



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 25 NOVEMBER 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Mr Nicholas Koumjian  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Wednesday, 25 November 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:32:10 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, Justice Sebutinde is still ill.

6 There's a Rule 16 order in place and the effect of that is that  
7 the trial will continue in her absence.

8 Mr Taylor, I remind you that you're still bound by your  
9 oath. We'll take appearances, please.

10 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

11 [On former affirmation]

12 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, your Honours. For the  
13 Prosecution this morning, Christopher Santora, Maja Dimitrova and  
14 myself, Nicholas Koumjian. I would like to convey the regrets of  
09:32:50 15 Ms Hollis. She actually called me early this morning. She did  
16 not expect that her illness would be more than 24 hours, but it  
17 is. She is not able to come because of the illness today. Also,  
18 unfortunately, our colleague Mr Bangura has suffered - his wife  
19 suffered a loss in her family, so he's unable to be with us  
09:33:11 20 today. I received that call from Ms Hollis this morning and she  
21 told me that because the Prosecution does want to cooperate in  
22 the efficiency of these proceedings, that, if I can, I could go  
23 forward with - I should go forward with questions.

24 Your Honours, I've had only since that phone call to try to  
09:33:36 25 organise those and I would inform your Honours that there may  
26 come times during the day when I ask for a change of the normal  
27 schedule to organise myself in order to continue with relevant  
28 questions. But we are ready to proceed at this time.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Koumjian. The right of

1 cross-examination, of course, rests with the Prosecution and if  
2 the Prosecution is satisfied that that right would be properly  
3 exercised by you, Mr Koumjian, in place of Ms Hollis, then so be  
4 it. But if you're saying that you feel at a distinct  
09:34:19 5 disadvantage because of the lack of notice to prepare, then  
6 that's another matter. I'm not quite sure what your application  
7 is. Are you saying that you're ready to go on even though you  
8 feel you shouldn't, or what is it, exactly?

9 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I'm saying we're ready to  
09:34:42 10 proceed at this time. We may not be able to complete five and a  
11 half hours in the normal schedule. I may during the course of  
12 the day - I haven't yet made an application - make an application  
13 to change the breaks or to alter the course of the schedule. But  
14 I certainly am ready now to proceed and see how far we can  
09:35:00 15 continue with the relevant questions.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand.

17 Yes, well, your appearances first, Mr Griffiths.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
19 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
09:35:17 20 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah and Ms Kathryn Hovington of  
21 counsel and we're also joined by Ms Priyanka Reddy today.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead then, Mr Koumjian.

23 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOUMJIAN: [Continued]

24 Q. Good morning, Mr Taylor.

09:35:37 25 A. Good morning, Mr Koumjian.

26 Q. Could you tell us, please, sir, remind us, when was it that  
27 you first heard the name of the Revolutionary United Front, the  
28 RUF?

29 A. I would say some time after the attack back in 1991.

1 Q. Sir, you certainly heard Foday Sankoh on the international  
2 radio before that attack. Isn't that correct?

3 A. I don't recall hearing Foday Sankoh on the radio. Where  
4 would I have heard him? No, I don't recall that.

09:36:17 5 Q. Where were you? You asked where you heard it. Where were  
6 you in March 1991 when the RUF and its allies invaded Sierra  
7 Leone?

8 A. Where was I? I was in Liberia.

9 Q. Did you hear Foday Sankoh in April 1991 talking on the  
09:36:38 10 international radio?

11 A. About April, I can't really recall hearing him on the  
12 radio. By international, what are you referring to? There are  
13 several international radios.

14 Q. Yes, I'm referring to all of them, sir.

09:36:59 15 A. No, I don't monitor radios. Sorry.

16 Q. You don't monitor radios. Mr Taylor, didn't you tell this  
17 Court previously that you did monitor the radio, including the  
18 BBC Focus on Africa programme?

19 A. Well, what years are we talking about now, Mr Koumjian?  
09:37:17 20 Your question relates to April 1991. Are you saying that I told  
21 this Court that I monitored the BBC radio in April 1991? I  
22 challenge that. I did not tell this Court that and I would like  
23 to refer to the --

24 Q. Sir, what I asked you is, you told - Mr Taylor, didn't you  
09:37:35 25 tell this Court previously that you did monitor the radio  
26 including BBC Focus on Africa? You did have a practice of  
27 monitoring international radio including that programme. Isn't  
28 that correct?

29 A. That is not correct. You say I had a practice. No, it was

1 not a practice of mine to monitor radios. I had people employed  
2 to do that.

3 Q. Sir, where in Liberia were you at the time of the invasion  
4 in Sierra Leone in March 1991?

09:38:04 5 A. March 1991, I was I guess stationed in the city of  
6 Buchanan, Grand Bassa County, Liberia.

7 Q. Sir, were you interested in this news about your  
8 neighbouring country being invaded?

9 A. I had a war on my hands, Mr Koumjian. No, that was not of  
09:38:24 10 interest to me. I was fighting a very serious war in 1991, no.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, as a strategic thinker, as leader of a  
12 revolution in a neighbouring country, it didn't interest you to  
13 know what was happening in Sierra Leone which bordered Liberia  
14 and bordered your territory?

09:38:41 15 A. Of course, but that was not your original question. Of  
16 course, it did interest me. Your original question proposed that  
17 it should have been of particular concern to me, that's why I  
18 answered you the first way. Now, if your question now as it is  
19 is would it have been of interest, of course, it would be of  
09:39:03 20 interest to me.

21 Q. Let's re-read my question, Mr Taylor, and see if your  
22 answer has been consistent just in the last minute. I asked you,  
23 "Sir, were you interested in this news about your neighbouring  
24 country being invaded?" You answered, "I had a war on my hands,  
09:39:17 25 Mr Koumjian. No, that was not of interest to me." Do you want  
26 to change that answer now?

27 A. No, I'm not changing my answer now. If you want to start  
28 playing with words, we can play with it all day. If you read  
29 that question back, your question is to the effect that it should

1 have been of paramount interest. I'm saying no to you. Then you  
2 asked me should it be of interest to me. I said of course you  
3 would want to know what is going on next door. So that's how I  
4 understand your question.

09:39:45 5 Q. Well, for the record, it's very clear about the consistency  
6 of your answers, Mr Taylor.

7 A. Very well, Mr Koumjian.

8 Q. Sir, so now that you have told us you were interested in  
9 the invasion of Sierra Leone, what did you do to find out what  
09:39:58 10 was happening?

11 A. Well, let's again - let's be very careful with your  
12 question. You've said that I have said that I was interested. I  
13 have answered to the best of my comprehension, your Honour. The  
14 question I'm trying to respond to from counsel is did I have  
09:40:18 15 interest following hearing of what's going on next door. That's  
16 what I'm responding to. The way the question is being phrased,  
17 it is phrased that one could almost conclude that it was of  
18 interest to know. That's not my response. I'm responding:  
19 Anyone civilised living next door would be interested in the  
09:40:43 20 information. That's what I'm responding to.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, I'm asking you this question  
22 so that we can clear this matter up and perhaps Mr Koumjian after  
23 that will rephrase the question. I think what is confusing you  
24 is the word "interest". You're not sure whether you're being  
09:41:02 25 asked did you have a passing interest in hearing that news or did  
26 you are a corporeal interest in hearing that news.

27 THE WITNESS: That's correct, your Honour.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps you might rephrase the question,  
29 Mr Koumjian.

1 MR KOUMJIAN:

2 Q. Mr Taylor, did you want to find out what was happening in  
3 Sierra Leone?

09:41:26

4 A. Did I want to find out what was happening in Sierra Leone  
5 is your question?

6 Q. Yes. Can you answer that question?

7 A. Well, I would say yes, I would want to find out what was  
8 happening in Sierra Leone, yes.

09:41:43

9 Q. Sir, what did you do to find out what was happening in  
10 Sierra Leone?

11 A. Asked my press officers to monitor what was going on and  
12 inform me.

13 Q. Sir, you had an intelligence operation at that time. Is  
14 that correct?

09:41:52

15 A. Yes, I did.

16 Q. Did you think about sending men to infiltrate the RUF?

17 A. No, no.

18 Q. Did you ask your commanders on the borders to report to you  
19 what they knew about the RUF?

09:42:07

20 A. I have - I asked my Defence Ministry individuals to get a  
21 report and get it down to me and the press to monitor, but I  
22 would not infiltrate Sierra Leonean territory, no.

23 Q. Sir, let me ask you now a slightly different question. I'm  
24 not asking whether you wanted to find out information about  
09:42:30 25 Sierra Leone. Did the situation in Sierra Leone - did you think  
26 at that time, in March 1991, it could have an effect on the  
27 strategic situation of the NPFL?

28 A. No, I would - I did not look at it in that particular way,  
29 no.

1 Q. Sir, was Sierra Leone - the Government of Sierra Leone a  
2 member of ECOWAS?

3 A. Of course, Nick, yes.

09:43:04

4 Q. Was the Government of Sierra Leone contributing to ECOMOG -  
5 contributing troops to ECOMOG in Liberia?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you feel then that there was any  
8 interest - strategic interest for your movement in what was  
9 happening in your neighbouring, bordering country of Sierra

09:43:26

10 Leone?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Did you ask your intelligence people about this RUF and  
13 whether they had ever been seen in Liberia?

14 A. No.

09:43:41

15 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, weren't you being accused soon after the  
16 invasion of being - of sponsoring it?

17 A. Well, not necessarily. There were accusations that  
18 individuals had come across the border, but at that particular  
19 time I have testified before this Court that President Momoh and  
20 I were still very good friends, and so this matter was being  
21 handled between Momoh, who through his friend and I, still had  
22 some contacts. No, that was not of interest to me as a strategic  
23 interest at that particular time, no.

09:44:02

24 Q. Well, you said out of curiosity or - I'm paraphrasing you -  
25 you were curious to find out what was happening in your  
26 neighbouring country. And did you hear those reports that the  
27 invasion had come from Liberia?

09:44:26

28 A. Well, yes, I - what I did not hear - again you have  
29 introduced the word "hear". It was reported to me that there

1 were news reports that the invasion could have come from Liberia.  
2 We responded to the best of our abilities that the invasion had  
3 not come from Liberia. I contacted President Momoh myself  
4 through Brigadier Toronkai and as far as we were concerned, it  
09:45:07 5 was an issue of just accusations, which are normal across  
6 borders. That's it.

7 Q. You were being accused of sponsoring an invasion, but you  
8 just considered that a normal accusation? It didn't upset you?

9 A. Well, when you say "upset", I mean, we were concerned that  
09:45:25 10 such information was out there. But I have said to you that I  
11 contacted President Momoh and told him there was no truth to it,  
12 he and I were very good friends and for me that was the close of  
13 that matter for me.

14 Q. Now, when you told your very good friend President Momoh  
09:45:41 15 that there was no truth to the matter, had you done anything to  
16 investigate whether in fact there was truth to the matter?

17 A. Yes, my Defence Ministry had said - had already  
18 investigated and said to the best of their information there were  
19 no NPFL forces that were involved in Sierra Leone whatsoever, and  
09:46:00 20 that was true.

21 Q. And you were able to say that with confidence, because in  
22 fact you had a capability within the NPFL structure to gather  
23 intelligence within individual units, correct?

24 A. You've asked me. I said that we had an intelligence unit,  
09:46:16 25 and the Defence Ministry was able to report to me that there were  
26 no NPFL forces that had participated or were involved in Sierra  
27 Leone, which was true.

28 Q. And I would like you to explain to us how it is you had  
29 confidence in that. You had informants in various units that

1 could verify no NPFL forces were involved; is that correct?

2 A. Well, you've introduced informants. I don't know how the  
3 system works. The word I'm dealing with is intelligence. My  
4 Defence Ministry reported intelligence that there were no NPFL  
09:46:51 5 forces. By that he's talking about a unit under the NPFL  
6 command. As to the presence of Liberians in Sierra Leone, it was  
7 very clear that Liberians had gone. But NPFL forces, my Defence  
8 Minister confirmed to me that there were no NPFL forces involved,  
9 and that was true.

09:47:13 10 Q. And you've previously told us that part of the intelligence  
11 system of the NPFL was to have individuals gathering intelligence  
12 that were not known by the rest of the unit. Is that correct?

13 A. Well, I'm not sure how you are paraphrasing that or what  
14 was the context of this question. So I'm not sure, is that  
09:47:40 15 evidence that I have presented before this Court? I would like  
16 to be --

17 Q. How about just telling us the truth about what you know.  
18 Did you have --

19 A. No, you've quoted me --

09:47:49 20 Q. -- intelligence units --

21 A. Mr Koumjian --

22 Q. -- planted - sir, let me finish the question.

23 A. Go ahead.

24 Q. Did you have intelligence assets planted undercover within  
09:47:58 25 individual units?

26 A. I don't know what was operating. All I do know is that the  
27 defence intelligence existed. How they existed, I have no idea.  
28 That could very well be that they have undercover, but I don't  
29 know how the intelligence is set up. I do know I received

1 information from my Defence Ministry. The inner workings I have  
2 no idea.

3 Q. So if you don't know the workings of the intelligence, you  
4 could not vouch for its accuracy because you don't know what  
09:48:30 5 process was used to [overlapping speakers] --

6 A. No President does, and so I don't. No President does. If  
7 it were so, some of the best intelligence in the world would not  
8 have mislead their leaders. No. I have no idea, no.

9 Q. So for example, sir, when it comes to information about the  
09:48:46 10 supposed plot against you that you called Black Kadaffa, you had  
11 no real information to verify whether that was true or not?

12 A. Of course. The reports came in through the Ministry of  
13 Defence. I'm saying to you I don't know how it works. But of  
14 course they must have agents, I suppose. They must have agents,  
09:49:05 15 and they must be able to verify it. And when people are arrested  
16 and people that collaborate come up and say, "Yes, this is the  
17 case," it goes through a court-martial process. But as far as -  
18 it is not the job of a leader or a President to verify

19 intelligence, so I didn't. I mean, you receive what we call  
09:49:26 20 intelligence, and normally what I have been told, even as

21 President, intelligence is a second or third stage away from  
22 information. So when something comes before you called  
23 intelligence you know it has been scrubbed, it's gone through  
24 information, the whole investigation then before it becomes  
09:49:46 25 intelligence. So when they bring a document and say it's  
26 intelligence, I know it has been scrubbed. But I don't verify  
27 it.

28 Q. So you don't know whether your intelligence was --

29 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Koumjian, I don't understand the

1 expression "it has been scrubbed".

2 THE WITNESS: It's an intelligence word where the process -  
3 I think through the various analysts argue it out, I think, and  
4 test it. It's a testing process, from my understanding.

09:50:20 5 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you. Sorry to interrupt,  
6 Mr Koumjian.

7 MR KOUMJIAN:

8 Q. So I'm trying to understand your testimony, Mr Taylor.  
9 Your testimony is you don't know how intelligence is put  
10 together. Is that correct?

09:50:40 11 A. I don't know the inner workings, are my words. The inner  
12 workings, how they work, I don't know the inner workings, how  
13 they put together their agents. I have no idea. No President  
14 does.

09:50:55 15 Q. Sir, did your intelligence tell you that Foday Sankoh had  
16 been in Liberia before the invasion?

17 A. The intelligence, no, did not tell me that, no. My defence  
18 intelligence did not tell me that.

19 Q. Did the intelligence tell you that Foday Sankoh in fact  
09:51:10 20 stayed in Liberia after the troops went over the border into  
21 Sierra Leone?

22 A. No, the intelligence did not report that to me.

23 Q. Was it reported to you that in fact he was in your  
24 territory, in the NPFL territory, after the invasion after the  
09:51:25 25 troops crossed the border?

26 A. When you say "after" now what period are we talking about,  
27 Mr Koumjian?

28 Q. We're talking about after March 1991, and we're talking  
29 about before - you already made it clear that you admit Foday

1 Sankoh's presence as of August 1991?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. In the period between March and August 1991, where was  
4 Foday Sankoh?

09:51:49 5 A. To the best of my knowledge he was in Sierra Leone, and my  
6 intelligence did not tell me that he was in Liberia before that  
7 period. No, they did not.

8 Q. Did your intelligence tell you that Foday Sankoh was a  
9 Special Forces who had been in Libya with your special - at the  
09:52:07 10 same time as your Special Forces?

11 A. Yes, not only my intelligence, but when the name came up  
12 other individuals that were Special Forces mentioned that they  
13 remembered the name Foday Sankoh, yeah.

14 Q. Who was that that told you that they remembered Foday  
09:52:20 15 Sankoh?

16 A. The Defence Minister told me. He was in Libya also. My  
17 general officer commanding, General Isaac Musa, mentioned that he  
18 had known Foday Sankoh, yes.

19 Q. And by the "Defence Minister" do you mean Tom Woveiyu at  
09:52:36 20 this time?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Tom Woveiyu had visited Libya. Is that correct?

23 A. Many times. That is correct.

24 Q. He had not trained as a fighter in Libya. Is that correct?

09:52:50 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. So Tom Woveiyu was sort of like you: He was an  
27 intellectual leader of the movement and not a trained fighter.  
28 Is that correct?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And he met Foday Sankoh in Libya. Is that right?

2 A. Well, he said that he had heard the name Sankoh. Maybe he  
3 got it from one his people, but he mentioned to me, "Oh, I've  
4 heard that name." He said he had heard the name.

09:53:13 5 Q. Mr Taylor, let's digress for a moment back to Libya and  
6 your time there. You knew that there were Sierra Leoneans  
7 training in the camps in Libya. Is that right?

8 A. Yes, I knew.

9 Q. Do you know how many were training?

09:53:29 10 A. No.

11 Q. Now, you mentioned that the organisation did not have a  
12 name at that time. Is that right? Or did not have the same  
13 name, the Revolutionary United Front?

14 A. To the best of my knowledge, no, it did not.

09:53:41 15 Q. That was a name they came up with in Liberia, correct?

16 A. I don't know where that name came up, Mr Koumjian.

17 Q. So the organisation itself, the Revolutionary United Front  
18 known by that name, was created during the time before the  
19 invasion when the group was in Liberia. Wouldn't you agree?

09:54:02 20 A. I have no idea, Mr Koumjian. I disagree.

21 Q. Sir, you mentioned Ali Kabbah, who had gone as the original  
22 leader of the group of Sierra Leoneans. Correct?

23 A. I mentioned Ali Kabbah, yes, as the individual that I met  
24 in Libya.

09:54:19 25 Q. Okay.

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And you draw a distinction between that and being the  
28 leader? You don't agree that he was the leader originally of the  
29 group?

1 A. Well, your question included more than just being a leader.  
2 There are some nuances to your question, so I'm trying to  
3 distinguish that I met him there as the leader.

4 Q. You did meet him as the leader?

09:54:38 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And Ali Kabbah fled Libya shortly after your forces  
7 arrived. Isn't that correct?

8 A. That is totally, totally, totally incorrect.

9 Q. When did Ali Kabbah flee Libya?

09:54:54 10 A. Well, I don't know precisely, but "just after" for me would  
11 mean maybe a couple of months. Ali Kabbah, to the - my men were  
12 in Libya for close to two years and for most of that time  
13 Ali Kabbah was there. So when you say "shortly thereafter", I  
14 have to say no.

09:55:12 15 Q. When did your forces first arrive in Libya?

16 A. My forces arrived in Libya in 1987.

17 Q. Are you sure it wasn't 1986?

18 A. I said they arrived there in 1987.

19 Q. Okay. You also testified you were sure that the bombing of  
09:55:26 20 Libya took place while your forces were in Libya, the American  
21 bombing of Tripoli. Do you recall that?

22 A. My forces were still there.

23 Q. Sir, that was April of 1986.

24 A. Well, then if - I don't have any recollection of that  
09:55:43 25 particular date. But if your date is correct, my men were in  
26 Libya at the time of the bombing. I remember that very well. I  
27 don't know as to whether your date is correct of the bombing, but  
28 I take your word for it.

29 Q. So if the American bombing of Libya was in April 1986, you

1 now have changed your testimony and the estimate you would give  
2 now is that your group had to arrive before that bombing - before  
3 April 1996?

09:56:19 4 A. I have not changed my testimony, Mr Koumjian. There are so  
5 many times these dates are mentioned. It's been a long time, and  
6 if we begin to hold people to dates, all of your Prosecution  
7 witnesses would be out of dates. So let's not argue here about  
8 dates.

09:56:36 9 Q. I certainly agree with that, Mr Taylor, that certainly our  
10 witnesses should be treated the same about dates as you are. You  
11 agree with that, don't you?

12 A. Of course, Mr Koumjian.

13 Q. If it's not a memory test for you, it shouldn't be a memory  
14 test for them. Do you agree?

09:56:46 15 A. Fairness. Fair play, yes.

16 Q. So you just made a little mistake and now if you realise  
17 that the bombing was in 1986, your forces arrived in Libya in  
18 1986. Is that right?

09:57:02 19 A. Well, if the bombing occurred in, as you say, April of  
20 1986, I know that my forces were in Libya during the bombing. I  
21 was in prison, so I don't know the precise time of the bombing.  
22 But if it happened in '86, then we should have had a few men in  
23 Libya at the time.

09:57:25 24 Q. That's something that you probably remember hearing about  
25 even in prison, is that correct, the bombing of Libya?

26 A. No, no, no, no, no.

27 Q. No, you didn't hear about it at the time?

28 A. I could have been - '86 April - I'm not sure, but I was not  
29 in Libya at the time when the bombing occurred. I'm not even

1 sure if I was in prison in Accra at the time. I don't quite  
2 recall.

3 Q. You don't know where you were when the bombing of Libya  
4 occurred?

09:57:54 5 A. No, I said I don't recall right now. You have put it back  
6 to '86. I have to double check that, so I had the figure at a  
7 different time, but you've put it to '86.

8 Q. Well, let me just read an answer you gave a few moments ago  
9 and see if you can explain to me the words you used. You said:

09:58:14 10 "Well, if the bombing occurred in as you say April 1986, I  
11 know that my forces were in Libya during the bombing, I was in  
12 prison, so I don't know the precise time of the bombing. But if  
13 it happened in '86, then we should have had a few men in Libya at  
14 that time."

09:58:35 15 So were you in prison when the bombing happened? Do you  
16 know that or you don't know that?

17 A. I cannot really, really recall because I'm now thrown off  
18 on your month because I was not in Libya when the bombing  
19 occurred. I know that some of our men were called upon to go to  
09:58:58 20 help - I think to clean off some of the debris from the place.  
21 I'll have go back through my mind and search it out, but I was  
22 not in Libya, I'm sure of that. But I'm not sure whether I was  
23 in Burkina Faso or not at that time.

24 Q. Sir, where were you when Thomas Sankara was killed?

09:59:22 25 A. I was in prison in Ghana.

26 Q. You're sure of that?

27 A. Very, very sure.

28 Q. Where were your NPFL forces?

29 A. At that particular time there were a few of our men that

1 had been taken to Libya. They were in Libya.

2 Q. Well, in fact, NPFL forces were in Ouagadougou when Thomas  
3 Sankara was killed. Isn't that true?

09:59:50

4 A. That is totally, totally, totally false. NPFL individuals  
5 were in Libya when Thomas Sankara was killed, because I can  
6 remember I was released about two weeks - two or three weeks  
7 after the death of Sankara and when I went on to Burkina Faso,  
8 but the men were already in Libya. They were not.

10:00:12

9 Q. Well, if you arrived in Burkina Faso within two or three  
10 weeks of the killing of Thomas Sankara, tell us what you know  
11 about the killing of Thomas Sankara.

12 A. Absolutely nothing.

13 Q. You arrived in Burkina Faso and you didn't ask anyone what  
14 happened?

10:00:24

15 A. Everybody knew that Thomas Sankara was killed in a military  
16 situation. It was none of my business. You asked me what did I  
17 know. All I know is what you know, that Thomas Sankara was  
18 killed.

19 Q. Sir, who killed Thomas Sankara?

10:00:38

20 A. I have no idea. All I was told was that it was a military  
21 coup d'etat. I have no idea who killed Thomas Sankara, no.

22 Q. Did you ask anyone, "Gee, Thomas Sankara, he really was a  
23 pan-African hero. How did Thomas Sankara get assassinated?"

10:01:00

24 A. Well, I did not ask anyone in particular because his deputy  
25 - and I knew Sankara very well, just as I knew his deputy,  
26 Blaise. When I arrived in Burkina Faso, Blaise was the President  
27 and all I - I didn't raise the conversation with him. All we  
28 knew that a coup had taken place and that his friend and deputy  
29 had taken over.

1 Q. You knew Blaise Compaore from before your imprisonment in  
2 Ghana?

3 A. Definitely.

10:01:30

4 Q. So you were in contact with the man that took over from  
5 Thomas Sankara after the coup?

6 A. What do you mean by I was in contact with him?

7 Q. Before the coup you had contacts with Blaise Compaore,  
8 correct or incorrect?

10:01:44

9 A. Totally incorrect. How do you have contact? I'm in prison  
10 in Ghana.

11 Q. You just told us you knew him. When did you have contacts?  
12 You told us you knew him before the coup. How did you know him  
13 if you had no contact?

10:01:57

14 A. I knew Thomas Sankara before the coup and I knew - your  
15 question - I tell you what, Mr Koumjian - your Honours, maybe -  
16 you know, I don't want to belittle the point. When I'm asked the  
17 question by you, "Did you have contacts with Mr Compaore before  
18 the coup," for me, your Honour, "contacts" mean there was some  
19 direct relationship existing while I was in prison with Blaise  
20 Compaore. That's what I'm answering. And maybe if you stop  
21 trying to ask these trick questions you will get straight  
22 answers. I did not have contact while I was in prison. I had  
23 contact with Sankara and Compaore before my imprisonment. So if  
24 we stop playing these little mind games because I'm not stupid.

10:02:20

25 Q. Sir, can you answer the questions?

26 A. I have.

10:02:42

27 Q. Let me make one thing absolutely clear, Mr Taylor: The  
28 Prosecution has many opinions about you, but it's not that you  
29 are not intelligent.

1 A. I have a lot of opinions about --

2 Q. You are a very intelligent man and you certainly can  
3 understand the questions.

10:02:55

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is not productive, arguing between  
5 each other. Just repeat your question, please, Mr Koumjian.

6 MR KOUMJIAN:

7 Q. Okay, Mr Taylor, if you make a promise to answer the  
8 questions, I'll make a promise not to cut you off. Can we agree  
9 on that?

10:03:22

10 A. Mr Koumjian, I'm here to answer your questions. I'm  
11 obliged to answer your questions and all I can promise is that I  
12 will answer them to the best of my ability, so we can continue.

13 Q. When did you first have contact with Blaise Compaore?

10:03:44

14 A. I first had contacts with Blaise Compaore, I would put it  
15 back to about 19 - I would say - 86 or thereabouts. Maybe late  
16 '85, '86, but I'll put it more to '86.

17 Q. And you had been in contact or were in contact with him  
18 until when?

19 A. Until my imprisonment by early '87.

10:04:12

20 Q. After 1987, were you ever in contact with Blaise Compaore?

21 A. After 1987, that's your question?

22 Q. Up to today, yes.

23 A. After 1987, yes, I have been in contact with Blaise  
24 Compaore.

10:04:29

25 Q. Can you briefly tell us the extent of your contacts during  
26 the NPFL time, during your presidency, after your presidency with  
27 Blaise Compaore?

28 A. Very well. Yes, I can. Blaise Compaore, I would describe  
29 as a friend and brother. So that gives you the extent. As a

1 friend and brother.

2 Q. Sir, let me be more precise. Obviously I was not precise  
3 enough. How many times do you think you've personally met Blaise  
4 Compaore?

10:04:58 5 A. I would put it to maybe several dozen times. He's a friend  
6 and brother.

7 Q. Have you spoken to him on the telephone?

8 A. Many, many times.

9 Q. Did you speak to him on satellite phones, on landlines?

10:05:17 10 A. Landlines.

11 Q. When was the last time you spoke to him?

12 A. I would say about probably - I would put it 2003 or  
13 thereabouts. Maybe early 2003.

14 Q. When you spoke to Blaise Compaore, how did you communicate  
10:05:50 15 as far as language?

16 A. I'm not fluent in French but I speak a little bit of broken  
17 French. Sometimes we used interpreters.

18 Q. When Blaise Compaore was President of Burkina Faso, did he  
19 have interpreters?

10:06:04 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Sir, after you arrived in Ouagadougou - you said about two  
22 weeks, am I correct, after the killing of Thomas Sankara?

23 A. I would say about that. Two or three weeks I said, yes.

24 Q. Your NPFL forces were in Ouagadougou at that time, correct?

10:06:24 25 A. I have said no. They were not there. They had no reason  
26 to be there. Every individual that arrived in Burkina Faso was  
27 in transit to Libya for training. I had no "NPFL forces" or even  
28 men in Burkina Faso at the time of the death of Sankara, no.

29 Q. The time of the death of Thomas Sankara, Prince Yormie

1 Johnson was a subordinate of yours. Is that correct?

2 A. Definitely.

3 Q. And you know that Prince Yormie Johnson has talked about  
4 his participation in the coup and the death of Thomas Sankara

10:06:58 5 before the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in a  
6 book he wrote?

7 A. Well, I tell you what, maybe Prince Johnson is on drugs  
8 because he was never, ever, ever in Burkina Faso. He is as  
9 blatant a liar as it comes. I don't care what book he wrote.

10:07:17 10 And if I see that book, I will counter-write it. He was never,  
11 ever around Burkina Faso. That's a lie.

12 Q. How did Blaise Compaore get between Libya and the Ivory  
13 Coast before you launched your invasion?

14 A. How did Blaise Compaore get between Burkina Faso?

10:07:34 15 Q. Sorry, my question is not precise. Let me try to clarify  
16 it.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. What countries did Prince Yormie Johnson pass through to  
19 get to the Ivory Coast before you launched your invasion of  
10:07:51 20 Liberia Christmas 1989?

21 A. What country did he pass through? Burkina Faso.

22 Q. Now, going back to the camps in Libya, you told us that Tom  
23 Woveiyu said that he knew about Foday Sankoh.

24 A. No, I did not say that, Mr Koumjian. I did not say that.

10:08:22 25 I said in my evidence here that Tom Woveiyu said, when you asked  
26 me the question, after the invasion, that he had heard of the  
27 name. I did not say that he said he knew Foday Sankoh. I did  
28 not say that, no.

29 Q. Mr Taylor, in my experience, politicians, one talent they

1 really have in common is the ability to remember names. Would  
2 you agree with that?

3 A. Some do. I'm very bad at remembering names, Mr Koumjian.  
4 I'm sorry. I would say some really do. I'm not one of those  
10:08:55 5 that remembers names very well.

6 Q. Do you remember faces well?

7 A. Yes, I try to remember faces more than names.

8 Q. And part of the work of a politician is making contacts  
9 with others who could be of assistance. Is that correct?

10:09:11 10 A. Well, Nick, I could agree with you. You normally try to  
11 get in touch with people that would give you assistance.  
12 That's - yes, I would say yes.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, were you interested in knowing - first of all,  
14 let me be precise because perhaps I don't recall your answer.

10:09:44 15 When, to your knowledge, did Ali Kabbah leave Libya?

16 A. Quite frankly, I don't know because I didn't really stay in  
17 Libya, but each time I went, he was there, so I would approximate  
18 that Ali Kabbah could have left Libya somewhere - and I'm  
19 approximating because of the number of times I met him - I would  
10:10:25 20 put it to around '89. I would put it to around maybe late '88,  
21 early '89, I would put it to you, because I can remember meeting  
22 Ali Kabbah as far back as '88. So I would put it to late '88,  
23 '89 for him to have - that I stopped seeing him.

24 Q. So your testimony would be consistent with what Suwandi  
10:10:53 25 Camara testified to which was that when he arrived in 1989, if  
26 you recall, that Ali Kabbah had already left, was no longer in  
27 Libya?

28 A. I don't recall exactly, but if you are saying that Suwandi  
29 said that I don't know even if he was there, that's another

1 question. So I don't want to confirm anything. All I am saying  
2 here, truthfully, is that I don't remember seeing Ali in '89. So  
3 I'm predicting that he left around that time.

10:11:29 4 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, could I be assisted with a  
5 page reference for the comment attributed to Suwandi Camara,  
6 please?

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have that handy?

8 MR KOUMJIAN: No, I do not. If I'm wrong, the transcript  
9 will reflect that I'm incorrect. That is my understanding.  
10:11:45 10 That's my recollection. If your Honours would like at the first  
11 break I will get you the citation, but we all have access to the  
12 transcripts. If I'm wrong, the transcript will reflect the  
13 correct testimony.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, if that reference is provided to  
10:12:05 15 you at the break is that going to be sufficient, Mr Griffiths?

