the diamond
16 mining. What I meant by that, I meant the government
17 diamond mining while he was in Kono. He continued to be
18 there until the very last time I saw Sam Bockarie. He came
19 there with two Arabs that I can recall had gone to Benjamin
15:52:32 20 Yeachen on that day who separated those diamonds. They
21 came to Kono to visit us. That was the very last time I
22 saw Mosquito.

23 Q. The question was about Issa Sesay. Did Issa Sesay
24 eventually leave Kono to go somewhere?

15:53:02 25 A. Well, the only time Issa Sesay left Kono was when
26 Mosquito Spray cut off our supply route. That was the -
27 when they attacked Foya, Lofa County. When that attack
28 occurred, it was when Sam Bockarie sent a message that all
29 the fighters that we had in Kono should organise themselves

1 and Issa should get a reinforcement from those men so we
2 should come and capture and clear the ULIMO off from Foya.
3 That was an order he had received from President Charles
4 Taylor. That was the only time Issa moved with troops."

15:53:55 5 Let's pause there. Mr George, you heard what I just read.

6 This witness says that the brigade commander of Kono was a
7 vanguard called Colonel Martin George. Do you agree with that?

8 A. Oh, yes, I said it, that I was brigade commander. Maybe
9 other people did not believe it.

15:54:24 10 Q. He said Issa Sesay was there when you were brigade
11 commander observing all the diamond mining. He called it
12 government diamond mining. Do you agree with that?

13 A. Issa was based in Kono, but I have told you that we had a
14 committee that was set up for mining. We had people in charge of
15 this mining. Issa had a base in Makeni and in Kono. When Issa
16 comes to Kono, he did not go there to monitor mining activities.
17 He went - he had people there who were taking care of mining
18 activities. He goes there to administer, spend time and go back
19 to Makeni. He spends time in Makeni because he was in charge

15:54:49 20 whilst Mosquito was in Buedu, so he had the full right to patrol
21 those various assignment areas.

22 Q. You heard me read the witness's response to a question
23 whether Issa Sesay left Kono at some point in time. You heard
24 the witness's response. The witness first started speaking about
15:55:31 25 Sam Bockarie before speaking about Issa Sesay. What the witness
26 said about Sam Bockarie was that the last time that witness saw
27 Sam Bockarie in Kono was when Sam Bockarie came there with two
28 Arabs who had gone to somebody called Benjamin Yeachen who
29 separated diamonds. The person says they came to Kono to visit

1 them. That was the last time he saw Mosquito. I asked you about
2 the name Benjamin Yeaten this morning. Have you ever heard of
3 somebody called Benjamin Yeachen?

4 A. I said no. I don't know him and I never heard of him when
15:56:18 5 I was serving as brigade commander in Kono.

6 Q. When you were serving as brigade commander in Kono, was
7 there ever a time when two Arabs came to Kono in the company of
8 Sam Bockarie in connection with diamonds?

9 A. In fact, when I was serving as brigade commander in Kono
15:56:44 10 Sam Bockarie never fought in Kono. If anybody told you that Sam
11 Bockarie went to Kono under my regime that person must be telling
12 a black lie. I was the commander in charge, Sam Bockarie never
13 went to Kono up to the time I left Kono brigade. Sam Bockarie
14 never entered Kono with any Arab.

15:57:06 15 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Have you heard the name Mosquito
16 Spray before?

17 A. The only name I know about is our own Mosquito. That is
18 Sam Bockarie. If they had any Mosquito Spray then I don't really
19 know about it. I don't really know about him. I only knew about
15:57:29 20 our own Mosquito, Sam Bockarie.

21 Q. Do you remember what I just read about what this witness
22 said about Issa Sesay leaving Kono to go somewhere else. The
23 witness said that Issa Sesay left Kono when Mosquito Spray cut
24 off the RUF's supply route. Do you remember an episode when you
15:57:55 25 were brigade commander in Kono involving a Mosquito Spray who cut
26 off the RUF supply route?

