



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

FRIDAY, 26 MARCH 2010
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Ms Kathryn Howarth
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Silas Chekera
Ms Kathryn Hovington

1 Friday, 26 March 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:27:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MR KOU MJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,
8 your Honours, counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this
9 morning, Kathryn Howarth, Maja Dimitrova, and myself, Nicolas
09:33:34 10 Koumjian.

11 MR ANYAH: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,
12 your Honours. Good morning, counsel opposite. Appearing for the
13 Defence this morning are Courtenay Griffiths QC, Terry Munyard,
14 myself, Morris Anyah and we are joined again by Ms Kathryn
09:33:52 15 Hovington, a legal assistant with our team.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning, Mr Vincent.

17 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: This morning you continue your evidence
19 and I remind you, as I normally do, that you are under your same
09:34:02 20 oath to tell the truth.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, please continue.

23 WITNESS: DCT-215 [On former oath]

24 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR ANYAH: [Continued]

09:34:09 25 Q. Good morning, Mr Vincent.

26 A. Yes, good morning, Mr Morris.

27 Q. Yesterday afternoon before the adjournment we were speaking
28 about the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in 1998 and the retreat
29 of you and others to the bush near Kono. Do you recall that?

1 A. Yes, I recall that.

2 Q. Now, Mr Vincent, before we continue from where we stopped,
3 you recall that most of yesterday we covered your time period in
4 Crab Hole; we covered the movement of you and others from Crab
09:35:03 5 Hole to Sierra Leone by the RUF; and we went as far as 1998 and
6 this period of time when you were in Kono. Do you remember all
7 of that?

8 A. Yes, I remember all.

9 Q. Well, there have been other witnesses besides you who have
09:35:23 10 testified before this Court regarding many of the events you
11 talked about yesterday, and I would like to review some of what
12 they have said to the Court with you this morning. Do you follow
13 me?

14 A. Yes, I am getting you loud and clear.

09:35:40 15 Q. And just as we did yesterday and as you are doing so far
16 this morning, let us just maintain a steady and slow pace so that
17 everybody follows what we were saying and we pay particular
18 attention to the interpretation. You understand that?

19 A. Yes, I'm getting you loud and clear.

09:36:03 20 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. The first witness's evidence I wish
21 to discuss is that of somebody you spoke about yesterday. Do you
22 remember telling us about Isaac Mongor yesterday?

23 A. Yes, I remember.

24 Q. In the same chair where you now sit, Isaac Mongor came
09:36:23 25 before these judges in March and April 2008 and he talked about
26 most of what you said yesterday. He talked about the RUF, he
27 talked about the invasion into Sierra Leone, and I would like us
28 to consider some of his evidence.

29 For the benefit of learned counsel opposite, as well as

1 Madam Court Manager, the first transcript I wish to refer to is
2 that of 10 March 2008 starting at page number 5669. Did I say 3
3 March? I meant 10 March.

4 A. You said 10 March.

09:37:29 5 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. At line 6 on page 5669 on that
6 transcript a question was asked of Isaac Mongor. Now,
7 Mr Vincent, just listen first to what I'm going to read and from
8 time to time I will interpose or ask you a question about what
9 I've read, okay? Line 6 the question was:

09:38:01 10 "Q. Can you explain, Mr Witness, what you mean you moved
11 - well can you explain, Mr Witness, what you mean moved to
12 the place that you trained for?

13 A. Well, I had told the Court that I was training the men
14 for the Sierra Leone mission, so after their passing out we
09:38:19 15 had some people who were part of the Special Forces. They
16 took some people to go to Pujehun. The other ones were to
17 come to Voinjama. We were to come and enter through the
18 Koindu/Bomaru end, so we came to Voinjama.

19 Q. Thank you. Mr Witness, you said, 'After their passing
09:38:49 20 out' is how it was translated to us. Can you explain what
21 you mean by the passing out?

22 A. After we had completed the training, that is what we
23 call passing out.

24 Q. Now you said that, 'We went to Voinjama.' Who went to
09:39:11 25 Voinjama with you?

26 A. I went to Voinjama with those men whom I had trained,
27 and Foday Sankoh too went with us, and we had other people
28 who had come from Gbarnga who came with some trucks. We
29 came to Gbarnga. That was where we met Mr Taylor at

1 Voinjama.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, you said some people came from Gbarnga
3 with trucks. Can you tell us who those people were? Not
4 necessarily their names, but what kind of people came with
09:39:44 5 trucks?

6 A. They were soldiers, some of the Special Forces. They
7 came with the materials that we were to use."

8 Now, Mr Vincent, later on in this transcript, in fact, the
9 very next page where I am now, 5670, Isaac Mongor says all this
09:40:12 10 happened in March 1991. That's at line 29 of the page I'm
11 currently at. Continuing at that page, 5670, line 3:

12 "Q. And just to be very clear, these soldiers that came
13 with the materials, they were soldiers belonging to what
14 fighting force?

09:40:35 15 A. They were NPFL soldiers.

16 Q. You said that when you got to Voinjama that is where
17 you met Mr Taylor. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes, we met him there."

19 Let's pause. Mr Vincent, Isaac Mongor was telling the
09:40:54 20 Court that in March 1991 he went to Voinjama; that after they had
21 completed the training and the passing out, quote unquote, Sankoh
22 went with them and at Voinjama there were some men who came from
23 Gbarnga with trucks. These men, he said, were soldiers, some of
24 the Special Forces; that they came with materials that they were
09:41:28 25 to use, the arms and ammunition that they were to use.

26 Now, you were at Crab Hole in March 1991 and you told us,
27 Mr Vincent, that you moved with one group to Lofa County and you
28 ultimately went into Koindu. On the eve of the invasion between
29 22 March and 23 March 1991, do you remember any NPFL forces, some

1 including Special Forces, coming to Voinjama with trucks
2 containing arms and ammunition?

3 A. That is not to my knowledge.

09:42:25

4 Q. When you reached Lofa County, did you in fact reach
5 Voinjama as you and others were moving to Sierra Leone?

6 A. We did not get to Voinjama at first. I did say that we
7 stopped at Kolahun, that was the second group, because that is
8 where the junction is that leads towards Grand Cape Mount County,
9 Bo Waterside area. And there is no road from Vahun - I mean let
10 me say from Voinjama that would come down. So where the group
11 was divided was in Kolahun, like I said.

09:42:56

12 Q. To your knowledge, the group that went before your group,
13 did they pass through Voinjama to go into Sierra Leone?

09:43:26

14 A. Except the group that went to Koindu, but apart from that -
15 the first group that went, though I was not there, but the honest
16 thing is that they were divided right in Kolahun.

17 Q. Now, Mr Vincent, were you aware of what was going on with
18 the group that went ahead of your group?

09:43:56

19 A. Well, I said I was not with that group, but when we went
20 after them, when we got there, all the explanation that you have
21 spoken about, I did not see any sign like those things happening
22 or that I understood anything about them.

23 Q. When you met up with the men later on in Sierra Leone, did
24 you and them discuss how the invasion unfolded on 23 March 1991?

09:44:23

25 A. As I told you, on 23 March that was the day that the RUF
26 finally launched its incursion into Sierra Leone. So going there
27 at that time I was only briefed about situations that took place
28 that made us to be first to enter on the 23rd, and that I have
29 spoken about. And the first thing was that according to the

1 Leader, Mr Foday Sankoh, the RUF was a self-reliant struggle that
2 depended on no one.

3 Q. That's fair enough. My question is as the troops were
4 moving into Sierra Leone, the group that went towards Kailahun,
09:45:17 5 first going to Koindu and then Kailahun, was it the case that you
6 came to learn about how they entered Sierra Leone? That's the
7 group that went ahead of your group?

8 A. Yes. But first of all we were on the base, like I said,
9 and Mr Sankoh went to the base and he asked for us to be in
09:45:47 10 formation and he told us that we were compelled to enter and,
11 like I said yesterday, I said the time schedule we had was
12 supposed to be in the dry season of 1991. And according to the
13 Liberian climatic system over there, the rainy season is around
14 March to September, something like that. And when he had said
09:46:09 15 the dry season, we were expecting to have entered with our
16 incursions from October upward in 1991.

17 Q. Let me continue with Mr Mongor's evidence and I'll ask you
18 some more questions. We've covered the part where he says that
19 they met Mr Taylor in Voinjama. Line 10, page 5670, the question
09:46:37 20 was asked of Mr Mongor:

21 "Q. Can you describe for the Court the meeting that you
22 had with Mr Taylor in Voinjama?

23 A. Yes. When we got to Voinjama, I had told you that we
24 got there at night. Mr Taylor was on the ground, which was
09:46:53 25 referred to as the executive ground, because wherever he
26 was based there was we referred to as the executive ground.
27 So, he was there. Then I brought my men, put them on
28 parade and later Foday Sankoh and Mr Taylor were in the
29 house together with some other Special Forces and they

1 invited me and I went inside. Then I was able to talk to
2 Mr Taylor that night. And when Mr Taylor saw me, he
3 thanked me for the job that I had done but he did not just
4 stop there. We still had some other mission that we were
09:47:34 5 to accomplish, so he said we were to come to Sierra Leone
6 to fight and we should make sure that the mission that we
7 were to come for should be accomplished. We should keep
8 the ball rolling."

9 Let's pause. There are a number of issues here,
09:47:56 10 Mr Vincent. The first issue is this: In the period when you
11 were making your way into Sierra Leone, in particular the days
12 between 22 and 23 March, did you ever hear anyone say that
13 Charles Taylor was in the vicinity of Voinjama as you and the
14 others were moving into Sierra Leone?

09:48:16 15 A. Not at all. Had Mr Taylor been in Voinjama, and when
16 Mr Sankoh went for us, the last group, he would have told us and
17 when we got there if at all he was there I was going to see him
18 too, but that did not happen.

19 Q. Did you see Mr Taylor in the vicinity of Voinjama as you
09:48:35 20 were making your way into Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Second issue: Isaac Mongor refers to men he had trained.
23 Did you hear me say something to that effect, that he was thanked
24 by Mr Taylor for the job he had done? Now, to your knowledge did
09:49:05 25 Isaac Mongor train any of the men that went into Sierra Leone on
26 behalf of the RUF?

27 A. I told you that Isaac Mongor was not an instructor. He was
28 a demonstrator. Before Isaac Mongor became a demonstrator, he
29 undertook the particular training as a first training for the

1 RUF. He went through the same Halaka that we all went through
2 and he underwent all other training that every recruit underwent
3 on the training base.

09:49:49 4 Q. To your knowledge before the invasion was launched from
5 Liberia into Sierra Leone by the RUF was there a parade called of
6 the men that were going into Sierra Leone in the vicinity of
7 Voinjama?

8 A. Well, I was not with the first group but I went - when I
9 got to Voinjama amongst the second group no parade was called.
09:50:12 10 When we got to Voinjama we were divided and our trip continued.
11 We did not alight. In fact we were in haste. Nobody was in fact
12 allowed to leave the truck and go anywhere else.

13 Q. When you got to Voinjama did you encounter any NPFL Special
14 Forces that were there to provide support to the RUF?

09:50:46 15 A. No, not to my knowledge.

16 Q. Did you see any trucks containing arms and ammunition that
17 was supplied by the NPFL to facilitate the RUF invasion of Sierra
18 Leone?

19 A. No.

09:51:15 20 Q. I want to consider another part of Mr Mongor's evidence.
21 This is also on the transcript of 10 March 2008. I should start
22 from the page I was at, because it is relevant. This is line 25,
23 page 5670. Learned counsel opposite, Mr Koumjian, was putting
24 the questions to Mr Mongor. Line 25:

09:51:54 25 "Q. I want to ask you some details now about these events
26 in Voinjama. First, do you recall - can you give us any
27 idea of when it was that you went to Voinjama and these
28 events took place?

29 A. We came to Voinjama in 1991. That was in the month of

1 March. That was when we came to Voinjama. The group that
2 came, I told you initially that we had two groups, which
3 one came to us towards the Lofa end, one was to go to
4 Bomaru, and the other one was to go to Koindu. Before we
09:52:36 5 arrived there, the other men who were the Bomaru people had
6 already left before we got there.

7 Q. So I take it from your answer, correct me if I am
8 wrong, that your group was the group assigned to go to
9 Koindu?

09:52:52 10 A. Yes, that was the place where my group was to go."
11 Pause there. Mr Vincent, the group to which you belonged,
12 to which place in Sierra Leone were you destined to go?

13 A. The group that I went with, we went directly to Koindu.

14 Q. Was there a group that was assigned to go to Bomaru?

09:53:23 15 A. There was no group set up to go to Bomaru.

16 Q. Besides Koindu, where else did any other group go to?

17 A. The group was divided into two. One was to go to the Bo
18 Waterside and one was to go to the Koindu border area.

19 Q. Mr Mongor's evidence continues, line 9:

09:53:51 20 "Q. You said you brought your men out to the parade - to
21 the parade. First, can you tell us who are these men that
22 you brought to the parade ground there?

23 A. They were the ones whom I trained from Camp Naama.

24 They were the ones I put into the parade."

09:54:16 25 Do you recall we've covered this, Mr Vincent; whether or
26 not Mr Mongor trained any men at Camp Naama. Now, just to be
27 clear, there's a difference between Crab Hole and Camp Naama on
28 the basis of what you've told. Whether at Crab Hole or Camp
29 Naama, to your knowledge did Isaac Mongor train any men when you

1 were there?

2 A. Isaac Mongor did not train anybody. I continue to say that
3 Isaac Mongor was a demonstrator. All the forces trained by
4 Foday Sankoh, his instructors there were Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed
09:54:57 5 Tarawalli. They were the main instructors.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. We continue with Mr Mongor's
7 evidence, line 23 of that page 5671. The question is asked:

8 "Q. Sir, these troops that you had with you, were they
9 armed?

09:55:23 10 A. At that particular time we were not armed. When we
11 were at Voinjama we had no arms.

12 Q. Okay, then I will come back to that in a moment. After
13 the meeting at the parade you said you were called into the
14 house. Is that correct?

09:55:43 15 A. Yes. Yes."

16 And this is when Mr Mongor went on again to elaborate about
17 the house he was called into. Then on the next page, 5672, the
18 question is asked:

19 "Q. Can you tell us whose house was that?

09:56:28 20 A. It was General Dopoe Menkarzon's place who we called
21 General Pepe."

22 Mr Vincent, do you know somebody called Dopoe Menkarzon?

23 A. Yes, I know General Dopoe Menkarzon. I know him very well.
24 Even before I left Monrovia, I met with him even before I came.

09:57:01 25 Q. Now, at the time when you all were moving into Sierra
26 Leone, do you know whether or not he had a house in Voinjama?

27 A. No.

28 Q. When you say "no", does that mean you do not know or he did
29 not have a house in Voinjama?

1 A. I don't know.

2 Q. In the period preceding your movement into Sierra Leone,
3 did you hear anyone say that Dope Menkarzon was in that area
4 near Voijnama?

09:57:36 5 A. No. Can I go on to say something? The first time I got to
6 know General Dope was at the time that he was sent to collect
7 the NPFL soldiers who had misbehaved. And after the Top 20,
8 Top 40 and the Top Final, that was the very first time I set eyes
9 on him.

09:58:14 10 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. One last bit about Isaac Mongor's
11 testimony. This is at page 5678, also of the transcript of
12 10 March. At the bottom of the page, the last line, line 29,
13 there was a question posed. The question was:

14 "Q. What was your rank during the years '91, '92 and '93
09:58:50 15 that you've been talking about?

16 A. Well, I told you I was a lieutenant, but at that time I
17 was in Liberia and so when we launched the attack I was
18 promoted to captain. I went and at some point I was made a
19 colonel and acting battle group commander.

09:59:15 20 Q. Mr Witness, do you recall what year it was that you
21 were named the acting battle group commander?

22 A. I became acting battle group commander in 1992."

23 Mr Vincent --

24 A. '92? Yes.

09:59:37 25 Q. Isaac Mongor told this Court in 1992 he became acting
26 battle group commander of the RUF. To your knowledge, did that
27 in fact occur?

28 A. No, not to my knowledge. The acting battle group commander
29 I knew at that time was Sam Bockarie.

1 Q. Yesterday when you testified you mentioned your period in
2 Kailahun and in particular reference to Isaac Mongor and the
3 Kailahun training base. Do you recall telling us about that
4 yesterday?

10:00:15 5 A. Yes. I said that if at all Isaac Mongor was the battle
6 group or acting battle group commander, I don't think he would
7 have gone to fight against me for my position because that was a
8 position higher than the training commander. So how could
9 someone be a battle group in charge of all activities and then
10:00:39 10 you go and fight for a small position?

11 Q. When you said a few minutes ago that one position was
12 higher than that of training commander, who was the training
13 commander you are referring to?

14 A. In 1992 at the time, because by then I had left the base.
10:01:07 15 I called the man's name yesterday.

16 Q. Perhaps you misunderstood my question. We're now referring
17 to an incident that occurred when you said you were training
18 commander of the Kailahun base and you were trying to make a
19 comparison between training commander and acting battle group
10:01:25 20 commander. Can you explain what the differences are between the
21 two?

22 A. Yes. When I talked about a battle group as compared to a
23 training commander, let's look at battle group maybe to be the
24 third in the command structure of positions. And as training
10:01:49 25 officer or training commander, he was subject to the higher
26 people. So there was a great difference. There is a great
27 difference. So the training commander is subordinate to the
28 battle group.

29 Q. And what position was Isaac Mongor trying to occupy or take

1 over when you were training commander of the Kailahun base?

2 A. He had wanted to take over as training commander.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent.

4 A. Thank you.

10:02:27 5 MR ANYAH: Now, Madam President, I wish to consider the
6 evidence of another witness. That evidence was given in closed
7 session, but the Court has allowed us in the past, if we are
8 careful and make sure we do not disclose the witness's identity,
9 to put questions on the basis of transcript references to
10 witnesses in open session and elicit responses, and so I can
11 ensure I can - I can indicate to the Court that I will be very
12 careful in how I proceed to ensure that no details of this
13 witness's identity are disclosed to the public.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Might this be a Prosecution witness?

10:03:11 15 MR ANYAH: It is, yes, Madam President.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could I inquire from Mr Koumjian if
17 that's okay.

18 MR KOUMJIAN: Can I have the page that counsel is referring
19 to? It depends on what the witness is saying. And if the
10:03:25 20 witness is not identified by what's being read, I don't have an
21 objection.

22 MR ANYAH: And just so it is clear, I will try to
23 paraphrase truthfully the evidence of the witness and only read
24 the transcript as is when necessary. The relevant pages are from
10:03:42 25 the transcript of 25 January 2008, and I will start at page 2212
26 and may cover up until page 2221. About 11 pages - 9 to 11
27 pages, thereabouts.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Officer, well, we can't see
29 anything, so I can't even rule on the matter.

1 MS IRURA: Your Honour, please, unless I print the pages,
2 placing it on the public display would mean it is viewable from
3 the gallery.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: We definitely need to refer to the
10:04:34 5 transcript, so perhaps you could print a few pages for the Bench.

6 MR ANYAH: It's 25 January starting at page 2212 and going
7 up until page 2221.

8 MR KOUMJIAN: Madam President, I do have a concern on that
9 because it appears the witness is speaking about a mission he
10:05:48 10 undertook and the only other person mentioned on that mission is
11 deceased, so I don't know if this would identify to the witness
12 and others that this is the - the identity of the closed session
13 witness.

14 MR ANYAH: If I may respond. The others referred to by the
10:06:07 15 witness extend beyond one other person. At page 2213 the witness
16 speaks of about six people going on this mission, so it is far in
17 excess of just one additional person.

18 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, one additional name was given of
19 a deceased person. The others, I don't know if they are alive or
10:06:30 20 deceased, so I am afraid that it would identify the witness. So
21 that leaves four individuals besides the witness and the
22 deceased, and I don't know whether they are alive or deceased.

23 MR ANYAH: Madam President, several people were sent on a
24 mission and they number as much as six. Now, under the
10:06:54 25 circumstances, I think if due care is taken, this evidence can be
26 elicited in public session. And I'll just refer your Honours to
27 page 2212 through 2213. That's the beginning of this exercise.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, I'm going to indulge you and
29 absolutely trust in your professionalism to ensure that you do

1 not jeopardise the protective measures of this person. I know
2 that we have done it before in the court whereby we have referred
3 to closed session or private session material in open session in
4 such a manner that doesn't jeopardise. So it's not alien. And
10:07:43 5 I'm going to indulge you and just trust that you will not
6 jeopardise these measures.

7 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

8 Q. Mr Vincent, listen to what I'm about to read or speak
9 about. This is evidence from a witness who came to court, and at
10:08:06 10 page 2212, the witness told the justices that before the invasion
11 of Sierra Leone, in the period leading up to March 1991,
12 Foday Sankoh sent at least six people to go into Sierra Leone on
13 a reconnaissance mission. Some of those whom he sent were some
14 of the senior training commanders you mentioned at Crab Hole,
10:08:36 15 people like Mohamed Tarawalli and Mike Lamin. It is said that
16 these six people were sent to Sierra Leone --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian?

18 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I'm afraid to state my argument
19 publicly, but I think that this are matters that should not be in
10:08:56 20 open session, given what's just been stated. The issue is not
21 whether the witness is named but whether the testimony could
22 disclose the identity of the witness.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: But, Mr Koumjian, some of these are
24 factual things as counsel had begun explaining that there was a
10:09:19 25 reconnaissance mission sent - of six people sent and he hasn't
26 gone beyond that. Now, for goodness sake, who knows which of
27 those six people he is even referring to. I'm going to indulge
28 Mr Anyah a little bit more. I'm not convinced that that in and
29 of itself is revealing.

1 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

2 Q. Mr Vincent, are you aware of Foday Sankoh sending some of
3 the RUF personnel who were at Crab Hole into Sierra Leone on a
4 reconnaissance mission in the period leading up to the invasion
10:10:10 5 of Sierra Leone in March 1991?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you know when he sent those people into Sierra Leone?

8 A. Those people were sent in that same March. That same
9 March. The beginning of that month in 1991.

10:10:40 10 Q. Do you know which persons Foday Sankoh sent on this
11 reconnaissance mission?

12 A. Yes. I recall a few of their names.

13 Q. Yes. Can you tell us.

14 A. Yes. You had Mike Lamin, Mohamed Tarawalli, Patrick --

10:11:08 15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
16 it to repeat that last name.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please speak clearly. And after
18 Tarawalli you mentioned another name. Please repeat that name.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes. I said Mike Lamin, Mohamed Tarawalli,
10:11:36 20 Patrick Laluba.

21 MR ANYAH:

22 Q. Can you spell Laluba for us, Mr Vincent, if you know?

23 A. Laluba could be L-A-L-U-B-A, something like that.

24 Q. Who else?

10:11:59 25 A. And then Lawrence Womandia. Those are the ones I recall.
26 The rest of them I do not recall them, but I think the number was
27 over six. Then can I continue? But that was not going to be the
28 only mission. There was going to be another mission. After
29 those people would have returned, some other people were supposed

1 to go back on reconnaissance but that did not happen.