16 MR GRIFFITHS: That will be sufficient for that particular  
17 supposed comment, Mr President, but it would be of assistance to  
18 everyone in the courtroom if there are to be any further  
19 references to evidence heard before this Tribunal that we be  
10:12:31 20 given the reference, because we are talking about over two years  
21 worth of testimony. It would be of assistance, and I think it's  
22 unfair to the witness that general comments are made like that  
23 without referring him specifically to the transcript.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, Mr Koumjian, I know you've taken  
10:12:49 25 over this cross-examination at short notice, but it has been the  
26 practice in this Court to provide the opposition with transcript  
27 references when such questions are put to the witness.

28 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honours, I understand that there's a  
29 reference at page 2418 of the transcript.

1 Q. Sir, West African people have a lot in common with each  
2 other, don't they?

3 A. Well, we're getting into - I --

10:13:46

4 Q. If that's difficult, let me be more precise, if you find  
5 that a difficult question. It was very general. In your  
6 experience, do West African people enjoy each other's company  
7 when they find themselves outside of West Africa?

10:14:07

8 A. Yes, it all depends if they can communicate. Some are  
9 French speaking, some Portuguese speaking, some English speaking,  
10 so - but in trying to help, because I want to move this process,  
11 knowing - meeting a West African, or maybe an African, in any  
12 part of the world, there is always that feeling of friendship. I  
13 would put it that way.

10:14:25

14 Q. Sir, you are helping. The point you make about languages  
15 is a good one. Of the neighbours of Liberia, how many are  
16 English speaking of the bordering countries?

17 A. Neighbours of Liberia: One.

18 Q. That is Sierra Leone, correct?

19 A. That is correct.

10:14:39

20 Q. Would you say that most Liberians would say that the people  
21 that they feel closest to of their neighbours in culture and  
22 food, sometimes in tribe, is Sierra Leone?

10:15:01

23 A. No. Well, not exactly. It depends on the size of the  
24 particular tribal population, for example. And the reason why I  
25 answer this way is because the border with La Cote d'Ivoire is as  
26 long as the border with Guinea and the border with Sierra Leone,  
27 and it depends on the size of the tribal segment. So I would  
28 have to look at that on an individual basis, Mr Koumjian, before  
29 I would be able to help you with a definitive answer.

1 Q. Sir, are Liberians, in your opinion, closer in culture to  
2 the people of Sierra Leone or the people of The Gambia?

3 A. Well, again I would say - normally because of the border, I  
4 would say Sierra Leone.

10:15:48 5 Q. Are the people of Liberia, in your opinion, closer in  
6 culture to the people of Sierra Leone or the people from Burkina  
7 Faso?

8 A. I would say Sierra Leone.

9 Q. So, Mr Taylor, isn't it reasonable to believe that your  
10:16:06 10 forces socialised regularly with the Sierra Leone forces that  
11 were training in Libya?

12 A. I can't make that general assumption because there were  
13 other English speaking West Africans there, so - Ghana was there.  
14 You had - Ugandans were there, they were English speaking. But

10:16:35 15 in general you would say that because they were neighbouring  
16 countries there's that possibility. But I would not - I would  
17 give you, I would say, a higher percentage to be fair, yeah.

18 Q. Sir, did you have strategic interests, while you were in  
19 Libya, in knowing the Special Forces from Sierra Leone - those  
10:16:54 20 that were training from Sierra Leone?

21 A. No, I had no strategic interest in wanting to know who they  
22 were. I knew their leader. We met so many times, and that was  
23 sufficient for me. No, I had no strategic interest in knowing  
24 who they were, no.

10:17:09 25 Q. When you say "their leader", who are you talking about?

26 A. I'm talking about Ali Kabbah.

27 Q. But you told us Ali Kabbah had left. Isn't that right?

28 A. No, but what time are you talking about now? You asked me  
29 a general question: Did I have a strategic interest in knowing

1 the individuals? I said no, I had no strategic interest in  
2 knowing the individuals because I knew their leader. Now you  
3 come back and say, "Well, when did you learn?" Well, of course I  
4 would not have known. Whether he left or not, Mr Koumjian, I  
10:17:33 5 knew him. Whether he was present or absent, I knew him.

6 Q. Sir, my question is: Did you have an interest in knowing  
7 who replaced him?

8 A. I didn't even know that Kabbah - that Ali had been  
9 replaced, so your question presupposes that I knew. I did not  
10:17:50 10 know that Ali was replaced until I heard - in fact, when I heard  
11 of the invasion of Sierra Leone, my first thinking when the  
12 reports were brought to me was that it was Ali Kabbah. So I did  
13 not know that he had been replaced. I had no idea.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, you already knew that Ali Kabbah had run away  
10:18:10 15 with money from Libya?

16 A. No. That is totally, totally incorrect. I first heard of  
17 Ali Kabbah escaping with money actually in this courtroom. I did  
18 not know beforehand that Ali Kabbah had escaped. I had no idea,  
19 no. Totally no. And have never testified to the fact that I  
10:18:33 20 knew. No.

21 Q. Is it your testimony that you made no effort to find out  
22 what the leadership structure was of the Sierra Leoneans before  
23 your invasion of Liberia in 1989?

24 A. No. Mr Koumjian, no. In Libya, all I - all we knew was  
10:18:57 25 the leaders. We did not interfere into the revolutions of other  
26 countries, so it was none of my business. Neither, according to  
27 your question, did I pursue that. No, to know what the structure  
28 - I knew the leader. That was sufficient.

29 Q. The leader of the Gambians, for example, Dr Manneh, you

1 knew him. It was important for you to make that contact,  
2 correct?

3 A. Dr Manneh was there. He knew Ali Kabbah too. Manneh,  
4 Ali Kabbah and myself sat together many days. He - I mean, but I  
10:19:28 5 didn't get into the structure of his organisation, no.

6 Q. Sir, when a leader is replaced, don't you make an effort to  
7 know the successor?

8 A. That is if you know he's replaced, Mr Koumjian. What if  
9 you don't know he's replaced? How do you inquire as to something  
10:19:45 10 that you don't know as a fact? I had no idea.

11 Q. Sir, isn't it logical that if a leader has left, that he's  
12 going to be replaced so that the organisation will have a  
13 leadership?

14 A. Well, it is logical. Of course it is logical.

10:20:02 15 Q. You used Special Forces from other countries in your NPFL,  
16 correct?

17 A. Yes. There was Special Forces from other countries, yes.

18 Q. This was against the mercenary laws of Liberia at the time.  
19 Correct?

10:20:16 20 A. Well, yes, the mercenary - the law on mercenarism, yes, I  
21 would say it was an against the law of mercenarism.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I hesitate to interrupt but  
23 we're in some difficulty. The page reference which we were  
24 given, 2418, which allegedly deals with the evidence of Suwandi  
10:20:41 25 Camara deals with evidence of another witness completely, indeed  
26 a protected witness, and it's not on that page 2418.

27 MR KOUMJIAN: We will recheck that then. My apologies.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. That will be rechecked and  
29 another correct reference, hopefully, will be provided to you.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

2 MR KOUMJIAN:

3 Q. Just before we dealt with the problem of the transcript,  
4 you told us that - I was asking you whether the presence of

10:21:21 5 Special Forces from other countries was against the mercenary  
6 laws of Liberia at that time and you said: "Well, yes. The law  
7 on mercenarism, yes." Sir, you had mercenaries from The Gambia  
8 with your forces, the NPFL, correct?

9 A. I'm not sure you want to call them mercenaries. I had  
10:21:42 10 Gambians with me, yes.

11 Q. Were they Liberians?

12 A. No, at the time - they were not Liberians at the time.

13 Q. Did you have people from other countries?

14 A. Besides The Gambia we had one Ghanaian with us. Yes, we  
10:22:02 15 had one Ghanaian.

16 Q. And there was a time when you had forces from Burkina Faso,  
17 correct?

18 A. Totally incorrect. Now you talked about the law of  
19 mercenarism now, and I've answered you correctly. The law of  
10:22:18 20 mercenarism in Liberia has to do with a Liberian being used to  
21 fight in a country that does - that is friendly to Liberia. I am  
22 not sure, your Honours, if the law on mercenarism in Liberia  
23 deals with non-Liberians fighting in Liberia. So the way you  
24 posed the question, I have answered you. But for the records, I  
10:22:44 25 want to make that clear when I say yes, there was a law on  
26 mercenarism, but it did not cover, to the best of my knowledge,  
27 the presence of others fighting in Liberia. I just wanted to  
28 clear that, your Honour.

29 Q. Sir, we have, I believe, the law on mercenarism. That was

1 one of your exhibits. So we can check that. We can go over  
2 that.

3 A. That's what I'm saying. I don't know if it dealt with  
4 individuals from other countries that fought in Liberia, or it  
10:23:11 5 had to do with Liberians that fought outside of Liberia.

6 Q. Blaise Compaore sent several hundred men to assist you. Is  
7 that correct?

8 A. I wouldn't say several hundred men, no. That is totally  
9 incorrect. There were a few military advisers at the very onset  
10:23:33 10 in dealing with artillery, but not several hundred. No, that's  
11 incorrect.

12 Q. You've heard that Blaise Compaore has been reported in the  
13 press as saying that he sent several hundred Burkina Faso  
14 soldiers to assist you. You've read that, haven't you?

10:23:49 15 A. I haven't. I haven't read that. I said there were  
16 advisers that came, but there were not several hundred, no.

17 Q. Sir, you were fighting a revolution and you needed trained  
18 soldiers, correct?

19 A. Yes.

10:24:00 20 Q. So why not the Sierra Leone Special Forces?

21 A. But that's a very good point, Mr Koumjian. That's a very  
22 good point.

23 Q. You agree you had every reason to bring the Sierra Leone  
24 Special Forces to assist you in Liberia?

10:24:13 25 A. That is - I mean, if there was reason - if there was reason  
26 and they were out there that I knew of, it would have been a good  
27 thing. That's why they were never used, because I never knew of  
28 them.

29 Q. Sir, you never knew that Sierra Leone Special Forces

1 trained in Libya with your NPFL?

2 A. That's not what I'm saying. That's not what I'm answering  
3 to you. We're talking about the use of those individuals, and  
4 I'm saying you make a strong point. Your question is to the use  
10:24:44 5 of them. I'm saying of course it would have been useful. I did  
6 not know of them, and did not use them, and could not have used  
7 them. That's the point I'm making.

8 Q. Sir, can you explain to the judges what you mean when you  
9 say you didn't know about the Special Forces that had trained  
10:24:59 10 from Sierra Leone?

11 A. Mr Koumjian, it is very simple to explain to the judges  
12 what you want to know.

13 Q. Sir, just answer --

14 A. I have never said that I did not know that there were  
10:25:13 15 Sierra Leonean Special Forces trained in Libya. That's not my  
16 testimony. Your question was to the use of those people, and I  
17 said to you it's a very good question. Of course it would have  
18 been useful. If I knew that they existed within the confines of  
19 Liberia, I would have used them. But I did not know of their  
10:25:34 20 existence in Liberia and could not have used them. That's the  
21 point I'm trying to make.

22 Q. Sir, although your Special Forces - you told us that  
23 Liberians and Sierra Leoneans were the closest people - or the  
24 Sierra Leoneans were the closest people in the region to  
10:25:50 25 Liberians - you had no knowledge from your forces that there were  
26 Sierra Leonean Special Forces in Liberia?

27 A. I said that I had no knowledge from my individuals that  
28 there were Sierra Leonean Special Forces in Liberia. That is  
29 correct.

1 Q. Now, when you brought the Gambians you contacted them while  
2 they were in Burkina Faso to bring them. Is that correct?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Did you try to make contact with the Sierra Leoneans?

10:26:17 5 A. No. I mean, I did not know where the Sierra Leoneans were,  
6 and I did not go looking for them. There were no Sierra Leoneans  
7 in Burkina Faso whatsoever. And based on the testimony of the  
8 witness that you've mentioned before we will get to know that he  
9 lied to this Court. There were no Sierra Leoneans in Burkina  
10:26:36 10 Faso, so I had no contact with Sierra Leoneans. I made use of  
11 the Gambians that were in Burkina Faso.

12 Q. Sir, where were the Sierra Leoneans? You had no idea?

13 A. I had no idea where the Sierra Leoneans were whatsoever.

14 Q. Although you were a pan-Africanist?

10:26:53 15 A. Of course. Being a pan-African mean that I would have had  
16 to know where the Namibians were or where the South Africans  
17 were, okay? Because there were training groups in Libya,  
18 including SWAPO, the ANC. Should I have asked where they were?  
19 No, it was none of my prerogative. I didn't go asking, "Oh,  
10:27:15 20 where are the Sierra Leoneans? Maybe I can use them." No.

21 Q. In fact, didn't you have a common interest? If the Sierra  
22 Leoneans were looking to overthrow their government and you were  
23 controlling neighbouring - or you were bordering countries,  
24 wouldn't it make absolutely perfect strategic sense that you  
10:27:33 25 would make contact and alliances with that group?

26 A. No, for me, I would totally disagree with you. For me, it  
27 was not of strategic importance for such an alliance, no. And  
28 I'll tell you why, to be very, very clear for the record, Joseph  
29 Momoh was a personal friend of mine and I did not have any

1 interest in seeing Joseph Momoh removed from power because he was  
2 a very good friend of mine. So it was not of strategic interest  
3 to me to align with them or in any way, whether it is with me or  
4 with them, that was not of interest to me, no.

10:28:12 5 Q. Your good friend Joseph Momoh is the one who imprisoned you  
6 when you asked to use Sierra Leone as a base to invade Liberia.  
7 Correct?

8 A. Totally false. Totally, totally false. Totally.

9 Q. Were you imprisoned in Sierra Leone?

10:28:27 10 A. I was imprisoned for about three days in Sierra Leone.  
11 Joseph Momoh was not in the country. He was in London. In fact,  
12 he cut short his trip to London, flew back, met with me and saw  
13 me safely out of the country. I was imprisoned by a gentleman  
14 called - who was the chief of the police, Bambi Kamara. Joseph  
10:28:47 15 Momoh, in fact, was so upset about it and he apologised.

16 Q. Sir, and Joseph Momoh is the one that you told us you  
17 threatened over the radio, I believe you said it was the BBC,  
18 because of the participation and support of Sierra Leone in the  
19 ECOMOG in 19 - forgive me whether it was 1990 or 1991

10:29:15 20 [overlapping speakers]?

21 A. The ECOMOG came in 1990.

22 Q. When did you make this threatening radio broadcast, sir?

23 A. Let's read your question back from the text. You said that  
24 I told, I said. Now, but I did not say. So, you see, your  
10:29:30 25 question, if you read from the text, you said --

26 Q. Let me ask you this question, sir: Did you threaten Joseph  
27 Momoh on the radio at any time?

28 A. No, I don't recall threatening him. I had mentioned to  
29 Momoh personally that I did not think it was a good idea for

1 Sierra Leoneans to fight against Liberians.

2 Q. You made no radio broadcast threatening Sierra Leone for  
3 their support of ECOMOG?

4 A. No, not to my recollection. Not that I can recall.

10:29:59 5 Q. So let's go back, Mr Taylor, to 1991 --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and the invasion of Sierra Leone. After you learned of  
8 the invasion, did you take any steps - did you do anything in  
9 response to hearing that news?

10:30:35 10 A. Yes. When I heard about the invasion and got all the  
11 reports in, the first thing that I ordered was the closure of the  
12 Liberian side of the border with Sierra Leone, that there could  
13 be no one going in or no one coming.

14 Q. So if Foday Sankoh had been passing back and forth on that  
10:30:57 15 border, you would certainly know about it. Correct?

16 A. Following between that - we're talking about a short month  
17 or two, of course, I would have - he would have been stopped. He  
18 would have been stopped. We're talking about between March and  
19 about July, he would have been stopped, of 1991.

10:31:16 20 Q. Were any Sierra Leoneans, for example, carrying ammunition?

21 A. Yes, definitely. Anyone coming across with any warlike  
22 material or wanting to enter Sierra Leone, we would have done  
23 everything to stop them.

24 Q. Now, since Momoh was your good friend and his country had  
10:31:38 25 been invaded, did you determine or ask your intelligence to  
26 determine where the weapons and ammunition came from for this  
27 invading force?

28 A. No, no, no, no. I must be earnest. I did not ask where  
29 did they get the guns from, where did they get the weapons from,

1 because it had never occurred to me that - no, I did not ask  
2 where did they get it from. No, I must be earnest, I didn't get  
3 into that.

10:32:16 4 Q. So tell us, Mr Taylor, what happened when you first did -  
5 how did you first get into contact with Foday Sankoh?

6 A. ULIMO started attacking across the borders. I would say  
7 about May/June of 1991 there was this intensification and we had  
8 received reports from Sierra Leoneans in Liberia talking to their  
9 individuals across and, in fact, some captured POWs that we had  
10:32:56 10 captured from the AFL mentioned that these ULIMO individuals were  
11 actually their brothers that were coming back across the border.  
12 Following that intensification and the entry into Bomi, I think  
13 it was Cape Mount, excuse me, not Bomi, into Cape Mount in about,  
14 I would put it to about June/July of 1991, we determined from  
10:33:25 15 captured individuals that had told us that they were being backed  
16 and supported by the Sierra Leonean government, they had been  
17 armed by the Sierra Leonean government.

18 I tried to contact President Momoh. We talked about it.  
19 There were denials here and there. Strategically, we decided  
10:33:42 20 about July of 19 - about June, I would put it to about June, to  
21 contact the leader, whoever the leader was, to - I would put it  
22 to May/June to get them to cooperate with us in terms of security  
23 of the border because we then had a common enemy.

24 Q. So when you say we decided, the leader of the NPFL, who do  
10:34:10 25 you mean by "we"?

26 A. The leadership of the NPFL, I'm talking about the Defence  
27 Minister and other senior officers. Knowing that we had this  
28 information and POWs in custody that had said that they had been  
29 armed and we saw brand new rifles with them that we had caught,

1 that strategically, since Momoh - in fact, I'm not sure, since  
2 Momoh was using Armed Forces of Liberia personnel to come into  
3 Liberia to attack us, that we would use his enemies against him  
4 as he was using our enemies against us. We had a common enemy.

10:34:52 5 Q. How did you contact the leader of these forces?

6 A. On the borders. On the border, the border commanders. I  
7 can remember the border commander at that particular time was  
8 asked to see if he could contact any senior commander on the  
9 other side to get in touch with the leader and that was done.

10:35:13 10 Q. So it would not be true that Foday Sankoh contacted you.

11 You contacted him first?

12 A. Yes, we made the contact.

13 Q. And where were you at that time?

14 A. By this time, 1991, I think I'm in Buchanan around this  
10:35:41 15 time. I have not moved further up because I come from Gbarnga,  
16 down Tappita. I'm in Buchanan.

17 Q. And how did the contact proceed? Tell us what happened.

18 A. How they worked it out I don't know, but we received  
19 information that he was available, I would say by about - I would  
10:36:14 20 put it to about May, we sent General Menkarzon to the border to  
21 get Mr Sankoh, once we had said we wanted to see him and have him  
22 brought to me. By the time he comes now, I think I'm living now  
23 in Harbel.

24 Q. So he was brought from where to where by General Menkarzon?

10:36:37 25 A. He was brought from the border at, I understand Mendekoma,  
26 from the Mendekoma border, all the way down to me in Harbel.

27 Q. Who was with him?

28 A. I don't remember all of the individuals that were with him.  
29 Normally, when these people come, you meet the leader. I don't

1 remember any of the other individuals because they didn't meet  
2 with me. Only Sankoh.

3 Q. What were your discussions with Foday Sankoh at that time?

4 A. My discussion with him was about fighting a common enemy in  
10:37:19 5 trying to protect the borders to keep ULIMO that were fighting  
6 them and fighting me, to keep the cross-border activities shut  
7 down, that I would send Liberians. In fact, one of the things is  
8 that we did not use the RUF to fight. We - that we would send a  
9 unit, a special operations unit, to man the border to make sure  
10:37:47 10 that ULIMO did not come into Liberia. We used Liberians.

11 Q. You sent them over the border into Sierra Leone?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. What did you and Foday Sankoh - what did Foday Sankoh say  
14 to you when, according to you, you first met him at this time in  
10:38:04 15 1991?

16 A. Well, generally, we - he talked about, you know, his days  
17 in Sierra Leone and that - because I was concerned about the  
18 issue of how he got started in Sierra Leone, and then this is  
19 when we got the first hint of the fact that he knew some Liberian  
10:38:37 20 Special Forces that gave him a lot of help.

21 Q. Did he thank you for that assistance?

22 A. No, he did not thank me because I didn't give him  
23 assistance.

24 Q. Would that be rather ungrateful? You said he told you that  
10:38:50 25 Liberians were helping him, Special Forces, is that right?

26 A. Yeah, I said he knew some Liberian Special Forces that had  
27 helped him.

28 Q. Well, that was news to you, according to your testimony, is  
29 that right?

1 A. Of course, it was news to me.

2 Q. So what did you do?

3 A. We commenced an investigation of these individuals.

4 Q. Did you have them arrested then?

10:39:10 5 A. Not at that particular time. We conducted an investigation  
6 to get to know what had happened. We did not get to the bottom  
7 of it. In fact, there were denials all along, but later on we  
8 get to know the facts.

9 Q. Sir, who were the people that Foday Sankoh told you had  
10:39:26 10 helped him?

11 A. He mentioned Mekunagbe; he denied. He mentioned Oliver  
12 Varney; Oliver Varney denied the allegations. He mentioned  
13 Yegbeh Degbon; Degbon denied the allegation. These are three of  
14 the individuals. I think also, if I'm not mistaken, Timothy  
10:40:01 15 Mulibah was one of those that he mentioned.

16 Q. So, sir, these people, according to Foday Sankoh, had,  
17 without your orders, fought in another country, the country of  
18 your good friend Joseph Momoh against his government. Is that  
19 right?

10:40:22 20 A. Well, I did not say that Foday Sankoh said these people  
21 fought, Mr Koumjian. I said to you that Foday Sankoh told me  
22 that he had gotten some help from these individuals, not fought.

23 Q. I'm certain you asked him what kind of help he got, didn't  
24 you?

10:40:37 25 A. Yes, I did ask him. He said they had given him some  
26 ammunition and I knew they had no - and I was shocked. I said,  
27 "They gave you ammunition?" He said yes, they had helped him  
28 with some arms and ammunition to launch his operation, and I was  
29 very, very upset by that because it should not have happened.

1 That's why we launched an investigation immediately.

2 Q. Now, sir, you've heard many of the witnesses, including the  
3 victims who came and testified, talk about Liberians and NPFL  
4 forces being in Sierra Leone in the early stages of the invasion.

10:41:16 5 Do you recall that?

6 A. Well, I've heard a lot of the witnesses talk about  
7 Liberians being in Sierra Leone. We would disagree as to whether  
8 they were NPFL. But that's another question. I've heard some of  
9 the testimony, yeah. I disagree with the testimony. I agree  
10 with Liberians. NPFL, I disagree.

10:41:35

11 Q. So you're saying, as far as you know, Anthony Mekuagbe,  
12 for example, was never in Sierra Leone prior to this meeting you  
13 had with Foday Sankoh that you say was June/July of 1991?

14 A. Well, I had no idea that Anthony Mekuagbe - no, that is  
15 correct. I did not know Anthony Mekuagbe was inside Sierra  
16 Leone, no.

10:41:58

17 Q. Sir, it wouldn't be hard for you to investigate that matter  
18 because these people have subordinates and you can talk to their  
19 subordinates, correct?

10:42:13

20 A. Well, I wouldn't investigate, Mr Koumjian, but the way how  
21 these matters work, if a commander is involved in something  
22 clandestine, as we got to know it was clandestine, you would be  
23 hard pressed to ask anyone under his command that would want to  
24 tell on him. It would be very difficult. I don't know how the  
25 intelligence went on, but an investigation was conducted and they  
26 denied it. It was determined that they were not involved. What  
27 Mekuagbe and the rest of them said was that some Liberians had  
28 crossed but they have no control over them, but they did not  
29 personally assign arms and ammunition for any operation. This

10:42:41

1 was the excuse that he gave.

2 Q. Did you keep them under surveillance at that time?

3 A. Keep who under surveillance?

4 Q. Those that Foday Sankoh said had been assisting him?

10:43:13 5 A. No, no, no, no. I did not say we kept them under  
6 surveillance.

7 Q. No, I'm asking you.

8 A. No.

9 Q. Thank you, you've answered.

10:43:19 10 A. No, there was no reason to keep them under surveillance,  
11 no.

12 Q. In fact, you sent them into Sierra Leone to fight after  
13 that, correct?

14 A. No, I did not send Mekunagbe into Sierra Leone to fight  
10:43:30 15 after that. No. I would say no.

16 Q. Did you ever send Anthony Mekunagbe to Sierra Leone?

17 A. No, never did.

18 Q. Did you ever send Oliver Varney to Sierra Leone?

19 A. No, never did.

10:43:39 20 Q. Sir, let's talk a little bit about Foday Sankoh. This is,  
21 according to your testimony, the first time you met him?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Tell the Court what your impression of Foday Sankoh was?

24 A. Quite frankly, Foday Sankoh did not come across to me as an  
10:44:11 25 academic like Ali Kabbah. He appeared to have had some military  
26 knowledge, because he said that he had been trained and was in  
27 the Sierra Leonean armed forces before he even got into the fact  
28 that he had been involved in a coup d'etat at one time and that  
29 he had trained in Britain at one time. But I didn't really put

1 him in a category as somebody that was a strategic thinker or  
2 something like that. That was my - so my impression of him, if I  
3 were to assign let's say a percentage to it, maybe I would give  
4 it - I would say a fair grade.

10:45:05 5 Q. He was certainly less educated than you, correct?

6 A. Well, I don't know how far he went in school, Mr Koumjian,  
7 so I would assume yes.

8 Q. Your impression of him was that he was not as educated as  
9 you, correct?

10:45:19 10 A. I wouldn't say - you know, education - no. My answer to  
11 you was that I did not consider him an academic. Less educated?  
12 I wouldn't go that far because education, it depends - that could  
13 be subjective.

14 Q. And did you learn that his background was that he had been  
10:45:41 15 a corporal and a photographer?

16 A. I said - no, he told me that he had been in the armed  
17 forces, he had trained in Britain, and that he had been involved  
18 in a coup. So I didn't learn; he told me that.

19 Q. Now, you knew who were the respected leaders in Libya,  
10:46:01 20 correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. He wasn't one of them, according to your testimony?

23 A. I didn't know him as a leader in Libya, Mr Koumjian, so I  
24 had no evaluation of him at that time. I didn't know him as a  
10:46:11 25 leader in Libya.

26 Q. But you said you were recognised by the Libyans as the  
27 leader of the NPFL, correct?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't you say that at one

1 time Gaddafi told you he wasn't happy with Foday Sankoh later?  
2 Is that correct?

3 A. That Gaddafi told me he was not happy with Foday Sankoh  
4 later?

10:46:31 5 Q. Yes, on one of your trips as President?

6 A. But we're talking about some times later, Mr Koumjian.

7 Q. I'm just asking you: Did Muammar Gaddafi ever tell you  
8 that he was disappointed in Foday Sankoh?

9 A. On one trip I made he did mention - I'm not sure if he  
10:46:55 10 mentioned it to me. Yes, in a meeting I think he mentioned - we  
11 were talking about the problems in Sierra Leone that Foday  
12 Sankoh - we all agreed he was a problem and I have - I made that  
13 statement in UN meetings that at one point I felt he was a  
14 problem. That's in United States - excuse me, United Nations  
10:47:12 15 documents demonstrated here. I felt at one point he was a  
16 problem.

17 Q. Sure. And you knew that, as you've told us here, that the  
18 RUF, you learned, was notorious for its acts of atrocities  
19 committed against civilians. You eventually learned that,  
10:47:28 20 correct?

21 A. Well, again now, Mr Koumjian, you said that I told - I said  
22 that I knew - I heard that the RUF was notorious. I don't  
23 remember that testimony. I stand corrected. I think, if I  
24 recall back during this trial, the question that had been posed  
10:47:46 25 to me was at some point did I hear of atrocities in Sierra Leone.  
26 I have said that yes, I heard of those reports. Now, as the way  
27 you've phrased your question, I don't recall it being put to me  
28 in the way that you have suggested.

29 Q. Okay. Well, let me put it to you that way now then. Sir,

1 when you aware that the RUF - are you aware today that the RUF  
2 was notorious for its atrocities against civilians?

3 A. Well, I was aware - I was told - it was reported to me that  
4 there were atrocities going on in Sierra Leone.

10:48:23 5 Q. Well, that's a pretty vague answer. That wasn't the  
6 question I asked you, sir.

7 A. That wasn't vague.

8 Q. The question I asked you, sir, was about the RUF?

9 A. Yes, I've just told you that it was reported to me.

10:48:34 10 Q. Sir, didn't you know - wasn't it reported to you - didn't  
11 you hear in the international media that the RUF was committing  
12 atrocities against civilians?

13 A. When you say "hear", it was reported in the media. That  
14 got to me through - I had people that reported to me.

10:48:48 15 Q. So then the answer, sir, is yes. You knew the RUF had been  
16 - it had been reported that they were committing atrocities  
17 against civilians. Can you give me a straight answer on that?

18 A. I'm saying it was reported to me. It was reported to me.

19 Q. And certainly you knew that by the time of the elections in  
10:49:03 20 Sierra Leone in March of 1996 when this infamous campaign of  
21 amputations was going on of fingers and hands - the February and  
22 March elections in Sierra Leone?

23 A. Where are you placing me in 1996? Quite frankly, I was not  
24 following that particular situation in 1996, as you proposed,  
10:49:29 25 when I became President. I am not President in 1996, so I would  
26 say I was not following it.

27 Q. You never heard of the amputation campaign - the election  
28 campaign by the RUF to stop the elections?

29 A. I said to this Court that I was not following the elections

1 in 1996 in Sierra Leone. I was not aware, had nothing to do with  
2 it. In 1996, depending on what time you put it, I was busy  
3 dealing with the internal problems of Liberia, disarmament,  
4 demobilisation. I was not aware of the internal workings of  
10:50:07 5 Sierra Leone, I'm sorry.

6 Q. So the atrocities committed against the civilians of Sierra  
7 Leone was not something that caught your attention in 1996?

8 A. Well, it depends on what you're talking about now,  
9 Mr Koumjian.

10:50:19 10 Q. How about amputations?

11 A. I was not aware of amputations going on in Sierra Leone in  
12 1996. It was not the type of issue that I would be interested  
13 in. 1996 - the year 1996, looking back at what I'm doing in  
14 Liberia, I'm not even involved in the type of international  
10:50:42 15 activities you're talking about, so I'm not following what's  
16 going on in Sierra Leone at that particular time.

17 Q. So, sir, you would not be interested in 1996 in these types  
18 of activities - and I had asked you about amputations - even when  
19 they were being carried out by your former ally Foday Sankoh?

10:51:06 20 A. What amputations are going on in 1996?

21 Q. Sir, didn't you hear - are you trying to tell the Court you  
22 never heard of amputations to stop the elections in February and  
23 March 1996?

24 A. I have told this Court that I did not hear of it. I am not  
10:51:19 25 going to withdraw that. I've said it. In 1996 I'm not President  
26 of Liberia. I had not heard of what was going on in Sierra Leone  
27 to stop elections, no.

28 Q. Sir, did you ever receive information that led you to the  
29 conclusion the RUF is carrying out a campaign of atrocities

1 against civilians in Sierra Leone?

2 A. What time are we talking about? Later when I become  
3 President, yes.

4 Q. My question was "ever". So you said when you became  
10:51:51 5 President. When did it dawn on you, the realisation the RUF is  
6 an organisation with a campaign of terror against civilians?

7 A. That's a different question now. You're asking me - well,  
8 I did not ever come to that conclusion that you just raised, the  
9 way you posed the question. So would you help me in what are you  
10:52:07 10 trying to get so I can help the judges? What are you trying to  
11 say?

12 Q. You're saying that you never reached the conclusion that  
13 the RUF was engaged in a campaign of terror against civilians.  
14 You deny that?

10:52:19 15 A. That's not what I'm saying. Now, that's why I tried to get  
16 you to a period. You've opened a wide door and you're trying to  
17 ask me questions. Following --

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, in fairness to counsel, his  
19 question --

20 THE WITNESS: Did I ever look.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: -- was, "When did it dawn on you, the  
22 realisation the RUF is an organisation with a campaign of terror  
23 against civilians?" He asked you, "When did it dawn on you".

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour, and he went further to say  
10:52:50 25 did it ever occur - is there ever, because he's asked two  
26 questions.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's because you didn't answer the  
28 first one. So will you please answer that question and we'll go  
29 on from there.