27 A. In fact, RUF never had a supply route in Liberia. The
28 movement was called self-reliant struggle. We never had a supply
29 route in Liberia. You're talking about Issa carrying manpower to

1 Buedu to go and find Mosquito to Spray. How on earth can Issa be a
2 commander taking care of Kono and Magburaka and the other areas
3 and instruct him to carry manpower to go and fight? You see?
4 No.

15:58:43 5 When I was serving as brigade commander in Kono, no, Issa
6 never asked me for manpower, because Issa would not take manpower
7 without me knowing. I had my brigade. I knew the strength of my
8 brigade. Before doing something he needed to consult me.
9 Although he was the commander but he needed to consult me because
15:59:03 10 I owned the brigade. Issa never asked me for manpower or took
11 manpower from my brigade to go and fight. And Issa never - Issa
12 used to go to Kailahun to Mosquito but he never went with
13 manpower.

14 Q. Mr George, the place where this witness says Issa went to
15:59:22 15 is not Buedu or Kailahun. He said they went and attacked Foya in
16 Lofa County. Do you know which country Foya is in?

17 A. Yes, Foya is in Liberia. But that's what I'm saying. How
18 could Issa leave his own assignment ground because there's only
19 two of - the two of them that were controlling. Apart from him
15:59:48 20 it is Mosquito. How could Mosquito send an instruction to him in
21 Kono?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly take this
23 last bit of his answer slowly.

24 MR ANYAH:

15:59:59 25 Q. Mr George, you were saying how could Mosquito send an
26 instruction to Kono. Can you carry on from there?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, I thought the instruction
28 allegedly came from Charles Taylor? What was the instruction -
29 the instruction in the transcript that you just read.

1 MR ANYAH: It was from Sam Bockarie but also he ultimately
2 said the order came from Charles Taylor, but let me read it again
3 to avoid confusion:

4 Q. Mr George, let me read what that witness said again, this
16:00:36 5 portion, line 4, page 11541, 11 June 2008. The question was:

6 "Q. The question was about Issa Sesay. Did Issa Sesay
7 eventually leave Kono to go somewhere?

8 A. Well, the only time Issa Sesay left Kono was when
9 Mosquito Spray cut off our supply route. That was the -
16:01:04 10 when they attacked Foya, Lofa County. When that attack
11 occurred, it was when Sam Bockarie sent a message that all
12 the fighters that we had in Kono should organise themselves
13 and Issa Sesay should get a reinforcement from those men so
14 we should come and capture and clear the ULIMO off from

16:01:25 15 Foya. That was an order he had received from President
16 Charles Taylor. That was the only time Issa moved with
17 troops.

18 Q. Sir, you mentioned Mosquito Spray. Do you know who
19 Mosquito Spray is?

16:01:49 20 A. Although I don't know him or I did not see him, he was
21 a ULIMO. He was the commander of the LURD rebels. They
22 were the ones who cut off our supply route - our supply
23 route in Foya - because everything came from Liberia for
24 us. So Mosquito Spray came - Mosquito Spray and others
16:02:19 25 came and cut off our supply route and that created a
26 problem for us. That was why Issa put men together to go
27 and clear that supply route."

28 Let's pause. Mr George, what this witness told the Court
29 was that an order came from the President of Liberia, Charles

