



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 23 JULY 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Mr William Romans  
Ms Sidney Thompson

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Thursday, 23 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:19 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,  
6 first.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A  
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Maja Dimitrova and myself, Brenda J  
09:31:40 10 Hollis.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself, Courtenay  
14 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah,  
09:31:56 15 Mr Silas Chekera, and we are joined today by one of our interns,  
16 Mr Adil Raza.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor, I'll  
18 remind you you are still bound by your declaration to tell the  
19 truth. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

20 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

21 [On former affirmation]

22 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

23 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

24 Q. Mr Taylor, I'd like to take a little time today to deal  
09:32:26 25 with specifically one or two aspects of the Prosecution case now  
26 that we've reached the end of 1996. Do you follow me?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. Now do you recall that one of the important witnesses  
29 called at an early stage by the Prosecution was a Mr Varmuyan

1 Sheriff?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. And we've dealt to a little extent with that man so far,  
4 but I would like to deal with, please, one particular exhibit,

09:33:15 5 exhibit D-1 which that witness dealt with. Can we put that up on  
6 the screen, please. Now on 10 January of last year in an open  
7 session, when cross-examined by me he drew this map to outline  
8 the area controlled by ULIMO. Do you recall that testimony,  
9 Mr Taylor?

09:34:27 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. And his testimony was to the effect that that area was cut  
12 off by ULIMO between 1992 and 1996. Do you remember that?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. And for the assistance --

15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just pause, please, Mr Griffiths. Yes,  
16 Ms Hollis.

17 MS HOLLIS: I object to that. He is misstating this  
18 witness's testimony. The witness broke the areas down into Bomi  
19 and Grand Cape Mount Counties and Lofa County, and the testimony  
09:35:04 20 relating to Lofa County was not that it was cut off from 1992.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, the page references, your Honours, are  
23 page 976, lines 25 to 29; 977, lines 1 to 5; and 978, lines 7 to  
24 11. And in the last passage in answer to a question by me he  
09:35:39 25 gave that time frame, 1992 to 1996, and I would respectfully ask  
26 my learned friends to check the transcripts to see whether or not  
27 that is correct.

28 MS HOLLIS: And we will check it, and there are other  
29 references in the transcript where in fact the witness says it

1 was toward the end of 1993 when Lofa County came under the  
2 control of ULIMO.

09:36:48 3 PRESIDING JUDGE: We don't have the transcript here, but  
4 I'm just - we'll need to see the transcript if this requires a  
5 ruling, but at this stage I'm curious to know: Is one counsel  
6 talking about what was said by this witness in chief and the  
7 other counsel talking about what he said in cross-examination?

09:37:14 8 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, Mr President, as far as I'm aware,  
9 this map was marked as a result of questions put by me in  
10 cross-examination.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: It looks as though we've got the  
12 transcript available. Just pardon us, we'll have to go into the  
13 transcript.

09:38:09 14 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I invite your Honours' attention to page  
15 978 between lines 5 and 11. That's 10 January 2008, page 978  
16 between lines 4 and 11. The question asked on that date was:

09:39:28 17 "Q. So putting all of that together, then we can say that  
18 the area marked by the pink line between 1992 and 1996 was  
19 controlled by ULIMO, whether as a unified force or a split  
20 force J and K. Would you agree?

21 A. Yes."

22 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, my apologies, would you give  
23 me the page again, please.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Page 978, transcript for 10 January 2008.

09:40:15 25 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: So now that I've found the correct page,  
27 I'd just like to recapitulate. You're referring to line 7, are  
28 you? The question put at line 7?

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, yes, and the answer given at

1 line 11.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. So you asked:

3 "Q. So putting all of that together, then we can say that  
4 that area marked by the pink line between 1992 and 1996

09:41:45 5 was controlled by ULIMO, whether as a unified force or as a  
6 split force J and K. Would you agree?"

7 A. Yes, yes."

8 Could you remind me what is your objection again, please,  
9 Ms Hollis?

09:42:00 10 MS HOLLIS: Your Honour, the objection is that this  
11 reference to this single page misstates the totality of this  
12 witness's evidence. Now I can certainly deal with that on  
13 cross-examination and go to those other portions, even in the  
14 Defence's cross-examination that give other time frames and break  
09:42:18 15 down control.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand. Thank you, Ms Hollis.  
17 Well, on the basis that you have your right to cross-examine  
18 we'll overrule the objection and you can proceed.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

09:42:39 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, looking at the pink line to which Mr Sherif  
21 referred on 10 January of last year, help us please. What does,  
22 as we look at it, the right-hand side of that pink line  
23 delineate?

24 A. When you say the right-hand side of the pink line,  
09:43:12 25 because --

26 Q. As we look at it, we have the border on the left. Now the  
27 right side of that pink line, what does it delineate?

28 A. You mean within - because there's a right side of the first  
29 line at the border and there's also a right side at the close of

1 the pink. The right side as of the border?

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Because the pink line encircles an area, but there is a  
4 beginning line and there's an ending line which comes --

09:43:49 5 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor. Do you see marked on that map the  
6 St Paul River?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And do you see that that pink line at one point touches  
9 that river?

09:44:03 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. So, help us. That part of the line, what geographical  
12 feature is it following?

13 A. That line is following the river.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Now just so that we can put this in context,  
09:44:24 15 can I now ask, please, that MFI-3 be provided. I wonder if there  
16 is a way in which we can helpfully compare the two maps. Let's  
17 put MFI-3 up first of all, please:

18 Q. Can you see it, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, I can.

09:45:19 20 Q. And just remind us, Mr Taylor, where did you put the  
21 eastern boundary of the area controlled by ULIMO?

22 A. The eastern boundary is the green line on the St Paul  
23 River.

24 Q. On the St Paul River?

09:45:59 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Now, is there a way in which we can put both maps on the  
27 overhead at the same time so that we can compare what you're  
28 saying with what a Prosecution witness, Varmuyan Sheriff, said?

29 Yes. So your case is, Mr Taylor, that green line which follows

1 the St Paul River delineates the area controlled by ULIMO, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

09:47:05

3 Q. Now it may be to a different scale, but what we have next  
4 to it is the area marked out by Mr Sheriff as the area controlled  
5 by ULIMO between, as he said on page 978, 1992 to 1996. What do  
6 you say about Mr Sheriff's map, Mr Taylor?

09:47:54

7 A. When I look at this map by Mr Sheriff, the lines that cross  
8 at the end of his map at the St Paul River, as a general view  
9 this is exactly the position held by both ULIMOs as of the time  
10 stated in the evidence.

11 Q. So let us be clear about what it is you're telling us. In  
12 respect of that aspect of his evidence, was Mr Sheriff telling the  
13 truth?

14 A. With respect to that aspect, yes.

09:48:19

15 Q. Now still keeping that map on the screen, let us bear in  
16 mind that Moses Blah in his evidence on 19 May 2008 at page  
17 10193, lines 5 to 12, told us that that border between Sierra  
18 Leone and Liberia was cut off between 1992 until elections in  
19 June 1997 by ULIMO. Do you remember Mr Blah giving us that  
20 evidence, Mr Taylor?

09:49:09

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. And help us, in terms of the time frame provided by that  
23 Prosecution witness, 1992 to 1997, do you agree or disagree?

24 A. I agree.

09:49:41

25 Q. Do you also recall a Prosecution witness who in open  
26 session on 9 May 2008, Karmoh S Kanneh, page 9445 to 9446, lines  
27 27 to 29 and lines 1 to 13, told this Court that that border was  
28 cut off between 1992 and 1996 by ULIMO? Do you recall that?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. The areas which both you and that  
2 important Prosecution witness, Mr Varmuyan Sherif, delineated on  
3 your respective maps, how long do you say ULIMO had control of  
4 that area?

09:50:47 5 A. I say ULIMO had control of that area from 1992 until 1997  
6 and it's important to understand that if you look at it, your  
7 Honours, there's not a very big difference in the final year.  
8 What we see here, if I may help the Court, in 1996, as I have  
9 told this Court, this is the period where deployment of the  
09:51:26 10 peacekeepers occurred throughout the country to begin the process  
11 of disarmament and I have also told this Court that that  
12 disarmament process ends around the first quarter of 1997. So  
13 what you find over here, one side, I am looking at my election as  
14 the time because ULIMO is still sitting in there until I'm  
09:52:01 15 elected President.

16 Now, the '96 - I'm just helping the Court and I could be  
17 wrong about this - is trying to explain the year of the  
18 disarmament and the deployment when ULIMO had to disband as ULIMO  
19 at the end of 1996. This is the only way I can help the Court.

09:52:26 20 But I see no real difference. It has to do with when you  
21 look at ULIMO converting to a political party at the beginning of  
22 '97, as the NPFL did, or you are looking at the period when a new  
23 government is put into place. I look at it in '97 as the time  
24 that ULIMO actually leaves the area, because that is the time  
09:52:52 25 that the Government of Liberia as the constituted government  
26 takes charge and then ULIMO people begin to really move. So I  
27 think it's almost like, you know, the chicken and the egg, which  
28 came first.

29 Q. Well, I really want us to put this question to bed.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. In 1996, which is the cut-off point given by two  
3 Prosecution witnesses, Sheriff and Kanneh, at that time what is  
4 actually going on in Liberia?

09:53:33 5 A. At that time the disarmament process is ongoing and every  
6 faction is still in its position.

7 Q. Were the various factions, including the NPFL, still in  
8 control of their areas they had conquered during 1996?

9 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

09:54:05 10 Q. When did they in fact give up control of those areas?

11 A. In actual fact, as I have said, I would say as of the  
12 election of a President of the Republic of Liberia, because even  
13 though the ECOMOG forces are deployed their control of those  
14 areas - by control I mean the individual control - is still in  
09:54:42 15 place. It is only the unified Government of Liberia that takes  
16 final control, but up until my inauguration on 2 August the  
17 leaders of these different factions could still give orders to  
18 those men under their control. So I would say in actual fact  
19 control ceased on the day the President of Liberia took the oath  
09:55:08 20 of office on 2 August 1997.

21 Q. Now you recall of course that your Vice-President Moses  
22 Blah, another important Prosecution witness, gave the end date of  
23 June 1997. So help us, what was happening in Liberia in June of  
24 1997?

09:55:39 25 A. June 1997 we are in the final weeks of election - of  
26 campaigning for the presidency. Elections are held in July of 19  
27 - I don't know what's going through Moses's head here, but he  
28 should know. June of 1997 we are in the final stages of  
29 campaigning throughout the country. I cannot understand what

1 importance he attaches to June as regards control. I can't speak  
2 for him.

3 Q. Well help us with this, please: Of those three Prosecution  
4 witnesses I have named, Varmuyan Sherif, Moses Blah, Karmoh  
09:56:30 5 Kanneh, bearing in mind that the first and the last, Sherif and  
6 Kanneh, say '96, and the middle, Moses Blah, says '97, help us,  
7 Mr Taylor, which is the most accurate of those three accounts,  
8 i.e., the account you would like these judges to accept?

9 A. 1997. The year 1997.

09:57:22 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, can we now please remove those two maps  
11 from the overhead. Could I now please ask that the witness be  
12 shown exhibit D-15.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Did you want that shown to the witness,  
14 or put on the overhead?

09:58:11 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I'd like it to be put on the overhead,  
16 please. Can we bring it down a bit, please, so that we can see  
17 the start of the document:

18 Q. Mr Taylor, do you recall this document being produced?

19 A. Yes, I do.

09:58:51 20 Q. Let us look at it, please. You will see that it is headed  
21 "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone". Do you see that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. And it is dated 26 June 1996, yes?

24 A. Yes.

09:59:15 25 Q. Let us pause at that point. In June of 1996 what were you  
26 doing?

27 A. Seriously campaigning throughout the country.

28 Q. What for? Campaigning for what?

29 A. Excuse me. June of 1996, no, no, I mixed that up with July

1 of 1996 - of 1997. June of 1996 we are - in April we have this  
2 fracas in Monrovia. By June of 1996 we are just about recovering  
3 from the fracas with Roosevelt Johnson in Monrovia. By fracas I  
4 mean the war that has occurred in 1996 upon trying to arrest  
10:00:18 5 Roosevelt Johnson.

6 Q. And help us, what is your role within Liberia at that time?

7 A. I am a member of the collective presidency at the time.

8 Q. Now do you recall that we saw a similar letter to this  
9 yesterday afternoon? Do you recall that?

10:00:40 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Dated 4 December 1996. Do you recall that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. So this letter is some six months before the letter we  
14 looked at yesterday, yes?

10:00:57 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now it's from Corporal Foday S Sankoh, leader of the RUF to  
17 brother Mohamed Talibi, Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriya, Accra,  
18 Ghana. You note this is the same addressee and the same address  
19 as the letter of 4 December. Is that correct, Mr Taylor?

10:01:31 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. "Subject, follow-up request. I want to thank you and the  
22 other brothers back home again very much for the half million  
23 United States dollars which I received through you for the  
24 purchase of needed material to pursue the military mission."

10:02:05 25 Now help us, Mr Taylor, which mission was that?

26 A. I have no idea. He says it's a military mission. His  
27 military mission, I guess.

28 Q. But, Mr Taylor, it's suggested that you're controlling the  
29 RUF, so please help these judges: Which military mission is

1 this?

2 A. Well, this has got to be his military mission. It's got  
3 nothing to do with me, because he surely cannot be receiving  
4 \$500,000 to help with a military mission in Liberia. I'm just  
10:02:39 5 recovering from a war with Roosevelt Johnson, so it's not for me.  
6 So this must be his own mission probably for what he wants to do  
7 elsewhere, but not for me.

8 Q. But let us now fully understand what the picture is.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I invite the learned judges to have open  
10:03:07 10 within the bundle of documents - additional documents for week 30  
11 which we disclosed the document which I showed the witness  
12 yesterday behind tab 5, exhibit P-272. Now can I please have  
13 exhibit 15, the one just taken off the screen. Because it's  
14 important that we bear in mind what these two documents are  
10:04:28 15 saying:

16 Q. In June of 1996 Mr Sankoh is writing to the same people  
17 saying, "Thank you for the 500,000 US dollars". In December he  
18 is writing to the same person saying, "I received the 29,000 US  
19 dollars". Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

10:05:06 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Now help us, and can we put this back on the screen,  
22 please, the document of 26 June. So we have this situation: In  
23 June he has received 500,000 US dollars and sometime prior to 4  
24 December he has received a further 29,000 US dollars. Is that  
10:05:44 25 right, Mr Taylor?

26 A. That is right.

27 Q. Now help us. You are supposed to be the controller of the  
28 RUF. Were you aware that your underling, Mr Sankoh, was  
29 receiving these kinds of monies in 1996?

1 A. Not at all. Not at all. And in fact if he were in fact an  
2 underling, he made a very bad one. He made a very bad one,  
3 because this is an indication that if, as alleged by the  
4 Prosecution, there is any connection whatsoever, he is a very  
10:06:30 5 disrespectful and terrible underling, I mean. And if this were  
6 true and if I did not take action against him, then I would be  
7 stupid myself that he would receive a \$500,000 and doesn't even  
8 refer to me here. So for someone to even conjecture that he is  
9 supposed to be controlled by me simply means that if you look at  
10:06:55 10 it at the reverse, that means that he's controlling me.

11 Q. And Mr Taylor, of course we need to look at this within the  
12 context of the maps we looked at earlier this morning and the  
13 timelines given by Prosecution witnesses. Because you recall  
14 according to their own witnesses between 1992 and 1997 there is  
10:07:23 15 no contact, and here we have two letters from your supposed  
16 underling in 1996 which makes no mention of you. Can you help us  
17 as to why that is?

18 A. Well, let me just help the Court as follows: June 1996,  
19 December 1996, there is one basic question I guess, where is  
10:08:03 20 Foday Sankoh at this time? Based on evidence before this Court,  
21 Foday Sankoh is pursuing the peace process in Ivory Coast. Now -  
22 so he's in Ivory Coast, and I have told this Court that the road  
23 from Monrovia to the town I have mentioned here several times is  
24 Loguato, that drives straight into la Cote d'Ivoire. You start -  
10:08:33 25 on the Ivorian side there's a town called Bianhitouo, I think  
26 that's already in the records here as regards a particular  
27 Prosecution witness that talked about the return of Sam Bockarie  
28 and that town is in the records. And there's a road all the way  
29 through Danane, Man and on the way to Abidjan.

1 Now here we are - throughout this entire period there is  
2 not any evidence before this Court that suggests that Foday  
3 Sankoh sent someone to me in Monrovia or he wrote to me. He had  
4 every opportunity. If there were any contacts or connection with  
10:09:20 5 me, he had every opportunity, let's just take from June of 1996,  
6 all the way to get in contact with me. He did not because there  
7 was no contact. He didn't have a reason to because he knew of  
8 this situation that had occurred back in 1992 so, I mean, this  
9 should be very, very clear that such disconnect, even looking at  
10:09:53 10 this period, should be self-evident of the fact that Foday Sankoh  
11 I can almost say wants nothing to do with me as much as I want  
12 nothing to do with him. He had every opportunity, and there is  
13 not any evidence that I have heard, and I stand corrected, before  
14 this Court that suggests that while he's in Abidjan whether  
10:10:12 15 advising him on the peace treaty that they are trying to go  
16 through, or whether suggestions or whatever, I have not seen any  
17 evidence presented to this Court to suggest any contact even  
18 during this period, and he had every opportunity to do just that.  
19 And he did not because there was no need to, there was no  
10:10:41 20 contact. Everything had been severed.

21 Q. Now looking at the letter which is up on the screen we see  
22 mention of, "The 500,000 US dollars which I received through you  
23 for the purchase of needed material to pursue the military  
24 mission". Now when we look at the letter of 4 December, which is  
10:11:15 25 behind divider 5 in our bundle, we see mention again in that  
26 first paragraph of "our fighting materials". And if we go to the  
27 second page of that document dated 4 December, we again see  
28 mention of the word "materials". That is the four lines from the  
29 end of that first paragraph, "Provision of our needed materials".

1 Can we go back to the document of 6 June, please. Now  
2 looking at this document dated June 1996 and that reference to  
3 materials, Mr Taylor, you're supposed to be providing the RUF at  
4 this time with their materials. So why is he needing to purchase  
10:12:45 5 these materials from someone else? Can you help us?

6 A. It beats me too, counsel. I don't understand, because even  
7 the assertion that I'm supposed to be providing material to the  
8 RUF even around this time, it is impossible to even say that  
9 because there are just so many variables involved here. Not only  
10:13:16 10 do you have the cut-off as of 1992, but now you also have being  
11 deployed, even at the smallest level as of 1994 we see some  
12 deployment of United Nations and ECOMOG forces, but that  
13 deployment is completed - is in full swing going into '95 and  
14 '96.

10:13:49 15 Now here we have - so to suggest that material is being  
16 supplied by the NPFL at that time actually, in all fairness, is  
17 to suggest complicity on the part of ECOMOG and the United  
18 Nations forces. Because if they are there for a purpose of  
19 making sure that there is free movement of people, no materials,  
10:14:15 20 arms, and warlike materials should go through their positions,  
21 they are deployed fully in the country, all airports, all  
22 seaports, all major highways, all entries into Liberia and out,  
23 and if material is still going as suggested by the Prosecution,  
24 then one must assume complicity on the part of the peacekeepers.

10:14:40 25 I mean, it is silly for anyone to believe that this would happen,  
26 but this is the way it is. I mean, it's not possible.

27 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, were you controlling ECOMOG in the same  
28 way you're alleged to be controlling the RUF?

29 A. Well, by the Prosecution's own assertions one may have to

1 agree that I'm controlling them too.

2 Q. Were you?

3 A. No.

10:15:13

4 Q. Let's go back to the letter: "However, I wish to let you  
5 all be informed that my business partners for these materials are  
6 here with me."

7 Now let's go back to the letter of 4 December, please,  
8 second paragraph behind divider 5: "I have already finished  
9 negotiations with my business partners."

10:15:49

10 Can we go back then to the letter of 6 June and we see  
11 there, second paragraph: "My business partners" - same phrase -  
12 "for these materials are here with me."

13 Help us, Mr Taylor, who are these business partners who  
14 were there with him in June and who he is expecting to see in  
15 December? Who are they?

10:16:29

16 A. I'm sorry, I cannot help the Court. I have no idea who he  
17 is referring to.

18 Q. Mr Taylor, you're supposed to be in charge of this man.

10:16:46

19 A. Well, I really - I really do not know who he is referring  
20 to as his business partners because let's assume that - if one  
21 just waking up from sleeps assumes well, maybe Mr Taylor is  
22 there, and I am his boss, referring to me as his business partner  
23 would be, what, insubordination. So he surely cannot be  
24 referring to me. I really cannot help the Court on this. I do  
25 not know who he is speaking about.

10:17:14

26 Q. How did you allow your underling to be dealing with these  
27 other people when you're supposed to be in charge?

28 A. Well, the fact of the matter is because he's not an  
29 underling, that's why he can do as he pleases. There is

1 absolutely nothing here that has to do with strengthening such  
2 outrageous suggestions by the opposite side. I think there is  
3 ample evidence here to demonstrate to anyone that Mr Sankoh is  
4 operating on his own and is doing that for a long time.

10:17:58 5 But let me just add this for the Court, you know, like I  
6 said, I'm not a lawyer, I never studied law; I'm a politician,  
7 I'm an economist. But just for the sake of a logical argument,  
8 Mr Sankoh is cut off from me as of 1992. Wouldn't one believe  
9 that upon getting an opportunity in 1996 to come from the bushes  
10:18:29 10 into the Republic of La Cote d'Ivoire that a normal person would  
11 say, "Wow, I now have an opportunity to link back up with my  
12 friend and brother or my boss that I - from 1992 up until now,  
13 ULIMO, we are cut off and I have not been able to get to him.  
14 Wow, what an opportunity". He doesn't use it because there is no  
10:18:56 15 link. He doesn't use it because he doesn't want to, there is no  
16 link, and he doesn't want it to happen. As simple as that.

17 So this whole thing about being a subordinate and - I mean,  
18 it makes good when you're dealing with - I wouldn't even call it  
19 a theory. You know, dealing with an hypothesis, because some  
10:19:23 20 theories lead to fact. This cannot even be called a theory, it's  
21 just a mere simple hypothesis thrown around trying to make ends  
22 meet where they do not - they do not meet. Because if you go  
23 through the normal logical pattern of thinking, it's evident here  
24 that this man as of 1992 has had it, he doesn't want to be  
10:19:47 25 bothered with me, he wants to carry on his revolution by himself,  
26 he is doing it on his own without my knowledge, without my  
27 consent, without my participation.