1 THE WITNESS: Yeah, but we're talking about time now  
2 because if he's talking time --

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the question. "When did it dawn  
4 on you?" He's asking you a question about time, "When did it  
10:53:09 5 dawn on you, the realisation the RUF is an organisation with a  
6 campaign of terror against civilians?" That's the question that  
7 was originally put and hasn't been answered. Was it in 1996,  
8 '97, sometime after that?

9 THE WITNESS: Okay, I'll answer the question if we can keep  
10:53:30 10 it simple and one question at a time. After the January invasion  
11 of 1999, I became incensed by what was going on in Sierra Leone  
12 on activities of the RUF. That's when it really, really dawned  
13 on me that there was a serious problem in Sierra Leone.

14 MR KOUMJIAN:

10:53:50 15 Q. So, throughout the election campaign of 1996 you didn't  
16 realise - you never heard of atrocities committed by the RUF in  
17 1996. Is that true?

18 A. I was not following, that is true.

19 Q. In 1997 did you ever hear of atrocities committed by the  
10:54:12 20 RUF?

21 A. In 1997 there were news reports of problems in Sierra  
22 Leone, yes.

23 Q. At the time of the coup in Sierra Leone, did it interest  
24 you what was going on in May 1997?

10:54:24 25 A. None of my business. None of my business. Did not --

26 Q. Following the coup were you interested in what was  
27 happening to the people of Sierra Leone under the junta?

28 A. Not at all, no. It was none of my business, I didn't  
29 follow it. None of my business. That's for Heads of State to

1 do. I never - no.

2 Q. After your election did you care at all about what was  
3 happening in Sierra Leone?

10:54:54

4 A. Yes, I was concerned after my election about peace and  
5 stability in Sierra Leone, yes.

6 Q. So when did you - did you realise then as a person that was  
7 concerned about what was going on in Sierra Leone - let me  
8 withdraw the question and let me start again. As you say, a  
9 person concerned about the peace in Sierra Leone, did you educate  
10 yourself on who it was that was committing atrocities against the  
11 civilians?

10:55:10

12 A. No.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, did the people of Sierra Leone matter to you at  
14 all?

10:55:23

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. At the time of the intervention you opposed that, correct -  
17 the military force of the intervention?

18 A. Nonsense. I supported it. As a matter of fact, we made  
19 available Roberts International Airport for the intervention.

10:55:42

20 Q. Very good. So you supported the intervention and restoring  
21 the elected government of President Kabbah, correct?

22 A. Of course. Of course. All the records are here to back  
23 that, yes.

24 Q. So, sir, did you learn about the atrocities committed by  
25 the junta as it fled Freetown?

10:55:56

26 A. Yes, there were reports. Yes, we learned of the reports  
27 that there were atrocities all over the place, yes.

28 Q. Who was responsible for those atrocities, according to your  
29 information?

1 A. I did not investigate to find out. The information was  
2 that there were atrocities on all sides: The armed forces of  
3 Sierra Leone; the Kabbah forces; ECOMOG committed atrocities.  
4 From what was brought to Heads of State, that everybody committed  
10:56:25 5 atrocities and there was even a video that was shown we know of,  
6 Cry Freetown. Everybody committed atrocities: ECOMOG, the  
7 peacekeepers; the Sierra Leonean armed forces; everybody. That's  
8 what we were told.

9 Q. Is that your position today, Mr Taylor, that the RUF was  
10:56:38 10 the same as every other operator in the conflict in Sierra  
11 Leone --

12 A. No, that's not what I'm saying.

13 Q. Please let me finish the question. I think I have now. We  
14 can't talk over each other.

10:56:50 15 A. That's not what I have said, Mr Koumjian. That's not my  
16 response.

17 Q. So today, Mr Taylor, do you recognise the RUF was a  
18 terrorist organisation committing atrocities against civilians?

19 A. I have not come to assigning those kinds of names to RUF or  
10:57:14 20 any other group in Sierra Leone. Whether they were a terrorist  
21 or not a terrorist organisation, I never came to that conclusion.  
22 That was not for me.

23 Q. Was your conclusion, Mr Taylor, that the RUF was using the  
24 same tactics against civilians that the NPFL used?

10:57:28 25 A. No, there were no amputations and that kind of thing in  
26 Liberia, no. I would not - no.

27 Q. Were there rapes and murders in Liberia?

28 A. Yes, there were rapes, there were murders.

29 Q. Could anyone who lived through that forget the fact that

1 there were rapes and murders in Liberia?

2 A. Well, these are terrible crimes that people don't easily  
3 forget. The difference is with Liberia, impunity was not  
4 accepted. We had courts and tribunals to deal with people. So,  
10:58:05 5 you know, crimes are things, Mr Koumjian, that people find it  
6 very difficult to forget. But I have always said that, yeah,  
7 there were terrible things that happened in Liberia, but we made  
8 sure there was not impunity, to the best of our knowledge.

9 Q. There were massive - I'm not just talking about your  
10:58:22 10 faction. There were massive murders of civilians and rapes of  
11 women in Liberia during the conflict there. Isn't that true?

12 A. Well, Mr Koumjian, no, I really - I cannot - I haven't  
13 seen - for example, your colleague has been quoting figures. I'm  
14 not aware of those, no. On the NPFL side, I can recall a  
10:58:45 15 massacre that happened in the Harbel area called the Harbel  
16 Massacre. That was investigated by the international community.  
17 But, to the best of my knowledge, all of these massive atrocities  
18 that have been mentioned are not to my knowledge and you have  
19 mentioned a few of them. No, they're not to my knowledge.

10:59:13 20 Q. To your knowledge, you don't know about massive killings of  
21 civilians - let me just take that question and break it to down  
22 into two - in Liberia during the conflict?

23 A. Massive? I am not aware of the massive killing of  
24 civilians in Liberia.

10:59:33 25 Q. Sir, how many civilians do you think - I mean, you're the  
26 former President of Liberia. You lived there throughout the  
27 conflict. How many civilians do you think were killed, murdered  
28 during the civil conflict in Liberia?

29 A. Now you've asked two questions, Mr Koumjian; how many were

1 killed and how many were murdered. Now which question do you  
2 want me to answer; the ones that were killed or those that were  
3 murdered?

11:00:02

4 Q. Those that were murdered. By murdered let me be clear, I  
5 mean those that were killed not be accident, not by stray fire.  
6 Those that were slaughtered.

11:00:25

7 A. Well, those that were murdered, I would - from the - and I  
8 can only speak frankly to this Court about the NPFL side. I  
9 cannot account for the other side. I would put it to, I would  
10 say, under 200 that were murdered throughout the entire crisis  
11 and most of those people paid for it.

11:00:47

12 Q. Sir, I'm asking you about all the factions. I'm talking to  
13 you about the suffering of the Liberian people. The Liberian  
14 people. How many Liberians were killed, civilians? And let me  
15 use the word "killed" now. How many Liberians were killed in the  
16 civil conflict?

17 A. I would say - I would put the amount of Liberians that died  
18 during the Liberian civil conflict to 5 to 7,000.

11:01:08

19 Q. Sir, how many Liberian women do you estimate were raped,  
20 suffered sexual assault, during the civil conflict in Liberia?

11:01:31

21 A. I really do not know. I really do not know. I can only  
22 speak about the NPFL side. I can speak about the NPFL side and I  
23 would put them to a very, very few, and those - and I can put it  
24 to a very few because of the number of executions that were done  
25 of rape by my soldiers, yes.

26 Q. Sir, let me ask you about a question that you were asked  
27 the first day. I'm referring to page 24329 of the transcript.  
28 You were asked by your counsel - there was this exchange,  
29 beginning at line 6:

1 "Q. Were you thereafter aware of atrocities being  
2 committed in Sierra Leone?

3 A. Well, I put it this way, there was no one on this  
4 planet that would not heard through international  
11:02:41 5 broadcasts or probably discussions about what was going on  
6 in Sierra Leone. I would be the first to say, yes, we did  
7 hear of certain actions that were going on in Sierra Leone  
8 that we - that were a little strange for us because those  
9 things did not occur in Liberia.

11:02:54 10 Q. What things?

11 A. Well, we heard that people were getting killed, women  
12 were getting raped and different things. We couldn't  
13 understand it."

14 So, sir, you never heard about people being killed and  
11:03:10 15 women being raped in Liberia?

16 A. I did not say I never heard of women getting raped in  
17 Liberia. I said I could speak for the NPFL side and there were  
18 very few because those that did, if you read the text, were tried  
19 and executed.

11:03:24 20 Q. Your counsel's questions were not limited to the NPFL. Was  
21 your answer - he was talking about the atrocities committed in  
22 Sierra Leone.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you said you never heard of these happening in Liberia.  
11:03:40 25 Had you heard of people being killed and women being raped in  
26 Liberia?

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm sorry, Mr President, because I have the  
28 relevant page here and in fairness my learned friend should  
29 continue where he stopped. "I could not understand it because

1 these are things that we did not tolerate" --

2 MR KOU MJIAN: Perhaps counsel could wait for re-direct  
3 examination before leading his witness.

11:04:01

4 MR GRIFFITHS: If I could finish - if I could have an  
5 uninterrupted sentence.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just to answer Mr Koumjian, if you have  
7 asked that question unfairly about something that the accused has  
8 said, I think Mr Griffiths has a right to object and I'd like to  
9 hear the rest of the objection.

11:04:18

10 MR GRIFFITHS: Because the answer continues, "I could not  
11 understand it because these are things that we did not tolerate  
12 in Liberia and so for me it was unacceptable." Which by  
13 implication suggests that he accepts things like that were done  
14 but the punishment was meted out for them. It's a simple point  
15 and in our submission Mr Koumjian really ought to seek to ask the  
16 questions fairly.

11:04:39

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the objection. Would you like to  
18 reply to that, Mr Koumjian?

11:04:54

19 MR KOU MJIAN: I'll reply by asking Mr Taylor to explain his  
20 answer:

21 Q. Sir, your answer just before the - I'll read part of it -  
22 was again - you talked about:

11:05:09

23 "No one on this planet would not have heard through  
24 international broadcasts or probably discussions about what was  
25 going on in Sierra Leone. I would be the first to say yes, we  
26 did hear of certain actions that were going on in Sierra Leone  
27 that we - that were a little strange to us because those things  
28 did not occur in Liberia."

29 Now, when you said those things did not occur in Liberia,

1 were you talking about the NPFL?

2 A. No, we said things. The NPFL is not a thing. When I said  
3 those things I'm referring to amputations that did not happen in  
4 Liberia. That's what I'm talking about.

11:05:37 5 Q. That obviously is what you would like to say now, but you  
6 then said --

7 A. No.

8 Q. Counsel asked you, "What things," and you didn't say  
9 amputations. Let me read what you said. You said, "Well, we  
11:05:48 10 heard the people were getting killed, women were getting raped  
11 and different things. We couldn't understand it."

12 A. Yes, we could not understand it because it was being done  
13 with impunity. That's what we're talking about, okay. We could  
14 not understand it because it was being done with - so when I talk  
11:06:05 15 about those things, okay, by naming those two, Mr Koumjian, those  
16 were not - you know, I guess the whole point here, and I'm trying  
17 to be fair because I know these judges want to get us moving.

18 These questions have beginning, endings, sometimes when you jump  
19 in the middle it becomes a problem. But I'm speaking about these  
11:06:27 20 things that happened with impunity, we were acting against them.  
21 We did not tolerate these. There seemed to have been, and I'm  
22 using the word very, very strictly- seemed to have been a degree  
23 of tolerance on the other side. We did not tolerate that in  
24 Liberia.

11:06:42 25 Q. Is that right? All factions in Liberia - are you saying  
26 now that all factions in Liberia did not tolerate killings and  
27 rapes?

28 A. I did not say "all factions", Mr Koumjian.

29 Q. So in fact, killings and rapes did occur in Liberia with

1 impunity. Is that true or not?

2 A. Mr Koumjian, again I want to get the record straight. I  
3 never said "all". I have constantly said for the judges I am  
4 referring to the NPFL because I cannot account for the activities  
11:07:12 5 of other factions. That's what I have said.

6 Q. You didn't say that in this answer, sir, so let me ask you:  
7 Why was it strange to you about people being killed and women  
8 raped when it was happening in Liberia?

9 A. Well, I just said the impunity - the appearance of  
11:07:28 10 impunity, Mr Koumjian, on the other side. We did not tolerate  
11 it. The NPFL did not tolerate it and we could not understand why  
12 anyone should tolerate that. Because we were busy trying people,  
13 had executed people for rape, had executed people for murder. We  
14 heard of no such thing in Sierra Leone. We had no such reports  
11:07:48 15 and so we - it was hard for us to understand that people could  
16 operate with impunity. That's what I'm talking about.

17 Q. Sir, since you couldn't understand impunity, it was a  
18 foreign concept in Liberia, who was held to account for the  
19 Lutheran Church massacre in Monrovia?

11:08:05 20 A. Well, I don't know who was held to account. Sadly,  
21 Mr Koumjian, my father was killed in the Lutheran Church, so I  
22 don't know what Doe did to hold anybody for what they did. But  
23 my father was a victim in the Lutheran Church.

24 Q. And about 600 people were killed in that church. Is that  
11:08:26 25 right?

26 A. That is correct. My father was among those.

27 Q. But Doe is someone that you say you can't really criticise  
28 because he may have had his own reasons for doing things?

29 A. No, I have my criticisms. What in fairness, Mr Koumjian, I

1 meant: You know, when you begin to come to a court and begin to  
2 label other Presidents and call them all kinds of names, I have  
3 tried to refrain from that against President Doe. This is not to  
4 say that Doe did not have his own faults. And when I say I do  
11:08:59 5 not know what his reasons were, they could be psychological, they  
6 could be whatever. Not that I supported them or believed that  
7 they were right. In fact, I believe that they were not right,  
8 whatever his reasons were. But what I have tried to do in this  
9 Court is to make sure that I speak earnestly about the activities  
11:09:17 10 of Doe, even though we fought.

11 Q. Even though Doe was responsible for the killing of at least  
12 hundreds of civilians, you're not ready to condemn him?

13 A. No, that act, I am saying, is wrong. That act of killing  
14 is wrong. The question was when I - you asked me if I said that  
11:09:37 15 I could not - that he had his own reason. But of course I  
16 condemn the killing of even one person.

17 Q. Sir, do you recall hearing in this courtroom a former  
18 member of the RUF saying there was a saying, "Civilians have no  
19 blood"? Do you agree with that saying?

11:09:52 20 A. I think that saying is sickening for anyone to - someone's  
21 got to be psycho to believe that or even say that. That's a sick  
22 mind to say that, by anybody.

23 Q. So of course you were concerned with the civilians of  
24 Sierra Leone?

11:10:15 25 A. Well, to the extent, yes, human life I'm concerned - I'm  
26 concerned with - we did everything - I did not try to make it -  
27 after I become President I begin to work very hard, but of course  
28 I was concerned about Sierra Leoneans and people. Anywhere there  
29 are conflicts I was concerned, yes.

1 Q. So after the intervention, did you educate yourself about  
2 atrocities committed by the junta, by the RUF and its allies from  
3 the AFRC?

4 A. Well, most of these reports were made to us as Heads of  
11:10:53 5 State, yes. I read some of the ECOMOG reports. I was a member.  
6 Remember, I was - I led the whole Sierra Leonean situation, so I  
7 was - I did get information about it, yes.

8 Q. So then you realised that the RUF were committing  
9 widespread and systematic atrocities against civilians. Is that  
11:11:16 10 true?

11 A. Yes, amongst the other groups. Like I said, all of the  
12 groups, yes.

13 Q. When did this dawn on you? When did you reach this  
14 realisation?

11:11:25 15 A. Well, I said by 1999 it really hit me. But your question  
16 was the information. We started getting the information after  
17 the intervention of the actions of all sides and we became very,  
18 very concerned and intensified - I intensified my efforts. By  
19 1999 the stories that came out of Freetown were horrific, and  
11:11:52 20 this is when I even redoubled my efforts with my colleagues  
21 pressing me to continue to work very hard, and we redoubled our  
22 efforts.

23 Q. Sir, were you aware that after the intervention, as the RUF  
24 fled and fled through Makeni, they committed widespread looting,  
11:12:10 25 widespread rapes against the civilian population of Makeni?

26 A. No, no, no, I was not aware to specific areas, Mr Koumjian.  
27 The briefing that was given to us by the ECOMOG commanders to  
28 Heads of State was there that there were lootings by the junta  
29 forces. We're talking about - this is February of 1998 and we go

1 to a meeting - in fact, almost immediately we hold a meeting and  
2 we are briefed by the ECOMOG forces commander.

3 Q. When were you aware, Mr Taylor, of the use of child  
4 soldiers by the RUF?

11:12:50 5 A. I was not aware of any - that was not amongst the ECOMOG  
6 reports that there were child soldiers. No, I was not.

7 Q. You had never received any information that there were  
8 child soldiers among the RUF?

9 A. No, I had never - I never received any such information,  
11:13:05 10 no.

11 Q. Had you heard about women being abducted and kept basically  
12 as sex slaves by the RUF?

13 A. No, no, I had not. I had not heard about that.

14 Q. Was that information that would interest you, or these were  
11:13:18 15 matters that were outside of your interest?

16 A. Well, they would be issues that would interest me, but I  
17 didn't go out asking questions. Most of the briefings that all  
18 of us received were given by ECOMOG, and if you bring any ECOMOG  
19 reports that would even - and most of these - what I know ECOMOG  
11:13:34 20 knew, ECOWAS knew, the Secretary-General of the United Nations  
21 knew. That's the kind of report that we got. But if your  
22 question is was it of interest to me, I really did not go asking,  
23 Mr Koumjian. I only dealt with what reached the international  
24 community.

11:13:51 25 Q. Sir, ECOMOG reported widespread atrocities by the RUF,  
26 didn't they?

27 A. Yes, yes.

28 Q. Sir, the United Nations reported widespread atrocities by  
29 the RUF, the use of child soldiers, sexual violence, killings and

1 amputations, correct?

2 A. It depends on when. You've been switching me between '99  
3 and '98. February, the intervention - you've been switching me  
4 between the intervention and the 6 January invasion and so it  
11:14:23 5 depends on now - by the intervention time, if you read the  
6 Secretary-General's report - because I know of that report.

7 We've presented copies here. Following the intervention - most  
8 of the issues that came up following the intervention that  
9 Liberia was concerned with was the presence of Liberians and  
11:14:47 10 that's what we were seized with at that time. So I'm not aware  
11 of the details. Following the 6 January '99 situation, yes,  
12 that's a different story. We begin to get more details based on  
13 even what - if you read the Secretary-General's report, what we  
14 all received, that's what I'm talking about.

11:15:09 15 Q. So in your role as a contact person with the parties to the  
16 conflict - do you accept that word? I'll use whatever you  
17 choose. Point man. Which word would you like me to choose,  
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yeah, I would like to say the point President, yeah,  
11:15:26 20 responsible.

21 Q. Point President?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Sir, as the point President in the negotiations, wouldn't  
24 it be important to understand who you're dealing with on the  
11:16:05 25 various sides?

26 A. Yes, it would be very important.

27 Q. So did you read up about what the RUF - who they were and  
28 what they were doing?

29 A. Yes. Whatever reports came I read the reports from ECOMOG,

1 yes.

2 Q. And did ECOMOG give you reports that the RUF were a good  
3 organisation, that they were kind to civilians?

11:16:31

4 A. No, that was not - that type of comment was not - being  
5 kind was not one of the comments that ECOMOG used to describe the  
6 RUF.

7 Q. In fact, didn't they report that they were committing  
8 atrocities against civilians?

9 A. I'm not disputing that, Mr Koumjian.

11:16:41

10 Q. Mr Taylor, isn't it interesting: Didn't you notice that  
11 throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone even though, as you say,  
12 ECOMOG had committed some offences, the civilians are always  
13 fleeing to ECOMOG and away from the rebels? Have you noticed  
14 that?

11:16:56

15 A. By "notice", no. I didn't notice that. But it would be  
16 clear to say that from what we were told that yes, they went to  
17 the Kamajors and they went to ECOMOG, so we - I mean, ECOMOG was  
18 supposed to be a last resort, I would say, yes.

19 Q. Can you remind me when it was that you were appointed the  
20 point President? It was after your election?

11:17:21

21 A. I would put that all the way back to 1997. Late 1997.

22 Q. Approximately when in 1997?

23 A. I said late 1997.

24 Q. Thank you. Sir, then it was only about two years after the  
25 Dayton Accords - and I know you're very knowledgeable on world  
26 affairs, so you're certainly aware of the Dayton Accords --

11:17:38

27 A. Dayton, Ohio.

28 Q. -- and the negotiations to end the war in Bosnia?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do you recall that the President of Serbia, who was not a  
2 party to - supposedly - claimed not to be a party to that  
3 conflict - was invited to Dayton because of his obvious influence  
4 over one of the warring parties, the Bosnian Serb entity? Do you  
11:18:07 5 recall that?

6 A. Yes, if you are speaking about Mr Milosevic?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Was that the President that caused you to be selected as  
11:18:15 10 the point President to deal with the RUF?

11 A. I would say no. I would say totally no. I think I was  
12 invited for several reasons. What my colleagues said - and I  
13 have told this Court - my colleague said to me, "Well, you're a  
14 former rebel. You know how to deal with rebels, so we want you  
11:18:37 15 to come on this committee to help us, because you would know how  
16 to deal with them." In the case of Milosevic, from my  
17 understanding of Milosevic, Milosevic, being President of Greater  
18 Serbia, was brought in because of his military prowess and his  
19 capacity as leading Serbia at the particular time. Two different  
11:19:03 20 reasons.

21 Q. Well, he was the President of the former Yugoslavia. He  
22 had never been in the army, sir, but he certainly had influence  
23 over military affairs, and there's plenty of precedents of that,  
24 aren't there?

11:19:16 25 A. No, well --

26 Q. Civilian Presidents with influence over military affairs?

27 A. Well, most civilian Presidents - in fact, the whole essence  
28 of democracy means that the military submits to the civilian  
29 head. That's the essence of the democratic process.

1 Q. Did you read the United Nations reports about atrocities  
2 committed in Sierra Leone?

3 A. Yes, the Secretary-General's report, I read them, yes.

4 Q. Did you read reports or get summaries of reports of the  
11:19:51 5 international human rights community, people like Amnesty, Human  
6 Rights Watch, and their reports that of the atrocities that were  
7 being carried out by the RUF and its allies in Sierra Leone?

8 A. No, no, I did not. I only read the Secretary-General's  
9 reports.

11:20:09 10 Q. Did you read the reports in Liberian newspapers about the  
11 atrocities being committed against the civilians in their  
12 neighbouring country, Sierra Leone?

13 A. Well, I received briefings on the reports. I did not very  
14 rarely grab up a whole bunch of papers to read. I had people  
11:20:25 15 that would summarise the important issues. But I received  
16 reports of what was reported in the papers as being reported in  
17 the international media, yes.

18 Q. Let's look a little bit at that situation after the  
19 intervention. The RUF was on the run, isn't that right?

11:20:47 20 A. When you say "on the run" --

21 Q. Thank you. That's a fair question. I'll try to clarify  
22 it. The RUF is militarily weakened?

23 A. Well, I would say I don't know. The intervention was  
24 against the junta and if you want to ask me if the junta - well,  
11:21:09 25 your question was the RUF. I don't really know, Mr Koumjian, if  
26 they were weakened or not.

27 Q. Was the junta weakened?

28 A. Well, I would say yes, they were destroyed.

29 Q. They were destroyed. In fact, the AFRC and the RUF, the

1 allies, had lost most of their heavy weapons that were in  
2 Freetown during the intervention. You knew that, didn't you?

3 A. No, I did not know.

4 Q. As the point person on peace, wasn't it important to  
11:21:30 5 understand the strategic situation?

6 A. Well, one could say that. But if your question is did I  
7 ask how many guns, how many pieces of artillery did they lose, I  
8 didn't get into that. For ECOWAS, driving the junta out of power  
9 was something that was agreed upon by ECOWAS. So for me

11:21:49 10 strategically I did not ask for the military and intricacies of  
11 loss of equipment. I didn't really get into that.

12 Q. You understand strategically the junta, the RUF and its  
13 AFRC allies, were retreating and weakened, correct?

14 A. Definitely. We received reports on that, yes.

11:22:11 15 Q. Sir, let me ask you this: At this point - let's even get a  
16 date so it will be clear to you. Let's say by April 1998, was it  
17 clear to you that anyone who continued to provide support to the  
18 RUF and the AFRC would be supporting a group engaged in a  
19 campaign against the civilian population of Sierra Leone?

11:22:32 20 A. Well, I would say no because I was not aware that - I was  
21 not aware of anyone that was giving - as you put the question,  
22 giving support to be aware that anyone that would continue. So I  
23 really don't know how to answer this question. To the best of my  
24 knowledge from reports that reached to the Heads of State, we did  
11:22:54 25 not get an indication that they were receiving support from  
26 outside.

27 Q. Sir, my question is: Would anyone who gave support to the  
28 RUF be giving support to a force that was carrying out a campaign  
29 of atrocities against civilians as of April 1998?

1 A. That never - you're talking about strategically thinking  
2 about it. No, it didn't - what I was hoping was that nobody  
3 would support the RUF. So I was not thinking in that particular  
4 direction, no.

11:23:27 5 Q. What did you do to make sure that no one would support the  
6 RUF?

7 A. Well, like I said, I was not aware that anyone was  
8 supporting the RUF in the first place to begin to plan that no  
9 one would do so. But what I did know at the particular time was  
11:23:43 10 that ECOWAS had taken a decision that the junta would not be in  
11 power. That had been accomplished. All of us took part in that  
12 by, you know, in making sure that they were removed. I provided  
13 bases for that. So as far as I'm concerned, the strategic  
14 interest of ECOWAS had been served and the international  
11:24:06 15 communi ty.

16 Q. Let's go back to my question because I don't believe you've  
17 answered it. The question is not whether you were aware of  
18 people providing support. The question is: If someone was  
19 providing support to the RUF/AFRC as of April 1998, they would be  
11:24:23 20 supporting a group engaged in a campaign of atrocities against  
21 the civilian population of Sierra Leone. Do you agree?

22 A. Well, to an extent you could say yes, anybody that would  
23 supply would be doing it against the civilians, yes.

24 Q. Now, what did you do to assist ECOMOG to weaken the RUF?

11:24:46 25 A. Well, it was not what I had to do. Nothing. I did  
26 absolutely nothing outside of - we're not operating by me or you.  
27 What did I do? Absolutely what was within the purview of ECOWAS  
28 to work to bring peace. That's what I did; work for peace.

29 Q. Mr Taylor, did it occur to you that the best solution for

1 the people of Sierra Leone would have been the defeat of the RUF  
2 and the AFRC?

3 A. Quite frankly, no. Personally, my views were part of a  
4 concerted view of many other individuals. My own personal view  
11:25:34 5 was that the return to peace and the recognition of the Kabbah  
6 government was the proper way to go. That was my personal  
7 thought.

8 Q. So because of that personal belief, did you refrain from  
9 doing anything that would weaken the RUF?

11:25:52 10 A. Well, I had nothing personal to do. Again I'm not going to  
11 get into personal, because the situation was not personal. So  
12 there was nothing - I did nothing personally. Absolutely nothing  
13 personally.

14 Q. Liberia was a member of ECOWAS at this time, of course?

11:26:14 15 A. It is, yes.

16 Q. And Liberia - in fact, what was your relationship to ECOMOG  
17 at that time?

18 A. Depending. We had - what time are you speaking about now?

19 Q. I'm talking about after the intervention. Just for  
11:26:31 20 precision's sake we'll call it, say, April 1998?

21 A. We had a bittersweet relationship.

22 Q. Did you do anything to assist or to hinder ECOMOG in the  
23 fight against the RUF in Sierra Leone?

24 A. That's two questions, Mr Koumjian. I've answered the first  
11:26:47 25 one. Did I do anything to assist them? Yes. Did I do anything  
26 to oppose them? No.

27 Q. What did you do to assist ECOMOG in the fight against the  
28 RUF?

29 A. We provided the use of Liberian territory, Roberts

1 International Airport, for air strikes against Sierra Leone.

2 Q. So providing a base for a force engaged in a conflict in a  
3 neighbouring country is a form of support for that force. Is  
4 that right?

11:27:15 5 A. Well, yes. I would say, yes.

6 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I would prefer to just break now  
7 if that's okay, a few minutes early, and try to gather some more  
8 thoughts.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: We've only got about two or three minutes  
11:27:33 10 to go anyway, Mr Koumjian. So we will take the morning break now  
11 and resume at 12 o'clock.

12 [Break taken at 11.27 a.m.]

13 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12:03:04 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I report a change in  
16 representation? Ms Hovington has left now and we are joined by  
17 Mr Munyard.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

19 Yes, please continue, Mr Koumjian.

12:03:16 20 MR KOUMJIAN: Thank you, your Honours. Mr President,  
21 before I begin, the page reference that was requested by counsel  
22 - I hopefully have the correct one now - and that is from 12  
23 February, page 3668 to 3669.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

12:03:35 25 MR KOUMJIAN:

26 Q. Mr Taylor, did you meet with your Defence team over the  
27 break?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And since you began your testimony --

1 A. I am sorry - I am sorry for interrupting. Not with my  
2 Defence team, no. I met with a member of the team, okay?

3 Q. Which member much your team did you meet with?

4 A. I met with Mr Griffiths.

12:04:00 5 Q. And since you began with your testimony on 14 July, how  
6 many times have you met with Mr Griffiths over the breaks in your  
7 testimony?

8 A. I can't recall, but I have met with - many, many, many  
9 times.

12:04:16 10 Q. Would you say on a daily basis when you're testifying you  
11 meet with Mr Griffiths over the breaks or whichever counsel's in  
12 court?

13 A. Not always during the break. Sometimes before the  
14 commencement of court we would - I would meet with a member of  
12:04:34 15 the team to talk, yes.

16 Q. Let's say you have testified, I believe, about 60 days, and  
17 that's an approximation. I believe testified 50 days or 51 days  
18 in your direct. Out of those days, approximately how many did  
19 you meet with Mr Griffiths?

12:04:54 20 A. I could say 50 to two-thirds of the time.

21 Q. Do you also speak with members of your Defence team via the  
22 telephone since you began testifying?

23 A. Yes, I have spoken to - yes.

24 Q. And can you tell me how do you understand the admonition  
12:05:15 25 that you have been given at the end of your testimony the first  
26 day and since then?

27 A. Well, my understanding is that I am not to discuss my  
28 testimony in any shape or form. That's my understanding of it.

29 Q. So in all of these meetings on breaks in the middle of your

1 testimony, you have not been discussing your testimony?

2 A. No, we do not discuss my testimony, no, no.

3 Q. Have you been speaking with Mr Supuwood since you began  
4 your testimony?

12:05:45 5 A. Oh, yes.

6 Q. And how do you speak to Counsellor Supuwood? Do you call  
7 him?

8 A. Yes. He calls me; I call him.

9 Q. Because the procedure is that a person cannot actually call  
12:05:57 10 you. They have to call in and then the detention unit will call  
11 them back. Is that correct?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And I think we have briefly discussed the incident where,  
14 in fact, Mr Supuwood called you - or someone saying their name  
12:06:12 15 was Supuwood called you two times while - and the second time you  
16 were still engaged in the first conversation. Do you recall  
17 that?

18 A. Yes, I do recall the explanation on the part of  
19 Prosecution, but the details are available.

12:06:31 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I hesitate to interrupt, but  
21 this particular topic has been covered on two prior occasions,  
22 and I am sure my learned friend, as the Prosecution have often  
23 stated, they are anxious to expedite the proceedings. I really  
24 don't see the sense in it being revisited for a third time.

12:06:51 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Mr Koumjian, what's the purpose of  
26 going back on this again? We do have Mr Taylor's answers on  
27 record, unless you have got some different aspect to question him  
28 on.

29 MR KOUMJIAN: I certainly have. I hope to ask different

1 aspects. I am not planning on asking the same questions and  
2 getting the same answers:

12:07:24 3 Q. Mr Taylor, when you - when Mr Supuwood called the second  
4 time, where was he? First of all, let me withdraw that. Were  
5 either of the phone calls that came in from Mr Supuwood,  
6 actually?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. One or both?

9 A. Both.

12:07:31 10 Q. Where was Mr Supuwood?

11 A. At his office.

12 Q. Where?

13 A. In Monrovia.

14 Q. And why was it that Mr Supuwood called you a second time  
12:07:42 15 while you were still talking, supposedly, to Mr Supuwood on the  
16 first call?

17 A. Well, the fact of the matter - this calls for an  
18 explanation now. The fact of the matter of that case, now that  
19 the Registrar has done what - I guess now we have to make sure we  
12:07:59 20 get all the documents before the Court. Mr Supuwood has two  
21 telephone numbers, and I made it very clear to the Registrar that  
22 it was my understanding that I could speak through that phone to  
23 members of that team in Monrovia, including my investigators. I  
24 was speaking to the investigator, who was in one room, and he had  
12:08:26 25 one phone, and Counsellor Supuwood was in another room. He was  
26 not aware I was still on the phone with the investigator when he  
27 called, and he was told that I was on the phone with somebody  
28 else. That's the matter; he has two telephones.