1 Taylor. That order somehow got to Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie
2 then sent a message that fighters in Kono should organise
3 themselves and that Issa Sesay should get reinforcements from
4 those fighters in Kono to go and clear - the person referred to -
16:03:03 5 ULIMO and also LURD rebels from Foya. Let's pause there. Let's
6 consider that. When you were brigade commander in Kono, did you
7 ever hear of Charles Taylor sending any orders to Sam Bockarie.
8 A. I said no. I never heard about Charles Taylor sending
9 orders to Sam Bockarie or Bockarie sending instructions to Issa
16:03:31 10 Sesay to collect manpower from my brigade in Kono.
11 Q. Were you aware when you were brigade commander in Kono of
12 any fighting taking place in Foya, Liberia, between Liberian
13 government forces and either ULIMO or LURD?
14 A. I heard it. You know, everything that happened used to be
16:03:58 15 over the BBC. I was in Kono and I was concentrating on my front
16 line. I never had problems with Liberian issues because I had my
17 own issues.
18 Q. Who were the Liberians fighting; was it ULIMO or was it
19 LURD when you were in Kono as brigade commander?
16:04:15 20 A. I heard about ULIMO. But for Issa to take manpower from
21 Kono and carry them, I'm sitting on my grave, I can't tell lies
22 to anybody. I need not make anybody feel happy. I never saw
23 that in my life when I was in Kono.
24 Q. The witness told this Court, and I just read it a few
16:04:41 25 minutes ago, he said, or she said, "Because everything came from
26 Liberia for us." This is in reference to the supply route being
27 cut off. Was it the case, Mr George, when you were brigade
28 commander in Kono, that supplies that you and your fighters had,
29 everything, all of it, came from Liberia?

1 A. In fact, I never heard - sorry, I never had supply route in
2 Liberia. The only supply route I had was from Kono to Buedu.
3 That was my route. I had no road in Liberia, so I didn't have
4 any supply route.

16:05:24 5 Q. Carrying on with the transcript. I believe I stopped at
6 line 24. On that same page, 11541, the witness was asked this
7 question:

8 "Q. How long was - first of all, just to be clear, when
9 Issa Sesay left Kono because of the Mosquito Spray attack,
16:05:44 10 was that before or after the Lome Peace Accord was signed?

11 A. That was after the Lome Peace Accord was signed."

12 So this witness is saying that after the Lome Peace Accord
13 was signed is when all of these events happened. Now, this Court
14 has found as a fact - Mr George, this is one of those things the
16:06:10 15 Court has said is not in dispute - the date on which this Lome
16 Peace Accord was signed. Your Honours, this is again CMS 227,
17 admitted facts and Law number 32. Mr George, the Court said or
18 found:

19 "On 7 July 1999 the Government of Sierra Leone signed a
16:06:33 20 peace agreement with the RUF in Lome, Togo (Lome Peace
21 Agreement)."

22 So the Court is saying 7 July 1999 was when this agreement
23 was signed. This witness said that these events I've been
24 reading about to you happened after July 1999, sometime after
16:06:57 25 that. Continuing from the witness's evidence at line 28 a
26 question was asked:

27 "Q. Do you recall for approximately how long Issa Sesay -
28 well, first let me ask you did Issa Sesay return to Kono
29 after leaving on the Mosquito Spray operation?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. About how long after he left did he return?

3 A. Approximately two weeks.

4 Q. Did he come back by himself, or with anyone else?

16:07:39 5 A. Well, when Issa Sesay returned I can recall that he
6 brought the twin barrel that was at Mosquito's headquarters
7 - the twin barrel. That was what we used to defend the
8 headquarters from the Alpha Jet. He brought it back
9 together with some more men, including Captain American and
10 his troops. Captain American was an SLA and his troops, he
11 brought them back to Kono and they met us.

12 Q. Were there any other persons that you recognised with
13 Issa Sesay when he returned to Kono?

14 A. Yes, he had reinforcement, his men and some of the
16:08:29 15 fighters who were in Buedu, together with some SS men who
16 he brought from Foya. He crossed over with them to Kono.
17 They met us at the base."

18 Mr George, let's consider that response by this witness.

19 The witness said Issa Sesay left Kono, went for this Mosquito
16:08:51 20 Spray operation and was gone for about two weeks. When Issa
21 Sesay came back, he came back with a twin barrel that he got from
22 Mosquito's headquarters. Do you recall any of these events
23 happening when you were brigade commander in Kono, Mr George?