28 Q. Let's go back to the letter:

29 "However, I wish to let you all be informed that my

1 business partners for these materials are here with me and we  
2 have had extensive discussions on this subject. Attached to this  
3 letter you will find a list of materials (arms and ammunition)  
4 and their costs for your serious and urgent attention. I now  
10:20:31 5 need one and a half million United States dollars in order to  
6 purchase twice the listed materials for effective and smooth  
7 operations.

8 My representative, Captain Philip S Palmer, will elaborate  
9 on this all-important and urgent mission, as he is expected to  
10:20:57 10 travel along with my business partners somewhere for these  
11 materials if, and only if, the above-mentioned amount is  
12 available. These materials will be given to me" --

13 A. Maybe "at".

14 Q. -- "at discount rates and the requested amount plus the one  
10:21:23 15 already at hand will cover in addition all transportation costs  
16 for airlifting these materials."

17 Can we see the next page, please: "The airlifting of these  
18 materials to our controlled territory will be done before any  
19 payment for this mission is done by me."

10:21:57 20 Pause there. Mr Taylor, were you airlifting materials to  
21 the RUF?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Did you have the capacity to airlift materials to the RUF?

24 A. I did not have the capacity, neither did I have a reason  
10:22:18 25 to.

26 Q. Were you aware that such materials were indeed being  
27 airlifted to the RUF?

28 A. No, I was not aware.

29 Q. But, Mr Taylor, this is an organisation you're supposed to

1 be in control of. How does it come about that they're having  
2 materials airlifted to them and you know nothing about it? How?

3 A. Because I had no contact or had no relationship with them,  
4 so I didn't have to know and they did as they - as any  
10:22:56 5 organisation with all these contacts would do.

6 Q. Going back to the letter: "This is why I am urgently  
7 appealing to you and the other brothers back home for your usual  
8 cooperation." Pause there. "Usual cooperation", does that  
9 suggest to you, Mr Taylor, an ongoing relationship? This is June  
10:23:28 10 1996, "usual cooperation"?

11 A. Of course that suggests that there is an ongoing  
12 relationship with the brothers that he is referring to here and  
13 based on the context, we know who the brothers are.

14 Q. Who are they?

10:23:50 15 A. Well, he's saying to Talibi, With he and the brothers back  
16 home. One can assume that he's referring to Talibi's brothers  
17 and Talibi's people. So this simply shows that not only is there  
18 an ongoing relationship, but maybe one that has developed some  
19 roots.

10:24:15 20 Q. Let us pause for a moment. What was, Mr Taylor, the nature  
21 of the support provided by Colonel Gaddafi through the Mataba to  
22 revolutionary movements in Africa?

23 A. Well, I will speak about my organisation. I was provided  
24 training and basic disciplinary styles. I was not provided with  
10:24:58 25 arms and ammunition by the Libyan government for my revolution.  
26 However, they did from time to time provide me with assistance in  
27 small amounts of cash before I launched my revolution and during  
28 the early stages. So I speak for my revolution, yes.

29 Q. Now help us. Bearing your experience in mind, is it

1 surprising to you that this kind of financial support was being  
2 provided by Libya to the RUF?

10:25:56 3 A. Quite frankly, I must say yes. I must say yes because  
4 during my time, if I had received half a million or a million  
5 dollars from Libya at the time, I probably would have reached  
6 Monrovia earlier than July of 1990. It's a little surprising  
7 here to me that he is provided with this kind of money.

10:26:25 8 Q. Because just to remind ourselves, half a million in June,  
9 29,000 in December, with a request for a further 700,000 in that  
10 letter in December. So we're talking about substantial financial  
11 assistance by Libya for the RUF. Did you receive that kind of  
12 assistance, Mr Taylor?

10:26:50 13 A. No, I did not receive this kind of money, no. Like I said,  
14 if I had I probably would have cut the time of the revolution  
15 much shorter.

16 At that time when we went to Libya as a pan-African  
17 organisation - and let me just clarify one thing here, or may I  
18 say remind the Court. I did say on the records here that I was  
19 promised arms and ammunition by Libya that never actually got to  
10:27:18 20 me through Sierra Leone at the time. I don't want in the future,  
21 "Well, you know, you said you did not, but this" - we did not get  
22 those arms and ammunition. So the money that is being provided  
23 here for me it's a little new, because I did not get this kind of  
24 money. Libya as a pan-African pioneering country helped with  
10:27:46 25 disciplinary training - military and disciplinary training for  
26 the most part.

27 Q. "That is why I am urgently appealing to you and the other  
28 brothers back home for your usual cooperation in providing this  
29 time the one and a half million United States dollars to be at

1 hand with me so that my business partners and my representative  
2 can proceed for these materials very quickly for fast and smooth  
3 operation. Kind regards, signed Colonel Foday S Sankoh."

4 A. You mean corporal.

10:28:41 5 Q. Mr Taylor, did you know anything at all about this  
6 relationship between Foday Sankoh and the Libyan Arab People's  
7 Jamahiriya?

8 A. No, I did not. I did not know that he was dealing with  
9 them and I think it is self-evident here that this is a  
10:29:04 10 relationship that he probably developed I can see here through  
11 Ghana. So from their own staging position in Ghana as - I'm  
12 referring specifically to the release that was done by the RUF,  
13 so - and because these letters are addressed to Ghana one must  
14 say that this contact is made through Ghana. I do not know  
10:29:30 15 anything about this.

16 Q. Let us try and put all of this together then, shall we?  
17 You will recall that I drew your attention to a letter - a press  
18 release - issued by the RUF from Ghana. Do you recall that?

19 A. That's what I just - yes, I do. That's what I referred to.

10:29:55 20 Q. And just to remind ourselves, that press release is dated  
21 23 March 1994. Do you recall that, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. We then have secondly this letter of June of 1996,  
24 addressed to the Libyan People's Jamahiriya in the same place,  
10:30:35 25 yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. We thirdly have another letter dated 4 December 1996 in the  
28 same place?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. On top of that we have three Prosecution witnesses saying  
2 the RUF are cut off from Liberia between 1992 to 1996 or 1997.  
3 So, I'm pausing. Mr Taylor, did you have any contact between you  
4 and the RUF between 1992 and 1997?

10:31:23 5 A. I had no contact whatsoever with the RUF between 1992 and  
6 1997. No contact whatsoever. And I think it's very clear here  
7 through these letters, without any references and without any  
8 evidence before this Court, that messengers or letters were sent  
9 to me. There's no reference and even the mere fact here where  
10:32:04 10 we're seeing Sankoh talking about airlifting into his controlled  
11 territory, I think it's got to be as clear as you can ever get  
12 that there is no relationship.

13 And I tell you, and by you I mean this Court, if by this  
14 time - and let's say one can take for granted that, oh, maybe  
10:32:34 15 there is this blind assertion of contact, but if by 1996 while  
16 Foday Sankoh is out in the clear open with every opportunity to  
17 reach me he doesn't, that must show that even I, who someone  
18 would say will be controlling him, should be concerned now that  
19 this my so-called underling is really what? Is pushing me aside,  
10:33:22 20 if one were to conclude that he's an underling. So I conclude my  
21 answer by saying I have no contact whatsoever with the RUF  
22 between 1992 and 1997. None.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, you appreciate of course, don't you, that the  
24 Prosecution say you are a liar and that at the very least you had  
10:33:54 25 radio control with the RUF during this period? Did you?

26 A. I had no radio control or contact with the RUF and I want  
27 to believe that the Prosecution must know that and I will tell  
28 you why I say that. They must - and I use the word must know  
29 that.

1           The individuals that constructed this indictment against me  
2 are military people. Lieutenant Colonel David Crane, retired  
3 army personnel of the United States Army, Dr Alan White, a 20  
4 year veteran of defence intelligence at the Pentagon in the  
10:34:46 5 United States, our learned counsel is a retired air force  
6 colonel, they know that it is the business of the military to  
7 intercept communication and listen. If they had any evidence,  
8 they had professional military people in the area. It's their  
9 business to intercept communication and to listen to telephone.  
10:35:06 10 They know they must do this. It's a part of military.

11           Let them bring to this Court any evidence of any  
12 intercepts, or transcripts. That's why I say they must know it  
13 doesn't exist. It's a fabrication and I challenge them to bring  
14 - I don't want to hear this thing about, "Oh, it's intelligence  
10:35:29 15 and we cannot release it." Look, my life is on the line here.  
16 If these major governments that have brought me here, they ought  
17 to quote unquote I don't want to hear about classified  
18 intelligence. Declassify any information you have about  
19 Charles Taylor.

10:35:46 20           I was told before about, "We think we have aerial  
21 photography of trucks going across" - nonsense - "the border."  
22 Where is it? That's why I mean that they must know that it's a  
23 lie. They know it's a lie and I challenge them to bring the  
24 intercepts, okay? Even before that particular time that we're  
10:36:09 25 talking about they had military intelligence, they had  
26 intelligence in Liberia, it's their business - the Central  
27 Intelligence Agency has operated in Liberia, they're still there,  
28 it's a business for people to listen to radio and telephone  
29 messages. It's their business. It's the business of the British

1 that had interests in Sierra Leone at that time. They listen.  
2 It's a part of the intelligence situation. Let them come forward  
3 now and bring this evidence before this Court. That's why I mean  
4 that they must know it's a lie. They know it's a lie.

10:36:52 5 Q. What do you mean when you say, Mr Taylor, the CIA  
6 involvement in Liberia?

7 A. Well, when I say the CIA involvement, I'm not trying to  
8 knock on the CIA. What I'm trying to say it is the business -  
9 the CIA have agents across the world; Liberia being one and they  
10:37:09 10 have in Sierra Leone. It's the business of intelligence  
11 agencies. And because of the interests in the United States in  
12 sending these Pentagon people here to prosecute me, they must  
13 produce the evidence. That's what I'm saying.

14 Q. Have you any documentary proof to show that the CIA were  
10:37:26 15 involved in Liberia, Mr Taylor?

16 A. To the extent that I'm saying that the intelligence  
17 community is - they are installed, there is practically nowhere  
18 in the world that the CIA - and I'm not trying to mention the CIA  
19 for any specific reason. Whether it is French intelligence, or  
10:37:46 20 British, I'm just trying to say intelligence as we know it is  
21 part of the business of information. And they are everywhere,  
22 just as the British are, just as the French are, just as  
23 everybody. So I don't want to knock them specifically, but they  
24 are there. They must be there. It's a part of their business to  
10:38:05 25 listen. It's a part of their business.

26 I know it because my own National Security Agency in the  
27 United States, don't forget about the relationship - the very  
28 close relationship - between Liberia and the United States  
29 specifically. Most of our people are trained by the Americans

1 and the British. So I'm not here to divulge information, but I'm  
2 just trying to say that it is a part of the business of  
3 intelligence to collect this type of information and to listen to  
4 what's in the airwaves. Whether it is radio signals, or whether  
10:38:36 5 it is telephone or whatnot, it's a part of their business to do  
6 it and all countries do it. As small as Liberia is, we did a  
7 little bit too. That's what I'm trying to point out.

8 Q. Have you seen any document suggesting CIA involvement in  
9 Liberia, Mr Taylor?

10:39:02 10 A. When you say of CIA's involvement in Liberia, what do you -  
11 would you help me here, counsel, because I'm trying to say that  
12 in Liberia there is intelligence cooperation and so they are  
13 there, okay? So when you say their involvement, are you talking  
14 about in terms of cooperation with governments because

10:39:22 15 governments cooperate from --

16 Q. What I'm asking, Mr Taylor, is this. Have you seen any  
17 letter, document, or report from for example your archives  
18 dealing with CIA involvement in Liberia?

19 A. Oh, yes. Yes, I have seen a document. Yes.

10:39:41 20 Q. And which document is that?

21 A. It's a very, very late document in the - I think it's a  
22 document by Mr Saunders just revealing a few minor tips, that's  
23 all.

24 Q. Can you recall how you came by that letter?

10:40:10 25 A. It's a part of my archives.

26 Q. Could I please invite attention to --

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

28 MS HOLLIS: I think there's insufficient foundation to show  
29 a connection. Having seen something or having it in your

1 archives does not connect you to the document and we would  
2 suggest that more foundation is needed before it is shown to the  
3 witness.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say, Mr Griffiths?

10:40:36 5 MR GRIFFITHS: This is a man who was President of Liberia,  
6 Mr President. It's part of his archives. He has already  
7 mentioned the writer of the letter. It defeats me as to what  
8 further foundation can be required to put this particular  
9 document in.

10:41:19 10 [Trial Chamber conferred]

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we agree with Ms Hollis's  
12 objection. The mere fact that this document is part of  
13 Mr Taylor's archives does not establish that he knows the  
14 contents sufficiently to incorporate the document as part of his  
10:41:49 15 oral evidence. So we say that you would need to lay more  
16 foundation.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

18 Q. What's the document in question, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Well, the document in question is not any real big secret  
10:42:07 20 document; if not, I would not divulge such secrets. It deals  
21 with Mr Saunders, Jeff Saunders, referring to the period of  
22 former President Samuel Doe and we're dealing with the Cold War  
23 era and the underlying desire of the United States government to  
24 maintain Doe in power because of their own reasons, and these are  
10:42:40 25 the intelligence assessments as to why they need to keep him in  
26 power. It is not any great thing.

27 Q. Can you help the judges with, for example, the date of this  
28 letter?

29 A. That letter could be - I'm not too sure but it's in the -

1 around 80 - I have forgotten the date. It's about 80 something,  
2 but I know the content of the letter. I'm not too sure about it.  
3 But it's not any deep secret. If not, I would not have - it  
4 would have required permission from the United States government.

10:43:14 5 But it's not a secret.

6 Q. So the letter deals with CIA involvement during the Doe  
7 era, it's dated in 1980s, and it's a letter written by a Jeff  
8 Saunders, you tell us?

9 A. That is correct.

10:43:36 10 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if that is now sufficient  
11 foundation to satisfy my learned friend.

12 MS HOLLIS: Again we suggest that it is not. We're talking  
13 about his knowledge of the contents of the document, as I believe  
14 has been the evolution of the requirement in this Trial Chamber.

10:43:52 15 It's not just that he's had an opportunity to read it: It's the  
16 creation of the document; how did he come by it; does he have  
17 independent knowledge of the contents of this document or is it  
18 only something he's read, and we don't believe that has been  
19 established.

10:44:20 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: The context in which this issue arises,  
22 Mr President, is the witness giving evidence about the  
23 involvement of intelligence agencies around the world in Liberia  
24 and the absence of crucial independent objective evidence in  
25 proof of his alleged involvement in the crisis in Sierra Leone.

10:44:43 26 It's in that context that it arises, and we submit the evidence  
27 he has to date given regarding this document is sufficient: (1),  
28 to identify it; (2), to identify its contents and consequently,  
29 we submit, to admit it in evidence.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we now find that there has been  
2 sufficient foundation laid for you to continue, Mr Griffiths.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful. Can we please look at the  
4 document behind divider 1 in Defence documents for week 30.

10:46:32 5 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Are you referring to the thinner binder?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: No, your Honour, it's the larger one. And I  
7 appreciate from discussions with the Court staff yesterday that  
8 we were in error in serving an additional bundle which didn't  
9 continue the numbering from the first bundle, and we will ensure  
10:46:55 10 that that error doesn't occur again. But it's the second bundle  
11 of additional documents which should be in a folder behind  
12 divider 1.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Are you then referring to MFI-7?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I'm not. It's a letter which should  
10:47:18 15 look like that.

16 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, it's in this binder here and  
17 it's prefaced "Defence exhibits week 30, 20-24 July, binder  
18 number 1 of 1."

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Binder number 1 of 1, yes:

10:48:02 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, can you see the document?

21 A. Yes, I can.

22 Q. Do you see it's headed "Associated Investigators  
23 Incorporated, 1025 Vermont Avenue Northwest, Washington DC 2005."  
24 A telephone number follows and it's dated 11 April 1988. It  
10:48:33 25 reads as follows:

26 "Thereafter agent made contact with sources at the Federal  
27 Drug Enforcement Agency. DEA maintains a computer database of  
28 information on all individuals convicted of drug-related offences  
29 or even implicated in such activities. Of the names supplied,

1 only Keith Wilson is on file, which is consistent with your  
2 statement that everyone knows he is a drugs dealer.

3 Mr Wilson also operates several gambling concerns, and  
4 illegal money is often laundered through such concerns, as there  
10:49:18 5 is no way to determine how much legal money such establishments  
6 handle. Other sources have indicated that Dr Walter Young is not  
7 one of the most forthright of people and that this his  
8 involvement in such an operation would not be surprising;  
9 however, no concrete evidence could be developed."

10:49:36 10 Then this:

11 "One aspect which must be considered is the invested  
12 interest the US government may have in keeping Doe in power. In  
13 the Noriega case, the United States knew of his involvement with  
14 drug trafficking for years. They suppressed the information on  
10:50:01 15 the grounds that it was in the United States's best interest to  
16 keep him in power. As the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
17 maintains the regional headquarters in Liberia, it is highly  
18 likely they would suppress any information harmful to the Doe  
19 regime. For this reason you should proceed with caution as to  
10:50:28 20 your inquiries and intent.

21 Agent has subsequently learnt that the US Department of  
22 State has a classified file detailing Liberian activity. Folebi  
23 Akerele is mentioned."

24 Let's pause there. Help us, Mr Taylor, were you aware of  
10:50:58 25 the CIA maintaining a regional headquarters in Liberia?

26 A. Well, without getting into details, it was general  
27 information. Yes, I was aware.

28 Q. Where was it based?

29 A. Well, I may have to seek some help from the Court here,

1 because I am not sure - when we get into locations of  
2 intelligence headquarters for countries that we have cooperated  
3 with, I do think that probably in - I'm not sure if this is the  
4 appropriate place to get into those details. I'm a former head  
10:52:13 5 of state, and I want to be careful that I do not deal with some  
6 of these matters in a very unstructured way because I think that  
7 it may not be in anybody's interest if we begin to directly  
8 locate these places. But I really want to be - I want to tread  
9 very carefully with this matter.

10:52:34 10 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor.

11 A. I can verify that there is full cooperation between  
12 governments and some of these may be secret, so I'm not sure as  
13 to whether I want to deal with it now if it doesn't mind - you  
14 don't mind, counsel.

10:52:50 15 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor. I won't press you on that. But can  
16 I ask you this: Was that regional headquarters in existence  
17 between 1992 and 1996, to your knowledge?

18 A. The crisis in Liberia during the period that you talk about  
19 led to some adjustments. As we knew it during the time in  
10:53:32 20 question, some adjustments were made because of the crisis in  
21 Liberia. And so I cannot say that it was as a quote unquote full  
22 regional headquarters during - between '92 and '96, but they did  
23 have some operations going on, but adjustments were made because  
24 of the threats that were posed to certain facilities.

10:54:03 25 Q. What about during your presidency?

26 A. During my presidency we started rebuilding, but we had not  
27 reached to pre-war levels by the bend of my presidency. There  
28 had been changes in, I would say, technology and other things.  
29 We had not - during my presidency we had not reached to the

1 pre-war levels.

2 Q. But was there such a CIA presence in Liberia during your  
3 presidency?

10:54:50

4 A. Definitely. The ability to collect intelligence and  
5 execute certain things remained all the time. It's there. It  
6 was there during my presidency, yes.

7 Q. And this might sound like a silly question, Mr Taylor, but  
8 I want your assistance. What is the purpose, and I ask you  
9 because you're a former President - what is the purpose of having  
10 an intelligence agency like the CIA in a country?

10:55:17

11 A. Well, look, the collection of information that is  
12 eventually processed into intelligence is important for so many  
13 security purposes. In some cases national security, in some  
14 cases - and I'm talking about in terms of military - in some  
15 cases it is important for economic security. It is important  
16 just, you know, knowing what is going on that you do not run into  
17 surprises. It's always important. And I'm trying to say that  
18 not just big countries do that, even little countries do that.

10:56:01

19 Like I say, Liberia had its own intelligence operations too and  
20 for little countries where we cannot reach, we used the help of  
21 big countries that we cooperate with. But it is a business to  
22 know what the other side is doing for economic, for social, for  
23 political and other reasons. It's important not to be caught,  
24 you know, unawares, especially when you're dealing with interests  
25 of nations. So the longstanding relationship with Liberia and  
26 the level of cooperation in Liberia would be fertile ground for I  
27 would just use the word cooperation.

10:56:28

10:56:53

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Before I move on, Mr President,  
29 can I ask that this letter be marked for identification please.

1 It should be MFI-11.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: I've put my copy of the letter away.  
3 What's the title of the letter to be marked?

10:57:44

4 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it might be best identified as  
5 letter from Jeffrey Saunders dated 11 April 1988.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you. Well, that  
7 document then will be marked for identification MFI-11.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful. Would your Honours give me a  
9 moment, please?

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness could now be shown,  
12 please, exhibit D-85. Can we place it on the screen, please:

13 Q. Do you recall this document being introduced, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, I do.

10:59:44

15 Q. Can we take a little while and have a look at it, please.

16 We see that it's headed, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra  
17 Leone (People's Army of Sierra Leone) Operation Segbwema", and I  
18 will need somebody's help as to the date. I can see "31 August",  
19 but I can't quite make out the remainder of the year?

11:00:20

20 A. Look at the subject matter, it's 31 August '99. A little  
21 lower, "Subject", the date is there.

22 Q. It's 31 August?

23 A. 1999. Look at "Subject". "To, From, Subject".

24 Q. Okay. And it's to Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh from Major  
25 Francis M Musa, District IDU Commander Kailahun. Yes?

11:00:45

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Do you see that?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Do you know him?

1 A. Francis Musa, no.

2 Q. "Subject: Brief comprehensive report on all salient  
3 activities that took place in the absence of the leader from 24  
4 March 1996 to 31 August 1999."

11:01:22 5 Now you will recall, Mr Taylor, that so far in the  
6 narrative of your account we've stopped at the end of 1996, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And it's in that context that I address your mind now to  
9 this document, "The leader, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, left  
11:01:48 10 Zogoda on 24 March 1996 for Abidjan." Pause there. You will  
11 recall that the letter we looked at yesterday is dated 4 December  
12 1996. Do you recall that?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. Which means then that Sankoh was in Abidjan from 24 March  
11:02:19 15 1996 until December of that same year. Do you follow?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. So we're talking about him being in the Ivory Coast for  
18 some nine months. Now during that nine month period, Mr Taylor,  
19 was the NPFL in control of part of the border between the Ivory  
11:02:51 20 Coast and Liberia?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. During that nine month period, whilst your underling was  
23 next door in the Ivory Coast did he come and visit you?

24 A. No.

11:03:06 25 Q. Did you contact him and say, "Foday, please come to see me.  
26 I need to talk to you because I'm in control"? Did you do that?