2 Q. What do you mean by that was not supposed to be the only
3 mission?

10:12:40

4 A. Yes, there was an arrangement according to Mr Sankoh that
5 when they left and that first team returned to base there was
6 going to be another group organised to go for the final
7 reconnaissance before the revolution itself would be launched.
8 He said that was something that he had arranged for.

10:13:03

9 Q. Now, the person who testified said that their mission, this
10 reconnaissance mission, was to go and confirm the route that
11 Foday Sankoh was planning to use to enter Sierra Leone, and then
12 the person said the route Sankoh was planning to use was a route
13 to attack the Daru Barracks. Do you recall, Mr Vincent, whether
14 Foday Sankoh had a plan to invade Sierra Leone by attacking the
15 Daru Barracks?

10:13:33

16 A. Yes, he had a plan to attack the barracks which was of
17 course a military installation and that was one of our major
18 targets.

19 Q. Where in Sierra Leone is Daru Barracks located at?

10:13:55

20 A. Daru Barracks is in Kailahun District.

21 Q. A few minutes ago in response to the question about the
22 reconnaissance mission, you said there was going to be another
23 mission after those people would have returned. This second
24 mission you were referring to - that's at page 21 of my LiveNote,
25 lines 13 through 15. The second mission you were referring to,
26 did it in fact take place, Mr Vincent?

10:14:26

27 A. No, the second mission did not go.

28 Q. Do you know why there was no second reconnaissance mission?

29 A. Yes, the reason was that there was an unexpected attack on

1 Sierra Leone that we were not prepared for, so for that reason we
2 had to launch before the actual time that was set aside for us to
3 launch the revolution. So the second mission was not chanced to
4 be executed. The second reconnaissance mission did not get their
10:15:21 5 chance to go.

6 Q. Now, these persons you mentioned who went on the first
7 reconnaissance mission - Patrick Laluba, Mike Lamin, Lawrence
8 Womandia and Mohamed Tarawalli - did they return to Crab Hole
9 while you were there after they had gone on the mission?

10:15:44 10 A. Yes, all them came back.

11 Q. The person who testified before Court said when the six
12 people who went on this reconnaissance mission were on their way
13 back into Liberia, when they got into Liberia, in particular as
14 they reached Voinjama, they met Foday Sankoh there. The person
10:16:13 15 went on to say when they met Foday Sankoh, Foday Sankoh was with
16 Charles Taylor in Voinjama. They were in a convoy of vehicles.
17 They reached Voinjama and the purpose of that trip to Voinjama
18 was to discuss the operational plan for the invasion of Sierra
19 Leone on 23 March 1991. This is at page 2213. Mr Vincent, are
10:16:44 20 you aware of there being in Voinjama a meeting between Charles
21 Taylor and Foday Sankoh to discuss the invasion of Sierra Leone
22 in March 1991?

23 A. No, not to my knowledge. I don't know anything about that.

24 Q. Continuing with the evidence of the witness, he says that
10:17:06 25 when the six people finally --

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Anyah, I note that throughout you have
27 mentioned there were six people. The witness here present before
28 us has said more than six. And I note on the first line of page
29 2213 of the transcript which you are citing, that that particular

1 witness said, "He sent me and six others", which would --

2 MR ANYAH: Be seven, but if you look at line 6,
3 your Honour, he does say that it was that witness with the other
4 five. So that seems to be that there were six.

10:17:44 5 JUDGE DOHERTY: So there seems to be a difference between
6 both witnesses and Mr Vincent and this thing you are citing, as
7 you correctly say, he does say something further on. Thank you.

8 MR ANYAH:

9 Q. Mr Vincent, you appreciated this, you tell us there were
10:18:02 10 more than six. The person who testified before the Court says
11 there were about six. So can you tell us to your recollection
12 how many people went on this first reconnaissance mission?

13 A. I told you that there were six but I can only recall four
14 names. The other two names I can't recall. They were not more
10:18:25 15 than six.

16 Q. The person went on to say that at Voinjama, one of them -
17 at least one of them spent the night in Voinjama at the home of
18 one Joseph Brown. Do you know a Joseph Brown who was a member of
19 the RUF?

10:18:53 20 A. Yes, I know Joseph Brown very well.

21 Q. What nationality is Joseph Brown?

22 A. Joseph Brown is a Liberian.

23 Q. When you were at Crab Hole, was Joseph Brown there as a
24 recruit or otherwise?

10:19:14 25 A. Yes, Joseph Brown was a recruit. All of us underwent the
26 same training. We were all civilians. We underwent the same
27 training.

28 Q. By the time you had completed your training, was Joseph
29 Brown still a member of your group?

1 A. Joseph Brown was still member of the RUF, yes.

2 Q. By the time you and others were being moved into Sierra
3 Leone between 22 and 23 March, did Joseph Brown have any kind of
4 rank or assignment within the RUF?

10:19:56 5 A. No, no, not at all. Not to my knowledge.

6 Q. Well, the person who testified said that Joseph Brown was a
7 Liberian - this is at page 2214 - that Joseph Brown belonged to
8 the NPFL at that time. Mr Vincent, was Joseph Brown an NPFL
9 member or an RUF member in March 1991?

10:20:29 10 A. I got to know Joseph Brown as a civilian, and his first
11 encounter with any arms was with the RUF movement.

12 Q. In March 1991 was Joseph Brown an RUF or an NPFL,
13 Mr Vincent?

14 A. Did you say 1991? I said throughout. From the training
10:21:01 15 base throughout Joseph Brown had always been an RUF man.

16 Q. The witness who testified before the Court said - this is
17 at 2214 into 2215 - that there was a meeting held in Voinjama at
18 the home of the 2nd Battalion commander at Voinjama at the time
19 for the NPFL, a Special Forces commando called Anthony Mekunagbe.

10:21:39 20 The person said Foday Sankoh was present at that meeting. It was
21 in the living room of Mekunagbe. That Charles Taylor was
22 present. Charles Taylor was surrounded by senior officers of the
23 NPFL. That there was a Shell map of Sierra Leone spread open.

24 Charles Taylor was hovering over the map and that they were
10:22:11 25 discussing the operation to attack Sierra Leone. The person
26 described Charles Taylor as wearing a red T-shirt and an American
27 camouflage trousers.

28 Mr Vincent, did you hear of any meeting taking place in the
29 days leading up to the invasion of Sierra Leone at the home of

1 one Anthony Mekunagbe in Voinjama?

2 A. No, I did not hear that.

3 Q. Did you hear of Charles Taylor being present at the home of
4 Anthony Mekunagbe in Voinjama, along with Foday Sankoh and
10:22:52 5 others, planning how to attack Sierra Leone?

6 A. No, not to my knowledge.

7 Q. If we go to page 2218 of the 25th. The witness told the
8 Court about a particular plan to attack Pujehun District in
9 Sierra Leone, in particular Zimmi, and a question was asked of

10 the witness regarding who made the decision to attack that place
11 Zimmi, and the witness said that decision was made by Charles
12 Taylor. Mr Vincent, you've told us that one of the groups who
13 entered Sierra Leone went through Bo Waterside and ended up in
14 Pujehun District of Sierra Leone. To your knowledge, was Charles

10:24:01 15 Taylor behind that attack --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Madam President, I learned counsel is
17 moving very fast. Can he be asked to slow his pace and repeat
18 his last statement.

19 THE WITNESS: I believe that Mr Taylor --

10:24:16 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause. The Liberian interpreter was
21 complaining that Mr Anyah is going too fast and he couldn't
22 interpret for the witness. So perhaps, Mr Anyah, you could
23 repeat your comment - your quotation and allow the interpreter to
24 interpret to the witness.

10:24:36 25 MR ANYAH: I will:

26 Q. Mr Vincent, you have told us about one group of RUF forces
27 entering Sierra Leone through Bo Waterside and ultimately
28 attacking Pujehun District in Sierra Leone. Do you recall
29 telling us that?

1 A. Yes, one group entered through Bo Waterside. I said that,
2 yes.

3 Q. My question was: To your knowledge, was Charles Taylor
4 behind that operation into Bo Waterside and ultimately Pujehun
10:25:18 5 District? Did the idea of it come from Charles Taylor?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Does that mean you do not know, or it did not come from
8 Charles Taylor?

9 A. I don't know, and I believe that it did not come from him.

10:25:41 10 Q. The person who testified told the Court about some of the
11 other people who were present at this meeting in Voinjama. This
12 is at page 2218. Some of the senior officers and Special Forces
13 that were said to be present at this meeting were Sam Larto and
14 they said Sam Larto's position then was battle group commander of
10:26:15 15 the NPFL. Mr Vincent, in March 1991 do you know whether the NPFL
16 had something called a battle group commander?

17 A. Yes, I knew that the NPFL had battle group commander, but
18 at that time it was not Sam Larto that used to be the battle -
19 that I knew to be the battle group commander. I heard about
10:26:43 20 Isaac Musa at that time. Isaac Musa, that was the name I used to
21 hear as battle group commander for the NPFL.

22 Q. The person went on to say that another person who was
23 present there was something called Michael Peager and he said
24 Michael Peager was the Executive Mansion Guard battalion
10:27:10 25 commander. Do you know who Michael Peager is, Mr Vincent?

26 A. Well, to tell you, the very first time I saw Michael Peager
27 was when I was a single-barrel man in Bong Mines at the gate.
28 And when he got there, that was the very first time I saw him in
29 Bong Mines. Since then I have never seen him, nor have I heard

1 about him anywhere else.

2 Q. Did you hear of someone named Michael Peager being present
3 in Voinjama and being engaged in a meeting regarding the invasion
4 of Sierra Leone with Foday Sankoh?

10:27:53 5 A. No.

6 Q. The name Charles Timber, have you heard that name before?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The person who testified said Charles Timber was the deputy
9 of one Sam Tuah. You mentioned Sam Tuah's name yesterday, yes?

10:28:22 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did you hear of Sam Tuah being present in Voinjama in March
12 1991 in the days leading up to the invasion of Sierra Leone and
13 engaging in discussions with Foday Sankoh regarding the upcoming
14 invasion?

10:28:45 15 A. No.

16 Q. To your knowledge, in Voinjama, as you and the other troops
17 were moving into Sierra Leone, were there any other nationals
18 engaged in that operation such as people from Ghana, Nigeria,
19 Niger or Gambia?

10:29:09 20 A. Yes. I told you that there was one Ivorian that Mr Sankoh
21 had secured his release from detention whom we did not know, but
22 we only knew his name as Mon Ami. He was the only foreigner
23 apart from the Liberians and Sierra Leoneans who entered with us
24 during that Koindu operation.

10:29:32 25 Q. Mr Vincent, just remember to speak slowly so that everyone
26 can follow you. You've given us the name of Mon Ami and you said
27 he was Ivorian and then you said something to the effect that "he
28 was the only foreigner apart from the Liberians and Sierra
29 Leoneans who entered with us during the Koindu operation." Is

1 that what you said to us just now?

2 A. Yes, that was what I said, yes.

3 Q. But speaking more beyond the Koindu operation, I'm speaking
4 about the entire invasion of Sierra Leone during those two days,
10:30:13 5 22 through 23 March 1991, were any of the RUF forces discussing
6 the plans to invade Sierra Leone with persons from The Gambia, to
7 your knowledge?

8 A. No.

9 Q. The person who testified said that at this meeting that
10:30:32 10 we've been talking about there was there present a Gambian whom
11 the person referred to as a Gambian Special Forces by the name of
12 Dr Manneh. This is at page 2219. Mr Vincent, have you heard of
13 a Gambian Special Forces by the name of Dr Manneh?

14 A. No. I said no.

10:31:02 15 Q. Did you hear from anyone of such person being present in
16 Voinjama planning how to attack Sierra Leone with the RUF?

17 A. No.

18 Q. The person who testified, also at the same page 2219, said
19 that this Dr Manneh was there at this meeting; that there was a
10:31:31 20 Gambian contingent that had a plan to carry out a similar
21 invasion of The Gambia; that this Dr Manneh was their leader and
22 that they were going to assist the RUF as well as the NPFL and
23 those two would in turn assist the Gambians carry out an invasion
24 in The Gambia. Have you heard any of this type of information
10:32:02 25 before, Mr Vincent?

26 A. No.

27 Q. If there were Gambians present in Voinjama as you and the
28 others were moving into Sierra Leone, and if there were
29 interaction with the RUF, in particular Foday Sankoh, would you

1 have known about it, Mr Vincent?

2 A. Yes, that was what I said. I even also said that even if
3 Mr Taylor was in Voinjama by then I was going to know. So all
4 this you are talking about, I don't have any idea. Things you
10:32:38 5 are talking about concerning the Gambians, it's not to my
6 knowledge.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. That's all I have for that
8 reference to the evidence on 25 January 2008.

9 Mr Vincent, one other thing very briefly. This is from a
10:33:00 10 transcript on 8 April 2008. The relevant page is 6825.

11 Mr Vincent, this is the evidence of another witness and I just
12 have a small passage to read to you. Transcript of 8 April 2008,
13 page 6825. The question was asked of the witness, line 10:

14 "Q. Do you recall who your training instructors were at
10:34:03 15 the national secondary school?

16 A. One was John B Vincent. Two, Ibrahim Dugba. Isaac T
17 Mongor and one Rambo. There were many other instructors,
18 but those were the prominent ones I can remember."

19 Mr Vincent, the reference there to John B Vincent, is that
10:34:34 20 to you?

21 A. Yes, I am John B Vincent.

22 Q. Now, line 22, the same page. The question was asked of the
23 witness:

24 "Q. These people who you've mentioned who were your
10:34:49 25 instructors, do you know which nationalities they were?

26 A. Yes, sir. They told me they were Liberians. And like
27 for Dugba, he told us he was once a SATU in the Liberian
28 army under the control of the late President Samuel Kanyon
29 Doe and that he was captured during the war in Liberia and

1 trained by the NPFL."

2 Let's pause there. Mr Vincent, do you know an Ibrahim
3 Dugba?

4 A. Yes, I know Ibrahim Dugba very well.

10:35:34 5 Q. And under what circumstances did you come to know him?

6 A. Ibrahim Dugba, I got to know Ibrahim Dugba on the RUF main
7 base in Camp Zogoda - no, Crab Hole. Sorry for the mistake.

8 Q. When you got to know him at Crab Hole, was he a recruit or
9 was he already a trained fighter?

10:36:07 10 A. Ibrahim Dugba and I trained together.

11 Q. To your knowledge, was Ibrahim Dugba ever trained by the
12 NPFL?

13 A. No, I have no idea about that.

14 Q. Have you ever heard of SATU, a unit within the Liberian
10:36:34 15 army under President Samuel Kanyon Doe?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you know what SATU stands for?

18 A. SATU is Special Anti-Terrorist Unit.

19 Q. Do you know where members of SATU received their training?

10:37:04 20 A. Well, during the administration, SATUs were sent to --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he repeat the name of
22 the place where they were sent for training.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, please repeat the name of the
24 place where they were sent for training.

10:37:18 25 THE WITNESS: Israel. Israel:

26 MR ANYAH:

27 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent.

28 A. Thank you.

29 Q. Let's go back to where we stopped yesterday afternoon

1 before we adjourned. You told us you were in Kono in the bushes
2 with the ECOMOG having flushed out the People's Army from
3 Freetown. Do you recall telling us that?

4 A. Yes, I recall.

10:37:49 5 Q. Do you recall telling us that Johnny Paul Koroma was in a
6 place called Kangama?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. When the forces had been flushed out of Freetown and you
9 found yourselves in Kono --

10:38:09 10 A. When we came from Freetown, we went to Kono, yes.

11 Q. In Kono, did the RUF and the AFRC or SLA still have a joint
12 command?

13 A. Yes, we were still together at that time. We were still
14 together.

10:38:30 15 Q. I'm not asking you if you were still together physically.
16 I'm asking you if you reported under the same chain of command.
17 Do you understand the difference?

18 A. Yes. We were together and we reported to Sam Bockarie at
19 the time because - let me just explain something. When we

10:38:56 20 retreated from Freetown and went to Kono, while we were based
21 there, we organised ourselves together. And as I told you, that
22 when we retreated, Sam Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koroma, they crossed
23 and went over to Kailahun District. Sam Bockarie was based in
24 Buedu while Mr Koroma was in a town called Kangama. But we were
10:39:37 25 reporting at - to Sam Bockarie at the time.

26 Q. Was Johnny Paul Koroma also reporting to Sam Bockarie at
27 that time?

28 A. No, Johnny Paul Koroma was not reporting to Sam Bockarie.

29 When we retreated, Johnny Paul Koroma turned every activity over

1 to Sam Bockarie and he said he should carry out all operations;
2 that he was going to be an adviser to Sam Bockarie and be
3 operating side by side. Whenever Sam Bockarie had any
4 difficulties, maybe in a decision, they will go to him for
10:40:23 5 advice. That was how they were working.

6 Q. You told us that Issa Sesay was based in Buedu as well. Do
7 you recall telling us that?

8 A. Yes, Buedu was the headquarters. Sam Bockarie was there,
9 Issa Sesay was there. It was only Morrison Kallon that was with
10:40:49 10 us in the Kono zoebush. When we talk about zoebush, we mean - I
11 don't know if you want me to define that to you.

12 Q. Yes, please. Go ahead.

13 A. Zoebush, in our traditional areas, we have an area that is
14 set up for the women. It's a cultural tradition. That was where
10:41:17 15 women gathered together to do their things. And the male section
16 they called the Poro boy and we retreated to a place where we
17 called zoebush. Wherever we met we called zoebush.

18 Q. Beside Morris Kallon with you in the zoebush, besides Sam
19 Bockarie and Issa Sesay in Buedu, where were other senior
10:41:42 20 commanders of the RUF at that time?

21 A. We had different assignments. Like Isaac Mongor was with
22 us in that Kono zoebush. Superman as they call - what is his
23 name now? Dennis Mingo too was with us in that zoebush. Then
24 Rambo known as Boston Flomo was also with us in that zoebush. We
10:42:27 25 had Kailondo as well in the zoebush. We were plenty there.

26 Senior officers were plenty in the zoebush because we had all
27 come together, so we were now planning how to divide ourselves
28 and start another operation.

29 Q. We will come back to your plans to start another operation

1 in a minute, but you mentioned Superman, Dennis Mingo. Did he
2 remain in that zone with you or did he leave to go somewhere
3 else?

4 A. Yes, when we started to operate Dennis Mingo left us and
10:43:09 5 went to where most of the SLAs were converging, that is around
6 the Kurubonla area. When he got there, I don't know. Maybe to
7 himself. He separated from the rest of us. He had nothing to do
8 with us. He only had something to do with SAJ Musa at the other
9 end when we were - we were in Kono. That was the first group
10:43:47 10 that left to go. When he went there was a split.

11 Q. Do you remember what year and what month he went to the
12 Kurubonla area you've just spoken of?

13 A. All of this happened in 1998. I am sorry if I cannot
14 recall the month because at that time it was very hectic for
10:44:18 15 someone to keep record. Everybody was thinking about how to
16 survive, so we were not keeping records for most of the time.

17 Q. You said a few moments ago that you were planning how to
18 divide yourselves and start another operation. What sort of
19 planning did you and the others undertake?

10:44:38 20 A. Well, the planning was - the plan was to maintain our
21 position and to advance and add other areas to our controlled
22 territories so that we would have a large ground. At least as we
23 went further maybe there will be intervention for peace, because
24 at this time we were all tired but we could not just give up so
10:45:09 25 easily. So we just wanted to be all over so that someone would
26 come and say we want you people to observe peace. So that was
27 our plan.

28 Q. Were these plans reduced to writing? How were they
29 discussed or put together?

1 A. Well, these plans were carried out later. Superman having
2 broken away, the commander in charge called us to discuss how to
3 launch this plan to retake our lost positions. That was what we
4 were planning. Yes, he had record of those plans. He was the
10:46:08 5 commander. I'm talking about Sam Bockarie at the time.

6 Q. You said he called you to discuss. Were you part of that
7 discussion of these future plans?

8 A. Yes, I was part of that meeting in Buedu. He called
9 vanguards from all over, including some junior forces who were
10:46:32 10 trained who were made senior officers to help us carry out the
11 operations.

12 Q. Let's pause there. We will come to this meeting in Buedu
13 that you said included vanguards from all over. You said when
14 Superman left he only had something to do with SAJ Musa at the
10:46:52 15 other end. Who was SAJ Musa?

16 A. SAJ Musa was one of the SLAs.

17 Q. Do you know what position, if any, he occupied within the
18 SLA?

19 A. No, I did not know at the time.

10:47:13 20 Q. Was he a junior man, a senior ranked man? What status, if
21 any, did you know him to occupy within the SLA?

22 A. Well, I did not know his position. All I knew was that he
23 was SAJ Musa. So I was thinking that it could be an abbreviation
24 for sergeant. That was how I took it, not knowing that it was
10:47:40 25 his real name. I took SAJ to be an abbreviation for sergeant.

26 Q. And in what part of Sierra Leone was he based when Superman
27 went to join him?

28 A. Around that Kabala or Kurubonla - Kabala district in Sierra
29 Leone.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Now going back to this vanguards
2 meeting - or this meeting involving vanguards, you said it was
3 called by Sam Bockarie and it took place in Buedu, yes?

4 A. Yes.

10:48:21 5 Q. Was there a particular place in the vicinity of Buedu or
6 within Buedu that this meeting was held at?

7 A. This meeting was held in an area called Waterworks. It is
8 an area where water purification was done. That was where water
9 was supplied to the surrounding villages or towns. That was
10:48:53 10 where this meeting was held.

11 Q. How many persons, to your knowledge, were in attendance at
12 this meeting?

13 A. In the meeting we were well over 200.

14 Q. Was Issa Sesay present at that meeting?

10:49:16 15 A. Yes. I said a meeting of all vanguards.

16 Q. And when you refer to vanguards, are you referring to those
17 who were trained at Crab Hole?

18 A. Yes, those who were trained by Mr Sankoh himself.

19 Q. What was discussed at this meeting?

10:49:45 20 A. Well, the discussion at this meeting was that we should
21 launch a serious offensive, because at that time our leader was
22 not with us. I'm talking about Mr Sankoh now. So two days'
23 offensive, probably the international community would know and
24 intervene so as to bring peace and Sankoh would be released. So
10:50:24 25 it was an operation to free Sankoh.

26 Q. Was the release of Foday Sankoh the only objective or
27 purpose of this meeting?

28 A. Yes, yes. Because during the discussion at the meeting we
29 planned to attack and make sure that we captured major areas that

1 will cause some concern for the international community.

2 Q. What were some of those major areas that you were planning
3 to capture?

4 A. As far as Makeni. Kono, Makeni.

10:51:18 5 Q. Did the plan to capture major areas include a plan to
6 capture Freetown?

7 A. No, that was the initial stage so we could not have gone to
8 Freetown, so that was the first mission - target that was set.

9 So when we would have gotten Makeni, the next place would have
10:51:38 10 been to go close to Freetown or to Freetown itself.

