Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 28 JULY 2010
9.00 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:
Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:
Ms Rachel Irura
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:
Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Nicholas Koumjian
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay Taylor:
Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Silas Chekera
Ms Logan Hambrick
Good morning, we'll take appearances first, please.

MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning, your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this morning, Maja Dimitrova and Nicholas Koumjian.

MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours, counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay Griffiths, with me Mr Silas Chekera, Mr Terry Munyard and Mr Hawi Alot.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Good morning, Mr Sesay. I remind you of your oath to tell the truth, which still binds you today. Please proceed, Mr Griffiths.

WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

Q. Mr Sesay, yesterday we began looking at a document that, unfortunately, had not been reproduced in full. And consequently, we had to adjourn our examination of it until the copies were obtained. I'd like us now to return to that document, please. It's behind divider 4, in the week 27 additional binder. Do we all have it?

PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, you will recall, Mr Sesay, that this was a document bearing your name and the name of Gibril Massaquoi, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, then Kofi Annan.
Let us begin again at the beginning of the document so that we can have its contents in context. We see it's from --

MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. It's our position that I believe the witness denied any knowledge of the document, so there's no foundation to go through the document with the witness.

MR GRIFFITHS: This is a document bearing the witness's name, which no doubt Mr Koumjian in due course may choose to cross-examine the witness on. It seems to me the witness has every right to have an opportunity of dealing with the document before he's cross-examined on it in due course.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, you see that it's from the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, defence headquarters, Makeni, dated the 6th of April 2001. In April 2001, Mr Sesay, where were you based?

A. I was in Kono.

Q. Where was Gibril Massaquoi?

A. Gibril was in Monrovia.

Q. Where was the RUF defence headquarters?

A. No, sorry, Gibril was in Makeni in April 2001.

Q. And where was the RUF defence headquarters in 2001?

A. In Makeni.

Q. Now, we see that the heading is "Detailed information about the RUF and her position on the ongoing peace process":

"The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone deems it necessary to inform you and the United Nations Security Council through you about her activities from 1991 when she launched her insurgency and on to the current peace process because of the intensification of President Kabbah and his government's
propaganda machinery to destroy the RUF.

Below are the contents the RUF is informing you about her activities and position:

(a) Cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone.
(b) Atrocities during the conflict.
(c) Failure of various Peace Accords on Sierra Leone.
(d) Position of the RUF on the current peace process and her political stance.

(a) Cause of the Conflict in Sierra Leone:

The Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone believes that she has been sidelined for too long and that international community seems to only listen to President Kabbah's own version which have definitely not yielded any fruitful peace for the people of Sierra Leone. And, therefore, it is now time to listen to the RUF too so as to achieve durable peace, not one that is dictated by the recycled and corrupt politicians of Tejan Kabbah's government."

Can I pause for a moment and ask you this: By April 2001, Mr Sesay, had the RUF established itself as a political party?

A. No. It was after the disarmament.

Q. Let's continue.

"The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone was formed by a group of gallant men and women headed by Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh in 1982, in the south and eastern parts of the country, with a full participation of people with all walks of life in the entire country and Sierra Leoneans out of the country.

The cause of the conflict is known to all Sierra Leoneans, both in and out of the country, except those politicians along
with their families who pretend not to know due to their own actions. Leaders of this country created misery on this nation, especially after independence on to the current date. Massive corruption, nepotism, tribalism, mismanagement and misuse of State resources and funds was the order of the day by the one party rule, All People's Congress (APC). The poor become poorer, the rich richer, and education and health was completely zero, and they became privileges instead of rights. People dying without medication on a daily basis, number of drop-outs from school due to unaffordable school fees was also on daily basis. Civil servants not paid at the end of the month. No development throughout the country, especially the rural areas. No freedom of speech and association. The saying of the day was: 'Where you tie a cow feeds itself there' in local language 'Creole' meaning --

Maybe you can help me with the next sentence, Mr Sesay, the Krio part.

A. "Where you tie a cow is where it feeds from."

Q. "There was total breakdown in governance. Instead of government of the people, it became government of the politicians and families."

Now, Mr Sesay, that description of the way life was in Sierra Leone, is it one with which you agree?

A. Yes, that's how life was in Sierra Leone. Things were difficult, because I experienced that myself, personally. My father worked at the Ministry of Works. It took them three to four months without being paid any salary.

Q. Let's continue.

A. That's why I didn't further my education.
Q. "Today, the same recycled politicians, moving from one party to another for self-interest, are now telling you that the war is about diamonds, which is totally untrue, trying to misconstrue our agenda."

Mr Sesay, was the war about diamonds and mineral resources in Sierra Leone?

A. No.

Q. "Although diamonds are part of our endowed natural resources which have been mismanaged since 1930 when it was discovered, virtually it has not produced development in this country. Even roads leading to the sites are unmotorable. The politicians are only interested in getting the gemstones for their own use and not the State and her people.

The RUF only took Kono in December 1998. From 1930 on to date, what have the diamond done for this nation? Same for gold, bauxite, rutile, fishes, iron ore, crude oil, et cetera, et cetera.

President Kabbah and his cohorts are propagating that the war is a diamond war because he signed contracts with the British to exploit our minerals, which we will not agree to. The people of Sierra Leone this time should be involved in their mining and knowing where the resources go, not only cabinet or parliamentarians of the proportional representative system who are not voted for by the people to these positions.

The resources of Sierra Leone belong to Sierra Leoneans, which RUF is part of. We cannot cry down politicians for mismanagement of our resources and turn around to copy them. We have enough arms captured from government forces, some in store and others on assignment. No need to sell diamonds for arms as
alleged."

Now, pausing there again. By 2001, Mr Sesay, what was the position of the RUF, in terms of arms available to them?

A. RUF did not look for arms or ammunition during this time.

Q. But did you have arms and ammunition in April 2001?

A. Yes, we had arms and ammunition, many of them, and we had tanks that we captured from the ECOMOG, and many bombs, mortar guns, mortar bombs, we had many of those that we captured in December '98.

Q. Now, tell me, was it the case that at this time the RUF found it necessary to trade arms in order to -- to trade diamonds in order to obtain arms and ammunition?

A. No, it was not necessary.

Q. "For all these reasons mentioned, students and trade unions demonstrated - demonstrations, failed several times for a change in government and governance but were all foiled by the government. Some were arrested and detained and others killed. This made the RUF to take up arms as the last resort in 1999 to wipe off this system throughout the country, as it was now the order of the day.

The RUF therefore advised that the cause of the conflict is not neglected by United Nations if durable peace is to reign in Sierra Leone.

Lastly, the continuous propaganda of President Kabbah that RUF is using diamonds to purchase arms from President Taylor is rubbish. Let them prove it by giving you one of the end user certificates or certificates. In fact, he, President Kabbah, is one of the causes of the conflict by stealing State resources, including two others in 1968, wherein Justice Singor Boaku Betts
passed a ruling of Tejan Kabbah not to hold public position of
trust in Sierra Leone, during the commission of inquiry after
stealing a shipload of cocoa. This very man on the BBC Focus on
Africa admitted that RUF was right to fight and that when at
Central African Republic, Bongay, he was not happy as corruption
engulfed the whole nation. Because he wants to entrench himself
into political power by hook and crook, he’s now bent on
destroying RUF. Realistically, the RUF can no longer leave the
destiny of this country in the hands of crooked politicians.

Conclusively, the RUF fought for democracy, justice and
human rights when there was one-party dictatorial rule of the All
People’s Congress, and there is no way we cannot accept being
sidelined by the same politicians who are the cause of the
conflict."

I’m going to pause again, Mr Sesay, and I’m going to ask
you directly: Why did you, as a young man, decide to take up
arms and enter Sierra Leone?

A. Well, during my training at Naama, when Foday Sankoh was
addressing us, lecturing us, as you said, yes, the man was saying
the truth, that the State was ruled by one party and that the
people was suffering, and that was the fact that gave me the
cause to be part of the revolution.

Q. Now, tell me, Mr Sesay, whilst you were training at Camp
Naama, did any of those undergoing the same training as you
suggest to you, firstly, that the whole purpose of this
enterprise was to control the mineral resources of Sierra Leone?

A. No. Throughout the time that I spent at Naama, nobody ever
told me. None of the instructors, including Mr Sankoh, nobody
spoke about mining diamonds.
Q. Did, for example, anyone say to you that Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor had made a plan, an agreement, in Libya to carry out such a purpose in Sierra Leone?
A. No, no, nobody told me that.

Q. Did Foday Sankoh, in Camp Naama, tell you, for example, that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and that the two of them had decided to conspire together?
MR KOUMJIAN: Objection. The questions are leading the witness into answers suggested by counsel.

PRESIDING JUDGE: What is your response, Mr Griffiths?
MR GRIFFITHS: Let me just repeat the question: "Did Foday Sankoh, in Camp Naama, tell you, for example" --
MR KOUMJIAN: He's repeating the suggestion. We all can read the transcript.

MR GRIFFITHS: -- "that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and that the two of them had decided to conspire together?"
What is the allegation being made by the Prosecution in this case? Am I not allowed to put it to the sole most senior surviving member of the RUF to get his answer on that? Why is Mr Koumjian afraid of any answer that the witness might give to a question like this, which goes to the very heart of the allegation being made by the Prosecution?

PRESIDING JUDGE: Please, order. Order. Please sit down. We've heard the objection. We've heard the response. Let me consult.

[Trial Chamber conferred]

PRESIDING JUDGE: We are of the view that this is one of the main Prosecution assertions in their case, alluded to in the indictment, and that it may be put precisely in the manner that
Mr Griffiths is putting it to the witness.

MR GRIFFITHS: I'm very grateful.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Mr Sesay, did Foday Sankoh in Camp Naama tell you that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and the two of them had decided to conspire together?

MR KOUMJIAN: I do have another objection. It's a compound question. There's two parts, and they should be separated.

PRESIDING JUDGE: I think counsel has the right to put the assertion as he has put it. Please go ahead.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Did Foday Sankoh, Mr Sesay, in Camp Naama tell you that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and the two of them had decided to conspire together?

A. No, Mr Sankoh never told me that. He never told any of us that at Naama. In fact, what we knew from Mr Sankoh and Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli and they said that the leader of the RUF who was training at Libya was called Mohamed Kabbah, he was the leader of the RUF then.

Q. I'm grateful. Let's go back to the document, shall we: "The judiciary lost its sense of justice, whereby the criminals reached triumph over the judicial system while the poor became entrapped in abject frustration and punishment. The judiciary's criminally responsible for frustrating so many youths in taken arms in this nation. Up to date, the judiciary continues to be the hallmark, spectra and behemoth of injustice and intolerance. The judiciary have refused itself to be independence."
The politicians have politicised and institutionalised corruption within their midsts. Backed by the philosophy of 'Wusai den tie cow, dog-eat-dogism.' What does that mean? What does that sentence in Krio mean?

A. Where they tie a cow, that's where it feeds from. That means where you work, you feed from there.

Q. "I.e. - 'engulfed in one big fight for survivalism and hence lost its sense of justice'."

(b) Atrocities During the Conflict.

The civil war in Sierra Leone have been catalogue with a lot of atrocities especially at a latter date, simply because of the amount of forces involved in the fight. The international community have not investigated the commission of these atrocities fully, either from the people themselves or the fighting forces. They only cast blame on the RUF due to what the so-called Government of Freetown tells them or spoon feeds people to say RUF did this to me.

The RUF will never deny involvement in committing atrocities in Sierra Leone during the 10 years civil war, but the kind of appalling atrocities committed at a latter time of the conflict cannot be attributed to the RUF, because the RUF is bounded by rules and regulations which cannot allow anybody to commit atrocity against innocent civilians whom the RUF took arms to save from the misery imposed on them by politicians."

I'm going to pause. Mr Sesay, I'm going to ask you again do you agree with this proposition: "The RUF will never deny involvement in committing atrocities in Sierra Leone during the 10 years' civil war."

Do you agree with that?
A. Yes, I agree with it, that the RUF cannot deny being involved in committing atrocities. Yes, I agree with it. But as you read, that the later part, all the atrocities in Sierra Leone was being blamed on the RUF. That's a lie. Because, for example, in Freetown, the invasion in 1999, January, even like the late Defence Minister of the SLPP who was arrested, and all of us were in detention; there were times when we had arguments with our friends, the AFRC guys, and once one morning Hinga Norman told myself, Alex Brima - Gullit - were arguing, because he told me that he wanted to testify that Superman was --

Q. This is important, so I want you to take your time. I don't want to miss a word of this. Do you get me? Now, you were having a discussion with whom? Hinga Norman, the former - what was his position?

A. He was the Defence Minister for the SLPP government during that time.

Q. Who else was involved in this discussion?

A. Tamba Alex Brima, alias Gullit.

Q. Anybody else?

A. Five-Five was there, Santigie Kanu, Morris Kallon was there and Augustine Gbao. It was in the morning at the detention centre in Freetown, because all of us were in detention.

Q. Was this while you were awaiting trial or during the trial?

A. This was during the time that Alex Tamba Brima was to go and testify in the Court. That was when he suggested this to me. And I said, "No, I was not going to accept that." So I informed Kallon and Gbao. So there was there was an argument between us. Chief Norman was the one who mediated. When Tamba Brima, alias Gullit, told me that he wanted to go and tell the Court that it
was himself and Superman who carried out the attack on January 6th. And I said, "Oh, why are you going to call out the name of Superman when Superman was not involved in the incident?" And I said, "No, I will not accept this." And I said, "In fact, I'm going to tell my colleagues." Then I told Gbao and Kallon. And Gbao said, "You see, what was their handiwork, now they want to put the blame on the RUF." He said, "Let him not even - don't even encourage him to bring those sorts of discussions to you." And Gbao invited Brima, Tamba Brima, alias Gullit, and asked him, and said, "What did you tell Issa?" When he asked him, he did not want to respond. And I came there, and I explained that Tamba had said he wanted to go and testify in court that he carried out the attack in Freetown, together with Superman. And Gbao said, "Man, you go and say what you did. Forget about the RUF, because Superman was not in Freetown and no RUF joined you in Freetown."

And Chief Norman came to calm down the situation, to talk to us, together with Tamba. And he said, "This is strange to me." He said, "I was the Defence Minister. Trust me, I myself went with the idea that it was you, the RUF and the AFRC, that carried out the attack in Freetown. So that means what, just telling lies on you guys, and we are taking sins from you. It is only now that I've realised that RUF never took part in the attack on Freetown." So Chief Norman mediated and resolved the issue. And I said, "No." And Chief Norman said, "Brima", that is Gullit, "if you are going to testify, go and testify about what the AFRC did. Don't implicate the RUF in things that they did not do. If you knew that the RUF did not take part in the attack, say that. If they did it, then you can say it. But if
you know that no RUF commander did not go to Freetown and they
were not part of the attack on Freetown, don't try to bring any
problem."

So Chief Norman advised him and he accepted it. But even
the SLPP government and the authorities in that government during
the invasion of Freetown, and after that invasion, they had the
idea that RUF was part of the attack, but it was later that they
came to realise that it was not the RUF, that the RUF took no
part in the attack on Freetown.

Q. Thank you.

PRESIDING JUDGE: If I may seek clarification, Mr Sesay.

When you say "during the 10 years of the civil war the RUF will
never deny involvement", could you be precise as to what part of
these - which 10 years you are referring to here, from which year
to which year?

THE WITNESS: Like, my Lord, I'm talking about from 1991 to
the end of the conflict. Because even like the man who wrote
this letter committed atrocities.