27 A. No, we had not - there was no need to do that because we  
28 had not been in contact for so long.

29 Q. Let's go back to the letter:

1           "The Leader left Zogoda on 24 March for the Abidjan peace  
2 talk. Brigadier Morris Kallon now took over command at Zogoda in  
3 the absence of Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli. 72 hours  
4 later Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli arrived and took over  
11:04:03 5 command from CO Morris Kallon as instructed by the leader before  
6 he left for Abidjan. Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli  
7 started fine but later he was wrongly advised by his bodyguards  
8 and late Captain Daniel Wankeh Rambo who was bodyguard commander  
9 to the leader. For instance all kinds of civilians and standbys  
11:04:42 10 were now entering in and going out of Zogoda without proper  
11 security. The Camp Lion training base became a ground of revenge  
12 rather than for ideology. Lieutenant Titesu, Pujehun District  
13 IDU commander, was killed in halaka at the Camp Lion training  
14 base some time in July 1996. All those who were involved  
11:05:32 15 including Major Junior Vandi, Major Muyepoh, late Captain Cobra  
16 were all demoted and removed from the training base to other  
17 areas of assignment. The lethargy as delaying attitude of  
18 Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli in responding to  
19 instructions sent by the leader made the Kamajors to overrun  
11:06:07 20 positions from the end of 1996 to early 1997."

21           Pause. Do you recall telling us yesterday, Mr Taylor,  
22 about an RUF incursion into Liberia following the overrunning of  
23 Camp Zogoda?

24 A.     That is correct.

11:06:29 25 Q.     "While the peace talk was going on in Abidjan in 1996  
26 Kamajors together with soldiers loyal to Tejan Kabbah continued  
27 to attack our position with flimsy excuses that they were  
28 returning to their villages, defend and harvest their  
29 agricultural produce. The instruction given to Lieutenant

1 Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli by the leader to evacuate Zogoda and  
2 send some people to Pujehun and the rest to Kailahun axis delayed  
3 until the enemies over run Koribundo jungle, Bandawor, Zogoda,  
4 Kenema bypass, across Moa, et cetera. A good number of both  
11:07:31 5 civilians and soldiers including good brothers like Captain  
6 Augustine Koroma, Captain Papa, Captain Long By-pass, Lieutenant  
7 Shalalor, Lieutenant AB Dundas, et cetera, died in this incident.  
8 All our positions were overrun by the enemies with the exception  
9 of the Kailahun axis, Western Jungle, Peyima axis and Pujehun  
11:08:02 10 axis. Later on Pujehun axis fell to the enemies. This was as a  
11 result of the lack of materials and disunity between the very  
12 citizens of this area, both civilians and soldiers.

13 Thanks be to God and Major General Sam Bockarie because  
14 when he observed the cruel determination of the enemies to  
11:08:31 15 massacre us he instructed that Peyima jungle must be dissolved.  
16 This was done, as everybody crossed over to Burkina to put effort  
17 together to defend the original land of the RUF/SL rebels in  
18 Sierra Leone. At this juncture the RUF/Sierra Leone could only  
19 boast of the Western Jungle and the Kailahun axis. A very big  
11:09:04 20 praise to Brigadier Denis Mingo and others who upheld this jungle  
21 up to the time the AFRC took over on 25 May 1997."

22 Now the Burkina which is referred to there, Mr Taylor,  
23 what's that?

24 A. I don't know. I think it can't be Burkina Faso. It may be  
11:09:35 25 a base. I don't know.

26 Q. Now, were you aware of this deterioration in the position  
27 of the RUF?

28 A. Not at all. I was not aware of it.

29 Q. In 1996?

1 A. No. No, I was not.

2 Q. That effectively they had been reduced to control of  
3 Kailahun and according to this document the Western Jungle. Were  
4 you aware of that?

11:10:06 5 A. No, but it's very clear that I'm not aware, but let's go  
6 back to the letter, "While the peace talks were going on in  
7 Abidjan in 1996 Kamajors together with soldiers loyal to Tejan  
8 Kabbah continued to attack...", and it goes on. But if you go a  
9 little further down you will see, "The instructions given to  
11:10:32 10 Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli by the leader to evacuate  
11 Zogoda and send some people to Pujehun...", and the rest. But  
12 this is very clear here of the fact that I don't - why didn't  
13 Foday Sankoh say here, "Well, guess what. You guys are under  
14 attack. Send some people to our brother in Liberia", okay?

11:11:01 15 I don't know what's going on in Sierra Leone and I think  
16 it's even clearer if we look - if we pay some attention to that  
17 particular paragraph. Foday Sankoh has instructed, because  
18 apparently he knows of the problem and he has instructed his  
19 people where to go. He doesn't send them to Liberia. So their  
11:11:19 20 coming into Liberia was I think a desperate attempt to save their  
21 lives, but I don't know in this particular period what is going  
22 on there whatsoever. I have no idea what's going on.

23 Q. Yes, but, Mr Taylor, your underling is in the Ivory Coast  
24 and you're supposed to be in control. So help us, when this  
11:11:43 25 situation develops in Sierra Leone why didn't you do something  
26 about it? You're supposed to be in control.

27 A. This is a very disrespectful underling then. A very, very  
28 disrespectful underling. I mean, it's very clear here that there  
29 is no contact between Sankoh and myself. He has demonstrated it

1 here. He has demonstrated it through the more than eight/nine  
2 months he's in Abidjan. There is no contact. The fact of the  
3 matter is we have broken apart since 19 - there is no contact. I  
4 don't care how they twist it, how they turn it, there is no  
11:12:22 5 contact.

6 And I think this is just further evidence that Sankoh, in  
7 really exercising on his own, gave instructions while his people  
8 were under attack and tell them what to do. And if there were  
9 contacts and if I were in control and if he had respect for that  
11:12:41 10 control while we are in contact, the very thing that these people  
11 did he would have told them, "Listen, if things get rough for you  
12 just cross into Liberia. Our brother is there", or, "Mr Taylor  
13 is there and he will help you." He doesn't say that because he  
14 knows of the problem. He doesn't want any contact. That's why.  
11:13:03 15 So that's just the long and short of it. There is no contact and  
16 there's no need to contact me and I do not know.

17 Q. Let's go back:

18 "Again a very big thank you and praise to Major General Sam  
19 Bockarie, Brigadier IH Sesay, Brigadier Peter B Vandi, other  
11:13:31 20 devoted soldiers and civilians. If it were not the cooperation  
21 of those mentioned people under the commandship of Major  
22 General Sam Bockarie the enemies would have finally flushed us  
23 out of Sierra Leone. This was the time Captain Palmer, Fayia  
24 Musa, Deen-Jalloh and Dr Barrie had told the SLPP government a  
11:14:12 25 lot about the RUF/SL. They disclosed to the government that we  
26 are lack of ammunition, that we depend on the arms and ammunition  
27 we capture from the enemies. So they advised the Tejan Kabbah  
28 government to concentrate on Kamajors with single barrels, knives  
29 and sticks to fight us, thinking that when we are suppressed we

1 would have accepted their government and betrayed the RUF/Sierra  
2 Leone."

3 Let's pause. Mr Taylor, why did you allow the RUF which  
4 you had created to get into this kind of situation where they had  
11:15:03 5 a lack of arms and ammunition? Why did you allow that?

6 A. I did not create the RUF and because I did not create them  
7 I could not have, quote unquote, allowed. I was not in control  
8 of them and so the expression "allowed" would not apply. So I'm  
9 not allowing because I didn't create and I don't have contact, so  
11:15:29 10 you can only allow when you are in control of. I'm not.

11 Q. "Thanks to the Lord Almighty with the help of Major  
12 General Sam Bockarie, Brigadier IH Sesay and Brigadier Peter B  
13 Vandi, these betrayers, coup plotters, were rounded up at the  
14 Sierra Leone-Guinea border somewhere around Koindu. The  
11:16:00 15 information previously given to the enemies about the RUF/Sierra  
16 Leone by these coup plotters triggered the enemies to suppress us  
17 in Ngiema axis attacking our positions including in Ngiema HQ  
18 twice or thrice every week. They used single barrels, sticks and  
19 knives with limited automatic rifles to fight us and hence we  
11:16:41 20 captured nothing from them any time they were killed or pushed  
21 back. Major General Sam Bockarie who was gifted by God worked  
22 very hard to serve the movement. He sacrificed his life, went to  
23 Liberia, contacted the Liberian soldiers and established strong  
24 relationship between the RUF and the Liberian soldiers."

11:17:11 25 Pause there. Do you know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

26 A. No, I do not know anything about this, but let's look at  
27 the period in question here and I think we will be able to verify  
28 that I don't know anything about this. The period in question  
29 here is 1996, is that right? That's the period in question here

1 and don't let's forget who is in that area.

2 Q. Who is in that area?

3 A. ULIMO - ULIMO-K. This is their controlled area. So if  
4 he's referring to Liberian soldiers - excuse me, excuse me, I  
11:18:00 5 think this letter is dated 1999. The date - I think this is a  
6 1999 letter. No, no, no. I thought it was a 1996, letter. No.

7 Q. The period being dealt with in this document, Mr Taylor, is  
8 from 1996 to 1999?

9 A. Yes, but the Zogoda situation is 1996.

11:18:37 10 Q. And this then is before you became President, isn't it?

11 A. That is correct.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I have a moment please?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:18:58 15 Q. Mr Taylor, whilst we're trying to locate a particular  
16 document, do you recall hearing evidence in this Court about  
17 contact between Sam Bockarie and individuals in Liberia?

18 A. Yes. I heard evidence to that effect of the risk that  
19 Bockarie had to take to come into Foya to meet with ULIMO people  
11:19:28 20 during the cut-off period.

21 Q. You see, I am here trying to assist as to who these  
22 Liberian soldiers are, because you see the context of this  
23 passage is:

24 "Major General Sam Bockarie who was gifted by God worked  
11:19:54 25 very hard to serve the movement. He sacrificed his life, went to  
26 Foya, contacted the Liberian soldiers and established strong  
27 relationship between the RUF/Sierra Leone and the Liberian  
28 soldiers. Devoted soldiers and civilians freely offered cocoa  
29 beans, coffee beans, pistols, single barrels, X-base tape,

1 presentable dressings, et cetera, to be exchanged for ammunition.  
2 This ammunition is what we used to fight the enemies and withhold  
3 the Burkina axis until the AFRC took over the reins of Government  
4 of Sierra Leone from Tejan Kabbah."

11:20:59 5 A. But excuse me, counsel, in answer to your question, it's  
6 very clear here that he refers to until the period that the AFRC  
7 takes power in Sierra Leone. We know that the AFRC takes power,  
8 when, in early 1997, and so the period here in question now must  
9 be pre-1997.

11:21:23 10 Q. Now, let us look at another document and it is exhibit D-9.  
11 Let us look at the second paragraph of this document: "Upon your  
12 departure" - now, remember the other document we've just been  
13 looking at talked about his departure in March 1996. Do you  
14 recall that, Mr Taylor?

11:22:05 15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. "Upon your departure I initiated contact with ULIMO as per  
17 your instructions in a bid to buy materials to repel the vicious  
18 attacks of the Kamajors at a time when there was a peace document  
19 in place and we were not expecting to fight. At first ULIMO  
11:22:31 20 arrested me, thinking that I had come to them to surrender.

21 Later I was able to convince them to release me and we commenced  
22 a mutually beneficial relationship. I used the 7,000 US dollars  
23 to purchase vitally needed materials that gave us the stance to  
24 fight and challenge the SLPP government until they were ousted by  
11:23:01 25 the AFRC coup. The efforts of the civilians must be highlighted  
26 as they provided agricultural produce which I traded for  
27 materials during the same period."

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I know that document is  
29 already in evidence, but it would facilitate the following of

1 this particular passage of evidence if you read on to the record  
2 who is writing. Who is that document by?

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. I'm sorry, Mr President. This is a  
4 document written by Major General Sam Bockarie, RUF/Sierra Leone,  
11:23:41 5 to the leader of the revolution and it's a salute reported dated  
6 26 September 1999:

7 Q. Now can we remove that, please, and put back the page of  
8 this other document that we were looking at. Now bearing in mind  
9 the passage from this salute report from Sam Bockarie, let us now  
11:24:14 10 go back to this passage:

11 "Major General Sam Bockarie who was gifted by God worked  
12 very hard to save the movement. He sacrificed his life, went to  
13 Foya."

14 In this salute report, "ULIMO arrested me thinking that I  
11:24:46 15 had come to them to surrender." We have in this report,  
16 "sacrificed his life." Then, "Contacted the Liberian soldiers"  
17 and here we have, "I initiated contact with ULIMO." And who was  
18 in control of that part of Liberia at the time, Mr Taylor?

19 A. ULIMO was.

11:25:10 20 Q. "Contacted the Liberian soldiers and established strong  
21 relationship between the RUF and the Liberians".

22 "At first ULIMO arrested me thinking that I had come to  
23 them to surrender. Later I was able to convince them to release  
24 me and we commenced a mutually beneficial relationship."

11:25:39 25 "Established strong relationship between the RUF/Sierra  
26 Leone and the Liberian soldiers. Devoted soldiers and civilians  
27 freely offered cocoa beans, coffee beans, pistols, single  
28 barrels, et cetera."

29 "The efforts of the civilians must be highlighted as they

1 provided agricultural produce which I traded for materials during  
2 the same period."

3 So do you see the similarities between the two documents,  
4 Mr Taylor?

11:26:28 5 A. Not only do I see the similarities. The description - this  
6 letter goes - the letter before the Court right now goes a long  
7 way in doing several things. It describes fully the period. It  
8 talks about the period pre-AFRC government in Sierra Leone. The  
9 second letter, that is the salute report that the President of  
11:26:53 10 the Court asked about, that is written as a salute report  
11 describes the very period. So it must be clear in anybody's mind  
12 that we're talking about the same period.

13 Now as to the description of the people that I met, I would  
14 help the Court by saying ULIMO are Liberians, they are soldiers.  
11:27:12 15 So by saying, "We met the Liberian soldiers", I'm sure one could  
16 construe Liberian soldiers and say, "Well, the only soldiers we  
17 know in Liberia are the AFL", but the AFL is not there. So by  
18 Liberian soldiers they are referring to ULIMO fighting, Liberians  
19 that are soldiers fighting. This is the same period. The two  
11:27:39 20 letters describe the same incident and the same period. There's  
21 no doubt in my mind.

22 Q. "This ammunition was what we used to fight the enemies and  
23 withheld the Burkina axis until the AFRC took over the reins of  
24 Government of Sierra Leone from Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997,  
11:28:08 25 Sunday, and called upon the RUF/SL.

26 We joined the brothers on 29 May 1997. The following key  
27 positions were offered to the RUF/Sierra Leone: Vice-President,  
28 Pa Foday Sankoh; minister of trade and industry, Major Eldred  
29 Collins; minister of agriculture and forestry, Mr AA Vandi;

1 minister of energy and power, Major Lawrence Womandia; minister  
2 of lands and mines, Mr SYB Rogers; deputy minister of education,  
3 Major PS Beinda. Very minimal positions in the army were offered  
4 to the RUF/Sierra Leone. Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma  
11:29:09 5 was wrongly advised by prominent military men who were Kamajors  
6 and Tejan Kabbah supporters. The RUF/Sierra Leone was treated  
7 with infinitesimal dignity. Most advice given by our own  
8 authorities by them were not adhered to. Little attention was  
9 paid to security information from the RUF/Sierra Leone  
11:29:36 10 securities. Recommendations were never attended to. On the  
11 whole, the brothers had no confidence in us. However" --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we've run out of tape now  
13 so you will have to continue that after the break.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

11:29:55 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll take a break now until 12 o'clock.

16 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

17 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I had to interrupt you in that  
19 rather long question.

12:02:31 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all, Mr President:

21 Q. Mr Taylor, could you go back to the document, please, and  
22 hopefully [microphone not activated].

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "Recommendations were never attended to. On the whole the  
12:02:53 25 brothers had no confidence in us, however we accepted everything  
26 in good faith because we were instructed by our leaders to take  
27 all orders and instructions from Johnny Paul Koroma."

28 Pause there. Did you give that instruction, Mr Taylor?

29 A. No, I did not give any such instructions.

1 Q. "This enabled the Tejan Kabbah government, supported by the  
2 Nigerian-led ECOMOG and the Sandline International from Britain  
3 to overthrow the AFRC government in February 1998. Tejan was to  
4 come together with the RUF/SL leader to Freetown on 22 April 1998  
12:03:54 5 to regain presidency but the enemies did not wait for this time.  
6 The Nigerian-led ECOMOG with British mercenaries attacked  
7 Freetown in February 1998 and this extended to you all the  
8 provinces and towns. Two displacing incidents that took place  
9 while we were in Freetown, including the alleged misusing of nine  
12:04:22 10 million leones by Brigadier Superman and the use of about 45  
11 million leones on marriage ceremony by Major Eldred Collins.  
12 Considering our military strength and the pressure that were put  
13 on us by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG we withdrew into the bush paths  
14 of Kailahun and Kono Districts to reorganise ourselves and regain  
12:04:51 15 strength. We still continued to thank and praise Major General  
16 Sam Bockarie, Brigadier IH Sesay, late Colonel Buster Flomo,  
17 Rambo, Brigadier Superman, Brigadier Morris Kallon, Brigadier  
18 Peter MB Vandi and some others who stood firm and made sure that  
19 the enemies did not overcome us. The rampant promotion of  
12:05:20 20 soldiers served as incentives that motivated the combatants to  
21 double up their efforts. The consultation, coordination and  
22 cooperation amongst senior officers and other ranks brought about  
23 the recapture of [inaudible] jungle, Kono, Makeni, Magburaka,  
24 Segbwema, Tongo Field, Western Jungle, Freetown and many other  
12:05:50 25 places from the end of 1998 to early 1999. This drew the  
26 attention of the western" - can we raise it a bit?  
27 I can't make out that last line, your Honours, but can we  
28 go to the next page then: "The RUF rebel leader and sign the  
29 Lome Peace Accord will lead to every lasting peace in this

1 country. We can" - something - "for ourselves."

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: See.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: "See for ourselves", thank you:

4 Q. "During our withdrawal into the bush security divulged that

12:06:58

5 some former SLA soldiers were in possession of diamonds and

6 foreign currencies which they wanted to use only to satisfy their

7 personal needs. Some of them even wanted to escape with this

8 wealth and left us struggling. In fact, a good number of them

9 with or without wealth escaped to Liberia and Guinea. Since in

12:07:20

10 RUF/SL diamonds and foreign currencies are government properties

11 authorities decided to collect diamonds and foreign currencies in

12 possession of individuals so that they could be used in the

13 interest of the movement with priority to arms and ammunition.

14 Some important items like mini satellite, radio freedom,

12:07:53

15 et cetera, were required for the need of the movement. Small

16 small diamonds which only the higher authorities and the miners

17 will collect for. This collected from the mining done in Kono

18 and Tongo Field but the proceeds recording to my understanding

19 were all used in the interest of the movement. In the course of

12:08:25

20 promoting the movement, diamonds were also collected from

21 Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma himself. Rather

22 unfortunate some of these diamonds and foreign" - I can't read it

23 from my screen, I'm sorry - "...got missing in the hands of

24 Brigadier Sesay Liberia when he went to enter for ammunition for

12:09:24

25 the movement. This is the number 1 grievance of Brigadier

26 Superman, but Brigadier Sesay was not queried when he lost the

27 diamonds and the foreign currencies but he misused the nine

28 million Leones in Freetown. He was brought to quarterdeck. To

29 be frank enough Brigadier Sesay was the only strong man under

1 Major General Sam Bockarie at the time who helped to put  
2 situation under control as the enemies were seriously pressing. "

3 Pause there. Mr Taylor, in that account which is covering  
4 a period from 1996 to 1999, do you see any mention of you?

12:10:29 5 A. No, no, I do not.

6 Q. But you do appreciate, don't you, that you were supposed to  
7 be running the RUF at this time?

8 A. That's what is alleged, but if you - if you go a little  
9 further and if you look at the previous question asked, when the  
12:10:51 10 reference is made to the instructions to join the AFRC junta  
11 let's be reminded there's evidence led before this Court that  
12 those instructions came directly from Foday Sankoh. And evidence  
13 before this Court states that a recording was made by the junta  
14 and was played on radio, so there's no question as to where the  
12:11:22 15 instructions came from. It came from Foday Sankoh.

16 And it's also evident here I'm not mentioned because I have  
17 nothing to do with them. And that even though at this time  
18 Foday Sankoh is under some form of incarceration, but the  
19 instructions are coming from him. I think there's evidence to  
12:11:44 20 that effect before this Court.

21 Q. Let's finish with this document then:

22 "Taking Colonel Issa off from whatever he was doing at that  
23 time and brought him in for investigation would have done more  
24 harm than good because something worse than the loss of the  
12:12:12 25 diamonds and the foreign currencies would have occurred.  
26 Moreover, the collection of diamonds from some former SLA  
27 soldiers money and diamonds from people who were in Kono when the  
28 former SLA soldiers some of them broke the bank in Kono.

29 The failure of the authorities to provide Lieutenant

1 Colonel JP Koroma with vehicle and communication sets may be  
2 responsible for the indifference that cropped up between the men  
3 in the Western Jungle and we on this side. Above all, they were  
4 expecting that we were going to subdue ourselves to them in our  
12:13:13 5 own territory like we did when we were in Freetown which resulted  
6 to our retreat into the bush. If we had subdued ourselves to  
7 these guys we would have moved from the frying pot to the fire.

8 The above points triggered the former SLA brothers  
9 presenting in the Western Jungle to incite Superman to disobey  
12:13:48 10 Major General Sam Bockarie with unwarranted excuse that Major  
11 General Sam Bockarie insulted and condemned his Lebanese woman.  
12 This problem escalated to a point that Brigadier Superman either  
13 or by himself or through others killed Colonel Boston Flomo,  
14 Rambo, by shooting him.

12:14:19 15 Although about 90 to 99 per cent of the SLA brothers,  
16 including Colonel Akim Turay, Lieutenant Colonel Seriba,  
17 Lieutenant Colonel Dumbuya, Lieutenant Colonel Bakarr, Major  
18 Leather Boot and many others are loyal to this movement but out  
19 of observation, the balance, 5 to 10 per cent, are power  
12:14:51 20 conscious materialists and so can be incited by the politicians.  
21 However, it will take some of them time to get used to some of  
22 the rules and regulations (ideology) binding the RUF movement.

23 Since we joined together with the brothers, crime rates  
24 have maximally increased. Hence as you have come as our leader  
12:15:24 25 to join us all to make Sierra Leone a better place to live, you  
26 have to set your eyes, sir, to wipe out all forms of corruptions  
27 and in the interim, you and all of us should be concerned about  
28 your security as the politicians would want to prevail on these  
29 power and material hungry men to do anything to distort your good

1 intention."