11 Q. But the question I'm asking is at that meeting when you
12 were planning these operations, was there on the table a plan to
13 attack Freetown in addition to Kono and Makeni?

14 A. No.

10:52:03 15 Q. Where was the RUF getting its arms and ammunition at this
16 particular time in 1998 when this meeting took place at the
17 Waterworks?

18 A. At this time there were many ways that we went about it.
19 Selling produce, that is cocoa and coffee. We had other people

10:52:34 20 who were making deals at the Guinean border. We were getting
21 arms and ammunition from them also. There was some NPFL

22 territory that we were getting these things from. That was the
23 deal that was going through Timothy Fayah. He used to help us

24 too. He used to get some things for us and we would give him his
10:53:01 25 own share and he would give us whatever he was able to give us.

26 Because at that time General Timothy Fayah was the one taking
27 care of Foya.

28 Q. Mr Vincent, please pause and just remember to go slowly.

29 Let's consider some of what you have said. You mentioned Timothy

1 Fayah. Is that the name or is it another name?

2 A. Timothy Fayah.

3 Q. Is it Timothy or is it --

4 A. The same as Timothy is spelled.

10:53:42 5 Q. How do you spell the last name of this person?

6 A. Fayah. I think it should be F-A-Y-A-H. F-A-Y-A.

7 Something like that. Or he may have had a different way of
8 spelling it because these are African names.

9 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, would it be possible to have the
10:54:08 10 witness spell the first name just so there's no doubt about it.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay, Mr Witness. First of all, say that
12 first name again and then spell it.

13 THE WITNESS: Is it not T-O-M-A-T-H? It's spelled as the
14 same Timothy.

10:54:37 15 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I understand the pronunciation
16 to result in a different spelling, but the witness's spelling
17 controls, subject to your Honours' intervention.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Proceed.

19 MR ANYAH:

10:54:56 20 Q. Mr Vincent, this person Timothy Fayah, what nationality was
21 that person?

22 A. Timothy Fayah is a Liberian.

23 Q. Was he a Liberian citizen or was he in the Armed Forces of
24 Liberia?

10:55:18 25 A. He was a Liberian citizen and of the Armed Forces of
26 Liberia and of the Kissi tribe from that same Foya end.

27 Q. Was he a commander within the Armed Forces of Liberia?

28 A. Yes, he was commanding Foya at the time.

29 Q. The time you're referring to, what year was that?

1 A. I am talking about 1998.

2 Q. You said:

3 "He used to help us too. He used to get some things for us
4 and we would give him his own share and he would give us whatever
10:56:05 5 he was able to give us."

6 What are you referring to that he used to get some - what
7 do you mean by he used to get some things?

8 A. I'm talking about arms - I mean ammunition. Arms,
9 ammunition.

10:56:24 10 Q. Do you know from where he got those arms and ammunitions?

11 A. I did not know, but I remember once Sam Bockarie took me in
12 his jeep and we went to him one night and I was in the car
13 waiting. He only came back and said, "I've got something for you
14 here", and they spoke and that was how we pulled out that same
10:56:49 15 night and returned to Buedu.

16 Q. Where did you and Sam Bockarie go on the night in question?

17 A. Foya. Foya Town.

18 Q. Are you saying that you crossed over from Sierra Leone into
19 Foya, Liberia?

10:57:07 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you said that Sam Bockarie got something. What did he
22 get from Timothy Fayah?

23 A. I am talking about ammunition.

24 Q. What, if anything, did Sam Bockarie give in exchange for
10:57:32 25 the ammunition?

26 A. Well, where they met to talk, I did not go with them. I
27 was in the car. One of his bodyguards was with him, Junior
28 Vandi. He went with him and I was in the car.

29 Q. Junior Vandi was whose bodyguard?

1 A. Junior Vandi was a bodyguard to Mosquito at the time,
2 Sam Bockarie, alias Mosquito.

3 Q. Was that the only time, to your knowledge, Sam Bockarie
4 obtained ammunition from this fellow Timothy Fayah?

10:58:09 5 A. That was the time he took me along and we got that and
6 returned.

7 Q. Apart from that time, did you ever hear of Sam Bockarie
8 obtaining ammunition from this person Timothy Fayah?

9 A. No. It was only at that time that the two of us went.
10:58:32 10 There was also another vanguard that was making deals on the
11 Guinean side. This is our own vanguard brother Sam Kolleh.
12 There was a lady who used to do business from Guinea. It was
13 through that woman too that he used to go and get ammunition from
14 Guinea.

10:58:51 15 Q. We will come to Sam Kolleh in a moment. I want to ask you
16 some questions still about this Fayah. Was he of any rank within
17 the AFL, the Armed Forces of Liberia?

18 A. Timothy Fayah was commanding Foya at the time that he was a
19 general.

10:59:17 20 Q. To your knowledge --

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: How does that answer the question,
22 Mr Anyah?

23 MR ANYAH:

24 Q. Mr Vincent, when you say general, was that his military
10:59:28 25 rank? What was the rank of Timothy Fayah?

26 A. That is the rank that I'm calling, general. He was a
27 general for the AFL at the time.

28 Q. At the time he gave Sam Bockarie these ammunitions, do you
29 know whether he was doing so on the basis of instructions given

1 to him by someone else?

2 A. The moment that I saw - at that time that I witnessed, he
3 was doing it on his own to get something in his pocket at the
4 time. The way I saw it, he was doing it as if he was hiding from
11:00:14 5 someone not to make a complaint about him. That is how I read
6 his movement.

7 Q. Did it appear to you, that entire transaction, to be a
8 transaction that was being done on behalf of the Armed Forces of
9 Liberia, or was it a transaction General Fayah was doing for
11:00:44 10 himself?

11 A. It was a transaction that he was doing for himself.
12 Because, let me just comment here. You know Buedu and Foya, they
13 have the same ethnic groups down there. Foya and Buedu are all
14 of the Kissi ethnic groups, so it was very easy for them to carry
11:01:04 15 out any transaction there. This person will come and speak the
16 same vernacular to his friend and they will do whatever they
17 wanted to do to assist one another. And mostly around that area,
18 people had dual citizenships. They had one parent from Liberia
19 and one parent from Sierra Leone. That was how it was around
11:01:28 20 that area.

21 Q. You mentioned another person. I think you referred to him
22 as a vanguard brother, Sam Kolleh. Who is Sam Kolleh?

23 A. Yes. Sam Kolleh was a vanguard, I said.

24 Q. What is his nationality?

11:01:46 25 A. Sam Kolleh is a Liberian.

26 Q. Was he trained with you at Crab Hole?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Did he partake in the RUF invasion of Sierra Leone in March
29 1991?

1 A. Yes. Sam Kolleh was one of those that went through Bo
2 Waterside.

3 Q. You mentioned something about him having transactions
4 involving Guinea. You said, "There was a lady that used to do
11:02:29 5 business from Guinea. It was through that woman too that he used
6 to go and get ammunition from Guinea." Who used to go to Guinea
7 to get ammunition from a woman?

8 A. Sam Kolleh had business links with this woman. At that
9 time when things got tough we had things like generators, as I
11:03:00 10 said, cocoa and coffee. People needed these things in Guinea, so
11 that was the only thing - those were the only things we exchanged
12 them for. It was Sam Kolleh who was heading that. Nobody went
13 there. That was his own operation, to go there and do the
14 transaction for the RUF at the time.

11:03:22 15 Q. And when he obtained these arms - well, you referred to
16 ammunition from Guinea - on whose behalf was he obtaining them?

17 A. For the movement. We were stranded at the time, so he was
18 getting it for the movement so that we would have something to
19 start our operations.

11:03:54 20 MR ANYAH: Now, may the witness please be shown Prosecution
21 exhibit 45A. It's a photograph. I have additional copies here
22 should the original be marked, but I don't believe it is marked.
23 Can I ask that he be allowed to look at it first in his hand up
24 close, please.

11:05:00 25 THE WITNESS: I have seen it.

26 MR ANYAH: May it be displayed, please. Madam President,
27 may I propose a way of proceeding with this photograph? I have
28 another copy in colour here with me that perhaps Mr Vincent could
29 write on vis-a-vis identifying anyone that he does identify in

1 this photograph so that naturally the original exhibit remains
2 untouched.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Fair enough, yes.

4 MR ANYAH: So if I can hand this to Madam Court Officer.

11:05:48 5 Q. Mr Vincent, can you see that photograph as it's being
6 displayed on your monitor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you recognise anyone in that photograph?

9 A. Yes. I recognise the three young men here.

11:06:07 10 Q. Remember to speak up and speak slowly.

11 A. Yes. Yes, I said the three men in this photograph, I can
12 remember them.

13 Q. Let's start from the left to the right. The man with the
14 red T-shirt and a hat on the left holding his right hand up and
11:06:33 15 two fingers displayed, who is that person?

16 A. This man is known as Zigzag Marzah.

17 Q. The man in the middle wearing what appears to be tennis
18 shoes also holding his right hand up with two fingers displayed,
19 do you know who that person is?

11:07:06 20 A. This is Daniel Tamba known as Jungle.

21 Q. The man to the far right with a white hat and sunglasses
22 and a blue and white shirt, do you know who that is?

23 A. He looks like Abu Keita.

24 Q. Is he Abu Keita or are you not 100 per cent sure?

11:07:38 25 A. I believe he is Abu Keita.

26 Q. Let's talk about these three persons for a minute. Let's
27 start with Abu Keita, the last person. Who is Abu Keita,
28 Mr Vincent?

29 A. Abu Keita - I got to know Abu Keita when we had a meeting

1 at Buedu at the time that --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness kindly
3 repeat his answer slowly.

11:08:25

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, please repeat your answer for
5 the interpreter.

11:08:48

6 THE WITNESS: I said - I am saying that I got to know
7 Abu Keita when a meeting was held in Buedu. It was there that
8 Sam Bockarie - after I had been named as the vanguard commander,
9 that was the time that Abu Keita was introduced to me by

11:09:25

10 Sam Bockarie, and his story was that Abu Keita came to him with
11 men, ranging from between 20 to 40 of his men, mostly of his
12 tribesmen, the Mandingos. And he stated to Sam Bockarie that he
13 had come to him to join the RUF because he had escaped from
14 Liberia and that the Charles Taylor people were after him. They
15 wanted to take away his life. That was why he had escaped and
16 come to Sam Bockarie in Buedu. That was how he was introduced to
17 me.

18 MR ANYAH:

11:09:42

19 Q. Mr Vincent, the meeting you are referring to that was held
20 in Buedu, is that the same meeting you testified to as being held
21 at Waterworks or is it a different meeting?

11:10:08

22 A. That was the meeting, but this introduction was made at Sam
23 Bockarie's house in Buedu to me. Because it was in the meeting
24 that he announced me as vanguard commander. I was promoted to
25 the rank of colonel at that time, so he wanted me to know that
26 this man was now part of the vanguards.

27 Q. Before that day when you saw Abu Keita at Sam Bockarie's
28 house in Buedu, had you seen him before?

29 A. From that day? No, no, no. I had not known him from

1 anywhere. It was that very first day that I saw him.

2 Q. What nationality is Abu Keita?

3 A. Abu Keita is a Liberian but has a Mandingo background.

11:10:55

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he repeat the rest of
5 his answer slowly.

6 MR ANYAH:

7 Q. Can you repeat what you were saying? Speak up clearly and
8 do so slowly, please. You were saying Abu Keita is a Liberian
9 but he has a Mandingo background. Can you continue?

11:11:11

10 A. Yes. I said Abu Keita is a Liberian from what he said to
11 me. He has a Mandingo background. And most of the Mandingos
12 too, these dual citizenship that I spoke about, some would come
13 from Guinea and they said they were Liberians and we would accept
14 them because we had Mandingos. We couldn't distinguish who was
15 who.

11:11:41

16 Q. You said you were told Abu Keita escaped from Liberia.
17 What was he escaping from in Liberia?

18 A. Well, that was what I was told. So there is no other thing
19 that was said to me about him except that he brought his men and
20 these men had come with other arms and ammunition too. So it was
21 like he came and surrendered to Sam Bockarie.

11:12:04

22 Q. Did you see any of the men - you said 20 to 40 - that Abu
23 Keita came with to Buedu?

24 A. No, I did not see any of those men.

11:12:33

25 Q. But you were told he brought some men with him?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. To your knowledge, was Abu Keita - after that period of
28 time in Buedu, did he become an RUF member?

29 A. Yes, he became an RUF member.

1 Q. Do you know if after he became an RUF member he had any
2 connection with Charles Taylor in Liberia?

3 A. No, because according to the introduction that was made,
4 that he had said Charles Taylor people were out after his life,
11:13:24 5 that was why he left Liberia.

6 Q. The arms and ammunition you said the men Keita brought
7 along had with them or brought with them, were those arms and
8 ammunition turned over to the RUF?

9 A. Yes, because at the time - before that meeting was called,
11:13:51 10 I left Kono. I was in the Kono Jungle and I saw some men who
11 were going there saying they were sent by Sam Bockarie. It was
12 at that time that I came to Buedu and after the introduction I
13 knew that those men were some of his men that were sent to us in
14 the jungle there.

11:14:12 15 Q. Were those the only arms and ammunition that Abu Keita
16 provided to the RUF to your knowledge?

17 A. That was what I was told. That was what I was told. What
18 he told me is what I can still remember.

19 Q. The man in the middle of the photograph you referred to as
11:14:39 20 Daniel Tamba, also known as Jungle, what nationality, if you
21 know, is he?

22 A. Jungle has a dual citizenship. He is from the Kissi tribe.
23 So the parental background that I spoke about that one side was
24 from Sierra Leone and the other from the Liberia, that Foya end.

11:15:12 25 Q. [Microphone not activated] are you saying that he is part
26 Liberian, part Sierran Leonean?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Was this person Jungle at Crab Hole when you were there?

29 A. No, Jungle was not at Crab Hole. I got to know him at that

1 same meeting too.

2 Q. Was this person Jungle present at the Waterworks meeting
3 near Buedu in 1998?

4 A. I did not see him at that meeting but he was in Buedu Town
11:15:52 5 on that particular day. It was only Abu Keita that was in that
6 meeting.

7 Q. Was it on the day of the meeting that you saw this fellow
8 Jungle in Buedu Town?

9 A. Yes.

11:16:05 10 Q. Under what circumstances did you see this fellow Jungle on
11 that day?

12 A. Well, I met Jungle after the introduction had been made
13 between Abu Keita and I. Some vanguards, we all walked the road
14 going towards that Waterworks area and we got to Jungle's house
11:16:31 15 where he was residing. And I was made to understand that Jungle
16 was always in and out, in and out because that was his home. He
17 will go there and come back.

18 Q. When you say he was always in and out, in and out of where?

19 A. Going to Liberia, coming to Sierra Leone, going to Liberia
11:16:55 20 and returning to Sierra Leone.

21 Q. And you said he had a house. Are you saying that he had a
22 home in which he lived in Buedu?

23 A. Yes. I met him at his house whilst I and some vanguards
24 were walking down the road and we got to his house. That was
11:17:19 25 where I got to know him.

26 Q. Before that day, the day of the meeting at the Waterworks,
27 had you ever seen this person Jungle?

28 A. I said that was the first day that I saw him.

29 Q. These trips to and back from Liberia, do you know the

1 purpose behind those trips?

2 A. Well, I got to know later that he too was somehow helping
3 his brother Sam Bockarie, because both of them were from that
4 same Buedu Town. So when he used to come, he used to come with
11:18:05 5 some ammunition and he would leave it, because that was his home
6 as well, so he was playing his own part. That was what I got to
7 understand.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, if I may interrupt. The
9 witness testified about Abu Keita coming to Buedu with 20 to 40
11:18:27 10 men. Could he give us some indication of when that was, either
11 in terms of actual time or in relation to an occasion or an
12 incident?

13 MR ANYAH:

14 Q. Mr Vincent, did you understand the question as posed by the
11:18:45 15 President? The question is what time frame can you place
16 regarding the presence of these 20 to 40 men in Buedu that Abu
17 Keita is said to have brought?

18 A. Well, this time, as I told you, it was around '98 when this
19 meeting was held. I think it could have been something around
11:19:16 20 August, July or September. Something like that. But I'm not
21 sure of the month, but it was in 1998.

22 Q. You said previously - this is at my LiveNote page 50, lines
23 3 through 8. You said:

24 "Before that meeting was called I left Kono. I was in the
11:19:38 25 Kono Jungle and I saw some men who were going there saying they
26 were sent by Sam Bockarie. It was at that time that I came to
27 Buedu and after the introduction I knew that these men were some
28 of his men that were sent to us in the jungle there."

29 The men you were referring to when you made that remark,

1 are those the men that Abu Keita is said to have brought to Sam
2 Bockarie?

3 A. Yes, because immediately when he got there with his men the
4 fact that we were out of materials and these men had materials,
11:20:25 5 he could not just keep them at the headquarters. There were
6 people who could operate, so he deployed them. That was how they
7 were deployed. Some of us went to us in the jungle.

8 Q. And you keep saying he brought those men, he. Is the "he"
9 Abu Keita or Sam Bockarie?

11:20:44 10 A. Keita brought these men and these men were deployed by Sam
11 Bockarie.

12 Q. Going back to Jungle, Daniel Tamba. Do you know from where
13 in Liberia he got these arms or ammunitions he used to bring when
14 he would go to Liberia?

11:21:06 15 A. No.

16 Q. Did you ever hear Sam Bockarie say that Jungle used to
17 bring those supplies from Charles Taylor?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Did you ever hear anyone say that Jungle was working for
11:21:26 20 Charles Taylor when he would bring those supplies to the RUF?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Do you know whether Jungle received anything from Sam
23 Bockarie when he would bring those supplies?

24 A. No.

11:21:45 25 Q. You told us Jungle is of the Kissi tribe, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And what tribe is Sam Bockarie of?

28 A. Sam Bockarie too is of the Kissi tribe. And both of them
29 are from the same town, Buedu.

1 Q. The man on the left of the photograph, the far left with
2 the red T-shirt, you said was Zigzag Marzah. What nationality is
3 he?

4 A. Zigzag Marzah is a Liberian.

11:22:23 5 Q. Do you know Zigzag Marzah?

6 A. Yes, I got to know Zigzag Marzah in Vahun when I went back
7 to Liberia.

8 Q. What year did you go back to Liberia?

9 A. I went back to Liberia at the end of 2000, 2001.

11:22:48 10 Q. From the time when you were taken to Crab Hole, September
11 1990, through your departure for Liberia end of 2000 into 2001,
12 did you ever see this person Zigzag Marzah, whether in Liberia or
13 Sierra Leone?

14 A. No.

11:23:08 15 Q. Around the time when you were in the Kono bush and when you
16 went to Buedu for this meeting with Sam Bockarie and other
17 vanguards, did you see this person Zigzag Marzah?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Did you know Zigzag Marzah during the period of time when
11:23:28 20 you were with the RUF to also be an RUF member?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Did you know Zigzag Marzah during the period of time
23 following the retreat from Freetown, that is 1998, to be a source
24 of arms and ammunition for the RUF?

11:23:51 25 A. No.

26 Q. Did you ever hear of Zigzag Marzah bringing arms or
27 ammunition to Sam Bockarie in Buedu in 1998?

28 A. No.

29 Q. How about in 1999?

1 A. I said no, all throughout. It's a no.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Mr Vincent, are you comfortable writing on the photograph?

11:24:21 5 Because I would have you write the names of these people.

6 Madam President, might I inquire? Your Honours have a
7 practice that we've become aware of where there is some
8 reluctance to receive the same document twice as an exhibit, in
9 particular photographs. I wonder whether having this witness
10 identify these persons by writing their names and drawing lines
11 and signing and dating a second copy of an identical photograph
12 would be frowned upon by your Honours?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, as far as we're concerned, the
14 witness has spoken to the photograph that is originally P-045A.
11:25:27 15 We would not think putting in writing what he has said orally
16 adds anything of value, but if you refer to have him write on the
17 photograph that's up to you. It then becomes a different
18 exhibit, of course.

19 MR ANYAH: My question has been answered and I will move
11:25:45 20 along. Thank you, Madam Court Officer:

21 Q. Mr Vincent, you mentioned at the Waterworks meeting that
22 you were made vanguard commander by Sam Bockarie, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What is a vanguard commander? What does someone with that
11:26:10 25 title do?

26 A. Well, being appointed at the time as a vanguard commander,
27 I was there to seek the interest and welfare of vanguards.
28 Whenever there was a problem that they couldn't easily solve, I
29 would go to the authorities to discuss with them and find a

1 solution to - in the interests of the vanguards. So I was there
2 to seek the interests of the vanguards.

3 Q. Did this new position you had place you in charge of all
4 the vanguards who trained at Crab Hole?

11:27:06 5 A. Yes, even the Sam Bockarie himself. He used to call me his
6 commander even though he was the commander for the revolution,
7 but he used to call me his commander.

8 Q. Where were you based when you had this position vanguard
9 commander?

11:27:26 10 A. When I was made a vanguard commander, I went back to the
11 Kono Jungle.

12 Q. When you were vanguard commander, did you have any
13 interactions with Superman?

14 A. Yes.

11:27:52 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, do we have a time frame for
16 this post of vanguard commander? Has the witness told us when
17 this was?

18 MR ANYAH:

19 Q. Mr Vincent, what year and under what circumstances were you
11:28:06 20 made vanguard commander?

21 A. Well, I said it was during the time of that meeting in 1998
22 when we came for the meeting. That was where the authority -
23 that is Sam Bockarie at the time, he looked at me and said it was
24 necessary to have a command structure wherein when vanguards had
11:28:32 25 a problem, they would channel their grievances and that would be
26 where their grievances would be channelled. That was how it was
27 to be. It was then that I was given command over the vanguards.
28 That was the highest rank that I was given in the movement,
29 colonel.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Now, I asked you the question
2 whether during the period of time when you were vanguard
3 commander you had any interactions with Dennis Mingo, alias
4 Superman.

11:29:11 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What was the nature of that interaction or interactions?

7 A. Well, the interaction there was that --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat his
9 answer a little slower.

11:29:34 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just pause. Mr Witness, please repeat
11 your answer a little slower.

12 THE WITNESS: I said my interaction that I had with
13 Superman was that I really wanted to call upon the RUF vanguards
14 in the territory at the time so that all of them would come and
11:29:53 15 work together as one body because we were all fighting for the
16 same goal.

17 MR ANYAH:

18 Q. And what did you do as a consequence of this effort to have
19 the vanguard come together and work together?

11:30:14 20 A. Yes. At that time we were in the Kono Jungle. When I went
21 in the radio room, I called Superman and explained to him my
22 appointment by Sam Bockarie, which he appreciated and he said
23 that was good. So I told him that since you have accepted the
24 position, it's okay, then I'm your commander. Then he said yes,
11:30:49 25 he had no problem with that. I requested to meet him there where
26 he was so that we would sit down and discuss for me to know what
27 his problems were so that he will explain what had given him the
28 cause to break away from Sam Bockarie's command and go and join
29 another man who had broken away from us. Based upon that, the

1 commander who was in charge of operations at the Kono zoebush,
2 that is, Rambo, Rambo in turn complained him to Sam Bockarie that
3 he did not understand the reason why I wanted to meet Dennis
4 Mingo. Based on that complaint, I was recalled from the Kono
11:31:47 5 zoebush and deployed at Jojoima in the Kailahun District.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: That would be a good place to break. We
7 will have a break until 12 noon.