29 Q. He has two telephones. So what was the name of the

1 investigator that was speaking to you on the first call?

2 A. Well, I have two investigators in Monrovia. I was speaking  
3 to Mr Grey on the phone.

12:08:59

4 Q. And just for those who - there are some people in the  
5 audience and others following that may not realise that you have  
6 said this before. This was a privileged line in which you are  
7 guaranteed that no one will listen because it is a line where you  
8 can communicate with counsel, correct?

12:09:16

9 A. That is my understanding, but sometimes it's not always the  
10 case.

11 Q. So what you are saying is that Mr Supuwood called the  
12 detention unit, asked to speak to you, you called back, and did  
13 you actually speak? Did he answer the phone? Did you speak to  
14 him?

12:09:28

15 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes, he answered the phone.

16 Q. And then he handed the phone to Mr Grey, is that --

12:09:43

17 A. After some time. We were - they were going through an  
18 investigation of a potential witness and there were certain  
19 direct questions that the investigator needed to find out if I  
20 wanted to ask certain specific questions, and that was taking  
21 some time and --

22 Q. Just to clear up: I am not asking you what's going on with  
23 your investigation. I am just asking you about the phone calls.

24 A. Yes.

12:09:53

25 Q. So the phone was given to Mr Grey, and from another room  
26 Mr Supuwood called you again on another phone?

27 A. On another phone.

28 Q. So on a different line?

29 A. Yes, there were two telephones.

1 Q. In fact, there are two telephones. In fact, Mr Supuwood  
2 has one phone with a Liberian number that is approved for calls?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And another one with a Ghana number that's approved for  
12:10:16 5 calls?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Both calls were from the Liberian number; isn't that true?

8 A. That is not true.

9 Q. Are you saying that the records of the detention unit would  
12:10:23 10 show that the two calls were not from the same number?

11 A. Well, it depends on the forwarding. It depends on the  
12 forwarding, but the call did come on the Ghanaian number. The  
13 call that I made was on the Ghanaian number and the Liberian  
14 number.

15 Q. Sir --

16 A. In Liberia - let me just - because you are asking a  
17 question now. In Liberia, the telephone - the same telephone  
18 cell company, I understand, that operates in Ghana owns Liberia.  
19 There is very, very little difference. So even like roaming  
12:10:54 20 charges virtually are nonexistent. It was a roaming number.

21 Q. I'm not sure I understand the relevance of that  
22 information, but let me just be clear. The Ghanaian number has  
23 one number with the Ghana country code; the Liberian number has  
24 another number with the Liberia country code. Correct?

12:11:11 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And you cannot call on both lines from one telephone,  
27 correct, at the same time?

28 A. At the same time, of course not.

29 Q. And you're welcome. If the records of those calls would be

1 brought to the Court so the Court could see whether or not you  
2 were calling from the same line.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, Mr President, again, the point is the  
4 admission of documents during cross-examination currently sub  
12:11:43 5 judice. There is an outstanding motion filed by the Prosecution.  
6 For Mr Koumjian to be seeking, in effect, to trap the witness  
7 into saying "bring the documents" is, in our submission, quite  
8 unfair and unnecessary. Why don't they exercise some patience  
9 and wait until the outcome of that decision?

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the objection, Mr Koumjian, if you  
11 wish to respond.

12 MR KOUMJIAN: I would only say I understood Mr Taylor to  
13 make a statement that the records would reflect this, but I will  
14 move on. I am happy to move on and drop the subject of the  
12:12:18 15 records.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

17 MR KOUMJIAN:

18 Q. Mr Taylor, in fact, you told us that the Ghanaian line - in  
19 fact, you told us both lines - have the ability to forward the  
12:12:33 20 call. Correct?

21 A. Depending on where you are.

22 Q. Well, certainly the Ghana phone number has the ability to  
23 be forwarded to anywhere in the world. Correct?

24 A. I can't say that as reality. I don't know the technical  
12:12:48 25 thing, because some numbers don't operate, you know, depending on  
26 the contract of the forwarding. I don't really know the  
27 technical part, Mr Koumjian.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, is the reason that Mr Supuwood has a second  
29 phone so that you can communicate through that Ghanaian line to

1 other persons?

2 A. No, Mr Koumjian. Most lawyers have two telephone numbers  
3 listed. The reason he has the Ghanaian line is that when he is  
4 travelling on the road, those countries that Liberia cannot -

12:13:24 5 what do they call it? You cannot --

6 Q. Connect with?

7 A. -- roam to, the Ghanaian line would roam to. For example,  
8 when he travels on certain missions, it's virtually impossible to  
9 get him on one line. Sometimes you get him on another line.

12:13:40 10 Q. Mr Taylor, in fact, the truth about what happened that day  
11 is that, first, a call came in from someone identifying  
12 themselves as Supuwood on the Liberian line - excuse me, the  
13 Ghanaian line; approximately a half hour later, another call came  
14 in from someone saying they were Mr Supuwood on the Ghanaian

12:14:03 15 line. When the detention officer went to get you for the second  
16 call, you were still talking on the first line. That's correct?

17 A. I have said to this Court that I was still speaking on the  
18 line with the investigator in another room. Counsellor Supuwood  
19 is in another place, and he called not knowing I was still on the  
12:14:22 20 phone. I have said that. I didn't pick up the second call. The  
21 detention centre receives calls. I don't receive calls.

22 But again, you see, Mr Koumjian, we had an agreement that  
23 you would ask the questions and I will answer them. Now, again,  
24 we have a situation here where I am being questioned now on  
12:14:45 25 documents that I have not even had a chance to review, because  
26 also there are letters that I have from the Registrar on certain  
27 allegations that were made by the Registrar that the Registrar  
28 withdrew. So when we get into the authenticity of these reports  
29 that you are referring to that are still not before this Court, I

1 can only answer to the best of my knowledge. I disagree.

2 The Registrar says some things in the initial report to the  
3 United Nations that I have a letter from Binta Mansaray, whatever  
4 the name is, that they were wrong. So there could be so many  
12:15:17 5 other things that are wrong. So I haven't had the chance to  
6 review what you are referring to, but I will try to answer you as  
7 best as I can.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, just listen a bit more carefully to  
9 the question, please, Mr Taylor, because counsel did not mention  
12:15:32 10 any documents in that question he put to you.

11 THE WITNESS: I know, but I am trying to tell him that I  
12 disagree. His is putting documents, your Honour, that I am aware  
13 of that I have disagreement with, okay? So I can --

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: He's moved on since then. He has moved  
12:15:46 15 on since then. Just follow the question a bit more carefully.

16 What's your next question, Mr Koumjian?

17 MR KOUMJIAN:

18 Q. In fact, the fact of the matter was that when the detention  
19 officer realised that obviously you were not talking to two  
12:15:59 20 Mr Supuwoods on two different lines, that that was impossible,  
21 you, after a period of time of not talking to him, asked him to  
22 call Mr Supuwood on the Liberian line, the line that neither call  
23 came in from. Isn't that correct?

24 A. That is incorrect. I disagree with you.

12:16:20 25 Q. Mr Taylor, you have the technical possibility through  
26 Mr Supuwood's line to be connected to anyone in the world and  
27 speak to them on an unmonitored call, correct?

28 A. That is incorrect. The technical possibility, no,  
29 incorrect.

1 Q. I am going to go back to Foday Sankoh for a moment, but let  
2 me just say, Mr Taylor, anytime you have documents in your  
3 possession that are relevant to your answer, please let us know  
4 and you can refer to them if it refreshes your recollection or it  
12:16:57 5 helps you give a more complete answer.

6 Sir, you talked about meeting Foday Sankoh in Gbarnga -  
7 excuse me, I believe you said it was Buchanan where you first met  
8 Foday Sankoh, your first contact. Is that correct, sir?

9 A. I did not say Buchanan.

12:17:19 10 Q. Okay. I apologise. Where were you?

11 A. I said that the initial contact was in Harbel.

12 Q. When you met Foday Sankoh at that time, did it appear to  
13 you after your discussions that he had an organisation as strong  
14 as the NPFL?

12:17:39 15 A. I didn't evaluate that. I didn't ask him that or come to  
16 that conclusion, no.

17 Q. Well, since you were making an alliance and had a common  
18 enemy, wouldn't that be one of the first considerations or  
19 interests that you would have, the strength of your ally?

12:17:58 20 A. Yes, the strength of my ally would be of consideration, but  
21 that was not your question.

22 Q. So let me ask you, Mr Taylor, did you determine what was  
23 the strength of the RUF when you met Foday Sankoh?

24 A. No, I did not determine the strength of the RUF when I met  
12:18:16 25 Foday Sankoh, no.

26 Q. Was it clear to you, sir, that the RUF was a much weaker  
27 organisation at that time than the NPFL?

28 A. I would suppose so, yes. It was clear to me because they  
29 were new, yes.

1 Q. So at that time you were a more educated man, you had more  
2 experience as a leader. Would you agree with that?

3 A. Not necessarily, no.

12:18:42

4 Q. And you would agree that you were the head of a stronger  
5 organisation?

6 A. In a way I would - well, again, I am not going to be  
7 subjective about this. I wouldn't say that I believe I was the  
8 leader of a stronger organisation because, you know, strength,  
9 again, is relative. So I was the leader of my organisation; it  
10 was strong.

12:19:03

11 Q. Did you respect Foday Sankoh as an equal or did you  
12 consider him a subordinate or someone of lower rank?

13 A. For me, as leader of his organisation, he was, I would say,  
14 an equal.

12:19:18

15 Q. In your opinion, was he a strong leader?

16 A. I don't know. I don't know. I had not evaluated him in  
17 terms of leadership. No, I had no opportunity. This is a  
18 meeting. No, I had not evaluated him.

19 Q. Was he rational? Could you speak him to him and get  
20 rational answers?

12:19:41

21 A. Yes, he appeared to give rational answers militarily,  
22 yes.

23 Q. Did you establish a good personal relationship?

24 A. Well, I would say not a good personal relationship, but I  
25 tried to establish a relationship.

12:19:57

26 Q. Was Foday Sankoh - did he appear to you to be a brave man?

27 A. Somebody - yes, you got to be either brave or stupid to do  
28 what he did. I would say yes. I would call him a brave man,  
29 yes.

1 Q. Was he the kind of leader that never went to the front  
2 line, who was afraid of going to the front line?

3 A. I don't know, Mr Koumjian. I did not know at the time that  
4 I met him that he went or didn't go. I really don't know.

12:20:26 5 Q. Well, Foday Sankoh based in Gbarnga where you were. Is  
6 that correct?

7 A. Well, if I recall your question, I am still referring to  
8 the first meeting and I said I met him in Harbel, Mr Koumjian.

9 Q. Obviously I have moved on now, sir.

10 A. Oh, you have?

11 Q. Did Foday Sankoh base with you in Gbarnga?

12 A. Well, again, Foday Sankoh was not based with me in Gbarnga.

13 Q. Please explain what you mean when you say he was not based  
14 with you in Gbarnga.

12:20:57 15 A. Well, to be based means to be permanent, from my  
16 understanding, so he was not permanent. If your question is he  
17 visited me in Gbarnga, yes, but he was not based with me in  
18 Gbarnga, no.

19 Q. Well, he had his own house assigned to him by you. Is that  
12:21:11 20 correct?

21 A. I have said yes.

22 Q. And you also provided to him communications capability. Is  
23 that correct?

24 A. I have said yes.

12:21:20 25 Q. If Foday Sankoh is a leader of a group that is doing a  
26 revolution in Sierra Leone, why would he be in Gbarnga?

27 A. That's why I am saying he is not based. He visits. I have  
28 just said I am trying to draw a distinction for the judges of  
29 what my basing is and what his visitation was. I said to this

1 Court he visited.

2 Q. What was the period of time that Foday Sankoh was coming  
3 and going to Gbarnga?

4 A. I have told this Court.

12:21:46 5 Q. I'm sorry?

6 A. Between August 1991 and May 1992. I have said it a hundred  
7 times.

8 Q. So all through that period of time he was coming and going,  
9 approximately what percentage of that time was he actually in

12:21:59 10 Gbarnga?

11 A. Foday Sankoh did not go outside of Gbarnga and in again all  
12 through that time. I would say Foday Sankoh would come only to  
13 Gbarnga. He would not visit any other areas. So of the time he  
14 came to Gbarnga he spent a hundred per cent of whatever time he  
15 spent in Liberia in Gbarnga.

12:22:18

16 Q. My question - I'm sorry if it wasn't clear - was what  
17 percentage of the time did he spend in Gbarnga as opposed to in  
18 Sierra Leone?

19 A. Foday Sankoh only made a few visits over the years,  
20 Mr Koumjian. That was not his home. He spent I would say - if  
21 you look at the total period, I would say Foday Sankoh spent  
22 90 per cent of his time in Sierra Leone and maybe another, maybe  
23 5 or 10 per cent in Liberia. Very, very few visits to Liberia.

12:22:33

24 Q. Why was it necessary then to give him a house if he was  
25 only coming for very short visits?

12:22:56

26 A. We did not have any hotels in Gbarnga at that time, he  
27 could not live at my house and so we gave him a place. It was  
28 something like a guesthouse that he would use for whatever number  
29 of days he would be there. And that would be two, three days.

1 But we didn't have hotels in Gbarnga at the time, if not he would  
2 have lived in a hotel.

3 Q. Did you end up giving him some of your security to be his  
4 permanent bodyguards?

12:23:29 5 A. No.

6 Q. What about Jackson Swarray?

7 A. Quite frankly, I don't know how or when Jackson Swarray -  
8 when I heard that name Swarray, I thought he was Sierra Leonean,  
9 really. I remember the Swarray, no, but I never gave him to

12:23:48 10 Foday Sankoh, no.

11 Q. What is his nationality?

12 A. Quite frankly, to tell this Court the truth, I really don't  
13 know. Swarray is a Sierra Leonean name. I have heard that he is  
14 Liberian, but I really don't know his true nationality. Some  
15 people have said that he is Liberian. Some people have said he  
16 is Sierra Leonean. I don't know.

12:24:05

17 Q. Well, he served as your security and then he eventually was  
18 transferred to Foday Sankoh. Isn't that correct?

19 A. No.

12:24:14

20 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, again, I am sorry to  
21 intervene. These questions were asked and answered by Ms Hollis  
22 last week. The very same topic of Jackson Swarray was covered  
23 last week. I fail to see why we need to revisit this topic.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, that's the objection, Mr Koumjian.

12:24:36

25 MR KOUMJIAN: I don't know if counsel has a transcript  
26 reference, and it's certainly possible that in the 8,000 pages of  
27 transcript I have forgotten some questions and answers. I do  
28 know the name came up, but I do not believe - I do not recollect  
29 that the questions that I have asked were asked and answered.

1 But if counsel has a reference or - certainly Mr Taylor repeated  
2 his evidence on direct examination at times to remind us all of  
3 what he was saying.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I don't doubt what you say,

12:25:04 5 Mr Griffiths, but I personally don't have - apart from the name,  
6 I don't have a distinct memory of the evidence that came out last  
7 week.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I will find the passage.

9 MR KOUMJIAN: Well, I believe I can move on.

12:25:19 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, is it possible that you can move on  
11 to another topic and come back to that, if necessary.

12 MR KOUMJIAN: Yes:

13 Q. Sir, what were the purpose of these visits that Foday

14 Sankoh made to Gbarnga to see you the 5 or 10 per cent of his

12:25:43 15 time he was in Liberia?

16 A. Just sometimes Foday Sankoh came to purchase foodstuff and  
17 medicines for his people, to discuss the security situation on  
18 the border. Those were the purposes.

19 Q. Sir, I want to go back to 1998 just so you can refocus your  
12:26:10 20 mind timewise.

21 A. That appears to be forward now. We are dealing with '92.

22 Okay, so let's go.

23 Q. We talked this morning a bit about the intervention and you  
24 told us you supported the intervention by ECOMOG to restore the  
12:26:24 25 elected government of President Kabbah, correct?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. In fact, Mr Taylor, didn't your Liberian information  
28 Minister - is that Mr Mulbah at that time, sir?

29 A. Yes, if I recall, yes.

1 Q. Didn't he issue a release I believe on 10 February 1998  
2 saying that we think that it is pathetic in relation to the  
3 intervention and expressing the opinion that there should be no  
4 military solution in Sierra Leone?

12:26:54 5 A. Well, again, you have referred to a document here. I am  
6 sure we will probably look at that document. But let me just be  
7 very clear of the situation at that particular time. There were  
8 disagreements about the intervention before it took place because  
9 there was an agreement that by April 1998, if the junta did not  
10 leave power, ECOWAS would intervene. But Liberia did join the  
11 intervention, even though we disagreed, because this was the  
12 overwhelming decision on the part of ECOWAS.

13 So we did - I do not remember the particular reference you  
14 are making. I would hope that since it's available, maybe - if  
12:27:42 15 it's available through being marked for identification, I would  
16 like to read the full context. But there were disagreements,  
17 yes, about the intervention and the time it took place and  
18 Liberia saying that war was never going to solve the solution in  
19 Sierra Leone.

12:28:00 20 Q. So you do recollect that your government made statements  
21 that it opposed the military intervention of ECOMOG in February  
22 1998?

23 A. No, I don't recollect it in that way. What I do recollect  
24 is that my government always said that force would not solve the  
12:28:19 25 problem in Sierra Leone. This is couching it properly, yes.

26 Q. And that was directed to ECOMOG, that ECOMOG's use of force  
27 would not solve the situation in Sierra Leone?

28 A. I was speaking about generally ECOWAS. ECOMOG is an ECOWAS  
29 force. I was saying ECOWAS and this view was known by all of my

1 colleagues and I was not only one that felt that way either.

2 Q. In fact, the only way the junta was - that the people of  
3 Sierra Leone were able to be free of the junta was through the  
4 military intervention of ECOMOG in Freetown in February 1998,  
12:28:58 5 correct?

6 A. Well, yes, that's the method used and I am a part of that  
7 process too. Often there are disagreements and people come  
8 together. We are just hearing that Britain didn't support the  
9 invasion of Iraq but joined anyway. So, I mean, these things  
12:29:16 10 happen.

11 Q. Sir, you say you were supporting of ECOMOG. You certainly  
12 heard then about the horrible attack on ECOMOG forces and the  
13 civilians - let me withdraw that. You certainly heard about the  
14 attack on Koidu Town, Kono District, by the retreating AFRC/RUF  
12:29:41 15 forces after the intervention. You heard about that, didn't you?

16 A. I am not sure. Again, Mr Koumjian, I would not - the  
17 retreating attacks we heard generally. I would not deceive this  
18 Court by being specific as to I knew that this town came under  
19 attack. So when I say no, I know about general retreat and  
12:30:03 20 reports of attack. Now, I cannot be specific. I have heard  
21 mention, if my recollection is correct, through testimony here.  
22 But at the time I was not following, oh, they are in X town or Y  
23 town or Z town. No, I was not that specific.

24 Q. You hadn't heard of Koidu as the diamond capital of Sierra  
12:30:26 25 Leone?

26 A. No. Quite frankly, no.

27 Q. How many countries border Liberia?

28 A. Three.

29 Q. Did you receive reports from ECOMOG of the attack on Koidu

1 Town where civilians were burnt in their homes to death?

2 A. I did not receive any such report from ECOMOG as given to  
3 me. There may have been a report, but your question did I  
4 receive? No, I did not receive.

12:30:55 5 Q. Did you receive reports from any means about this burning  
6 of Koidu?

7 A. No, I didn't.

8 Q. And the punishment of the civilian population for opposing  
9 the RUF?

12:31:09 10 A. No. Did I receive? No, I did not receive any such  
11 reports.

12 Q. Mr Taylor, you were the point President, correct?

13 A. Well, you are asking me if ECOMOG made a report and did I  
14 receive it, no.

12:31:18 15 Q. As the point President, would you say now that you were a  
16 badly informed point President?

17 A. Well, it depends on the situation. I mean, I am responding  
18 only to your question. I am responding only to your question.

19 Were there reports through the United Nations? There were

12:31:37 20 reports. Your question was did I receive a report from ECOMOG?  
21 And my answer is no.

22 Q. So you did receive information through United Nations  
23 reports about these attacks --

24 A. Information that came, yes. There were all of these UN  
12:31:51 25 reports, I would say, yes, that information was available.

26 Q. So at that point it clearly was obvious to you that the RUF  
27 was engaged in a campaign - and its allies, the AFRC - of  
28 atrocities against the civilian population of Sierra Leone,  
29 correct?

1 A. No. Incorrect.

2 Q. What do you call burning people alive in their homes?

3 A. Well, again, Mr Koumjian, I am trying to answer your  
4 question, and I want the Court to understand - because I can see,  
12:32:28 5 you know, you are coming, attacking like a little attack dog, so  
6 I want to be very specific. I want to be clear as to my answer.  
7 You asked me a question and I was - when I say no, it is to your  
8 question.

9 Q. Well, I don't believe you have answered my question, so  
12:32:47 10 that means - no, wait, let me re-read it. You said - the  
11 question was: "So at that point it clearly was obvious to you  
12 that the RUF was engaged in a campaign with its allies from the  
13 AFRC of atrocities against the civilian population of Sierra  
14 Leone?" You said, "No. Incorrect."

12:33:06 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. The next question, sir --

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. So you were not aware of that?

19 A. What we received at that particular time from the United  
12:33:13 20 Nations and other things were dealing with the junta. In your  
21 question you mentioned RUF. When the reports came at that time,  
22 they did not distinction between RUF, AFRC. The reports that I  
23 recollect talked about junta forces retreating. So I answered  
24 specifically because you mentioned RUF, and that's not the report  
12:33:36 25 that I saw.

26 Q. Sir, if I say "the RUF and its allies, the AFRC," do you  
27 understand that to mean the junta?

28 A. Yes. But that came later on, yes.

29 Q. Do you consider burning people alive in their homes an

1 atrocity?

2 A. Terrible, terrible atrocity, Mr Koumjian.

3 Q. Did you receive reports about that occurring in Koidu by  
4 the junta forces by the RUF and the AFRC?

12:33:59 5 A. There were reports, yes. I did not receive them, but I got  
6 to know of these reports, yes.

7 Excuse, Mr President, just for the Court, you see, I am  
8 trying not to waste time. I am interpreting Mr Koumjian's  
9 question, "Did you receive as point President" ECOMOG coming to  
10 mean and saying, "Mr Point President, here is what is going on".  
11 So that's what I am responding to. So when you say, "Did you  
12 receive", it is as if there is a subordinate out there bringing  
13 you specific reports. So that's what I am responding to.

14 Now, did I read reports of such through United Nations  
12:34:48 15 agencies? Yes. So I don't want to be told later on: Well, you  
16 say you didn't know. That's not what I am saying. I am just  
17 saying for the Bench when you asked me, "Did you receive", that's  
18 how I am interpreting reception.

19 Q. So after reading these reports from the United Nations and  
12:35:04 20 other sources, what was your opinion of the leadership of the  
21 RUF?

22 A. Obviously, any - and, again, these reports were by the  
23 junta and all of them. Anyone that was involved in atrocities  
24 anywhere, I would give them a very, very low score that they were  
12:35:27 25 not acting properly.

26 Q. Did you believe that they were war criminals?

27 A. Well, I didn't get into the legal part of it, and we are  
28 talking about at this particular time, and a lot of people that -  
29 no, I did not get into that legalistic side. Never evaluated it

1 that way.

2 Q. But this was also a group that had already been isolated by  
3 the international community through the United Nations travel  
4 ban, correct?

12:36:00 5 A. In 1998?

6 Q. In 1997, actually, the United Nations issued a travel ban  
7 on members of the junta. Isn't that correct?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Did you support that?

12:36:14 10 A. A lot of things - no, I really don't - I really don't think  
11 travel bans are the business of the Security Council. I don't  
12 support it.

13 Q. Well, travel is something that can be valuable to a  
14 revolutionary group when it's seeking support, when it's seeking  
15 weapons and ammunition, correct?

12:36:34

16 A. Yes, I would agree.

17 Q. So up to this point, now, let's say we're - take us to June  
18 1998.

19 A. Yes.

12:36:49 20 Q. What had you done as the point President for the peace  
21 process?

22 A. We had --

23 Q. No, I'm sorry, I'm asking you what you personally had done,  
24 just so it's clear.

12:37:04 25 A. Well, that's what I am talking about "me" in terms of what  
26 I did, because I was doing a job for a group. So I would say  
27 "we". You are asking me me, but I did not operate alone. We had  
28 arranged - immediately I tried to arrange a ceasefire.

29 Q. How did you try to do that?

1 A. Well, we got in touch with ECOMOG, and we tried to talk to  
2 some of our leaders to try to see how we could find a way to stop  
3 the hostilities and try to get people to return to the 1996  
4 agreement that had been signed between the RUF and Tejan Kabbah.

12:37:58 5 Q. Actually, sir, that was with the AFRC government and the  
6 Kabbah government and the international community. You are  
7 talking about the October 1997?

8 A. No, I did not say that.

9 Q. You are talking the Abuja Accord, sir?

12:38:13 10 A. No, I am speaking about the 1996 Abidjan Accord signed by  
11 the RUF and the Tejan Kabbah government. That's the basis for  
12 all of these agreements.

13 Q. So if you're --

14 A. Are you getting to the point yet?

15 Q. [Overlapping speakers]. Thank you.

16 A. Oh, okay.

17 Q. So when you are talking about the Abuja Accords then, that  
18 was a document, as you pointed out, between the RUF and the  
19 Kabbah government - Abidjan, excuse me. The Abidjan Accord  
12:38:42 20 between the RUF and the Kabbah government, correct?

21 A. In 1996, yes.

22 Q. Right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So did you contact the RUF? They were a party to that.

12:38:49 25 A. We did every possible thing, yes. We tried to - mind you  
26 now, we are talking still about - by 1998, at this particular  
27 time, it's very, very, very difficult. We tried to use UN  
28 sources in Sierra Leone to try to get - to try to get to the RUF.  
29 It was very, very difficult. And then the five Heads of State,

1 along with UN sources, got together and agreed that we should  
2 permit members of the junta and others to come outside for the  
3 first time to talk to some of us.

4 Q. Was the Kabbah government aware of that?

12:39:45 5 A. Yes, Kabbah was always aware.

6 Q. And the five Heads of State include, of course, Nigeria?

7 A. At the time of - Nigeria was aware, yes.

8 Q. Nigeria was aware?

9 A. Yes, Nigeria was aware.

12:40:01 10 Q. Do you have that correspondence where you made Nigeria  
11 aware?

12 A. Aware of the peace process?

13 Q. Of what you just said. You said that there was an  
14 agreement among the five Heads of State that you would permit  
15 members of the junta and others to come outside.

12:40:17 16 A. Yes, there is a document that we've displayed here. It's  
17 marked for identification. In late 1997, Secretary-General's  
18 report that did say in that report that members of the junta and  
19 other senior people were given permission to leave Sierra Leone.  
12:40:36 20 That has been - it is marked as identification as part of our  
21 exhibits here of the Secretary-General's report in late 1997 - I  
22 mean - yes.

23 Q. How did you try to contact the RUF?

24 A. I have said we tried to use UN sources in Sierra Leone.

12:40:55 25 Q. It wouldn't be difficult to contact the leadership of the  
26 RUF, was it?

27 A. It was very difficult at that particular time, because we  
28 had not had any contacts with the RUF since the - since 1992, so  
29 it was very difficult.

1 Q. You had the support of Nigeria in this endeavour is what  
2 you have told us, correct?

3 A. In what endeavour?

12:41:21

4 Q. The endeavour to bring peace and to contact the RUF. Did  
5 you have any reason why Nigeria did not support you?

6 A. If I recollect my answer to you, you asked me how did I try  
7 to contact them. I said through UN sources.

8 Q. Well, my question is: Did you have the support of Nigeria  
9 in trying to contact the RUF?

12:41:37

10 A. Of course, yes. Nigeria --

11 Q. So it wouldn't be difficult to contact the leader of RUF at  
12 that time, was it?

12:41:49

13 A. Of course it would be difficult. We are talking about -  
14 remember now you pushed me to 1998. The intervention has

15 occurred in February. You have come all the way up to April,  
16 Mr Koumjian. By this particular time, you know the bad blood.

17 ECOMOG is being looked at, especially the Nigerian troops. It  
18 would have been silly for anyone to ask to send Nigerian troops

12:42:11

19 to contact the RUF, when you know that following that February  
20 situation in 1998 there were constant conflicts going on and we  
21 were trying to get a cessation of hostilities.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, you are telling us - you are telling these  
23 judges, as I understand it, that the President of Nigeria was  
24 fully on board, fully supportive of you playing a role as a point  
25 person on peace and contacting the parties?

12:42:28

26 A. Of course, and that's factual. We have got evidence -  
27 documentary evidence to that, yes.

28 Q. Where was Foday Sankoh at this time in April/June 1998?

29 A. April/June 1998, Foday Sankoh was still, to the best of my

1 recollection, incarcerated in Nigeria.

2 Q. So did you arrange to speak to him on the phone or to meet  
3 him in person?

4 A. No, no, no.

12:42:54 5 Q. Why not?

6 A. But why would I want to? He is incarcerated in Nigeria.  
7 Why would I want to speak to him to arrange - no --

8 Q. Because he is the leader of the RUF, and you're trying to  
9 tell this Court that you were the point person on peace and  
10 trying to bring the RUF back to the Abuja Accords. Why wouldn't  
11 you meet with Foday Sankoh?

12 A. But why would I want - he is already in Nigeria. Nigeria  
13 is a member of the delegation, I mean, so they can speak to him  
14 too.

15 Q. Because you - sorry.

16 A. Any member of the Committee of Five could speak. I am the  
17 point man, but he is in Nigeria. I can remember in my testimony  
18 before this Court at one point I had asked Abacha to meet with  
19 Foday Sankoh, and he did not put through that, I mean, for me to  
12:43:41 20 meet with Foday Sankoh because they were meeting with him on that  
21 side. I did request that. That evidence is very clear.

22 Q. When was that that you asked Abacha to meet with Foday  
23 Sankoh?

24 A. During the time that Foday Sankoh was incarcerated  
12:43:55 25 somewhere in 1998.

26 Q. Is this before or after the intervention?

27 A. That would be after the intervention.

28 Q. So it was clear to you at that point - and this then would  
29 be before June 1988, because that's when Sani Abacha died,

1 correct?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. So it was clear to you sometime between February and June  
4 of 1998 that Nigeria was against your contacting the RUF,

12:44:19 5 correct?

6 A. No, that is totally incorrect. If they were against me  
7 contacting the RUF, they would have objected to my role on the  
8 committee and that's what - you are trying to, again, bring one  
9 of your tricky things. I never said that. They were not against  
10 me being in contact with the RUF. Totally no.

12:44:38

11 Q. Sir, if your dealings as the point person, as a true  
12 neutral party, were aboveboard, why didn't you go to Nigeria and  
13 meet with Foday Sankoh or at least arrange to speak to him on the  
14 telephone?

12:44:57

15 A. I just told you that the Nigerians were dealing with that  
16 angle. I asked Abacha to speak to him. We have presented a  
17 letter that is marked for identification before this Court of  
18 which I asked - I mentioned to Abacha that I had asked to meet  
19 Foday Sankoh, and he had not completed that process. But for me,  
20 we were a team working on this, Mr Koumjian. I am the point man,  
21 but I was not a dominant person. I shared my information. We  
22 shared ideas on what was going on. Nigeria had their own reason  
23 for even holding Mr Sankoh at that particular time, and Nigeria  
24 was the power at that particular time and there were

12:45:24

25 disagreements as to how even they conducted themselves, I can  
26 say. So - but I did make the attempt, but that did not muddy my  
27 role, no.

12:45:48

28 Q. So instead of contacting Foday Sankoh, who did you try to  
29 contact?

1 A. Well, we were trying to - by this particular time, from all  
2 indications, Sam Bockarie was in control of the RUF during the  
3 incarceration of Foday Sankoh, and we tried to ask some of the UN  
4 through their contacts to see if they could get in touch with  
12:46:30 5 him. But that was not successful during that period.

6 Q. Which UN contacts did you use to try to contact Sam  
7 Bockarie?

8 A. Well, once we informed the UN offices there to - I don't  
9 know what contacts they use in Sierra Leone. We informed the UN  
12:46:46 10 offices in Liberia that, "Look, get to your colleagues in Sierra  
11 Leone, see if they have any contacts," because the UN was always  
12 seen as a neutral force. "Get in contact with your people and  
13 see if there is any way we can make a link with the RUF." So I  
14 don't know who was contacted in Sierra Leone. In Liberia, we  
12:47:05 15 dealt with the UN mission in Liberia.