2 And that's signed "Welcome and God bless all, sir, Major  
3 Francis M Musa" and it's dated 31 September 1999. Now,  
4 Mr Taylor, any mention of you in that?

12:16:24 5 A. None whatsoever.

6 Q. And you note that that report dated September 1999 - and  
7 we'll look at other reports. That date of September 1999,  
8 Mr Taylor, just to jump ahead, what's the significance of that?

9 A. September 1999, Foday Sankoh has arrived in Liberia  
10 following the Lome peace talks to meet with me as the head of the  
11 committee of now six dealing with Sierra Leone. He is now in  
12 Liberia along with Johnny Paul Koroma, September 1999.

13 Q. And as we will see in due course when we come to it, there  
14 are a number of reports to the leader filling him in on what had  
15 happened during his absence. We've seen a number of those,  
16 haven't we, Mr Taylor, in this Court?

17 A. Yes, we have.

18 Q. I've already referred to another one, the salute report  
19 from Sam Bockarie, all of them dating around this time in  
20 September 1999?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now have you seen in any of those reports, Mr Taylor, any  
23 mention of you?

24 A. None whatsoever.

12:18:13 25 Q. Were you controlling the RUF from 1992 up to 1999?

26 A. No, I was not.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Incidentally, Mr Griffiths, the report we  
28 just looked at the date of the report would appear to be August  
29 1999, not September.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: It's August, very well. Very well:

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, can we just deal with a couple of other -  
3 clear up one or two matters, please.

4 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me. I hesitate to interrupt, but just  
12:19:10 5 so that the record is clear if Justice Sebutinde would look at  
6 the last page of the report where there's a signature, there in  
7 fact there does appear to be a date of 31/09/99 and so it could  
8 be that it was actually signed at the end of September, but just  
9 to assist the Court on that.

12:19:33 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well thanks for pointing that out,  
11 because there is no such day, is there, as 31/09, and so maybe  
12 they meant August.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, can I deal with one or two aspects of the  
12:19:55 15 evidence this Court has heard about events between 1991 and 1996  
16 so that you can have an opportunity of dealing with them. There  
17 was a witness who alleged that you were in contact with  
18 Foday Sankoh in 1993, in particular that during the course of a  
19 radio communication between your radio operator Butterfly and  
12:20:30 20 Foday Sankoh's operator, Foday Sankoh complained about a lack of  
21 arms and ammunition and your response was something to the effect  
22 that, "That's guerrilla warfare." Do you recall any such event?

23 A. No, no such event occurred. And sometimes you wonder if  
24 all of us don't fall into the same trap about the year that some  
12:21:01 25 of these things happened. Could he have been referring to 1991  
26 before the break up? Because Foday Sankoh comes to me to  
27 complain and it is in fact the essence of the letter that he  
28 writes about small amounts of ammunition during the early part of  
29 1991. I don't know.

1           Some of the people we are dealing with, you know, people  
2           have been taken advantage of. Some of the people that we are  
3           dealing with, without meaning anything negative, are not at the  
4           level and some of them have been pushed unnecessarily to saying  
12:21:40 5           things. I don't know, he may be talking about different things.  
6           These are some of the impossible things that we've heard here.  
7           That's not the only one. In response to Rule 98 filings from the  
8           Prosecution, they refer to 1994 and Sierra Rutile in 1996 --

9           Q.     Oh, I'm coming to that.

12:22:05 10          A.     I mean, these are just part of the exaggerations. There's  
11          no contact, there's no radio, but they are alleging that things  
12          are happening. I don't know how these things are possible.

13                 MR GRIFFITHS: And can I give a reference for the  
14          suggestion I'm making. It's trial transcript at page 12869, 2  
12:22:28 15          July 2008:

16          Q.     Now it was also suggested, Mr Taylor, that you had further  
17          contact in 1993 after ULIMO had blocked the border when  
18          Foday Sankoh requested materials from you and you told him to  
19          send men but the men weren't able to reach Gbarnga. Do you  
12:23:03 20          recall that?

21          A.     I recall the testimony.

22          Q.     What's your position on that?

23          A.     That's a total lie. If they did not reach, where did they  
24          go to? That's not true. That's not true.

12:23:14 25                 MR GRIFFITHS: That's trial transcript 12868, 2 July 2008:

26          Q.     Let's move on then with other allegations made about your  
27          involvement during this period, bearing in mind we're talking  
28          about the period up to 1996. Did you ever, Mr Taylor, provide  
29          Foday Sankoh with any military advice?

1 A. None whatsoever. In fact, if it was anyone that could  
2 advise the other, he was a military man for many, many years, had  
3 been trained in Sierra Leone, had been trained in Britain. I'm a  
4 non-military man. What kind of advice could I give Foday Sankoh?  
12:24:08 5 Never, never, never supplied him with military advice.

6 Q. Did you, for example, indicate to him locations to attack  
7 and capture?

8 A. No, I never did that. In fact, for anyone to even be able  
9 to do that you must know the country. You must know what's  
12:24:32 10 important. I am not familiar with Sierra Leone. The first time  
11 I ever really went to Sierra Leone in my entire life was when  
12 earlier I went to see President Momoh to talk about some  
13 assistance in entry - I do not know Sierra Leone. So to begin to  
14 give military advice, strategic advice, you must know the  
12:25:01 15 country, you must know the purpose. I did not give any such  
16 advice.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, you told us earlier in your testimony that you  
18 had been to Sierra Leone prior to the launch of the revolution in  
19 Liberia. Do you recall that?

12:25:35 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. When was that?

22 A. We are trying to get in in '89, so we're talking about -  
23 Momoh and I holding these discussions in Freetown at about the  
24 beginning of '89.

12:25:51 25 Q. Since that event, Mr Taylor, did you ever set foot in  
26 Sierra Leone again?

27 A. Not on one inch of Sierra Leonean soil. Not on even an  
28 inch of Sierra Leonean soil at any point at any time thereafter.  
29 None.

1 Q. So, Mr Taylor, just so that we can underline the point,  
2 when was the last time you were in Sierra Leone?

3 A. Around the beginning I would say of 1989.

12:26:35

4 Q. During the indictment period, did you ever set foot in  
5 Sierra Leone?

6 A. Never. Never.

7 Q. Now, there was a witness who suggested that you advised  
8 Foday Sankoh to attack Sierra Rutile. Do you recall that  
9 allegation?

12:27:03

10 A. I recall it very well.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, where is Sierra Rutile?

12 A. I have no idea, except I know it's in Sierra Leone. I  
13 don't know what Sierra Rutile really is.

12:27:20

14 Q. Well, how can you say that when we have Prosecution  
15 evidence suggesting that you actually advised Foday Sankoh to  
16 attack that location?

12:27:40

17 A. Well, that's a part of the - when I talk about the  
18 fabrications. It's impossible and somewhere you wonder why  
19 people didn't pick up these kind of things. You've got your own  
20 witnesses saying that Mr Taylor cut off all contact since 1992.  
21 You've got most of your witnesses saying the same thing. Then  
22 you come with another witness that contradicts what you're saying  
23 and says, "Oh, guess what happened. There is someplace called  
24 Sierra Rutile, Mr Taylor calls on the radio and he says to go and  
25 attack the place."

12:27:59

26 I don't really know - it doesn't make sense. Maybe to  
27 others it does. It doesn't make sense because how - it just  
28 didn't happen. It just didn't happen. From 1992 there was no  
29 contact with Sankoh so I could not have logically advised him.

1 Well, okay, how many such advices did he get between 1992 and  
2 1993? So he got no advice in the rest of 1992. He got no advice  
3 hardly in 1993. All of a sudden in 1994 there is supposed to be  
4 this adviser called Taylor calling and saying go and attack this  
12:28:40 5 place called Sierra Rutile. I mean, what is that?

6 Q. Mr Taylor, what is the significance of Sierra Rutile?

7 A. I have no idea of what Sierra Rutile is about, what it  
8 does, I don't know.

9 Q. Does it have any strategic importance?

12:28:54 10 A. I have no idea. I have no idea.

11 Q. The reference for that suggestion is trial transcript page  
12 3053 to page 3054 of 4 February 2008. Another matter, Mr Taylor.  
13 Operation Stop Election. It's alleged by Isaac Mongor that you  
14 ordered Operation Stop Election in Sierra Leone, a plan which  
12:30:00 15 involved the terrorisation of the civilian population, including  
16 amputation, and this was in 1996. Did you do that?

17 A. I did not do that, but in order maybe to put it in some  
18 context probably if the Court could - I don't know precisely when  
19 the elections occurred in 1996 in Sierra Leone, and the reason  
12:30:28 20 why I will - probably if I got some help I would know. Don't  
21 let's forget, according to evidence before this Court,  
22 Foday Sankoh leaves for Ivory Coast in March I think of 1996. So  
23 I mean if we were able to ascertain when these elections occurred  
24 in 1996 we would be able to tie in that information to the date  
12:30:56 25 that he left which is March of 1996.

26 So this contact I'm supposed to make with him, where am I  
27 making this contact? Am I making it in Sierra Leone or am I  
28 making it in la Cote d'Ivoire? I think it would be important for  
29 us to establish when these elections were held. I have no idea

1 of the exact date.

2 Q. Well, I'll be corrected if I'm wrong, but I understand  
3 those elections - and I'm looking at a time line for Sierra Leone  
4 - took place in February 1996. It was in February 1996. Now,  
12:32:04 5 the suggestion being made by the witness that I'm referring to is  
6 that in May of 1996 you ordered Operation Stop Elections. Did  
7 you do that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. I did not. Here we are. This is exactly what I'm talking  
9 about. This is why some of these people - I don't know how they  
12:32:32 10 go through their logic or discussions but, I stand corrected,  
11 Foday Sankoh leaves in March of 1996 to go to La Cote d'Ivoire  
12 for these talks. Now, there's a lot of evidence before this  
13 Court. I'm not in contact with Foday Sankoh, not only in  
14 Sierra Leone but I'm not in contact with Foday Sankoh in La Cote  
12:33:00 15 d'Ivoire. So I don't know how this is supposed to happen that  
16 this order is supposed to go, but if I'm not mistaken, there's  
17 another witness that refers to a radio call that was made to  
18 Sankoh in Zogoda or thereabouts about these elections.

19 So that's the conflict that you have in these different  
12:33:22 20 witnesses coming, contradicting themselves and making up these  
21 lies. I have absolutely no contact with Sankoh. He is already  
22 in La Cote d'Ivoire. So I don't know. I'm busy - during this  
23 period in 1996 what are we doing? We're talking, what, May? May  
24 of 1996. Let me remind this Court, May of 1996 I am in serious  
12:33:57 25 combat in Monrovia. May of 1996 we are fighting, trying to  
26 arrest Roosevelt Johnson. I am in a war.

27 I don't know what these people are talking about. I have  
28 absolutely no idea. I'm fighting. By this time I have brought  
29 between 5 to 7,000 marines in Monrovia. Remember I told this

1 Court in April of 1996 or thereabouts the Roosevelt Johnson  
2 arrest situation comes and there's a major combat in Monrovia  
3 that goes up through June and ends between June, July.

4 So here I am at war in Monrovia, trying to consolidate  
12:34:42 5 peace in Liberia and they have me now ordering stop elections in  
6 Sierra Leone when I'm trying to make elections in Liberia come  
7 forward. It doesn't hold. It has no ground. It doesn't hold  
8 water. It's a lie. A diabolical lie at that.

9 Q. Now, the reference for that suggestion is trial transcript  
12:35:09 10 page 5689 to 5691, 10 March 2008. Mr Taylor, another matter.

11 Did the NPFL ever establish radio bases in Sierra Leone?

12 A. No, no, no.

13 Q. Did you, for example, establish radio bases in Sierra Leone  
14 in order to get information about ULIMO?

12:35:46 15 A. None whatsoever. No, we didn't.

16 Q. Do you recall it being suggested by Isaac Mongor that you  
17 sent a radio man Foday Lansana, also known as Nya, and a radio  
18 set to the RUF?

19 A. Well, the gentleman mentioned is also - there is also  
12:36:19 20 evidence in this Court that he is also Sierra Leonean; part  
21 Liberian, part Sierra Leonean. I didn't send Nya or, what do you  
22 call him, Foday to Sierra Leone. If we go in the records we get  
23 to find out how he got into Sierra Leone. I think he has a  
24 Sierra Leonean mother and a Liberian father or something like  
12:36:43 25 that. These are people I'm sure that found their own way into  
26 Sierra Leone.

27 If a radio was given - if a radio was given to the RUF, it  
28 could have only been given by me or authorised by me during the  
29 period August '91 through the end of the association in May 1992.

1 If it was given before that it had to be maybe the underground  
2 corrupt actions that was going on between them apparently. But  
3 not by me, no.

4 Q. Do you know a Foday Lansana, also known as Nya?

12:37:27 5 A. I saw the gentleman. I have never known him, no. I did  
6 not know him before I saw him here and I don't think he said that  
7 he knew me personally.

8 Q. Now, the reference for that suggestion is trial transcript  
9 page 5676, 10 March 2008.

12:37:54 10 A. In fact I have told this Court that the radio man that was  
11 in charge of radio activities in Liberia at the time was one of  
12 my Special Forces called William Gensen. That's a part of the  
13 records already.

14 Q. So let's go back to Liberia now in late 1996, Mr Taylor.

12:38:31 15 What's going on at that stage?

16 A. Late --

17 Q. Late 1996?

18 A. By late 1996 we are trying to wind down the process of  
19 disarmament and demobilisation of all warring factions to meet a  
12:38:59 20 deadline, because by January of 1997 all warring factions should  
21 have disbanded and those wishing to involve themselves in  
22 politics by February would then register and put together their  
23 political parties. So by late 1996 we are concluding all of the  
24 fine prints of disarmament and demobilisation.

12:39:33 25 Q. Was disarmament total, Mr Taylor?

26 A. I'll use the words - in fact the description - used at that  
27 particular time by the international community. The  
28 international community put it to "substantial to total  
29 disarmament". That was the general expression, "substantial to

1 total".

2 Q. But what was the feeling within Liberia as to whether or  
3 not all the warring factions had handed in their arms and  
4 ammunition?

12:40:19 5 A. That's why they used that expression "substantial". A lot  
6 of people believed at that time that there will be a great degree  
7 of dishonesty on the part of certain factions, especially those  
8 that had their links within the border area. We had suspicions  
9 about ULIMO being able to either hide or return the equipment to  
12:40:51 10 Guinea and Sierra Leone, where they had gotten them from. They  
11 had suspicions that the NPFL, where we were, would try to hide  
12 something.

13 We were concerned, because if you remember I mentioned to  
14 this Court that I was attacked in the Executive Mansion in around  
12:41:13 15 about October of 1996 and the Executive Mansion was supposed to  
16 be clear of arms except for the peacekeepers. But I was attacked  
17 on the sixth floor with rifles, so there was always this doubt in  
18 the mind of the general public that there will be some dishonesty  
19 especially with the border regions because it was easier for  
12:41:41 20 those on the border area to get the weapons out and those in the  
21 forest regions like ULIMO could really hide their arms because  
22 they occupied the rainforest at that time.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I drew your attention this morning to a  
24 salute report from Sam Bockarie to Foday Sankoh. Do you recall  
12:42:00 25 that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. And do you recall a reference in that report by  
28 Sam Bockarie to him purchasing arms from ULIMO?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Can you assist this Court as to the circumstances in which  
2 that might have taken place?

3 A. Well, ULIMO is in the area. They are preparing for  
4 disarmament. They are hiding materiel. I can just help by  
12:42:31 5 saying that while there was a chance that he took to just go over  
6 to ULIMO, there was availability of arms of ULIMO at the time and  
7 he just saw an opportunity to go in and buy.

8 Q. Mr Taylor, just explain to us, please, what the process of  
9 disarmament involved in physical terms?

12:42:55 10 A. There was a map presented before this Court on yesterday,  
11 if I recollect properly. Sites were set up and at those sites  
12 individuals would come - and let me say set up by whom. By  
13 ECOMOG and the UN forces at the time. These sites were called  
14 disarmament sites. Individuals walked to those sites under  
12:43:30 15 command of their factional commanders and disarmed. Depending on  
16 whether it was a rifle, old or new or used, were given in and  
17 your name was listed and then those items were collected. Now --

18 Q. By whom?

19 A. By the very people who set up the disarmament process,  
12:44:00 20 ECOMOG and the United Nations.

21 Now, important along this line is the fact that there were  
22 observers from all of the factions working alongside these forces  
23 to carry out this - you know, to observe what was going on. And  
24 I can remember a report that got back to my side was that what  
12:44:29 25 some of these ULIMO boys and LPC people were doing was they were  
26 bringing in old rifles that really couldn't function and they  
27 were just bringing them in to increase their numbers. So the old  
28 rifles, the rusty ones that couldn't even shoot, were coming in.  
29 So right away we observed that there is something funny going on

1 here. So for them it was not the quality of the arms that were  
2 being brought in. It was the quantity that was being brought in.  
3 So we got concerned right away and so we knew they were stashing  
4 arms away somewhere.

12:45:00 5 Q. Now for the combatant, Mr Taylor, was there some  
6 consideration or reward given for handing in the weapon?

7 A. No. In Liberia, no. In fact, the process of  
8 demobilisation as we would know under certain arrangements as -  
9 this is purely historical, not to get the Court too tied up in  
10 this long history. When you look at disarmament campaigns as we  
11 know them in Mozambique, for example, that was a little  
12 different. In Mozambique, to the best of my knowledge, the  
13 disarmament process involved little funds and something to start  
14 up meals and clothes and different things. In the case of  
12:45:34 15 Liberia we did not get this and I always argued that the  
16 disarmament while it was not even correct, the demobilisation was  
17 terrible in Liberia and so we really got nothing. The combatants  
18 got nothing really.

19 Q. And the idea was that once the arms were handed in and  
12:46:20 20 ammunition, what was going to be done with them?

21 A. All arms and ammunition were handed in and controlled from  
22 that point by the peacekeepers. And let me just add that by this  
23 time in Liberia there were some 20,000 peacekeepers, both UN and  
24 ECOMOG, present in Liberia on the ground. They would take  
12:46:49 25 possession and they would secure the arms, ammunition, artillery  
26 and every other thing that was given during this process.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just bearing in mind what you've just told  
28 us about there being no monetary or other incentive for the  
29 combatants to hand their weapons in, was there any advantage to

1 say ULIMO trading arms with the RUF for money?

12:47:38 2 A. Yes, there was an advantage because they knew that we were  
3 getting nothing from the disarmament process, but actually people  
4 were left to fend for themselves and so it is logical one can -  
5 while I don't agree with the method that they used, but it is  
6 understandable.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall it being suggested by the  
8 same Varmuyan Sheriff that you sent money to the RUF to purchase  
9 arms from ULIMO during demobilisation? Do you recall that  
10 testimony?

11 A. Oh, yes, I do.

12 Q. Did you?

13 A. How would the money have reached them? That's the level of  
14 their thinking. How would the money have reached them?

12:48:14 15 Q. I don't understand what you mean?

16 A. Well, if there's no contact. Mind you, who would take this  
17 money? By this time what is going on? There is - I mean, there  
18 are soldiers deployed all through the country and so what would  
19 be the purpose?

12:48:31 20 And even let's just say for the sake of - because, you  
21 know, law really is human reasoning. Without reasoning, law  
22 cannot exist. Well, let's just look at it then. If money is  
23 sent then these people - then the - then Foday Sankoh and all of  
24 his leaders are ungrateful, because if they received \$7,000 from  
12:48:58 25 me and in no document, no letter and all of their reports don't  
26 even acknowledge it, or say, "Well, let's thank Mr Taylor for  
27 sending", then they are ungrateful.

28 So if we now look at the logic. If they receive it and  
29 they are so ungrateful then you know that there is a problem. It

1 simply means it never happened. I don't know how they put this  
2 thing together, but it doesn't work that way.

3 There is not one evidence they acknowledge that they have  
4 some money sent to them through whom I don't know, but at least  
12:49:32 5 they would have acknowledged, "Well, let's please thank.

6 Through" - whatever you want to call it - "the kindness of  
7 Mr Taylor he has sent us \$7,000 and we bought some things."

8 There's no evidence whatsoever - not even a shred of it -  
9 that even suggests that, so I don't know how he could have come  
12:49:57 10 up with this kind of stuff. He doesn't even say - well, who told  
11 him that? How would he know? Did the money go to him to pass to  
12 them and come back to him? How does it work? It's just not  
13 true.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, do you know someone called Bropleh?

12:50:27 15 A. Very well.

16 Q. Who is he?

17 A. I know a gentleman called Bropleh. At the time I knew him  
18 he was Major Bropleh.

19 Q. What's his first name?

12:50:43 20 A. His first name is David. David - actually his full name is  
21 I think David Livingstone Bropleh is the one that I know.

22 Q. When did you first come across him?

23 A. Major Bropleh and I got to know each other all the way back  
24 in 1980.

12:51:14 25 Q. In what circumstances?

26 A. I worked in the government of the late President Samuel  
27 Doe, the People's Redemption Council Government, and Major  
28 Bropleh at that time was assigned as the chief financial officer  
29 for the People's Redemption Council.

1 Q. Now, do you recall telling us about the circumstances which  
2 led to the request by the Liberian government for your  
3 extradition from the United States and your subsequent arrest  
4 there?

12:51:49 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Was Major Bropleh involved in that in any way?

7 A. We were both two very good friends of the general  
8 mentioned, General Thomas Quiwonkpa. Very good friends of  
9 General Quiwonkpa.

12:52:06 10 Q. Now after the Doe regime came to an end, what happened to  
11 Major Bropleh?

12 A. Quite frankly, when I fled Liberia I lost contact and did  
13 not hear the name - did not hear anything again about General  
14 Bropleh until I would say somewhere in I would say about 1998,

12:52:47 15 when I got to know that he - let me say to be even - late '97/'98  
16 when I got to know that he was in Sierra Leone as head of the  
17 remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia that were in

18 Sierra Leone, had consolidated themselves. And following my  
19 election, those individuals from the LPC, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K that  
20 were a bit afraid to stay in Liberia, and I really want to say  
21 for no particular reasons, returned to Sierra Leone and

12:53:27 22 information that reached me was that they had returned and they  
23 had met and rejoined General Bropleh, he was now general, who was  
24 heading a Liberian group in Sierra Leone under contract with the  
12:53:54 25 Sierra Leonean government called the Special Task Force. That  
26 was the information reaching me.