8 [Break taken at 11.32 a.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 12.02 p.m.]

11:57:22 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, as you continue with your
11 evidence with this witness, the witness has on more than one
12 occasion referred to himself as a single-barrel man. I am not
13 sure that he has explained what that is. Please throw some light
14 on that.

12:03:12 15 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President:

16 Q. Did you hear what the Presiding Judge has just said? Can
17 you tell us what it means to be a single-barrel man?

18 A. Yes. When I talk about being a single-barrel man, a single
19 barrel is a common gun that people who are not trained use to
12:03:45 20 kill bush animals. So at the time when I went through the NPFL
21 police headquarters and gave myself up I was not a trained man,
22 so I did not know anything about automatic rifles. So the single
23 barrel was given to me to join the NPFL soldiers who were on duty
24 so that I would be there as a standby, so when the time came for
12:04:14 25 me to be a trained man for automatic rifles.

26 Q. So what time period would it be correct to describe you as
27 having been a single-barrel man?

28 A. Yes. I am saying from the time Bong Mines was captured.
29 And like I told you, that Bong Mines was captured in 1990 in June

1 on the 4th. And around the 15th, thereabouts, I started doing my
2 trade. I go around, buy my local commodities, some pepper, some
3 garden eggs to sell them. And around September I was harassed by
4 one of the armed men, and based on that --

12:05:16 5 Q. I am sorry to interrupt, Mr Vincent. We have covered this
6 before. The question has to do with the time frame when it would
7 be accurate to describe you as being a single-barrel man. Is
8 that limited to the time when you were stationed at an NPFL
9 checkpoint?

12:05:36 10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. And during what year and what month again were you
12 stationed at an NPFL checkpoint?

13 A. I am talking about the month of September 1990.

14 Q. Is it the case, then, that when you were with the RUF in
12:05:56 15 Sierra Leone, it would not be correct to describe you as a
16 single-barrel man?

17 A. No, no. I was already trained and I was given an AK rifle
18 when we entered.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Before we broke for the last break
12:06:17 20 30 minutes ago, you were telling us about a radio communication
21 that you made to Superman. Do you recall telling us that?

22 A. Yes, I remember that.

23 Q. I want us to re-cover some of what you said. We will go
24 through a bit by bit so that everybody can understand what you
12:06:42 25 told us before the break. You said that you called Superman and
26 you explained to him your appointment. What appointment were you
27 explaining to Superman?

28 A. The appointment that I explained about to Superman was that
29 I had now been named the vanguard commander of the RUF, and he

1 appreciated that that meant that he accepted my command. And the
2 next discussion I had with him was when I asked him that I will
3 want to take my own time to meet you where you are so that we
4 will have a discussion, because I want us to work as a body.

12:07:35 5 Because we had all started the struggle, and now it has got to
6 the point wherein we need not separate. So we discussed, and he
7 accepted that I should go.

8 Q. If you could pause there. He accepted that you should go
9 to where he was. Can you tell us where Superman was when you had
12:07:58 10 this conversation with him over the radio?

11 A. Superman was now in Kabala - in the Kabala District.

12 Q. Again, as we have gone through your evidence, I have
13 reminded you from time to time to go slowly. I will do so again.
14 Just go slowly. Take your time. You said that Superman was in
12:08:25 15 the Kabala District, and before the break you said he had joined
16 another man who had broken away from the RUF. Who was that other
17 man that Superman had joined?

18 A. At the time Superman went he joined with one SAJ Musa, who
19 was an SLA.

12:08:52 20 Q. You said that somebody named Rambo complained to Sam
21 Bockarie upon learning of your radio communication with Superman.
22 The Rambo to whom you refer, is that the same Boston Flomo you
23 testified about this morning?

24 A. Yes, it's Boston Flomo. Boston Flomo complained to Sam
12:09:21 25 Bockarie that the communication I had with Dennis Mingo, he said
26 to him he was not satisfied with it and he said he did not
27 actually know the intention. So probably he might have been
28 thinking that since - if you had gone to - if I had gone to
29 Superman, maybe Superman wouldn't have allowed me to come back.

1 He would have added me to the enemy power, and the enemy power
2 would have been heavier against him. It was actually not what he
3 told me, but that was in my mind later. I said maybe it was
4 based on that that he decided to complain me.

12:10:04 5 Q. What was Boston Flomo's rank or position at the time he
6 complained to Sam Bockarie about you?

7 A. At that time he was taking the operation in the Kono Jungle
8 there. He was the commander there at that time.

9 Q. What consequence, if any, did you suffer as a result of the
12:10:27 10 complaint that was made to Sam Bockarie by Boston Flomo?

11 A. Well, the only consequence I suffered was that my
12 assignment was changed from Kono and I was sent to the Kailahun
13 District at Jojoiima. The RUF-controlled territory.

14 Q. Do you know how to spell Jojoiima?

12:10:55 15 A. Jojoiima, I think it should be J-U-J-U-I-M-A. Something
16 like that, if I am not mistaken. Jojoiima.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent.

18 A. Thank you.

19 Q. Also before the break and when you spoke about the meeting
12:11:18 20 at the Waterworks you said plans were made to undertake
21 operations to attack Kono and Makeni. Do you recall telling us
22 that?

23 A. Yes, I said that.

24 Q. Did the RUF in the period after the Waterworks meeting in
12:11:39 25 fact launch an attack on Kono?

26 A. Say that again.

27 Q. In the period shortly after the meeting at the Waterworks
28 in Buedu, did the RUF launch an attack on Kono?

29 A. No. The attack was not launched at once. I went back to

1 Kono to wait for the operations time. Because I wanted Superman
2 to be part of that operational plan. That was why I contacted
3 him as the vanguard commander, so that at least he would respond
4 positively and then I will get in touch with the commander in
12:12:31 5 charge to bring us together so that we will all be part of that
6 operation.

7 Q. Was there eventually an operation to attack Kono after the
8 Waterworks meeting?

9 A. There was an operation planned to attack Kono, but it did
12:12:54 10 not happen until I left there, when my assignment was changed.
11 After the meeting I went to Kono, but when my assignment was
12 changed, it was after that the operation started and it extended
13 all up to Makeni.

14 Q. Was it the case then that the operation commenced when you
12:13:14 15 were in Jojoiima?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. In what month and in what year did that operation to attack
18 Kono commence?

19 A. That operation took place around the end part of December,
12:13:38 20 the end part of December, because I can remember that around
21 December 22 there was a border closure between Liberia and Sierra
22 Leone at that time. And it was in that same December that that
23 operation started.

24 Q. Do you know how it came to be that the border between
12:14:07 25 Liberia and Sierra Leone was closed in December?

26 A. No, I did not actually know why it happened, but that was
27 what I got to understand. So that meant that we were now
28 supposed to struggle on our own.

29 Q. In what year was this border closure effectuated? When did

1 it take place?

2 A. That took place around December - in December. And it was
3 in that same December that that particular operation started.
4 The border closure was in December. I put it sometime around the
12:14:58 5 22 December.

6 Q. Mr Vincent, I want to know the year. What year was it?
7 '97, '98, '99, what year?

8 A. That operation was sometime in 1998.

9 Q. Referring to the border closure, you said a few minutes
12:15:25 10 ago, "So that meant that we were now supposed to struggle on our
11 own." What did you mean by that?

12 A. Yes. That means, the means that we had been trying our
13 possible best to get things from our brothers like Timothy Fayah
14 and others, that was not going to happen any more.

12:15:55 15 Q. What do you mean by small small things? What things are
16 you referring to?

17 A. I am talking about ammunition. When we were short of them,
18 we would go to him, we would cry to him because he was the man on
19 the ground and he was the commander in charge at that time. So
12:16:13 20 that meant that nothing like that was now going to happen. So we
21 were to depend on our own efforts by either the other way through
22 Guinea or embarking on ambushes and attacks.

23 Q. The other way through Guinea, what are you referring to
24 when you say the other way through Guinea?

12:16:34 25 A. That means that we were now going to be still using Sam
26 Kolléh as the person who had the contacts with whosoever so that
27 he could make his deals and for us to get the things that we
28 needed.

29 Q. You keep referring to things. What are these things you

1 are speaking about, the things that you say the RUF needed?

12:17:18 2 A. Basically ammunition, food. When I am talking about
3 things, those are the things that keep the movement going on. In
4 times of war when we talk about things, we refer to ammunition,
5 food, drugs, just the things that can keep us up.

6 Q. You said besides relying on efforts through Guinea, another
7 means of getting the things you needed were embarking on
8 ambushes. Who was the target of these ambushes by the RUF?

12:17:53 9 A. At that time the targets of the ambushes were against the
10 ECOMOG forces who were fighting along the SLA who were under the
11 Tejan Kabbah administration in Freetown.

12 Q. Are you saying that the ECOMOG forces were under Tejan
13 Kabbah's administration as well as the SLAs?

12:18:24 14 A. Yes. The SLA was the Sierra Leone Army and the ECOMOG
15 forces were there because they pushed us to retreat and they
16 occupied the areas that we were occupying, so we had to put
17 strategies together so that we can get ammunition for us to
18 continue our struggle.

12:18:41 19 Q. Mr Vincent, just remember to take it easy and slow down a
20 bit.

21 A. No, no, I'm okay.

22 Q. Thank you. This attack on Kono in December 1998, did you
23 participate in it?

12:18:59 24 A. No. I told you that my assignment had already been
25 changed, so I was not there when that operation went on.

26 Q. Did you hear from other RUF members what unfolded when Kono
27 was attacked in December 1998?

28 A. Yes. At the time the place where I was, there was
29 communication. So we had communication link and we were being

1 informed about all activities that went on. And from there they
2 advanced as far as Masingbi, Matotoka, you know, Magburaka, as
3 far as Makeni.

12:19:38 4 Q. Mr Vincent, do you know what purpose was behind the RUF
5 attack on Kono? Why did the RUF feel it necessary to attack Kono
6 in December 1998?

7 A. The purpose was to get control of our territories that we
8 had lost before. We had lost some territories before, so we
9 wanted them to come back under our control.

12:20:03 10 Q. Was Kono at that time of any strategic significance to the
11 RUF?

12 A. Yes. Important in the sense that - important in the sense
13 that the government of the day under Tejan Kabbah had interest in
14 Kono because that was where they had operations like mining and
12:20:38 15 other things. So if we got there from them, they wouldn't have
16 been able to get any source by which they could get diamonds and
17 other things from Kono.

18 Q. Did the RUF succeed when it attacked Kono in December 1998?

19 A. Yes. They succeeded like I told you and they advanced as
12:21:13 20 far as Makeni.

21 Q. Who was the commander of that operation to attack Kono?

22 A. When I left the ground, I left Rambo there as the commander
23 for the ground. He was there as the commander. But actually
24 there were many vanguards and various commanders who went to take
12:21:43 25 part in that operation. But I can remember that I left Rambo
26 there as the commander. So had there been any other commander
27 who went as far as Makeni, I cannot tell. But he was the one
28 that I left there as commander.

29 Q. Was Issa Sesay involved in that attack on Kono in December

1 1998?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Did Morris Kallon play any part in the RUF attack on Kono
4 in December 1998?

12:22:21 5 A. Yes. I told you that it was an operation that every senior
6 man needed to take part in. But Rambo was there as the
7 commander. So Issa was a senior commander and he was second to
8 Sam Bockarie, but Rambo was the commander for that particular
9 mission.

12:22:44 10 Q. When the RUF succeeded in its attack on Kono, do you know
11 whether there was diamond mining taking place in Kono in December
12 1998?

13 A. 1998 December? Well, I was not there anyway, but I know
14 that there was mining going on there, though I was not there.

12:23:16 15 Q. How do you know diamond mining was taking place in Kono in
16 December 1998?

17 A. Yes. The reason is that I told you that Kono was very
18 strategic. The government of the day of Tejan Kabbah was
19 fighting to push us out of Kono so that they could mine. And the
12:23:42 20 RUF too, which depended on a self-reliant struggle, if they got
21 there, obviously they were going to mine. I was not there, I
22 told you that, but I knew they were mining.

23 Q. When you say you knew they were mining, are you saying you
24 knew the RUF was mining once it took over Kono in December 1998?

12:24:09 25 A. Yes, I can tell you that, yes. Because the RUF needed some
26 means of support and how would they get the support except they
27 mined?

28 Q. Were the diamonds that were being mined to be used to
29 purchase anything for the RUF?

1 A. No. I cannot give you any story on that because I was not
2 in charge of diamonds and the authority at the time, they did it
3 the way they wanted to do it, but I was not informed about how it
4 was spent.

12:24:47 5 Q. Yes, but you just said a few minutes ago - your answer was,
6 "Because the RUF needed some means of support and how would they
7 get the support except they mined?" What did you mean by mining
8 as a means of support for the RUF?

9 A. Yes, I stated that because it was a diamond area and we are
12:25:20 10 talking about rebel incursion and we had no means of getting
11 support from anywhere else and that was one of the means. And
12 all of these things were controlled by the authorities, like the
13 person who was in Kono at the time, at the time you are talking
14 about, was one Amara Peleto and one other vanguard. Amara Peleto
12:25:49 15 is a junior force and there was a vanguard too. They were in
16 charge of that. Whatever they did, it went to the commander.
17 All we were after was to see what they did, but I did not
18 actually know the ways they went through to do these things, that
19 is like collecting the diamonds.

12:26:16 20 Q. Are you saying that Amara Peleto was in charge of the RUF
21 diamond mining in Kono in December 1998?

22 A. December 1998 was a fighting time. I am talking about the
23 time Kono was captured. There was mining going on, and after
24 Kono was completely put under control then the forces advanced as
12:26:42 25 far as Makeni, because there will not be fighting and mining at
26 the same time. It's never possible.

27 Q. Yes, we appreciate the distinction, Mr Vincent. Can you
28 clarify for us, then, when exactly Kono was put under control, as
29 you say, so that it was possible to mine for diamonds? What

1 month and year was Kono under full control of the RUF?

2 A. I still continue to tell you that it was December 1999. I
3 mean, let me not say 1999. It's 1998.

12:27:26

4 Q. To your knowledge, was this attack in December 1998 the
5 first time that the RUF had attacked Kono during the period when
6 you were an RUF member?

12:27:59

7 A. Well, Kono had been attacked. At the time we were at
8 Kangari Hills when forces were taken from the various jungles and
9 wherein George Daniel, who was with us in the North Jungle, he
10 headed the group that left from our own point to go with other
11 people from Peyama, other people from Zogoda, and other people
12 from Kono.

12:28:21

13 Q. You referred to the time when you were at Kangari Hills as
14 being the time when George Daniel spearheaded an attack on Kono,
15 amongst others. What year was that, Mr Vincent?

12:28:48

16 A. Yes. I am not saying that he was spearheading. He headed
17 the group that left our own jungle. He headed the group that
18 left our own jungle to go on the Kono attack. And that year, if
19 I can recall, it could have been around 1994.

20 Q. Was that 1994 attack on Kono by the RUF successful?

21 A. No, the RUF did not stay there. They attacked and they
22 retreated.

23 Q. What was the purpose behind that attack of Kono by the RUF
24 in 1994?

12:29:18

25 A. It was to get a hold over Kono.

26 Q. Now, these two attacks on Kono we have been talking about,
27 the 1994 attack and the one in December 1998, do you know whether
28 the RUF high command received any instruction from Liberia to
29 carry out these attacks?

1 A. As far as I am concerned, the 1994 attack command came from
2 Sankoh himself. And then the 1998 December attack, command came
3 from Sam Bockarie.

12:30:08 4 Q. Did you hear anyone say that Charles Taylor ordered Sam
5 Bockarie to carry out the attacks on Kono in December 1998?

6 A. No, not to my knowledge, no.

7 Q. At the meeting at the Waterworks in 1998 that you talked
8 about previously, did you hear anyone there say that the
9 instruction to attack Kono came from Charles Taylor in Liberia?

12:30:41 10 A. No. And I will tell you if at all Sam Bockarie had got any
11 instruction from outside apart from his own, I believe he was
12 going to tell me. Because that was the time he wanted me to work
13 with him and he appointed him as the vanguard commander. I was
14 going to be informed. But I was not informed, and therefore I
12:31:00 15 don't think so.

16 Q. With respect to the attack on Kono in December 1998, are
17 you aware of the RUF receiving any arms or ammunition that was
18 used for that attack from Liberia?

19 A. No.

12:31:21 20 Q. Are you aware of Charles Taylor providing any of the arms
21 or ammunition that was used for that attack on Kono in December
22 1998?

23 A. No.

12:31:41 24 Q. Did you hear anyone say that supplies, as in arms or
25 ammunition for that attack, was secured or obtained from
26 Charles Taylor?

27 A. No.

28 Q. You said the attack on Kono succeeded and the RUF moved to
29 Masingbi, to Matotoka and then to Magburaka. Did they make it as

1 far as Makeni ?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And from Makeni where else did the RUF go, if you know?

4 A. Well, from Makeni - when Makeni was captured, the RUF based
12:32:28 5 in Makeni and there was no other operational plan. It was about
6 that time that I recall we heard about - it was about that time
7 that we heard about the leadership being free, something like
8 that - that is Mr Sankoh - and the RUF forces based in Kono, and
9 there was no other operational plans.

12:33:14 10 Q. What month and what year did the RUF capture and base in
11 Makeni ?

12 A. I am talking about - Makeni was captured around that
13 December 1998 to 1999, when the RUF was completely based in
14 Makeni .

12:33:46 15 Q. When the RUF was completely based in Makeni , do you know
16 where the person you referred to as SAJ Musa was at that time?

17 A. SAJ Musa - the time I told you that I was in Jojoima, so
18 really I think it was during that time that SAJ Musa decided to
19 launch his operation in Freetown. But I cannot actually give you
12:34:24 20 real story about SAJ Musa's movements, because I was not with him
21 and I did not understand anything about his movements.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Just remember to speak slowly.

23 A. Yes.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, the witness has referred to
12:34:40 25 being in Jojoima under a new assignment. Could he tell us what
26 that assignment was.

27 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President:

28 Q. Mr Vincent, what was your assignment in Jojoima?

29 A. Well, Jojoima was just a safety zone that had been captured

1 by the RUF, so, I mean, there was - at the time I looked at it to
2 be something like a punishment because I said I wanted to go to
3 Superman, so they just sent me there to sit there. That was all.
4 So I knew that they wouldn't have told me that --

12:35:20 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
6 to slow down.

7 MR ANYAH:

8 Q. Mr Vincent --

9 A. Yes, yes.

12:35:27 10 Q. -- Let's slow down a little bit. You were saying that you
11 were in Jojoiima and it resembled a punishment in relation to your
12 conversation with Superman. What else do you wish to tell us
13 about your assignment in Jojoiima?

14 A. Yes. I am saying that Jojoiima was a safety zone for the
12:35:53 15 RUF in Kailahun District at that time. So sending me there, I
16 looked at it to be something like a punishment because probably
17 the authority wouldn't have looked at me and say: Oh, we are
18 going to do this to you. So I think they just sent me there for
19 safekeeping or something like that. So I looked at it to be
12:36:17 20 something like a punishment because I had a conversation with
21 Superman at that time.

22 Q. You said it was during the time period when you were in
23 Jojoiima that SAJ Musa, in your words, decided to launch his
24 operation in Freetown. This is at page 74, lines 2 to 3 of the
12:36:39 25 LiveNote transcript. Mr Vincent, what do you mean by "launch his
26 operation in Freetown"?

27 A. Well, when I spoke about launch operation in Freetown, I
28 think it was about that time - it was around January 6, 1999,
29 when SAJ Musa launched his attack on Freetown after the RUF had

1 taken over Makeni. So probably he had wanted to be the one who
2 would go and sit in Freetown and declare himself as leader.

3 Q. To which group did SAJ Musa belong when he launched this
4 operation into Freetown?

12:37:35 5 A. SAJ Musa was controlling the SLA who broke away from us and
6 joined hands with the group that Superman had and went along with
7 him.

8 Q. The group that Superman had, was that group under the
9 command of Sam Bockarie or was it under the command of SAJ Musa?

12:38:02 10 A. The whole group that Superman went with, they were all at
11 that time taking command from SAJ Musa. And I told you that
12 Superman broke away, and it was for the sake of that breakaway
13 that I wanted to talk to him so that we would be able to run that
14 operation. So it was upon that that I was punished so that I
15 would not take part in those operations.

16 Q. The group that Superman broke away with that joined with
17 SAJ Musa, were they considered as of that January 1999 still a
18 part of the RUF?

19 A. No, no, they were not part of RUF. Because in that
12:38:53 20 meeting, I was told that Sam Bockarie had already declared the
21 area that SAJ Musa controlled as an enemy zone. So if anyone
22 from the RUF was in that particular zone, then you were also
23 considered to be part of that category, an enemy to the RUF.

24 Q. Did the group with SAJ Musa in fact invade or attack
12:39:21 25 Freetown on January 6, 1999?

26 A. Yes, they did.

27 Q. Were they successful in that attack, to your knowledge?

28 A. I was not there. But all that I know is that RUF was --

29 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could be the witness be

1 asked to repeat that last bit.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Repeat that last bit. You said all that
3 you know is that the RUF was what?

12:39:58

4 THE WITNESS: Was not part of that particular operation
5 that SAJ Musa carried out in Freetown.

6 MR ANYAH:

7 Q. Where was the RUF, to your knowledge, at the time SAJ Musa
8 carried out his operation in Freetown in January 1999?

9 A. The RUF was still occupying Makeni.

12:40:20

10 Q. Was the RUF heading towards Freetown from Makeni when
11 SAJ Musa was already in Freetown?

12 A. Yes. They made an attempt on the highway, but they did not
13 go through. If I am not mistaken, I think they stopped somewhere
14 around Masiaka, but they did not reach. They stopped at Masiaka

12:40:45

15 at the time they attacked two places in Freetown. That is what I
16 know and that is what I recall. I was not there, like I said.

17 At that time I was still in Jojoima.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Just remember to go slowly. Can I
19 ask you whether, during the time SAJ Musa was in Freetown, to

12:41:03

20 your knowledge there was communication between him and any member
21 of the RUF in Makeni?

22 A. No. And can I explain something further? Can I?

23 Q. Yes, go ahead, Mr Vincent.

24 A. No. The fellow, the fellow, there was one radio man with
25 the RUF who happened to be part of that group, the SAJ Musa

12:41:31

26 group. He attempted to communicate with the RUF authorities. He
27 was flogged and upon that he escaped. So there was no
28 communication link. The attempt that was made was discouraged by
29 the SAJ Musa group.