16 Q. So clearly documentation would exist from the United  
17 Nations about that request?

18 A. Well, I don't know. You should be able to know. I would  
19 hope so, but we don't have access to all UN documents. Some of  
12:47:21 20 them we don't have. I don't have access to all of those.

21 Q. Certainly you would have had your copies of your  
22 documentation of letters written and received regarding these  
23 efforts?

24 A. Well, Mr Koumjian, again, I never said to this Court that I  
12:47:36 25 wrote a letter.

26 Q. You would have reports from someone that you sent - you are  
27 saying that you had absolutely no documentation about this effort  
28 to have the United Nations --

29 A. I said --

1 Q. Excuse me, sir. Let me complete the question.

2 A. I'm sorry.

3 Q. Thank you. To contact Sam Bockarie. You have absolutely  
4 no documentation about that?

12:47:54 5 A. I have no documentations of that at this time, no.

6 Q. So after you asked the United Nations to get you in contact  
7 with Sam Bockarie, what happened?

8 A. They were unsuccessful. They told us that they had no one  
9 behind the line. By behind the line they meant outside of

12:48:21 10 Freetown that could contact him, but luckily later on we do. He  
11 makes an attempt to contact us.

12 Q. Well, who was it from the United Nations that told you  
13 that?

14 A. We spoke to the UN officer in Liberia. I am sure I had one  
12:48:35 15 of my ministers, my Minister of State Tambakai Jangaba - in fact,  
16 the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs - of State for Foreign  
17 Affairs talk to his UN contact to see as to whether they could  
18 make a contact with Mr Bockarie.

19 Q. And who reported that the efforts to contact him were  
12:48:56 20 unsuccessful? Who reported that to you?

21 A. Mr Tambakai Jangaba, the deputy minister at the time  
22 responsible for that Sierra Leonean programme.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that name on the records?

24 THE WITNESS: It is on, your Honour. Tambakai Jangaba is  
12:49:15 25 on.

26 MR KOUMJIAN:

27 Q. So after this unsuccessful effort that you claim you made  
28 through the United Nations, what happened regarding your efforts  
29 to bring peace to Sierra Leone?

- 1 A. Well, we continued the peace process throughout the period  
2 you are talking about because I was concerned - the very period  
3 you are talking about now, Mr Koumjian, yes, I am working with  
4 Sierra Leone, but I am also concerned with Liberia because we are  
12:49:50 5 now accused of having Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone. So  
6 Luckily for us - you are talking about June, July. By August,  
7 the RUF make their own contacts with the Government of Liberia.  
8 Q. Now, was this the first contact you had with Sam Bockarie?  
9 A. Very, very, very first, ever.
- 12:50:15 10 Q. You're sure of that?  
11 A. I am as sure as I'm alive, yes.  
12 Q. This first meeting with Sam Bockarie, how was it arranged?  
13 A. The first meeting with Mr Bockarie was arranged following  
14 contacts made at our embassy in Guinea and then we - that set up  
12:51:08 15 the contacts and then we sent to the border and had him brought  
16 to Gbarnga - I mean to Monrovia.  
17 Q. Who did you send to the border to have him brought to  
18 Monrovia?  
19 A. I sent General Dopoe Menkarzon to bring Bockarie to  
12:51:32 20 Monrovia.  
21 Q. And are you sure about that?  
22 A. I am very, very, very sure, Mr Koumjian. Very sure.  
23 Q. You wouldn't tell the Court contradictory stories about  
24 your first contact with Sam Bockarie, would you?  
12:51:46 25 A. No, I wouldn't. There would be no reason to do that. If I  
26 admit that he came, I would not lie to the Court about how he  
27 came, no. That would be silly.  
28 Q. Well, let's look at the transcript from 14 July, page  
29 24337. Could that be shown to Mr Taylor? Is that possible?

1 Mr Taylor, take your time reading this because I don't want  
2 you to accuse me of putting --

3 A. No, no, go ahead.

4 Q. I just want to make sure you understand exactly the  
12:52:49 5 context, but I am going to ask you beginning at line 25. You  
6 were asked by your counsel:

7 "Q. What year did you first make contact with Sam  
8 Bockarie?

9 A. Our first real contact with Sam Bockarie was in late  
12:53:22 10 1997 to early 1998. I can't recall the exact month, but it  
11 was very close around this time following the second Heads  
12 of State meeting which occurred in September. So I would  
13 put it about the last quarter in 1997 to the beginning of  
14 '98 when we - I ordered the general at the Lofa side of the  
12:54:01 15 border to contact Sam Bockarie and RUF people to invite him  
16 to Liberia for discussions and to inform him what my role  
17 was and on whose behalf I was acting, which was ECOWAS."

18 Let's keep reading. You were then asked by your counsel:

19 "Q. What's the name of the general in Lofa?

12:54:24 20 A. Sadly so there is also a Mosquito in Liberia. The name  
21 is General Christopher Vambos, AKA Mosquito, who knew Sam  
22 Bockarie during the period that the RUF and the NPFL  
23 cooperated."

24 A. Yes.

12:54:45 25 Q. So, Mr Taylor, when you told this Court a few moments ago  
26 you were very, very sure that your first contact with Sam  
27 Bockarie was in September 1998, that wasn't true, was it?

28 A. It was totally true. And what you have done, Mr Koumjian,  
29 you have to go back into the records because we have gone through

1 - past this record, we have corrected this I remember. My  
2 testimony before this Court, I have given this Court in very deep  
3 details September, October and November of 1998 of Sam Bockarie's  
4 coming, the third trip going to Burkina Faso, the second trip  
12:55:24 5 giving him a house. These dates were corrected in the record so  
6 you have to go back in the records.

7 So when I told this Court again today that it is in 1998,  
8 it is correct. We have gone through my ambassador with Eddie  
9 Kanneh going. So the information here has been corrected on the  
12:55:41 10 records.

11 Q. So, sir, what I just read to you is not true, what was said  
12 on 14 July?

13 A. The records have been corrected on this matter.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, why did you say on 14 July, very specifically,  
12:55:58 15 that you met Sam Bockarie in late '97 to early 1998 and that you  
16 sent Liberian Mosquito to get him; a completely different story  
17 than you have been telling the Court since then?

18 A. But did this document that you just read say that I sent  
19 Mosquito to get him? Where does it say that in this record?  
12:56:19 20 This record that you just read, it doesn't even say I sent him to  
21 get him. It says that I asked the commander to get in contact.  
22 That's not my understanding of this record. So you are  
23 misquoting the record.

24 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, what were you telling the Court on 14 July  
12:56:35 25 when you just told us a few moments ago that you never had any  
26 contact with Sam Bockarie before September '98?

27 A. If you read the document, Mr Koumjian, it is very clear as  
28 to the certainty September '97, late '97, '98 September, and this  
29 particular issue came up and we went through at length, the

1 records have been corrected, because this year situation was an  
2 issue that was corrected on the record. So if you only take this  
3 part of the record and don't go after the fact when all of the  
4 records have been corrected and I have been questioned numerous  
12:57:13 5 times, all the records even in examination-in-chief. So if you  
6 go to a corrected statement that had been made and you do not  
7 refer to the corrected statement but you refer to the one that  
8 was corrected, then I have a difficulty with that. What I have  
9 just said to this Court is the fact and that is on the record.

12:57:34 10 Q. Sir, I am just trying to understand your meaning when you  
11 say the record has been corrected. Are you saying that this was  
12 recorded incorrectly, that these were not the words that you said  
13 on 14 July?

14 A. Years have been tumbling matters for these judges and the  
12:57:53 15 year was the question that has been corrected.

16 Q. When was that corrected, sir.

17 A. Oh, you have to go. I can't go through it. But tons of  
18 records that the three times Sam Bockarie came, they go into  
19 Burkina Faso. We have been through this. Lead counsel and if I  
12:58:05 20 am not mistaken even I think your colleague may have touched it,  
21 I am not too sure.

22 Q. Just so we are clear we understand what you mean by  
23 corrected, you are saying that if you say something inconsistent  
24 that means that you have corrected it?

12:58:19 25 A. No, not something inconsistent. Throughout this trial,  
26 many witnesses, Mr Koumjian, have had problems and sometimes you  
27 speak and you misspeak, you talk about one year and then late  
28 this year or late the other year. There is not an inconsistency  
29 here. I am sure the Defence team will be able to bring you at

1 least 3 or 4,000 pages that have corrected this particular  
2 situation of the time involved here. I am sure of that.

3 Q. Sir, did you have trouble recognising the difference  
4 between Christopher Vambos, Liberian Mosquito and Dopoe  
12:59:02 5 Menkarzon? Are they twins?

6 A. No, they are not twins.

7 Q. Dopoe Menkarzon, was he Special Forces?

8 A. Very much so, yes.

9 Q. And approximately how old is he now?

12:59:10 10 A. I don't know Dopoe's age. I'm sorry. I don't know. If  
11 you want me to guess, I can take a wild guess.

12 Q. Please.

13 A. I would put Dopoe between maybe between 35 and 40.

14 Q. And how old is Christopher Vambos?

12:59:24 15 A. I would say probably about 35. I am just guessing. I am  
16 just taking a wild guess at it.

17 Q. So was Dopoe Menkarzon in Libya with you?

18 A. Yes, Dopoe Menkarzon was in Libya.

19 Q. At the time that the bombing - of the American bombing of  
12:59:47 20 Libya, was he there?

21 A. I don't know because the groups were spread, they went over  
22 time in small groups. I do not know his group as to whether he  
23 was there.

24 Q. Would he have been there within a year, let's say, of that  
13:00:03 25 bombing?

26 A. I can't recall really.

27 Q. Well, within two years of the bombing?

28 A. I can't recall.

29 Q. How many years were your forces in Libya?

1 A. Two years.

2 Q. Well, from 1996 that would go to 1998, so that would  
3 be - excuse me, 1988. 1986 to 1988, so that's 21 years ago. So  
4 if you're saying that he is 35 to 40, you are saying --

13:00:31 5 A. Mr Koumjian, you asked me to take a wild guess.

6 Q. He was between 14 and 19 at that time?

7 A. Excuse me, Mr Koumjian. I'm sorry. If I am going to be  
8 taken this way again, I am not going to be helpful in that way.

9 I said to these judges I am only taking a wild guess, so - but if  
10 you are going to try to hold me this way in the future, I would  
11 not even try to help by guessing. So I withdraw that statement.  
12 I don't know his age.

13 Q. Can you tell us approximately how old he was in Libya?

14 A. I can't tell, Mr Koumjian.

13:01:13 15 Q. So in 1998 now, your corrected version, is that you brought  
16 Sam Bockarie for the first time - your first contact in  
17 September. Tell us what happened when he arrived in Monrovia.

18 A. Well, Mr Koumjian, you see, I don't want us getting into  
19 this fussing. When you make a statement "your correct version"  
13:01:32 20 as though I corrected it here today. It is not corrected here  
21 today. The version is the version I have given. It's not a  
22 corrected version as though you just found some inconsistency. I  
23 am not stupid.

24 Q. Fine. Let's move on.

13:01:48 25 A. Okay, so let's move on then.

26 Q. Sir, what happened when Sam Bockarie arrived in September  
27 1998?

28 A. Mr Bockarie arrived in September 1998. We talked about the  
29 peace process and getting a cessation of hostilities in Sierra

1 Leone because, like I said, after the intervention in February,  
2 they did not have total cessation of hostilities. He showed  
3 interest in what I had to say and said that one of the things on  
4 his mind - or the RUF - was the release of their leader. So I  
13:02:26 5 said, well, fine, that is an issue that I would discuss with  
6 other colleagues in ECOWAS. But what we were interested in was  
7 making sure that we had peace and a return to the 1996 agreement  
8 that had been signed in La Cote d'Ivoire. That was my  
9 conversation with him.

13:02:45 10 Q. Thank you. So it was clear at that time to you that Sam  
11 Bockarie still recognised Foday Sankoh as a leader of the RUF?

12 A. Well, I tell you what, I can only say what he said to me;  
13 that they wanted Foday Sankoh released. That was one of the  
14 conditions he said.

13:03:07 15 Q. Well, in fact, the words you used were: "He showed  
16 interest in what I had to say and said that one of those things  
17 in his mind were the RUF was the release of their leader." So  
18 did you understand him to be saying that the RUF still recognised  
19 Foday Sankoh as their leader?

13:03:30 20 A. Well, I would say - I could say subjectively yes. I mean,  
21 he said that they wanted, you know, their leader released.  
22 That's how he put it, yes. I would say yes.

23 Q. Did you then try to contact Foday Sankoh in Nigeria?

24 A. No.

13:03:47 25 Q. Excuse me, because I may be misleading. He was brought -  
26 around that time he was brought to Sierra Leone. Is that  
27 correct?

28 A. I know he was transferred, what, about --

29 Q. I think it was August.

1 A. August, yeah, about 1998.

2 Q. Did you call President Kabbah and say: Look, I am the  
3 point man on peace. RUF, I want to deal with them. Let me speak  
4 to Foday Sankoh to bring peace to Sierra Leone?

13:04:08 5 A. No, I did not do that. That's not the way it's done. It's  
6 not done that way.

7 Q. Did you do that through diplomatic channels, through your  
8 foreign minister or through the United Nations?

9 A. No, it's not done that way. It's not done that way.

13:04:21 10 That's not the way it's done. Once I heard what he said, I made  
11 sure that that information was communicated with the members of  
12 the Committee of Five. I was not given authority to do any and  
13 everything I wished. Even when I received the information in  
14 August that Sam Bockarie wanted to come to see me, I consulted  
13:04:42 15 all of my colleagues. They felt it was a good idea. He came in  
16 September. After that meeting, I consulted with all of them.  
17 Kabbah had to know. He knew. He was not a member of the  
18 committee, but he was known as the leader, so he was briefed of  
19 the RUF's demands. Everybody was aware.

13:05:02 20 Q. This is very critical, so, Mr Taylor, if I can ask you to  
21 try to recall. Tell us exactly who it was that you contacted and  
22 informed - you said all of your colleagues - that you were  
23 meeting with the military leader of the RUF in September 1998.

24 A. The members of the Committee of Five. We are talking about  
13:05:19 25 La Cote d'Ivoire, we had - Ghana was a member, Nigeria, who else?  
26 I think Guinea was also a member of that committee. All the  
27 leaders.

28 Q. Sir, do you have any - have you produced to this Court or  
29 do you have in your possession any documentation that you

1 informed anyone that you were bringing the military leader of the  
2 RUF to Monrovia?

13:05:56 3 A. Well, I'll tell you what happened. When you look at the  
4 agreement - the way these things work, Mr Koumjian, the United  
5 Nations had approved the movement of these individuals, and the  
6 only - the best measurement of this is if and when Sam Bockarie  
7 came to Liberia, and even went to see the OAU chairman in Burkina  
8 Faso in late 1998, if it had been done inconsistent with what was  
9 expected, there would have been yells and screams all over the  
13:06:22 10 place. But what is available for this Court through records are  
11 the accounts of those different meetings and the efforts that  
12 we're making that had been reported in United Nations documents.  
13 So if your question is do I have - like, I sent a circular letter  
14 around? That did not happen, but there are UN accounts of these  
13:06:46 15 meetings.

16 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, I am putting to you that there are no UN  
17 accounts of these meetings and you haven't produced any of them;  
18 that the UN exemption on travel for Lome occurred, of course, in  
19 the middle of - early 1999; not in 1998.

13:07:02 20 A. Mr Koumjian, you are so wrong. You have got to let Chris  
21 re-check it.

22 Q. Sir --

23 A. In 1998 - in 19 - back in 1997, there is a United Nations  
24 document marked for identification here that did grant junta  
13:07:17 25 individuals and others to travel. That is here. It's marked for  
26 identification. It's in this Court. I am certain about that.

27 Q. Perhaps your counsel could --

28 A. Now, the exemption for 1999 is a different matter. I am  
29 talking about going all the way back to 1997.

1 Q. Perhaps your counsel could assist by bringing us that  
2 document or telling us the number so you can refer us to it now,  
3 if that's possible.

4 A. No, I mean, I --

13:07:56 5 Q. [Microphone not activated]. Mr Taylor, I am putting it to  
6 you that there is no United Nations document that would grant you  
7 the power to bring - to exempt Sam Bockarie from the travel ban  
8 and bring him to Monrovia in September 1998. There has been no  
9 document produced here because there is no such document. What  
13:08:14 10 do you say to that?

11 A. You are dead wrong. I am saying that you are dead wrong.  
12 That document is alive in this courtroom. That was in a  
13 Secretary-General's report, that members of the junta were - in  
14 fact, their names were - in fact, some of them were suggested  
13:08:34 15 that could travel. That document exists. It was a United  
16 Nations document, Secretary-General's report. I am certain of  
17 that.

18 Q. Secretary-General's report from 1997; is that what you are  
19 saying?

13:08:45 20 A. Late - that report came out in late 1997. So what you have  
21 put to me, you are wrong.

22 Q. So what you are saying is this came out before - long  
23 before you brought Sam Bockarie to Monrovia?

24 A. The junta - from the junta members to travel, members of  
13:09:02 25 the junta, late 1997, yes.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm putting it to you that you don't have - you  
27 haven't produced any document - Secretary-General's report from  
28 1997 - December 1999.

29 A. I did not say December. I said late 1997. You have tied

1 me to a month. That came out in late 1997. It's marked for  
2 identification here.

3 Q. In fact, the only document you could possibly be referring  
4 to was dated December '98, which is long after you say you

13:09:35 5 brought Sam Bockarie three times to Monrovia.

6 A. Well, that could be another document. But I do recall a  
7 Secretary-General's report that granted the juntas and their  
8 officials permission to leave and travel, and that's the basis  
9 for that invitation at that particular time, yes.

13:09:57 10 Q. Well, you have access to your documents, correct?

11 A. Well --

12 Q. You personally, sir, do you have access to your documents?

13 A. Those that have been marked for identification right now?

14 Q. Yes.

13:10:10 15 A. I don't have access to them. They are with the Court.

16 Q. You don't have copies of your exhibits, DCTs?

17 A. No, I don't have them.

18 Q. Not at the moment, but in your - during the break or  
19 overnight where you could bring this document and show us - tell  
20 us which number it is.

13:10:24 21 A. Well, I tell you, I don't know if they can - listen,  
22 Mr Koumjian. Mr Koumjian, look, there is a United Nations  
23 document before this Court that permitted junta and other  
24 officials of that junta to travel. It is based on that that Sam  
13:10:44 25 Bockarie came to Liberia. Now, you want to get me to months? I  
26 could very well be wrong, about maybe late '97 or late 1998. I  
27 am not going to - that's for the judges to decide. I acted on a  
28 document. And mind you, that decision was made before the  
29 Secretary-General's report.

1 Now, the Secretary-General's report, okay, is reflecting -  
2 and assuming it's in December 1998, the Secretary-General's  
3 report comes after the fact. The September visit was covered. I  
4 remember that document. So, I mean, you brought it. We will  
13:11:23 5 produce the document --

6 Q. This document - I'm sorry. Thank you. We'll appreciate -  
7 we look forward to that.

8 A. Excuse me, Mr Koumjian, are you saying that you admit that  
9 there is a document, but I have got the year wrong? Is this your  
13:11:33 10 point?

11 Q. No. Let me make it very clear to you, Mr Taylor, you never  
12 informed anyone that you were bringing Sam Bockarie, the United  
13 Nations, or the other members of the Committee of Five in  
14 September '98, and you have no documentation about that because  
13:11:45 15 it was a clandestine visit; is that clear? That's my position.

16 A. But your position is totally wrong. I disagree. And if it  
17 is clandestine and he is travelling all over West Africa, then  
18 that's not my knowledge of clandestine. So I 100 per cent  
19 disagree with you. 100 per cent.

13:12:07 20 Q. Now, sir, we were told a couple of times in this case that  
21 you had 50,000 pages of documentation, 25 boxes. Correct?

22 A. No, I don't recall the numbers, Mr Koumjian. I know this  
23 Court has been told that I have boxes of documents. I don't  
24 recall specific the number 50,000 or 100,000.

13:12:25 25 Q. I take - perhaps that didn't come from you. Perhaps that  
26 came from your counsel, so I won't hold you to the number. You  
27 talked about 25 boxes. You said 15 boxes were from - collected  
28 by you just before you left Liberia being aware of this case. Is  
29 that correct?

1 A. I said - well, I'll tell you what, to - if you really want  
2 to be correct, the numbers 15 and 10 came from you, came from the  
3 prosecution, okay? About numbers, really, was suggested by the  
4 Prosecution, about 10 boxes at the office and 15 boxes at this  
13:13:00 5 side. I have said that there were several boxes, and we went  
6 along with the numbers. And if I recall, I said, "Well, hey,  
7 I'll go along. I'm not going to fuss about numbers."

8 Q. To be fair to you, as I recall it, Ms Hollis was quoting  
9 from Mr Griffiths at the hearing, so the numbers may not - of  
13:13:17 10 boxes didn't come from you. Large numbers of boxes of documents,  
11 thousands and thousands of page were collected by you being aware  
12 of this case before you left Liberia, correct?

13 A. That is totally, totally incorrect.

14 Q. Please correct. Tell us what's wrong about that.

13:13:34 15 A. Your question.

16 Q. Well, did you collect thousands of pages of documents?

17 A. I collected documents from my archives, yes.

18 Q. Well, okay. And these documents were collected from your  
19 archives being aware of this case?

13:13:48 20 A. No.

21 Q. Do you recall saying that in Court?

22 A. I said to this Court that we took the documents for future  
23 references, yes; not as a result of this case.

24 Q. Well, certainly, if it comes to this case, or even to the  
13:14:05 25 history of Liberia and the region, your meetings with Sam  
26 Bockarie in 1998 are critical documents that would show your role  
27 as a peacemaker, wouldn't they?

28 A. Of course. My meeting with Sam Bockarie would be very  
29 critical; that is, if documents were formulated for that, yes.

1 Q. Well, are you saying documents were not formulated; that  
2 you met Sam Bockarie to discuss the peace process; you informed  
3 all of your colleagues, you told us, and no documents were  
4 produced?

13:14:37 5 A. We have produced documents, Mr Koumjian, except you are  
6 missing them.

7 Q. I am missing them?

8 A. We produced documents to show there were - do you accept  
9 that I had a role? You know I had a role. You are saying  
13:14:50 10 documents here where my colleagues have commended me. The  
11 Secretary-General have written reports. So [indiscernible] when  
12 you talk about documents between Bockarie and myself, there were  
13 no exchange of documents between Bockarie and myself, if that's  
14 what you're talking about, no.

13:15:03 15 Q. No, let me be clear, Mr Taylor. I'm going to make sure you  
16 understand my question.

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. I think you do, but let me make - try to say it more  
19 clearly. Do you have any documents that show that you met with  
13:15:14 20 Sam Bockarie in September 1998?

21 A. I do not have any documents physically here with me. There  
22 could very well be notes that were taken by my minister. They  
23 could be in Liberia. I have no documents physically with me  
24 here, no.

13:15:35 25 Q. Mr Taylor, that is because it was a clandestine meeting.  
26 All of your meetings with Sam Bockarie were clandestine, and it  
27 wasn't as a peacemaker, but a person supporting and directing the  
28 RUF; isn't that true?

29 A. That is totally, totally untrue. And if that were even

1 remotely true, you understand me, I am sure ECOWAS and the United  
2 Nations would have insisted on stopping me or removing me from  
3 the committee. That's totally untrue.

13:16:11

4 Q. Well, they couldn't do that if they didn't know about it,  
5 could they?

6 A. Oh, they knew about it. That's the whole point I am  
7 telling you.

13:16:19

8 Q. Certainly there would be every reason - if what you're  
9 saying is true, there would be every reason for you to document  
10 and let everyone know publicly: Hey, I'm meeting with Sam  
11 Bockarie, the person - leader of the military of the RUF.  
12 Because, Mr Taylor, isn't it correct that you have told us the  
13 atrocities of the RUF, of which he was the leader, were notorious  
14 at that time, correct?

13:16:36

15 A. Mr Koumjian - Mr Koumjian, that is correct.

16 Q. Thank you.

13:16:57

17 A. But let me just tell you that my role at that particular  
18 time, if my colleagues and ECOWAS had not dealt with individuals  
19 there would not have been a peace. What changed in 1999? Were  
20 they less notorious for us to get an agreement in 1999? Were  
21 they less notorious? In fact by that time they were more. They  
22 were even - look, I know where you are going. Look --

13:17:15

23 Q. Sir, I don't need you to tell me my strategy. Let me just  
24 ask you this question from what you have just said: The  
25 difference between Lome and the agreements and the RUF  
26 participating in those negotiations, what you are telling us  
27 about your meetings with Sam Bockarie in 1998 is that there is  
28 documentation - there is hundreds of documents about the RUF  
29 participating in Lome. It was open. It was well known. You can

1 get on the web and find it. You have produced it here in court.  
2 That was not clandestine. Your meetings with Sam Bockarie in  
3 1998 were, isn't that true?

4 A. That is not true. But what about my meetings with Sam  
13:17:47 5 Bockarie in 1999? You see, if you want to do this type of  
6 analysis, if you are assuming that my meetings in 1998 were  
7 clandestine, are there any documents for my meetings in 1999.

8 Q. Well, tell us --

9 A. There are no documents.

13:18:02 10 Q. -- what meetings did you have with Sam Bockarie in 1999?

11 A. Of course Sam Bockarie was not there. In 1999 Sam Bockarie  
12 came to Liberia at the movement of the individuals to the peace  
13 conference. He came in Monrovia and he went back. So when we  
14 talk about meetings, are these meetings that you need notes from  
13:18:22 15 me? Mr Koumjian, what about the meeting in November/December  
16 with the chairman of ECOWAS - I mean of the OAU?

17 Q. Mr Taylor, the way it works in an examination is I ask the  
18 questions.

19 A. Yeah, I know but I'm just --

13:18:35 20 Q. And I appreciate your answer but let me follow up on that  
21 because you talked about meeting Sam Bockarie in 1999. Now I put  
22 it to you, Mr Taylor, you did and you slipped just now when you  
23 said it because Sam Bockarie was not part of the Lome delegation.  
24 The documentation is clear. If you met Sam Bockarie in 1999 it  
13:18:51 25 wasn't as part of Lome. When did you meet him in 1999?

26 A. Well, I will tell you very much. I think you need to  
27 revise the way how you are thinking about things.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor.

29 THE WITNESS: I am coming to answer the question, because

1 he is misquoting me, your Honour.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Listen to me. You are free to answer the  
3 question as completely as you think fit but please don't make  
4 personal remarks. You have done it before and I have overlooked  
13:19:19 5 it but it is very non-productive, believe me. Now go ahead with  
6 your answer.

7 THE WITNESS: I met Sam Bockarie - you asked me when did I  
8 meet him in 1999. Sam Bockarie was a part of Lome. He was not a  
9 part of the delegation to Lome. Don't let's forget it is Sam  
13:19:37 10 Bockarie and during his leadership that Lome was put together.  
11 He did visit Monrovia during that particular time. In fact, the  
12 second time that Sam Bockarie is seen is when Foday Sankoh  
13 arrives in Liberia in September 1999. Sam Bockarie comes back,  
14 so of course I met Sam Bockarie in 1999, yes.

13:19:58 15 MR KOUMJIAN:  
16 Q. Mr Taylor, it's very interesting you haven't told us about  
17 these meetings with Sam Bockarie in 1999 --

18 A. I have.

19 Q. -- in your direct examination, have you?

13:20:05 20 A. It's on the records, Mr Koumjian. It's on the records  
21 about Sam Bockarie meeting with Foday Sankoh in Liberia upon his  
22 return and even making a report, okay. The report that Sam  
23 Bockarie made to Foday Sankoh as leader was made when he arrived  
24 in Liberia. It's on the records. It's on the records.

13:20:27 25 Q. Sorry, the report - are you talking about exhibit D-9? The  
26 salute report you're saying was made in Monrovia?

27 A. I don't remember the exact number, but that report was  
28 - Sam Bockarie met Foday Sankoh in Liberia when he came from Lome  
29 in September 1999. I have told this Court.

1 Q. It's very interesting what you just said. Exhibit D-9,  
2 this exhibit that your attorney has relied on quite a bit in your  
3 examination, that was made in Monrovia when Sam Bockarie was  
4 meeting Foday Sankoh? That's what you just told us, correct?

13:20:59 5 A. Sam Bockarie reported, yes, in Monrovia.

6 Q. That might explain why there was no need for him in that  
7 document to explain your role in assisting the RUF, since he was  
8 in Monrovia at the time, correct?

9 A. Well, you are inferring something different. That is  
10 incorrect, Mr Koumjian. Sam Bockarie came to meet Foday Sankoh  
11 in Monrovia, did his report. He was under no influence or any  
12 type of thing. No, you are incorrect, Mr Koumjian, I'm sorry.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, when Sam Bockarie explained that the RUF wanted  
14 to free the leader, what else did he say was the position of the  
13:21:32 15 RUF?

16 A. To the best of my understanding, this was the principal  
17 thing: He wanted the leader free so there could be peace. Our  
18 position was the return to 1996 agreement.

19 Q. What did you say about the freedom of Foday Sankoh?

13:21:48 20 A. Well, I told him very clearly that the freedom of Foday  
21 Sankoh was an issue that definitely would be tied to the peace  
22 process and how it went. That if we got a cessation of  
23 hostilities and a return to the agreement of 1996, that that was  
24 a possibility and that I would discuss it with my colleagues.

13:22:08 25 Q. Now, as you have pointed out, as we have agreed, Foday  
26 Sankoh was at this time in Sierra Leone in custody, correct?

27 A. Around this time, yes.

28 Q. So the only persons with the power to release him at that  
29 time would have been the Government of Sierra Leone, it would

1 ultimately have required their cooperation, correct?

2 A. Now you have asked me two questions. Which one do you want  
3 me to answer; whether it was the government or it required their  
4 cooperation?

13:22:33 5 Q. Could you release Foday Sankoh without the cooperation of  
6 the Government of Sierra Leone?

7 A. No, you could not.

8 Q. So did you inform President Kabbah of Sam Bockarie's demand  
9 in this meeting for the release of Foday Sankoh and that if that  
10 happened that there could be peace for Sierra Leone?

11 A. Everybody, yes - everybody was aware, yes.

12 Q. That wasn't my question. My question was did you inform  
13 President --

14 A. Yes. I said Kabbah was aware. When I said everybody, he  
13:23:00 15 was aware along with the other leaders.

16 Q. Sir, there is a difference between being aware - and I know  
17 you want to be very precise in your language - and informing. My  
18 question is did you inform President Kabbah --

19 A. Kabbah, no.

13:23:09 20 Q. -- that, "I've talked to Sam Bockarie. The RUF is willing  
21 to have peace but demands the release of Foday Sankoh"?

22 A. No. I did not speak to him. He was not a member of the  
23 committee, so I didn't speak to him about it.

24 Q. What did you say to Sam Bockarie and the RUF about the  
13:23:30 25 positions, their military positions that they were holding?

26 A. I didn't speak to them about their military positions and  
27 what they were holding, no.

28 Q. Did Sam Bockarie ask you for any assistance at that time?

29 A. No. All Sam Bockarie talked about was peace and the

1 release of their leader. He didn't ask me for any assistance,  
2 no.

13:24:02 3 Q. Didn't that strike you as rather strange. Here is the RUF  
4 at this time, they have been removed from Koidu Town, they are in  
5 Kailahun, they have been battling with ECOMOG, that he wouldn't  
6 try to get aid from wherever he could get it?

7 A. No, it didn't strike me because it was none of my - I mean  
8 I didn't think he would dare. He was aware of why he was coming  
9 and I would call releasing his leader a type of assistance.  
13:24:21 10 Military assistance, no, he did not request that.

11 Q. Did your intelligence tell you where the RUF was obtaining  
12 military assistance?

13 A. Well, no. The RUF and what they were doing was not my  
14 preoccupation with their internal thing. My preoccupation was  
13:24:43 15 with peace. No, my intelligence never said the RUF is surviving  
16 because of X, Y, Z, no. All we know is from what ECOMOG had been  
17 saying, that's all, that they had captured some of their  
18 materials and different things. That's all.

19 Q. Where did the meeting with Sam Bockarie or meetings in  
13:24:59 20 September take place?

21 A. They took place at the mansion in Monrovia.

22 Q. Who was present - first of all, how many meetings were  
23 there?

24 A. Well, you have a total of about, like I said before, two  
13:25:13 25 and a half meetings.

26 Q. Who was present at the first meeting?

27 A. I am sure Tambakai Jangaba. We could have had maybe a few  
28 senior personnel. I don't recall who exactly was in the meeting,  
29 but I am sure Tambakai was there who was the Foreign Minister

1 responsible for Sierra Leone.