24 A. When I was serving as the brigade commander, I'm still
16:09:21 25 saying it, I never saw Issa coming from Liberia with other
26 manpower to Kono with a twin barrel from Buedu. Buedu had twin
27 barrel. We had twin barrel across, Kono and Makeni. Issa can't
28 - cannot take twin barrel from Buedu. Where would he pass
29 through when enemies were staying at Daru. There was no ferry.

1 Where would he pass through to take this weapon to Kono? So
2 really I do not know where he got his own whatnot from. It never
3 happened during my regime.

16:10:08 4 Q. What about this name that the person mentioned, Captain
5 American and his troops, an SLA and his troops. When you were a
6 brigade commander in Kono, did you ever see or hear of somebody
7 called Captain American?

8 A. No, when I was serving as a brigade commander I knew about
9 Banya, Hector, Alpha - MP Alpha. They were the SLA officers that
16:10:35 10 I had with my in my brigade. I knew Junior who was serving as
11 battalion commander in Jagbwema Fiamama. I knew the men whom I was
12 dealing with from the SLA during my regime.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Those names you just mentioned MP
14 Alpha, you said somebody called Junior, somebody called Banya,
16:11:05 15 somebody called Hector, were they all SLA officers when you were
16 brigade commander in Kono?

17 A. Yes. Every one of them was SLA and we're sharing power.
18 When an SLA colonel was battalion commander, an RUF would be his
19 deputy. That was how we were changing the shifts in Kono when I
16:11:27 20 was serving as brigade commander.

21 Q. You heard the witness from what I read say that Issa Sesay
22 returned to Kono with reinforcement, his men, that is, Issa's
23 men, and some of the fighters who were in Buedu and that they
24 came together with some SS men whom Issa had brought from Foya.
16:11:51 25 Do you know what the reference there is to SS men? Who are these
26 people, Mr George?

27 A. Well, I don't actually know what he is talking about, SS.
28 I did not see any NPFL soldiers or Charles Taylor's soldiers in
29 my ground of assignment in Kono. Maybe he met them elsewhere,

1 but not in Kono. Not in my ground. I did not see any of them.

2 Q. Going to line 22 of that page, the question was asked of
3 that witness:

16:12:31

4 "Q. Do you recall any of the SS men? Do you know their
5 names?"

6 A. I can recall like Captain Denis. I can also recall
7 the men I told you that they were always with us
8 representing Liberia, like Colonel Jungle, he was one of
9 the men, and one Colonel - he too was from Liberia and he
10 was called Colonel Martin. I can recall those but his
11 nickname was Lion. He too came along with Issa in Kono."

16:12:59

12 Let's pause. Now, this witness is saying, Mr George, that

13 he could recall somebody called a Captain Denis, that this

14 Captain Denis was one of these SS men. Somebody named Colonel

16:13:28

15 Jungle was one of those representing Liberia with the RUF. Now,
16 did you know a Captain Denis, a Liberian that was an SS man when
17 you were brigade commander in Kono?

18 A. No. The only Denis I know was an RUF man, an RUF soldier.

19 He was based in Pendembu. He was a Mende by tribe. And then the

16:13:59

20 Jungle you are talking about, maybe is a different Jungle. But

21 the Jungle I know that was in Kono with me is the Jungle that
22 came along with Abu Keita when they brought ammunition for us to

23 use. I said that in my statement, that he came with one Jungle

24 and he came with one other commander, one Colonel Leo. Yes, I

16:14:19

25 can remember those guys. But to say they brought another Jungle,

26 no. I only know about these two guys that Abu Keita brought with

27 him, the Colonel Jungle for Abu Keita or Colonel Leo that he

28 brought with him the time he brought those ammunition. Finish.

29 Q. Did you know somebody by the name of Colonel Martin whose

1 name or nickname was Lion?