1 Q. What is the name of this radio man you have referred to?

2 A. That radio man would have been, if I am not mistaken - but
3 I take it to be something like King Perry.

4 Q. Mr Vincent, remember to speak up now and you may want to
12:42:19 5 sit up straight because it makes it --

6 A. Yes, I said.

7 Q. Thank you. You said King Perry. Was he a member of the
8 RUF before January 1999?

9 A. King Perry was member of the RUF, but he was one of those
12:42:44 10 who broke away along with Superman.

11 Q. You said he attempted to communicate with the RUF
12 authorities and he was flogged. Who flogged King Perry?

13 A. The SLA authorities at the time because they did not want
14 the RUF to get any information about their operation that was
12:43:12 15 going on in Freetown. And therefore, when he was caught trying
16 to communicate with the RUF, he was flogged and it was based on
17 that that he himself had to escape from them because he knew that
18 there was danger around for him and if he had made any other
19 attempt probably he would have been eliminated.

12:43:33 20 Q. Where was Sam Bockarie, to your knowledge, at the time of
21 the January 6, 1999, invasion of Freetown by SAJ Musa?

22 A. He was at Buedu.

23 Q. Whom, to your knowledge, was King Perry trying to
24 communicate with within the RUF?

12:43:57 25 A. At that time, Sam Bockarie was still in control of the RUF,
26 so he was trying to pass that information to Sam Bockarie, that
27 Freetown had been captured, this and that. So, I mean, other
28 people even framed it to be that it was the RUF that captured
29 Freetown. And the RUF was not even part of that operation.

1 Q. To whom do you refer when you say other people framed it to
2 look as if the RUF was part of the operation? Who are these
3 other people?

4 A. Some of the RUF authorities, because even me, I was in
12:44:49 5 Jojoiima, all I thought, I thought it was a joint operation that
6 the RUF, SAJ Musa and others had captured Freetown. But it was
7 only later that I got to know that RUF did not enter Freetown.
8 So we were all jubilating when that particular invasion took
9 place, but it was only later that we were convinced that they
12:45:16 10 were not part of it.

11 Q. Why, to your knowledge, were the RUF authorities trying to
12 make it appear that they had taken part in the Freetown invasion?

13 A. Well, everyone would have done the same and we were
14 fighting for a goal. If one person went and accomplished a
12:45:47 15 mission, and at that time we were thinking that we would all come
16 together and work as one body and the main area that we were
17 fighting for, one person had already taken that place, so we
18 thought it was one and only one - it was one, something that
19 happened that we all did together, but it did not work out that
12:46:08 20 way.

21 Q. To your knowledge, did the RUF collaborate or assist in any
22 way the SLAs when SAJ Musa invaded Freetown?

23 A. No. Except for those who were with Superman and I told you
24 that as long as they were with Superman, and the area where
12:46:34 25 Superman was with SAJ Musa had been declared as an enemy zone by
26 Sam Bockarie, they were not considered part of the RUF, because
27 they had already been declared as enemies as long as they were in
28 that zone.

29 Q. A few minutes ago when we began speaking about Freetown and

1 SAJ Musa, you mentioned something about the release or freeing of
2 "the leader". Who were you referring to when you made those
3 remarks?

4 A. Well, I was talking about Corporal Sankoh.

12:47:22 5 Q. And what, if you know, were the circumstances surrounding
6 this release that you speak of?

7 A. Well, that was - repeat the question, please. I am out of
8 track.

9 Q. Yes. How did it come to be that there was news about the
12:47:53 10 possible release of Corporal Sankoh?

11 A. Well, Sankoh's release, we knew that Sankoh was arrested
12 and he was in jail in Nigeria and there came a time when he came
13 to us in Buedu and that was where we met him.

14 Q. In what year and what month did Sankoh come to you and
12:48:36 15 others in Buedu?

16 A. That could be around 1999, August.

17 Q. What was your assignment in 1999, around this time in
18 August?

19 A. At that time I was still at Jojoima. I was still at
12:49:12 20 Jojoima.

21 Q. What was the purpose behind Mr Sankoh's trip to Buedu?

22 A. The reason was that he went to Buedu and he called the RUF
23 authorities that he had left on the ground, including Sam
24 Bockarie, and he said that the Lome Peace Accord that was now
12:49:53 25 going on had been carried out, therefore it was now time for
26 peace and he said all of us should put arms down and join him and
27 together with our brothers, according to him, he said so that we
28 would be able to get peace and so that we could stop the masses
29 from their sufferings in Sierra Leone.

1 Q. You referred to the Lome Peace Accord. What was your
2 understanding of this Lome Peace Accord?

3 A. The Lome Peace Accord was established --

12:50:39

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
5 to repeat that last bit.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Repeat that last bit. Repeat your
7 answer.

8 THE WITNESS: I am saying that the Lome Peace Accord was to
9 bring peace to Sierra Leone.

12:50:51

10 MR ANYAH:

11 Q. And do you know where that accord was signed?

12 A. I have no idea about that.

13 Q. Do you know whether the RUF was a part of that accord?

12:51:21

14 A. Yes, the RUF was part of the accord because some personnel
15 of the RUF travelled out of Sierra Leone to go for that peace
16 accord.

17 Q. Was that accord approved and authorised by Corporal Sankoh?

18 A. Yes.

12:51:43

19 Q. Did everyone in the RUF high command, to your knowledge,
20 approve of the Lome Peace Accord?

21 A. Yes, I can say, but later there was a breakout of
22 misunderstanding in that when Mr Sankoh was in Freetown, he came
23 to Buedu and he talked to us. And he started taking men from
24 Kailahun District and taking them to Freetown unarmed. People
12:52:24 25 went with him without arms. So it was based on that that some of
26 us, which included myself here, I started getting panic. I was
27 in fear being that we were fighting and now that our leader has
28 been called to town, he will now come to us, take people with him
29 without arms, so my fear was that anything dangerous could take

1 place, that we will lost our lives and we will not be able to
2 defend ourselves.

3 So it was based on that, as a vanguard commander, I called
4 a forum that I chaired with many other vanguards present,

12:53:20 5 including Sam Bockarie, wherein I said now this is the situation.

6 But within me, I suggested that Mr Sankoh should establish his
7 headquarters here in Kailahun or Kono. That whenever he was
8 called upon, at least we can give him escort of armed men for his
9 own protection. It was there that people misinterpreted my

12:53:59 10 statement and it became a problem wherein the commander in charge

11 at that time, Sam Bockarie, too, started carrying out some
12 misbehaviours, which I did not intend. He decided to disobey the
13 leadership and they refused to carry out the disarmament. So
14 that was the time there was a problem in there. Yes, sir.

12:54:39 15 Q. Let us consider some of what you have just said. Let's
16 start from the beginning. Mr Sankoh was in Freetown, you tell
17 us, and he came to Buedu. This trip to Buedu, is it the same
18 trip you spoke about previously that took place in August 1999?

19 A. Yes, that's the trip I am talking about.

12:55:04 20 Q. When he came to Buedu in August 1999, you said there was a
21 meeting held, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Were you present at that meeting?

24 A. I was not present at the meeting. At that time I was still
12:55:23 25 at my assignment area. But after the meeting, when I heard what
26 was discussed, that some men were being listed to go to town,
27 that was when I called, - yes, yes, sir.

28 Q. Let's just take it bit by bit. You were not there but you
29 heard what happened in the meeting, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You heard that some men were being taken from Kailahun
3 District back to Freetown by Foday Sankoh?

4 A. Yes.

12:55:58 5 Q. Just listen to the question. Just take it easy. These men
6 that were taken to Freetown by Foday Sankoh, were they members of
7 the RUF?

8 A. They were all members of the RUF and fighters. But my
9 concern here was that these people went without arms.

12:56:21 10 Q. Thank you for that observation. Now, when Sankoh took
11 these RUF members unarmed to Freetown, was Sankoh a part of the
12 Sierra Leonean government or some other group at that time?

13 A. Pa Sankoh was still the RUF.

14 Q. And why were you concerned that these men were unarmed?

12:56:52 15 A. Well, you know, I am a trained guerilla, so at times I
16 think ahead of time. When that happened, I felt the danger to
17 which the men he carried with him were exposed, and he himself
18 was not going to be protected, because we were there with him and
19 we knew nobody else but him. So it was based on that I called
12:57:30 20 Sam Bockarie and arranged this forum with him to arrange for a
21 forum to be held with other vanguards in Kailahun, and I chaired
22 that forum.

23 Q. Was Sam Bockarie in attendance at the forum you held in
24 Kailahun?

12:57:52 25 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie was there; Jonathan Kposowa was there;
26 Junior Robertson was there; some vanguards. I cannot name all of
27 them, but I will name just a few. They were present at that
28 particular forum.

29 Q. And what did you discuss at that forum?

1 A. My point here was that Corporal Sankoh is our leader. We
2 are not disobeying him. He has already carried with him a first
3 batch of men in Freetown, and I believed that their lives were at
4 risk because they were not armed and that anything could happen,
12:58:45 5 that he himself would be in danger, including the men that he
6 took with him. And therefore I suggested to Sam Bockarie to have
7 him informed and to discuss with him that we should establish a
8 headquarters for him, for Corporal Foday Sankoh, in Kailahun or
9 in Kono and to have his base there. And even though there was
12:59:15 10 going to be an RUF base in Freetown where I would have men, and
11 that anytime we would need him, we will give him escort to go
12 there. But people went and misinterpreted it.

13 Q. Mr Vincent, how were your statements misinterpreted and to
14 whom were they misinterpreted?

12:59:41 15 A. The statement was misinterpreted to Corporal Sankoh in the
16 sense that Sam Bockarie had called a group of vanguards together
17 and his collaborators, and therefore they had planned to
18 overthrow the leadership of the RUF. So it was in there also
19 that Sam Bockarie got that information and he started disobeying
13:00:16 20 the leadership, and that was, of course, not what I intended and
21 it was based on --

22 Q. You said Sam Bockarie, upon learning about the spread of
23 this misinformation, started disobeying the leadership. Can I
24 ask you, was there any consequence to you or Sam Bockarie on
13:00:41 25 account of this forum that the two of you participated in?

26 A. Say that again?

27 Q. Yes. You yourself, did you suffer any consequence or
28 penalty for having participated in this forum in Kailahun?

29 A. Yes. Yes.

1 Q. What consequence did you suffer, if any?

2 A. When Sam Bockarie disobeyed the Leadership, Corporal Sankoh
3 ordered his arrest and his collaborators. That was the order.

4 At that time I had left Jojoiima and gone to Pendembu. To my

13:01:47 5 surprise, an order was given to Issa, Morrison Kallon, Momo

6 Rogers, to come and arrest Sam Bockarie together with his

7 collaborators. Then Sam Bockarie and Joseph Brown met me, and

8 they told me that the meeting we had had been misunderstood by

9 the people. They had ordered our arrest; therefore, we had to

13:02:30 10 find amends and the things are settled, otherwise they would

11 either kill us or do us something else. I refused and I said I

12 did not mean any harm. I was only speaking for the protection of

13 the Leadership and those of our brothers who would be taken to

14 town in case of any danger so that they would be on the safe

13:02:55 15 side.

16 Q. Let's pause there for a minute. You said an order was

17 given to Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Momo Rogers to arrest --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- to arrest Sam Bockarie and his collaborators. Who gave

13:03:13 20 that order?

21 A. It was Mr Foday Sankoh.

22 Q. You said Sam Bockarie and Joseph Brown met you. The Joseph

23 Brown you referred to there, is that the same Joseph Brown you

24 spoke of earlier today as having trained with you at Crab Hole?

13:03:31 25 A. Yes, he is the Joseph Brown.

26 Q. Was anyone arrested as a consequence of this order given by

27 Corporal Sankoh?

28 A. Yes. I was arrested, Isaac Galamah.

29 Q. Can you spell the last name, if you know how?

1 A. Galamah is G-A-L-A-M-A-H.

2 Q. Who was Isaac Galamah?

3 A. Isaac Galamah was a vanguard.

4 Q. Besides you and Isaac Galamah, who else, if anyone, was
13:04:17 5 arrested?

6 A. Big Daddy. Big Daddy, that is, Melvin Kerkula, was also
7 arrested.

8 Q. Did you say "Big Daddy" or did you say "Big Darling"?

9 A. Big Darling. D-A-R-L-I-N-G, Darling.

13:04:46 10 Q. Besides you, Galamah and Kerkula, who else was arrested, if
11 anyone?

12 A. Other junior forces were also arrested. The number of us
13 that were arrested were up to about 18.

14 Q. What happened to you after you were arrested?

13:05:12 15 A. I was taken to Kono and put in prison for a month. The
16 whole group, not just me. The entire 18, including me, we were
17 put in jail for a month in Kono.

18 Q. Mr Vincent, you said you were in jail for a month in Kono.
19 Was Sam Bockarie also arrested as a consequence of Foday Sankoh's
13:06:25 20 order?

21 A. Sam Bockarie was not arrested. Sam Bockarie went into
22 exile in Liberia.

23 Q. When did he go into exile in Liberia? What month and what
24 year, if you know?

13:06:48 25 A. It was in 1999 around that same time that we were arrested.
26 We were arrested around October, November, around that time.

27 Q. And when you say he went into exile, do you know how he in
28 fact went into Liberia? Under what circumstances did he go into
29 Liberia?

1 A. The circumstances that I know about was that when Sam
2 Bockarie escaped and went into exile in Liberia, Mr Taylor
3 intervened because he wanted peace. He took him to Monrovia so
4 that he will call Corporal Foday Sankoh in order for them to make
13:07:47 5 peace.

6 Q. Mr Taylor at that time was President of Liberia, yes?

7 A. Yes, yes, yes.

8 Q. Do you know how it came to be that he became involved with
9 the RUF at that time?

13:08:07 10 A. I mean, this was something any leader could do. Somebody
11 escaping and going into exile, you will know that there is a
12 problem. So I believed that he was doing it out of sympathy so
13 that he will bring peace. Because we had already gone far, and
14 he didn't want us to be divided. So he wanted to bring peace in
13:08:32 15 the RUF.

16 Q. When you say you had already gone far, what are you
17 referring to?

18 A. Gone far in the sense that we had fought, Corporal Sankoh
19 was in jail, now he has been released. It was now time for us to
13:08:52 20 come together and go according to the peace accord so that we
21 will bring peace for everybody to be satisfied; not one group
22 dissatisfied and the other one, you know, having bad feeling for
23 the other group.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Again, remember to go slowly. You
13:09:10 25 mentioned the peace accord again. To your knowledge, were other
26 West African countries involved in securing that peace accord in
27 Lome?

28 A. I understood, but I do not understand much. But I
29 understood about Obasanjo and Doctor --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat the
2 name of the doctor.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, pause. You spoke of
4 Mr Obasanjo and doctor who?

13:09:49 5 THE WITNESS: Sebo. One Sebo. Dr Sebo.

6 Q. And can you spell "Sebo" for us?

7 A. Well, I don't know if my spelling is right. I don't know
8 if it could be S-E-B-O or something like that.

9 Q. And do you know from which country that person hales?

13:10:16 10 A. No, no.

11 Q. Do you know that person to have had any relationship with
12 Foday Sankoh?

13 A. I don't know, but I believe that these people were - they
14 were people who wanted peace to come to Sierra Leone, so they had
15 to intervene, you know, to bring peace. I did not know whether
16 they had any other relationship with Corporal Sankoh.

13:10:36 17 Q. Did that Dr Sebo, to your knowledge, at any time give Foday
18 Sankoh a satellite phone?

19 A. Yes.

13:10:59 20 Q. What can you tell us about that?

21 A. I heard of it and I did not know how it happened. I heard
22 of it.

23 Q. What exactly did you hear?

24 A. That Dr Sebo had given a satellite phone to Corporal
25 Sankoh, but there is no other story that I can really elaborate
26 on.

13:11:23 27 Q. Do you know where Corporal Sankoh was when he was given
28 that satellite phone?

29 A. I understand that he was in Ivory Coast.

1 Q. And do you know what year that was when he was in the Ivory
2 Coast?

3 A. No.

4 Q. You said Sam Bockarie escaped to Liberia. Who was in
13:11:59 5 charge of the RUF after Sam Bockarie escaped?

6 A. When Sam Bockarie escaped from the RUF, Issa automatically
7 took charge of the RUF. Issa Sesay.

8 Q. Where was Corporal Sankoh at the time you say Issa Sesay
9 took over the command of the RUF?

13:12:35 10 A. At that time Corporal Sankoh was in Freetown.

11 Q. Was he free or was he in custody somewhere at that time?

12 A. No. He was free at that time. He was free at that time.

13 Q. When Issa Sesay took over the command of the RUF, what was
14 your assignment, if any?

13:13:04 15 A. When he took over the assignment of the RUF, I was under
16 arrest at the time. I was under arrest.

17 Q. Were you eventually released from custody?

18 A. I was released after one month.

19 Q. And how were you released?

13:13:28 20 A. I was released when Corporal Sankoh and some UN or ECOMOG
21 forces went to Kono and had called for Mosquito's collaborators.
22 I was brought outside, because everybody there, I was the most
23 senior man among them. We stood there. Issa stood there and the
24 other people. He explained to them and said, "Look, I won't
13:14:05 25 blame these people. Like this man here, I know him." He said
26 that in a Krio language. He said, "I am" --

27 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat his
28 answer on this part.

29 Q. Just slow down a bit. You were saying that Mr Sankoh

1 explained something in the Krio language. Can you first say it
2 slowly in Krio and then translate for us its meaning in English.
3 Just speak slowly. What did he say in Krio?

13:14:46 4 A. When he got there, they put us outside from the prison and
5 all of us lined up, 18 of us. Everybody's attention was focused
6 on me. And he looked at me and he said in the Krio language,
7 [Krio spoken]. So he was trying to say that he knows me. I did
8 not have anybody there. He is my mother, he is my father, so let
9 us leave him. So as I was released, the other people were
13:15:26 10 released on that same day.

11 Q. Were you still a member of the RUF after your release?

12 A. Yes, they released me from detention and I still remained
13 an RUF member. But at that time, my position as RUF commander, I
14 lost - a vanguard commander, I lost it and my position was given
13:15:53 15 to another vanguard, whose name I cannot recall, but I can
16 remember his code name, Lion. That position was given to him.
17 And then --

18 Q. Just slow down a bit. Your position as a vanguard
19 commander was given to somebody named Lion. Is that what you are
13:16:12 20 telling us?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And then what happened after Lion was given your position?

23 A. I was taken to Makeni by Morrison Kallon. And when I got
24 to Makeni, Issa came back to me and said that this was a
13:16:37 25 revolution, it could happen to anybody, so we should all work
26 together as one. And I told him that I had no problem. And in
27 Makeni, I was given this book "Footpath to Democracy" to teach
28 those who had just joined the RUF in the northern area, most
29 especially the civilians, to teach them part of the ideology of

1 the RUF from the book, "Footpath to Democracy". That was what I
2 was doing.

3 Q. What year, what month, were you in Makeni teaching ideology
4 and using the book "Footpath to Democracy"?

13:17:37 5 A. I am talking about November, going to December 1999.

6 Q. To your knowledge, who wrote that book, "Footpath to
7 Democracy"?

8 A. That book, the author of the book is Foday Saybana Sankoh,
9 but actually the person who wrote that book was this man whom
10 I've called Mike Lamin, but it was only that the author was Foday
11 Saybana Sankoh.

12 Q. Is this the same Mike Lamin who taught you ideology at Crab
13 Hole?

14 A. Yes. He was very good at that.

13:18:36 15 Q. How long did you remain in Makeni teaching ideology?

16 A. I stayed in Makeni teaching ideology until the ceasefire
17 was broken by Morrison Kallon and Augustine Gbao in Magburaka.

18 Q. And when was that ceasefire broken?

19 A. The ceasefire was broken around that 1999 ending and 2000.
13:19:12 20 I cannot really recall the actual time, but it could be around
21 that time.

22 Q. When did the ceasefire start? If it was broken at the end
23 of 1999 into 2000, when did it start, to your knowledge?

24 A. The ceasefire started right after January 6 - after the
13:19:42 25 January 6 invasion, when SAJ Musa, I don't know if he died or
26 what, around that time, it was around that time that the
27 ceasefire started and we were on it while Corporal Sankoh went
28 and met us in Kailahun until my arrest and brought to jail and
29 released.

1 Q. When you say Morris Kallon, or the person you call Morrison
2 Kallon, broke the ceasefire, where did you go to from Makeni?

3 A. When the ceasefire was broken, at that time I was teaching.
4 It stopped because I had nobody to talk with. They took me again
13:20:33 5 and sent me to Masiaka to go and fight for their own disturbance.
6 They had disturbed and they wanted me to go and fight.

7 Q. Who had disturbed?

8 A. Morrison Kallon and Augustine Gbao.

9 Q. And when you went to Masiaka, what assignment did you take
13:20:58 10 up?

11 A. I was there as a fighter. Not even a commander, but a
12 fighter.

13 Q. How long did you stay at Masiaka?

14 A. I stayed in Masiaka until later when Mr Foday Sankoh was
13:21:24 15 again arrested, until he again died in jail. He was not ever
16 released.

17 Q. What year was Foday Sankoh again arrested?

18 A. It was in 2000 when the ceasefire was broken. You know,
19 people understood that he had passed on the instruction to --

13:21:57 20 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat his
21 answer slowly.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause, Mr Vincent. Please repeat your
23 answer. The interpreter didn't get you.

24 THE WITNESS: I am saying that he was arrested around the
13:22:19 25 ending part of 1999, 2000. I cannot recall the correct month,
26 but the understanding that probably caused his arrest was that
27 they would have been led to believe that he had passed
28 instruction to his men in Makeni to break the ceasefire.

29 MR ANYAH:

1 Q. Where did you go from Masiaka upon the arrest of Foday
2 Sankoh in 2000?

3 A. From Masiaka, I went back to Makeni. From Makeni, Issa and
4 others reorganised us and brought me back to Kono. From Kono, I
13:23:19 5 was taken back to Koindu at the border, the border between
6 Liberia and Sierra Leone.

7 Q. Were you an ordinary fighter at the time you were taken
8 back to the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone?

9 A. Yes. At that time I had no command because they said I was
13:23:44 10 a collaborator, so every command was taken away from me. I was
11 just an ordinary fighter.

12 Q. What relationship did you have at that period of time with
13 Issa Sesay who was in charge of the RUF?

14 A. Well, Issa Sesay, when he was in charge of the RUF, our
13:24:12 15 relationship was not that cordial, you know. I was almost like
16 his enemy. I only give thanks to the Almighty God that all the
17 plans that he had for me did not work because he always used to
18 instruct people that when we are at the front line they should
19 fire at my back and these same young men would go and meet other
13:24:39 20 commanders and tell them and say, "Look, this man is the man that
21 trained us. We will not see that happen. So we want him to stay
22 at the rear." That was how I was saved.

23 Q. When you say all the plans Issa Sesay had for you did not
24 work, what plans are you referring to?

13:25:03 25 A. He had wanted me to die at the front line. He had told
26 people to shoot at me at the back whilst we were fighting and the
27 people with whom we were fighting were my trainees, so they
28 couldn't have looked at me and done that to me. So they would
29 tell their commander in charge that, "This man was the man that

1 trained us, we will not see that happen. We would want you to
2 keep him at the back." That was how I was saved.