27 Q. Now, when you say rejoined, what do you mean, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Well, as ULIMO fought, and they were in Liberia, some of  
29 the Armed Forces of Liberia personnel that were in Sierra Leone

1 at the time - let me just summarise to remind the Court, and I  
2 stand corrected, I think there is evidence before this Court  
3 that's even contained in the statement that was delivered by  
4 President Tejan Kabbah before the truth commission that details  
12:55:03 5 what I'm talking about. The Liberians had been hired to fight  
6 alongside the Sierra Leone Armed Forces during that particular  
7 period.

8 Q. Hired by whom?

9 A. It started off with President Momoh and continued with  
12:55:28 10 Valentine Strasser and on and on. Some of them stayed on in  
11 Sierra Leone and continued to be a part of the Sierra Leonean  
12 army. A lot of them came in as ULIMO.

13 Now, out of fear, and no one could blame them for being  
14 afraid - out of fear, following my elections our own calculations  
12:55:58 15 about - and I could be wrong about this, but the figures may be  
16 closer - about 3 and as many as 5,000 were afraid and they went  
17 back into Sierra Leone and they just went and rejoined that unit  
18 that had not formally come out and were now working as the  
19 Special Task Force with the Sierra Leonean government.

12:56:31 20 Q. Can I invite your attention now, please, Mr Taylor, to  
21 exhibit number D-26. This is part of submissions made to the TRC  
22 in Sierra Leone. "Submissions to the Sierra Leone TRC,  
23 Sierra Leone by Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on 5 August 2003."  
24 Can we go directly to the meat of the document, please:

12:57:23 25 "Special Task Force. Another group which came to know  
26 about much later as part of the security units utilised by the  
27 military was the Special Task Force. I was never briefed about  
28 this when I assumed office as President in 1996. I knew about  
29 the existence of this unit only on the day of the AFRC coup

1 d'etat. Yet the army, without regard for the origin and true  
2 motive of the members of this group, had used them regularly and  
3 depended on them considerably.

4 It is important for this commission to be told of the role  
12:58:28 5 played by this unit in thwarting our peace efforts. It is an  
6 instance of the reckless regard with which our national army  
7 treated the security of the country. The Special Task Force was  
8 a group of mainly Liberian militia personnel who survived the  
9 several internal power struggles that characterised the initial  
12:58:58 10 coalition force put together to counter Charles Taylor's NPFL  
11 forces in Liberia.

12 By late 1990 when the Liberian war had reached the  
13 outskirts of Monrovia the refugee flow into Sierra Leone had  
14 reached its highest peak. Amongst these refugees were a  
12:59:23 15 substantial number of remnants of the late President Samuel Doe's  
16 Armed Forces of Liberia and Liberia police force personnel who  
17 had fled the fighting. Their common objective was to regroup and  
18 return to Liberia to continue their resistance against Charles  
19 Taylor's NPFL. This group included a number of influential  
12:59:48 20 Liberians who were supporters of the late Samuel Doe's regime.  
21 This new alliance was received by the APC government and allowed  
22 to remain in the country and a special relationship developed  
23 between them and the government.

24 Gradually and predictably, these Liberians requested for  
13:00:14 25 support from the government, initially by way of better  
26 accommodation facilities for their leaders and then financial  
27 support. When the RUF incursion occurred in Sierra Leone in  
28 March 1991, the then APC government yielded to their demand to be  
29 supplied with weapons which they could use to stave off the

1 Charles Taylor inspired incursion. By this time they had  
2 developed independent ambitions of their own. Namely, to use the  
3 weapons supplied them by the APC government to invade Liberia and  
4 halt the rapid advances of Charles Taylor."

13:00:58 5 Let's pause. That group who were armed and were fighting  
6 against you, Mr Taylor, which your brother President Tejan Kabbah  
7 is telling the TRC about, what were they called?

8 A. ULIMO.

9 Q. ULIMO:

13:01:18 10 "Thus instead of utilising the weapons supplied them in the  
11 defence of this country, they hid them and always came back  
12 demanding more weapons for more military operations, many of  
13 which were only stage managed.

14 Eventually the unit of Liberian dissidents and refugees in  
13:01:47 15 Sierra Leone was named ULIMO with Roosevelt Johnson as their  
16 field commander. Again the new structure was fraught with  
17 intrigues amongst the various tribal groups, namely Krahn and  
18 Mandingos. A split occurred. Alhaji Kromah spearheaded a  
19 splinter group, ULIMO-K, backed by Mandingo financiers based in  
13:02:17 20 Kenema and some key Guinean top officials."

21 Pause there. Now, you've told us, Mr Taylor, about the  
22 backing for ULIMO provided by Guinea, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And here we have President Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone  
13:02:44 25 asserting in public evidence that they were backed by some key  
26 Guinean top officials. Let's continue:

27 "The other group holding allegiance to Roosevelt Johnson  
28 became the ULIMO-J faction. When the NPRC government took over  
29 in 1992, ULIMO did not take long to support the overthrow of the

1 APC government. Efforts by the ousted APC regime to get them to  
2 mobilise against the NPRC did not yield much. Again at that  
3 stage ULIMO used the opportunity to acquire more weapons and  
4 other logistical support. They joined the new regime as they now  
13:03:34 5 saw a better future in the perceived to be more youthful NPRC.

6 The NPRC inherited from the APC regime the problem of  
7 ULIMO, but it too never settled it or attempted to settle it.  
8 All it did was to insist on the dropping of the J and K from the  
9 names of the two factions and to collectively rename them Special  
13:04:07 10 Task Force, STF.

11 The Special Task Force was then almost incorporated into  
12 the Sierra Leone army and they received salaries, allowances, and  
13 their supplies were regularly replenished.

14 The two leaders of the ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J factions, Alhaji  
13:04:49 15 Kromah and General Johnson, respectively later became members of  
16 the interim government of Liberia headed by Charles Taylor.  
17 Brigadier David Livingston Bropleh eventually became the new head  
18 of the Special Task Force.

19 The Special Task Force had its whole command line separate  
13:05:10 20 from that of the Sierra Leone army. Their personnel were  
21 attached to the army unit throughout the country. For many  
22 operations however, the Special Task Force elements in the units  
23 were regrouped into one large unit. There was a general  
24 understanding that the Special Task Force were experienced in  
13:05:35 25 jungle warfare and could match the RUF in the brutal manner in  
26 which they handled their troops and hence their perceived  
27 effectiveness in jungle fighting compared to the troops of the  
28 Sierra Leone army.

29 My government inherited the STF, but I had not known of the

1 existence of this outfit within the security apparatus as no one  
2 briefed me about its existence. Incidentally, this situation was  
3 no different from the military's about my persistent request to  
4 know more about the military itself, especially in such crucial  
13:06:20 5 matters as the strength of the military. There was no other  
6 means by which I could source such information. But as the war  
7 was still waging, I allowed the status quo to continue while my  
8 government continued to provide funds, rations and other  
9 logistics as demanded by the military.

13:06:42 10 I first knew of the existence of the Special Task Force as  
11 part of our security apparatus on 25 May 1997, the day of the  
12 AFRC coup. While I was listening to the military network I heard  
13 the then chief of defence staff of the Sierra Leone military  
14 ordering the special task force to move and engage the disloyal  
13:07:08 15 troops so as to foil the incipient coup.

16 Instead of doing this, the special task force moved and  
17 joined forces with the AFRC junta and together they overpowered  
18 the few remaining loyal troops. Their leader, General Bropleh,  
19 was compensated by the AFRC junta when he was made advisor to  
13:07:37 20 Johnny Paul Koroma and given special privileges.

21 General Bropleh and his STF followers fled together with  
22 other AFRC junta personnel when the ECOMOG led force removed the  
23 junta from Freetown in February 1998. Together they played an  
24 active role in all the attacks that displaced ECOMOG and  
13:08:05 25 government troops in such places as Koidu, Makeni, Kamakwie and  
26 Lunsar. They supported the 6 January '99 attack of Freetown."

27 Pause there. Let's pause for a minute, Mr Taylor, and seek  
28 to put all of that together. What President Kabbah, would you  
29 agree, was telling the TRC was that there was this group of

1 Liberians in Sierra Leone from the very early 1990s who first  
2 became ULIMO and then the STF? Do you agree?

3 A. Yes, I do.

13:09:03

4 Q. Those Liberians, as the STF, played a role in the  
5 coup d'etat which ousted Kabbah on 25 May 1997. Is that correct?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. They also played a role, according to Kabbah, in the 6  
8 January 1999 Freetown invasion. Is that right, Mr Taylor?

9 A. That is right.

13:09:28

10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you have heard evidence to the effect of  
11 people saying that those who invaded Freetown in January '99,  
12 some of them were speaking with Liberian accents. Do you  
13 remember that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

13:09:48

15 Q. Now, help us. Did you at any stage send Liberian fighters  
16 into Sierra Leone in 1998/1999?

17 A. No, I did not. It's very clear who they are here.

18 Q. Who are they?

13:10:10

19 A. They are the remnants of ULIMO that have now been engaged,  
20 as I would use the word, as mercenaries by governments of  
21 Sierra Leone. And by governments I mean coming all the way - in  
22 fact, Tejani is being diplomatic here when he talks about  
23 officials. He knows it's Lansana Conte that has done this, his  
24 good friend, so he is playing a little bit of politics here. He  
25 know it's Lansana that had equipped these people and not just  
26 so-called Mandingo financiers. He knows that and so he is  
27 playing a little bit of politics.

13:10:38

28 And they all know - and this is what I talk about here.

29 They know who these Liberians are and in the indictment when they

1 talk about Liberian fighters they know who they are. They know  
2 that they are not my people when they refer to Liberian fighters  
3 in the indictment. They know that these are the people that they  
4 have hired as mercenaries over the years are there, they are part  
13:11:15 5 of the Sierra Leonean army, they are paid, they are fed and they  
6 are maintained. They know. They know that these are not my  
7 people.

8 And these very people that they are talking about later on  
9 we'll get to know remain in Sierra Leone until today. Some of  
13:11:31 10 them were - when the British came they used them to fight the  
11 West Side Boys and when the British trained some of these  
12 Liberians right now are officers in the present Sierra Leonean  
13 armed forces. They know all of this. They cannot tell me they  
14 don't know. These are not my people, they have never been my  
13:11:51 15 people and they have known all along, but they still put in the  
16 indictment Liberian fighters loyal to Charles Taylor. They know.

17 Q. Let's go back:

18 "They" - that is the STF - "supported the 6 January 1999  
19 attack of Freetown. On the recall of all military personnel in  
13:12:12 20 2000, after the granting of the amnesty in the Lome Peace  
21 Agreement in 1999, the STF resurfaced with General Bropleh still  
22 at the helm of the force.

23 When this fact came to my knowledge I ordered the expulsion  
24 of General Bropleh and his men from Sierra Leone. He made a  
13:12:37 25 U-turn and was back in the country. I finally succeeded in  
26 getting him out of the country when I insisted with UNHCR that it  
27 was their responsibility to secure a safe haven for this man and  
28 that his continued stay in Sierra Leone was no longer desirable.

29 This account I hope gives the commission an idea of the

1 precarious security situation which prevailed in the country  
2 before and after my assumption of office. That situation did not  
3 arise accidentally. It was contrived without due regard for the  
4 true security of the people of this country and it was the people  
13:13:33 5 who became victims of the reckless conduct of their government."

6 I don't think I need trouble with the rest of that. Can we  
7 put that away now, please. Now, Mr Taylor, when did you first  
8 become aware of the existence of the STF

9 A. We became aware of this I said after my election as  
13:14:08 10 President. It has to be somewhere in late '97. Now, we are  
11 aware of the presence of Liberians in Sierra Leone being a part  
12 of the armed forces. Their actual name as STF really comes to  
13 light around the time after I'm President.

14 Q. After you become President?

13:14:32 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Now, at the time of demobilisation, Mr Taylor, at that  
17 stage were you aware of any Liberians going to Sierra Leone for  
18 military purposes?

19 A. Well, we were getting reports that a lot of the ULIMO  
13:15:06 20 people in fact were just going back and joining their friends in  
21 Sierra Leone with their arms, that a lot of them just turned  
22 around and said, "Well, you know, we're not going to give our  
23 arms" and they went in - you know, this is the thing that Tejani  
24 is talking about here. I'm talking about Kabbah. Kabbah is  
13:15:30 25 saying that by 2000 he's making all these moves of expulsion, but  
26 Tejani is returned to power in 1998. And what does he do with  
27 the STF? The Liberians have been used throughout this entire  
28 process as paid fighters and in a way he's giving a full account  
29 here, but Tejani is not being fully upright that he too used

1 these people when it was convenient for him.

2 So all this stuff here that he is talking about, while it  
3 is true but I do not think he is forthcoming and he and I always  
4 used to have some tough arguments, so it's not new today. But  
13:16:14 5 the fact of the matter is Liberians did go back into Sierra Leone  
6 with their arms and don't let's forget we're talking about still  
7 this forest region on the border and going into Sierra Leone with  
8 guns really at that particular time, because of the conflict,  
9 would not have been a big issue. So they did return, yes.

13:16:42 10 Q. And as far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, did those people who  
11 returned receive any training in Sierra Leone?

12 A. No, no. The people that are returning to Sierra Leone  
13 don't need training. They are trained. These are fighting men  
14 that have come in. They are ULIMO fighters, very experienced.  
13:17:08 15 And they go back and they don't really need - the only thing they  
16 need to do is to be handed - those without weapons to be handed  
17 weapons. They are trained.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, please, Mr President.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

13:18:11 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes:

21 Q. Let's start on 1997, Mr Taylor. What are you doing in  
22 January of 1997?

23 A. By January of 1997 the NPFL and all the warring factions  
24 are disbanded. We then begin the process of forming political  
13:18:40 25 parties.

26 Q. And what does that process actually involve?

27 A. It involved an order from the leadership of each of the  
28 factions that effective this day, the - in my case the National  
29 Patriotic Front of Liberia no longer exists. All soldiers have

1 been officially demobilised and should no longer consider  
2 themselves as military personnel and that the NPFL cease to exist  
3 as of this date. That's the official situation through an order,  
4 something like a proclamation, issued by the Leadership.

13:19:40 5 Q. Now, what are you, Charles Taylor, actually involved in in  
6 January 1997? What are you doing?

7 A. I'm busy. After this process I'm busy putting together the  
8 mechanism for political work.

9 Q. What mechanism are you talking about?

13:20:08 10 A. The process of getting registered as a political party,  
11 identifying a headquarters in the city and offices throughout the  
12 country as provided by the provisional electoral laws that have  
13 been put into place.

14 Q. Yes. And at this stage in January 1997, has a date been  
13:20:48 15 fixed for an election?

16 A. Yes, to the best of my recollection, the first date - and I  
17 might just be a little off, but I'll help the Court to the best  
18 of my knowledge. The first date that was set up was around June.  
19 We had to miss that date because of financial matters in trying  
13:21:16 20 to raise money to fund the electoral process. So if my  
21 recollection is correct it's around June. We miss it and it's  
22 pushed not further than July.

23 Q. Okay. Now, obviously you stood as a candidate in that  
24 election, Mr Taylor?

13:21:37 25 A. Definitely. Definitely.

26 Q. So help us. When did you start campaigning?

27 A. Well, we had to first - later on there was a campaign  
28 period. I think the deadline was about three months of  
29 campaigning. That would bring us all the way down to about

1 April/May or thereabouts that the actual campaign season opened.  
2 But before that we are still dealing with this problem, because  
3 the elections almost did not take off because there was a big  
4 problem where, we will expand on later, the ECOWAS, the Economic  
13:22:27 5 Community of West African States, had a - and the, quote unquote,  
6 international community had a problem.

7 So there are these squabbles going on and in fact the  
8 squabble got so terrible where the international community - and  
9 I don't mean to sound cynical, but when we talk about  
13:22:49 10 international community we are talking about mostly the  
11 United States and that's a fact, whether people accept it or not,  
12 I said that. They refused to help to fund the elections and  
13 insisted on a change of date and ECOWAS member states decided  
14 that they were going to have none of that. So the 1997 elections  
13:23:12 15 in Liberia were funded by - for the most part by ECOWAS where  
16 member states for the first time were tasked certain amounts that  
17 they - each country contributed along with a donation of \$1  
18 million from the Republic of China before these elections could  
19 get off. So that's why it was delayed from June until July. So  
13:23:41 20 during that time organisation is going on, but prior to three  
21 months before the elections we are just, you know, organising and  
22 carrying on basic work.

23 Q. Now, up until the elections, Mr Taylor, in Liberia, what  
24 was your primary concern?

13:24:10 25 A. Trying to get elected as President. Primarily. I'm busy  
26 trying to put together an organisation necessary to propel me  
27 into the presidency. That's my preoccupation.

28 Q. Now, let us pause for a moment and see what is going on in  
29 Sierra Leone during this period when you're campaigning to become

1 President. In March of 1997 Foday Sankoh is arrested in Nigeria.

2 Were you aware of that?

3 A. Yes, I was aware.

4 Q. How did you become aware of that?

13:24:59 5 A. It was all on the local news, yes.

6 Q. And do you have any idea what Foday Sankoh was doing in

7 Nigeria?

8 A. None whatsoever. I do not know.

9 Q. Had you sent him there?

13:25:14 10 A. No, no, no.

11 Q. Do you recall thereafter that a group of senior RUF members  
12 effectively tried to take control of the RUF in Sankoh's absence?

13 A. Well, let me - by recalling, that's what I heard here. At  
14 the time that issue occurred it was not a big news issue, so it's

13:26:11 15 very unlikely that I would have really heard about it. It was  
16 not a big issue. I heard the details here.

17 Q. Now, the next event that I want to ask you about,

18 Mr Taylor, is this: We know that on 25 May 1997 there was a coup  
19 in Sierra Leone.

13:26:36 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you have anything to do with that?

22 A. I could have not had anything to do with it. Never. How  
23 could I?

24 Q. Did you have anything to do with it, Mr Taylor? Let's  
13:27:13 25 clarify it.

26 A. No.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, since 1989 when you had began your revolution in  
28 Liberia, had you had any contact with the Sierra Leonean armed  
29 forces?

1 A. None whatsoever.

2 Q. You do recall telling us though, don't you, that you had  
3 had some contact with President Momoh and certain of his military  
4 hierarchy?

13:27:51 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. What was the extent of that contact, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Well, the contact goes back to the days when I went to  
8 Momoh, that is at the beginning of '89, to ask for some help.

9 That contact continued into the early part of 1990, when there  
10 was a fracas and Momoh and I resolved it. I explained to this  
11 Court that Momoh and I resolved the first border issue between  
12 the two of us.

13 Following thereafter after the ULIMO attack inside Liberia  
14 in '91 - the friendship, by that time, there was no other result.  
13:28:53 15 It had collapsed and following that time I had not been in touch  
16 with my good friend Momoh or my other friend Brigadier Toronkai.  
17 All of that had ceased.

18 And let me just clarify this, because my contact was with  
19 the President of Sierra Leone who was the commander in chief of  
13:29:20 20 the armed forces and a brigadier that he trusted and used. I was  
21 not even at that time in contact with the Sierra Leonean armed  
22 forces. I was at that period in contact with the President of  
23 the Republic and the individuals that he trusted. And I'm using  
24 the word individuals. I'm referring to Brigadier Toronkai and  
13:29:49 25 Mohamed Dumbuya. These are the two - only two people that he had  
26 us in contact with at the time and not the armed forces or his  
27 personnel.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We'll

1 adjourn now for lunch and reconvene at 2.30.

2 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:31:22 5 Q. Right. Mr Taylor, we were dealing with the coup in Sierra  
6 Leone on 25 May of 1997. Now at the time of the coup, what were  
7 you doing?

8 A. May 1997 I am very, very, very busy putting together my  
9 organisation for elections.

14:32:00 10 Q. And what did that actually involve?

11 A. It involved, I said, putting together an organisation. We  
12 had to register the political party. We were trying to get  
13 material in the country for campaigning, T-shirts, getting  
14 banners made. We could not campaign, I said, until about three  
15 months before the elections, but I am very busy strictly on  
16 trying to secure a position as President of the Republic through  
17 the electoral process.

18 Q. So when did the actual campaigning begin, Mr Taylor?

19 A. I would say round about the same time. It is three months  
14:32:57 20 before the election, so first the election is June, it's changed,  
21 so I would put it to about the beginning of May of 1997.

22 Q. And the campaigning, what did that involve?

23 A. The campaigning involved, first of all we had to set up  
24 offices across the country. It is movement from one region to  
14:33:26 25 the other, making speeches, holding rallies. It is a big  
26 logistical nightmare. But it involves movements, speeches and  
27 all this, trying to get as much support from a wide segment of  
28 the populace.

29 Q. And is the country peaceful at this time, Mr Taylor?

1 A. I would say relatively. Relatively, yes. The disarmament  
2 is over, demobilisation has occurred and the peacekeepers are in  
3 place. By peacekeepers I am talking about ECOMOG and the United  
4 Nations do not withdraw from their positions after disarmament.

14:34:22 5 They remain in position to make sure that the elections are  
6 conducted in a very peaceful way. So they are still deployed as  
7 we saw in that map earlier, I think yesterday. They deployed  
8 across the country. All of the observers are moving up and down.

9 Because one of the things that some of the opposition  
14:34:51 10 individuals were concerned about was because we had the largest  
11 faction during that time and because we had occupied most of the  
12 country, their concern was that, well, Mr Taylor may have an  
13 advantage because he had a bigger area. So important in the  
14 process was the ability of those that were campaigning and  
14:35:17 15 running for office to be able to get in and out of those areas  
16 and stay in there for as long as they wanted to without being  
17 harassed or intimidated.

18 So all these are in place. The structures are on the  
19 ground and I am just moving from one place to the other  
14:35:35 20 campaigning. In some areas - some counties you would spend about  
21 a week or two. But it is basically work, work, campaigning.  
22 It's a nonstop - it's really a nonstop situation, because the  
23 opposition - and we had very strong opposition, as you very well  
24 may not know, but the present President of Liberia, I will call  
14:35:58 25 her my sister, we are from the same tribe, she is also a  
26 candidate in those elections. All of the warring factional  
27 leaders, Dr Boley, Alhaji Kromah and many more, are all part of  
28 the electoral process running to become President. So it is a  
29 very hectic time and I am putting all the time that I can in to

1 win.

2 Q. Now, two questions. Firstly, when did the disarmament  
3 process actually come to an end?

4 A. The disarmament process officially - we have to get the  
14:36:51 5 official and unofficial. The official end is by December 1996.

6 Q. And demobilisation?

7 A. That is before that particular time.

8 Q. And that had officially ended December '96, but hitherto we  
9 know that areas of the country had been controlled by various  
14:37:33 10 factions.