PRESIDING JUDGE: And when you say that you do not agree
that the RUF was responsible for the latter time of the conflict,
what specific time are you referring to as the latter time of the
conflict?

THE INTERPRETER: I'm talking about since the time the RUF
joined the AFRC in 1997 to the end of the conflict.

PRESIDING JUDGE: You are saying that the RUF does not
acknowledge committing atrocities from 1997 to the end of the
conflict, is this what you're saying?

THE WITNESS: No, that is not it. I was saying that they
were not just to cast blames on the RUF for conflicts committed
from 1997 to the end of the war; that it was only the RUF that committed atrocities. That is what I'm saying, ma'am.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Mr Sesay, let's clarify that. Do you accept, Mr Sesay, that after the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998, up until the Freetown invasion in January 1999, that a number of atrocities were committed?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was responsible for them?

A. The AFRC, some were by the RUF and some were by the CDF. And even the ECOMOG.

Q. Yes?

A. Because even the ECOMOG committed atrocities because they were dropping bombs, they were killing innocent civilians, they were shelling heavy missile rockets that dropped in civilian villages, towns and killed people.

Q. Now, who committed the bulk of the amputations which took place during that period, Mr Sesay?

A. Well, those were committed by the AFRC, because a witness testified against us during our trial and that witness was from an NGO, and they were the ones receiving the amputees from Masingbi, from Kabala, from Makeni in '98, Port Loko, up to the time for the invasion in Freetown. And all that witness's testimony, according to the witness, the areas that they received the amputees, and all the atrocities committed against the amputees, up to the early 1999, the witness testified about all of those, that they were committed by the AFRC.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE LUSSICK: But, Mr Sesay, are you saying that if it
were not for that witness you would not know who committed the atrocity?

THE WITNESS: My Lord, I know, because those atrocities committed for example in 1998, there was no RUF present in Koinadugu District from February '98 up to August. It was only the AFRC who were there. And those same AFRC moved down to Bombali District, up to the time they attacked Karina, and they went down to Port Loko District and down to Freetown in early 1999. And during those times, those were the times that the amputations actually took place, because, when we attacked Kono and we went to Masingbi, Magburaka, Makeni in December '98, no amputations took place. And even the civilians in Makeni did not see anyone being amputated in November 1998.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Does the name --

JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I thought I heard the witness say Koinadugu District. Which district did you say, Mr Sesay, that the RUF was in in 1998?

THE WITNESS: My Lord, I said from February of '98 -

from February to August of '98, RUF were not present in Koinadugu District and from --

JUDGE DOHERTY: The record shows Kono when it should be Koinadugu.

MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

Q. Mr Sesay, does the name Staff Alhaji mean anything to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he a member of the RUF?

A. No, he was AFRC.

Q. How do you come to know the name?
A. Well, I came to know that name when I attacked Kono in December 1998 and it was after the attack that I heard about Staff Alhaji and even Savage, the atrocities that they had committed in those areas in Small Sefadu, Benduma and Tombodu.

Q. What atrocities had they committed, Staff Alhaji and Savage?

A. Well, when I came and attacked Kono, they told me that those two men and their followers, they used to put people into houses in Tombodu and they would put fuel on the houses and burn them. They were amputating civilians, they were amputating ECOMOGs in Kono, in Koidu, and they were killing people.

Q. Was Savage a member of the RUF?

A. No, Savage was AFRC.

Q. I'm grateful. Let's go back to the document:

"...cannot be attributed to the RUF because the RUF is bounded by rules and regulations which cannot allow anybody to commit atrocity against innocent civilians whom the RUF took arms to save from the misery imposed on them by politicians. If you can recall from 1991 until 1996, when the first peace accord was signed on Sierra Leone in the Ivorian capital Abidjan on the 30th of November 1996, you never heard of the kind of appalling atrocities which you are hearing now. This is simply because of the principles RUF operates under. The kind of atrocities you are seeing now started in 1997 when President Kabbah took over the government of this country, coming on to the AFRC rule, ECOMOG intervention and up to pushing ECOMOG from the hinterlands to Freetown. Any RUF who is identified by any victim of committing atrocities against him or her will face the full weight of the
law. Even those who went against the ideology of the RUF during the armed struggle, steps was taken against them severely. This is why Foday Sankoh himself took time to teach the men on how to deal with civilians, prisoners of war and humanitarian laws."

During your ideology training at Camp Naama, Mr Sesay, did that training cover the topics listed here?

A. Yes.

Q. "Do not forget that a lot of forces have been involved in the fight in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Army, Kamajors, Kapras" - what is Kapras?

A. Well, they were part of the Civil Defence Force. They were on the northern axis in Sierra Leone. They were the Kapras in Tonkolili District, Bombali District and Port Loko District.

Q. What about Donsos?

A. The Donsos were also part of the CDF but they were the Konos, the Kono group. They had the Donso.

Q. What about Gbentis?

A. The Gbentis, those were in the Port Loko District.

Q. And were they part of any larger force?

A. Yes, they were part of the CDF force, because they were under the government.

Q. "ULIMO forces from Liberia based in Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes, Ghurkhas, Sandline, ECOMOG forces, especially Nigerians and Guineans, all on the part of the government and the RUF."

For President Kabbah to suggest to the United Nations for the RUF to be tried alone means covering his own atrocities committed during his blind and purported democratic rule in Sierra Leone. We fought for democracy, fair and equal justice
and human rights in Sierra Leone. During the arm struggle, if any member of the RUF was identified committing crimes against civilians, charges were levelled against him or her when found guilty and necessary steps were taken against the person.

Likewise now. We welcome action taken by international community against any member who will be identified by a victim, not only say RUF. In the same vein, what will happen to Kabbah's forces who committed worse crimes like burning of human beings alive with tyres in Freetown, ECOMOG forces killing hundreds of civilians at the Aberdeen Bridge and threw them into the river in Freetown, claiming they were rebel collaborators, using jet bombers and helicopters gunships in the killing of dozens of civilians behind the rebel line in the north and eastern part of Sierra Leone and destroying houses, raping, looting and innocent killing of civilians by pro-government forces (CDF). This has been attested to by one of the Kamajor chiefs, Francis Goba.

Do you know Francis Goba, Mr Sesay?

A. I heard the name but I don't know the person facially.

Q. Very well:

"Francis Goba in an interview with Ninja News when he classed Kamajors as worst in committing atrocities more than any fighting force who claimed to be fighting on their behalf, worst atrocities committed by Johnny Paul Koroma's West Side Boys who attacked Freetown on January 6th 1999. This have been attested tested by Mr John Selehemen of Reuters in an interview with Musa Jalloh in charge of the amputees and some of the amputees themselves in Freetown. The people of Freetown can also attest that atrocities committed in Freetown was done by the AFRC (Arm Forces Revolutionary Council) of Johnny Paul Koroma. Even West
Side themselves after arresting the 11 British soldiers, confirmed that on the BBC Focus on Africa, and above all, Gibril Massaquoi, who was detained at Pademba Road Prison, tried for treason by the Tejan Kabbah government, was removed from prison on the 6th of January 1999 and was with the West Side Boys and saw all what they did in Freetown after being released from prison, spent weeks with West Side Boys. --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreters from the Krio booth are asking that counsel be advised to slow down his pace.

MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

Q. "...January 1999 and was with West Side Boys and saw all what they did in Freetown after being released from prison, spent weeks with West Side boys in Freetown before joining the RUF troops in Waterloo. These very West Side Boys are now being trained back as the new army by the government."

Q. When was Gibril Massaquoi released from Pademba Road - sprung from Pademba Road Prison?

A. It was on the 6th of January 1999.

Q. Did he thereafter rejoin the RUF?

A. Yes, after the AFRC withdrew from Freetown, Gibril went and rejoined the RUF in Waterloo where he met Superman and Rambo.

Q. Did you, Issa Sesay, speak to Gibril Massaquoi about his experience in Freetown after he was sprung from prison?

A. Yes, when I came to Waterloo, I met him there. That was when Bockarie sent me to come and ask him to go and meet him in Buedu. But when I was ready to go, I asked him to go with me but he hide away from me. He hid away from me. But he told me at that time that they had been sprung from Pademba Road and that on
their way retreating the guys were talking about the atrocities that they had committed in Freetown. He said, "Oh, these people, they burnt down Freetown. They killed so many people. They amputated people. So many people in Freetown." And I said, "Is that so?" He said, "Yes", and I said, "Okay."

Q. And which people was Gibril Massaquoi telling you had committed these atrocities?
A. The AFRC troops who attacked Freetown.

Q. "The Mende tribal Kamajors crossed to the north from the south killing and amputating civilians in the north when they claimed are brothers and sisters of Foday Sankoh ethnic group, like in Mile 91 and Yonni Bana. There are mass graves to prove. Some civilians killed and their parts removed for their Kamajor societal activities and political stance.

There are dozens of evidence with the RUF to prove the guilt of the government in the bulk of atrocities committed in this country by her forces, some written evidence by victims in person, mass graves, recordings, documents, et cetera, et cetera. The RUF welcomes the idea of international community investigating genuinely human rights abuses in this country and not one dictated by President Kabbah's so-called suggestion of Special Court on RUF for his political gains. We fought for equal and fair justice and human rights, and we will love to see that exercise in Sierra Leone.

(c) Failure of Various Peace Accords on Sierra Leone.

There are three Peace Accords signed by parties to the conflict for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. For example, the Abidjan Accord of the 30th November 1996, the Conakry Peace Plan of 22nd October 1997 and the Lome Accord of July 7th 1999. The
question to be answered by parties to the conflict is that why has peace not returned to Sierra Leone? Generally this can be answered thus; signing international document is one thing and knowing the intentions of those signing it is another issue.

Having clear intentions to give peace to the people of Sierra Leone and political motives and entrenchment are the two aims that are seriously disturbing peace moves in Sierra Leone by parties. Until these two issues are seriously addressed, there will always be problems.

The Abidjan Accord of 30th of November 1996 could not give peace to the people of Sierra Leone due to the insincerity of President Kabbah and his cohorts. In the first place, after signing the Abidjan Accord, he, President Kabbah, summoned a meeting at his State House office where his chief of army staff, Colonel James Max Kanga, chief of defence staff, Brigadier Hassan Conteh, and deputy defence minister, Hinga Norman, including the ULIMO commander, the commander of the Nigerian air wing, the Air Force commander of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, including others, were in attendance and instructed by their commander in chief, who is also the president, to attack the RUF base where the leader Foday Sankoh left for Abidjan on the peace accord (Zogoda).

PRESIDING JUDGE: "Peace process (Zogoda)."

MR GRIFFITHS: "Peace process (Zogoda)."

Q. "This attack was successfully carried out in which nearly 150 civilians died and others wounded, and the RUF commander Zino's whereabouts was not known up-to-date. President Kabbah further told them to give the credit to the Kamajors so that he could not be seen as one not fulfilling his obligation under the
Abidjan Accord, because, when asked, he will reply that it is the
civilians going back home and he has no option of stopping them.

This was revealed in a voluntary statement by the then-army
chief of staff, Colonel James Max Kanga, during the kangaroo
court martial in 1998 in Sierra Leone. Colonel James Max Kanga
was killed by the government after the court martial, even though
he was not part of the other ranks who successfully overthrew
him, simply because he leaked the president's secret.

In another development, President Kabbah connived with the
late Head of State of Nigeria, Sani Abacha, to have our leader,
Foday Sankoh, detained after the eruption of fighting caused by
him as stated in top paragraph. Foday Sankoh went to Nigeria
upon the invitation of Sani Abacha, the then ECOWAS chairman, in
order to resolve the continued violation of ceasefire, and Kabbah
was to go there too. The RUF members sent to represent RUF on
the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace were given money by
Kabbah and the then UN Secretary-General's Special Representative
to Sierra Leone by then Mr Bahama Dinka, in order to forge new
leadership for the RUF which they attempted and failed. We know
that President Kabbah will deny this, but the question for him to
answer is - why did he ask his ambassador to Guinea, Mohamed
Jabbie, to join Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa and others to cross
into RUF territory from Guinea, to convince them to denounce the
leader, Foday Sankoh, for Philip Palmer? Why did Kabbah swiftly
go on the media on the 23 March 1997 to support Palmer and others
as new leaders of the RUF, failing to realise that he signed a
peace deal with Foday Sankoh in Abidjan? All of these people
were arrested, along with the ambassador and bodyguard called
Sergeant Gobeh, all from Guinea.
Furthermore, creating a militia group against the national army made the situation worst when they started killing one another, which is contrary to the Constitution which led to the May 25th 1997 takeover of government by the junior ranks of the army.

After the May 25th 1997 coup d'etat and subsequent takeover by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, the RUF leadership was contacted for peace where he agreed for the RUF to join the AFRC for peace, while on the detention at the Sheraton Hotel in Nigeria by Kabbah and his colleague Sani Abacha. The AFRC signed a peace agreement whereby they were to stay in power from 22 October 1997 until 20 April 1998. This agreement was signed by international community, especially ECOWAS, as mandated by the United Nations on behalf of the ousted Government of Kabbah.

This time never expired when Kabbah hired Sandline mercenaries to bring in arms to fight along with Nigerians to destroy the agreement and to violate the arms embargo on Sierra Leone by United Nations Security Council, and nothing came out of it. After Tejan Kabbah's return, he made four courts of treason for those they termed as collaborators, including our leader, Foday Sankoh, and it was in these courts that Solomon Berewa, the attorney general, said that they were not signatories to the Conakry peace plan and therefore it was not binding on them. Dozens of civilians were killed in and around Freetown in a cold blood while fighting to reinstate Kabbah, and that was the end of the Conakry peace plan. Twenty-four soldiers were killed, even though they had legitimate reasons for the overthrow, and Kabbah never listened to the international community to stop the killing of these soldiers.
The Lome Peace Accord was signed after international community, including ECOWAS, supported Tejan Kabbah to have a two-track approach on the crisis in Sierra Leone. It was Mr Francis Okelo, the United Nations Secretary-General's Representative to Sierra Leone, who saw the failure of the two-track approach that decided to forgo the military option for a political settlement which was supported by ECOWAS after the RUF had taken over two-thirds of the provinces and West Side Boys take over two-thirds of Freetown, the capital city. After months of deliberations, the agreement was signed on the 7th of July 1999. This agreement was derailed by Tejan Kabbah for its full implementation. Propaganda against the RUF was the order of the day, just to create corridor for the non-implementation of Lome. To start with, any time our leader, Foday Sankoh, went out of the country, even with his permission, he always created tensions in the country that Foday Sankoh went out to buy arms, given ugly pictures of the leadership to both the local people and the peacekeepers. President Kabbah failed to give parastatals and ambassadorial positions to the RUF, including other public offices, as agreed to in Lome. Any time RUF supporters wanted to gather either to welcome their leader back from trips or for meetings, they were stopped by Tejan Kabbah under the guise of state of emergency. But state of emergency never stopped them ganging their Kamajors and SLA troops, including their supporters, to attack the residence of Foday Sankoh on the 8th of May 2000, hence derailing the whole programme. The incident that happened between UNAMSIL and RUF was on the verge of settlement which should not have extended to this stage. We
would have made progress if they had not attacked RUF leadership, including the officials in Freetown. The deputy UNAMSIL force commander will attest to this. So the attack on RUF officials and RUF leaders was not because of what happened between UNAMSIL and RUF but a deliberate act to derail the peace process, planned and masterminded by Tejan Kabbah and Johnny Paul Koroma for political gains.

Deployment of UNAMSIL did not occur in Kono as well because Tejan Kabbah failed to set up the commission for the management of strategic resources, reconstruction and development. No office space was provided. Teams came from Britain and America to assist in setting up the commission, and there was no cooperation from President Kabbah due to his hidden agenda.