13:25:41 3 Q. In late 2000, when you went back to Koindu to the border
4 area between Liberia and Sierra Leone, did you undertake any
5 operations on behalf of the RUF?

6 A. Yes. The operation under the RUF, as I have already told
7 you that I was not a commander, it was Matthew Barbue who was the
8 commander and when we went to Koindu, from Issa Sesay's
9 instruction, that there was an operational plan by the Kamajors
13:26:19 10 together with the LURD forces in Guinea to come and attack both
11 Sierra Leone and Liberia from the rear. So he designed a
12 strategy that we too should sabotage their operations. That was
13 how I was taken to Koindu along with the commander in charge of
14 that operation, Matthew Barbue.

13:26:49 15 Q. Let's pause, Mr Vincent, and consider what you have just
16 said. Matthew Barbue, this person you referred to, is it the
17 same Matthew Barbue you spoke of as having been trained as
18 Crab Hole with you?

19 A. Yes, yes.

13:27:07 20 Q. What is Matthew Barbue's nationality?

21 A. Matthew is a Liberian.

22 Q. You referred to the Kamajors as having an operational plan.
23 Who were the Kamajors?

24 A. The Kamajors were the single-barrel group that was
13:27:32 25 organised in Sierra Leone to fight against the People's Army at
26 the time that the AFRC and the RUF joined. But because they did
27 not accomplish their mission at that time, they designed a
28 strategy to start attacking us through the Koindu border. And
29 this operational plan was between them and the LURD forces who

1 were also planning to attack Liberia.

2 Q. Let's pause there. You have mentioned that single barrel
3 again. You referred to the Kamajors as a single-barrel group.
4 Is a single barrel the same thing as a shotgun?

13:28:17 5 A. Yes, because I do not understand Mende. In Mende, when
6 they talk about Kamajors, they are talking a single-barrel group.
7 I do not understand Mende, but I think that is what Kamajor
8 means, a single-barrel group.

9 Q. My question was whether a single barrel is the same as a
13:28:39 10 shotgun.

11 A. Yes. A common gun that local hunters use to kill animals.

12 Q. You mentioned LURD forces fighting in Guinea. Who are
13 these people you referred to as LURD?

14 A. The LURD forces were a group that was organised in Guinea
13:29:18 15 to overthrow the NPP government at the time. And when they met
16 there, the Kamajors too had their own operational plan, so they
17 joined hands. They had wanted to work together so that when they
18 hit and enter, wherever they would entered, they would divide
19 that group. While one group is coming towards Sierra Leone, the
13:29:41 20 other group will be going towards Liberia.

21 Q. You said that the LURD forces were a group that was
22 organised in Guinea to overthrow the NPP government. The NPP
23 government was in which country at that time?

24 A. The NPP government was in Liberia.

13:30:04 25 Q. Just pause. The NPP government was in Liberia. What does
26 NPP stand for?

27 A. It was National Patriotic Party.

28 Q. Who was head of the NPP government in Liberia?

29 A. Well, it was nobody else but Mr Taylor.

1 Q. These LURD forces, do you know what their ethnic or
2 national makeup was? Were they Liberians? Were they Sierra
3 Leoneans? Who were they?

13:30:53 4 A. Well, the LURD forces, they claimed to be Liberians, but
5 majority of them, we found out that they were Mandingos, Mendes
6 and other tribes were also with them. But majority of them were
7 of the Mandingo tribe.

8 Q. You said the Kamajors too had their own operational plan.
9 What was the focus or target of the Kamajors' operational plan?

13:31:19 10 A. The Kamajors' plan was to get rid of the RUF. But being
11 that they were facing us at the front line and could not succeed
12 by all means, their strategy was to also get support from
13 wherever they could and this was how they joined hands with the
14 LURD forces so that they would work together simultaneously.

13:31:56 15 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Mr Vincent. Thank you,
16 Madam President.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's time to have the luncheon break. We
18 will reconvene at 2.30.

19 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

14:23:44 20 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Anyah, please
22 proceed.

23 MR ANYAH: Madam President, one housekeeping matter. I
24 omitted to indicate during the 11.30 break that Courtenay
14:31:26 25 Griffiths had left the Defence side of the Bar and as of
26 1.30 p.m. Mr Munyard is no longer with us, and we've been joined
27 by Mr Silas Chekera.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: So noted.

29 MR ANYAH: Thank you:

1 Q. Mr Vincent, good afternoon.

2 A. Good afternoon.

3 Q. Before the Luncheon adjournment we were speaking about the
4 Kamajors and an operational plan the Kamajors had with LURD

14:31:59 5 forces. Do you recall that?

6 A. Yes, I remember.

7 Q. You told us that the LURD forces wanted to overthrow the
8 NPP government of Charles Taylor and the Kamajors' plan was to
9 get rid of the RUF. Do you remember telling us that before

14:32:20 10 lunch?

11 A. Yes, I remember that very well.

12 Q. Let us continue this discussion about this operational
13 plan. At my page 98 of the LiveNote at line 18 through line 19
14 you said that they had wanted to work together, and at line 20

14:32:46 15 you said, "While one group is coming to Sierra Leone, the other
16 group will be going towards Liberia." Which groups are you
17 referring to when you said that?

18 A. Yes, when I spoke in terms of groups I was referring to the
19 Kamajors, a group that was set up to dislodge the RUF forces.

14:33:18 20 The LURD forces were a group set up to fight against the NPP
21 government, so these groups came together to fight.

22 Q. Where were these forces when they came together; that is,
23 in which country where they?

24 A. According to the information that Issa gave us, according
14:33:57 25 to the security information, he said this was an operational plan
26 that we, the RUF, had to encounter. We had to find means to stop
27 this operation by not allowing them to launch this operation. We
28 were therefore to go on the offensive along - we were therefore
29 to go on the defensive so that they wouldn't come into any of the

1 territories that were under our control.

2 Q. Where were you to go on the offensive at? What location
3 were you to go towards?

4 A. We were not to go on the offensive until these groups, the
14:34:56 5 Kamajors, first attack. We were to defend our border line. We
6 were then taken to Koindu, as I said.

7 Q. Incidentally, when you were giving your response a few
8 minutes ago did you mention a place called Ganta?

9 A. Ganta? Ganta is way behind Gbarnga going towards Nimba
14:35:33 10 County in Liberia.

11 Q. Fair enough. I thought I heard something to that effect,
12 and that's why I asked the question. Now --

13 A. No, no.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. You said you were to wait until the
14:35:48 15 Kamajors actually attacked. Where were the Kamajors supposed to
16 attack from?

17 A. The Kamajors were organised together with the LURD forces,
18 and they were occupying the border line of Guinea to come on the
19 offensive any time that they were ready. And the area they were
14:36:16 20 occupying was Nongowa and Gueckedou.

21 Q. I think Nongowa is on the record, if I'm not mistaken, and
22 Gueckedou certainly is in the record. In which country is
23 Nongowa, Mr Vincent?

24 A. Nongowa is the border town with Sierra Leone from Guinea,
14:36:46 25 also with Liberia, because that's a common border. The three
26 countries are sharing a common border in the same area.

27 Q. And in which country is Gueckedou?

28 A. Gueckedou is also in Guinea. It's a border. It borders
29 Liberia.

1 Q. When you say that they were occupying Nongowa and
2 Gueckedou, besides the Kamajors, where were the LURD forces
3 occupying?

14:37:28 4 A. These forces were combined forces. They were working as
5 one. That was the information that Issa passed on to us at that
6 time, that these people were working as one group and that they
7 were to launch their offensive at the same time.

8 Q. Which of those two groups was to launch an offensive into
9 Sierra Leone, if you know?

14:37:57 10 A. The Kamajors were the ones set to launch an offensive into
11 Sierra Leone against RUF-occupied territories.

12 Q. And to which country were the LURD forces to launch their
13 own offensive?

14 A. The LURD forces were to launch their own offensive into
14:38:25 15 Liberia and that was the second operational plan that they had
16 before Issa Sesay told us that we should immediately move towards
17 Koindu in a bid to defend our border.

18 Q. Did the Kamajors in fact attack Sierra Leone when you were
19 at the border at Koindu?

14:38:52 20 A. They did not attack the border. We went to fortify the
21 border and that was where we were.

22 Q. While you were at the border in Koindu, did you encounter
23 any fighting with Kamajors?

24 A. Yes, we encountered fighting with them. When we got to the
14:39:24 25 border, whilst we were occupying our positions, we were with the
26 forces of the NPP government. We almost attacked each other.
27 But as God could have it, there were some commanders or some
28 people among both groups, that is, the RUF and the NPP, who were
29 able to recognise each other. That stopped the attack against

1 each other. So we walked on the field.

2 Q. Mr Vincent, you said you encountered fighting with them and
3 that while you were occupying your positions at the border you
4 were with forces of the NPP government. Are you saying that RUF
14:40:27 5 forces found themselves at the border with forces of the NPP
6 government?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did this occur in December or thereabouts in the year 2000?

9 A. Yes, around that time.

14:40:51 10 Q. The forces of the NPP government you refer to, is that the
11 same as Armed Forces of Liberia?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Was there a commander, to your knowledge, of those group of
14 fighters?

14:41:09 15 A. The commanders - the commander that I met with them was one
16 Kwame [phon] - I don't know - Joe Kwame or something like that.
17 I met him there.

18 Q. And you told us previously that Matthew Barbue commanded
19 the RUF forces on this operation.

14:41:37 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Who was Matthew Barbue's deputy commander for this
22 operation?

23 A. Matthew Barbue's deputy commander - Matthew Barbue was
24 commander. I was on the operation, but I have forgotten his
14:42:03 25 deputy commander, but he was a junior commando, a junior commando
26 who we trained.

27 Q. When you encountered these Armed Forces of Liberian
28 soldiers, were they in Sierra Leonean territory or where they in
29 Liberian territory?

1 A. When we encountered these AFL soldiers, they were occupying
2 their border area and we were occupying our own border area. But
3 the entire area, that border area, was something like traces
4 coming in, like Liberia going into Sierra Leone and Sierra Leone
14:42:44 5 coming into Liberia. That was how the border area was. So
6 whilst we were trying to deploy, we took them to be Kamajors
7 coming and they took us to be LURD forces. We almost attacked
8 one another. But as I said, as God could have it, some soldiers
9 of the NPP and some members of the RUF, the vanguards, were able
14:43:09 10 to recognise one another. That was how we avoided fighting one
11 another - against one another. On the field, we worked together
12 to defend our territories.

13 Q. When you say you worked together, are you saying the RUF
14 worked together with the AFL?

14:43:34 15 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, the witness is saying NPP and I
16 think counsel is re-characterising it.

17 MR ANYAH: I respect that, but it is also the case that he
18 has said AFL soldiers. If you look at page 105 of the LiveNote
19 transcript, at my line 4, the witness said, "When we encountered
14:43:54 20 these AFL soldiers."

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, I think you should clarify from
22 the witness, was it AFL or NPP soldiers, or are they
23 simultaneously - are they synonymously the same?

24 MR ANYAH: That's fair enough. I will do that:

14:44:11 25 Q. Mr Vincent, you've heard the confusion that we are now
26 faced with. These soldiers the RUF encountered at the border
27 between Sierra Leone and Liberia in December 2000, what name do
28 they go by?

29 A. They were AFL. Sorry for the inconvenience. I only called

1 them NPP because that was the government that was in charge at
2 the time and they were soldiers of the AFL that were assigned to
3 the government. I am only calling the name because they were
4 serving with that government, but it was AFL.

14:44:52 5 Q. Now, my question was: When you say you worked together,
6 are you saying that the RUF worked together with the AFL?

7 A. Yes, on the field.

8 Q. The purpose of working together at that particular occasion
9 was what?

14:45:17 10 A. The purpose of working together was that we saw the
11 manpower and we knew, in fighting, when manpower are together,
12 you would have advantage over the enemy, so we were all there to
13 defend each other's border. So we were happy to work together.
14 That was how we ran the operation across on that side to Guinea.

14:45:46 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, what does the witness mean by
16 we worked together on the field? What field?

17 MR ANYAH:

18 Q. Mr Vincent, can you help us?

19 A. Yes, I can help. When I said work together here, it meant
14:46:09 20 that the commander whom we went with, Matthew Barbue, is a
21 Liberian, okay. Then the commander we met on that side is - was
22 a Liberian. We were defending the border of Sierra Leone and Joe
23 Kwame was also defending the Liberian border. Meeting together
24 those two commanders were of the same nationality. Though we
14:46:38 25 shared the same operational plan, they decided that we should
26 work together to accomplish our aim. That was on the field. Any
27 way possible that we could have worked together to get our aims
28 accomplished.

29 Q. When you use the word "field", Mr Vincent, are you

1 referring to the border area between Liberia and Sierra Leone?

2 A. The border area between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

3 That was the field. That was the front line.

4 Q. And when you say "work together", was it working together
14:47:26 5 to fight somebody?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Actually, I'd rather the witness told us
7 what he meant by works together. That's why I asked.

8 Mr Witness, what do you mean "we worked together"? How did you
9 work together?

10 THE WITNESS: We worked together in a sense that the
11 Liberian AFL forces and the RUF forces, all of us sat together
12 and made operational plans of how we were to defend ourselves to
13 engage these common enemies of ours. That was what I meant by
14 working together. The two commanders, Matthew Barbue and Joe
14:48:16 15 Kwame, sat down and made this plan just like I have explained to
16 you.

17 MR ANYAH: Madam President, just an observation about the
18 record. At page 105 of the LiveNote, between lines 5 and 7,
19 there is a sentence there referring to an answer given by the
14:48:37 20 witness where it reads, "We were occupying our own border area,
21 but the entire area, that border area, was something like traces
22 coming in." I heard the witness saying it was twisting or
23 something to that effect. Not traces. But we could clarify from
24 the witness what he said.

14:49:00 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Frankly, he said something that I didn't
26 understand. I thought he said traces. I don't know what traces
27 are, but please clarify.

28 MR ANYAH:

29 Q. Mr Vincent, when you were trying to describe how the

1 Liberia-Sierra Leone border was during that period of time,
2 December 2000, what were you saying to us about how it was?

3 A. What I am trying to say here is that the border area around
4 the Sierra Leone-Liberian border, there were areas where in some
14:49:39 5 part of Liberia comes into Sierra Leone and some part of Sierra
6 Leone goes into Liberia. That was what I meant. So you can even
7 be in Liberia and you would not know that you were in Liberia in
8 Sierra Leone and you would be in Sierra Leone and you would not
9 know that you are Sierra Leone from Liberia.

14:49:58 10 Q. Mr Vincent, before you, Matthew Barbue and others went to
11 that border area and saw these AFL soldiers, did Issa Sesay tell
12 you as you were given this assignment that you would be
13 encountering AFL soldiers at the border?

14 A. Issa Sesay never told us that we were going to meet AFL
14:50:29 15 soldiers at the border. But we ourselves knew that the Liberian
16 border would also be fortified, so we too wanted to fortify the
17 Sierra Leonean border. He did not tell us, but our commonsense
18 told us that.

19 Q. You knew the Liberian border would be fortified. Fortified
14:50:55 20 by whom?

21 A. By the AFL forces.

22 Q. Was there any fighting at that border area between any of
23 the forces that were present there in December 2000?

24 A. Yes. At that time the LURD forces had already crossed into
14:51:19 25 Liberia once and attacked and they retreated. Based upon that,
26 the AFL forces were always deployed at the border because there
27 was information for another offensive into Liberia. Also, our
28 own commander at the time, Issa Sesay, had got information that
29 there was going to be another offensive into Sierra Leone and

1 these forces were going to work together simultaneously to launch
2 an attack to protect the two countries at the same time.

3 Q. Mr Vincent, please slow down. We are following you. Let
4 me ask you a few questions about what you've said. You said the
14:52:06 5 LURD forces had already crossed into Liberia once and they
6 retreated. You said they attacked and they retreated. Where did
7 they retreat to after entering Liberia the first time?

8 A. They entered Liberia and attacked and retreated right back
9 to where they had been organised in Guinea. But their bases were
14:52:35 10 now Gueckedou and Nongowa. Among them as well were the Kamajors.

11 Q. You said that information was received that there was going
12 to be another offensive into Liberia. Who was going to launch
13 another offensive into Liberia?

14 A. The LURD forces.

14:53:07 15 Q. And then at my page 109, line 14 you said, "Also our own
16 commander at the time, Issa Sesay, had got information that there
17 was going to be another offensive into Sierra Leone." You're
18 referring to another offensive into Sierra Leone. Who was going
19 to launch this offensive into Sierra Leone?

14:53:33 20 A. The Kamajors were going to launch the offensive into Sierra
21 Leone from the rear where we were not even expecting them to be.
22 Because the back of Koindu was our rear, our safe zone, where we
23 had civilians. They were living freely there and doing their
24 farming and other things.

14:54:03 25 Q. Did the Kamajors, at the time when you were in the border
26 area between Liberia and Sierra Leone around December 2000, in
27 fact launch an offensive into Sierra Leone?

28 A. Say that again.

29 Q. When you were at the border being commanded by Matthew

1 Barbue in December 2000, did the Kamajors in fact launch an
2 offensive into Sierra Leone?

3 A. They did not because we went ahead of them. We went before
4 - we went ahead of them, so we were first - we were fast to
14:54:47 5 receive the information and fast to take action.

6 Q. And what action did you take?

7 A. The action was to go and fortify our border so that they
8 won't have any space to come in.

9 Q. Was there any fighting between the RUF and Kamajors when
14:55:04 10 you went to fortify the border?

11 A. Yes, indeed.

12 Q. And what was the result of that fighting?

13 A. The result was that when the LURD forces launched their
14 attack at the border where the Kamajors were, that was how I said
14:55:36 15 that we joined together with the commander on the border on the
16 other side so that they would not cross over into Liberia and
17 Sierra Leone. So we fought against them. We divided our forces,
18 mixed with soldiers, then we crossed into Guinea, Nongowa,
19 Gueckedou. Those areas were attacked together. When the AFL
14:56:05 20 chased the LURD forces, that was what happened.

21 Q. And the commander on the other side that you joined
22 together with, is that the person you referred to as Kwame?

23 A. Joe Kwame. Joe Kwame.

24 Q. Of the AFL?

14:56:26 25 A. Of the AFL, yes.

26 Q. Was it the case when this fighting was taking place that
27 the RUF were receiving commands from this Joe Kwame?

28 A. The RUF was not receiving command directly from Joe Kwame.

29 The idea here was that we worked together to defend one another's

1 interest. That was what we were fighting for. Matthew Barbue
2 had his command coming from Issa Sesay. Whatever Issa Sesay told
3 Matthew Barbue, that was what we were doing.

14:57:25 4 Q. Did Matthew Barbue at any time receive commands, that is,
5 accept commands, from Joe Kwame?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Did Joe Kwame to your knowledge during that period of time
8 accept any commands from Matthew Barbue of the RUF?

14:57:52 9 A. No, Matthew Barbue - I mean, Joe Kwame was not accepting
10 commands from Matthew Barbue, but the instruction from Issa to
11 Matthew Barbue was that whatever plan that comes from Joe Kwame,
12 all of us should work together to accomplish that aim so that our
13 areas would not come under attack. So we were only trying to
14 prevent our areas from being attacked. This was a guerilla
14:58:20 15 warfare, and we were to do anything in order to prevent our areas
16 from being attacked.

17 Q. Do you know whether, during the period of time Issa Sesay
18 was instructing Matthew Barbue, Issa Sesay was in radio contact
19 with anyone in Liberia?

14:58:42 20 A. No, as I told you, I said no. All instructions from Issa
21 Sesay were coming directly to Matthew Barbue.

22 Q. That was not my question. I'm asking about Issa Sesay and
23 whether to your knowledge he, Issa Sesay, was receiving
24 instructions from anyone in Liberia that he passed along to
14:59:05 25 Matthew Barbue?

26 A. No, not to my knowledge. I don't know.

27 Q. Did you know Issa Sesay, during the period of time when he
28 led the RUF, to have been taking instructions about RUF
29 operations from anyone in Liberia?

1 A. No.

2 Q. When you say "no" do you mean you do not know or do you
3 mean it did not happen?

4 A. It did not happen. If I knew it, if it happened I would
14:59:45 5 have known. It did not happen, that's why I'm saying no.

6 Q. What was the result of this conflict at the border? What
7 happened when this fighting took place and how did it end?

8 A. Well, when we launched the offensive we were overpowered
9 anyway. That was why we retreated. And when we retreated, both
15:00:19 10 forces - the AFL retreated on their side and the RUF retreated on
11 their own side. When we got to Koindu, that was the time that I
12 saw Issa Sesay in Koindu after we had retreated.

13 Q. At any time during this operation was Issa Sesay to be
14 found at the front line?

15:00:49 15 A. No, it was only when we came back that I met him in Koindu.

16 Q. When you say that you were overpowered, was it the case
17 that - well, let me ask you who was overpowered? Was it the RUF,
18 or the Armed Forces of Liberia, or both?

19 A. Both the RUF and the Armed Forces of Liberia were
15:01:17 20 overpowered by the enemy forces. That is the LURD and the
21 Kamajors.

22 Q. And when you say you retreated, you said the AFL on their
23 side and the RUF retreated on their own side. Did any AFL
24 members retreat into RUF territory?

15:01:44 25 A. No, not to my knowledge. It did not happen.

26 Q. Did any RUF member to your knowledge retreat into Liberian
27 territory?

28 A. Yes. For example, I myself, I later retreated and I went
29 to Vahun in Liberia.

1 Q. Was it during this fighting in the border side in 2000 that
2 you ended up in Vahun in Liberia?

3 A. No, it was not there exactly. But it was after we had
4 retreated and when I met Issa in Koindu and I thought of the
15:02:33 5 plans they had for me and I felt my life was not secure, so I had
6 no other alternative but to go back home. That was the reason
7 why I retreated into Liberia.

8 Q. Mr Vincent, we will come to that. We will come to you
9 meeting Issa Sesay in Koindu. My question has to do with the
15:02:54 10 fighting against LURD and the Kamajors. After LURD and the
11 Kamajors overpowered the AFL and the RUF, my question is did any
12 RUF soldiers retreat into Liberian territory when they were
13 running away from the Kamajors and LURD?

14 A. I said no. All the RUF forces retreated back to Koindu and
15:03:30 15 the AFL retreated to Foya - the Foya area.

16 MR ANYAH: May the witness please be shown Prosecution
17 exhibit 68I. Madam President, if I may be heard about this.
18 This same photograph has been exhibited twice by the Prosecution.
19 There is Prosecution exhibit 68I. Which has markings on it, that
15:04:12 20 is, another Prosecution witness wrote on it, and an identical
21 photograph was admitted as Prosecution exhibit 152G, but that
22 version of the photograph was admitted confidentially.