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. So help us. Was it possible for you to campaign in places  
13 like Lofa which had been hitherto a ULIMO stronghold?

14 A. Yes, it was possible, but I did not campaign in Lofa.

14:37:57 15 Q. Why not?

16 A. Well, the country - well, you know, I will tell you. The  
17 fact of the matter is that after my experience in the Executive  
18 Mansion, where I had been attacked in October, Lofa again is the  
19 rain forest. Between Gbarnga and Zorzor we are talking about  
14:38:32 20 forest. Hardly, I would say one, two - about three towns on the  
21 road. Between Zorzor and Voinjama hardly any - you are driving  
22 for hours through the rain forest. I was not about to take a  
23 chance during that particular time to go to Voinjama to campaign,  
24 but I had the campaign organisation that took care of that.

14:39:03 25 There were just some areas of the country that I am not claiming  
26 were not free to travel. They were free to travel, but I did not  
27 exercise the option of travelling to those locations and it was a  
28 personal decision.

29 Q. What about the areas which had been controlled by ULIMO-J?

1 Did you campaign in those areas?

2 A. Bomi. Yes, I went to Bomi, which is Tubmanburg, and the  
3 reason why I went to Bomi was even though ULIMO-J was there, but  
4 that is the section of the country that we are from. And so  
14:39:45 5 while he was there, by the time the people returned to Bomi I was  
6 a favourite son, so the possibilities of any what I would say  
7 clandestine activities developing in Bomi at that time were  
8 virtually zero, so I could take a chance to go.

9 Q. Now how many parties in total took part in the election,  
14:40:12 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. Let's see, I think there were about, what, 12/13. I think  
12 about 13 to be exact.

13 Q. And help us, were there foreign observers present?

14 A. Oh, by the hundreds. The foreign observers - ECOWAS that  
14:40:39 15 was sponsoring these elections had ECOWAS observers. Then it was  
16 still the Organisation of African Unity had observers. Then you  
17 had the European Union with observers. The largest unit came  
18 from the United States from the Carter Centre. Carter, I think,  
19 may have had as many as 40 plus observers alone. Of course there  
14:41:14 20 were our good friends the United States had observers through  
21 IFES, I think I said before. It maybe haven't the real meaning  
22 wrong, but I think it is the international something for  
23 electoral systems, IFES. And so there were hundreds of observers  
24 all over the place, because after seven years of civil war and  
14:41:46 25 some 20,000 troops in the country, the international community,  
26 this time everybody, was interested in making sure that these  
27 elections were free - in fact the expression used fair and  
28 transparent. And so they covered for the first time every inch  
29 of the country and made sure that they were free, fair and

1 transparent.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: IFES, your Honours, the International  
3 Foundation For Electoral Systems.

14:42:40

4 THE WITNESS: That is attached to the United States State  
5 Department.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Now, you mentioned that amongst the observers was the  
8 Carter Centre?

9 A. That is correct.

14:42:51

10 Q. Did they thereafter to your knowledge prepare a report  
11 about the elections?

12 A. Yes, President Carter following the elections did a major  
13 report and analysis of the process and his own observations.

14 Q. And have you seen that report, Mr Taylor?

14:43:13

15 A. Oh, yes, I have seen it. I have seen it.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness could be shown,  
17 please, the document behind divider 10 in the additional  
18 documents served for week 30:

14:44:25

19 Q. Right. Mr Taylor, the first document behind that is headed  
20 "Ballot Paper". Is this a copy of the actual ballot paper used?

21 A. Yes, it is.

22 Q. Now, we see that there are 13 photographs on the ballot  
23 paper?

24 A. That is correct.

14:44:48

25 Q. And 13 different logos?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. And then an empty box where the voter can place his or her  
28 mark, yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Now just take us, starting at the top, through the  
2 candidates, please, Mr Taylor, explaining what faction if any  
3 they belonged to?

14:45:19 4 A. Now you are saying faction, not parties. Just if they were  
5 affiliated with some faction.

6 Q. From the past?

7 A. Okay, great. The first on the ballot is the Progressive  
8 People's Party, and their standard bearer is Chea Cheapo. Now  
9 this name is in the records. This is the gentleman that was  
14:45:48 10 minister of justice that I explained to this Court at the time  
11 that was instrumental in arresting me as justice minister. He is  
12 in part associated with - he would necessarily be associated with  
13 the LPC. He is Krahn. He is from Grand Gedeh County.

14 The National Reformation Party with Martin Sheriff, I don't  
14:46:20 15 know offhand now what his affiliation was, but it is logical that  
16 he would have leaned - I don't know why he is here - somehow  
17 towards Alhaji, but I can't be certain. I might say that he may  
18 not have been associated with Alhaji Kromah.

19 The next one is the Free Democratic Party. It is headed by  
14:46:56 20 Sahr Faya Gboley. I don't think Sahr was directly associated  
21 with any of the warring factions.

22 The next on that list is the Liberia National Union. This  
23 is the gentleman Dr Harry F Moniba. Now this individual  
24 Dr Moniba served as Vice-President to Samuel Doe, and so in fact  
14:47:34 25 during the crisis in Liberia Dr Moniba claimed still to be, after  
26 the death of Doe, the legitimate President that should have  
27 succeeded him under the constitution. That did not happen.  
28 Dr Moniba.

29 The next person is the Unity Party, and that picture is the

1 present President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. She ran.  
2 She had been associated with the NPFL as one of the leaders of  
3 putting together NPFL, but we had broken up as of the time of the  
4 Banjul and coming on, so she participated.

14:48:21 5 Q. And just pausing there, Mr Taylor, what were your - what  
6 was the nature of your relationship with her by this time? Did  
7 you still regard her as a friend, or what?

8 A. Well, not - surely not an enemy, but I would say an  
9 adversary. Not an enemy. I would say an adversary. We had had  
14:48:49 10 our differences because of the leadership of the NPFL at the time  
11 and she had finally broken away. So I would really regard her as  
12 an adversary.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. The next individual there is the All Liberian Coalition  
14:49:13 15 Party, and that gentleman there is Alhaji GV Kromah. He is the  
16 leader of the ULIMO-K.

17 Right under there at 7 I am there, the National Patriotic  
18 Party, I am the leader. The next individual is the Alliance of  
19 Political Parties, and it is headed by a gentleman called  
14:49:48 20 Cletus-Segbe Wortoson. Now this gentleman, Mr Wortoson, served  
21 as a minister in the late President Tolbert's government and is  
22 presently the President pro tempore of the present Liberian Senate.

23 Under there is the Reformation Alliance Party. It is  
24 headed by Dr Henry Boima Fahnbulleh. Now this name has come up.  
14:50:29 25 My friend, I told this Court, that received me upon my coming  
26 initially to Ghana is Dr Fahnbulleh that received me in Ghana  
27 when I first arrived and one of those individuals that was  
28 instrumental in putting together the first NPFL with  
29 General Quiwonkpa.

1 Q. Pause there for a minute, Mr Taylor, because earlier you  
2 told us - last week, in fact - that Fahnbulleh had also had a  
3 group of Liberians training in Libya. Do you remember telling us  
4 that?

14:51:12 5 A. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. Just pausing there for a minute, what had happened to them?

7 A. They left Libya and I mentioned that two of them remained  
8 with me, Paul Nimely and - I have forgotten the other boy's name  
9 right now - it will come to me. Putu Major. But the rest of the  
10 men --

11 Q. Who?

12 A. Putu Major. That is in the records. It is in my evidence  
13 before this Court. The rest of them I do not know what happened  
14 to them, but they left. To the best of my knowledge they left,

14:51:58 15 but those two stayed with me.

16 Q. Okay, carry on?

17 A. Under there is the People's Democratic Party of Liberia,  
18 which is led by General George Toe Washington. General  
19 Washington later on became a scholar. He was the army chief of  
20 staff during the time of the Tolbert government. After the coup  
21 he left and General Washington is a very well-known individual.

14:52:33 22 Under there is the United People's Party, UPP, headed by  
23 Gabriel Barcus Matthews. To remind the Court, Barcus Matthews I  
24 would say is one of the pioneers of the new political  
14:53:01 25 dispensation in Liberia. This is the gentleman that I told the  
26 Court there was a part of the union in the United States that had  
27 the Progressive Alliance of Liberia, that's a part of the  
28 evidence, and had come to Liberia and challenged the Tolbert  
29 government into trying to establish a political party which he

1 finally established called the United People's Party, UPP. A  
2 very, very, very well-known and respected - he is late --

3 Q. This was the man you told us about who had fomented some of  
4 the problems which led to the rice riots?

14:53:46 5 A. Definitely. That's him. That's Barcus. Under there is  
6 the National Democratic Party of Liberia, NDPL. It is headed by  
7 Dr George Saigbe Boley. Now Dr Boley was the leader of the LPC  
8 and this name came up before in the evidence. Dr Boley was the  
9 minister of state of Samuel Doe at the time of the coup, when the  
14:54:18 10 coup occurred. Dr Boley subsequently headed the LPC and this  
11 party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia, is the party  
12 that was used by Samuel Doe as - this is President Doe's party  
13 and so they are just continuing the party. This is the party  
14 that he - the banner he ran under when he claimed he won the  
14:54:48 15 presidency before.

16 Q. In 1995?

17 A. That is correct. Then the last person on that list is the  
18 Liberian People's Party. That is headed by Dr Togba-Nah Tipteh  
19 and we know that he is one of the senior people from MOJA that's  
14:55:09 20 served, I told this Court, as minister of planning in the Doe  
21 government at the same time I served as director general of the  
22 general services administration.

23 Q. Very well. Thank you for that, Mr Taylor. If we go over  
24 the page now behind that divider there is a letter which is a  
14:55:31 25 covering letter for the actual Carter Centre report. So if we  
26 just go on a couple of pages ignoring the letter we come to the  
27 Carter Centre report, don't we, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And it is entitled, "Observing the 1997 Special Election

1 Process in Liberia", yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Let us go straightaway, please, to page 4, which looks like  
4 this, yes?

14:56:11 5 A. Yes, okay.

6 Q. Just to get an idea of the number of observers sent by the  
7 Carter Centre. We see that amongst the observers the leadership  
8 team is headed by former President Jimmy Carter and I have no  
9 intention of going through all of those names, but if we go over  
10 the page there is a rather badly reproduced photograph beneath  
11 which there is this caption: "Members of the 40 person Carter  
12 Centre delegation gather for a group dinner". So that gives us  
13 the number of observers sent by the Carter Centre. Now, pausing  
14 there, Mr Taylor, these observers, what did they actually do?

14:57:11 15 A. They were there to see first of all if the process as  
16 designed was on the ground. They were also looking at the ballot  
17 process, those that wanted to vote, making sure that they had the  
18 chance to vote. They were also concerned with - I mean not with  
19 that. They were concerned that the ballots not be tampered with  
20 once they were in the boxes. So they were pretty well spread as  
21 observers to see if the process at the end of the day could be  
22 deemed free, fair and transparent.

23 Q. Now on that note, Mr Taylor, before we come to the  
24 substance of the report, you will recall mention being made in  
14:58:13 25 this Court of a slogan being used during the elections, "He  
26 killed my pa, he killed my ma, but I will vote for him", yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And do you remember it being suggested that that was as a  
29 consequence of intimidation carried out by your supporters of

1 voters?

2 A. Well, that is not correct. Had that been the case the  
3 international observers would not have declared the elections  
4 free, fair and transparent. This is another one of those things  
14:58:54 5 that if anybody had asked what did it really mean, someone would  
6 have explained to them instead of trying to come up with their  
7 warped interpretation of what it meant. The meaning of that is  
8 just pure and simple.

9 Your Honours, before the election and during the process  
14:59:22 10 those individuals that claimed that they had nothing to do with  
11 the elections were saying that, "Don't vote for any killers. We  
12 are the good people and they are the bad people". So what my  
13 supporters did was to say, "Okay, great, you are calling them -  
14 you want to call them killers. You want to call them thieves.  
14:59:47 15 Whatever you want to call this man, if you say he killed our  
16 mother, if you say he killed our father, no matter who you say he  
17 killed we will still vote for this man because we believe in  
18 him". That was the underline interpretation of that slogan.  
19 That regardless of whatever attachment or title or description  
15:00:08 20 you put against him, we will vote for him still. That's what  
21 that meant.

22 Q. If we go over the page we see a foreword by Jimmy Carter.  
23 I am not going to trouble with that. But can we go to page 10,  
24 please, the executive summary?

15:00:30 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. "On 24 December 1989 Charles Taylor launched a rebellion  
27 against Samuel Doe's regime igniting a civil conflict in Liberia  
28 that lasted nearly seven years. As a result, one tenth of the  
29 pre-war population died, and hundreds of thousands of people

1 became refugees and internally displaced. The Economic Community  
2 of West African States intervened with military force in August  
3 1990 but was unable to end the war, as an array of armed factions  
4 fought for control of the country.

15:01:25 5 After countless peace initiatives and a serious eruption of  
6 fighting in the capital of Monrovia in April 1996, the latest of  
7 13 peace agreements - Abuja II - was signed in Abuja, Nigeria in  
8 August 1996. This accord paved the way for a transitional  
9 government, disarmament, demobilisation, and the 1997 special  
10 elections.

11 To implement demobilisation and disarmament, ECOWAS was  
12 enlarged and made more effective. Demobilisation was relatively  
13 successful in collecting arms but was less successful at breaking  
14 the armed factions' command and control structures."

15:02:22 15 Pause there. Is that true, Mr Taylor?

16 A. This part that you have just read is in part true and I  
17 think we have gone through that, that we said and it didn't end.  
18 That's why the distinction between when did it actually end in  
19 1997 versus 1996. This is fairly true.

15:02:48 20 Q. "Several of the major faction leaders - including Charles  
21 Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, and George Boley - turned their militias  
22 into political parties. Various traditional political parties  
23 organised themselves into an alliance of political parties,  
24 nominating Cletus Wortoson as its presidential candidate. Splits  
15:03:17 25 in the alliance, however, led several prominent politicians to  
26 withdraw and launch candidacies with other parties, including  
27 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Togba-Nah Tipoteh and Barcus Matthews.

28 The Carter Centre's involvement in Liberia dates from 1991.  
29 At the conclusion of the Yamoussoukro I summit in June 1991, the

1 centre was publicly requested to help in the peace process and we  
2 eventual elections. In 1992, the centre opened an office in  
3 Monrovia to support its work there. However, fighting in April  
4 1996 forced its closure."

15:04:09 5 Pause there. Mr Taylor, again we have that reference to  
6 fighting in April 1996. What are we talking about there?

7 A. We are talking about the Roosevelt Johnson attempted  
8 arrest.

9 Q. Right:

15:04:24 10 "With Abuja II's establishment in August 1996, the centre  
11 renewed efforts and began developing plans for its Liberia  
12 election project. In April 1997, the centre re-opened its  
13 Monrovia office under the direction of Terrence Lyons, who served  
14 as senior project adviser.

15:04:48 15 In the pre-election period, the centre sent three missions  
16 in March, April and June 1997. The March mission, led by the  
17 centre's Gordon Streeb, assessed electoral preparations and  
18 explored how the centre could best support a credible election  
19 process. The team reported serious concerns about the lack of a  
15:05:17 20 level playing field, the need for an electoral code of conduct,  
21 and the need to establish effective, neutral electoral  
22 institutions to administer the elections."

23 Pause there. What are they talking about there, Mr Taylor,  
24 lack of a level playing field, et cetera?

15:05:35 25 A. Well, I do not know what he is speaking about because I  
26 disagree with some other things that he mentions in his summary  
27 and he and I shared these thoughts after my election. I do not  
28 know - level playing field as interpreted generally at that time  
29 was that I had more areas under my control. By that time we had

1 put together a better organisation and so they felt that we were  
2 far ahead of the pack in terms of organisational structure on the  
3 ground and all of that. In terms of radios - I am not talking  
4 about calling radios. Radio FM, we had an FM radio station. We  
15:06:38 5 had a better transport system set up and so people - he just felt  
6 that the playing field should be level. I want to assume this is  
7 what he is talking about.

8 Q. "The centre's April delegation noted that progress had  
9 been made, including the work of the newly established

15:07:01 10 independent elections commission but remained concerned about  
11 problems with the elections' preparations and timetable.

12 Delegates thus recommended to postpone the election date beyond  
13 the scheduled 30 May. They reported serious problems regarding  
14 access by political parties to the countryside and media and

15:07:24 15 fears related to security. The mission raised the issue of  
16 post-election governance with various leaders, but some, most  
17 notably Charles Taylor, resisted even considering the  
18 suggestion."

19 What's that about, Mr Taylor?

15:07:44 20 A. Well, at this particular time I have mentioned in my  
21 statement before this Court there was a problem between ECOWAS  
22 then - and don't let's forget the Carter Centre for this whole  
23 process was in fact funded by IFES. They received funding for  
24 their work from the United States government to carry out their  
15:08:14 25 work. They had all kinds of ideas that even ECOWAS was supposed  
26 to - the then chairman of ECOWAS was the President of Nigeria,  
27 General Sani Abacha. And so they kept bringing conditionalities  
28 after conditionalities after conditionalities, and some of them  
29 were just outrageous. I mean, there is no instance in the world

1 where there is a level playing field anywhere in the world in an  
2 electoral process. No matter what you take - let's go to the  
3 United States. Nine out of ten chances in terms of fundraising,  
4 historically the Republicans have always raised more money than  
15:09:02 5 Democrats. So when you talk about level playing field - or let's  
6 go into Britain. You always find that sometimes the Labour Party  
7 may have more. I mean, there is such thing has a level playing  
8 field. So ECOWAS just got annoyed and said look to them that -  
9 look, and what I was really following was the dictates of ECOWAS  
15:09:24 10 at that time and, you know, everybody came after me because I had  
11 the largest faction and the largest - and maybe the best  
12 organisation on the ground and if they could divide us, they were  
13 rulers. What do I mean by that? If they could get Taylor to  
14 say, "Well, we will go along," then they will say, "Well, listen,  
15:09:47 15 the largest faction in Liberia doesn't want election." And that  
16 is a little strategy. They keep pushing between people. We come  
17 here, we get this group to disagree, they divide you. Then they  
18 say, oh, this and that. So I just - whatever ECOWAS said at that  
19 particular time, I said - ECOWAS were saying we are going to have  
15:10:03 20 it, and so he is right. I just didn't consider it because to  
21 consider that suggestion would have meant dividing the country,  
22 and then they would have had a way to say the elections cannot  
23 happen. At the end of the process they refused to fund the  
24 process, and ECOWAS had to fund it and I just said it to this  
15:10:22 25 Court. So, yes, he is right.

26 Q. And it continues:

27 "After it became clear that it would be difficult to meet  
28 the schedule, ECOWAS organised a consultation with Liberia's  
29 political parties on May 21, 1997. This resulted in the release

1 of a special elections package (including election laws) and an  
2 agreement to postpone elections until July 19. Most observers  
3 believed that the abbreviated timetable favoured Charles Taylor's  
4 National People's Party, the faction with the best organisation  
15:11:07 5 and most resources. At IECOM's request, the Carter Centre  
6 coordinated a workshop on the special elections package on May  
7 29-31, during which the Interparty Advisory Committee was formed.  
8 IIPAC sought to bring together the parties with IECOM to resolve  
9 issues and communicate electoral information".

15:11:39 10 Over the page, please:

11 "As part of its parallel effort to promote and protect  
12 human rights throughout the electoral process, the centre  
13 conducted a human rights assessment mission in April, followed by  
14 an intensive training programme for the Liberian human rights  
15:11:57 15 community on June 18-25, 1997.

16 Earlier that month, the centre deployed two medium-term  
17 observers to assess the campaign process and registration status.  
18 The centre's final preelection mission visited Liberia from June  
19 26-28, led by former US President Jimmy Carter. It focused on  
15:12:28 20 voter registration, political party campaigning, IECOM election  
21 management problems.

22 The delegation concluded that despite some obstacles,  
23 preparations seemed to be in place for an adequate but far from  
24 perfect election and that such an election probably was the only  
15:12:51 25 alternative to violence. After the mission, the centre deployed  
26 another set of medium-term observers to continue monitoring the  
27 registration process. The centre, coordinated activities with  
28 IECOM, ECOMOG, the EU, IFES, UNOMIL and other international  
29 observers to address common issues relating to logistics,

1 communications, security, and information sharing.

2 For the July 19 elections, the centre organised a 40 member  
3 team of international election monitors. President Carter,  
4 former President Ni ce phore Sog lo of Ben in, and former US Senator  
15:13:41 5 Paul Simon co-led the mission. Carter Centre delegates were  
6 deployed in ten of Liberia's 13 counties. On election day, they  
7 watched polling site openings, visited numerous sites over the  
8 course of the day, and observed vote counts at preassigned sites.  
9 At each site visited, monitors filled out process evaluation  
10 forms. The delegation observed the voting process at  
11 approximately 10 per cent of all polling sites.

12 The Carter Centre delegation also conducted a parallel vote  
13 tabulation, or 'quick count', for an independent data source on  
14 the results and to facilitate a possible role in calming fears or  
15:14:32 15 mediating any post-election disputes between parties or  
16 candidates. Despite some logistical difficulties, the Carter  
17 Centre's quick count provided an important check on the official  
18 results and helped President Carter in his meetings with  
19 political party leaders during the days after the election.  
15:14:58 20 Early results indicated Charles Taylor and the NPP winning an  
21 overwhelming majority of the votes."

22 Pause there. Mr Taylor, what percentage of the votes did  
23 you get?

24 A. Well, they stopped really at about 70 per cent really.  
15:15:21 25 That is where they stopped.

26 Q. What do you mean they stopped at 70 per cent?

27 A. Well, they stopped counting. They just came out with a  
28 percentage there and left it.

29 Q. Now, after the election, Mr Taylor, remember you had given

1 an interview with Baffour Ankomah in 1992 whilst you were in  
2 Gbarnga?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. Do you remember that?

15:15:52 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. After the election when you were elected as Liberia's 21st  
7 President, did you give a further interview to Baffour Ankomah?

8 A. Oh, yes, I did, some - a little down the road, yes.

9 Q. And help us, what magazine was he working for at that time?

15:16:18 10 A. Baffour was working for New Africa.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I therefore invite attention to behind  
12 divider 9, please:

13 Q. And can we go five pages into that divider to the page  
14 which begins like this, Mr Taylor.

15:17:15 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now do you recall giving this interview, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Now, we see from the bottom that this dates from December  
19 1997?

15:17:39 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Now you see that the first question posed to you was to  
22 this effect:

23 "I have been here for two weeks, Mr President, and I think  
24 the most beautiful thing that has happened in Liberia in 100 days  
15:18:00 25 of your government is national reconciliation, is that right?"