2 A. I knew one SLA Martin. We had one SLA Martin, but I've
3 forgotten the last name. He was black. That's the only Martin I
4 know about. And as I'm talking now, some SLA can attest to it if
16:15:11 5 they hear me talking. He was with us in Kono, Buedu, Makeni.
6 Yes, I know one Martin.

7 Q. Was his nickname Lion, the Martin that you are referring
8 to?

9 A. No. I did not know him by that nickname. I only knew his
16:15:34 10 Martin name.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, the Leo that the witness says
12 he knew, is this same as Lion?

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr George, can you answer that? The Leo you referred to
16:15:57 15 who you said Abu Keita brought with Colonel Jungle or with Jungle
16 to this meeting at the Waterworks, is that person also known as
17 Lion?

18 A. I said no. We were talking about the last name, Martin's
19 last name Lion. I said no. I only knew Martin - his name Martin
16:16:21 20 and I told you he was an SLA. That was what I said.

21 Q. Lion is said to be the nickname of this Colonel Martin.
22 Now, the SLA you knew as Martin, was his nickname Lion?

23 A. I said no. I did not know him by that name. I only knew
24 his Martin name. He was never been called Martin in my presence,
16:16:45 25 no.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, that is not the question I
27 asked. The witness stated a few lines ago that he was aware of a
28 Colonel Jungle who came with Abu Keita and --

29 THE WITNESS: Leo.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, the question I asked was: Was this
2 Colonel Leo also known as Lion? It has nothing to do with
3 Martin. I just said was this Leo also known as Lion.

4 MR ANYAH:

16:17:18 5 Q. Mr George, can you answer that?

6 A. Yes, I can answer it. I did not get the question clear.

7 No. Leo never had a nickname as Lion, ma'am.

8 Q. Now, Mr George, continuing with the witness's answer. Same
9 page, line 29, the last question on that page, page 11542:

16:17:44 10 "Q. Now, Mr Witness, you've talked to us about some
11 operations you were involved in in Sierra Leone after
12 returning from Liberia. During any of those operations do
13 you know whether or not any of the ammunition that you had
14 picked out, or ammunition of that type that you had picked
16:18:09 15 out, in Burkina Faso was used?

16 A. Like the RPG bombs and the twin barrel ammunition, he
17 brought some more together with the twin barrels. And the
18 tanks, because there was a tank in Kono, he brought
19 ammunition for that one too. I can recall that.

16:18:46 20 Q. Who are you saying brought the ammunition?

21 A. It was Issa Sesay. He brought the ammunition and some
22 more 7.62 millimetre NATO and Warsaw type because after the
23 ceasefire - when the ceasefire was in place already ECOMOG
24 was not fighting, so there was no way we could get
16:19:10 25 ammunition from ECOMOG, so he brought some more of those
26 from Buedu."

27 Mr George, you've heard what I've just read. Page 11543,
28 the witness is saying that the RUF at some point got ammunition
29 from Burkina Faso. They had picked out ammunition from Burkina

1 Faso. Are you aware of the RUF obtaining ammunition from Burkina
2 Faso when you were a member of the RUF?

3 A. That's - it's my first time hearing this news about Burkina
4 Faso. If Sam Bockarie had that contact, why then was he making
16:19:58 5 us suffer? This is my first time hearing about Burkina Faso.

6 Q. What about a tank? Did you have a tank in Kono when you
7 were brigade commander?

8 A. Yes, I had that tank in Kono and I escorted it to Magburaka
9 to Morris Kallon. We captured it from the ECOMOG.

16:20:24 10 Q. Did Issa Sesay at any time bring ammunition for that tank
11 to Kono?

12 A. No. The tank was captured in Kono. I don't remember them
13 carrying the tank up to Buedu and bringing it back to Kono, no.
14 The tank was captured right in Kono. If they had rockets for it,

16:20:58 15 I know that it should have been in Kono. It's not Buedu. You
16 cannot get the tank in Kono and then get the rockets from around
17 Jamaica. No.