23 Now, the public version 68I has been written on by another
24 witness. So what I propose to do is to have everybody confirm
15:04:40 25 that 68I is identical to the clean copies I have here of the
26 photograph that I wish to give to the Court Officer to show to
27 the witness. The documents are the same. They bear the same ERN
28 number, the difference being I don't wish for the witness to see
29 the markings that were made on the public version P-68I. I

1 wonder if that's an acceptable procedure to the Court?

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian?

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, our records from the exhibit
4 label indicate that 68I is a confidential exhibit.

15:05:21 5 MR ANYAH: Well, I show that 152G is confidential - it may
6 be that 68I is the confidential version, but then the public
7 version would be 152G.

8 MS IRURA: Your Honour, both P-68I and P-152G are
9 confidential.

15:05:44 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Both are confidential?

11 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I can confirm that both P-68I and
12 P-152G are confidential.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: So, Mr Anyah, what is that you want to do
14 with these exhibits?

15:06:15 15 MR ANYAH: We can keep them and not use them, but I don't
16 think the Prosecution would be prejudiced if I decided to use a
17 photograph I now have that they know is identical to documents
18 already admitted. The issue now becomes one of timely
19 disclosure. The photograph I wish to use, the photograph, is
15:06:32 20 already a matter of record. They are just confidential. I wish
21 to use the identical photograph in a public forum and to have
22 this witness mark it as a potential Defence exhibit.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: You mean a document similar to these two
24 existing confidential exhibits?

15:06:52 25 MR ANYAH: Identical except for the writings of the
26 previous witness on one of those two documents. I mean, the
27 Prosecution can examine the photographs I have and we can, of
28 course, provide the same to the Court.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could we see the document you propose to

1 show the witness?

2 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President.

3 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, my position is that out of an
4 abundance of caution we should do this in private session. I
15:07:57 5 don't have an objection to marking this, but we've seen some of
6 the Defence witnesses that have asked for protection, anything
7 that could identify even the group they belong to was something
8 that had to be handled in private session.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, Mr Koumjian, we haven't even heard
15:08:16 10 a single question arising out of this photograph. I don't know
11 what the photograph - what the witness is going to be asked
12 arising out of this photograph. I don't see that the witness
13 himself is in this photograph, unless I'm mistaken, but as in the
14 earlier case --

15:08:39 15 MR ANYAH: May I be heard?

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let me just finish. But for tying it to
17 exhibits P-152 and 68, which are prior confidential exhibits,
18 really, there would be nothing revealing in this photo as far as
19 I'm concerned. But, Mr Anyah, let me hear you.

15:09:04 20 MR ANYAH: No, that's precisely the point. This just
21 becomes an ordinary photograph being shown to a witness. The
22 fact that identical photographs are marked confidentially and
23 filed confidentially has no bearing on what this witness is going
24 to identify and convey to the Court in relation to this
15:09:21 25 photograph. The persons pictured are not identified by name. To
26 the extent that the witness identifies somebody's name, does that
27 make the person identified the subject of any protective measures
28 of the Court? So what is the abundance of caution we have to be
29 mindful of when I wish to show the witness a photograph?

1 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, photographs don't appear out of
2 the space, they come from individuals, and obviously those who
3 may know where or when a photograph was taken would know who or
4 when had possession of the photograph. It's clear that the
15:10:06 5 photograph could indicate the source. So for that reason it
6 should be handle confidentially, and I don't know why --

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: There are five individuals in this
8 photograph. Any one of them or the person taking it, making six,
9 could have supplied this photograph. Either the person that took
15:10:26 10 it or any one of these five individuals or any friend of these
11 five individuals could have taken this photograph and given it to
12 the Court.

13 MR KOUMJIAN: Generally, only the person who had the
14 photograph, who took it, would be able to be in the position to
15:10:42 15 give it to the Court. And we took in private session testimony,
16 we had to ask a witness because he belonged to a unit of 20 or 50
17 people, a Defence witness recently, that had to be done in
18 private session.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, but that's because that witness was
15:10:56 20 testifying and was a protected witness. This witness sitting
21 before us is not a protected witness anymore. He doesn't appear
22 in the photograph. We don't even know the questions that are
23 going to be asked. Let me consult my colleagues on this.

24 [Trial Chamber conferred]

15:12:14 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian and Mr Anyah, we don't see
26 any problem with the way Mr Anyah is going to proceed now. He is
27 well aware of the protective measures in place for other
28 witnesses. And I trust you're going to be careful, Mr Anyah.

29 MR ANYAH: Yes, Madam President. Could the witness be

1 shown this photograph, please.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: The photo has an ERN number I think or
3 something. You could prefer to it by this ERN number and not
4 necessarily tie it to existing exhibits.

15:12:51 5 MR ANYAH: Yes. This is a document given to us by the
6 Prosecution and the ERN number on the photograph is P0000627:
7 Q. Mr Vincent, can you look at that photograph. And then when
8 you are done, please hand it over to the Court Officer to display
9 it.

15:13:26 10 A. Yes, I have seen it.

11 Q. Mr Vincent, do you recognise any of the persons shown in
12 that photograph?

13 A. Yes, I recognise two persons.

14 Q. Well, let's start with the person on the far left. The
15:13:57 15 person is holding a teacup with what appears to be a spoon in the
16 cup in his right hand.

17 A. Yes. The person in the brown shirt, I recognise that
18 person to be someone like Rashid. Rashid. But I have forgotten
19 the last name. But Rashid something. Rashid Foday, okay, yes.

15:14:35 20 Q. Well, that's the person you say is in the brown shirt, is
21 it?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. Now, do you recognise any other person besides this person
24 in the brown shirt you referred to as Rashid Foday?

15:14:53 25 A. Yes. The next person that I recognise here is like he is
26 sitting down lower with a jeans trousers. He looks like
27 Matthew Barbue.

28 Q. Now, can you switch seats for us because it is difficult to
29 follow this without you pointing at the photograph. Could the

1 witness please be placed in front of the overhead projector.

2 Mr Vincent, let's start with the person you identified previously
3 as Rashid Foday. Can you use the pen you've been given and point
4 to that person on the photograph?

15:15:55 5 A. Yes, I can use it.

6 Q. Please do so.

7 A. This is Rashid Foday.

8 Q. And you mentioned the name Matthew Barbue. Can you point
9 to the person on that photograph who is Matthew Barbue?

15:16:16 10 A. Here is Matthew Barbue.

11 Q. The person to the far left of the photograph also holding a
12 teacup looking at the person taking the photograph and wearing
13 black pants or trousers, do you know who that person is?

14 A. Well, I take this person to be someone like Osman Tolo, but
15:16:47 15 I am not too sure because there is some semblance of Osman Tolo
16 in him. But I'm not too sure whether it is Osman Tolo.

17 Q. Can you point just so we are sure we are talking about the
18 same person. Who do you think might be Osman Tolo?

19 A. Osman Tolo was one of the radio men at Kangari Hills.

15:17:17 20 Q. And the person you identified as Matthew Barbue, was that
21 the person who commanded the operation at the border area between
22 Liberia and Sierra Leone in December 2000?

23 A. Yes, this is Matthew Barbue.

24 Q. Is he the same person you just testified about to
15:17:40 25 previously?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And who is Rashid Foday, the person with the brown shirt?

28 A. Rashid Foday was one of the bodyguards to Corporal Sankoh.

29 Q. Was he an RUF fighter that fought at the front lines?

1 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection, counsel is leading the witness and
2 suggesting answers.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Anyah, you could ask the question in a
4 less leading way.

15:18:16 5 MR ANYAH: That's fair enough:

6 Q. You said Rashid Foday was a bodyguard to Foday Sankoh.
7 Besides serving as a bodyguard to Foday Sankoh, did he have any
8 other assignments in the RUF, to your knowledge?

9 A. Well, there wasn't any other assignment that I know of, but
10 I think there were times they would go on the front line and
11 monitor activities and from there they would go back and give the
12 report to Corporal Sankoh.

13 Q. Now, Mr Vincent, can you take the pen you've been given and
14 can you draw a line from Matthew Barbue to the bottom of the
15 photograph and write the name Matthew Barbue on that photograph?

16 A. Yes. Should I write on the picture?

17 Q. You can draw a line from the centre of his body all the way
18 down to the bottom of the photograph, just draw a line from there
19 down, and then below there you can write the name "Matthew
20 Barbue". You can hold the document if you wish.

21 Can you do the same thing in respect of the person you
22 identified as Rashid Foday. Draw a line from the person with the
23 brown shirt upwards to the white part of the picture and write
24 "Rashid Foday" for us, please.

15:20:24 25 Can you sign that document at the bottom and put today's
26 date, 26 March 2010.

27 Mr Vincent, I notice your signature doesn't say what your
28 name is. Can you write your name under your signature. Thank
29 you, Mr Vincent.

1 Your Honours, I don't know if your Honours wish to review
2 the document.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, that won't be necessary.

4 MR ANYAH: Thank you. Could he be shown to his proper
15:21:45 5 seat, please. Madam President, with leave of the Chamber, may
6 that photograph be marked for identification, please.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is now MFI-1. This is a photo with
8 ERN number P0000828 as marked by witness DCT-215 that is marked
9 MFI-1.

15:22:29 10 MR ANYAH:

11 Q. Mr Vincent, you told us that you retreated and went back to
12 Koindu after the RUF was overpowered. Do you recall telling us
13 that?

14 A. Yes.

15:22:42 15 Q. What happened when you went to Koindu?

16 A. When I went to Koindu, it was there that I met Issa. And
17 when I met him, he told us that we shouldn't leave the border
18 area because, he said, since the Kamajors had flushed us and we
19 crossed into Sierra Leone, they said they could come at any other
15:23:18 20 time and launch their offensive. So he said we should stay there
21 and defend the border.

22 Q. Were there any further offensives launched by the Kamajors
23 when you were now in Koindu?

24 A. No, there wasn't any other offensive launched by the
15:23:41 25 Kamajors. Because, as I told you, when we retreated from that
26 particular operation I did not take any more time into Sierra
27 Leone. I found my way into Vahun in Liberia.

28 Q. Do you know whether, separate and apart from this offensive
29 that concerned Nongowa and Gueckedou, the RUF in late 2000 went

1 into Guinea to fight anyone?

2 A. Do you mean after the first operation that I have spoken
3 about?

4 Q. Yes.

15:24:26 5 A. No, I was no longer there. I told you that I had already
6 retreated and I found my way to Vahun. So whatever they did in
7 the RUF territories, I never had any ideas about them.

8 Q. Now I'd like to review with you evidence given by another
9 witness to this Court regarding an offensive along the border
10 areas between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. The relevant
11 transcript is from 9 April 2008 starting at --

12 MR KOU MJIAN: Excuse me, your Honours, I apologise for the
13 interruption, but I believe there's a necessity for a redaction.
14 I did not bring this to the Court's attention, but double
15:25:28 15 checking the photograph, looking at the transcript page - and I
16 would like to hand this transcript page rather than say it in
17 open court to your Honours - a witness would identify themselves
18 if this photograph is now made public.

19 MR ANYAH: I don't understand any of that, but it would be
15:25:52 20 helpful to see the transcript reference.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is this an open session transcript?

22 MR KOU MJIAN: Private session.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: So how would anyone know something in
24 private session? How? The photographs that we spoke of earlier
15:26:16 25 were confidential photographs. The transcript you're quoting is
26 private session transcript. How on earth would a member of the
27 public have any information or inkling about the photograph that
28 we're now looking at? Mr Koumjian, I'm asking you.

29 MR KOU MJIAN: Your Honour, if it's in private session, I

1 see your point. I was trying to respond quickly to what I
2 thought was a major problem.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay, so the objection is not really
4 valid. Although, I must say, when I was marking this photograph
15:26:59 5 I think the ERN number was 0000627, wasn't it?

6 MR ANYAH: Yes, but there is a "P" before it.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Exactly, so I do correct myself. I might
8 have given a different ERN number based on prior exhibits.
9 Please proceed.

15:27:24 10 MR ANYAH: Thank you, Madam President. Is there any
11 objection to this transcript reference? Because I didn't
12 understand the last objection. This is 9 April 2008.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, not that at all.

14 MR ANYAH: Okay, I'll proceed then.

15:27:40 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: The objection has been overtaken by
16 events. It doesn't arise now.

17 MR ANYAH: The relevant page is 7070. That's where I'll
18 start from:

19 Q. Mr Vincent, I'd like you to listen carefully to what I am
15:28:00 20 going to read, starting at line 21 of that page. There was a
21 question asked of a witness. This witness was here April 2008,
22 and this is what they responded to the questions that were posed:

23 "Q. Now following that communication which Issa had with
24 Yeaten, what happened? After that communication, what
15:28:27 25 happened?

26 A. Issa himself came to Foya, Liberia.

27 Q. Did he come alone?

28 A. He came with armed men, a good number of armed men and
29 together with Benjamin D Yeaten and some other fighters

1 they set in for Surumba."

2 Let's pause there. Do you know Benjamin D Yeaten,
3 Mr Vincent?

15:29:15 4 A. Yes, I got to know Benjamin Yeaten in person when I got to
5 Vahun. That was where I got to know him personally.

6 Q. And who is he?

7 A. I knew Benjamin Yeaten to be the director of the Special
8 Security Services, SSS, for the NPP government at that time.

9 Q. Do you know a place called Surumba, S-U-R-U-M-B-A?

15:29:49 10 A. Yes, I know Surumba.

11 Q. In which country is Surumba located?

12 A. Surumba is in Liberia not too far from the Sierra Leone
13 border.

14 Q. Continuing at line 28 a question was asked of that witness:

15:30:15 15 "Q. Now what happened then after Issa came when the set in
16 for Surumba, what happened?

17 A. The forces were mobilised and they cross into Guinea.
18 We launched an attack on a town called Gueckedou.

19 Q. Now which other forces did the RUF ally with in this
15:30:43 20 operation?

21 A. The operation included the AFL, the SOD.

22 Q. And do you know what happened during that operation?

23 A. They attacked Gueckedou, but the mission commander for
24 that particular operation was one General Barbue. Matthew

15:31:10 25 Barbue. Some other senior officers I can remember were one

26 Abu Keita. Abu Keita, John B Vincent and Chucky from

27 Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, those were brought by General Issa

28 Sesay. They are came under the command of General Issa

29 Sesay.

1 Q. Just hold on a while.

2 THE WITNESS: I have left one Sam Kolleh out. Sam Kolleh
3 was also part of that operation."

4 Let's pause there. Mr Vincent, the John B Vincent that you
15:32:07 5 hear mentioned here in connection with an operation to attack
6 Gueckedou whose mission commander was Matthew Barbue, do you know
7 who that John B Vincent is?

8 A. John B Vincent is the John B Vincent that is sitting in
9 front of you. But in the first thing, Matthew Barbue in the RUF
10 was not even a general. Matthew Barbue was not a general. So I
11 would plainly state here that that person is a liar. How would
12 he give a rank to someone who did not represent that rank?

13 Q. What was Matthew Barbue's rank at the time of the operation
14 - may I finish? Thank you. What was Matthew Barbue's rank
15:33:03 15 within the RUF at the time of the operation in December 2000 when
16 you fought along the border side and into Guinea?

17 A. Thank you. Matthew Barbue - as far as I know, Matthew
18 Barbue was a colonel. Although my appointment had been taken
19 from me, but I still maintained my rank. I was still a colonel.
15:33:36 20 But the only thing was that I was not the commander, so Matthew
21 Barbue was not even a general.

22 Q. Another question flowing from what we've just read. The
23 person seems to say that the forces were mobilised, crossed into
24 Guinea and attacked Gueckedou, and that the RUF was allied with
15:34:08 25 the AFL and the SOD. What is the SOD, if you know, Mr Vincent?

26 A. I know that the SOD was a branch of the police force in the
27 NPP government. But when we got to that particular area, when we
28 went on with that particular operation there was no SOD that I
29 saw there. So I continue to say that this person is a liar, and

1 I did not even see Sam Kolleh during that operation, and I know I
2 trained together with Sam Kolleh, and even in Monrovia we are
3 living together. I know him very well.

15:35:02 4 Q. You said the SOD was a branch of the police force in the
5 NPP government. What is that police force's name?

6 A. I mean SOD. That is the name that the person called.
7 Special - SOD. Special Operation Division, or something like
8 that.

9 Q. Of which police force?

15:35:27 10 A. The LNP, the Liberian National Police.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Now we continue on the same page
12 7071, line 25. The witness continues with the answer. The
13 witness says that:

14 "John B Vincent. Those were the commanders I can recall
15:35:55 15 went on that mission, and the radio operator who went with them
16 was called Operator Generation. I did not cross into Guinea. I
17 stopped at Surumba and retreated to Foya."

18 Let's pause there. Do you know a radio operator by the
19 name of Generation?

15:36:30 20 A. No, I don't know Generation, but the radio operator that
21 went on that operation was Mortiga. Mortiga. Then how would he
22 have gone on a mission, according to him, and he was away in Foya
23 whilst the mission was going on in Guinea?

24 Q. Well, the witness - the person testifying is not saying
15:36:52 25 they went on that mission. They are saying that they stopped at
26 Surumba and retreated to Foya. And what is it you say in
27 relation to that, Mr Vincent?

28 A. He did not go on the mission. That witness is a liar. You
29 cannot give accounts about anything for which you were not

1 present.

2 Q. Did you have amongst your numbers when you went on that
3 mission a radio operator called Generation?

4 A. No.

15:37:29 5 Q. Page 7072, line 1, there was a question posed to that
6 person, who testified:

7 "Q. And what happened during the operation?

8 A. The target was captured. They spent some time there
9 and they ran out of ammunition. They were beaten back by
10 the Guinean forces. So everybody crossed into Liberia, and
11 those RUF fighters who came back and took there with
12 General Issa Sesay started escaping back to Sierra Leone."
13 Let's pause. Did you hear me read a reference to Guinean
14 forces, Mr Vincent?

15:38:53 15 A. You mean the reference you read? I am seeing it.

16 Q. Did you hear me say Guinean forces? That's my question.

17 A. Yes, yes. I heard that.

18 Q. When you fought the LURD and the Kamajors along the
19 Guinean, Sierra Leonean and Liberian border, did the Guinean
15:39:23 20 forces engage in any fighting at that time?

21 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection, vague as to the border. It's not
22 clear whether he's talking about Gueckedou or something much
23 closer to the border in the question. The witness was talking
24 about fighting around Koindu and now we're talking about
15:39:44 25 Gueckedou.

26 MR ANYAH: Well, the question is not being asked in the
27 abstract. We've been reading testimony about an operation into
28 Gueckedou and everybody seems to be following.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think you can ask the question.

1 We'll see what the witness says when answered.

2 MR ANYAH:

3 Q. Mr Vincent, in December 2000 when you were along the
4 Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Guinean borders and there were
15:40:08 5 operations regarding Nongowa and Gueckedou, were forces from
6 Guinea, that is, the Government of Guinea, engaged in any
7 fighting?

8 A. Yes. I said the Kamajors together with the LURD forces
9 were organised in Guinea, and when they did the attack, they
15:40:35 10 retreated into Guinea. So when the Liberian AFL attacked and we
11 followed after them, the Guinean army actually gave support to
12 the LURD forces and the Kamajors because they too did not want
13 fighting to go deeper into Guinea. So they had to give fire
14 support. That was the reason why I said we did not make it. We
15:41:04 15 were beaten back. We were overrun. So we left.

16 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Now, the person who testified said
17 that after they were beaten back and had run out of ammunition,
18 everybody crossed into Liberia. And the person indicates that
19 includes RUF fighters, because later on it is said that the RUF
15:41:30 20 fighters started escaping back into Sierra Leone. Now, when the
21 RUF was overpowered by these LURD and Kamajors and now you
22 include there the Guinean forces, did any RUF members retreat
23 back into Liberia?

24 A. Yes, you will have to. Crossing is a matter of must. That
15:42:01 25 you must retreat either back into Sierra Leone or Liberia,
26 because the border itself is twisted, like I was saying. So
27 we'll have to cross over to take our own time to get into Koindu.
28 So that area is quite correct.

29 Q. Reading on. There's a question posed at line 7:

1 "Q. Do you know how long the operation lasted before they
2 were beaten back?

3 A. It lasted for some time. It lasted for some time. And
4 at this time another attack on Guinea was going on through
15:42:41 5 Sierra Leone into Guinea and they were to meet at a
6 particular point in Guinea, but they were beaten back in
7 Guinea also. They retreated into Sierra Leone. So after
8 some time Superman was --

9 Q. You said that at this time another attack was going on
15:43:09 10 in Guinea from another part of Sierra Leone. Is that
11 right?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Where was that?

14 A. The RUF forces crossed into Guinea from Sierra Leone.

15:43:26 15 Q. Which part of Guinea - from which part of Sierra Leone
16 did they come?

17 A. From Kono. They left Kono, which was the base. Kono,
18 Makeni, manpower was collected from those two areas and
19 they set in for Guinea.

15:43:46 20 Q. And who was heading that group?

21 A. I think it was Superman at this time, Superman at this
22 time. After they retreated Superman cause called upon to
23 come to Liberia and join forces with the other group in
24 Liberia. That was in Foya."

15:44:08 25 Let's pause there. Mr Vincent, do you understand what this
26 witness was saying? This witness told the Court that there was
27 an attack into Guinea, that the RUF had retreat into Liberia.
28 The witness says there was another attack into Guinea from Sierra
29 Leone, this time from Kono, and manpower was taken from Makeni

1 and Kono for that particular attack and that that second attack
2 was headed by Superman. Were you aware, Mr Vincent, of any such
3 other attack into Guinea from Sierra Leone headed by Superman
4 around December 2000?

15:44:54 5 A. No. I can only tell you about the operation that was
6 undertaken by Matthew Barbue upon the instruction that he
7 received from General Issa.

8 Q. We appreciate you can tell us about that operation that you
9 went on. What I want to know is whether you heard of any other
15:45:18 10 operation being undertaken about the same time headed by Superman
11 from Sierra Leone into Guinea.

12 A. No.

13 Q. Did you hear of any group being led by Superman joining
14 forces with another group of RUF fighters in Foya, Liberia?

15:45:45 15 A. No.

16 Q. We're now at page 7073. The witness's answer continues at
17 the top of page:

18 "A. ... So when Superman came with these armed men and
19 joined forces with General Barbue, instead of attacking
15:46:10 20 Gueckedou, the mission was now diverted to a place called,
21 in Guinea, Nongowa.

22 Q. So this attempt that was made from Kono failed, is that
23 right?

24 A. Yes.

15:46:26 25 Q. And Superman was called over to Foya, is that correct?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. And he joined forces with the others that were already
28 there?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Where did they go to?

2 A. To a place in Guinea, a town called Nongowa."

3 Line 17:

15:47:06

4 "Q. Now, who summoned Superman to Foya when the operation
5 through Sierra Leone failed?

6 A. RUF was between 50 and General Issa Sesay."

7 Let's pause there. Mr Vincent, to your knowledge, was
8 Superman ever in the vicinity of Gueckedou or Nongowa in December
9 2000 during the operation headed by Matthew Barbue?

15:47:36

10 A. I have told you that the commander for that particular
11 operation was Matthew Barbue. I know nothing about Superman
12 taking part in that operation. And Matthew Barbue was not even a
13 general. I continue to say this.