There was a lot of lapses on the part of government, including even the DDR programme, reference to RUF position paper dated 27 December 1999, which a copy was sent to the United Nations on violations of various articles of Lome by President Kabbah."

Then we come to sub-heading (d), which is the final section.

"Position of the RUF on the current peace process and her political stance. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone still believes that the only way out of the crisis in Sierra Leone is genuine peace. The creation of awareness have been made especially to the grass roots by the armed struggle. It is therefore now left with international community to count on the integrity of the parties by putting aside the past and compel parties to do the right thing in the interest of the masses.

On the part of RUF, we are also concerned about the double role of some self-seeking mediators and conflict settlers in
Africa, thus prolonging on the conflict as long as they are enriching themselves. We will partly criticise the international community for failing to fulfill their obligations under the international documents they sign. For instance, failing to give trust fund to the RUF for her political transformation, according to Lome. International community failed to prevail on politicians and leaders of various African countries to govern their countries in the interests of the masses. They sit aside until things go out of hand that lead to civil wars, only at the end for them to start saying war crimes, human rights, et cetera, et cetera. They don't condemn the politicians earlier when in power and abusing human rights.

The RUF's position is very clear as far as the ongoing peace process is concerned. UNAMSIL is allowed to deploy in our territories, which is the first step. We know we have been blamed in the past for creating obstacles to UNAMSIL deployment. It will not happen this time around. Non-governmental organisations are also welcomed into all of our territories without hindrance, but before disarmament the following have to be addressed:

The RUF knows very well that by us joining other political parties in asking for interim government, the so-called 'something' government will tend not to accept if not pressurised by international community as our people are suffering. They always say the Constitution don't have room for that. This is unacceptable to us because this same Constitution was abused by them from day one of their rule on to date. For instance, there is no provision that says when a man conduct elections, he will accept appointment in the formation of the ruling party's
government. Neither there is a provision for a foreigner to head Sierra Leone's army or police force. There are a host of other abuses of the 1991 Constitution by the so-called government. The RUF is not in position to accept any Constitution of poverty on our people.

The release of all RUF members detained by President Kabbah as he promised in his August 20th 2000 press communique in Freetown in the presence of two ECOWAS leaders which he has not done up until now.

Training of Kamajors and so-called Sierra Leone army to stop, as it is contrary to Lome, UNAMSIL is aware and have not stopped these trainings.

Mercenaries to leave Sierra Leone in the security of the state to be in the hands of UNAMSIL alone and not in conjunction with any armed group in Sierra Leone.

Disarmament to commence under an interim government as President Kabbah's 10 year of office is over. This will further enhance disarmament and speedy implementation of the peace process, a level and fair political playing field and the international community to be able to investigate human rights abuses and war crimes. This is a challenge to the Tejan Kabbah's lead government since they are claiming that the RUF is unpopular and has committed worse crimes during the conflict and do not have a political agenda. The interim government to be headed by a reputable Sierra Leonean whereby all political parties, including RUFP and civic organisations, will be absolved for true peace and reconciliation.

Disarmament to be carried out by all parties and UNAMSIL to take over State security, even up to six months after elections.
The removal of our disarmed brothers from Port Loko DDR camp to Pademba Road central prison. Some have been released and now with us while others remain languishing in the Pademba prison.

Creating obstacles for the RUF to get party house in Freetown by President Kabbah's several times is also our most concern, threaten to burn houses of anyone leased to RUF.

Treating the RUF as a separate entity and not part of their last government e.g. a big commotion arose for the withdrawal of our vehicles at the quay when they arrived last year."

Pause there. Mr Sesay, "the arrival of our vehicles at the quay", what's that about?

A. Yes, because Mr Sankoh had a friend of his, whom he went to Gibril in South Africa. He planned to send vehicles for the use of the party; after we would have disarmed, those are the vehicles we would have used for the use of the party.

Q. And with what had those vehicles been purchased in South Africa?

A. Well, he met a friend called Nkrumah. That was the name of the man. So according to Mr Sankoh, when he returned from South Africa, he said this man said he will support him to get all necessary items for the party's transformation. So he was ready to investment with Mr Sankoh, and he said after the elections Mr Sankoh would pay him back; that he wanted to invest in agriculture to cultivate big farms of corns, because he wanted went to Magburaka and Makeni and he spoke about those farms. So that was the man who was supposed to support that agricultural programme.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, you said big farms of
what?

THE INTERPRETER: Corn, C-O-R-N, your Honour.

MR GRIFFITHS: Corn.

THE INTERPRETER: Corn.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. "If these issues are not addressed, disarmament on our side will be definitely derailed and there will be a political stalemate. The RUF joins other organisations and countries in the world in support of your excellently serving another term as UN Secretary-General using our African brother and your efforts in resolving our crisis."

And we see that Gibril Massaquoi's name appears, and you will recall that over the page your name appears. And we see that this document was to be sent to a number of individuals, apart from the UN Secretary-General, those people being named.

Go back to page 9, please. Mr Sesay, the propositions which the writer of this document sets out on this page, was there any discussion within the RUF about these issues? Party offices, difficulty in getting the vehicles off the quay and so on, had there been such a discussion within the RUF?

A. Yes, those discussions went on. I was aware of them. Because even the party office in Freetown, President Kabbah used to dodge the discussions to give us the office, except when pressure was piled on him, then the office space was allocated.

And even the building was an empty house; I was the one who gave money to Mike Lamin to renovate the house, to repair it, and to buy office equipment. And even the office in Bo, they used to dodge us. And after disarmament they gave us a two-room apartment, and in Kenema President Kabbah refused giving office
to us. So I was the one who provided money to take the office in Kenema and Makeni.

Q. Yes, we can put that document away now, please.

When we adjourned yesterday, Mr Sesay, we'd been - we'd embarked on looking at some evidence heard by these Judges from a witness, TFI-571. And I was inviting your comment on some of the testimony given by that witness. I'd like to continue with that process now, please.

MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I do have an objection to exactly what counsel stated he plans to do; invite comment by the witness on another witness's testimony. There's nothing that allows a witness, and that's what Mr Sesay is, to comment on other witness's testimony. He can state facts, he can give his opinion about what happened, he can say whether something is true or not, but he can't comment and give his opinion about it.

MR GRIFFITHS: I really don't see either the logic or the sense in what Mr Koumjian is saying. Given that, for example, he, Mr Koumjian, has on several occasions invited witnesses to comment on whether another witness is a liar or has told lies or not. What's the difference? What's good for the goose is good for the gander - sit down, I haven't finished. I haven't finished.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Could we have some decorum in the Court, please. I cannot have two counsel standing at the same time and neither can I have counsel shouting at each other. Please, try and maintain decorum in this Court.

MR Griffith, I've asked you to give your response and you were in the course of doing that.
MR GRIFFITHS: I’m grateful.

The point we make is very simple. It is perfectly acceptable for a witness to be reminded of the evidence of another and for the witness to comment on that evidence. And I underline, Mr Koumjian himself has embarked on such an exercise on several occasions. So I submit, quite bluntly, that it’s totally hypocritical of him now to be making this objection. That is my response.

PRESIDING JUDGE: I’m going to give a ruling on this objection, Mr Koumjian.

It is perfectly admissible for a witness sitting in the witness box to have excerpts of past testimony read to the witness where past witnesses have given evidence relating to the participation of this particular witness or relating to events that this witness is able to speak to. There is absolutely nothing irregular about it. So the objection is overruled.

MR GRIFFITHS: I’m grateful.

I am helpfully reminded by Mr Munyard that I did not request that your Honours mark the last document for identification.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we did not hear what you said because your folder was interrupting.

MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I am helpfully reminded by Mr Munyard that I did not ask for the last document we looked at to be marked for identification.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you really require this document, because whilst I did rule that you could put the document to the witness, the witness did say yesterday that he did not know where this document emanated from and that his purported name at the
end - he couldn't associate himself with this document.
Secondly, you've read virtually the entire document into the record and the witness has commented on excerpts of it. Do you still need to mark this document for identification?

MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, please.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. The document will be marked MFI - right, this is the document entitled - well, this is a document addressed apparently, to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, it is dated 6th of April 2001, and it appears to emanate from the RUF Defence Headquarters, Makeni, and is apparently written by one Gibril Massaquoi, Secretary of and Spokesman of the RUF. So that document will be marked MFI-10.

MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

Q. Now, you recall that the aspect of this testimony that I invited your attention to yesterday was regarding the transfer of two parcels of diamonds, firstly, 43 diamonds, then 18, by - to Foya by Jungle and then on to Monrovia, do you remember that? Do you remember me asking you about that yesterday, Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, I remember.

Q. Now, thereafter, this Court was told this by the witness, he was asked, "Did Jungle" --

MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. May I have a citation?

MR GRIFFITHS: 9384. I'm picking it up at line 25.

Q. This is after the second trip, witness told these judges, that was made to Monrovia with diamonds:

"Q. Did Jungle return after he left Tongo Fields on that occasion?"

A. Well, Jungle came but he did not meet us in Tongo. By

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the time he came back, my assignment had changed."
And then he went on. He said this --
MR KOUMJIAN: Sorry. Could I just get the date? I don't have the date in front of me.
MR GRIFFITHS: Sorry. It's 8 May 2008 and I'm now going to page 9393.
Q. And the witness now goes on to deal with a meeting that took place between Waterworks and Buedu. This is page 9392, bottom line. Now, Mr Sesay, where is Waterworks?
A. You mean in Buedu? Waterworks is between Buedu and a village called Benduma, about a mile - not a complete mile but about a mile from Buedu Town.
Q. Is it on the Foya road?
A. Yes, it is that road that leads to the borderline in Dawa and when you cross you take the road to Foya.
Q. Okay. Now, the witness says this:
"Q. Why was this meeting held at this particular place?"
Page 9393, line 4:
"A. Well, at that time there was serious fighting between us and ECOMOG and we were afraid of the air raids so we decided to look out for a thick forest where we could hold the meeting, so that was why we were there."
Q. Who called this meeting?
A. Mr Bockarie.
Q. Are you able to say when this meeting took place?
A. This meeting took place after the intervention, that was in 1998.
Q. How long after the intervention?
A. Well, if my memory serves me well, because when we
left February we went to Daru, March - it was April, May, around June or even before the death of Abacha, we held that meeting before Abacha died."

He then goes on to describe Abacha being the Nigerian President. And then he continues when asked what was the purpose of the meeting, line 25:

"A. Well, Mr Bockarie called this meeting and it had so many reasons for which we held the meeting."

And then he goes on to describe, page 9394, line 6, that there were about 600 people at this meeting. Now, let me pause. Do you recall a meeting at that kind of time, Mr Sesay, between Waterworks and Buedu in a forest, attended by some 600 individuals?

A. Well, no, this is a lie. It's a lie. Because Bockarie posted me to Pendembu in late April 1998. And all the meetings that Bockarie held about the front lines in Pendembu - about the front lines, it was in Pendembu that we held the meeting about the front lines in, you know, Baiima, Mobai, Kuvia, they would come together with their staff to Pendembu. It was in Pendembu that we held the meetings. Even to create the brigade around May 1998, it was in Kailahun District that we held the meeting. But Bockarie came from Buedu and we held the meeting in Pendembu. So no meeting took place at Waterworks to my knowledge. No meeting took place there from February right up to December of 1998.

Q. I need to make you aware, Mr Sesay, the witness is claiming that this meeting took place in a thick forest between Buedu and Waterworks and some 600 people were present. Do you know of such a meeting?
A. No, no. Such a meeting never took place there.

Q. Another aspect of this. Now you will recall that the witness told these judges that this meeting took place in April, May or June of 1998. Now, this is how the witness continued, page 9394:

"Q. What happened at the meeting?
A. Well, at that time Mr Bockarie was just from Monrovia in the first place."

Q. In April, May or June of 1998 did Bockarie go to Monrovia?

A. No, Bockarie did not go to Monrovia.

Q. And I should ask you this, Mr Sesay, just so that we're clear. Do you recall any meeting called by Bockarie, attended by some 600 individuals?

A. No. Never did a meeting take place in Kailahun District under Sam Bockarie when 600 people attended who were RUF fighters, no, commanders, no.

Q. And he continues:

"A. Well, at that time Mr Bockarie was just from Monrovia in the first place and he told us about his new promotion that he had. And, secondly, he told us about the command structure between us and the AFRC. And at that time, Johnny Paul himself was present in the meeting."

Pause. Do you recall such a meeting where Johnny Paul was present?

A. No. Such a meeting did not take place.

Q. "He also told us of the role of jungle and he explained that to Johnny Paul and his men. He told us about the Fitti-Fatta operation that was supposed to take place in Kono and he told us about his travel to Burkina Faso together with General
Ibrahim."

Now, when was it that Bockarie went to Burkina Faso?

A. That was late November 1998.

Q. In or about April, May or June of 1998 did Bockarie go to Burkina Faso with Ibrahim Bah?

A. Not at all.

Q. Help me, when was the Fitti-Fatta mission?

A. The Fitti-Fatta mission was in late July to early August 1998.

Q. Prior to the Fitti-Fatta mission, did Bockarie go to Burkina Faso?

A. I said no.

Q. "He told us about his travel to Burkina Faso together with General Ibrahim and that General Ibrahim was supposed to move with him. He discussed so many other things but I think those were the major things that we discussed. He also told us about the diamonds that Issa took along with him that he said got missing. That was in Monrovia."

Do you recall such a discussion at a meeting involving 600 individuals?

A. No. No such meeting took place. In fact, even the Fitti-Fatta that this person is claiming about, that Fitti-Fatta mission, at the time Sam Bockarie invited Superman, it was only Sam Bockarie, Mike Lamin and Superman who had a meeting. And even that was held in Sam Bockarie's room. That was where they discussed about the plan to attack Kono during the Fitti-Fatta mission. Because even for me, Sam Bockarie called me, because by then I was in Pendembu, and this person who was speaking here was in Baiima at this time. And after the meeting that Superman held
with Sam Bockarie, he and Mike Lamin - Sam Bockarie gave his jeep, his Land Cruiser, to Mike Lamin. Superman and his bodyguards in Mike Lamin's vehicle. They travelled to Pendembu where they met me and from there Mike Lamin stayed with me in Pendembu and Superman said he was going to visit the front lines in Baiima, Mobai and Kuiva.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Please slow down as you are narrating your testimony. Slow down, please, for everybody's sake. Continue.

THE WITNESS: So Superman left. Mike Lamin stayed with me in Pendembu. Superman said he was going to visit the front lines. He went to Baiima, he met the battalion commander and his men. He left there, he went to Mobai and from there he went to Kuiva.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Which part of slow down did you not understand, Mr Sesay? Do you understand when I say slow down and address the judges? Your testimony is not to counsel. It is to us. So you face us and slow down and give your testimony. Slowly, please.

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. What were you saying, Mr Sesay?
A. Yes, I've heard that, my Lord.
Q. Go on, Mr Sesay.
A. Yes. Where did I stop?
Q. Let me remind you. You were saying this: And after that meeting that Superman held with Sam Bockarie, he and Mike Lamin - Sam Bockarie gave his Land Cruiser to Mike Lamin. Go on from there.
A. I said Sam Bockarie gave his Land Cruiser to Superman.
Mike Lamin used his own vehicle, he also had a Land Cruiser. And both of them drove, they came to Pendembu where they met me and then Mike Lamin stayed in Pendembu with me and Superman told me that he was going to visit the front lines. From Pendembu Superman went to Baiima, and from Baiima he went to Mobai. From Mobai he went to Kuiva, he went to Baiwala and then he came back to Pendembu and went to Buedu.