26 And your answer is:

27 "Definitely. I will start by saying to you that last week  
28 as I travelled to Tubmanburg in Bomi, I went along with the  
29 former interim President Dr Amos Sawyer. The Guinean ambassador

1 to Liberia came along as well, and he said to me, 'Your  
2 Excellency, I am going to send a cable back to Conakry  
3 immediately to tell my President about what I'm seeing.' I said,  
4 'What is it?' He said, 'It is very unusual for Presidents in  
15:18:38 5 Africa to behave this way. Here you are just after winning the  
6 election, and you have a former leader of your country, a man  
7 with whom you had many bitter disagreements in the past, touring  
8 with you in the same car. This is beautiful and exciting.'"  
9 Mr Taylor, this incident with Amos Sawyer, you had been on  
15:19:06 10 different sides during the war, hadn't you?

11 A. Very different, yes.

12 Q. So this reconciliation that the interviewer is talking  
13 about, was that something which you were seeking to achieve in  
14 Liberia?

15:19:28 15 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely.

16 Q. And help us. Let's just pause for a moment. How were you  
17 going about doing that, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Immediately after my election I then set out to do several  
19 things. Foremost on my mind was reconciliation. I got in touch  
15:19:54 20 with Alhaji Kromah and I asked him if he could lead a national  
21 reconciliation commission. He said he would, but he never did.  
22 I then started putting together a government, a government of  
23 national unity. I took the country into regions. Most of the  
24 problems of the government - I mean of the war years had come  
15:20:32 25 from the southeastern part of the country. That is where you  
26 find the Krahn, the Sapos that had caused a lot of trouble. So  
27 I made sure that the positions in government were split up by  
28 regions. For example, the Supreme Court. We took the Chief  
29 Justice - nominated the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from

1 the deep southeast from the county of Maryland. That is Gloria  
2 Musu-Scott. Then I took the other members of the Court from  
3 region, even the first Mandingo appointed to the Court. We  
4 appointed a justice from the Mandingo tribe. I tried to  
15:21:47 5 reconcile by splitting them up. I also went to the - by the way,  
6 your Honours, this election was based on the proportional  
7 representation system. And so I had the majority in the house; I  
8 had the majority in the Senate. So I also did the selection  
9 during that particular process based on the regional thing.

15:22:12 10 So I then move on to the senior people from the warring  
11 factions, from LPC, ULIMO-J. Roosevelt Johnson that was from  
12 ULIMO-J was appointed a minister in my government. Hezekiah  
13 Bowen, that name came out during the testimony here, was also  
14 made a minister in my government. He was one of the first chiefs  
15:22:46 15 of staff of the armed forces. The second chief of staff of the  
16 armed forces that also fought along with these factions, General  
17 Philip Karmah, also from Grand Gedeh who fought against me, he  
18 was made the minister of national security and senior members of  
19 all of the factions were brought into my government.

15:23:13 20 So Dr Sawyer and one of the former Leaders of the  
21 transitional government Dr David Kpomakpor, all of them - I tried  
22 to bring everybody on board. There was not one person that was  
23 involved in the war - even if I did not get the leader to  
24 participate in the government, I got some seen senior officials  
15:23:42 25 to continue it. That is how from the Kromah side, Alhaji Kromah  
26 - that is how Varmuyan Sherif stayed on as an assistant director  
27 at the mansion. One of his other top generals became one of  
28 assistant superintendents of police and on and on.

29 So these are the steps I did across the board. Every

1 faction that participated, including Tom Womeiyu that had broken  
2 away from me, he came and we brought him on and later on he  
3 became a member of the senate from the NPP side. So we did  
4 everything that we could in this action that I just revealed.

15:24:32 5 Q. Let's skip a couple of questions, Mr Taylor, because I want  
6 to look merely at the election so far as this article is  
7 concerned. If we go to the third column and to the bottom of  
8 that column, your interviewer asks you this question:

9 "Let's talk about the 19 July elections, Mr President. You  
15:24:59 10 won so overwhelmingly. What do you think made that huge victory  
11 possible?"

12 And you answer in this way:

13 "It proved one thing. The Liberian people in the final  
14 analysis stuck to their convictions. The Liberian people decided  
15:25:16 15 six and a half years ago what they wanted to do and where they  
16 wanted to go. They decided that I presented the best framework  
17 for building this country, the best framework to take them into  
18 the next millennium.

19 For some reason, however, certain individuals at home and  
15:25:35 20 abroad tried to indulge in king making here with the sole  
21 objective of sidelining the decision made by Liberians six and a  
22 half years ago. It worked for some time. People were appointed  
23 Presidents here, foreign countries came in with their fighting  
24 forces, they dictated policy, they subdued the Liberian people -  
15:26:00 25 but only for a time.

26 In the final analysis, when the people had the opportunity  
27 to come out and speak in the last elections, they said (to the  
28 foreigners), you have wasted our time for six and a half years;  
29 we've always wanted this man to lead us; you did not give us the

1 chance to express it, you came and dictated your policies, now we  
2 are speaking: That's the man we want.

3 This is not to say that we, our party, the NPP, did not  
4 work hard during the campaign - we worked very hard. But to a  
15:26:38 5 great extent the people always knew who they wanted. They had  
6 things dangled before them, in certain western capitals the  
7 Presidential candidates who stood against us were helped to amass  
8 funds, but when it came to the elections on 19 July, the Liberian  
9 people did what they always wanted to do in that last six and a  
15:26:59 10 half years."

11 What in effect were you saying there, Mr Taylor?

12 A. You know, when we go back to get an essence of what I am  
13 saying, when you go back to even a suggestion that was made in  
14 President Carter's conclusion that by redefining the date it gave  
15:27:31 15 me an advantage, I disagreed with that. In fact I told him after  
16 we took it - all of us, in fact, took exception to it because  
17 that suggests that ECOWAS favoured me and that's not the case.  
18 So that is terribly wrong.

19 What we are talking about here is if we go back just  
15:27:53 20 briefly, all along this whole war - and I also disagree by the  
21 way with this one tenth of the pre-war population. That's total  
22 nonsense. If the pre-war population was 3.5 to 4 million people  
23 and you say that one tenth of the pre-war population died, you  
24 are talking about 3 or 400,000 people and that's not the case.  
15:28:21 25 So I really want to get that clear since this is read in the  
26 records.

27 The problem was from the beginning, stop Charles Taylor.  
28 That's what prolonged this war. We have said before this Court  
29 that by July of 1990 we are around the capital. We have

1 surrounded the capital. We have been asked not to take the  
2 capital. We do not, only to be told later you should not have  
3 listened. ECOWAS comes in, fights, Babangida is trying to help  
4 his friend Doe. That doesn't work. Prince Johnson kills him and  
15:29:02 5 quite frankly I have said publicly before, and I say it here  
6 today, I would not have killed Doe if I had arrested him. I  
7 don't think there was a need for that. I think he went too far.

8 But you also have interference after interference after  
9 interference. Within the first six or more months we had reached  
15:29:23 10 the capital, we fight for another five or six years. Everyone  
11 from outside has a solution for Africa's problem except Africans  
12 themselves. They come to your little country, they tell you what  
13 you must do. They know it all. We went to school in these  
14 countries. I swear I made better grades by - I mean from some of  
15:29:47 15 them, at least on these campuses we Africans that were there  
16 didn't cheat. They had their sorority clubs and all that  
17 nonsense; we didn't.

18 So they come and tell you and try to - they always know  
19 better. They always know better. So they come here and they  
15:30:03 20 begin to change until even the ECOWAS leaders themselves get sick  
21 of it and say, "Look, okay, we are just going to fund this  
22 election". Every country contributed. Some countries 200,000,  
23 some countries 300,000. Nigeria shouldered the most part.

24 So what we are talking about, even during the electoral  
15:30:24 25 process Ellen Johnson was giving money in violation of the  
26 electoral law. She was using these IFES jeeps. We complained at  
27 that particular time. But somewhere by "king maker" here  
28 somebody has said who they wanted to be President of Liberia.  
29 This is all this trouble. And try to delay the process further.

1 Now this is not Charles Taylor. ECOWAS Leaders got  
2 together and said, "Enough is enough. You don't want to provide  
3 the money. We will do it". And 15 - there were 16 member  
4 states, Mauritania now I think withdrew. The 15 member states of  
15:31:00 5 ECOWAS got together and contributed.

6 Now this shows you how despondent the leadership had gotten  
7 in ECOWAS, because they tried to do what they wanted. Charles  
8 Taylor must not be. And so this whole thing, the slogans about  
9 they are the bad people, vote for those that did not participate,  
15:31:20 10 then our people come up with just a counter. You know, in  
11 electoral processes you may have a slogan that may come out that  
12 will win and some will lose. Now in the United States recently  
13 what won? "Yes, we can". I mean some slogans really catch on.  
14 So to counter this move our people started saying, "Yes, you say  
15:31:44 15 he kill our ma, he kill our pa, but we will vote for him".

16 So this is this whole process that is going on of king  
17 making and trying to decide who should be, but the final decision  
18 did come from the Liberian people. Not 50 per cent. I was in  
19 excess of 70. I remember Jimmy Carter telling me, "Well, you  
15:32:07 20 know, you have won". He uses the expression "overwhelming". It  
21 was more than 70. If they had really come out with the number -  
22 it was a disgrace. I would have won 75 per cent of the - I mean  
23 of the votes and I ran against the best of all of them. In fact  
24 Ellen Johnson now took - she won 10 per cent of the vote in that  
15:32:30 25 election, the present President of Liberia.

26 Q. Now you see that the next question put to you is to this  
27 effect:

28 "There are some commentators in Europe, America and  
29 elsewhere who say you won because of the fear factor, that the

1 people of Liberia knew you alone had the capability and the  
2 resources to restart the war if you lost and that's why they  
3 voted so overwhelmingly for you, to stop the war."

4 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

15:33:01 5 A. Total nonsense. That's the best I can say about this.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, had you lost the election, would you have gone  
7 back to war?

8 A. No, I would not have gone back to war. We were committed -  
9 everything that I did before this time is all about peace. And I  
10 tell you I fought very hard and I would say that discussion with  
11 President Abacha brought peace to Liberia. There was never going  
12 to be another war started by Taylor. We had disarmed. I had  
13 moved to the capital. I am from that section of the country and  
14 I had no intention of leaving. I had pledged to supporting  
15 whoever won the elections.

16 Now this is the type of language and you see where it is  
17 coming from. That's the language. Where do we see it? Ah,  
18 Europe, America. Well, that's where these comments normally come  
19 from; those that know it all. Because they gave you a little bit  
20 of money, you must take what they say and if you don't take what  
21 they say you are wrong. And so this is it.

22 So they lose seriously so they come up with a side  
23 argument, "Ah, well, it's only because he was about" - well, I  
24 will tell you what happened. The international community at that  
25 time, the group that was there, even if Taylor wanted to start a  
26 war Taylor had been disarmed, there were 20,000 plus peacekeepers  
27 in the country and I think the international community, ECOWAS in  
28 particular in the African Union, all of us were so tired of this  
29 war we wanted an end to it. So this statement here as alleged is

1 total nonsense about their own interpretation of why I won.

2 Q. Now I want to move to the last question on the right of  
3 that page, bottom, third column:

4 "Let's look at the economy. What would you say is the  
15:35:07 5 central plank of your economic policy that investors would look  
6 at and say, 'Oh, we will put our money into Liberia'?"

7 You say this:

8 "Well, there are several factors. The first is stability.  
9 Investors want to see stability and national reconciliation. The  
15:35:23 10 two work hand in hand, because through reconciliation you get  
11 stability.

12 Second, they would want to see human rights observed here.  
13 We have moved rapidly through the national legislature to make  
14 human rights the bedrock of our overall economic and political  
15:35:42 15 policy of our government."

16 Pause there. But, Mr Taylor, you are said to be a tyrant,  
17 a dictator and that you were abusing the rights of people like  
18 Hassan Bility. So were you lying to this journalist in this  
19 interview when you were claiming to be a respecter of human  
15:36:09 20 rights?

21 A. Well, no, I was not lying to him and, you know, the proof  
22 is really in the pudding. What I did immediately was to pass an  
23 Act of the legislature establishing a national human rights  
24 commission in Liberia. I am not just talking about what I was  
15:36:26 25 planning. We did. All of the human rights agencies in Liberia,  
26 the different groupings were permitted at - it was during my  
27 presidency that the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and all  
28 other human rights groups came up and they were respected.

29 So I listened to that gentleman here and he left a whole

1 lot of stuff. This is a man that claims I was supposed to be  
2 abusing him and doing - and knowing that he is arrested.

3 Q. Which gentleman are you talking about?

4 A. Mr Hassan Bility and he is visiting my house for birthday  
15:37:07 5 parties and going in and out. I mean, this for me is hardly a  
6 man that is threatened when he comes to my house - comes to  
7 official things. I mean this is - you know, when we get to that  
8 part I will deal with Hassan a little more, but this is very  
9 earnest and sincere and we do something about it.

15:37:30 10 Q. Now, I want to deal with a bit more of this document,  
11 Mr Taylor, so that we don't have to revisit it. Let's go to the  
12 right-hand column and I direct your attention to this right-hand  
13 column in light of something you told us earlier in your  
14 testimony. You see that you are asked this question:

15:37:55 15 "Let me take you to the international scene. Let's talk  
16 first about ECOWAS. Last week I saw you on TV describing  
17 President Abacha of Nigeria as my very good friend and brother.  
18 Was that diplomatic speak? Those of us who have followed the  
19 Liberian crisis closely know that Nigeria and the NPFL - which  
15:38:17 20 you headed - were not very good friends. What's changed it?"

21 You say this:

22 "You know, in most cases you have to agree to disagree.  
23 Yes, we had a lot of disagreements with Nigeria. But one thing I  
24 admire General Abacha for, I will tell you quite frankly - I will  
15:38:37 25 not tell you that everything is rosy, there are still some  
26 disagreements between us about certain fundamental problems  
27 regarding ECOWAS and even the Sierra Leonean situation.

28 But the thing I admire General Abacha for is that when I  
29 first met him, and after a long discussion, I said to him that in

1 order to bring peace to Liberia, we had to be sure that ECOMOG  
2 was a neutral force.

3 I said: 'Now let's forget the fact that we know that ECOMOG  
4 has assisted other armed groups in Liberia - that was the war -  
15:39:10 5 but in order to bring peace to Liberia ECOMOG must not only be  
6 seen as neutral, it must be neutral.' And he said to me, 'Fine,  
7 if this is going to bring peace, I promise you that ECOMOG as of  
8 now will be neutral. I give you my personal word that your  
9 security will never be threatened by ECOMOG'. And he did exactly  
15:39:33 10 as he said. That's why I call him my friend."

11 Do you remember telling us about that before, Mr Taylor?

12 A. That is true, yes.

13 Q. And that was the point at which, are you saying, that  
14 ECOMOG changed their stance towards the NPFL?

15:39:48 15 A. Exactly. The orders changed and we saw a visible change in  
16 the whole comportmentation of ECOMOG, yes.

17 Q. Now, let's go to the next question. And although this is  
18 out of place, it will save us having to come back to this  
19 document. Do you see the next question:

15:40:08 20 "Neutrality is a magic word, isn't it, Mr President? But  
21 at the moment it is not happening in Sierra Leone. I was at Bo  
22 Waterside, your common border with Sierra Leone, last Sunday and  
23 I saw Kamajor fighters (supporters of Kabbah) going and coming  
24 across the Mano River bridge, all under the encouraging eyes of  
15:40:32 25 ECOMOG. ECOMOG is allowing the Kamajors to operate from the  
26 Liberian side of the border against the regime in Freetown.  
27 Where, therefore, is ECOMOG's neutrality?"

28 And you say this:

29 "That's what I'm saying. Neutrality is central to an

1 ECOMOG in West Africa. I support the concept of a West African  
2 peacekeeping force, Liberia supports it and we will participate  
3 in such a force when conditions here make it practicable. But we  
4 will only participate in such a force if it is neutral. Remember  
15:41:08 5 this, only if such a force is neutral.

6 Which brings me to the Sierra Leone situation. The last  
7 meeting of the ECOWAS heads of state clearly stated that the  
8 situation in Sierra Leone will be resolved through negotiations.  
9 That military force will be used as a last resort. This was the  
15:41:30 10 decision of the authority of ECOWAS which I am part of. Liberia  
11 was then named as a member of the Committee of Five on Sierra  
12 Leone. The committee was given the mandate to begin discussions  
13 to peacefully resolve the Sierra Leone issue. And I think it is  
14 important that ECOMOG, which must carry out the mandate of the  
15:41:54 15 member states of ECOWAS, should not act in any way except with  
16 the expressed authority of the heads of state of ECOWAS.

17 In Liberia's opinion, any member state acting unilaterally  
18 is not doing so in the best interest of ECOWAS, nor in the best  
19 interest of a West African peacekeeping force".

15:42:18 20 Now, was it the case, Mr Taylor, that Kamajors were  
21 operating from Liberian territory?

22 A. Oh, yes. Yes.

23 Q. Who were they fighting against?

24 A. They were then fighting against the junta in Sierra Leone.

15:42:40 25 What I am talking about here is something that - we have to look  
26 at this, your Honours, in a full context. We are put on the  
27 Committee of Five and I have mentioned here, I believe, that I am  
28 put on it because my colleagues joke at me and say, "You are a  
29 former rebel, so you know what to do," and immediately I am given

1 the task of being the point person in dealing with Sierra Leone.  
2 Because Guinea is supporting Kabbah and has been involved in  
3 problems with us and so I am asked - because of the earlier  
4 association with Sankoh from '91, they asked me with my  
15:43:38 5 experience to join. We get on board.

6 But there is something going on. Nigeria is doing very  
7 well, and I must say he is my good friend. The late President  
8 Abacha is a very strong-willed individual. Abacha, by the time I  
9 am in office - and we have met at least as the authority, which  
15:44:06 10 would be the member states - Abacha is bent on removing the junta  
11 as quickly as possible and they use some force to do so.

12 The problem that we are running into at this particular  
13 time is that there is a central question, and I am going to give  
14 you, the judges, an insight: Presidents sitting down and there  
15:44:39 15 were some of us that had this thing. Now, look, any action that  
16 is taken militarily - first of all, we know that the use of force  
17 is the express prerogative of the Security Council under Chapter  
18 7 and that no country is authorised to use force external of his  
19 borders except under Chapter 7. My good friend Abacha is very  
15:45:12 20 upset, and he wants this thing resolved, and a lot of us want it  
21 resolved as quickly as possible. But there is a second little  
22 joke that we are joking about. I will say "Well, listen, here  
23 you are. What if there is a coup d'etat in Nigeria? Which  
24 military force in West Africa can come and remove you? So come  
15:45:33 25 on, slow down a bit. Let's do it right". So there are these  
26 arguments between Heads of State in these meetings. You,  
27 Nigeria, we want you. But you have to be careful because if  
28 there is a coup d'etat in Nigeria tomorrow, the rest of West  
29 Africa cannot remove you from power, so what's your problem in

1 rushing, rushing. Let's take it easy and get the Security  
2 Council to approve this.

3 By this time when I am elected President, months into it I  
4 found out that in fact most of the Kamajors had been trained  
15:46:03 5 right outside Monrovia. There is a baptist institute about four  
6 or five miles outside of the capital called Ricks Institute. The  
7 Kamajors are trained in Liberia. Hinga Norman, my good friend,  
8 the late Hinga Norman, has been living in Liberia for some 15  
9 years. They are training and moving in and out because ECOMOG is  
15:46:25 10 fully training, arming and taking care of them. I come in, in  
11 fact, later on in my testimony - in evidence that will come  
12 before this Court - I eventually write a long letter to President  
13 Abacha because I am asked to - you know, I am saying that I  
14 cannot, and will not, have the Kamajors training and being armed  
15:46:52 15 and operating out of Liberia so freely, I said - because I was  
16 afraid that if that continued, it could cause a renewed burst of  
17 hostilities in Liberia. So I was opposed to it, and I write him  
18 a long letter that will come before this court telling him "Look,  
19 Guinea is better prepared to do this. I cannot continue to let  
15:47:18 20 ECOMOG train, arm and move the Kamajors out of here. I has to  
21 stop", okay?

22 So we are going on this whole process and now they don't  
23 like it, but I am intent on getting Liberia moving, and so I am  
24 now saying that we will do the best we can. Because I can see  
15:47:40 25 that ECOMOG is not neutral and they are beginning to do the same  
26 old things that I am used to, that is, helping one side, and  
27 eventually - eventually - this Court will get to know that ECOMOG  
28 - by January there is serious bombardment that begins in  
29 Freetown. We have met in late 1997 and a decision is taken that

1 force will be used, but we have not, up until that time, obtained  
2 the permission from the United Nations Security Council  
3 Resolution under Chapter 7 to use force.

4 The British ambassador at that particular time to the  
15:48:27 5 United Nations is also on radio criticising and condemning  
6 Nigeria for their bombardment of Sierra Leone. I will try to  
7 recollect his name. But I also am concerned and my concern is  
8 also that look, unless we can get this Chapter 7 resolution, it  
9 is going to be problematic for any little country in West Africa  
15:48:57 10 in the future if the bigger countries can come one day and just  
11 use force against you. We have to be very careful about this.  
12 So I am also rooting for the Chapter 7 and no use of force until  
13 we get Chapter 7.

14 Well, some of us lose out, but ECOWAS operates under  
15:49:17 15 consensus. So we all agree, and you will get to know that ECOWAS  
16 did not - I am saying did not - get the approval of the Security  
17 Council under Chapter 7 on the eventual removal of the junta in  
18 February of 1998. Immediately thereafter the security council  
19 patched it very well by a short one paragraph statement welcoming  
15:49:42 20 the return of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to Sierra Leone.

21 So I am only trying to give you the inside discussions  
22 going on in ECOWAS amongst us at the time about the use of force,  
23 how, when, where and out of fear for our own little countries.

24 British diplomats had, through diplomatic circles, conveyed  
15:50:14 25 to our government that they saw the growth of Nigerian power as a  
26 problem, and in fact we had been warned that - and I conveyed  
27 this to President Abacha in that letter. We - I mean, my  
28 government had been warned through diplomatic circles that the  
29 resolution that was being advanced by ECOWAS told the Security

1 Council seeking Chapter 7 mandate for the use of force that the  
2 British would not let it go through. The British had made that  
3 very clear to my government. They would not permit that because  
4 it was going to be giving Nigeria too much power, and they were  
15:51:02 5 not prepared to cede - these are the diplomatic words - Sierra  
6 Leone to Nigeria. And I wrote an extensive four or five page  
7 letter revealing this to President Abacha in 1998 revealing all  
8 of these steps.