18 Q. Did you say Jamaica? I just heard --

19 A. Buedu. Buedu.

16:21:16 20 Q. It might be getting late in the afternoon and perhaps some
21 of us are hearing things now.

22 JUDGE DOHERTY: [Microphone not activated].

23 MR ANYAH: Very well. I'm sane at this point still:

24 Q. Now, Mr George, continuing with the witness's evidence, you
16:21:34 25 heard me read about a 7.62 millimetre NATO and Warsaw type. Do
26 you know what type of ammunition or artillery that is?

27 A. Well, he's talking about - say that again, because we had
28 82 millimetres, 106, et cetera, et cetera. So please read that
29 again. Say that over again.

1 Q. Yes. The words used by the witness, he said, "He brought
2 the ammunition and some more 7.62 millimetre NATO and Warsaw
3 type." What does that mean to you, this 7.62 millimetre NATO and
4 Warsaw type? Is it a gun? Is it an artillery round. What is
16:22:28 5 it, if you know?

6 A. Well, the one I know about that we had was 86 millimetres.
7 We captured it from Jojoi ma, far away Jojoi ma. That was
8 86 millimetres. But the one he is talking about, actually, is
9 not to my knowledge.

16:22:50 10 Q. Very well. Line 22 of the witness's evidence there was a
11 question asked. This is still 11 June 2008's transcript:

12 "Q. Mr Witness, you said Issa Sesay brought ammunition.
13 First, where did you see Issa Sesay with the ammunition?

14 A. Issa Sesay took them from Buedu. After they had
16:23:17 15 cleared Mosquito Spray and the route, Issa Sesay brought
16 the ammunition, together with the twin barrel which
17 Mosquito was using to defend his headquarters from the
18 Alpha Jet, and brought them to Kono, together with some
19 more manpower and they met us in Kono.

16:23:36 20 Q. Earlier you spoke about some fighting at - I believe it
21 was Mano Junction. In that operation you talked about some
22 tank fire; is that correct?

23 A. Yes, my Lord. It was the tanks that I told you about,
24 the Panhard.

16:24:02 25 Q. The type of shells you described two different types
26 piercing and explosive.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Had you ever seen that type of ammunition in Liberia?

29 A. It was only at that time when we brought them from

1 Burkina. I told you that we wanted to make use of those
2 tanks that we had captured from ECOMOG."

3 Why are you shaking your head, Mr George?

4 A. I'm feeling my head.

16:24:39 5 Q. Are you feeling unwell?

6 A. My head is just - it's not that much. I'm feeling a little
7 bit of pain.

8 Q. Are you able to continue for five more minutes?

9 A. Yes. Oh, yes. Even 30 minutes I can withstand.

16:24:58 10 Q. Thank you, Mr George. Let us know if you feel more
11 discomfort. I will make the relevant applications --

12 A. No, no. Let's go on.

13 Q. So the question at line 8 to that witness was:

14 "Q. Had you ever seen that type of ammunition in Liberia?

16:25:17 15 A. It was only at that time when we brought them from
16 Burkina. I told you that we wanted to make use of those
17 tanks that we had captured from ECOMOG. It was only the
18 tanks without the ammunition. It was at that time that I
19 saw it. But when I came in, I only saw the ammunitions
16:25:34 20 again when we left Segbwema and tried to hit Mano Junction.
21 We used it again to hit Daru Barracks, but we were
22 unsuccessful."

23 Let's pause there. Mr George, this witness is saying that
24 a particular type of ammunition was brought from Burkina. You've
16:25:59 25 spoken previously about Burkina, but now the question pertains to
26 this type of ammunition. It is referred to as a type of shell
27 that's piercing and explosive. Did you know the RUF to have
28 those types of ammunition, shells that were piercing and
29 explosive?