2 Q. Did you have any adjutants present, or note takers?

13:25:59

3 A. No. Adjutants, no. Note takers, the questions are coming  
4 in twos now. Note takers, probably a staff member of my office  
5 that was not a military personnel, but I associate adjutants with  
6 military.

7 Q. Were there security present?

13:26:15

8 A. Not necessarily. There would be probably a security  
9 personnel around in the office, but not - yeah, I would say  
10 within the area, yes.

11 Q. So you had confidence --

12 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Taylor, I am not clear if - you said,  
13 "Probably there was a note taker. Probably a staff member of my  
14 office that was not a military personnel."

15 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour.

16 JUDGE DOHERTY: But was there somebody taking notes.

17 That's what I would like to know.

13:26:42

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, normally every time - I was responding  
19 to adjutant and I said not really. Yes, there was somebody  
20 taking notes.

21 MR KOUMJIAN:

22 Q. So, Mr Taylor, you had confidence enough to meet Sam  
23 Bockarie, the military leader of the RUF, without security in the  
24 room?

13:26:53

25 A. Well, I just told you that securities always are around.  
26 They are always around. I did not say that there was no security  
27 in the room. The security is around. They do not participate.  
28 They are around to observe the situation. There is a big check,  
29 by they are staff people. It is not a security meeting.

1 Q. Did Sam Bockarie express the position of the RUF that you  
2 have told us about this morning regarding the release of Foday  
3 Sankoh in this first meeting?

4 A. Yes, yes, the first meeting.

13:27:24 5 Q. What was the purpose of the second meeting?

6 A. Well, I told him to go and I would, you know, consult with  
7 my colleagues on the meeting and that we will get back to him on  
8 the demands that he had made and what we had said that the

9 Committee of Five wanted from the RUF. After the consultations,  
10 I invited him to come back the second time to convey to him what  
11 had been said and to begin what we call some arm twisting to get  
12 us back to the agreement.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, we might be speaking at cross-purposes here.

14 When you talked about two and a half meetings, I asked you, or I  
13:28:15 15 hope I asked you, In this September visit of Sam Bockarie, how  
16 many meetings did you have with him? I am not reading from the  
17 screen, but that's what I recall, but I could be incorrect.

18 A. Okay. From the September meeting how many times did I meet  
19 him?

13:28:30 20 Q. Yes.

21 A. I could have met him I would say about not more than twice  
22 during his stay. That's during that September meeting.

23 Q. So what would be the purpose of the second meeting with Sam  
24 Bockarie in September?

13:28:53 25 A. I am looking at second as if he is there and during his  
26 stay there. I am not talking about times, okay, if we are  
27 correct on that. You know, you meet for the first time a few  
28 minutes and then he was turned over to the deputy minister for  
29 detailed discussions. I got a report from the minister and then

1 called him the second time to talk. Really reviewing the notes  
2 of their meeting because the deputy minister's discussions were  
3 more analytical, I would think, and more detailed than mine. My  
4 meeting - my first meeting was very short.

13:29:33 5 Q. Well, that's interesting. So the deputy minister would  
6 have prepared a report on these detailed meetings for your  
7 review, correct?

8 A. Yes. I mean, I am not sure if it came in a form of a  
9 document, but I know he came and briefed me of the discussions.

13:29:49 10 Q. I think it's about time for the break. Let me just one  
11 question. Mr Taylor, you have shown us many photographs of your  
12 meetings with various persons. Do you have a photograph of your  
13 meetings with Sam Bockarie?

14 A. No, from that 1998, no, I don't have. There could very  
13:30:10 15 will be a picture in the archives of the Executive Mansion. I  
16 don't have one.

17 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I could continue but I believe  
18 it's the break.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I use the few remaining seconds to  
13:30:21 20 give my learned friend a page reference for the Jackson Swarray  
21 item. 18 November, page 32047, lines 10 to 27.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. We will take  
23 the lunch break now and resume at 2.30.

24 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14:26:20 25 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead, please, Mr Koumjian.

27 MR KOUMJIAN: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honour, before  
28 proceeding the Prosecution would just like to make the record for  
29 any impossible appellant proceedings that there were documents

1 that the Prosecution believes were relevant and admissible on the  
2 cross-examination this morning that would have been used in the  
3 cross-examination of the accused. I'm ready to proceed,  
4 thank you:

14:31:45 5 Q. Mr Taylor, I just want to digress for one moment before we  
6 come back to your dealings with Sam Bockarie. It was mentioned  
7 this morning your ideology and if I - you can correct me if I am  
8 wrong, but you've told this Court that you were not big on  
9 ideology, correct?

14:32:09 10 A. Mr Koumjian, now there are two questions now.

11 Q. Thank you. Mr Taylor, what was your ideology as a leader  
12 first of the NPFL?

13 A. That depends. Basically, I was not somebody that went on  
14 these long ideological things. I was not - like I said before, I  
14:32:29 15 was not basically an ideological person.

16 Q. Thank you. But you had described yourself as a  
17 Pan-Africanist. Is that correct?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And what does that mean to you?

14:32:41 20 A. Oh, one that believes in the freedom, independence of  
21 Africa and that Africa should be left and governed by Africans.  
22 That's my basic --

23 Q. In your role as the leader of the NPFL and later as  
24 President of Liberia, did you do anything to promote the fight  
14:33:06 25 against colonialism or apartheid in Africa?

26 A. No, by that time, Mr Koumjian, apartheid had - was  
27 nonexistent by the time I became President. So, no, I didn't do  
28 anything to fight apartheid, no.

29 Q. And all of the conflicts in which you were engaged were

1 with other African governments and African individuals, correct?

2 A. I didn't understand. You said all of the conflicts that I  
3 was engaged in?

14:33:42

4 Q. Yes. Let's just agree to disagree about which conflicts  
5 you were engaged in. Would you agree that all of the conflicts  
6 which you were engaged in were against Africans?

7 A. Well, again I'm going to need some help.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you want to know what conflicts  
9 counsel is referring to?

14:34:00

10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps you could rephrase that,  
12 Mr Koumjian.

13 MR KOUMJIAN:

14:34:07

14 Q. I'm referring to all of your conflicts and I know we  
15 disagree about what conflicts you were involved in, so I'm going  
16 to just move on to another question, sir.

17 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Koumjian, did we get an answer to the  
18 part dealing with colonialism? We got an answer to the  
19 apartheid.

14:34:26

20 THE WITNESS: Well, he asked two questions and he broke it  
21 down but in subsequent answer he only talked about apartheid so I  
22 answered one at a time. I'm open to the second one if you  
23 choose.

24 MR KOUMJIAN:

14:34:38

25 Q. Let me ask, Mr Taylor, did you consider the apartheid  
26 government and apartheid army an army engaged in a terrorist  
27 campaign against the civilian population?

28 A. You mean the apartheid regime in South Africa? Yes.

29 Q. Yes. And of course Liberia, the government and people of

1 Liberia have a very proud tradition of standing up against  
2 apartheid. In fact bringing a case here in The Hague at the  
3 International Court of Justice against the apartheid regime.  
4 That correct, isn't it?

14:35:09 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, did you find it then a bit troubling that you,  
7 as President of Liberia, hired a former member of that apartheid  
8 government's army to train your ATU?

9 A. No, it was not troubling. Apartheid had been abandoned for  
14:35:33 10 so long, even the new government that came in, these were all  
11 soldiers. There was nothing on our research that would have been  
12 troubling to me about that person's involvement in training a  
13 security force. No, there was nothing troubling about that.

14 Q. You didn't see that as compromising the proud tradition of  
14:35:55 15 Liberia of standing up against apartheid?

16 A. No. Actually, no. Actually, no. Mandela, who is someone  
17 that I respect and have met several times, did not even see it  
18 that way himself. He hired so many individuals that were part of  
19 the apartheid regime. No. To answer you directly, no, I didn't  
14:36:22 20 see that as a problem, no.

21 Q. Let's go back to your meetings with Sam Bockarie and we  
22 have what we believe to be the document that you were talking  
23 about that said - that you told us about that gave permission for  
24 Bockarie to travel. Could the accused be shown MFI-63. Sir,  
14:37:36 25 have you had a chance to look at the document?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Perhaps it might be helpful if there is a physical copy for  
28 Mr Taylor just to leaf through, if that's available for him.  
29 Perhaps on the screen we can direct Mr Taylor to paragraph 15.

1 It's on page 4.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: There's nothing on the screen. There's  
3 only the one copy.

14:38:25

4 MR KOUMJIAN: There is only one copy. Do your Honours have  
5 a copy? No. This document perhaps it would be helpful --

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll have it put up on our screens.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Just for all parties, for opposing counsel,  
8 this was tab 27 in binder 3 of week 31. I don't know if that  
9 helps.

10 THE WITNESS: Okay, I have seen it.

11 MR KOUMJIAN:

14:39:34

12 Q. Mr Taylor, is this the document that you were referring to  
13 when you said you presented the Court with documentation that  
14 showed that Sam Bockarie's travel outside of Sierra Leone to  
15 Monrovia was approved by the United Nations?

16 A. This is the reference of the document, yes, that --

14:40:03

17 Q. Perhaps first let's just turn quickly to the first page so  
18 we can see the date of this document. You see the date of the  
19 document. It's titled "S/1998/1176, Report of the United Nations  
20 Security Council," dated 16 December 1998?

21 A. That is correct.

14:40:22

22 Q. So in fact the report was issued in December while you  
23 indicated to us you started in - I believe you said August to ask  
24 your subordinates to make contact with Sam Bockarie and bring him  
25 to Monrovia?

26 A. Oh, definitely.

27 Q. Let's look at paragraph 15. I'll just read it slowly into  
28 the record:

29 "While reaffirming its commitment to end the ongoing rebel

1 war as soon as possible, the government has expressed its  
2 readiness to address any grievance the rebels might have on  
3 condition that they first stop fighting, lay down their arms and  
4 surrender to ECOMOG or UNOMSIL."

14:40:55 5 Let me just stop at that first sentence and make sure we  
6 are all in agreement. Mr Taylor, when the sentence says "the  
7 government has expressed its readiness", do you understand that  
8 to mean the Kabbah government?

9 A. Definitely, yes.

14:41:08 10 Q. So "the Kabbah government has expressed its readiness to  
11 address any grievance the rebels might have on condition that  
12 they first stop fighting, lay down their arms and surrender to  
13 ECOMOG or UNOMSIL." Now, when you met Sam Bockarie, had the  
14 rebels stopped fighting, had they laid down their arms and  
15 surrendered to ECOMOG or UNOMSIL?

16 A. No. If they had, I would not have met him. No.

17 Q. "There has also been discussion in government circles of a  
18 possible offer to provide safe passage to five persons identified  
19 as leaders of the two factions comprising the rebel forces:

14:41:47 20 Johnny Paul Koroma and SAJ Musa of the AFRC and Sam Bockarie,  
21 Denis Mingo and Eldred Collins of the RUF" --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- "to leave the country for a non-neighbouring country of  
24 their choice."

14:42:03 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, is Liberia a neighbouring country of Sierra  
27 Leone?

28 A. Liberia is a neighbouring country of Sierra Leone.

29 Q. So, Mr Taylor, do you understand this document - this last

1 sentence I read to clearly state that the government's possible  
2 offer of safe passage provided its conditions had been met was  
3 only that these individuals leave for a non-neighbouring country?

14:42:30 4 A. Well, that - according to this, I don't have any  
5 disagreement with you. But let's not forget one thing, this is a  
6 Secretary-General's report of an incident that happened. I agree  
7 with you. How does he get to the non-neighbouring country? He  
8 came to Liberia and he did go to a non-neighbouring country of  
9 Burkina Faso. But the process here, what the Secretary-General  
14:42:52 10 is explaining to the Security Council, is the process. And I'll  
11 wait for your question; we can explain the process. He doesn't  
12 leave illegally. He is the question of a discussion for them to  
13 travel, and that is in line with the peace process.

14 Q. My question, Mr Taylor, is - you're a very intelligent man.  
14:43:12 15 You've read this passage. Do you still maintain to the judges  
16 that you interpret this document as giving you permission to  
17 bring Sam Bockarie to Liberia?

18 A. I interpret this document as - with its explanation of  
19 giving that permission, because I know - this is on paper, but I  
14:43:29 20 know behind the scenes what went on. Yes, this is what I  
21 consider as an authorisation that caused him to leave the  
22 country, if not he would not have left, yes.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, of all the thousands of pages that you collected  
24 in your archive before leaving Liberia, being aware of this case,  
14:43:45 25 and all the work of your Defence teams, this is the best document  
26 you can come up with to show that your meeting with Sam Bockarie  
27 was not clandestine?

28 A. Well, Mr Koumjian - I mean, yes, this document. This and  
29 many other things. The fact that he travels, the fact that he

1 did it with the knowledge of members of the Committee of Five,  
2 the fact that he travelled to meet the OAU chairman with the  
3 knowledge of the African - of the Organisation of African Unity,  
4 these are all indications that it was not clandestine, no.

14:44:20 5 Q. Mr Taylor, this document is written in December. So if you  
6 told the security - the United Nations about your efforts to  
7 negotiate peace with Sam Bockarie, by this time three times in  
8 Monrovia, where is it in the report?

9 A. I have never said that I told the United Nations that he  
14:44:39 10 was coming to Liberia. I'm saying that it has been reported in a  
11 UN document, okay, that individuals of the junta could travel and  
12 that process --

13 Q. Complete your answer. Sorry.

14 A. That process - Mr Koumjian, there's a process here. This  
14:45:00 15 report is after the fact. This report - in fact, the  
16 Secretary-General's report came out three to four months after  
17 the fact. This is a December report stating that discussions had  
18 been held in government circles.

19 Q. Well, it certainly would make sense then for this report to  
14:45:17 20 say "and Charles Taylor, the point man on the peace process, has  
21 met with Sam Bockarie on three occasions" and report the results  
22 of those negotiations. Wouldn't that make sense?

23 A. It would make sense if I was reporting to the UN. I was  
24 not reporting to the UN. I was not working for the UN.

14:45:32 25 Q. Who did you report to?

26 A. I was making - I was consulting with members of my  
27 committee. This was an ECOWAS operation. Whatever the UN got,  
28 they got it from ECOWAS.

29 Q. Sir, you have the ECOWAS newsletters among your documents.

1 You have correspondence with ECOWAS Heads of State. Do you have  
2 a document that shows that you didn't hide these meetings with  
3 Sam Bockarie?

4 A. Well, no. But do you have a document that says that I did?

14:45:56 5 So if we reverse your logic, the fact of the matter is, the way I  
6 answer your question is this way: If these meetings - I'll give  
7 you an example of it not being clandestine. In October 1998, I  
8 go to Abuja right after Sam Bockarie's meeting. November 1998, I  
9 meet in Conakry with Jesse Jackson, Tejan Kabbah, Lansana Conte.

14:46:27 10 Look, when these discussions are going on amongst Heads of State,  
11 these are not matters that you expected the Secretary-General to  
12 say, well, he met on this day and this day. I'm not reporting to  
13 the Secretary-General, okay. But both October and November,  
14 especially November, with Jesse Jackson I meet in Conakry, with

14:46:46 15 Tejan Kabbah, they are aware. And the inner workings of this  
16 peace process, we may have to take some time to get into it  
17 because if you get legalistic to say, "Well, if the  
18 Secretary-General did not report it, it didn't happen." Look,  
19 everybody knew what was going on and that's why I was urged on  
14:47:04 20 continuously to keep on working. And that's the best I can say  
21 to you.

22 Q. So do you have some documents that show all these people  
23 that you informed of your meeting with Sam - with Jesse Jackson  
24 that was reporter?

14:47:12 25 A. I said --

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, again I hesitate to interrupt,  
27 but it seems to us important that my learned friend appreciates  
28 that because it's the Prosecution who bear the burden of proof,  
29 the manner in which his questions are phrased, which suggests as

1 if somehow Mr Taylor has to prove his innocence by producing  
2 documents, it seems to us that the manner in which the questions  
3 are asked should be changed to reflect the obligation which rests  
4 upon the Prosecution from first to last. And in our submission,  
14:47:51 5 the way in which Mr Koumjian is currently asking the question  
6 doesn't make that obligation clear.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: What's your response, if any?

8 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honours are well aware, as is the  
9 Prosecution, of our burden of proof. The issue is the accused is  
14:48:09 10 talking about meetings that we say were clandestine and never  
11 reported, that they were not open negotiations, as he's  
12 testifying to, and the logical inference from the failure of any  
13 documentation to be produced, and we're exploring that, how  
14 illogical that is, shows that what he's saying is not the truth  
14:48:31 15 to your Honours. Now, certainly, the Prosecution cannot produce  
16 a report that was never made. It is our position he never made  
17 such a report, so we cannot be given the - have the burden placed  
18 on us to produce a report that was never made.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, but that's something you can argue.

14:48:49 20 But I do agree that to put to Mr Taylor a question such as, "Do  
21 you have a document that shows that you didn't hide these  
22 meetings with Sam Bockarie," does imply to the witness that if he  
23 can't come up with a document, then that's proof that he did hide  
24 these meetings with Sam Bockarie. So I think you ought to  
14:49:10 25 rephrase your questions.

26 MR KOUMJIAN: Respectfully, your Honour, we believe that  
27 that is proper, that the failure of the Defence to produce  
28 logical evidence is a matter that a Trial Chamber, finder of  
29 fact, can consider.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian, I just said that's something  
2 you can submit in your arguments, but I'm telling you not to put  
3 it to the witness in that form.

4           MR KOUMJIAN: Thank you:

14:49:31 5 Q. Sir, did you have press conferences discussing your role in  
6 negotiations for peace in Sierra Leone?

7 A. Oh, yes.

8 Q. And at these press conferences, did you discuss "I've had  
9 discussions with Sam Bockarie, I'm meeting with the rebel  
10 leader," did you talk to the press about that?

11 A. Well, no. We didn't - even when I met with Sankoh, we did  
12 not call names, "I met with this." The whole process was to do  
13 press releases or press conferences that progress is being made.  
14 For example, following the 1999 attack on Freetown in January,  
14:50:23 15 later on in January we are able to secure a ceasefire. We don't  
16 say that, "I talked to all of the rebel leaders in Sierra Leone,  
17 Johnny Paul Koroma. I talk to Sam Bockarie." No, no. These are  
18 not done in that way, Mr Koumjian. These are ongoing  
19 discussions. We will say that we are holding discussions with -  
14:50:45 20 we would generalise it. With the RUF. We would not call names,  
21 but there are so many. In fact, even in our exhibits that we  
22 have shown that are marked here of different press releases about  
23 progress being made with the peace, yes.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, thank you for bringing up the ceasefire in  
14:51:05 25 January 1999 and your role in that. That was widely reported in  
26 contrast to these meetings that you had - claimed to have had in  
27 1998. There was wide press coverage of your role in the  
28 ceasefire following the Freetown invasion, correct?

29 A. Oh, yeah, but we announced it. After we announced it, that

1 was a happy occasion for everyone. We announced it, but we  
2 announced it again after we had discussed it with all of our  
3 colleagues. We had the announcement in Monrovia. And everybody  
4 was happy and the world press picked it up because that was a  
14:51:40 5 very welcome situation, yes.

6 Q. In your meetings with Sam Bockarie in September/October and  
7 the November/December trip to Burkina Faso where you passed  
8 through Monrovia, did you likewise have press releases and  
9 discuss it with the press, your role in these peace negotiations?

14:51:59 10 A. No, we did not have press conferences. Let's say, for  
11 example, to even help you, November, when Sam Bockarie comes to  
12 Liberia, before I go to Abuja in November, he's given a  
13 guesthouse in Liberia and the diplomatic corps - any member of  
14 the diplomatic corps in Liberia is aware and, in fact, people  
14:52:30 15 begin to visit there, the press. So it is an open situation.

16 I'm just giving an example of how open this whole process was.

17 Q. That's interesting. Why don't you give us a little more  
18 specifics. Who in the diplomatic community met with Sam Bockarie  
19 in November?

14:52:44 20 A. Oh, whoever wanted to see him. I don't have it. It was  
21 just open that members of the Committee of Five ambassadors in  
22 Liberia would go and see him. If you were there and you wanted  
23 to see him, that's how open it was.

24 Q. So you can't give us one name of a person that you  
14:53:06 25 introduced to Sam Bockarie or allowed to meet with Sam Bockarie  
26 in November 1998?

27 A. You have said did I introduce or allowed?

28 Q. Yes, introduce or allowed to meet.

29 A. Well, no. I didn't introduce Sam Bockarie to anyone.

1 Neither did I disallow anyone to meet with Sam Bockarie. The  
2 point I'm making here is that the process is so open, the  
3 building is so open that any diplomatic personnel that wanted to  
4 see him could. I was President and I would suppose that people  
14:53:36 5 did visit him.

6 Q. Did you inform the Sierra Leonean ambassador that Sam  
7 Bockarie is here, you can come and meet him?

8 A. Oh, no, I didn't have an obligation to him. But I would -  
9 he knew. I'm sure he knew that Sam Bockarie, you know, had come  
14:53:55 10 to Liberia. He had to know. It's a part of the embassy work.  
11 And where the house was located, right next to the Nigerian  
12 embassy, even shows there was nothing hidden about it.

13 Q. Can you give us the name of one diplomat that met with Sam  
14 Bockarie during his trips in 1998 to Monrovia?

14:54:11 15 A. No, I don't know any of their names because they didn't  
16 have to come back to report to me. I really don't know.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, you talked about these three trips and earlier  
18 in your direct examination you talked about a tradition in Africa  
19 of giving gifts when you meet fellow leaders, correct?

14:54:36 20 A. Say that again? When you meet fellow leaders?

21 Q. Yes. You've talked about an African tradition of giving  
22 gifts to visitors, correct?

23 A. Okay, visitors, okay. Depending on - yes.

24 Q. Is it the African tradition also to give gifts to your  
14:54:55 25 host?

26 A. Oh, yeah.

27 Q. What did Sam Bockarie give you?

28 A. Nothing. Sam Bockarie didn't give me anything. Nothing.

29 Q. Mr Taylor, at this time that you met him in September 1998,

1 do you want to tell - can you tell the judges that this time you  
2 still did not have any idea of the significance of Kono and the  
3 diamond district in Sierra Leone?

14:55:38 4 A. No understanding of the significance. Diamonds - Liberia  
5 with diamond? No, not at all. Not at all.

6 Q. Actually at this time in 1998, the summer, the situation  
7 strategically in Sierra Leone was shifting because of certain  
8 events in Nigeria, isn't that correct? The death of Sani Abacha?

14:56:08 9 A. Well, let's - I think we can agree that Sani Abacha died  
10 earlier than the period we're talking about. Can we agree on  
11 that?

12 Q. It's a stipulated fact in this case I believe that it was  
13 June 1998?

14:56:18 14 A. Yes, so June, but we're talking about - now you're talking  
15 about a developing situation, that's why, I mean, I'm glad we  
16 agree that Sani Abacha had died and a very able man had taken  
17 over. So by the time he comes in September, General Abdul salami  
18 Abubakar had been in power and we have even met at least once.

14:56:44 19 Q. And elections were scheduled in Nigeria to return to  
20 civilian government. Is that correct?

21 A. Yes. Yes.

22 Q. Now, you being the economist that you are, you're probably  
23 aware that the financial situation of Nigeria in 1998 was very  
24 dire because of the significant fall in oil prices at that time.  
14:57:02 25 You're aware of that, aren't you?

26 A. Well, to really be fair to you, counsel, I can recall the  
27 fall but as to the financial straits, I can't comment on that. I  
28 agree that there was a fall, but I cannot comment on the straits.

29 Q. Fair enough. Do you recall public statements by Nigeria

1 that it could no longer afford its commitment to ECOMOG and  
2 Sierra Leone, that it was spending a million dollars a day and it  
3 was no longer tolerable?

14:57:43 4 A. I can recall - I'm not sure, counsel, if these are the  
5 statements coming at that time, but I do recall at some point,  
6 I'm not too sure when, because I'm assuming you're still thinking  
7 about '98, that is after the death of Abacha. I don't know if  
8 this is the time but I do know that Nigeria is complaining about  
9 the burden on its shoulders about the ECOMOG situation.

14:58:07 10 Q. In fact, Mr Taylor, being aware of the political situation  
11 in West Africa, you know that all the presidential candidates in  
12 Nigeria for that election were promising to withdraw from Sierra  
13 Leone?

14 A. Quite frankly I would not be truthful if I was - if I can  
14:58:28 15 say I can say readily that all of them. I was not really  
16 following the day-to-day political developments to comment that  
17 all of them did. I'm sorry, I'm not aware that all of them did.

18 Q. As the point person for peace and your knowledge of the  
19 situation, the geopolitical situation in Sierra Leone, was it  
14:58:50 20 obvious to you that major fighting and a possible major defeat of  
21 ECOMOG forces could lead to an early withdrawal of ECOMOG from  
22 Sierra Leone?

23 A. Oh, yes. I mean militarily you would say yes.

24 Q. So it was in fact a vulnerable moment for ECOMOG and one in  
14:59:10 25 which a major offensive by the RUF could drastically change the  
26 political situation in Sierra Leone, correct?

27 A. These are hypotheticals that we deal with. I would say  
28 that would be correct but I do not think that any of us, the  
29 leaders in ECOWAS, would have permitted. Most of us thought that

1 Nigeria was actually what we call, I think it's a political term  
2 called jawboning where, you know, you are making certain  
3 statements because you want to achieve certain ends in the final  
4 analysis. But I don't think that anyone would have permitted  
14:59:51 5 Nigeria to withdraw. And so during the campaign, some of the  
6 political statements never materialised. We were not going to  
7 let that happen.

8 Q. What was your impression of the educational level of Sam  
9 Bockarie?

15:00:07 10 A. Oh, no, Sam was not someone that I thought was - that had  
11 attained a high level of education, no.

12 Q. The geopolitical situation that we've just been discussing,  
13 that would have been over the head of Sam Bockarie, correct?

14 A. I can't say. I can't say. I wouldn't agree. There have  
15:00:33 15 been a whole lot of people in my own political experience that  
16 have not achieved a high level of education but they are pretty  
17 smart and can manage and govern, so I wouldn't go that far.

18 Q. But you as an experienced politician, Head of State, well  
19 educated, the point person for the peace process in Sierra Leone  
15:00:57 20 was certainly aware of these geopolitical and military strategic  
21 factors affecting the situation in Sierra Leone in late 1998,  
22 correct?

23 A. I wouldn't answer that except we begin to break down what  
24 are these geopolitical factors that we're talking about?

15:01:16 25 Q. Okay, let me do that. First the financial situation of  
26 Nigeria. You're aware of that?

27 A. Aware of the financial, yes.

28 Q. The elections in Nigeria. You were aware of those?

29 A. That, yes, elections were coming up.

1 Q. The fact that Nigerians candidates were saying that we need  
2 to get out of Sierra Leone, promising that to the population.  
3 We've spilled enough blood and money in Sierra Leone. Were you  
4 aware of that?

15:01:38 5 A. I have said to you earlier, Mr Koumjian, that I could not  
6 comment because I was not aware of those internal debates at that  
7 level, no.

8 Q. Let's go to the October meeting.

9 A. Yes.

15:01:56 10 Q. Sam Bockarie had been there in September. He comes back in  
11 about how many weeks would you say it was?

12 A. Oh, I would say another - I'll put it to about three weeks.  
13 I see him before I go to Nigeria.

14 Q. So from the time he left in September until you saw him  
15:02:17 15 again in Monrovia in October was approximately three weeks?

16 A. I would put it there. I would put it there.

17 Q. How did he travel, if you know?

18 A. He drove by road. He came by road.

19 Q. Was he accompanied by any of your personnel?

15:02:31 20 A. Oh, I don't know. The first trip I know that was the first  
21 - but the second trip I'm sure that personnel would - I don't  
22 know who went but he would have been escorted by some of our  
23 personnel.

24 Q. How long would that take him to drive from Buedu to  
15:02:51 25 Monrovia?

26 A. October? That could take almost an entire day. Almost an  
27 entire day.

28 Q. When Sam Bockarie came back in October what was the purpose  
29 of that trip?

1 A. I answered just before the break. The purpose of that  
2 particular trip was to relay to him what some of our  
3 conversations were, because I had already held conversations with  
4 other members of that committee, and to begin now to press him on  
15:03:26 5 returning to the 1996 agreement signed in La Cote d'Ivoire.

6 Q. Let's please be more specific. You said you called him "to  
7 relay to him what some of our conversations were, because I had  
8 already held conversations with other members of that committee"?

9 A. The Committee of Five.

15:03:48 10 Q. Had you talked to all of them?

11 A. I would say just about all of them, yes. I don't quite - I  
12 would have spoken to the four others, yes.

13 Q. And what was it that you conveyed to them in these  
14 conversations?

15:04:09 15 A. Just that I had already met because before I met with  
16 Bockarie they knew I had met with him. I gave them my personal  
17 assessment that - what his - what they - what his calls were,  
18 that they wanted their leader released and what I had said and  
19 that I felt that return to the agreement of 1996 would be the  
15:04:32 20 proper thing and they told me that was the proper thing to do.

21 So I then called him back to relay to him that we had held  
22 discussions and what was important was the cessation of  
23 hostilities and a return to the agreement of 1996.

24 Q. What was the position of Nigeria in these conversations you  
15:04:54 25 had?

26 A. Well, Nigeria always backed it. Remember before even that  
27 meeting I met with General Abdulsalami Abubakar in July 1998  
28 along with Kofi Annan who had come down, we met in Abuja, and  
29 they were very supportive of the return to the 1996 agreement.

1 Nigeria always supported us.

2 Q. So, Mr Taylor, by this time of course Sam Bockarie had a  
3 satellite phone and you had his phone number?

15:05:40

4 A. In fact I gave Sam Bockarie, as I've told this Court, a  
5 satellite phone in October 1998.

6 Q. Were you able to communicate with Sam Bockarie by radio  
7 before you gave him that satellite phone, I'm asking technically?

15:06:12

8 A. Well, being able, yes, it would have been - yes, you would  
9 be able to do that because one of the things that we discussed on  
10 that first trip was the possible means of communication. I  
11 preferred the telephone because that would be a fast way.  
12 Sometimes the weather is so bad, that's why I gave him a phone.  
13 But, yes, you'll be able to communicate by radio.

15:06:29

14 Q. In fact you told us, correct me if I am wrong, that Sam  
15 Bockarie already had had a phone before that time but he was  
16 running out of - ran out of credits. Is that correct?

17 A. Yes, as far back as 1996 from all indications I think  
18 Sankoh had left a phone behind there by that time, yeah.

15:06:50

19 Q. Now the credits at that time were a scratch card. Is that  
20 correct?

21 A. Yes, a form of scratch card, yes.

22 Q. Basically you needed a unique number in order to get credit  
23 on your satellite phone?

24 A. I don't know what you mean by unique number.

15:07:02

25 Q. Well, you need a long number you would scratch off the card  
26 and you would have to punch into the phone a long number?

27 A. That is correct, yes.

28 Q. Which could have been conveyed by radio very simply,  
29 correct?

1 A. Yes, it could have been but what we did, we just got the  
2 number and you just text it. You text it to the person and they  
3 take the number because you have to call in Thuraya and give a  
4 particular code for the acceptance of the number. So I would  
15:07:28 5 assume radios could do it, but we texted it to them.

6 Q. Sir, why did you give Sam Bockarie the satellite phone?  
7 A. Again, that he would be able to contact other members of  
8 the committee and that he could be contacted by me or any other  
9 individual that wanted to reach to him because the radio was not  
15:07:52 10 the best way of doing it, yeah.

11 Q. Did you convey this information to the other members of the  
12 Committee of Five --  
13 A. I did.

14 Q. Let me complete the question, please. Sam Bockarie had a  
15:08:04 15 satellite phone and this is his number?

16 A. Oh, yes and they even called him, from what I understand.  
17 I don't know who, but I understand that he made some calls  
18 himself.

19 Q. So you created some kind of document which you sent somehow  
15:08:17 20 to these governments with that phone number. Is that right?

21 A. No, I did not create any document to write them and say  
22 here are the numbers. No, I did not.

23 Q. How did you give the phone numbers to the other  
24 governments?  
15:08:31 25 A. Not governments. I called Heads of State, "Listen, I've  
26 talked to Bockarie, here is a number he can be reached on" and he  
27 would make the notes himself.

28 Q. So an important matter like that you didn't have done  
29 through formal communications, you just called up and did it in a

1 phone call?

2 A. Mr Koumjian, that is correct. You take it to be important,  
3 I take it to be important. Heads of State exchange a lot of  
4 information on their own and that was a shortest way, yes.

15:08:56 5 Q. In fact, Heads of States have many, many aides to collect  
6 and record information like phone numbers, don't they? They  
7 don't bother writing down phone numbers as a Head of State, do  
8 you?