9 So I am just giving you a picture of why I did not believe  
15:51:22 10 they were neutral and some of the internal debates, and this  
11 Court must know that it was not just a little one day thing.  
12 There were massive debates throughout this particular time  
13 between and amongst Heads of State of ECOWAS.

14 Q. And tell me, Mr Taylor. Those conversations between  
15:51:40 15 Presidents, are they all written down?

16 A. No, no, no, no. When we are holding these meetings the  
17 doors are closed, but most of these things come out later. For  
18 example, a lot of the discussions will come out in final  
19 communiqes. You will see the polished version in final  
15:52:01 20 communiqes, but the little what I will call diplomatic pushings  
21 and pullings here behind the scene, you don't see it. You will  
22 get the polished version in final communiqes, but we will be  
23 able to exhibit the resolution after the crisis in a letter that  
24 I - in fact it was a confidential letter that I wrote to  
15:52:26 25 President Abacha at the time. So that is how this Court, and  
26 maybe the world, will get to know about some of these internal  
27 discussions.

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's go back to this page, please, because  
29 in answer to that question from the journalist you say this,

1 left-hand column, bottom:

2 "That's what I'm saying. Neutrality is central to an  
3 ECOMOG in West Africa. I support the concept of a West African  
4 peacekeeping force. Liberia supports it and we will participate  
15:53:00 5 in such a force when conditions here make it practicable, but we  
6 will only participate in such a force if it is neutral.

7 Which brings me to the Sierra Leone situation. The last  
8 meeting of the ECOWAS Heads of State clearly stated that the  
9 situation in Sierra Leone will be resolved through negotiation,  
15:53:18 10 that military force will be used as a last resort. This was the  
11 decision of the authority of ECOWAS which I am part of. Liberia  
12 was then named as a member of the Committee of Five on Sierra  
13 Leone. The committee was given the mandate to begin discussions  
14 to peacefully resolve the Sierra Leone issue. And I think it is  
15:53:41 15 important that ECOMOG, which must carry out the mandate of the  
16 member states of ECOWAS, should not act in any way except with  
17 the expressed authority of the Heads of State of ECOWAS.

18 In Liberia's opinion, any member state acting unilaterally  
19 is not doing so in the best interest of ECOWAS, nor in the best  
15:54:01 20 interest of a West African peacekeeping force."

21 Question: "But that is what is happening at the moment."

22 Answer: "I am coming. I am not saying that a member state  
23 of ECOWAS has done so or not. I am saying no member state should  
24 attempt to act unilaterally. No member state must act outside of  
15:54:25 25 that mandate, especially when the UN Security Council has  
26 pronounced on the issue in addition to the efforts of ECOWAS."

27 Then this:

28 "It is important that the situation in Sierra Leone, and in  
29 Liberia which shares a common border with Sierra Leone, that

1 nothing is done to support any armed group in Sierra Leone. The  
2 emphasis is on 'any'. Liberia will not support any armed group  
3 in Sierra Leone. Liberia will make sure that its borders are  
4 protected and that no one will be permitted to operate in and out  
15:55:05 5 of Liberia to carry on acts of aggression against Sierra Leone."

6 Pause there. Were you lying to the journalist then,  
7 Mr Taylor?

8 A. No, I was dead serious. I was dead serious.

9 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you know that the allegation here is that  
15:55:24 10 you have been supporting, funding, ordering, inciting and all  
11 those other words the RUF for years. And yet here you are, they  
12 would say, lying to this journalist in suggesting that you would  
13 be against providing that kind of support?

14 A. I would just say that's total foolishness. All those  
15:55:50 15 descriptions are just what they are, descriptions. I am very  
16 serious at the very, very start of my administration, laying out  
17 exactly what we intend to do and making sure that we are trying  
18 to be on the right side of history. We are putting together a  
19 programme of - and what I mean here by at the appropriate time,  
15:56:17 20 of how we would train our people, how we would begin to operate  
21 within the confines of the law. I am insisting that action be  
22 based on Security Council resolutions especially for use of  
23 force. I am trying to get this whole war stopped in Sierra Leone  
24 by saying, "Look, let's all just stop this fighting and we have  
15:56:38 25 been mandated to negotiate. Let's go ahead and negotiate". So  
26 what I said here to this journalist is genuine, it's true and  
27 it's what I am pursuing.

28 Q. And then we see this question:

29 "But at the moment, Mr President, ECOMOG is allowing the

1 Kamajors to operate from your side of the border against the  
2 regime in Freetown. I saw it with my very own eyes. And last  
3 week it was reported here in Liberia that the ECOMOG planes that  
4 bombed targets in Freetown flew into Liberia and landed at the  
15:57:18 5 Roberts International Airport."

6 Is that true?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you were supposed to be supporting the AFRC  
9 junta. You know that's part of the indictment, don't you?

15:57:36 10 A. Yes, I do know that's part of the indictment.

11 Q. So help us. If you are supporting the AFRC why are you  
12 allowing ECOMOG to use an airport in Liberia to bomb them?

13 A. That's what the Prosecution ought to be asking with their  
14 own analysis of what they put together to bring before this

15:58:02 15 Court. This is what makes it nonsensical, okay, because I have  
16 said to this Court that the planes that are being used by Nigeria  
17 are all mostly based where, in Robertsfield and at Spriggs Payne  
18 Airport. And once a consensus had been reached at that

19 particular time, okay - if we had not granted I will say the -  
15:58:30 20 and you see I used an expression here about washing clothes, our  
21 clothes, our dirty clothes in public, it's a figure of speech  
22 really, but these are the type of actions that you call covert  
23 actions.

24 It was agreed and ECOMOG could have and would have never  
15:58:48 25 taken off from Liberia without the expressed acquiescence on the  
26 part of the Liberian government. If we didn't want them to take  
27 off, they would not have been able to do so. So for someone to  
28 say that we are now supporting the AFRC, I guess they will say  
29 that I knew Johnny Paul Koroma and he and I talked before the

1 coup.

2 Q. Why did you give your approval for the use of airports in  
3 Liberia to bomb the AFRC?

4 A. Well, the issue here is that the Economic Community of West  
15:59:31 5 African States had taken a decision to remove the AFRC from  
6 power. Now, I am on the Committee of Five. We know that we are  
7 supposed to negotiate. I am not about to be the party spoiler,  
8 so - and because ECOWAS works with consensus they get the  
9 consensus and as in so many cases - we could give so many cases  
16:00:05 10 of recent wars involving major countries. There are countries  
11 that are pulled into these wars I can almost say yelling and  
12 screaming, but they have to participate because this is - you  
13 know, you have to work within a system. Even though there may be  
14 some disagreements, but in the final analysis you have to do what  
16:00:32 15 is in the best interests of the entire organisation and people.

16 At that particular time the decision was taken that the  
17 AFRC had to be moved and I would have messed the whole thing up  
18 by refusing to let aircrafts take off from Robertsfield. So what  
19 I did was to act in the best interests of Sierra Leone and  
16:00:52 20 Liberia at that time.

21 Q. Why didn't you do - the situation so far as the Kamajors  
22 being allowed to operate from your side of the border, for how  
23 long did that go on, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I actually met this when I was - after the election I got  
16:01:14 25 to find out about that. They had been operating out of Liberia  
26 pre-July. It continued until - I would say until about February  
27 of 1998 after the full removal of the AFRC. If you look at that,  
28 I am saying that we don't want to wash our dirty clothes in  
29 public. It doesn't mean behind the scene we are putting

1 pressure. There is a lot more that happens behind the scene than  
2 what - I know everybody here is experienced enough and I am sure  
3 these judges are very experienced. There is more that happens  
4 behind the scene than what finally comes on paper to the public.

16:02:00 5 There are a lot of discussions, sometimes confusion. You would  
6 be surprised to know that Heads of State too get angry and  
7 probable use a few bad words at each other, we do all of that,  
8 but these things don't come out, they are behind the scene.

9 So we are still putting pressure but I am saying I do not  
16:02:18 10 want us to wash our dirty clothes, but we finally succeed in  
11 stopping this thing I would say by or about February or so after  
12 the AFRC is removed.

13 Q. So what are you telling us; that from the time of your  
14 election as President, which is June --

16:02:41 15 A. July.

16 Q. July 1997.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. From then until February 1998 Kamajors are operating from  
19 Liberian soil attacking the junta government?

16:02:55 20 A. Sponsored by ECOMOG, yes.

21 Q. Sponsored by ECOMOG?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you are allowing this to happen whilst you are also  
24 running the AFRC and the RUF who are now in alliance?

16:03:09 25 A. Well, that shows you the extent of the - of how people  
26 formed their analysis of matters, which is impossible. That is  
27 not the way that things work. You know, we are not the people  
28 that help, you know, all sides and make fire. It just should be  
29 a very good example to show you how people reason things out.

1 Q. And then we notice the postscript:

2 "Straight from this interview, President Taylor went into a  
3 long cabinet meeting with his colleagues at the end of which the  
4 government announced the closure of the border with Sierra Leone  
16:03:51 5 to avoid cross-border incursions by the fighting forces in Sierra  
6 Leone. Two days after this announcement, ECOWAS achieved a  
7 breakthrough at its meeting in Conakry, Guinea, where the  
8 military regime in Freetown headed by Major Paul Koroma agreed to  
9 hand over power in April 1998 to President Tejan Kabbah who will  
16:04:16 10 run a power sharing government as enunciated under the Abidjan  
11 Accord of November 1995 which led to the elections in Sierra  
12 Leone in March 1996."

13 That business about the closure of the border, Mr Taylor,  
14 we will come back to that at a later stage, okay. But just to  
16:04:38 15 conclude this chapter regarding the elections, can we turn over  
16 the page, please? Now we see the famous slogan, "He killed my  
17 ma, he killed my pa, but I will vote for him". Then we see the  
18 other headline, "The elections that shocked the world" and we see  
19 at the bottom the voting figures. Is that right, Mr Taylor?

16:05:13 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And one glance at those figures suggests a great disparity,  
22 does it not, between votes cast for your party and the others?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Now, if we look at the second column on this page, at the  
16:05:58 25 top --

26 A. Yes.

27 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, Mr President.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

29 MS HOLLIS: We are going to raise the same objection we had

1 raised to an earlier document. The first document that was being  
2 read was an interview with this accused. This does not appear to  
3 be an interview with this accused and we don't think sufficient  
4 foundation as to this accused's connection with all of this  
16:06:20 5 interview has been laid, or with all of this article has been  
6 established.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, as part of their case the  
9 Prosecution led evidence regarding this phrase, "He killed my ma,  
16:06:35 10 he killed my pa, but I will vote for him". That was part of  
11 their case and it is their case that the election involving  
12 Mr Taylor was not fair. That was stated quite publicly by the  
13 first Chief Prosecutor of this Court, Mr David Crane, in the  
14 reference I gave during my opening address. And here we have in  
16:07:01 15 this column the reporter setting out the measures which ensured  
16 that this election was fair; that all the 13 contesting parties  
17 had their agents in the polling station. It seems to me  
18 perfectly legitimate for all those reasons to address the  
19 witness's attention to these facts.

20 [Trial Chamber conferred]

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will overrule the objection,  
22 Mr Griffiths. We see this evidence as answering the Prosecution  
23 case.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

16:07:49 25 Q. Top of the second column, Mr Taylor: "All the 13  
26 contesting parties had their agents at the polling stations ready  
27 to report any malpractices." Was that true?

28 A. That is true.

29 Q. "In addition, there were thousands of ECOMOG troops, UN

1 monitoring officials, and foreign observers from all over at the  
2 polling stations to make sure the elections were clean".

3 Is that true?

4 A. That is true.

16:08:16 5 Q. "Moreover, voting was done be in open view". Is that true?

6 A. That is true.

7 Q. "There were no cubicles where voters went to cast their  
8 votes." Is that true?

9 A. That is true.

16:08:27 10 Q. "People put their ballots in the boxes in the full view of  
11 everybody". is that true?

12 A. That is true.

13 Q. We can put that document away now, please, Mr Taylor.

14 Before I forget, Mr President, a name was mentioned earlier of  
16:09:27 15 the Chief Justice of Liberia who was appointed and it is Gloria,  
16 G-L-O-R-I-A, Musu, M-U-S-U, hyphen, Scott, S-C-O-T-T?

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, so you are elected in July?

16:09:47 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. What is the situation facing you within Liberia at that  
22 time?

23 A. Oh, we are really at rock bottom. The economy is  
24 destroyed. There is no money in the country. Infrastructure  
16:10:13 25 destroyed. Massive displacement of our citizens. Even at that  
26 time we have a large influx of citizens from Sierra Leone. That  
27 is a strange phenomena. While our people were running into  
28 Guinea, Sierra Leoneans were running into Liberia. So it is a  
29 strange situation. We made, in short, a mess. It is a mess. I

1 begin immediately to begin the process of sitting down and trying  
2 to work.

3 Q. What was the situation of the armed forces available to the  
4 Government of Liberia at that time?

16:11:10 5 A. There were no armed forces. Because the official Armed  
6 Forces of Liberia had participated in the war - and I remind the  
7 court about being a part of different factions - they no longer  
8 were considered the armed forces of Liberia, and so here we are  
9 after my election as President, we really don't have a force. So  
16:11:38 10 the only people we begin to rely on are those ex-combatants. We  
11 tried to pull back in some of the former members of the national  
12 police. Everything is chaotic and we do not have a national army  
13 at that time.

14 Q. So what had happened to the AFL?

16:12:04 15 A. They are the ones that had factionalised themselves by  
16 being a part of LPC, ULIMO-J, some of them joined the coalition.  
17 They just factionalised themselves in such a way that they could  
18 no longer be looked at as the national army.

19 Q. What about access to arms and war-making material,  
16:12:27 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. It must be clear. All arms, ammunition, artillery, all of  
22 the things that we have talked about here on that map, upon my  
23 election as President they are not given to me.

24 Q. Where are they?

16:12:49 25 A. They remain in the custody of the peacekeepers and the  
26 United Nations. We request the use of some of the material to  
27 give to security forces. They refuse. There is - the only armed  
28 people that are armed in Liberia at that time are those ECOMOG  
29 soldiers that are assigned to me as a newly elected President,

1 and we requested a number of rifles for my security protection as  
2 President and some handguns for the Secret Service. Other than  
3 that, no-one is carrying arms in Liberia. All the arms are  
4 locked down in the custody of the United Nations and eventually  
16:13:42 5 every bullet, every pistol, every gun, every piece of artillery  
6 collected during the war were all eventually destroyed 100 per  
7 cent.

8 Q. What about the finances of the country, Mr Taylor? What  
9 was that like?

16:14:15 10 A. Zero. I took over with, I think, less than \$20,000 in the  
11 coffers of the country. There was nothing. Absolutely nothing.

12 Q. What was the employment situation like?

13 A. Well, you had a super, super large civil service that had  
14 grown. And what do I mean by super large? When all of us came  
16:14:56 15 to the Council of State everyone came with his group, including  
16 myself, and they were posted in government. So I would say that  
17 the civil service grew by I would say 300 or 400 per cent, and so  
18 we couldn't even pay them, but it was just good to be around, I  
19 guess. We - in fact, one of the first statements that I made in

16:15:35 20 January of 1998 told the legislature involved the very terrible  
21 shape that the finances and the economy of the country was in.

22 Q. Now what about the infrastructure of the country at that  
23 stage, Mr Taylor?

24 A. A lot of the infrastructure had been damaged. In Monrovia  
16:16:11 25 buildings, ministries had been looted. No light. No water, but  
26 I want to emphasise the water system had practically broken down  
27 during the last years of the Doe's government. They were  
28 beginning to experience very serious economic problems as a lot  
29 of the aid from donor countries had been cut, and so the

1 infrastructure, a lot of - let's say water and light were not  
2 just as a result of the war, but this was a cancer that was  
3 beginning to develop during the last years of Doe.

4 Q. What about the road situation - the transport system?

16:17:10 5 A. Liberia has always had one little paved road straight from  
6 Monrovia to Ganta. That is it. That was the system. It remains  
7 that way until now as I sit here. The off tar roads had  
8 deteriorated significantly, because during the war no one  
9 repaired roads. No one repaired, and some of these bridges that  
16:17:44 10 were in the Lofa, the Cape Mount Bomi area, were wooden bridges.  
11 They were built not with your regular concrete. They were wood  
12 bridges, and these wood bridges have to be repaired all of the  
13 time. No repairs had been done. So most of them, the road  
14 conditions were terrible. Terrible.

16:18:14 15 Q. Now, let's now look over the border at that stage now,  
16 Mr Taylor?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Now, we know across the border in Sierra Leone just over a  
19 month earlier there had been a coup in Sierra Leone, yes?

16:18:44 20 A. Now, what period are you talking about?

21 Q. No, no, you come to power - you are elected in July, yes?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. On 25 May of that year, just before your election --

24 A. Oh, there is a coup, yes.

16:19:00 25 Q. -- there is a coup in Sierra Leone?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. When you come to power - when you come to power - what  
28 contact do you have at that stage with those who had seized power  
29 in Sierra Leone?

1 A. There is no contact whatsoever over the very early months  
2 of my coming to the presidency. I am put on the Committee of  
3 Five on or about somewhere around - I would say as early as  
4 September, very quickly, but around this time - around September  
16:19:59 5 - this is also the time, September/October - this is also the  
6 time of the meeting of the General Assembly and all heads of  
7 state address the General Assembly. Well I did not go, but in my  
8 speech read to the General Assembly the issue of Sierra Leone was  
9 mentioned, and in that speech I did remember quoting the  
16:20:30 10 agreement that had been reached by ECOWAS for a peaceful  
11 resolution of the Sierra Leonean problem. That statement to the  
12 General Assembly of the United Nations I would say brought about  
13 maybe some anxiety on the part of the leadership in Freetown and  
14 a letter was written by the junta leader, Johnny Paul Koroma,  
16:21:15 15 commending me for the statement I had made at the United Nations  
16 and I guess he, not knowing any better, asked if we could help  
17 him with some arms and ammunition.

18 Q. We will come to that letter later.

19 A. Uh-huh.

16:21:35 20 Q. But let's not get too far ahead of ourselves, Mr Taylor.  
21 The election takes place July 19th.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How long does it take for the results to come out - or to  
24 be announced?

16:21:55 25 A. Oh, I think the results come out by the next day or so. It  
26 is just so clear the results are almost out.

27 Q. And do you then take power immediately?

28 A. No, no, no, no.

29 Q. What happens?

1 A. There is a process. There is a process. I did not take  
2 the oath of office until August 2.

3 Q. So between the election and 2 August, who is in charge?

16:22:33

4 A. Oh, still in charge is the Chairman of the Council of State  
5 Ruth Sando Perry. S-A-N-D-0, Sando, and it is Perry as in Perry,  
6 P-E-R-R-Y.

7 Q. So it is after 2 August that you can exercise the powers  
8 and authority of the President of Liberia?

16:22:57

9 A. Of course. You can't unless you take the oath of office,  
10 yes.

11 Q. Now, getting back to the topic we were introducing, what  
12 was happening in Sierra Leone, you have heard evidence to the  
13 effect, haven't you, that after the coup in Sierra Leone the RUF  
14 were invited to join the coup makers in Freetown. You have heard  
15 that evidence, haven't you?

16:23:25

16 A. Yes. Yes, I have.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, did you give an order for that to happen?

18 A. No, I did not. I could not have. We all know from the  
19 records here where the order came from. We know where Foday  
20 Sankoh is at that time. Where is he? He is incarcerated in  
21 Nigeria. We also know that he was contacted directly by the  
22 junta. He did an interview and that was played on the radio, so  
23 that's total - that's unfounded.

16:23:45

24 Q. What did he say in the interview played on the radio?

16:24:10

25 A. Well, I am not sure what the exact words were, but to the  
26 effect that the RUF should join the AFRC.

27 Q. And thereafter we have heard in evidence how certain RUF  
28 affiliated individuals were appointed to a Supreme Council. Did  
29 you have a hand in that?

1 A. No, no, no.

2 Q. So just help us, Mr Taylor, before we adjourn. What is  
3 your preoccupation - what is on your mind - when you assume the  
4 reins of power on 2 August 1997?

16:25:06 5 A. Liberia. Liberia. Liberia. That's what's on my mind.  
6 Getting this country to get started, trying to get a process of  
7 reconciliation going, looking at the mess that we have on our  
8 hands. How do we get stability? How do we get the stability to  
9 encourage investment? What do we do? How do we bring everybody  
16:25:31 10 on board? I am occupied with Liberia, Liberia, Liberia. That is  
11 my preoccupation.

12 Q. And how much of your time was this occupying then,  
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Well, except for, you know, playing with my children at  
16:25:59 15 home, all of it. Every minute was spent on Liberia. Every  
16 minute, every second, because I knew what I had inherited and I  
17 was very, very determined to doing something about it. So I am  
18 using every bit of my time. I mean there are sleepless nights  
19 that Presidents go through too.

16:26:37 20 Q. Mr Taylor, bearing in mind that the indictment period  
21 starts in November 1996, we will come to the remainder of the  
22 indictment period in due course, but just to summarise the  
23 position up until now, did you between November 1996 and August  
24 1997 when you were elected President - were you providing any  
16:27:18 25 support to the RUF?

26 A. No, none whatsoever. No.

27 Q. Were you giving orders to the RUF during that period?

28 A. None whatsoever. No.

29 Q. Were you controlling them, Mr Taylor?

1 A. No, I was not controlling them. No.

2 Q. Were you in radio contact with them?

3 A. I was not in radio contact with the RUF and had not been  
4 for years before then.

16:27:48 5 Q. Were you in contact with Foday Sankoh during that period?

6 A. Not at all and I do not think he was - he had any interests  
7 whatsoever. No.

8 Q. During that, what, eight month period, Mr Taylor, what had  
9 been occupying your time?

16:28:12 10 A. Disarmament, demobilisation, putting together a political  
11 party, putting together political structure, running a campaign,  
12 being elected as President. That was my preoccupation during  
13 that period.

14 Q. And you are sure you weren't doing a bit of meddling on the  
16:28:34 15 side in Sierra Leone?

16 A. Well, when we get to that, the Prosecution's interpretation  
17 of meddling, I am sure I will deal with it later, but on my  
18 definition or the Webster's definition of meddling, no.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point?

16:29:02 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that is a convenient time.

21 Mr Taylor, we are going to adjourn now. I will remind you you  
22 are not permitted to discuss your evidence with any other person.  
23 We will now adjourn until 9.30 next Monday.

24 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.

16:29:25 25 to be reconvened on Monday, 27 July 2009 at  
26 9.30 a.m.]

27

28

29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

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EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	25081