1 A. No, he is talking about Segbwema and I was in Kono, so
2 really I cannot say I knew about it, and really I don't know
3 about that kind of ammunition he is talking about because I was
4 based in Kono. The tank was under my control, that I know about
16:26:38 5 it because it was with me in Kono. But that one he is talking
6 about that took place in Segbwema, that one I don't know about.

7 Q. That's fair enough. The tanks that were under your
8 control, did you have ammunition for them or did you not have
9 ammunition?

16:26:57 10 A. We had ammunition for it, because it was used by ECOMOG and
11 we captured it from ECOMOG and we had bombs for that particular
12 armoured car I'm talking about. I said I moved with it up to
13 Magburaka and I turned it over to Kallon. It had bombs in it.
14 Four at the front, four up, four down, and spare bombs. That was
16:27:24 15 when I got in the armoured car. I saw it. And I took it right
16 to Magburaka township and I handed it over to Morris Kallon.

17 Q. Was it one tank or was it more than one tank?

18 A. I had one with me in Kono.

19 Q. When you had the one tank in Kono did the RUF anywhere else
16:27:48 20 in Sierra Leone have a tank, to your knowledge?

21 A. Yes, they had another tank in Makeni.

22 Q. Now, line 19. A question was asked of the witness same
23 page, 11544, 11 June 2008 transcript:

24 "Q. My question was when did you leave Kono?

16:28:17 25 A. That was the time Issa Sesay had come from Buedu, as I
26 am saying. He came from Buedu and said that now the SLA
27 who are in Makeni do not listen to Papay Sankoh's order,
28 because he said because they said Foday Sankoh had told
29 them that they should send former President Momoh to Buedu

1 at Mosquito's place, but Brigadier Mani and the other SLAs
2 who were there had refused to do that, so we should
3 organise ourselves and so we would go and dislodge them
4 from Makeni.

16:28:51 5 I advised him that, 'General, now that all of us have been
6 fighting together as one, I think we should resolve this
7 thing amicably', because I was the IO commander and that
8 was my duty."

9 Do you know what an IO commander is, Mr George?

16:29:17 10 A. IO. IO commander, I take that to be intelligence officer.
11 They send reports against any commander upon their advice.

12 Q. Now, Mr George, I don't want you to mention any names that
13 come to mind - to your mind regarding the IO commander, but just
14 listen to the last part of the witness's response. The witness
16:29:51 15 said:

16 "Because I was the IO commander and that was my duty. But
17 he said I was not to dictate to him what he should do, so he
18 ended up organising men and they went and hit Makeni and they
19 dislodged the SLAs in Makeni. As a result of that I had a fear,
16:30:10 20 because I was an SLA and I was in Kono with Colonel Martin George
21 and others, so it was that fear that made me to go through
22 Magburaka and I went to 91 where ECOMOG was and I surrendered
23 myself and my weapon and my grenades that were in my possession."

24 Mr George, your name is mentioned here again, Colonel
16:30:42 25 Martin George. Now, this person says they were with you and
26 others in Kono. The question is asked of the person on line 10:

27 "Q. Mr Witness, do you remember approximately what month
28 and year that was?

29 A. It was at the end of 1999. The end of 1999."

1 The question to you, Mr George. The SLAs that were with
2 you in Kono, was there a reason for them to fear for their lives?

3 A. I think there was no reason for them to be afraid for their
4 lives because I think I named most of SLA officers that were

16:31:36 5 serving under me. We all used to sit in common, think in common.

6 I had no problem with any SLA officers who were under me in Kono.

7 MR ANYAH: I see the time, Madam President.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Anyah. Mr Witness, we've
9 come to the end of today's proceedings. I'm going to adjourn the

16:31:53 10 proceedings until Monday at 9.30. Mr George, you are not to

11 discuss your evidence, as I normally remind you, with anybody.

12 Thank you. Court is adjourned accordingly.

13 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.32 p.m.

14 to be reconvened on Monday, 26 April 2010 at

16:32:40 15 9.30 a.m.]

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WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DCT-062	39744
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR ANYAH	39744