9 A. No, I disagree with you, Mr Koumjian. African Heads of  
15:09:11 10 State, sometimes we call and we take messages from each other.  
11 We take notes from each other. I would say the western  
12 sophisticated governments, and my mind goes back to Alexander  
13 Butterfield with the White House tapes of the Nixon years - but,  
14 no, there are sometimes you call a colleague and while talking  
15:09:38 15 you take some notes. "Listen, I got a phone number." Even  
16 friends I will call - I have called Heads of State before and  
17 said, "Listen, I've been trying to talk to X, Y." He will say,  
18 "Oh, yes, I have his number" and he will give it to me and I'll  
19 write it down.

15:09:58 20 Q. Mr Taylor, how many times did you meet with Sam Bockarie in  
21 October?

22 A. During that October meeting I would put it to a least twice  
23 again. We did the house, talked about the installation of a  
24 radio, gave him a telephone. I would put it to at least twice.  
15:10:20 25 Very short meetings because those meetings were more like  
26 discussions with under-people. So I would put it to at least  
27 twice again.

28 Q. How long was the first meeting?

29 A. I don't know, Mr Koumjian. These meetings generally I

1 would say, Mr Koumjian, would not go for more than 20, 25 minutes  
2 at most. You would just, you know, meet and talk. I think he  
3 spent more time with the ministers that were responsible for  
4 Sierra Leone than he spent with me.

15:11:02 5 Q. So you informed Sam Bockarie that the Committee of Four  
6 took the position that the Abuja Accords - that all parties  
7 should go back to the Abuja Accords?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Excuse me, Abidjan Accords.

15:11:09 10 A. That is correct now. I informed him that it was the  
11 opinion of everybody that there should be a cessation of  
12 hostilities and a return to the Ivory Coast agreement of 1996.  
13 That was the message that was across ECOWAS, a return to the  
14 agreement.

15:11:31 15 Q. And was that position any different than the position of  
16 committee when you met with Sam Bockarie in September?

17 A. No, it was not different.

18 Q. What was the reason to call Sam Bockarie back in October  
19 then?

15:11:46 20 A. To begin the working process. The first meeting in  
21 September was an early meeting, what we call getting your feet  
22 wet and getting acquainted, brief them and get a consensus. This  
23 is why - things don't work that way, where you just get up - I  
24 was not given the authority by my colleagues to act at will and  
15:12:08 25 do whatever I wanted. So they had to be briefed, that's why I  
26 called them back the second time. We discussed the issue of what  
27 I wanted to do. I had told them - in fact, I can remember, La  
28 Cote d'Ivoire, for example, I raised the issue about housing and  
29 I got to know that La Cote d'Ivoire had given a house and they

1 felt that in order to maintain contact with these individuals, we  
2 may have to do something like that for their security because the  
3 hotel was not a safe place for them to, you know, to always stay,  
4 and because of the delicate nature of the problems, that a little  
15:12:46 5 place that we will call a guesthouse would be given that would  
6 serve two purposes: Their security, but we would also have  
7 control over who went in and who came out, and you can't do that  
8 in a hotel.

9 Q. Sir, in order to make sure that negotiations progressed and  
15:13:02 10 all parties had the same understanding, it's important to get  
11 those details down in writing about the various positions,  
12 wouldn't you agree?

13 A. Well, if there's an agreement, I would agree, yes. If  
14 you're doing a formal agreement. There are a lot of things that  
15:13:17 15 are discussed, Mr Koumjian, by telephone, I swear, and a lot of  
16 us are guilty of that.

17 Q. Let me make my question clearer. Let me repeat it. I'm  
18 not asking about negotiations. When parties are negotiating,  
19 it's important, especially if you are the mediator, to get the  
15:13:38 20 position of the various parties down in writing so there is no  
21 confusion about their positions, correct?

22 A. Oh, yes, if there are negotiations. I was not negotiating  
23 with the RUF, so --

24 Q. What were you doing?

15:13:52 25 A. I was mediating. I was not negotiating with them. I was  
26 --

27 Q. Can you explain the difference between mediating and  
28 negotiating?

29 A. As a mediator, I was trying to - I was conveying wishes of

1 the community. And where there was a conflict, I would try to  
2 resolve it, especially getting a ceasefire.

3 Q. A mediator is not a party. A negotiator is a party.  
4 That's the difference, correct?

15:14:20 5 A. Well, give me an opportunity.

6 Q. In fact, as a mediator, it's even more important, isn't it,  
7 Mr Taylor, to get the position of the various parties down in  
8 writing?

9 A. Well, you asked me two questions about negotiator and  
15:14:36 10 mediator. I've only answered one, but you have now interjected  
11 your definition that - but you've only got one of my side, so I  
12 will answer your next question.

13 Q. Let me repeat it because I think it's clear. I asked you,  
14 in fact, as a mediator, it's even more important, isn't it,  
15:14:54 15 Mr Taylor, to get the position of the various parties down in  
16 writing? Can you please answer that.

17 A. Oh, yes. Sometimes it would be important yes, but --

18 Q. When would it not be important?

19 A. Well, let's see who are the parties now? I'm mediating  
15:15:10 20 between who and who now? I'm mediating between the RUF, okay,  
21 and the belligerent fighting forces on the ground. I'm trying to  
22 get a cessation of hostilities. If I had been negotiating, then  
23 I would have been a part of the process with the Government of  
24 Sierra Leone, because there was no formal negotiation at the  
15:15:31 25 time. So mediation could be a form of pacification and trying to  
26 get things under control. You mediate and then probably  
27 negotiate.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, it seems you haven't answered my question. I  
29 asked whether it was important as a mediator to get the answered

1 down in writing - the positions, excuse me, of the various  
2 parties. You said sometimes it would be important. And then I  
3 asked you when would it not be important? Then you gave an  
4 answer that I believe to not answer the question. Do you want a  
15:16:04 5 further chance to answer that question?

6 A. A chance? Yes, Mr Koumjian.

7 Q. Go ahead.

8 A. Sometimes I say it would not be important because it  
9 depends on the parties. In this case there was no need to get  
15:16:16 10 written down positions because the position was already clear.  
11 Let me tell you what the position was. The position was very  
12 clear on the part of the government of President Tejan Kabbah,  
13 ECOWAS and the international community that the only recognised  
14 government in Sierra Leone was that of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and  
15:16:37 15 that the RUF should return to the 1996 agreement. So we already  
16 had the written position. There was no point to ask for a  
17 renewed writing of a position on the part of ECOWAS that we knew.  
18 So this is what I mean by it depends on the situation.

19 Q. You gave Sam Bockarie that position in September and you  
15:16:57 20 reiterated it in October, correct?

21 A. Yes, and started the process, yes.

22 Q. What did Sam Bockarie say?

23 A. Well, Sam Bockarie was very, very, very concerned about the  
24 leadership and he said that he wanted peace also, but that he -  
15:17:17 25 he and other folks were going to be consulting other leaders  
26 within the sub-region, and he did consult other leaders in the  
27 sub-region.

28 Q. Which other leader did Sam Bockarie consult?

29 A. Sam Bockarie went to Burkina Faso and talked to the

1 chairman of the OAU at that particular time, yes.

2 Q. Now you're talking about the November trip and we'll come  
3 to that. Thank you. Is that correct? The November trip, is  
4 that what you are discussing?

15:17:46 5 A. Well, I said - yeah, late November, early December, yes.

6 Q. Now, Sam Bockarie, was he a person you had confidence in as  
7 somebody interested in peace?

8 A. Quite frankly, I would say yes. From my discussions with  
9 him, he appeared to want peace, yes.

15:18:17 10 Q. But you knew at this time, of course, that he was the  
11 leader of an organisation committing horrendous atrocities  
12 against civilians, correct?

13 A. I tell you, by - by my own calculations, by November 1998,  
14 the whole issue of widespread atrocities in Sierra Leone was not  
15:18:46 15 front and centre as it was about a year later. So - but I knew  
16 from reports that there were reports of problems in - of  
17 atrocities in Sierra Leone.

18 Q. In fact, it was in 1998, do you recall, that there were  
19 reports - perhaps you heard on the radio Eldred Collins making  
15:19:08 20 the announcement of an operation No Living Thing - excuse me,  
21 Spare No Soul?

22 A. No, I didn't hear that on the radio.

23 Q. Now, do you recall in September 1998, Sam Bockarie, the man  
24 you've been meeting with, had threatened to wage a campaign of  
15:19:35 25 genocide if Sankoh was not immediately freed?

26 A. Well, it all depends on when he made that in September. I  
27 don't know, because when I meet Sam Bockarie, I'm not aware that  
28 he has made any such bellicose remarks. I meet Sam Bockarie in  
29 September and I have no knowledge at this time that such remarks

1 have been made. I would have confronted him. I'm not aware of  
2 that remark. Whether it's before or after, I have no  
3 recollection of seeing any reports of such.

15:20:23 4 Q. Do you recall hearing in mid-November 1998 Sam Bockarie on  
5 the media saying that the RUF would destroy every living thing if  
6 anything happened to Foday Sankoh, their leader?

7 A. No, I don't - I don't remember seeing any such report,  
8 Mr Koumjian, no. Quite frankly, no.

9 Q. Did Sam Bockarie convey to you what would happen if his  
15:20:41 10 demands for the release of Foday Sankoh were not met?

11 A. No. No, he made no - he made no such statements. No, he  
12 did not.

13 Q. In fact, Sam Bockarie made no demands of you, did he?

14 A. Sam Bockarie did not make any demands when he met with me.  
15:21:04 15 Sam Bockarie said he wanted his leader free, but beyond that,  
16 like what you will call making threatening or bellicose remarks  
17 when he met with me, no, that did not happen.

18 Q. I read to you this morning, Mr Taylor, your statement on  
19 the first day of your testimony that you first met Sam Bockarie  
15:21:28 20 in late 1997 and 1998. I want to go over the exchange, but you  
21 said that that has been corrected in your subsequent direct  
22 examination. Is that a fair summary of our exchange this  
23 morning?

24 A. If I recollect, yes, I would say that that whole issue had  
15:21:44 25 been - it was misspoken. It has been - it has been cleared in  
26 the record.

27 Q. I would like to explore maybe why that has been corrected  
28 on the record. Could the accused please be shown MFI-49.

29 DCT-139, MFI-49. This is in the binder for week 31, 27 to 31

1 July. It's the second of three binders, tab 20. Week 31, binder  
2 2, tab 20.

3 Mr Taylor, if you recall, you spent with your counsel a  
4 great - quite a long time discussing this document on numerous  
15:23:28 5 occasions during your direct examination. Do you remember that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And this is a document that's dated what?

8 A. 12 August 1998.

9 Q. So this is dated after what you told us the first day was  
15:23:45 10 your first meeting with Sam Bockarie, but before what you have  
11 corrected as the first date of your meeting with Sam Bockarie.  
12 Is that right?

13 A. Well, I will say no because of the implications of your  
14 question, no. The way the question is phrased, either yes or no  
15:24:05 15 could be your answer, the way it's phrased. I'm confused.

16 Q. Let me move on to read to you the third paragraph and we'll  
17 discuss it. The third paragraph says "meanwhile Major Kanneh".  
18 Now, you know who he is referring to by Major Kanneh, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes.

15:24:23 20 Q. Who is that?

21 A. It mentions in the paragraph before that.

22 Q. Eddie Kanneh?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Who you got to know, correct?

15:24:31 25 A. Yes, I got to know Eddie Kanneh.

26 Q. I think you even referred to him in your direct examination  
27 as Eddie on one or two occasions.

28 A. Eddie Kanneh, yes.

29 Q. Did you get to know him on a first name basis?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Is there any particular reason why you referred to him as  
3 Eddie in your direct examination?

4 A. Well, I've said Sam.

15:24:50 5 Q. Yes. So you had the same relationship with Eddie Kanneh  
6 and Sam Bockarie?

7 A. Well, if you are trying to imply it means some comradery,  
8 no. Within my direct examination, I would just say Eddie but  
9 with no special attachment, counsel.

15:25:04 10 Q. The third paragraph:

11 "Meanwhile Major Kanneh, who remains a strong advocate of  
12 the RUF junta forces, reiterated his plan of travelling to  
13 Liberia along with six other members of his organisation and  
14 would cross into Sierra Leone to join their men after his meeting  
15 with the Liberian leader."

15:25:23 16 Now, Mr Taylor, first, is there any question in your mind  
17 who the Liberian leader is?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Who is that?

15:25:32 20 A. I'm the Liberian leader.

21 Q. Now, it indicates that it's Major Kanneh travelling to plan  
22 with six other members, so a total of seven persons travelling.  
23 Is that how you would interpret this?

24 A. Yes.

15:25:46 25 Q. And then the next sentence says:

26 "He named one Mr Sidi ki Janneh" - with a phone number -  
27 "and Brigadier Bockarie, Mosquito, both Sierra Leonean nationals,  
28 including one Mr Sheriff, assistant director of special security  
29 service of Liberia, as contact persons in the country."

1 Now, Mr Taylor, when it says "contact persons in the  
2 country," isn't that absolutely clear these are persons that  
3 could vouch for Eddie Kanneh, people that you know?

15:26:25 4 A. I see the word "person" there. You are asking me now about  
5 people. Did he say - let's go back to that. I think he said  
6 contact person. Am I reading it wrong?

7 Q. I'm showing, Mr Taylor, the last sentence. It says in my  
8 reading, quite clearly, "contact persons".

9 A. Okay.

15:26:40 10 Q. There's an S on the end?

11 A. "With Mr Sheriff as contact persons in the country," yes.

12 Q. So this sentence makes perfect sense if you met Sam  
13 Bockarie, as you told us the first day, in late '97 or any time  
14 in 1997. This would make sense, wouldn't it?

15:27:01 15 A. It would not make a bit of sense to me or you. No.

16 Q. It doesn't make sense if you say that you didn't meet Sam  
17 Bockarie until September, because here this is dated August 1998?

18 A. Mr Koumjian, your inferences are just - how can I - I don't  
19 want to describe it. It's just outrageous. This document states  
15:27:35 20 what it states, it is factual and what I have stated before this  
21 Court is factual. Your inferences are just outrageous that  
22 somehow someone is supposed to be trying to doctor something.  
23 That is totally outrageous.

24 Q. I don't want to be outrageous, so let me give you a chance  
15:27:53 25 to correct me. Mr Taylor, let me explain my clear reading of the  
26 last sentence. It is that this person is saying Eddie Kanneh  
27 says that these three people, Sam Bockarie, Sidiki Janneh, and  
28 Varmuyan Sheriff know him and they are his contact persons in  
29 Liberia?

1 A. That's what it says.

2 Q. Thank you. What's what it says?

3 A. That's what it says.

15:28:14

4 Q. So that implies that you were already in contact with Sam  
5 Bockarie before this letter was written?

6 A. Totally, totally, totally - I don't see how you can come up  
7 with such an inference. Totally we disagree. I disagree with  
8 you fully.

15:28:25

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, there are two completely  
10 different propositions here. Whether Mr Taylor was prior to  
11 August 1998 in contact with Sam Bockarie and secondly --

15:28:48

12 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. Your Honour, I do have a problem  
13 if counsel is going to give a speaking interpretation of the  
14 letter in front of his witness so the witness could adopt it.  
15 The letter speaks for itself. Counsel is free to argue it during  
16 his argument or even can come back to it during his redirect  
17 examination.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: What's the gist of the objection?

15:29:02

19 MR GRIFFITHS: The gist of the objection is there is a  
20 difference between contact between this witness and Bockarie and  
21 Bockarie being a contact in Liberia. They are two completely  
22 different things and it's totally misleading for Mr Koumjian to  
23 be seeking to conflate the two. That is the simple point. He  
24 should be fair to the witness, particularly as a Prosecutor.

15:29:26

25 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I'll proceed with my questions  
26 unless you --

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Unless you want to respond.

28 MR KOUMJIAN: I think the facts speak for themselves and  
29 I'll just read the last sentence again so that everyone, counsel

1 and the accused, can comment on it:

2 Q. It says "contact persons in the country". Which country do  
3 you understand that to be, Mr Taylor?

15:29:50

4 A. That country I understand to be is Liberia, but why would  
5 anybody in his sound mind make such a conclusion, Mr Koumjian,  
6 when if you read this letter in its totality this letter is  
7 introducing individuals for the first time and seeking permission  
8 of the Government of Liberia. Why would anyone - my ambassador,  
9 knowing very well that the President has been in contact with  
10 someone, would be alleging to the person as one Sam Bockarie?  
11 Doesn't it make sense to you? I mean, I don't know, we went to  
12 different schools, that this would mean that he is in contact  
13 with me prior to this letter. This letter does not even minutely  
14 suggest that, so I don't know how you can come up with that.

15:30:10

15 Q. I think it's quite clear but let me ask you another  
16 question about this. The people that are travelling are Eddie  
17 Kanneh and six other members of his organisation. So that's  
18 clear to you from the first sentence of this paragraph, correct?

15:30:29

19 A. What's your question?

15:30:44

20 Q. Is it clear to you that the people that are travelling and  
21 seeking permission to enter Liberia are Eddie Kanneh and six  
22 other members of his organisation?

23 A. That's what the letter says, yes.

15:30:57

24 Q. And Eddie Kanneh, what we can agree on, was unknown to you  
25 at that time, Eddie Kanneh?

26 A. Totally, totally unknown to me, yes.

27 Q. And that's why he asked you - he gave you the names of  
28 contact persons who were known to you, correct?

29 A. No, no, no, no. He is not giving me contact people that

1 were known to me. I mean that's totally erroneous.

2 Q. He is giving you the contact people - the names of people  
3 that you don't know at all as references?

4 A. No, no, no, no, no. You say he is giving me contact people  
15:31:23 5 known to me. This letter, let's go back. This letter is not  
6 addressed to me, Mr Koumjian. This letter is not addressed to  
7 the President of the Liberia, okay. So let's get that straight.  
8 It's not addressed to me. This is a letter from an ambassador to  
9 the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs relaying something, so  
15:31:43 10 it's not addressed to me. So we can also conclude that this  
11 information is to the minister. So that's totally erroneous to  
12 suggest that it has to be somebody coming to me.

13 Q. I'll give you this, Mr Taylor, it's not addressed to you.  
14 It's clear that Sam Bockarie is one of the persons - contact  
15:31:57 15 persons in Liberia. Is that correct?

16 A. No, I would disagree. I would disagree.

17 Q. The letter is quite clear. Their Honours can read it and  
18 make their own interpretation. Now, Mr Taylor --

19 A. How would Sam Bockarie be travelling and be a contact  
15:32:19 20 person at the same time in the country? They're saying this.

21 Q. Mr Taylor, it's absolutely clear from this letter that Sam  
22 Bockarie is not one of the people travelling. He is the contact  
23 person?

24 A. No, I totally disagree. I totally disagree.

15:32:32 25 Q. Because it wouldn't make sense even under your version of  
26 affairs for Sam Bockarie to be writing, asking permission because  
27 you already sent someone to go look for him in August to bring  
28 him to Monrovia, correct?

29 A. I never told you that, Mr Koumjian. You are misstating the

1 record. I never told you that I sent somebody to look for  
2 Mr Bockarie in August. I never told you that and never told this  
3 Court. I said that I sent Mr Menkarzon in September. I'm sorry  
4 that you are misleading the Court based on my record.

15:33:09 5 Q. You said there were two meetings, Mr Taylor, in October.  
6 What was the purpose of the second meeting?

7 A. I've answered that question three times.

8 Q. Forgive me. My recollection is you answered the purpose of  
9 the first meeting, but why was it necessary to have a second  
15:33:26 10 meeting?

11 A. People come to the country, they come, greet, how things  
12 are doing, go, freshen up. Second meeting is normally the last  
13 meeting before you leave. The second meeting he was informed of  
14 what was expected from ECOWAS and the international community  
15:33:46 15 that a return - a ceasefire and a return to the 1996 agreement  
16 was the way to go and that we needed to start working on getting  
17 a cessation of hostilities. This was the purpose of the meeting.

18 Q. In addition to the satellite telephone, you provided some  
19 other facilities for the RUF to have a presence in Monrovia?

15:34:10 20 A. Definitely.

21 Q. And that was the guesthouse and communications?

22 A. The guesthouse, communications, that is correct.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, since you now had a satellite phone number for  
24 Mr Bockarie why did you need to have a guesthouse with a  
15:34:22 25 permanent presence of RUF in Monrovia?

26 A. Mr Koumjian, it's easy now - when the peace process is  
27 going on it's very, very - and you need contacts. Mr Bockarie  
28 was not permanent in Liberia. He never stayed there no more than  
29 a day or two. The matter of contact was very, very important; so

1 there could be easy access if and when something had to be  
2 transmitted immediately. The President of Liberia did not get on  
3 the phone to conduct business, so they needed someone just as  
4 they had done in La Cote d'Ivoire. So that was the purpose.

15:35:51 5 Q. Going over your answer about why you needed to have the  
6 permanent presence, Sam Bockarie wasn't permanently in Liberia,  
7 correct?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. But personnel of the RUF were permanently there?

15:36:03 10 A. Oh, yes. There were people coming and going.

11 Q. Why was that?

12 A. I just told you. Because we needed to maintain contact. I  
13 just told you.

14 Q. And telephone contact was not sufficient?

15:36:16 15 A. It was not sufficient. It's like asking why does North  
16 Korea have an office in Beijing with the six party talks,  
17 Mr Koumjian? It's natural and normal. That's why, to maintain  
18 contacts. That's what it's done for. It had been done before.

19 Q. Now, the satellite phone of course gave Sam Bockarie the  
15:36:40 20 ability to communicate outside of Sierra Leone to anyone,  
21 correct?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. The radio allowed the office in Monrovia to communicate  
24 with Sierra Leone directly, correct?

15:36:51 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. How many times did you visit the guesthouse?

27 A. Never.

28 Q. How many times did anyone other than Sam Bockarie in 1998  
29 visit you from the guesthouse?

1 A. Nobody from the - the people at the guesthouse were not  
2 people that were out at a point to visit me. Nobody from the  
3 guesthouse visited me. Not one.

15:37:22 4 Q. So people from the guesthouse were not of a rank that they  
5 would have participated meaningfully in peace negotiations,  
6 correct?

7 A. No. Their job was to transmit messages. That was what  
8 they were used for. They were not at the level. It is later on  
9 that somebody of a level can, but, no, they were not at the  
15:37:38 10 level. I don't meet with them. Never meet with them. Never  
11 visit the guesthouse.

12 Q. Transmit messages from who?

13 A. From me and the government. If we wanted to get to Sam  
14 Bockarie or Sam Bockarie wanted to get a message across he would  
15:37:55 15 call on the radio. It's less expensive calling on the radio than  
16 on a telephone. So the radio was just something like I would say  
17 a second source of transmitting information.

18 Q. If you're interested in saving money, how much did the  
19 radio and the guesthouse cost?

15:38:17 20 A. Nothing. What? These Yaesu radios cost nothing and  
21 operating them, all you operate them with is a 12 volt battery.  
22 So, no, it's no calls attached to operating an open radio.

23 Q. The messages transmitted by you for you and your government  
24 to Sam Bockarie and the RUF, how frequently did they occur?

15:38:40 25 A. Not very frequently. It depends. I mean, it depends on  
26 the situation at hand. If there was a hot situation where maybe  
27 a little fighting flare-up or something the minister would use  
28 the radio and call to try to calm things down. It was not  
29 frequent from my point, no.

1 Q. How many messages did you send to Sam Bockarie through  
2 that guesthouse radio through the end of 1998?

3 A. None that I - I would say I didn't - when you say how many  
4 messages did you send?

15:39:18 5 Q. Yes, I mean you personally. That you ordered, not that you  
6 sat at the radio, but you ordered?

7 A. Okay. Good. Okay. Well, I would put it to at least -  
8 there could be about one because most of the time I would  
9 instruct the minister to call. So radio I would say maybe one,  
10 if at all.

15:39:38

11 Q. How many phone calls did you make to Sam Bockarie or phone  
12 conversations did you have through the end of 1998 after this  
13 October meeting?

14 A. Personally none. But there were phone calls to him but I  
15 didn't make them. Personally none.

15:39:53

16 Q. How many phone calls did you understand your ministers to  
17 have or anyone from your government to have with Sam Bockarie  
18 after you gave him the satellite phone in October 1998?

19 A. I have no idea but I'm sure he made a few. I don't know  
20 how many.

15:40:13

21 Q. What were the messages that were being conveyed to Sam  
22 Bockarie?

23 A. Mr Koumjian, what does a negotiator do? The minister is  
24 responsible in taking over the minor details of the Sierra  
25 Leonean crisis. If he has a need to call him if there's a  
26 flare-up he would call him. I didn't get a log as to what he  
27 did. I'm just telling this Court that there were contacts. And  
28 those contacts for me were legitimate. I don't know how many.

15:40:30

29 Q. I'm just a bit confused because while I could see there

- 1 would be some possibility if someone was engaged in peace  
2 negotiations to have occasional phone contacts, you had the  
3 satellite phone. Why would you need to set up a radio? Would  
4 that - that would seem to be much more fitting for daily  
15:41:02 5 communications like notifications of ECOMOG jets taking off?  
6 A. In 1998, at the time it is put in. 1998 October?  
7 Q. Yes, sir.  
8 A. Why was ECOMOG - why would - if one were to even believe  
9 such a proposition, where and why would ECOMOG jet be taking off  
15:41:25 10 to do what? There's no combat in October 1998, Mr Koumjian. So  
11 that's not the purpose. The purpose of that radio is to maintain  
12 contact with the RUF and two tiers are set up. There's a radio  
13 and there's a telephone.  
14 Q. Mr Taylor, was there peace? Are you trying to say that  
15:41:47 15 there was peace in Sierra Leone in October 1998?  
16 A. No, there was not peace.  
17 Q. Sir, you said there was no combat in October 1998. Are you  
18 saying that there was no combat taking place after October 1998  
19 in Sierra Leone?  
15:42:01 20 A. By combat, I'm talking about between ECOMOG and the RUF.  
21 I've said that we had issues of trying to get cessation of  
22 hostilities. When I talk about combat, I mean ECOMOG is not  
23 fighting for jets to be taking off. That's what I mean by  
24 combat.  
15:42:17 25 Q. In fact, there was almost daily combat between ECOMOG and  
26 the RUF throughout 1998. Isn't that true?  
27 A. Not involving ECOMOG jets. There were always little flare  
28 ups. I would disagree that there were daily. I would strongly  
29 disagree. I will tell the Court, there were clashes and we were

1 busy try to patch things up. I was there. I was in charge. I  
2 knew. So there was not daily fighting every day. No, no, no. I  
3 didn't agree.

15:42:54 4 Q. As the point man on peace, after ECOMOG retook Koidu Town  
5 from the junta shortly after in approximately the mid-April 1998,  
6 what other fighting took place in Kono District to your  
7 knowledge?

8 A. I really - I don't recall the specific incident. No, I  
9 don't know the different districts and what was happening. No, I  
15:43:19 10 don't recall any specific fighting. There could have very well  
11 been. When we received reports, we received reports of clashes  
12 and you're saying it was April 1998?

13 Q. Sir, I'm talking about after April. April, ECOMOG retook  
14 Koidu Town in Kono District.

15:43:38 15 A. I'll take your word for it.

16 Q. Sir, were you informed of two - of subsequent attempts by  
17 the RUF, one them here has been referred to as Fitti-Fatta, to  
18 retake Koidu Town?

19 A. I was not aware of any operation like that, no.

15:43:52 20 Q. So would you say now, with all the information you have,  
21 that you were a very ill-informed person to be the point person  
22 for peace because you didn't know what was going on militarily in  
23 Sierra Leone?

24 A. Well, ill informed, I would - it depends what you want to  
15:44:14 25 use. I would disagree. I would say I'm poorly. I - you have to  
26 understand that my efforts in Sierra Leone were along the lines  
27 of bunch of other international groups: United Nations, ECOMOG,  
28 ECOWAS, that I am really working with. When the information  
29 comes, it's about fighting. We try to get a ceasefire. And if

1 your question - maybe you could be right during this stage. If  
2 your question is: Was I on top of every town and every village  
3 that who attacked, when they attacked, how did they attack, who  
4 died? No, I was not involved in that kind of daily routine  
15:44:57 5 seized, because just about this time, Mr Koumjian, at around June  
6 1998, Liberia is confronted with a problem where the Security  
7 Council alleges through a report from the special representative,  
8 Mr Okelo, that Liberians were involved in the February situation  
9 and that Liberia should respond. So we begin the process. And  
15:45:23 10 right after that, in June - in June 1998, I get a letter from  
11 General Abubakar to - that Kofi Annan is coming down. I meet  
12 with Kofi Annan I would say about the first few days of July.  
13 So, I mean, there are a lot of things I'm doing.

14 I'm definitely not entrenched into the day-to-day  
15:45:45 15 operation. My job as the point man is to try to mediate, to get  
16 a ceasefire and get us back to the negotiations. I'm not  
17 involved with the details, every day.

18 Q. Thank you for reminding us about this allegation by the  
19 Security Council in June 1998. So by the time that you met Sam  
15:46:06 20 Bockarie, brought him to Monrovia in September/October, you were  
21 under pressure for alleged ties to the RUF, correct?

22 A. No.

23 Q. No?

24 A. No. The allegation - what the Okelo report has said, which  
15:46:18 25 is before this Court in exhibits, is that a number of Liberians  
26 had been arrested during the intervention and that Liberia should  
27 give some accounts. It was not specifically the RUF, because in  
28 1998 it was the junta being kicked out of Freetown. So they  
29 talked about Liberia's involvement in the Sierra Leonean crisis.

1 This was the type of language at that time.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, then would you agree or disagree, as of the  
3 summer of 1998, you were under pressure because of alleged ties  
4 to the RUF? Do you agree with that statement or you don't agree  
15:47:01 5 with that statement?

6 A. Well, to be fair, you've limited it to the RUF. I would  
7 agree that these questions are obvious. I would agree.

8 Q. So it was even more important for you to be open about any  
9 possible meetings with RUF representatives. Isn't that correct?

15:47:23 10 A. Oh, of course. And that's why I keep telling you that the  
11 people that should have known, the committee and other people  
12 knew. That's why it would have been dangerous if they don't know  
13 that it would appear clandestine.

14 Q. Of course, another body that was critical to keep informed  
15:47:39 15 would be the United Nations Security Council, correct?

16 A. No. No.

17 Q. You said the allegation came from them in June, correct?

18 A. Well, you said critical. The Security Council had not made  
19 a determination. My representative at the United Nations met  
15:47:55 20 with the President of the Security Council and he was told that  
21 this matter had been reported, that there were Liberians that  
22 were involved in the February situation and that they wanted an  
23 explanation from the government. So by this time the Security  
24 Council, quote unquote, is not critical of Liberia. I would say  
15:48:15 25 no to you.

26 Q. I don't think that was my question.

27 A. Oh, yes.

28 Q. I'll try to read it and rephrase it, if necessary. I said  
29 a body, an institution, that it was very important, that it was

1 critical to keep informed about your meetings with Sam Bockarie  
2 would have been the United Nations Security Council.

3 A. No, but that was not your question, Mr Koumjian. If you  
4 read the text, that was not - you are rephrasing it, but that was  
15:48:45 5 not your question on the record.

6 Q. You still haven't answered it. Do you want me to read  
7 exactly what I asked you before?

8 A. Please.

9 Q. "Of course, another body that was critical to keep informed  
15:48:55 10 would be the United Nations Security Council, correct?"

11 A. But that was the not the question before that that we're  
12 talking about.

13 Q. That's what I'm reading off the screen.

14 A. Well, I will answer that question. I would say correct.

15:49:03 15 But the question that I did not get a chance to answer was the  
16 question you said that by this time the United Nations Security  
17 Council was critical of your involvement with the RUF. That's  
18 the question I was referring to. And that was not the case.

19 Q. After you met twice with Sam Bockarie in October, how did  
15:49:44 20 the third meeting in late November or December take place? How  
21 did that come about?

22 A. That was a very short meeting. The minister informed me  
23 that apparently Bockarie had spoken to the chairman of the OAU  
24 and intended on passing through Liberia to go there. And he came  
15:50:05 25 and I met with him very briefly en route to the chairman of the  
26 OAU. Very briefly.

27 MR KOUMJIAN: I believe my LiveNote is frozen. I didn't  
28 get the end of the answer either. I didn't hear it and I don't  
29 have it on my screen. Do your Honours have LiveNote operating?

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: It usually comes good after a minute or  
2 two, but --

3 MR KOUMJIAN:

15:50:46

4 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm sorry, but I did not understand the end of  
5 your answer.

6 A. Your microphone is off.

7 Q. Thank you.

8           PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll have to look into it, Mr Koumjian.  
9 It might be a bit more serious. There we go. Yes, go ahead.