14 Q. Was there a second operation or planned attack by the RUF
15 to Nongowa, Guinea, after the first attack failed?

15:48:04

16 A. There was no second operation. After the first operation
17 was when - after we returned, I saw Issa in Koindu and I found my
18 way out. So even if it happened it might have happened in my
19 absence.

15:48:29

20 Q. You heard me read [overlapping speakers].

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Just listen. You heard me read that the witness said that
23 Superman was summoned to Foya by somebody and the answer the
24 witness gave was that the RUF was between 50 and General Issa
15:48:58 25 Sesay. And if I were to continue, the witness was asked who
26 actually ordered Superman to come over to Foya and the witness's
27 answer was General Yeaten. This is at the same page, 7073, lines
28 20 through 22.

29 Mr Vincent, to your knowledge, was the RUF command

1 receiving instructions from General Yeaten during this Gueckedou
2 operation?

3 A. RUF was not receiving any command from outside the RUF high
4 command, please.

15:49:49 5 Q. If we go to the next page, 7074, line 6, a question is
6 posed to the witness:

7 "Q. Now you mentioned earlier the names of some commanders
8 who were brought that took part in the first Guinea - the
9 Gueckedou operation. You mentioned Matthew Barbue and a
10 few others. Were they also in the group that went to
11 Nongowa?

12 A. Matthew Barbue was not a commander again. He was only
13 the commander for the operations in Gueckedou, but for the
14 operations in Nongowa, it was led or headed by Superman.

15:50:41 15 Q. Who else was there among the commanders that were
16 previously in the first operation in Guinea?

17 A. Other commanders - the commanders joined forces. Those
18 commanders I had earlier named joined forces with
19 Superman and they crossed into Nongowa.

15:51:03 20 Q. Now you mention quite a number of them. You mention
21 Abu Keita. Was he among this group that also went?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You mentioned Vincent --"

24 Then there was an objection. And at line 25 the question
15:51:24 25 is asked:

26 "Q. Can you say which of these commanders actually was
27 involved in the second operation in Guinea?

28 A. Barbue also went on that operation, General Barbue, but
29 at this time round it was not led - the mission was not led

1 by Barbue, but Superman."

2 Let's pause there. This witness was telling the Court that
3 after an operation into Gueckedou, which failed, there was a
4 second operation this time not headed by Matthew Barbue but by
15:52:03 5 Superman in which Abu Keita participated as well as the same
6 Matthew Barbue who went to Gueckedou. Mr Vincent, are you aware
7 of any such second operation into Nongowa.

8 A. No, there was not any second operation. That is why I said
9 that even if it happened, then it might have happened in my
15:52:27 10 absence.

11 Q. Was Abu Keita, to your knowledge, a part of the operation
12 that you participated in that targeted Nongowa and Gueckedou?

13 A. The first operation that I took part in, I did not see
14 Abu Keita there. And I was not even a commander --

15:52:54 15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
16 to repeat that last bit and slow down.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Witness. Repeat your
18 answer a little slowly.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I said I did not see Abu Keita during
15:53:11 20 the first operation. And here the witness testified that one of
21 the commanders was Vincent, and I said I was not even a
22 commander. I was by then an ordinary fighter. All my position
23 had been taken from me. I was not a commander. I was an
24 ordinary fighter.

15:53:33 25 MR ANYAH:

26 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. If we move over to the next page,
27 7075, a question is asked of the witness:

28 "Q. Now you mentioned earlier that Issa Sesay also came to
29 Foya for the first operation into Guinea. Is that right?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Did he himself go?

3 A. He did not cross into Guinea, but he was in Foya and
4 even went to the border, that was the Liberian-Guinean

15:54:09 5 border, together with General 50. He was there until the
6 time the men started crossing the river.

7 Q. Now, after this operation that you say failed, the
8 Nongowa operation, did anything happen?

9 A. They treated to a village called Saadu.

15:54:36 10 Q. Can you spell Saadu?

11 A. S-A-A-D-U."

12 When you go further down to line 20 on the same page, after
13 having said that Saadu is in Liberia, the witness was asked a
14 question:

15:54:53 15 "Q. While you were at Saadu under whose command were you
16 there at Saadu?

17 A. General 50."

18 Let's pause. Mr Vincent, the first part of what I read
19 suggests that Issa Sesay came to Foya for the first operation
15:55:12 20 into Guinea, that he did not cross into Guinea itself, but that
21 he was in Foya. When you were being commanded by Matthew Barbue
22 into an operation in Guinea, was Issa Sesay, to your knowledge,
23 in Foya, Liberia?

24 A. I am saying no. Issa Sesay did not even go with us to
15:55:40 25 Koindu. He instructed Matthew Barbue, and Matthew Barbue took us
26 to Koindu. That is what I continue to say. Most of these
27 statements given by this man are all lies. Maybe he is trying to
28 call names, but missing names out. He might err and he - number
29 one, he made mistake that Matthew Barbue was a general and he

1 also said that I'm a commander, and I still continue to say that
2 I was not a commander.

3 Q. Do you know whether, during that operation concerning
4 Guinea in late 2000 - December, in particular - the RUF retreated
15:56:26 5 to a place called Saadu between Foya airfield and Surumba?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you know whether the RUF was under the command of
8 General 50 when they retreated from Guinea in the operation that
9 you participated in?

15:56:53 10 A. No.

11 Q. When you say "no", does that mean you were not under his
12 command, or you do not know?

13 A. I was not under Benjamin Yeaten's command. I was under RUF
14 command and under Matthew Barbue.

15:57:13 15 Q. Yes. Besides yourself were any other RUF, including
16 Matthew Barbue, being commanded by Benjamin Yeaten as you
17 retreated from Guinea?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. That concludes my reference to that
15:57:35 20 transcript. Now, Mr Vincent, you mentioned going back to Koindu
21 and having some difficulty with Issa Sesay after this operation,
22 and you said it caused you to go back to Vahun, Liberia. Do you
23 remember telling us about that?

24 A. Yes.

15:57:58 25 Q. In which month and in which year did you go to Vahun,
26 Liberia?

27 A. I went to Vahun in 2001 - at the early part of 2001.

28 Q. How did you cross into Liberia from Sierra Leone?

29 A. When we retreated back to Koindu I met Issa Sesay there,

1 and he passed the command that nobody should leave that area
2 until he issued further orders. But when I thought of his
3 threats against me, I thought that my life was not secure with
4 Issa. And he was now at that time the head of the RUF, and he
15:59:06 5 could have found any possible means to eliminate me or take away
6 my life. So what I did was I walked from Koindu, and that I did
7 alone quietly. I went to Buedu, and from Buedu I found a way
8 through Pendembu, and from Pendembu I took the bush path to
9 Bomaru, and that was the route I used to get to Vahun.

15:59:39 10 Q. You said you went from Koindu to Buedu, and from Buedu you
11 went through Pendembu, and from Pendembu you went through Bomaru,
12 and from Bomaru you found a route to Vahun. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can you explain to us why it was that Issa Sesay was
16:00:05 15 threatening your life as you say?

16 A. Well, actually I did not know whether it was because of the
17 meeting that I had with Sam Bockarie that I brought forward my
18 own suggestions that made Issa Sesay and others accuse Sam
19 Bockarie as someone who wanted to overthrow. And by then they
16:00:43 20 said also the allegation that I was appointed battle group for
21 Sam Bockarie. I don't know where they got that from. And since
22 then Issa and I never had a cordial relationship, though his last
23 comment finally put fear in me and I thought that my life was not
24 secure. That was how I decided to find my way.

16:01:08 25 Q. When you say the allegation was that you were appointed
26 battle group for Sam Bockarie, was it not the case that Sam
27 Bockarie had already left Liberia at this time?

28 A. Sam Bockarie was in there - he wasn't there, but he had
29 kept that in mind as a grudge. He was keeping that in mind as a

1 grudge. So he had actually wanted to eliminate me, and so I
2 wanted to sustain my life. And at the end of the day, before I
3 could allow him to take my life, I decided to find my way out.

16:01:58 4 Q. I notice that in the question I asked you I spoke of Sam
5 Bockarie already leaving Liberia. I meant Sierra Leone. But,
6 Mr Vincent, when you say that he actually wanted to eliminate
7 you, are you referring then again to Issa Sesay?

8 A. Yes.

16:02:22 9 Q. Now, when you walked through the bush paths and you got to
10 Vahun, at the time you crossed over into Liberia were you still
11 an RUF member at that time?

12 A. No. At that time I had already given up the hope that I
13 was no longer secure in the RUF territory. So my desire to go
14 home was mainly to go and rest so that I could not make my
16:02:48 15 struggle in the RUF go in vain. So I decided to find my way home
16 to go to Vahun, and from there I could find my way to go to my
17 home county, Bomi County, and get my rest and maybe find some
18 other things to do.

19 Q. Did you have any intention at that time of returning to the
16:03:10 20 RUF after you crossed over into Liberia when you left from Buedu
21 and made your way through the bush paths to Vahun?

22 A. No, because I left there with - in discouragement. I was
23 completely discouraged and I gave up hope on the RUF. Excuse me,
24 can I pass water, please?

16:03:40 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please show the witness out. We will
26 take a brief pause.

27 MR ANYAH:

28 Q. Now, Mr Vincent, when you arrived in Vahun and you told us
29 of your intention to go to your home county, Bomi County, what

1 happened when you arrived in Vahun?

2 A. When I got to Vahun, I met the AFL commanders. I met a
3 fellow, Peanut Butter --

16:08:42

4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat the
5 other name.

6 MR ANYAH:

7 Q. Mr Vincent, let's hear you clearly about this name. You
8 met a fellow named Peanut Butter.

16:08:59

9 A. Peanut Butter. His real name Adolphus Dolo, but he was
10 called Peanut Butter.

11 Q. Is that the name you are saying?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And Dolo, D-O-L-O?

14 A. Yes, Dolo.

16:09:09

15 Q. And he was a commander for whom?

16 A. He was one of the commanders for the AFL. And I saw Sai fa
17 Norman, one of the commanders with the AFL, and later I saw
18 Benjamin Yeaten in Vahun.

16:09:34

19 Q. This person you referred to as Sai fa Norman, can you spell
20 the name of that person for us?

21 A. Norman, N-O-R-M-A-N.

22 Q. What of the first name?

23 A. Sai fa is S-A-I-F-A. Most times people spell it with double
24 "F".

16:10:08

25 Q. These three persons you've named, Peanut Butter, Adolphus
26 Dolo, Sai fa Norman and Benjamin Yeaten, did you meet all three at
27 one time or was it separately?

28 A. Yes. When I got to Vahun, they were all in Vahun at the
29 time. So when I got there, I told them that I had a problem so I

1 had to come home. When they looked at me, I had to explain
2 myself all throughout. It was Benjamin Yeaten who looked at me
3 and said, "My young man, thank God you've come home. Liberia is
4 your home." Then I said, "Yes." He said, "But you've come and
16:11:03 5 you've met us at war and you are a trained man. Do you expect to
6 come and pass straight home? This is your country." And I said,
7 "Yes, I know that." So it was not by force, but I myself saw
8 reason that even if I went and sat, I wouldn't be at peace as
9 long as the country was at war. So I was compelled - not
16:11:31 10 compelled from them. I mean, my own conscience told me that I
11 was compelled to stay in Vahun and be a part of the operation in
12 the Vahun area.

13 Q. Mr Vincent, let's consider what you've said, but first some
14 additional questions. When you had this conversation with
16:11:52 15 General Yeaten, were you, in your opinion, a civilian then?

16 A. I knew within myself that I was not a civilian. I was a
17 trained man. After I had explained why I had gone to Vahun,
18 during my explanation, so he said out of his own intelligence, he
19 explained, just like I have explained, that, you were a trained
16:12:22 20 man and thank God you are back home, but Liberia was at war, do
21 you expect to go and sit back at home while your country is at
22 war? So my own conscience compelled me to stay in Vahun and join
23 them on the operation against the LURD forces. This was how I
24 became a member of the AFL.

16:12:43 25 Q. Thank you, Mr Vincent. Let's go back now and consider a
26 few things. The place where you encountered Benjamin Yeaten, was
27 that a border crossing into Liberia?

28 A. Yes. Vahun is a border town around Bomaru, the Sierra
29 Leone border. It is not too far away from the border. From the

1 main border to go to Vahun is about 5 to 7 miles distance.

2 Q. Were you the only person that met with these men or were
3 there other civilians trying to cross into Liberia when you
4 encountered them?

16:13:27 5 A. I went alone. I told you that this was a movement all by
6 myself that I intended. I didn't even want anybody to know that
7 I was leaving Sierra Leone. Only that when I met them in that
8 territory on the Vahun grounds, I was able to explain my
9 situation to them. After I had explained my --

16:13:59 10 Q. Your meeting them in that territory in Vahun, was that an
11 accident, a chance occurrence, or was it something that you had
12 planned before you met them?

13 A. I do not understand. When you say plainly - when you say
14 plan, I never had a plan of even going back to take arms. I
16:14:24 15 never had that plan. I was going to transform myself into a
16 civilian, to find something else to do in order to sustain myself
17 either by farming or doing any other thing to sustain myself.
18 That was my intention.

19 Q. We understand you, Mr Vincent. What I'm asking is, when
16:14:49 20 you met them, was it an accident? Was this something that
21 happened by chance?

22 A. I still do not understand you.

23 Q. Was it --

24 A. When you say accident, it's an unexpected happening.

16:15:09 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he repeat his answer
26 slowly.

27 THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers].

28 MR ANYAH:

29 Q. Exactly. Now, just listen, was it an unexpected happening

1 that allowed you to meet them, or did you expect to meet them
2 when you crossed over?

3 A. I expected to meet commanders but without knowing who the
4 commanders were. I really expected to meet a junior man whom I
16:15:41 5 could have spoken to easily and allowed me to go.

6 Q. When you say Benjamin Yeaten said that Liberia was at war,
7 with whom was Liberia at war at that time?

8 A. The LURD forces had already taken over some areas in Lofa
9 County, and Vahun was something like a headquarters that the
16:16:10 10 authority was based and they gave instruction to those who were
11 on the various front lines.

12 Q. And you said that your --

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, I don't understand. Vahun was a
14 headquarters for what authority? LURD?

16:16:29 15 THE WITNESS: No. Vahun was for the AFL.

16 MR ANYAH:

17 Q. And you've told us previously that Benjamin D Yeaten was
18 director of the Special Security Services. What position did he
19 occupy, to your knowledge, at the time you met with him at the
16:16:59 20 border in Vahun?

21 A. Mr Benjamin Yeaten, his position was director for Special
22 Security Services, and at the same time he was joint security
23 chief of staff, something like that.

24 Q. Joint security chief of staff for which group?

16:17:20 25 A. For the entire security forces in Liberia at the time.

26 Q. Does that or did that include the AFL?

27 A. The AFL, the police. When I say joint security staff, he
28 had command and could pass instruction to any of the commanding
29 officers of the various security forces.

1 Q. You said that your conscience compelled you to - and I want
2 to get this right. "My own conscience told me that I was
3 compelled to stay in Vahun and be a part of the operation in the
4 Vahun area." Is it the case that your decision to stay in Vahun
16:18:09 5 was voluntary, that is, by your own choosing, Mr Vincent?

6 A. Yes, I was willing because he said something that went deep
7 down in my heart. "Your country is at war. Your sisters and
8 brothers are dying. Here you are a trained man. Will you leave
9 them dying to go and sit and look at them dying?" So that
16:18:41 10 pricked my conscience. I said, "Well, then, I'd rather stay at
11 least to see what we can do."

12 Q. When you stayed in Vahun, did you join any of the Liberian
13 fighting groups to fight the LURD?

14 A. Yes. I was part of the AFL now.

16:19:04 15 Q. Were you given any particular assignments by the AFL during
16 this period of time?

17 A. Yes. When I got there I was taking care of Vahun, that is,
18 when reinforcement came, they came into my hand. And if there
19 was need to deploy them, I would deploy them, and supplies and
16:19:38 20 things were also given to me and that was what I was doing. And
21 sometimes when there is an attack at another area, we would all
22 go and run that attack and I'll return to Vahun as the
23 headquarters. I was at the headquarters in Vahun.

24 Q. Were any number of men under your command when you were
16:20:00 25 stationed in Vahun?

26 A. Yes. In Vahun there were more than 200 manpower, but not
27 everybody stayed in Vahun. Some were at the front line and some
28 would be in Vahun and other deployment areas around Vahun and out
29 of Vahun.

1 Q. When you were in Vahun, did you command any of the AFL
2 fighters? You yourself, were you a commander?

3 A. Yes, I commanded. Yes, I did.

4 Q. And what was the size of the troops you commanded?

16:20:41 5 A. After - let's say I commanded about 200 manpower, I'm
6 telling you. When they've all gone, I stayed in charge of Vahun.
7 I was in Vahun until the last commander left until the --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can he kindly repeat his
9 answer slowly.

16:21:09 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, you said you were in Vahun
11 until the last commander left until - and then we didn't hear
12 what you said after that. Please repeat.

13 THE WITNESS: I was in Vahun and I was the last commander
14 that left Vahun when the LURD forces attacked. That was in 2003,
16:21:35 15 February 12. When the LURD forces attacked Vahun, I finally
16 withdrew from Vahun with my troops.

17 MR ANYAH:

18 Q. February 12, 2003. Was it the case that LURD took over
19 Vahun on that date?

16:21:56 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. When you retreated with your men, were you still with the
22 AFL at that time?

23 A. Yes. Okay, let me come in. When I got to Vahun in 2002 -
24 in 2002 I had an accident. That was with the AFL. When I had
16:22:29 25 this accident, I was taken to Monrovia where I underwent
26 treatment. When I got well, it was at this time that Benjamin
27 Yeaten, the director for Special Security Services, enlisted me
28 into the Special Security Services and posted me back to Vahun.
29 So that was an error that I made. That's the correction.

1 Q. Are you saying that at some point while stationed in Vahun
2 you had an accident and you went to Monrovia for treatment?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And when you went to Monrovia, you mentioned something
16:23:11 5 about the Special Security Services and Benjamin Yeaten enlisting
6 you into the Special Security Services. What actually happened?

7 A. Yes, when I got to Monrovia, because this - my right arm
8 got cracked. I was in a pick-up and the pick-up somersaulted,
9 and it was by God's grace that I did not die. But that was the
16:23:42 10 injury that I suffered. So when I got to Monrovia, I took
11 treatment and I got well. For him not to feel bad, I was there
12 thinking that I had injured myself, what would have happened to
13 me? That was discouraging for me. So he looked at me and said,
14 You are one of the strong men. You need to go back to Vahun and

16:24:14 15 take care of the men, you know. So this is how I was enlisted
16 into the SS, the Special Security Services, because I was already
17 a trained man, and I was given the rank of captain in the SS.
18 And on the other side, I'm talking about the AFL side, I still
19 maintained my rank as a colonel, but the special security forces
16:24:46 20 I had that appointment and that was how I was serving, because it
21 was not possible for you to be an SS personnel, say you were
22 going to front line, and go and command the AFL if you are not
23 part of them. Because the SS were people who were only
24 responsible for taking care of the President and his officials.

16:25:11 25 Q. Mr Vincent, was this enlistment into the SSS a promotion or
26 demotion?

27 A. Going into the SSS as a captain, I did not count it as a
28 demotion, because I told you previously that I had given up.
29 When the RUF authorities molested me and I was going home, I gave

1 up. I wasn't planning to be anybody. Now I go and somebody
2 tells me "You are a captain", I appreciated it. It was
3 appreciated.

16:25:56 4 Q. So is it the case, then, that on 12 February 2003 when you
5 were overrun by the LURD forces in Vahun, you were retreating as
6 member of the SSS?

7 A. On the front line - on the front line I was a soldier; when
8 I went to Monrovia, I became an SSS. So that was how I was
9 operating. I will not tell the fighters on the front line that I
16:26:27 10 was an SSS. They will feel that I will pass on information to
11 the high authorities because I was there to protect the VIPs, and
12 anything that would bring disturbance to the administration of
13 the government and the President, for that matter. So it was a
14 risk for the men on the field to know that you were of that
16:26:49 15 class.

16 Q. During the time period when you were stationed in Vahun
17 working on behalf of the AFL and with the rank of a colonel, were
18 there any RUF, to your knowledge, in Vahun fighting with the AFL
19 against the LURD?

16:27:16 20 A. No, there wasn't any RUF fighting alongside the AFL against
21 LURD forces. I went there from the RUF and I was not RUF. So if
22 I tell you - if I tell you that the RUF was there, then I will be
23 referring to myself. But by then I was not RUF. I was not an
24 RUF soldier.

16:27:50 25 Q. Besides Vahun, do you know whether in any part of Lofa
26 County during the period of time when you were in Vahun any RUF
27 personnel or fighters were fighting with Liberian forces against
28 the LURD in Liberia?

29 A. I am telling you no. Everyone who was fighting in Liberia

1 was AFL.

2 Q. When the LURD took over Vahun and you say you retreated,
3 where did you retreat to?

4 A. When I was taken out of Vahun I went to a town called
16:28:49 5 Kumbo. Kumbo is in Gbarpolu County. That was where I was based.
6 From Vahun - I mean, from Kumbo again the LURD forces advanced as
7 far as to a place near Monrovia Town called Klay. Klay is about,
8 if I'm not mistaken, it is about 30 to 25 miles from Monrovia,
9 and I was far off. The area I am talking about is almost about
16:29:33 10 82 some miles away from Monrovia. So I was also instructed there
11 that I should try and make way to get down to Monrovia by walking
12 that distance. It was not easy. So on my way --

13 Q. If we could pause for a moment. This place Kumbo in
14 Gbarpolu County, do you know how to spell Kumbo?

16:30:00 15 A. Kumbo, no.

16 MR ANYAH: I would spell it phonetically as K-U-M-B-O.
17 Madam President, I believe Klay is on the record. It's K-L-A-Y:

18 Q. Now, this place Klay, Mr Vincent, in which county is Klay?

19 A. Klay is in Bomi County.

16:30:49 20 Q. How far is Klay from Tubmanburg?

21 A. Klay from Tubmanburg, I would not know the exact distance.
22 But if you were driving, it wouldn't take you about 35 minutes.

23 Q. And is it the case that Klay is between Monrovia and
24 Tubmanburg?

16:31:17 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. So it is closer to Monrovia than Tubmanburg?

27 A. Yes.

28 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I appreciate the time.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we've come to the end of today's

1 proceedings. Mr Vincent, we're going to adjourn. Not on Monday,
2 because on Monday the courtroom is not available to us, but we
3 will adjourn to the proceedings to Tuesday morning at 9.30. That
4 is Tuesday, 30 March. So in the meantime you are not to discuss
16:31:55 5 your evidence with anybody, Mr Vincent.

6 THE WITNESS: Yes.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: The proceedings are adjourned
8 accordingly.

9 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.32 p.m.
10 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 30 March 2010 at
11 9.30 a.m.]

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WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DCT-215	38069
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR ANYAH	38069