So to say that there was any battalion commander, be it Baiima, Mobai, or Kuiva, who attended the meeting at the time Superman came to Buedu and they held it before the attack on Kono or the Fitti-Fatta mission, that is a black lie. Because even the witness that the Prosecution brought against me during my trials who was Superman's operator, who was part of the people who came with Superman from Kono to Buedu, that witness testified before Trial Chamber I that Superman, Mike Lamin and Sam Bockarie were the people who held the meeting in Sam Bockarie's room and they planned the attack on Kono.

So there was no other commander, including me, who left from outside Buedu and attended that meeting. The meeting - in the meeting were only Superman, Mike Lamin and Bockarie.

Q. Now, the witness went on, Having been asked this question:

"Q. What did he say about his new promotion?"

Answer, page 9395:

"A. Well, he left us in Sierra Leone and went to Monrovia and we were - we used to call him Colonel Bockarie and then he came with two promotions and those were high promotions. He was called general now, he and Issa Sesay, and he said it was President Taylor, Pa Taylor, who gave them that promotion."
In April, May or June of 1998, Mr Sesay, were you promoted to the rank of general by Pa Taylor?

A. No. Throughout 1998, up to December, I was a colonel, and that was what everybody knew within the RUF. Mr Taylor did not promote me.

Q. Did Mr Taylor promote Sam Bockarie to the rank of general in April, May, June of 1998?

A. No, not at all. It was Johnny Paul Koroma who promoted Sam Bockarie to brigadier in March of '98, and that was the rank that Sam Bockarie used up to December 1998.

Q. So help us: This evidence of Bockarie being promoted in Monrovia, is it true or false?

A. It's a big lie because everybody in Kailahun within the RUF knew that Sam Bockarie was promoted to the rank of brigadier by Johnny Paul in 1998.

Q. Now, the witness was further asked this: He was asked about what Bockarie said about the command structure between us and the AFRC, and he said this:

"A. Well, he made it clear to all the AFRC men who were present that AFRC was no longer in power and that where we had now come, it was called the jungle, and that everybody was supposed to be under the RUF command and that the RUF - anywhere the RUF was serving as a commander, the AFRC should serve as a deputy."

Q. Do you recall anything like that, Mr Sesay?

A. Well, those things did not happen during any meeting.

Q. And then he said this, having been asked:

"Q. Was that something that was accepted at the meeting?

A. Yes, everyone accepted, up to the leader, the leader
for the AFRC. All of them accepted, all of us, and those
of us who was there besides SAJ Musa."

Now, do you recall such a meeting taking place between
Waterworks and Buedu where SAJ Musa was present?

10:43:22
A. No. SAJ Musa never went to Kailahun throughout '98. SAJ
Musa did not even go to Kono, let alone Kailahun.

Q. But he goes on:
"Q. Was SAJ Musa at that meeting?
A. No, no, no. He was not there, but after the meeting
they made it possible to send it as a message to all the
front lines."

Then this question:
"Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about the role of Jungle at
the meeting?

10:43:56
A. Well, he put it clear to Pa Paul, Pa Johnny Paul, that
that was the man whom the leader had introduced to us to be
Pa Ghankay’s own representative in the RUF territory. So
he was the person that always linked us to Pa Taylor, and
he wanted them to know that for them to recognise him."

What about that, Mr Sesay?

10:44:26
A. It’s a lie. That type of meeting did not take place. It’s
a big lie. Since the time Johnny Paul went to Buedu, when we
arrived in Buedu from Kono, he did not attend any meetings
between March and August in Buedu. He did not attend any
meetings wherein he addressed people, nor did he and Sam Bockarie
attend any meetings where they addressed people.

10:44:52
Q. Okay. Then this, page 9396, line 5. This question was
asked:
"Q. What was said about the Fitti-Fatta mission?
A. Well, he said" - that's Bockarie - "he would want us to go and clear the mining area" - that is Kono - "and that the Pa" - Mr Taylor that is - "had told him that nothing goes for nothing and that he had no machine to make arms, that they were materials. He also brought them from some other areas, so he said - he said we should go and capture the mining area so we would be able to get money from there and get the materials."

And then he goes on to confirm that the Pa who was said that to him was Mr Taylor. Do you recall anything like that ever being said by Sam Bockarie, Mr Sesay?

A. No. Sam Bockarie never said so, and even the meetings he attended in Pendembu to create the brigades, he never said that, because for me this type of meeting that he's talking about here, no such meeting ever took place in 1998 between Waterworks and Buedu. This is a lie.

Q. Now, just help us, Mr Sesay. Having been a senior commander in the RUF, you should be able to assist us with this. When the RUF were discussing the planning of an operation such as the Fitti-Fatta mission, who would be present at such a meeting?

A. Well, because what I am testifying about here is the reality that happened. Before the Fitti-Fatta attack, it was only Superman who carried out the attack. Mike Lamin, who was advisor to Bockarie, and Bockarie, they were the ones who discussed these things in Sam Bockarie's bedroom. No other commander took place in that discussion. And for me, it was after the meeting that they came to me, they met me in Pendembu, and that was the time Mike Lamin informed me about the things that they discussed in that meeting. And even for me, at the
time I was going to attack Kono, the meeting we held at Waterworks, it was only myself, the commanders and Sam Bockarie's adjutants and the late SYB Rogers. We did not invite any other commander, who is a junior commander, on the front line to attend the meeting. You, the commander, who was going to undertake the operation will be at the meeting with Sam Bockarie, including his advisor, Mike Lamin. And if it was necessary, it will include the war council chairman. Because to plan such a meeting, you did not need to involve all commanders, junior commanders, because we wouldn't want the information to leak out. Because, when you are planning an attack, you will have to keep it a confidential business until the day of the attack, or two or three days before the attack because, if the information went out, the junior fighters would go around saying it and they would spread out the information saying that, "Oh, we are going to attack so and so place", and we did not want that kind of thing. We did not like that. So in planning an attack, that is not something you will have to assemble everybody to discuss; no, we never used to do things like that.

Q. Question, line 19, page 9396:

"Q. Another thing that you said was discussed at the meeting was Sam Bockarie's travel to Burkina Faso with General Ibrahim.

Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about that?

A. He said that Mr Taylor told him that he would link in with Blaise Compaore, the President of Burkina Faso, and it was Mr Ibrahim who was going to travel with him, he was to move with him to Burkina Faso."

Now, who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso,
Mr Sesay?

A. Well, at the first time I knew that Sam Bockarie went to Burkina Faso was late November 1998, because Sam Bockarie went at first to Monrovia in September and he returned; he went again in October and returned; and, after his return, he invited me from Pendembu, when I went. He said he had met with President Taylor on two different occasions about the revisitation of the Abidjan Accord and he said that President Taylor said that he was going to contact the OAU chairman, who was President Blaise at that time. So his travel to Burkina Faso, according to Bockarie, President Taylor had spoken to Blaise about Sam Bockarie's travel. That was when he, Eddie --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked to slow down in that area and repeat it slowly.

Q. Mr Sesay, I'd like you to take it up from this part, please: "So his travel according to Burkina Faso, according to Bockarie, President Taylor had spoken to Blaise about Sam Bockarie's travel." Go on from there.

A. Yes. I said when Bockarie returned after his second visit in October, and before he left in November, he told me that I and Mike Lamin should come and stay in Buedu until his return. He said because President Taylor had told him that he was going to contact President Blaise Compaore about his - about the revisitation of the Abidjan Peace Accord. So Sam Bockarie told me that --

JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Griffiths, your question was: Who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso?

MR GRIFFITHS: Correct.
JUDGE LUSSICK: What is the answer?

MR GRIFFITHS: I'm coming back to it.

Q. Who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso, Mr Sesay?

A. It was President Taylor.

Q. And why was Sam Bockarie going to Burkina Faso?

A. Sam Bockarie said he had discussed with President Taylor about the revisitation of the Abidjan Peace Accord. So that was why Mr Taylor said he was going to contact the ECOWAS leaders - other ECOWAS leaders, because they were the guarantors for the accord, for them to revisit the Abidjan Accord.

Q. Thank you. Now, the witness was also asked this: About what you, Issa Sesay, had done. And the question was this?

"Q. Another topic that was discussed by Sam Bockarie at the meeting was something that Issa Sesay had done, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about Issa Sesay at the meeting?

A. Well, he told us. He said sorry to everybody for what happened. And he asked for forgiveness from Mr Sesay for what he did when he took the diamonds with him to Monrovia and he said on his way they had gone missing. Those were the things that he told us.

Q. Who asked for forgiveness?

A. Well, Sam Bockarie said so. He said Issa said we should forgive him. And he said when he went - when he went, the Pa himself told him that we should forgive him."

The Pa being Taylor. Do you recall any such thing being
said, Mr Sesay?

A. No. No such things took place in any meetings.

Q. And then returning to the learned judge’s question a moment ago, the witness was asked this question:

"Q. Did Sam Bockarie say why Charles Taylor was going to link him to Burkina Faso, send him to Burkina Faso?

A. Yes. Because he said he told him about the mission that we were to take to free the leader. And it was a mission that involved heavy materials, because we were supposed to clear the ECOMOG force before we get to Freetown. So he said he was going to link him up where we would be able to get direct material so that we would bring them over and be able to run the mission."

Did you have such a discussion with Bockarie, Mr Sesay?

A. I did not have such discussion with Bockarie and Bockarie did not tell anybody that throughout 1998. And even before he went to Burkina Faso he did not say that to anybody. And even when he came back before we attacked Kono, we had no plans in mind to attack Freetown.

Q. Now, you will have noted that in the course of that answer this individual mentioned a mission to free the leader. So the witness was asked this:

"Q. What were you referring to?

A. Well, that was Operation Free the Leader, and that was the material he went for, for us to come and run the mission to capture Freetown and free the leader."

I'll pause there before I continue. Do you recall an RUF operation called Operation Free the Leader, Mr Sesay?

A. No, I do not recall any operation that we named Operation
Free the Leader. Even the operation that I took to Kono did not have any name. But, you know, sometimes when you carry out a successful operation, fighters will give any kind of name to that operation. But to say we gave it a name that it was Operation Free the Leader or that Sam Bockarie gave it a name, no.

Q. Just to complete this, the witness continued by saying that this meeting lasted for some eight hours; line 13, page 9398. So the witness is talking about a meeting in a thick forest involving 600 people in which all of these things were discussed and the meeting lasted for eight hours. Do you recall such a meeting, Mr Sesay?

A. I do not recall any meeting of the such because we did not hold any meeting in 1998 that lasted for eight hours. The only meeting we had at Waterworks in December 1998, before I went to Kono, was about how to go and attack Kono and after that, we all dispersed.

Q. Now, I need to take you through some more of this account in order to come to the next matter that I want to deal with, in order to put it in context. This question was asked, line 14, page 9398:

"Q. Did anyone apart from Sam Bockarie speak at that meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. It was Sam Bockarie who spoke more and then later Jungle spoke and he buttressed the introduction that Mr Sam did, told the former AFRC members and he did say that he would try his utmost best to see that things worked out well. So he said so. And then later Johnny Paul too spoke
Q. Can you remember whether there were high level commanders at the meeting?
A. Yes."

And he went on to name that Bockarie was there, Johnny Paul was there, Jungle was there, Issa Sesay - that's you - was there, Eddie Kanneh was there, Gullit was there, AB, FOC, and some other commanders. Then he goes on to give details about those commanders. He again goes on:

"A. Yes, Gullit was there. Gullit was there and Superman was there, Morris Kallon was there and Akim Turay was there."

And then he continues at page 9423.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps we could continue with that new page after the break, the midmorning break.

MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll reconvene at half past eleven.

[Break taken at 11.01 a.m.]

PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Koumjian?

MR KOUMJIAN: There is a change of appearance. We are joined by Brenda J Hollis.

MR GRIFFITHS: Can I also register a change of appearance. We have been joined by Ms Logan Hambrick.

PRESIDING JUDGE: That is noted. Please continue.

Q. Mr Sesay, in April, May, June of 1998, where was Gullit?
A. In May of 1998, Gullit left Kailahun and went to Kono. From Kono he went to Koinadugu.
Q. Now, the witness was asked this at page 9423 in relation to that meeting which we have been talking about:

"Q. What were the topics that were discussed at that particular meeting?

A. Well, firstly, we discussed about trying to free the leader, and in that case we were to reattack Kono and go up to Freetown and then free our leader and take over power. We also discussed the disloyalty of SAJ Musa."

Now, pause there. I've already asked you, Mr Sesay, whether you had ever heard of an Operation Free the Leader, and you answered in the negative. Do you recall a meeting at which a mission to go up to Freetown was discussed?

A. No.

Q. Well, then he goes on. He was asked this:

"Q. When you say the first target should be Kono, to Makeni, up to Freetown. What do you mean by that, the first target was to be Kono?"

Now, let's pause there. When you embarked on that mission to capture Kono in December 1998, Mr Sesay, was it part of the plan that after Makeni was captured, you should go on to Freetown?

A. No. That was not part of the plan, because before I left Buedu, we were not sure of capturing Kono even, so there was no other further plan, apart from the Kono attack.

Q. Now, he goes on:

"Q. What do you mean that the first target was to be Kono?"

A. Well, Kono is a mining area. In that whole country, that is the place we know, the high level productivity for
diamonds, so we believed that if we were able to capture there first it would have been good for us. That was the reason why Kono. He said 'Kono should serve as the first target that we should capture'."

Now, I'm pausing again to ask you this: Mr Sesay, was the capture of Kono in December 1998 motivated by a desire to commence mining on behalf of the RUF?

A. No. That was not the motive, because when we retreated from Freetown, we went through Kono and to Kailahun, and ECOMOG advanced to Kono and the deployment that they had in Kono was so strong, so we attacked Kono to pursue ECOMOG, it was not with the intent of mining.

Q. "Q. Were any particular commanders given the role of capturing Kono?

A. Well, yes.

Q. Who?

A. Well, Sam Bockarie told us that this plan was designed in Monrovia by Mr Taylor. He said it was designed in Monrovia so he only brought it to brief us, that this should be the way we should do things so that we will be able to succeed in the war."

Now, the decision to attack Kono, Mr Sesay, was that devised in Monrovia by Charles Taylor?

A. No, not at all. It was at the meeting that we held at Waterworks. It was there that Sam Bockarie planned and discussed the meeting - the attack with us, and he never said that the attack on Kono was an instruction he got from Mr Taylor, no.

Q. Page 9425. Line 22 - 21:

"Q. What commanders were given the role of clearing Makeni?"
A. It was Issa who was the overall for that operation and Morris Kallon was his deputy and Superman was third in command."

Is that true?

A. No. That is not true.

Q. Who was your deputy in that operation to capture Kono and then on to Makeni?

A. Morris Kallon was the 2IC to me, the deputy, but from Kono to Makeni Superman was not with us, it was in Makeni that we met with Superman. And when we met in Makeni, Superman was senior to Kallon. It was not possible for Superman to be third in command.

When we met in Makeni for this short time, after me it was Superman who was second in command.

Q. Now, the witness continued in this way:

"Q. Then you said on to Freetown" - remember, the plan discussed at the meeting, according to this witness, is capture Kono, then Makeni, then on to Freetown:

"Q. Then you said on to Freetown. Was anyone given the role of moving on to Freetown?"