15:51:08

10           MR KOUMJIAN: The text of Mr Taylor's answer is still  
11 coming up. I would like to read that. If your Honours could  
12 just give me a moment:

13 Q. Where did you meet Sam Bockarie when he was en route to  
14 visit the chairman of the OAU?

15:51:41

15 A. At the mansion.

16 Q. And just so that everyone is clear, that is Blaise  
17 Compaore?

18 A. That is correct, yes.

19 Q. How long your meeting last with Sam Bockarie?

15:51:51

20 A. I would say about, what, five minutes. No more. It was  
21 real short.

22 Q. Who was present at that meeting?

23 A. I can remember my chief of protocol, Musa Cisse, was  
24 present in that meeting because what Bockarie had asked for was  
15:52:09 25 for someone to help to interpret because he doesn't speak French  
26 and my chief of protocol was in that meeting and, in fact, went  
27 along with them to interpret.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, you've already told us before in your direct  
29 that you know Eddie Kanneh. Eddie Kanneh speaks French, correct?

1 A. I don't know that.

2 Q. Now, how long before he arrived at that meeting in the  
3 mansion had you been informed that Sam Bockarie wanted to travel  
4 to visit Blaise Compaore?

15:52:42 5 A. The minister had told me. The minister - that he had  
6 talked and the minister had told me that Bockarie had contacted  
7 him to say that he had an appointment to see the chairman of the  
8 OAU, President Compaore, and when he will be coming and I said it  
9 was fine.

15:53:02 10 Q. How long before you met Sam Bockarie did you get that  
11 notice that he was coming through Monrovia? Was it hours? Was  
12 it days? Was it weeks?

13 A. No, days. I would say not weeks. Days.

14 Q. In order for Sam Bockarie to take that trip, were any  
15:53:18 15 preparations done in Liberia?

16 A. No.

17 Q. How did he get from Liberia to Ouagadougou?

18 A. He went by plane. He made his own arrangement. A plane  
19 came. No preparation was made in Liberia for that. A plane came  
15:53:34 20 for him.

21 Q. A private plane came for him?

22 A. That's what I understand. We didn't have a plane in  
23 Liberia. A plane was arranged and he went.

24 Q. Of course, a plane cannot land in Liberia without the  
15:53:44 25 permission of the government, correct?

26 A. Of course not.

27 Q. And Sam Bockarie at that time was still on the United  
28 Nations travel ban, correct?

29 A. Well, to the best of my knowledge, those travels were

1 exempt, from what I knew. Maybe you know differently now, but  
2 from what I knew, that anything that had to do with the ongoing  
3 peace process was okay. And that's how he went.

4 Q. How did you reach that conclusion?

15:54:12 5 A. We've gone through that. I've told you.

6 Q. That was the document we looked at this afternoon?

7 A. The document plus private discussions. Mr Koumjian, we  
8 brought a document to show to this Court that the issue of the  
9 travel of officials of the junta was something that was not  
10 hidden. That's the purpose of that document. The inner  
11 discussions between Heads of State in dealing with these matters  
12 for peace were not put in that document. That's very clear. So  
13 I'm saying to you, for Sam Bockarie to go to meet the chairman of  
14 the OAU is not a hidden matter. It's not. It's not a hidden  
15 matter.

15:54:52 15  
16 Q. You are basing that on the document that we looked at this  
17 afternoon, the first document, MFI-63?

18 A. My answer is that no, I'm not just basing my own analysis  
19 based on that document. I have told this Court, that document,  
15:55:25 20 along with discussions between and amongst Heads of State and  
21 other officials, not singularly on that document. I would then  
22 have to say no.

23 Q. Musa Cisse, you told us, was a person that you had almost  
24 daily contact with, correct?

15:55:43 25 A. Oh, yes. Just about, yes.

26 Q. He had a very important position in your government?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. You sent him on this trip with Sam Bockarie?

29 A. Surely I did.

1 Q. To act as an interpreter?

2 A. Surely I did.

3 Q. Isn't there better use for the chief of protocol of the  
4 Republic of Liberia than to act as an interpreter on a trip?

15:56:04 5 A. That's a very, very good use from my calculation. Other  
6 protocol officers in other countries did the same thing. Whether  
7 you are talking about Togo, I remember the protocol officer in  
8 Togo interpreted between Eyadema and myself. Sometimes Musa did.  
9 So when you say better, that's a qualification. That was for me  
15:56:24 10 a reasonable task, of course.

11 Q. Did Blaise Compaore have interpreters capable of  
12 communicating with Sam Bockarie?

13 A. That was possible, but I was asked. I was asked to let him  
14 go. Every country has interpreters.

15:56:39 15 Q. In fact it was more than possible because you've told us  
16 that you used those interpreters when you spoke with Blaise  
17 Compaore, that he had his own interpreters.

18 A. And there were times I used my own, yes.

19 Q. Sir, isn't it the protocol that when you are visiting the  
15:56:52 20 President of a country in that country it's the host government  
21 that provides the interpreter?

22 A. That is a protocol, I will agree, but that is not what you  
23 would call the only protocol. I agree with you that it is a  
24 protocol but that's not the only protocol. There have been times

15:57:18 25 that Presidents have come to visit me, I provide would and some  
26 of them would provide their own. I have visited Eyadema, I have  
27 visited Conte before where Musa Cisse interpreted.

28 Q. Sir, having your protocol officer Musa Cisse in meetings  
29 between Blaise Compaore, or whatever officials Sam Bockarie met

1 with in Burkina Faso, would have the advantage of keeping you  
2 informed of exactly what went on in Burkina Faso, correct?

3 A. I was not spying on my friend, no. No. I would have to  
4 say no. I was not spying on my friend, no.

15:57:55 5 Q. How long did that meeting take? How many days were they  
6 away?

7 A. To the best of my recollection, Sam Bockarie and that group  
8 was away for about two weeks. I think about two weeks.

9 Q. Sir, what would be going on - Presidents are busy people,  
15:58:14 10 correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Why would Sam Bockarie spend two weeks in Burkina Faso to  
13 have a meeting with Blaise Compaore just when the position of the  
14 region is quite clear as to the peace process?

15:58:27 15 A. Let's again, Mr Koumjian - I'm sorry if I missed your  
16 question. I think if your original question was how long was he  
17 in Burkina Faso, then I would be wrong if I said two weeks. I  
18 thought I understood you to say how long was he out of that area.  
19 I would say two weeks.

15:58:48 20 I do not know if he was specifically in Burkina Faso for  
21 two weeks because my protocol officer reported to me that he  
22 proceeded to Libya. So I don't want to mislead you by saying  
23 that I know specifically he was in Burkina Faso for two weeks.  
24 That is not the case.

15:59:06 25 Q. Did Musa Cisse tell you that he went with Sam Bockarie to  
26 Libya?

27 A. He told me he did not go. He remained in Burkina Faso.

28 Q. And why did Sam Bockarie go to Libya, according to your  
29 information?

1 A. Well, Musa didn't even know. I think he went there for, I  
2 think, consultations.

3 Q. Was Libya a member of the Committee of Five?

4 A. No, Libya is North Africa. No.

15:59:30 5 Q. Was Libya in any way involved in the peace process in  
6 Sierra Leone?

7 A. No, not to the best of my knowledge but Libya's position at  
8 that particular time, once he went - I don't know what transpired  
9 between the chairman of the OAU but at this particular time Libya

15:59:47 10 is playing a very important part. In fact, most of the OAU  
11 activities at that time were being backed by Libya as the United  
12 Nations like the high contributors. So I don't know what  
13 decision, quite frankly, that carried Bockarie from Burkina Faso  
14 to Libya or how it evolved. I would be misleading this Court if

16:00:13 15 I told you. I can only answer to the fact that he was out for  
16 two weeks and that I was told by my chief of protocol that he  
17 went to Libya and he, my chief of protocol, did not accompany him  
18 to Libya. That's the fact that I can tell these judges.

19 Q. Mr Taylor, based upon your knowledge of the situation in  
16:00:32 20 Sierra Leone, your general knowledge of Africa, Libya and your  
21 personal contacts with Sam Bockarie, what did you think at that  
22 time was the purpose of Sam Bockarie going to Libya? What  
23 occurred to you as possible reasons for him to go there?

24 A. I really - I really - I really can't say, Mr Koumjian. I'm  
16:00:54 25 not going to speculate, I think that would be wrong. If I want  
26 to help the Court, I know Tejan Kabbah and Gaddafi are very good  
27 friends. They are both El-Hajj, they are both Muslims and very,  
28 very, very close friends and Libya during that particular time  
29 was backing the peace process in Sierra Leone and supported Tejan

1 Kabbah. They were very close. So I can't see - the only thing I  
2 can surmise, I would say, would be maybe Kabbah could have asked  
3 Gaddafi to talk to Sam Bockarie to calm down, I don't know, but I  
4 know that Kabbah was and is still is very close to Gaddafi. Very  
16:01:38 5 close.

6 Q. The thought never crossed your mind that perhaps Sam  
7 Bockarie was going to Libya and Burkina Faso to arrange for arms  
8 or ammunition for the RUF?

9 A. No, that thought - I'll tell you quite frankly, no, it did  
16:01:51 10 not cross my mind. The chairman of the OAU, Blaise Compaore,  
11 would not do that so it never crossed my mind, no. Never.

12 Q. Did Musa Cisse travel back with Sam Bockarie?

13 A. Yes. He did.

14 Q. So Musa Cisse would know what was in that plane?

16:02:18 15 A. Yes, Musa Cisse came back but he did not report to me if  
16 there was anything on the plane. No, he never told me there was  
17 anything on the plane. As far as I know there was nothing on the  
18 plane, to the best of my knowledge.

19 Q. Let's be a little bit more clear about that because you  
16:02:33 20 heard the testimony during the direct examination. Mr Taylor, it  
21 wouldn't be possible, would it, for a plane full of ammunition to  
22 arrive in your capital Monrovia and that ammunition to be taken  
23 to Sierra Leone without your knowledge? That would be  
24 impossible, wouldn't it?

16:02:49 25 A. It would not be impossible. It would not be.

26 Q. Explain to these judges how it is that your information  
27 about your own country and your control would be so poor that a  
28 plane full of ammunition would come in and ammunition would be  
29 trucked to the border of Sierra Leone without your knowledge?

1 A. It is very, very simple. It depends on the quality of  
2 corrupt officials involved. It would never get to my attention,  
3 and not just in Liberia. In most places. It would never get to  
4 my attention. Depending on the quality - if there were any  
16:03:23 5 things on and you had high level corrupt officials it would never  
6 get out, ever.

7 Q. In fact, Mr Taylor, it would only take one person on the  
8 ground who was loading, who was driving that truck to report to  
9 you that this was going on for to you find out and for those  
16:03:38 10 officials to be in very big trouble?

11 A. I would disagree with you. Like I have answered you,  
12 Mr Koumjian, it depends on the level of officials that you are  
13 dealing with. I'll tell you what, I during tough times traversed  
14 arms and ammunition through countries that did not even know so  
16:03:58 15 that's - that happens all the time. It depends on how much you  
16 are willing to pay and who you are dealing with. You can bring  
17 in and move out and it would not reach to the President.  
18 Definitely. That's my experience with that.

19 Q. When you say how much you're willing to pay you are talking  
16:04:17 20 about bribing officials?

21 A. That's the whole point of corruption, yes.

22 Q. How many times have you done that?

23 A. It depends on - during the war we went through countries, I  
24 don't know who was involved but if we wanted to get something  
16:04:30 25 done we would do it and we've done it at least I would say once,  
26 twice.

27 Q. So you've only bribed once or twice officials in other  
28 countries to get arms or ammunition through?

29 A. No, no, no, no, no, Mr Koumjian. What did I just tell you?

1 No.

2 Q. Please explain. Explain what you just told me.

3 A. Okay, let me tell you what I said. Depending on how much  
4 you are prepared to pay and who you are dealing with, you can  
16:04:58 5 come in and leave these countries without the issue reaching to  
6 the President. I said in my own case I have done that. I did  
7 that in, what, I think 2001 when we brought in material into the  
8 country it passed through countries and they never knew. So  
9 that's possible. That's what I'm trying to say. Probable,  
16:05:22 10 maybe.

11 Q. Sir, what officials did you bribe in order to bring arms  
12 and ammunition through the countries?

13 A. Like I say, not personally. I don't know who got paid.  
14 All I wanted was for the material to get to me in 2001 and it got  
16:05:36 15 to me. I don't know who was paid. I really don't know.

16 Q. Who was responsible for arranging these bribes?

17 A. It depends on the official. It depends on - in fact in  
18 some of the countries we will use people. I don't know the names  
19 of those individuals. I just made the money available.

16:05:57 20 Q. Sir, what I'm asking you first is who in your government  
21 was responsible for arranging the bribes of officials in other  
22 countries?

23 A. We used even it was like - because most of these were in  
24 Francophone countries, I used the late Jebbah Cisse, Musa Cisse's  
16:06:23 25 brother, an educated one, he participated. In fact even Musa,  
26 depending on what country, will go in and spend some time and  
27 negotiate, I don't know with whom, but we would get things  
28 through.

29 Q. What countries were you bribing officials in in order to

1 allow arms to pass through those countries in violations of the  
2 United Nations arms embargo?

3 A. I talked about the violation. We traversed material  
4 through Niger, the Government of Niger didn't know. Simple. We  
16:06:58 5 came through Niger a few times, the government knew nothing about  
6 it.

7 Q. How much did you have to pay to the Government of Niger?

8 A. No, no, no.

9 Q. The official. Excuse me. The officials involved in order  
16:07:08 10 to bribe these officials to keep this quiet?

11 A. It could range sometimes \$25,000, \$30,000 you could pay  
12 officials in these countries or even sometimes it got higher, you  
13 bring it down and things will come and pass.

14 Q. Of course, sir, one of the most expensive things to arrange  
16:07:30 15 in such a clandestine arms delivery is a false End User  
16 Certificate. Is that correct?

17 A. Well, I don't know so I can't - I didn't use a false one.  
18 I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of the Republic of Liberia,  
19 took a Liberian End User Certificate to Serbia, informed the  
16:07:52 20 Security Council in a written document that we were ordering  
21 weapons and we did. I didn't - I don't have any knowledge of a  
22 false one. Never used one.

23 Q. A false End User Certificate was used for the transshipment  
24 of arms from Serbia, isn't that true?

16:08:05 25 A. Totally, totally false.

26 Q. Do you have, sir, the End User Certificate from Liberia  
27 that you are talking about?

28 A. If I have it?

29 Q. Yes.

1 A. I don't know if we have it because I don't know if we have  
2 a copy. That was sent in 2001 to Serbia.

3 Q. Really? And tell me, Mr Taylor, how did that work where  
4 you had an End User Certificate from Liberia when the United  
16:08:32 5 Nations arms embargo was in effect for Liberia? Did Serbian  
6 officials accept an End User Certificate from a country that was  
7 on the arms embargo list?

8 A. 100 per cent. They didn't really give a damn about that  
9 thing. There were problems and it was very clear to me that they  
16:08:49 10 didn't give a damn about any arms embargo. But I tell you what  
11 happened. And to tell you the truth of it, the United Nations  
12 went into Serbia and the factory that produced the weapons was  
13 closed. So it was nothing undercover. I wrote them, I told  
14 them, they went there, they verified it. So there's nothing  
16:09:08 15 about that.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, that's completely false and would be proven by  
17 looking at the reports of the panels of experts as to how the  
18 investigation of your arms deals with Serbia took place, isn't  
19 that true?

16:09:20 20 A. Totally nonsense.

21 Q. In fact, Mr Taylor, you only admitted to receiving those  
22 weapons after they were reported by the panel of experts in one  
23 of their public reports that you had evaded the arms embargo and  
24 brought in weapons from Serbia. That's the truth, isn't it?

16:09:38 25 A. That's a blatant, black lie. I wrote the Security Council,  
26 told them what I was ordering, gave them the list of it. That  
27 was done by me personally. It's a lie.

28 Q. Is that in your personal archives, that letter, sir?

29 A. We've tried to get it and I did not have a copy of that

1 letter. I wrote that letter and the United Nations has it. I  
2 personally did it. It was no discovery. Nothing. I informed  
3 them and I used in my letter I remember I think Article 50 or 51  
4 of the charter in my letter, stating that - in fact the argument  
16:10:22 5 and the legal argument that we made was that the United Nations  
6 Security Council under the charter had no right under the charter  
7 to deny --

8 Q. I think, sir, you are not answering my question.

9 A. But that's what I'm telling you.

16:10:36 10 Q. The question was is it in your personal archives?

11 A. I have said to you that it is not in my archives, but the  
12 fact is I wrote that letter and what you have suggested is  
13 totally erroneous.

14 Q. Sir, what I suggest to you is you are conflating two  
16:10:49 15 different documents, a letter you did write, but in fact the UN  
16 panel of experts discovered that you had brought in arms from a  
17 company in Serbia without the knowledge of the Serbian government  
18 through the use of a false End User Certificate, and I'm sorry I  
19 don't have prepared with me right now that country, but I believe  
16:11:07 20 it was Niger. Isn't that the truth?

21 A. That's totally, totally a lie. That's totally false. And  
22 because it's on the record I'm sure that we will have to bring  
23 the documentation if you say that it's wrong. I informed the  
24 Security Council. There was not any discovery. Totally, totally  
16:11:27 25 false. And we held fast to that argument about our right to  
26 doing so under I think it was Article 50, 51 of the Charter. We  
27 did. My government did.

28 Q. When Sam Bockarie and Musa Cisse returned to Monrovia, did  
29 you see Sam Bockarie?

1 A. No, I was out of the capital when they returned. We were  
2 putting together the - what was it? The polio programme. I was  
3 not - I was not in Monrovia when they returned from Burkina Faso.

16:12:34

4 Q. When did you speak to Musa Cisse? How soon after he  
5 returned to Monrovia did you speak to him?

6 A. I think in about a day or so, after Musa arrested the -  
7 about the next day or the day after he came to see me.

8 Q. What did Musa Cisse report to you regarding the trip?

16:12:52

9 A. He only reported that they had gone and met with the  
10 chairman and the chairman had also advised them that they had to  
11 return to peace and that Sam Bockarie had gone to Libya and left  
12 him and he stayed in Burkina Faso and didn't go. That was all.

13 Q. How many persons besides Sam Bockarie and Musa Cisse went  
14 on that trip to Burkina Faso?

16:13:13

15 A. Quite frankly, I can't be sure, but I can remember Eddie  
16 Kanneh was on that trip and we have subsequently gotten to find  
17 out that another person on that trip was I think old man Rogers  
18 was on that trip, from what Musa explained to me. I don't know  
19 the other individuals. I remember these two names that were on  
20 the trip.

16:13:40

21 Q. Sir, do you have any documents where you reported on Sam  
22 Bockarie passing through Liberia to go to Ouagadougou?

23 A. No, Mr Koumjian.

16:14:01

24 Q. Did you - let me ask another question because I did promise  
25 not to ask it in that form. Sir, did you report any documents on  
26 Sam Bockarie passing through Monrovia to, first, let's say the  
27 other members of the Committee of Five?

28 A. No. In terms of a document, no. But they were informed.

29 Q. A letter?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Do you have a letter?

3 A. No. Telephone conversation, yes.

4 Q. Do you have a formal note from your ministry to the embassy  
16:14:29 5 of Sierra Leone or some kind of diplomatic demarche delivered to  
6 any of these capitals?

7 A. No. Why would there be a demarche necessary? No. Those  
8 were not necessary. Sam Bockarie going to see the OAU chairman,  
9 why do - you don't issue a demarche for that. No.

16:14:43 10 Q. Did you have any internal reports from Musa Cisse about  
11 what happened on that trip?

12 A. Like a written report from Musa? No. Musa didn't do a  
13 written report. He came back and reported to me verbally.

14 Q. Did Blaise Compaore issue any public statements to your  
16:15:02 15 knowledge?

16 A. I don't know. He very well could have. I don't know  
17 really. I don't know.

18 Q. Mr Taylor, in your experience, isn't it the case that  
19 normally when an outsider is coming in to act as a mediator to  
16:15:18 20 bring parties together, that's something very public and very  
21 publicised?

22 A. In today's --

23 Q. Conflict?

24 A. Yes. In today's world, in the western world, yes, but  
16:15:32 25 that's a different environment, Mr Koumjian.

26 Q. Well, for example, when Jesse Jackson came to Liberia, that  
27 was well publicised, wasn't it?

28 A. The world super power, Jesse Jackson, coming, representing  
29 the President of the - yes, of course. Of course. And if you

1 remember now, even most of his discussions were not public. They  
2 were, in fact, classified State Department something. In fact,  
3 some of them are just being unclassified or declassified.

16:16:04 4 Q. In fact, Jesse Jackson and others who came through always -  
5 it was the practice to always have a press conference to give  
6 public information about what occurred in the discussions,  
7 correct, even if there wasn't progress?

8 A. Well, there are several questions in there now,  
9 Mr Koumjian. Now, was it customary to hold press conferences?  
16:16:25 10 Yes. Was it customary in those press conferences to talk about  
11 the details of the meetings? No. So you have generalised it,  
12 because most of the discussions were very secret and classified.

13 Q. Did you inform the Government of Sierra Leone about Sam  
14 Bockarie's trip to Burkina Faso?

16:16:49 15 A. I'm sure the Government of Sierra Leone - if I didn't, I'm  
16 sure the OAU chairman did. I didn't inform them, but I would  
17 want to believe that he did.

18 Q. Did you inform ECOMOG that Sam Bockarie, the leader of the  
19 RUF, the military leader of the RUF, was travelling to Burkina  
16:17:04 20 Faso in a plane and returning in a plane?

21 A. Why would I have to inform ECOMOG? No. I don't have a  
22 duty to --

23 Q. Perhaps to warn them about the possibility of arms and  
24 ammunition being delivered from an outside country.

16:17:19 25 A. No, no. I had no duty or responsibility to ECOMOG. They  
26 report to me. I don't report to them, no.

27 Q. Are you saying that in your roles as the point person for  
28 peace you kept ECOMOG in the dark?

29 A. I don't report to ECOMOG. ECOMOG is a force.

1 Q. That's not my question, whether you report to them, sir.

2 A. But it's an answer.

3 Q. They're the military party to the conflict. You decided  
4 that it wasn't your role to report to them?

16:17:43 5 A. Mr Koumjian, I've answered your question. I don't report  
6 to ECOMOG.

7 Q. My question is not the lines of authority. Did you report  
8 what was going on between you and Sam Bockarie to ECOMOG?

9 A. I don't report to ECOMOG anything.

16:17:56 10 Q. Let me change the word.

11 A. Never did.

12 Q. Thank you. I just want to make sure we understood each  
13 other.

14 A. Never did.

16:18:03 15 Q. Did you inform ECOMOG about Sam Bockarie, your dealings  
16 with him and his trips through your country to Burkina Faso?

17 A. I never informed ECOMOG and shouldn't inform ECOMOG.

18 That's the point I'm trying to make. No. Never.

19 Q. And that travel, Mr Taylor, you've told us was facilitated  
16:18:20 20 by your government including the landing rights for the plane,  
21 the travel documents for Sam Bockarie, being accompanied by Musa  
22 Cisse, all of that was facilitated by your government under your  
23 orders, correct?

24 A. Now, let's take it one by one. Now, which one? There are  
16:18:36 25 three or four questions.

26 Q. Let's take them one by one. You facilitated the travel of  
27 Sam Bockarie to Burkina Faso, first, by giving landing rights to  
28 the plane that came to pick him up and the plane that brought him  
29 back?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. You facilitated the travel of Sam Bockarie by giving him  
3 Liberian travel documents for that trip. Is that correct?

4 A. That is correct.

16:18:56 5 Q. And I think you said before that you're not sure what kind  
6 of passport or travel document that was.

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. And you facilitated that trip further by sending your chief  
9 of protocol to act, as you said, as his interpreter, as the  
16:19:14 10 interpreter for Sam Bockarie on this trip.

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. By the way, Musa Cisse, of course, would have been  
13 acquainted in some way with Blaise Compaore. Is that correct?

14 A. Acquainted? He knew Blaise Compaore.

16:19:29 15 Q. Mr Taylor, when did it - did you become informed, if ever,  
16 when did it dawn on you, if ever, that, hey, a whole bunch of  
17 ammunition has just arrived with the RUF after you allowed Sam  
18 Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso?

19 A. When did it dawn on me? It never dawned on me because I  
16:19:59 20 was not aware of any whole bunch of ammunition arriving in Sierra  
21 Leone. So nothing could have dawned on me. It didn't dawn.

22 Q. Sir, you had an intelligence service, you told us, correct?

23 A. You've asked me a question. I said it never dawned on me,  
24 Mr Koumjian.

16:20:13 25 Q. I've asked you another question. Sir, you had an  
26 intelligence service, correct?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Your intelligence service, did you ask them to collect  
29 information about the RUF?

1 A. Generally, whatever falls are running information, there  
2 was nothing specific - instructions from me. Intelligence do  
3 their work and they don't carry instructions. I never  
4 specifically gave any specific instruction "Go after the RUF".

16:20:40 5 No, I never did.

6 Q. Did you receive intelligence information about the RUF?

7 A. Not precisely. General information about news reports,  
8 that's what we had. We didn't have anyone on the ground in  
9 there.

16:20:53 10 Q. Well, it certainly would have been beneficial to you if you  
11 were playing the role of point person for peace to have people on  
12 the ground informing you what was going on with the RUF, wouldn't  
13 it?

14 A. No.

16:21:03 15 Q. No?

16 A. No. December, no. If it's - if the job of a mediator is  
17 to plant spies, I didn't see it that way. No, I would disagree  
18 with you.

19 Q. Let me ask you even today. Do you think Sam Bockarie was  
16:21:20 20 an authentic partner in negotiations for peace?

21 A. That's a subjective question. I would just be frank to  
22 this Court. I can only evaluate Bockarie on what he said and  
23 what he did, and so I would say he promised that there would be a  
24 cessation of hostilities. Other leaders spoke to him. And from  
16:21:46 25 what I can see, we did not get that out of him. But to have  
26 subjectively concluded at this - at that time, the time you're  
27 referring to and I'm talking about we're still in the end of  
28 1998, I had not made such a determination. I was still dealing  
29 from a position of goodwill.

1 Q. Sir, Sam Bockarie came back, you told us, in probably early  
2 December, correct, through Monrovia?

3 A. That is correct.

16:22:16

4 Q. And then he had to travel back to Sierra Leone to wherever  
5 he was based, correct?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And very, very shortly after that, you received reports of  
8 a major RUF/AFRC offensive in Sierra Leone, correct?

16:22:32

9 A. No, I did not receive such reports. I did not receive such  
10 reports, no. You are saying I received. No. No.

11 Q. Well, let me ask you: There's been evidence in this Court  
12 that the attack on Kono, particularly on Koidu Town, began on 16  
13 December. So it would have been a week or two after Sam Bockarie  
14 passed through your capital that you bid him safe journey,

16:22:54

15 whatever you told him. Do you recall receiving those reports  
16 that, hey, this man that I just brought back from Burkina Faso  
17 has now launched a major offensive?

18 A. No, I did not receive those reports, Mr Koumjian. And your  
19 question is, did I receive reports that the RUF had launched  
20 these attacks? No, I did not receive those reports that the RUF  
21 was the source of these attacks, no. I had no such information.

16:23:15

22 Q. Just so I'm clear on your answer, did you receive any  
23 reports of attacks in December 1998?

24 A. There were news reports of fighting in Sierra Leone. This  
25 is how it comes. It doesn't go with they are attacking this  
26 town. There were reports that they fighting in Sierra Leone in  
27 December 1998.

16:23:37

28 Q. That's all you knew?

29 A. Of course.

1 Q. You were unaware that the RUF took Koidu Town in the middle  
2 of December 1998?

3 A. Mr Koumjian, I was unaware. I'm not familiar - look, the  
4 only place in Sierra Leone I have been is Freetown. I was  
16:24:04 5 unaware of the specific areas of attack. I was aware that  
6 fighting had started in December. I was not aware of the  
7 specific towns or villages that were under attack. I've said  
8 that, no.

9 Q. Were you listening to international media?

16:24:18 10 A. No.

11 Q. Were you receiving any reports from your fellow members of  
12 the Committee of Five about what was going on?

13 A. No. I was receiving my own internal reports from briefings  
14 that would come out; there is heavy fighting in Sierra Leone;  
16:24:35 15 that is heavy fighting in Sierra Leone.

16 Q. Were you aware of the taking of Makeni around Christmas  
17 1998?

18 A. No, I was not aware.

19 Q. The atrocities that were going on in those areas, did the  
16:24:45 20 news of those atrocities reach you?

21 A. There were news that there were some - we're talking about  
22 late 1998 now. There were news that - of killings in Sierra  
23 Leone. When the news comes to me, it doesn't come and most  
24 people don't get into details of areas of what is happening.

16:25:08 25 They get involved into what is happening in general. Now, there  
26 are news reports of atrocities in Sierra Leone. Now, they don't  
27 come and say, "Well, in Makeni, this person was killed, but in,  
28 what you say, Koidu, this person was burnt." It doesn't come  
29 that way. So, no, to your question.

1 Q. Now, after Sam Bockarie came back through Monrovia from  
2 Burkina Faso, when was the next communication you had from him?

3 A. Oh, I didn't - I really didn't get in touch with Sam  
4 Bockarie again until, I would say, about a week after or so of  
16:25:51 5 the 6 January situation before - after the terrible situation of  
6 6 January before we started pushing - I pushed personally to get  
7 a ceasefire.

8 Q. We only have a few minutes but I want to make sure I get  
9 your explanation because I am a bit puzzled by your answer. Sir,  
16:26:07 10 you are the point President for peace. You were dealing  
11 specifically with Sam Bockarie. You told us you received reports  
12 of fighting breaking out in Sierra Leone, although you don't know  
13 the towns, in December 1998. And you had given him a satellite  
14 phone, you had arranged for a radio so you could contact him.

16:26:27 15 You never contacted him when this fighting broke out in Sierra  
16 Leone?

17 A. Personally no, I didn't contact him, no.

18 Q. That's because you really didn't care about the fighting in  
19 Sierra Leone; you were aiding and assisting the RUF to launch  
16:26:38 20 that offensive, isn't that correct?

21 A. You are very wrong. I did not say to this Court that no  
22 contact was made with Sam Bockarie. You asked me if I personally  
23 contacted Sam Bockarie. I said no. Now if your question is was  
24 there any contact with Sam Bockarie during that period the answer  
16:26:55 25 would be yes. I did not personally contact him.

26 Q. Why wouldn't you personally contact him?

27 A. Because I had a minister dealing with that. I didn't have  
28 to call him for everything.

29 Q. Thank you. Sir, if you had a minister to deal with Sam

1 Bockarie why was necessary to meet him two times in September,  
2 two times in October and again in November? You personally met  
3 Sam Bockarie on all those occasions, correct?

4 A. Yes, I said I met him.

16:27:18 5 Q. So when the fighting is breaking out and people are dying  
6 in Sierra Leone why didn't you pick up the phone and call Sam  
7 Bockarie?

8 A. Mr Koumjian, you see if you're trying to equate my  
9 mediating role as being in charge of Sierra Leone, I'm not in  
16:27:32 10 charge of Sierra Leone. There's a President over there, okay.

11 There's a President. And I think you are misreading my role as  
12 mediator. If you think that every time a gun fires in Sierra  
13 Leone I'm supposed to call him and control him, he is not under  
14 my command, he is not under my control and I have as much

16:27:50 15 influence with Sam Bockarie as any other member of that  
16 committee. So it's not a matter that I have to be calling him  
17 almost suggesting - call him and instruct him to stop. This is  
18 not the case.

19 So, for me, while contact may be made, I am still working  
16:28:05 20 with an organisation called ECOWAS and whatever is done is a  
21 decision process. So, no, I don't just get up and call him. The  
22 minister calls, we try to get there, other Presidents are trying  
23 to intervene. That's the process. So he's not under my command  
24 and control that every time there is a little break out I have to  
16:28:27 25 call him and what? Instruct him? Is that what I'm supposed to  
26 call him for? Instruct him to stop?

27 Q. Well, that would have been very helpful to the people of  
28 Sierra Leone if you would have done that.

29 A. It would only be helpful if he was under my command and

1 control and, as your indictment puts it, if I had superior  
2 responsibility. But I couldn't and I didn't.

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Thank you, your Honours.

16:28:50

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're going to adjourn. Mr Taylor, I'll  
5 remind you, as I'm bound to do, that you are not to discuss your  
6 evidence with any other person. We'll adjourn until 9.30  
7 tomorrow.

8 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.

16:29:22

9 to be reconvened on Thursday, 26 November 2009  
10 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	32334
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOUMJIAN	32335