Q. "Q. Then you said on to Freetown. Was anyone given the role of moving on to Freetown?"

A. Yes. They gave the mission to somebody.

Q. Who?

A. Well, Sam Bockarie sent the message to SAJ Musa, even before they attacked Kono but he refused. He rejected
the orders. He said he cannot take orders from him. So there was a heated argument over the issue."

Now, I want you to understand what this witness was telling these judges, Mr Sesay. Did Sam Bockarie send a message to SAJ Musa giving him the role of moving on to Freetown?

A. Not at all.

Q. I want us to be clear, Mr Sesay. Because what this person was telling these judges was this; that the decision to attack Kono, Makeni and then on to Freetown was formulated in Monrovia, brought back to Sierra Leone by Sam Bockarie, and that Sam Bockarie gave an order to SAJ Musa to carry out the Freetown leg of the attack. Did any such thing take place?

A. This is a bloody lie. It's a lie. Because the attack on Freetown was an independent attack by the AFRC, planned by SAJ Musa, and Bockarie was not part of it. And before this time, that is, before December, Bockarie and SAJ Musa never communicated. For a long time they never communicated with each other, so this is a lie. And even when I captured Makeni, we did not just capture Makeni and say we should move to Freetown. No, when we captured Makeni, we made an attempt to capture Kabala - when we attacked Kabala, I organised troops and we attacked Bumbuna and we attacked Mile 91. So we did not just go to Makeni, and we took the road straight to Freetown like we had a plan to go to Freetown just after Makeni, no.

Q. On this issue of SAJ Musa, this witness's testimony continued in this way. He was asked about this heated argument between Bockarie and SAJ Musa, and he answers in this way, page 9426, line 18:

"A. After the meeting - but there had been arguments even
before the meeting, before this mission there had been an
argument. Just at the time Sam Bockarie sent the message
to all the stations, right from that time, SAJ Musa was not
happy about it. He was disgruntled, right up to this
mission time. And after they had held the meeting. He
sent the same order to SAJ Musa and he refused even before
the Kono thing."

And then he continues, page 9427, line 3:
"Q. The second issue that you said was discussed at the
meeting was SAJ Musa.

A. Yes.

Q. What was it about SAJ Musa that was discussed at the
meeting?

A. Well, Sam Bockarie told us that the complaint had gone
up to Mr Taylor, that the man's complaint had been lodged
about his disloyalty towards the mission and he too gave
his own piece of advice.

Q. Sam Bockarie told you that a complaint had gone up to
Mr Taylor? Who is the man that made the complaint?

A. Sam Bockarie lodged the complaint to Mr Taylor against
SAJ Musa, regarding his attitude."

Now, do you recall SAJ - do you recall Sam Bockarie making
such a complaint to Mr Taylor about SAJ Musa's refusal to accept
this mission, Mr Sesay?

A. No. This is my first time to hear about this issue even,
this topic. That never happened. And what I knew, and that was
what happened - that was what used to happen from February of
1998 SAJ Musa and Bockarie had no discussion of sending message
to each other until December when SAJ Musa died in 1998. They
never had any business of operation.

Q. And this individual went on to say this in answer to this question:

"Q. At the meeting was there any other discussion about SAJ Musa? Apart from the fact that Sam Bockarie had made a complaint to Mr Taylor?

A. Yes. Mr Bockarie made us to understand that that man should not live to tell the story."

And on the next page he said:

"A. He - that being Bockarie - said we should go all out to ensure that that man should not live to tell the story. He said" - line 23 - "we should only be able to get him when there was a mission, when there was an operation going on. He" - that being Bockarie - "even made us to understand that that was something he was discussing with Gullit; that during any mission that man should not live, he should die because he was a traitor, he referred to him as a traitor."

And it goes on, page 9429:

"A. In the military terms, they said it should be during operations, you know, if they will mean arms he should die during the battle. He should be shot."

Now, do you recall Sam Bockarie - let me start again, my fault. Where did SAJ Musa die?


Q. How did he die?

A. Well, I was not present. What I heard later was that when they had captured Benduma, SAJ Musa and others captured a lot of weapons and ammunition, including bombs.
Q. And?
A. And the bombs were in the ammunition dump. So they said it was SAJ Musa who said they were to set the ammunition dump alight, so it was after the place was set on fire, it was one of the bombs that - it was one of the fragments that caught him and that was how he died, but I was not present, I only heard it.

Q. Do you recall Bockarie discussing with Gullit the killing of SAJ Musa during a military operation?
A. This is my first time to hear this, because before SAJ Musa joined Gullit and others, when they planned the attack on Freetown, because SAJ Musa came from Kurubonla after the infighting between himself and Superman, then he came and joined Gullit's group in Major Eddie Town. That was where they planned the attack on Freetown. Before that time, Bockarie and Gullit were not on speaking terms. But before this time, before they joined him in Major Eddie Town --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this area slowly, kindly.

MR GRIFFITHS: Pause.

Q. Pause, Mr Sesay. Before that time, Bockarie and Gullit were not on speaking terms. But before this time, before they joined in Major Eddie Town. Pick it up from there, please.

A. Yes. When SAJ Musa arrived in Major Eddie Town, he gave a strong warning to Alfred Brown and King Perry that they were not to go close to the radio set. From that time, in Major Eddie Town, right up to the time SAJ Musa died, Bockarie was not in contact with any - he was neither in contact with SAJ Musa, nor with Gullit before SAJ Musa died, there was no communication between them.
Q. Well, the witness was further asked on this topic, though, this question:

"Q. Did he say who should shoot him?
A. He - that being Bockarie - "just told us that he had spoken to Gullit and that the two of them had been discussing that even before Gullit went to where SAJ Musa was, that was what he made us to understand. It was the discussion that he had with Gullit. He did not specify who should do the shooting, but the decision - the discussion had been going on with Gullit."

And then counsel for the Prosecution returned to the topic at a later stage, page 9450:

"Q. Just one matter that I wish to return to from your evidence this morning. When I was asking you questions about the meeting that took place in December 1998, the three-hour meeting" --

PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you reading from page 9450?

MR GRIFFITHS: 9450.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Could we please have that page on the overhead.


Q. "Q. Just one matter I wish to return to from your evidence this morning, when I was asking you questions about the meeting that took place in December 1998, the three-hour meeting, and you said one of the issues was the SAJ Musa issue, I asked you this: Did Sam Bockarie say how SAJ Musa was to die? And you gave this answer:

Well, in the military terms, they say it should be during operations, you know. If they will mean arms, he should
die during the battle, he should be shot. Can you just explain what you meant by that answer."

A. What I meant, when they said somebody should die, he should be killed in a battle or in operation. We were not fighting with sticks. A commander will not come to tell you that you should use a knife or a stick. During battles we were using rifles, that's why I said the man should be killed with an arm. That was why I said he should be killed during the battle. Arms should be used. I don't know if that is clear enough."

A. That man was a commander and he had a lot of soldiers under his command. He cannot be lying in his house while there were securities and you would go there and kill him. That would not be easy. The only time you would get your colleague, that should be when firing was going on, when everybody would be concentrating on the enemy. That was the easiest time you would kill somebody that you had targeted."

Did Bockarie give an order for the killing of SAJ Musa, Mr Sesay?

A. Bockarie did not give such orders. And even the ones who were with SAJ Musa where SAJ Musa died, they were not taking instructions from Bockarie before SAJ Musa's death. And Gullit left Kailahun in April of 1998, and even the instructions that Bockarie gave to him was to go and join Superman to defend Kono. But on Gullit's arrival in Kono, he did not go by the instructions. He gathered the AFRC group and they joined SAJ
Musa. From that time Gullit did not take instructions from Sam Bockarie until that December, after the death of SAJ Musa, when he contacted Bockarie and he told Bockarie that SAJ Musa was dead. And even there, Bockarie did not believe him. But before the death of SAJ Musa there was no communication between Gullit and Sam Bockarie.

And, honestly, from what Gullit used to tell me, Bockarie would not give orders to Gullit to kill SAJ Musa. Gullit and SAJ Musa grew up together. They were born in the same Wilberforce Barracks and during the NPRC Gullit was a bodyguard to SAJ Musa and - and SAJ Musa was his commander. Even before the overthrow, and even when they had overthrown, when the AFRC took power, it was Gullit who called who told Johnny Paul to call SAJ Musa to come. So Gullit cannot obey those orders. Not at all.

Q. Now, the meeting at which this instruction or discussion took place, we are told, going back to page 9429, line 27, that this meeting was at night in December of 1998. Line 17:

"A. It was a very short meeting, just for three hours, because it was at night and we did not even want Johnny Paul to know."

So let's be clear what this individual was telling these judges, Mr Sesay. The meeting to plan the attack on Kono, then on to Makeni, then on to Freetown, took place at night and Sam Bockarie was at pains that Johnny Paul Koroma shouldn't know anything about it. Is that correct?

A. That is not correct, because the meeting about the attack on Kono was in the afternoon. We went and sat by a water well. There is - there is a barri at the water well, we were in that meeting. That is myself, Mike Lamin, Eddie Kanneh, late SYB
Rogers, Lawrence Womandia and Rashid Sandy who was the adjutant general at that time. After that afternoon meeting - we spent about one hour 30 minutes in that meeting. The following day we went to Johnny Paul in Kangama and Sam Bockarie briefed Johnny Paul. And the following day, Mike Lamin escorted me, that is Mike Lamin, myself and Bockarie, we went there and Bockarie informed Johnny Paul about the plan that he had made to attack Kono. And the following day Mike Lamin escorted me to the Moa River and I travelled together with Morris Kallon to Kono. So Johnny Paul was fully aware. Myself, Bockarie and Mike Lamin met him and he was informed by Bockarie about the attack on Kono.

Q. Thank you very much. Can we go to page 9430, please.

MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. My understanding was that the question was when he was informed about the plan to kill Gullit, not the plan to attack Kono. That was the question as I understood it.

MR KOUMJIAN: Sorry, yes.

PRESIDING JUDGE: The problem the question is asked and then so much else is said. Now I'm trying to find the last question.

MR GRIFFITHS: The question was:

"So let's be clear what this individual was telling these judges, Mr Sesay, the meeting to plan the attack on Kono, then on to Makeni, then on to Freetown took place at night and Sam Bockarie was at pains that Johnny Paul Koroma shouldn't know anything about it. Is that correct?"

And the witness has then gone on to explain how Johnny Paul
Koroma was in fact informed about it.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Indeed. What is irregular about that,

Mr Koumjian?

MR KOUMJIAN: Because that's misstating the testimony of

the witness from the transcript. The witness in the transcript

makes it clear that it's the plan to kill SAJ Musa that Johnny

Paul Koroma was not to be informed about. That's what

I understood what counsel read.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Was this a different meeting than the

meeting in which it was discussed to attack Kono? Was it a
different meeting?

MR KOUMJIAN: That's my understanding.

PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, the evidence is what the

witness says it is.

MR GRIFFITHS: Well --

PRESIDING JUDGE: It remains to us to make what we will of

it.

MR GRIFFITHS: I'm sure it's my fault, Madam President, and

I'm sure I'm the one who is being stupid, but I note that at page

9429 the witness says this:

"Q. This particular meeting, how long did it go on for?
A. It was a very short meeting, just for three hours,
because it was at night and we did not even want Johnny
Paul to know."

You go to page 9430, line 18:

"Q. This meeting, this three hour short meeting, was there
anything else discussed apart from the plan to attack
Freetown and the SAJ Musa issue?
A. Yes."
So it's one meeting at which a number of different things are discussed. This is a Prosecution witness, so I cannot understand why there is this difficulty in understanding the testimony of their own witness.

PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, please proceed.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So let's go to page 9430:

"Q. This meeting, this three hour short meeting, was there anything else discussed apart from the plan to attack Freetown and the SAJ Musa issue?

A. Yes.

Q. What?

A. Well, at that time, even the leader who had his revolution was there. That should be the first target to go to Pademba Road and to free - to release the leader. And second we were to go to State House and overthrow the President and, if possible, if we met him there, we should kill him.

Q. Just so it is clear, what President is to be overthrown and possibly killed?

A. President Kabbah.

Q. And what leader was to be released from Pademba Road?

A. Foday Sankoh.

Q. The person Jungle who you discussed yesterday, was he at this meeting?

A. Yes, yes. He was part of this 12-man meeting.

Q. Did Jungle speak at the meeting?

A. Yes."
you've already assisted us, Mr Sesay, as to who was present, was there a discussion at that meeting that in addition to moving on Freetown, that Foday Sankoh was to be released from Pademba Road Prison?

A. We did not have any discussions about Mr Sankoh and we did not have any discussions and any plans about attacking Freetown during that meeting. The only discussion we had was when Bockarie told us - those of us who were there and the other people - and it was about the attack on Kono. Not even Makeni, because we were not that sure whether I was even going to be able to attack Kono. So we did not have any other plan. The target was Kono, and that was the only thing that we discussed during that meeting.

Q. But I need your assistance, Mr Sesay, because this individual was giving a very detailed account to these judges and I need your assistance with the detail. Now, was there a discussion about killing President Kabbah at that meeting?

A. No, no. We did not discuss anything pertaining to President Kabbah.

Q. Secondly, was Jungle present at that meeting?

A. Jungle was not present at that meeting. Those of us who attended the meeting were seven in number and those were the names I have called. Jungle was not present. Not at all.

Q. Where was Jungle at this time in December 1998?

A. Jungle was in Liberia, he was not in Buedu.

Q. How do you know?

A. Well, had he been in Buedu I would have known because it was myself, Mike Lamin --

THE INTERPRETERS: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
to repeat that area slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Could you just start again, please, from the beginning,

Mr Sesay. Thanks.

A. I said it was myself, Mike Lamin and Sam Bockarie who
remained in Buedu. Look at Sam Bockarie's house here and my
house is across the other side, the other road. And had Jungle
been in Buedu I would have known, but Jungle was not there. And
even when Sam Bockarie came back, when we had the meeting, up to
the time I left, Jungle was still not there.

JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Sesay, you've told us you know Jungle
the was not in Buedu. How do you know he was in Liberia?

THE WITNESS: My Lord, Jungle used to go to Liberia because
when I met with him in Liberia in April - and I had told you that
it was Jungle who used to bring food supply from the Lebanese,
from Hijazi and Fayard. So had Jungle been in Buedu, I would
have been in the know. But he was not there. He was in Liberia.

JUDGE LUSSICK: You're saying that if he's not in Buedu,
the only other place he possibly could have been is Liberia? Is
that what you're saying?

THE WITNESS: Yes, because in 1998, he used to stay in
Liberia when he used to come with Fayard and the other man and
they would come and go back. So if he was not in Buedu, he would
go to his people in Foya Tinkia where he would spend some time.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, the witness continued in this vein:

"Q. Did Jungle speak at the meeting?

A. Yes. Later, after the plan had gone on, Sam Bockarie
spoke to Mr Taylor about the plan, how the mission was to carry on, and "they briefed President Taylor, the former President, about the plan, how it was set. After that, Jungle too buttressed the same topic to him, how the plan had been made, and he in turn thanked them and told them to carry on and that he said he should pray that the mission should be successful."

Now, do you recall, following that meeting at Waterworks that you've told us about, that Bockarie called President Taylor to brief him about the plan, how it was set?

A. No. After the meeting, all of us went on board the vehicles, the vehicles that we had used to go there. We all boarded the vehicles back and came back to Buedu. Bockarie did not have any communications with President Taylor, no.

Q. Well, I need to press you a little further on this. Can we go back to page 9424, please? And I want to ask you which of the two propositions is right. At page 9424, line 24, this individual told the judges: "Well, Sam Bockarie told us that this plan, the plan to capture Kono, Makeni, then Freetown, was designed in Monrovia with Mr Taylor."

When we go to page 9431, this same individual was saying, line 16: "They briefed President Taylor about the plan, how it was set."

Now what I want your assistance with is this: Was the plan designed in Monrovia or was the plan designed in Sierra Leone and then Mr Taylor was briefed about it? Which of the two is right?

A. The plan to attack Kono was discussed and decided right in Buedu at the Waterworks and Bockarie gave the mission to me.
I was the one now who came ahead and made the plan to attack Koidu Town and to meet with the others whom I met in Kono.

Q. Tell me, Mr Sesay, was Charles Taylor involved in any way in creating this plan to attack Kono?

A. As far as I know, no. He had nothing to do with the plan about the attack on Kono. It was RUF who planned to attack Kono.

Q. Page 9432, line 5:

"Q. What did Jungle say at the meeting?

A. Well, in the first place, Jungle himself told us about the material that Mr Bockarie had brought and that we should not fear this time round, and that there was no force to that could withstand us. That was what he said in the meeting and he said he had discussed it with the Pa in Monrovia even before they came.

Q. And did he say what the Pa had said in Monrovia?

A. Yes. It was just what Sam Bockarie told us. He just spoke about the same issue Sam Bockarie had spoken about, that the Pa had said our first target should be Kono before we should proceed."

"Q. Did Jungle say in the meeting what the Pa had said to Jungle in Monrovia?

A. Yes, that is what I explained. They said they were the ones who came so he too told us about the materials that had been brought for the mission and that the Pa, that they had discussed with the Pa how the mission should go on. That is Pa Taylor."

Now, another detail, Mr Sesay, and it's this: In that third trip that Bockarie made to Monrovia and then on to Burkina
Faso, did Jungle go with him?

A. No. Jungle was not part of the group with which Bockarie left Buedu; and, on his return, Jungle did not come with him.

Q. Thank you. And on this briefing of Charles Taylor after the meeting, page 9434, this question was asked:

"Q. You gave some evidence earlier when you used the phrase 'they briefed President Taylor'."

A. First it was Sam Bockarie. He held the phone and spoke to the Pa. He briefed him about the arrangement we had done about the mission and later Jungle himself went on the same phone and spoke on the same topic to Charles Taylor - President Taylor."

"Q. Where was this phone?
A. It was a satellite phone."

"A. All of us were in the veranda where the meeting was held. I was at the veranda myself. I was part of the meeting.
Q. Are you saying the 12 of you were there when the conversation took place?
A. Yes, because the meeting had not ended yet so all 12 of us were still there."

Now, the meeting to plan the attack on Kono, where did it take place?

A. Waterworks.

Q. Is there a veranda at the Waterworks?
A. No. The place where we were seated had a small barrier. In fact there were no chairs there. We all sat against the wall, we all sat against the wall, and there was a thatch cover; it was an open place, it had no veranda.

Q. Now, do you recall us looking at some photographs of Sam Bockarie's house in Buedu? Do you recall that?
A. Yes, very well.
Q. Could we have a look, please, and I would like your assistance with this, if you would, at --

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, are you referring to the photographs that we marked for identification?
MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I am. It's MFI-4A. Found it. Could we have a look at it, please.
Q. Mr Sesay, do you recall looking at this, identifying this photograph, as being Sam Bockarie's house in Buedu?
A. Yes.
Q. And you help us. What would you refer to as a veranda in this photograph? Do you want to move places to point it out for us?
A. Well, if I speak from here, you might see the - this is the veranda here. This point. Starting from this door up to the other door, towards the wall here, towards the railing, within here. This is what we called the veranda. This is the veranda. This is the veranda.
Q. So you're indicating that area between the low green-painted wall and the windows and door behind it; is that correct?
A. Yes, yes. That's the veranda.
Q. Now, what I want your assistance with, Mr Sesay, is this,
because it's very difficult, merely by looking at a photograph, to get an idea of the size of this building. That veranda, would it be big enough to hold a meeting involving 12 people?

A. Well, 12 people can sit here because, if you sit against the low wall here, people can sit on this side, they can sit on the ordinary side here; yes, 12 people can sit there. And even above 12, above 12 people, they can sit here, because they could have chairs against the higher wall there and then people could sit on the lower wall.

Q. Thank you for that, Mr Sesay. You can put that photograph away, please.

So the - this individual is saying, this discussion over the satellite phone, and that all 12 individuals present at the meeting were there when the conversation took place, and over the page to page 9436, line 8:

"A. He - that being Bockarie - "told him that" - being Mr Taylor - "about the mission that had been discussed in Monrovia. He said he had come and put it to the senior officers and that was the meeting that was going on and that the same plan he had given to him was the same plan they had come to discuss.

Q. Same plan that they had given to who?

A. Sam Bockarie."

PRESIDING JUDGE: Who gave the plan?

THE WITNESS: Mr Taylor, Mr Taylor."

Line 23:

"Q. And what did Jungle say?

A. He repeated the same thing to Mr Taylor because he was the representative for him in the RUF, so he explained the
same thing to him that the plan they had discussed in
Monrovia, they had come and put it to the senior officers
and they had assured him that they would go ahead with the
plan."

Is there any truth in any of this, Mr Sesay?

A. I said it's a lie. This witness is lying. Because before
I went on the attack in Kono, this meeting, which we held at
Waterworks, there was nothing like a meeting that we held in Sam
Bockarie's veranda about this. The meeting was held at
Waterworks. It was after all that Sam Bockarie went and briefed
Johnny Paul, and Johnny Paul advised me, before I left to go to
Kono; even the brigade commander who came after us, the senior
commanders, was the most senior brigade commander in Kailahun.
Bockarie did not invite him to attend this meeting, and who would
be this witness? Who was this witness to have been invited to
attend such a meeting? This is a black lie. This witness is
lying. The brigade commander, the deputy brigade commander, and
even Morris Kallon who was in Pendembu, Bockarie did not invite
him to this meeting. It was after the meeting that Bockarie told
me to invite Morris Kallon to join me to go to Kono. So this man
- those who were in higher in position, above him, they were not
invited to the meeting. How would he have been invited to such a
meeting? He was not part of any meeting about the attack on
Kono. To my living God, he was not there.

Q. Page 9442. 9 May 2008. Question line 3:
"Q. I want to turn now to a topic involving arms and
ammunition. Can you tell the Court generally, while you
were with the RUF, where you got the arms and ammunition
that you used from?
A. Well, first in 1991, after we had been trained, the Liberians were mainly leading the war. The ammunition was coming from Liberia. That was 1991, right up to --

"Q. For how long did the arms and ammunition continue to come from Liberia?
A. From 1991 to '92."

"Q. When you say the arms and ammunition were coming from Liberia, where, if you know, in Liberia were the arms and ammunition coming from?
A. Well, I couldn't tell the part of the country where the ammunition was coming from but the NPFL fighters who came were the ones who brought the ammunition because at that time, I was a junior man in the movement.

"Q. And did the NPFL fighters tell you where they got the ammunition from?
A. No."

"Q. Can I ask where the NPFL fighters came from?
A. It was Liberia.
Q. And where did the NPFL fighters get their arms and ammunition from?
A. Well, at that time I did not ask them where they got their arms and ammunition but only that we got arms and ammunition from the NPFL fighters.
Q. Earlier in your evidence, you did say that you got arms and ammunition in 1991 to 1992 from Liberia. Do you remember giving that evidence?
A. Yes.

Q. How do you know that the arms and ammunition at that time came from Liberia?

A. When we were in here, we were pushed to Liberia and we went to Bomi. When Pa Sankoh and Mr Ghankay came and met us and they issued materials to us to come and fight in Sierra Leone, so by that I know it was Liberia, we were not in any other country but in Liberia."

I want to pause there and ask you this, Mr Sesay: If I understand your evidence, there were two occasions when the RUF, or members of the RUF, were forced to retreat into Liberia, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. One occasion was when Zogoda fell, is that right?

A. Yes, October '96.

Q. And Mike Lamin led the survivors into Liberia and they surrendered to ULIMO, is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. When was the other occasion?

A. 1991, that was when the soldiers and the ULIMO pushed the RUF out of Pujehun, so the RUF crossed into Liberia, across the Mano River. Whilst others based in Sierra Leone, like Gibril Massaquoi, Momoh Rogers, and even this person who came here and spoke here, he was part of that group in 1991, they were in Pujehun, in those villages operating from there, while those who had been pushed and went across to Liberia, but that other group, they stayed in Pujehun District from 1991 up to 1994 when Mr Sankoh invited them to come from Pujehun and join him in Zogoda.
Q. Now, those who were pushed in 1991, did you have occasion to speak to them after that had occurred?

A. Yes, some of them who went to Liberia, they came to Kailahun, but some decided to go off the RUF, they were no longer part of the RUF, because Rashid brought some of them to Kailahun and they came back and joined the Kailahun group, whilst others were on their own, they no longer joined the RUF.

Q. Now, those who had been pushed into Liberia and later returned, did they tell you that they had met with Charles Taylor in Liberia?

A. No. They did not tell me that.

Q. Did any of them tell you that after they had been pushed to Bomi Hills they met with Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh and were provided with materials to come back to Sierra Leone and fight?

A. No, they did not tell me that because even the ones who were pushed, Sam Bockarie was among that group when Foday Sankoh took them to Kailahun. And when Sam Bockarie came, it was the house where I was with Morris Kallon in Pendembu, it was the same place that he stayed. He did not tell me that.

Q. Those who returned from Bomi Hills, having been pushed there by ULIMO and the government soldiers, did they return with arms and ammunition?

A. No. They did not bring arms. They did not return with arms. They travelled from Bomi Hills to Lofa Bridge and from Lofa Bridge to Kungbahun, Vahun, and they came to Vahun on to Bomaru in Sierra Leone.

Q. Question, page 9444 --

PRESIDING JUDGE: What was that? They came Lofa Bridge to Vahun and they came to some other place.
MR GRIFFITHS: Sierra Leone.

PRESIDING JUDGE: There was a place, Mr Interpreter, that you said.

THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord, I said Bomaru. They came from Vahun, they crossed the border into Bomaru, that is in Sierra Leone.

PRESIDING JUDGE: And you said - what is this other place you said?

THE WITNESS: Kungbahun.

PRESIDING JUDGE: That cannot be on the record yet. Can you please spell it for us.


MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, question - line 6, page 9444:

"Q. Did you know whereabouts in Liberia the arms and ammunition had actually come from?
A. No.
Q. In 1992, did something change in relation to where you got your arms and ammunition from?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the change?
A. That was the time ULIMO took the border from us, 1992, between us and NPFL, when they came from Lofa they fortified the border."

"A. That was the time the ULIMO forces came from Lofa and they ensured that the entire border was fortified between us and the NPFL. They captured right up to Robertsport. From that time, the relationship had started cutting off
between us and the NPFL.

Q. What effect did that have on the arms and ammunition that they - you had?

A. Well, that affected the movement greatly. The war was not progressing because we were not having any other place to get ammunition from, so it affected us greatly.

Q. What was it that affected the getting of the ammunition and the arms?

A. Well, at that time the enemy had cut off the supply line between us and the NPFL, where we used to get our ammunition to fight with. That was why the war was not progressing, because we could not fight without the logistics that so affected us immensely.

Q. What happened to the movement?

A. Well, the movement collapsed a little. We were just on defensive. Our only offensive was to lay ambush and we returned to our same base where we were, so that really created a problem for us.

"Q. How long did that situation last?

A. It started in 1992 up to 1993. It stopped there and then phase 2 started when we went and met with the leader but from 1992 right up to 1996, the border between us and NPFL was cut off. We had no relationship with them from 1992 right to 1996."

Now, pausing again, question one: Do you agree with what this witness was telling these judges, that from 1991 to 1992, the RUF were getting their arms and ammunition from the NPFL?

A. No. Because this, it was in --
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat.
MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. Start again.
A. I said this person was in Pujehun District in '91 to '94 and what happened in late 1991, the ULIMO and the government --

PRESIDING JUDGE: What person is the witness referring to?
Mr Sesay, which person are you referring to who was in Pujehun?
THE WITNESS: The witness.

PRESIDING JUDGE: How do you know who the witness is?
THE WITNESS: Well, they asked me about the certain person yesterday, where he was, and from the way I can follow this testimony, I just conclude that it's the person.

PRESIDING JUDGE: The person that you are referring to is the person that counsel asked you before you went into the testimony? Very well.

So the question we haven't had an answer to relates to the - whether you, Mr Sesay, agree that from 1991 to 1992, the RUF were getting their arms and ammunition from the NPFL, and you said no. Then you were about to tell us why you disagree.

THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. I said the RUF were on two flanks; the Pujehun District and the Kailahun District. The Pujehun District in late 1991 the ULIMO forces and the government troops pushed the RUF to the border. In fact, the ULIMO, which he said came from Lofa and they fortified the border, between Liberia and Sierra Leone, this is Pujehun District, no, that's not correct. The ULIMO came from there and they came through Pujehun District, they crossed the Mano River Bridge when they defeated the RUF and before they spread into Lofa Bridge and into Lofa County after they crossed the Mano River. So from late 1991
the RUF in Pujehun District were cut off. They were now surviving on captured ammunition from the government troops. Up to 1994, before they joined Mr Sankoh in Zogoda, some of them - while some of them remained in Pujehun.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So those who were pushed from Pujehun, what knowledge would they have of those who remained in Kailahun?

A. There was no communication because had they hadn't any radio sets to communicate with the Kailahun group, so they couldn't communicate with Mr Sankoh. This continued until 1993, when they sent Manawai, together with other men, to check in Kailahun and to be able to see Mr Sankoh and explain their situation in Pujehun to him, and, indeed, they came through the Gola Forest to Jojoima, it was in Jojoima that they came and they went to Mr Sankoh. So this group, about seven of them to ten, remained in Kailahun, that was including Augustine Koroma, he was the most senior man among them. They were now in Kailahun until 1994, December 1993, when they went to Mr Sankoh, that Mr Sankoh was to create the Zogoda. So Mr Sankoh was to send them, together with some other armed men, to go to radio set - to go to the Pujehun District. And when they went there, they installed the radio set and they spoke to Mr Sankoh. That was early 1994.

Q. Now, second question: Do you agree that ULIMO effectively sealed the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia up to Robertsport from 1992 through to 1996?

A. Yes. ULIMO controlled the entire border from 1992 to 1997, the entire Liberian-Sierra Leone border, from the Mano River.
Bridge down to Mendekoma, that is the Kailahun District; the entire Liberian border, ULIMO controlled it from 1992 to 1997.

Q. And the testimony continues in this way. Line 14, page 9446:

"Q. And in relation to the getting of arms and ammunition, what happened in 1996?
A. Well, in 1996 we had serious pressure from the Kamajors and it was almost at the point of collapsing, the movement was almost at the point of collapsing. Well, at that time we were able to get connection again with Liberia because there was now peace in Liberia and so we had some connection with Liberians again.
Q. And what was the result of the connection you had with Liberia, when it comes to the getting of arms and ammunition?
A. That was the time Foday Sankoh came from Abidjan and met us in Kailahun. He gave some money to Sam Bockarie, some dollars. At that time we had so much pressure. We had materials to fight against the Kamajors, so he gave some money to that man to try by whatever means for us to get logistics to fight with."

And then he goes on to explain that the money was given to Sam Bockarie.

"Q. Do you know how much money was given to Sam Bockarie?
A. No, he did not disclose the total to us. He only said the Pa had left some money for us to try and get ammunition."

Now, is it right that in 1996, Sankoh gave some money to Bockarie after Sankoh came from Abidjan to purchase arms and
ammunition?

A. Yes, yes, Mr Sankoh gave $7,000 to Sam Bockarie in Buedu in my presence, and Gibril Massaquoi was also there. Peter Vandi too was there and Sam Bockarie; that is in November 1996, yes.

Q. Question line 7, page 9447:

"Q. Do you know whether Sam Bockarie was able to get arms and ammunition with that money?

A. Yes. We started getting some arms and ammunition that sustained the movement."

Q. Was there a time when you, yourself, were involved in getting arms and ammunition?"

A. Yes.

Q. How many times were you involved in obtaining arms and ammunition for the RUF?

A. Three times.

Q. When was the first time?

A. The first time, it was after the intervention.

Q. Where were you based at this time?

A. I was in Baiima then."

Now, you've indicated, Mr Sesay, that you know who this witness is. Was this witness in Baiima after the intervention?

A. Yes, yes. From February - from March, it was in March that Sam Bockarie deployed him in Baiima, from March he was in Baiima up to October 1999.

Q. "Q. How was it that you became involved in obtaining arms and ammunition on that occasion?

A. I had a call from our high command, who was Sam
Bockarie. He called me at his base in Buedu.

Q. What did that Sam Bockarie say to you?

A. He said Pa Taylor was to send some ammunition for the RUF, that we were to go and collect it.

And then he goes on to describe that he had a Land Rover.

Did this individual have a Land Rover after the intervention, Mr Sesay, can you recall?

A. Yes. He had a Land Rover. That was what he used in Baiima.

Q. "Q. What did you do after the phone call you had with Sam Bockarie?

A. When he called me he told me that ammunition was to be brought to Foya and so we should go and collect it."

Line 24:

"A. So I joined him and we travelled, we took his two jeeps that he had and mine and we moved to Foya.

Q. Who did you join?

A. I joined Mosquito. We took his two jeeps that he had, and mine, and we moved to Foya.

Q. So how many jeeps went to Foya?

A. Three.

Q. Three vehicles. And who were the people who went to Foya?

A. I went - the two of us went with few of his security men and his radio man.

Q. Do you know the name of the radio man?

A. Elevation.

Q. What did you do when you got to Foya?

A. Well, at that time we went but the helicopter had not
arrived yet because he told us that the helicopter was to bring the materials and we went to the commander, the commander was one Commander Joseph.”

Now, there is a lot there that I want to ask you about, Mr Sesay. So what this individual is saying, sometime after the intervention, so after February 1998, he gets a call from Sam Bockarie who tells him that he, Sam Bockarie, has received a call from Pa Taylor, who will be sending ammunition to Foya by helicopter and you are to go there and collect it. Any truth in that?

A. That is not true. That is not true. Because I never heard that a helicopter landed in Foya for the RUF, or brought a RUF person throughout 1998 - for a helicopter to bring a RUF person, that was after the Lome Accord that that started between Mr Taylor and the RUF. But before that time, no, and this - this witness, this person, was - I came to Buedu in late February 1998, and this man was in Daru at that time. Because when we withdrew from Kenema, they were in Daru, so Bockarie and I visited Daru, we visited Daru from Buedu, they were there. Up to the time ECOMOG and the Kamajors captured Daru and they withdrew. That was the time Bockarie said I should take care of Baiima and Manawai was to go and take care of Kuiva and Foday Kamara should take care of Mobai. From that time I was -

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this area, kindly, slowly.

JUDGE DOHERTY: Before he does repeat this, I understood the question was directed to who will be sending ammunition to Foya by helicopter and you go there to collect it. And he’s referring to a RUF person coming by helicopter.
MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Okay, let's clarify this. First of all, in 1998, to your knowledge, was any arms or ammunition transported by helicopter to Foya to be picked up by RUF personnel?

A. No, that never happened in 1998, such a thing never happened. And to say - like even what you said, that Elevation was Sam Bockarie's operator, Elevation never became Sam Bockarie's operator. Elevation was my own operator. And he never crossed the Sierra Leonean border with Sam Bockarie, never.

Q. That was at page 9449, line 10, that the radio man that went with them was Elevation. You're saying that never happened?

A. No. Elevation - that never happened. Elevation was my radio operator from 1997 to 2001, up to the end of the disarmament. He was never assigned to Sam Bockarie, and he never moved anywhere where Sam Bockarie went.

Q. Do you know of a commander in Foya called Commander Joseph?

A. No, I never knew that person to be a commander in Foya.

Q. And the witness's account of these events continues at page 9453 in this way. Line 16, having explained that, after an hour or so, we saw a helicopter coming, it came to Foya, it was flying over Foya:

"Q. Where did it land?
A. Foya airfield.
Q. Can you describe the helicopter, please?
A. It was a military helicopter.
Q. What do you mean by military?
A. It had a green colour.
Q. How many people were in the helicopter?
A. Two pilots and I saw up to five people who alighted
from the helicopter."

"A. Mr Bockarie introduced me to a man whom he said was Mr Taylor’s chief bodyguard. He said his name was Benjamin Yeaten and they used to call him Director."

"Q. Did you see the person who was the pilot of this helicopter?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you describe what that person looked like?
A. He was white. They were white people."

And then he goes on line 11: "They were Ukrainians. Bockarie - later I asked Mr Bockarie and he said they were Ukrainians."

"Q. Did you know where this helicopter had flown from?
A. Monrovia."

"A. After the blacks had alighted we went there and off-loaded the material and put them into the vehicle.
Q. Can you remember what the materials were?"

"A. They were AK rounds and there was RPG rockets and there were RPG tubes; 40 boxes of AK rounds were there, 10 boxes of RPG tubes and some arms, AK-47s."

Mr Sesay, after the intervention, do you recall the RUF receiving that quantity of material flown by helicopter from Monrovia to Foya, 40 boxes of AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets?
A. This kind of thing never happened, after the intervention.

It never happened. It never happened. Because if this kind of thing happened, then there was no need for Sam Bockarie to send Kennedy, Matthew Kennedy Sesay, to go and be based in Voinjama to be buying buried ammunition from the ex-ULIMO fighters, honestly.

PRESIDING JUDGE: To be what? To go to Voinjama to do what?

THE WITNESS: To be buying ammunition that ex-ULIMO fighters had buried. Those were the ammunition that Kennedy bought. I said if Sam Bockarie received this kind of ammunition that this person spoke about, then there was no need for Kennedy to be sent to be buying buried ammunition from Voinjama because when they would bring them they would have to wash them, dry them in the sun, before we would ever use them.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. And then he continues, page 9457, line 12:

"A. We left Foya, we came to Buedu. The materials were put into the store, the ammunition dump.

Q. Where was the ammunition dump?

A. It's on the Foya road very close to his house.

Q. Whose house?

A. Sam Bockarie's house."

Now, Mr Sesay, help us: Was there an ammunition dump close to Sam Bockarie's house?

A. No. There was no ammunition dump near Sam Bockarie's house. The only place where Bockarie stored ammunition was at his store room, the place I pointed. That door, the store door that I pointed at. Even the ammunition that Kennedy bought, they were stored there. But if you come from the Foya end and you
pass the court barrier and pass the place where Lawrence and others were there, there was no ammunition dump in between there and Bockarie's house.

Q. Now, you will recall that when I began dealing with this topic of arms and ammunition, I recounted to you that the witness had said that he was involved on three such missions to collect ammunition. At page 9458, 9 May 2008, he was asked this:

"Q. When was the second occasion?
A. That was in 1998 still.

Q. Whenabouts in 1998?
A. Well, after this mission, because this other one was around March to April, it was not too long. It was a short time. That was the time ULIMO and the LURD forces invaded Lofa."

So let's pause and put that together, shall we. What this individual was telling these judges was this: Shortly after the ECOMOG intervention, the RUF received 40 boxes of AK rounds, ten boxes of RPG rockets and some AK-47s. Not too long after that, a second trip is made, so let's deal with the second trip. Line 16:

"Q. How did you become involved on that occasion in obtaining the arms and ammunition?
A. The commander called me again, that is Mosquito at the same place, Buedu, and explained the issue to me. That was what the Pa had told him, that those men had invaded his men at Lofa County. That's ULIMO and LURD."

And he then explains that the Pa is Mr Taylor.

"Q. Now you said that those men had invaded his men at Lofa, who were those men who invaded and who were his men?
A. The LURD forces.

Q. And who had the LURD forces invaded?

A. Charles Taylor.

Q. So what else did Sam Bockarie tell you?

A. He said we were to put men together to go and help to clear the enemy from that place.

Q. And what did you do when you were told to put men together and go and help to clear the enemy?

A. Well, he gave me my own task that I was to go and prepare men in Kono and that Issa - I was told to go and prepare manpower for that same mission" - line 17 - "and he said that he had told Issa and Morris Kallon to do the same preparation in Kono."

Now, pause. March/April 1998, that's page 9458. Was there discussions about you going to Kono with Morris Kallon at that time in 1998, Mr Sesay?

A. Not at all.

Q. And do you recall at or about the time that the attack on Kono was being planned, that simultaneously it was being suggested that men be put together to go and fight LURD in Liberia?

A. In fact, since the time I left Kono in February of '98 I never went back to Kono until December. That was when I went back to Kono and --

Q. My question is this: At the time that there was a discussion about attacking Kono, was there at the same time a discussion about sending RUF fighters to Liberia to fight LURD?

A. No.

Q. "Q. What did you do in relation to the manpower?
A. I brought them to Buedu.
Q. How many men did you bring to Buedu?"

Line 28.
"A. 62 in number."

And then he goes on:
"We divided the number into two groups, we divided them and
told them that we were to enter at two flanks. While Sam
Bockarie and I were to enter by the Foya axis, and the other
flank was to enter by Vahun."

Line 12:
"Q. And did you and Sam Bockarie enter by the Foya axis?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you do?
A. We attacked Foya Town.

Q. Who did you attack?
A. The LURD forces.
Q. Where did the LURD forces go after you attacked them?
A. They went to Kolahun. We chased them and we went to
the same Kolahun.

Q. Where did you chase them to?
A. Voinjama.
Q. What happened after you captured Voinjama?
A. We had an order from Benjamin Yeaten to chase the men
right from where they had come from.

Q. And where had they come from?
A. They said they'd come from Guinea.
Q. Did you chase them to Guinea?
A. Yes. We captured a town that was called Bayalo in
Guinea. We received orders to burn the entire town and
that we did.

Q. Who did you get the order from?
A. Benjamin Yeaten?

Q. And what happened after you got to Voinjama?
A. We spent the night there and in the morning we put our men together and we returned to Foya. Then we left the Liberians there.

Q. Where did you go?
A. Then Sam Bockarie took me to Monrovia."

Do you know anything about this, Mr Sesay?
A. No. I don't know about any movement that this man undertook to go to Liberia. That did not happen in 1998. I said throughout 1998 to October 1999 this man was based at that place, Baiima.

Q. Now, let's be clear what the man was telling these judges. That this took place in March/April 1998, when RUF combatants entered Lofa County at two points, Foya and Vahun, and battle pushed LURD forces all the way to Voinjama upon the orders of Benjamin Yeaten. Mr Sesay, help us. In March/April 1998, what was the position of the RUF in Sierra Leone?
A. Well, Sam Bockarie posted me to Pendembu in late April of '98 and I used to visit Vahun, I used to visit Tengbeh there, and there were over 100,000 displaced persons in the refugee camp in Vahun. There had no attacks in Lofa throughout 1998. And in fact LURD attack was in 1999. That was the time the fighting started going on there when we heard about it over the BBC. It was in '99, not '98. So that man was working directly under me from April to December '98 when I left the Kailahun District. Everything having to do with Baiima, Mobai, Jojoima, every one of
them reported to me. They used to report to me and I in return
reported to Sam Bockarie. Mike Lamin used to come, he would
visit Baiima, he would visit Mobai, he would visit Kuiva.
So everything pertaining to these various targets and the
battalion commanders around that area, shortage of food, shortage
of ammunition, medicine, if the combat medic did not have
sufficient medicines I was the commander who was based in
Pendembu that they used to inform. And what I knew about is that
this man was in Baiima starting from March of 1998 up to December
when he left the Kailahun District. He did not move to go to
anywhere. The only places - the only place he moved to was to
come to Pendembu where he attended meetings, or sometimes he left
Baiima to go to the village where his family was based. That was
between Mobai Junction and Pendembu.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, how far is Baiima from Buedu?
THE WITNESS: My Lord, from Buedu to Kailahun Town is 17
miles, Kailahun Town to Pendembu is 17. That is 34. And
Pendembu to Mobai Junction is 10 miles. 44 miles. And Mobai
Junction to Baiima is 5 miles. That is 49 miles, my Lord. 49
miles.

PRESIDING JUDGE: So from where you were living to where
this man was living is about 49 miles?
THE WITNESS: No, ma'am, my Lord. From Buedu to Baiima is
49 miles. From where I was staying, Pendembu to Baiima, is 19
miles - no, 15 miles. Because Mobai is 10 miles, then Baiima 5
miles, 15 miles if you use the main road. But if you use the
footpath it's 10 miles. From where I was staying and where he
was staying. If you use the car road it's 15 miles. If you use
the bush path, the survey road, it's 10 miles.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Please proceed.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, do you know of an occasion when Sam Bockarie took this man who we are talking about to Monrovia in 1998?

A. No, Sam Bockarie never took this man with him to Monrovia in 1998.

Q. Page 9461, line 25:

"A. Then Sam Bockarie took me to go to Monrovia."

9462, line 3:

"A. I went --

Q. Who went to Monrovia?

A. I went and Sam Bockarie went too and one of his bodyguards called Magazine.

Did Sam Bockarie have a bodyguard called Magazine?

A. Yes, Sam Bockarie had a fellow called Magazine.

Q. Well, we were the ones who went.

Q. How did you get to Monrovia? Remember this is '98.

"A. The same military helicopter with the combat colour picked us up from Foya."

Q. When you landed at this field in Monrovia city, where did you go from there?

A. A vehicle came and received us and we drove together with Benjamin Yeaten and we went to Benjamin Yeaten's place White Flower.

Q. Where did you meet Benjamin Yeaten?

A. Well, this helicopter that came, all of us travelled in it.

Q. Where did you meet Benjamin Yeaten?
A. Foya.

Q. Had he come in the helicopter?
A. Yes.

Q. What did you went do when you went to his place at White Flower?

Page 9463:
A. That was where we lodged, because he had taken us there. We spent some days in Monrovia, like three days. I was at Mr. Benjamin's place and in the morning the two of them would go out to meet with the President. They will say they were going to meet with the President. That being Benjamin Yeaten and Sam Bockarie.

Q. Did you yourself ever go to meet with Taylor on that occasion?
A. No.

Question page 9464 - no, to get the context we need to go higher up:
"Q. Did you speak to Sam Bockarie after he had met with Charles Taylor?
A. Yes. He told me that they had come from the President's and that was the mansion ground.
Q. Did he tell you what had taken place in his meeting with Charles Taylor?
A. The Pa said we should wait, that he had promised to give us morale booster and some ammunition for us to go back with.
Q. And did you wait?
A. Yes, we waited.
Q. What happened after you waited?
A. The day that we were to move was when I saw some
ammunition and Sam Bockarie told me that the Pa had given
him $10,000.

Q. Where did you see this ammunition?

A. It was at the Pa’s house where Benjamin Yeaten was, at
the back of the house Pa Taylor’s house, White Flower.

Q. And what was this ammunition that you saw there?

A. They gave us AK rounds and some RPG rockets. And then
he went on to say that he saw the $10,000 and how the
helicopter took them to Foya and that on return, he,
Bockarie, invited the commanders Issa, Morris Kallon and
the other officers, and he explained to them about the few
materials that we had gone with and the $10,000 that the Pa
had given us."

And then he goes on:
"Q. What happened to the $10,000?
A. We decided that, well, let the money be used to buy
drugs for the wounded soldiers so that they would be
treated."

Now, that’s page 9468, lines 4 and 5. Do you recall any of
this, Mr Sesay?

A. No. These events did not take place.

Q. Well, you see this individual is saying you were there,
involved in this discussion with Sam Bockarie, after Bockarie had
returned from Monrovia bearing $10,000. So you were supposed to
be there. Did this happen, Mr Sesay?

A. I said it’s a lie, he’s lying, this kind of thing did not
happen. It did not happen.

Q. Page 9469, line 12:
"Q. Was there a third occasion when you yourself were involved in obtaining arms and ammunition for the RUF?

A. Yes.

Q. When?"

"A. That was 2000, after the May incident that occurred in Freetown."

So remember, in May 2000, Mr Sesay, did you travel to Monrovia?

A. Yes, late May, I travelled to Monrovia.

"Q. And just so that we get the context, when was this one, the third occasion?

A. That was 2000, after the May incident that occurred in Freetown. There was some problem between RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. Our men and the UN had some clash in the northern province and a lot of the UN personnel were captured. That was the problem that went right up to Freetown. Even the civilians and the soldiers, the government demonstrated against the RUF who were in Freetown because that was their own zone. So that was the problem.

Q. And where were you based in May of 2000?

A. I was in Bo Town."

Now, we know who we’re talking about, Mr Sesay, so help us.

In May of 2000 was this individual based in Bo?

A. Yes, he was in Bo. He was not in Kailahun at this time.

He was in Bo.

Q. Line 7:

"A. We were there to monitor the peace, it was because of
the peace that I went there. I was working with CNC, that is, ceasefire monitoring committee or commission."

Was he?

A. No. He was not a CMC member. He only went to Bo where Mr Sankoh was trying to have an office established, but the CMC members who were in Bo, he was not part of them.

Q. Page 9471, please, line 18:
"Q. And you said at that time you were in Bo Town and you became involved in a third mission to obtain arms and ammunition for the RUF. How did you become involved in that third mission?

A. Well, the time that incident took place in Freetown, most of our men, our RUF members, were captured, and even those of us who were in Bo, the same thing happened to us. They tried to ransack wing and then they captured some people but I escaped and I went to Kenema. When I went to Kenema the same thing started there. I also escaped and I went to Tongo."

Do you recall any of this?

A. Well, I knew that after the incident in Freetown, this fellow, and the other RUF members who were in Kenema and Bo, they left Kenema and Bo and they went to Kailahun and Tongo.

Q. "Q. And you escaped and you ended up, you said you went to Tongo, what happened in Tongo?

A. Well, when I got there I sent a message to Mr Sesay, General Sesay, that I had arrived there and then he ordered me not to stay there but that I should go to Kailahun."

Did you give him such an order?

A. No. He withdrew from Kenema to Kailahun. He did not send
any message to me from Tongo. He went back to Kailahun and to Baiima here - where he was before.

Q. "Q. What happened when you went to Kailahun?
A. Well, when I went to Kailahun, at that time I realised that the Indians were captured and that was the same place where I went to. And then he said to me that they were going to change the command. That was the first brigade commander who was there, that I was supposed to replace him. And then at that time he gave me a new promotion and a new assignment to serve as brigade commander."

True?
A. Yes. I replaced the brigade commander but that was in late 2000, when I said he should be the brigade commander, that was around November 2000.

PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not sure I understand that last answer. "Yes, I replaced the brigade commander but that was in late 2000, when I said he should be the brigade commander, that was around November 2000." So what kind of an answer is that?

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. Did you appoint this witness to become brigade commander?
A. Yes. That was what I said. I said it was in November 2000, that was when I appointed him as brigade commander.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Not that Issa Sesay replaced the brigade commander but that he replaced the person who was brigade commander.

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. "Q. Well, the commander who was there" - line 24 - "who was there, Denis Lansana was the person that I replaced." Is that true?
Q. And what were your duties when you replaced Denis Lansana?

A. My first duty after taking up the command was that I should put pressure on the commanders to free these men, that is the UN peacekeepers who had been arrested, who had been taken hostage by the men. After I had taken over the UN, the other Indians in the UN also came to receive their brothers in Kailahun but that resulted to a serious disaster that led to destruction of places in Pendembu and other areas. So I went there and I tried to put things under control but my men incurred serious casualties and I lost the lives of most of my men in that mission.

Q. How were the lives of most of your men lost in that mission?

A. Well, we did not expect that kind of battle to confront us and they took us unawares, it was very early in the morning that they attacked, they raided us in the air and then they bombarded us on the ground, and I was living around that same area in Pendembu, so both soldiers and civilians lost their lives on that ground and more than 50 houses were burnt down.

Do you recognise such an incident?

A. Yes, that incident took place but he was not the brigade commander at that time. That was when the Indians who were in Kailahun decided to bulldoze their way to withdraw from Kailahun Town. So they attacked Pendembu, so it was not up to 50 RUF combatants who died. They were the ones who the Indians met in the hospital who were the wounded soldiers that the Indians
killed and they burned down 50 houses in Pendembu Town and then proceeded to Daru.

Q. Was this witness the brigade commander at the time of that incident?

A. No, no. It was after that time that I appointed him as brigade commander.

Q. And then he continues:

"Q. After that had taken place, did you receive a fresh assignment?

A. Yes. That was my assignment but I went on one operation and I was still brigade commander.

Q. What was the operation that you went on?

A. Well, that was the last invasion that Damate Konneh, the same LURD that we're talking about, that commander that brought them, that is Sekou Damate Konneh's own troops, they came and based in Voinjama." And he goes on to explain that they were LURD forces. Line 23:

"Q. Your mission was to do what?

A. Well, I received the similar instruction from the commander, Mr Sesay, that I should put men together to go and join Benjamin Yeaten at Kolahun."

Did you give this witness such an instruction, Mr Sesay?

A. No. I did not give him such an instruction and at the time he took over, when I appointed him as commander in Kailahun he did not take any men across into Liberia to go and fight there.

Q. He goes on to say that they went to Foya and then to Kolahun, this is page 9475, line 15:

"A. When we got to Kolahun we were there for two to three
days and we were waiting for ammunition.

Q. Did more ammunition arrive?
A. Yes."

And then he goes on to say that thereafter they moved on to Voinjama. And he goes on to say at page 9477 that:

"A. We captured Voinjama" - line 3 - "and the LURD forces withdrew to Guinea. And that they then chased them to the border. And that this was communicated to Benjamin Yeaten and that their radio operator was someone called Mortiga."

Do you know of a radio operator called Mortiga?
A. Yes, I know Mortiga.
Q. Do you recall an occasion in the year 2000 when Mortiga accompanied this witness on a mission into Liberia?
A. No, no.

Q. Whose radio operator was Mortiga?
A. At first, Mortiga was Mr Sankoh's radio operator, and later, starting from '97 up to 2000, he was an operator who was normally assigned to targets in the Kailahun District.

Q. What is Mortiga's real name?
A. Well, I don't know his real name.
Q. And then the witness says that after this mission, line 17, page 9478:

"A. Mr Yeaten took me to Monrovia.

Q. Why did Benjamin Yeaten take you back to Monrovia?
A. Well, he was so happy with the mission, and he said we should go for me to see - meet the President, Mr Taylor."

And then he describes travelling by helicopter to Monrovia.

Then page 9479:

"A. We went to White Flower with Benjamin Yeaten."
Q. Was there anybody else in Monrovia that you met after you arrived?
A. Well, no. We did not meet some other person, but somebody met us there.

Q. Who was the person that met you there?
A. General Sesay, Issa Sesay.

Q. Now, do you recall an occasion, Mr Sesay, when this witness that we are talking about met you in Monrovia?
A. No. This witness never met me in Monrovia, nor did I ever meet him in Monrovia. Since the time I became interim leader, this witness did not go to Monrovia. He remained in Kailahun up to the disarmament time.

Q. Whereabouts in Monrovia did General Issa Sesay meet you?
A. Well, we met at Benjamin Yeaten's place. This is at the back of the President's house.

Q. Mr Sesay, have you ever been to Benjamin Yeaten's house?
A. Yes.

Q. When?
A. I went to his house in - it was in October 2000. October 2000, I went to his house. That was the time I went with the delegation, when I went to drop the delegation. That was the first time I went to his house.

Q. Had you - did you go to his house thereafter?
A. No. After that time, I never went to his house any more.

Q. When in October 2000 you went to Benjamin Yeaten's house,
1. did you meet this witness there?
2. A. No. This witness was not in Liberia, at the time I was
3. taking the delegation along, this witness was in Kailahun. By
4. then I met him in Pendembu, he was based in Pendembu. Before
5. October, he was not the brigade commander at that time. It was
6. in November 2000 that I appointed him as the brigade commander.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, if this is an appropriate
7. time, we will take our luncheon break and reconvene at 2.30.
8. [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]
9. [Upon resuming at 2.32 p.m.]
10. PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please
11. continue.
12. MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I indicate for the
13. record that Mr Munyard is no longer with us.
14. Q. Now, Mr Sesay, this individual gave further details of this
15. trip to Monrovia during which he met you. He said this:
16. "A. The first plan after the mission - that was the
17. mission that he went on in Foya up to Voinjama - "was that
18. after accomplishing the mission, I should come and see the
19. Pa, and that was the reason why we moved me to that place,
20. but after the arrival of Issa, I did not see that happen
21. again. After Issa's arrival, I did not see Mr Taylor."
22. And then he goes on:
23. "A. Issa Sesay and Benjamin Yeaten would go to the
24. mansion."
25. And further:
26. "A. I was at Benjamin Yeaten's place - this is 9497, line
27. 24 - "when they told me that they were going to meet Mr
28. Taylor at the mansion. So they moved together with
Benjamin Yeaten, Issa Sesay, Benjamin Yeaten, so I did not follow them any longer. They moved again and went to the mansion. When we arrived in Monrovia on the first day, Issa was not there but he came on the second day."

And then he said that on the fourth day they returned.

This is page 9498, line 13:

"A. We flew back, Issa Sesay and I. We came back to Foya because that is where we left the troops.
Q. When you left to return to Foya, how did you travel?
A. That morning, I saw war materials, logistics, and they were put into the vehicle, and that same field where we used to land was the same field where we took the logistics."

And then he indicates that these were taken from the dump at the back of the President's house, Benjamin Yeaten's place, and then these were the logistics, page 9499:

"A. I saw AK rounds, a good number of it, RPG rockets, that too a good quantity. I saw AK machine guns, new ones, they were also in good quantity, and I saw RPG tubes, and they too were in good quantity and they were new ones, and I saw grenades and other materials that I cannot recall now.
Q. When you were there and you saw this material at the back of the President's house" - bottom of the page - "who else if anyone was present apart from you?
A. Issa was present, Benjamin Yeaten and the security officers were present. And I saw Zigzag Marzah. He was there too. The time the materials was loaded I saw Zigzag Marzah and other ATU soldiers." Line 18: "Zigzag Marzah
was one of the President's securities."

Now - and then he goes on to say, page 9503, line 9:

"Q. What happened to that material that you saw there?"

Bottom of the page, line 26.

"A. I said when they had loaded the materials into those
two vehicles, one van and a jeep, when they'd loaded the
materials, they brought another jeep where we - we went
into that vehicle and went to the field."

Over the page, 9504:

"Q. Who went to the field with the vehicle?" Line 4.

A. Issa Sesay."

And then the bottom of the page:

"A. After we arrived, the materials were taken out and
transferred into the helicopter but I was really concerned
why this quantity of materials, when there was disarmament
on in Sierra Leone, they were talking about peace and again
they'd sent this quantum of materials."

And then it goes on. Line 17:

"A. Issa Sesay entered into the helicopter." Line 21:

"We landed in Foya." Line 23: "We met vehicles that had
come from Kailahun and we loaded all the material into the
vehicles. We waited until the evening and we travelled,
and they waited until the evening because we were afraid
because at that time UNAMSIL had deployed and we were
travelling with materials. We were afraid that they will
see us. That is why we waited until night."

And then he goes on to say that the material was moved with
you accompanying it to Buedu, to Kailahun, to Pendembu.

Now, I have gone into some detail in relation to that,
Mr Sesay, because this individual is implicating you deeply in carrying a quantity of war materials in a helicopter from Monrovia to Foya and then by road from Foya to Kailahun at a time when you say you were disarming. Is this true?

A. No, this is not true. This is not true. The time that I went to Monrovia in October 2000, when I went to accompany the delegation that was to go to Abuja, like Jamba Goba, the two of us travelled together, that woman, from Kono to Monrovia. Then I waited in Monrovia while they returned. I travelled together with them from Monrovia back to Kono. I did not travel with this man to Monrovia and I did not meet him in Monrovia, and I did not break any single rounds, no, no ammunition to Sierra Leone. In October 2000 there was no UNAMSIL in Kailahun, the Indian troops that were deployed there had withdrawn and had come to attack Pendembu and had come to Daru. So I can say from September, October, November to December there was no UNAMSIL in Kailahun at this time, so this was just a made up story.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the witness mentioned a name of someone that was to go to Abuja, what was that name again.

THE WITNESS: Madam Jamba Goba, the two of us travelled. I travelled then from Kono to Monrovia and we travelled again from --

PRESIDING JUDGE: The name, I just want the name. Do we have that name on the record?

MR GRIFFITHS: I think we did, it is the sister of Jande.

Q. Is that the person whom you said was the sister of Jande, Foday Sankoh's wife who was executed, is that right?

A. Yes, yes.
Q. That name was mentioned a couple of days ago, but just to be on the safe side, just spell the name for us please.

A. It is J-E-M-B-A. Then Goba is the same as Jande's.

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, I have to explain to you what this individual claimed this material that you brought back from Monrovia was meant for. Page 9507, line 2:

"Q. And the reason why the materials were brought, he - that being you - said Mr Taylor had given those materials and the weapons and that we were to attack Guinea from two flanks. From the Sierra Leone end, he said those were the materials and even the money that he had told me about was for that mission. Because he went on to say that you brought $50,000 with you from Monrovia, that which President Taylor had given to you."

Q. Now, is that true?

A. No. That's a lie. President Taylor never gave me $50,000. It never happened. It is a big lie and this man - the two of us, I never met him in Monrovia and the two of us never travelled from Monrovia to Sierra Leone. He is telling lies.

Q. Now, he went on to say that this mission to Guinea did, in fact, take place in 2001. Did you order any RUF men to carry out a mission at Mr Taylor's behest in Guinea in 2001, Mr Sesay?

A. No. No, no. I did not order anybody on Mr Taylor's behalf to attack Guinea, no.

Q. And did you at some stage accuse this witness of having sabotaged Mr Taylor's plans?

A. No. I never accused that person, that he sabotaged Mr Taylor's plan. Because the two of us were never any mission on behalf of Mr Taylor, no.
Q. Yes. Now, I want to ask you some details about one or two individuals before we go on to look at more transcripts.

A. Did you know someone called King Perry, Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, very well.

Q. Who was he?

A. He was a radio operator.

Q. With whom?

A. Well, first he was in Kailahun because they were the ones that came together with Rashid Mansaray to Kailahun and he was in Kailahun with Mr Sankoh, Kailahun Town in '93 and we retreated to Koindu, but he did not go to Koindu, he was in Giema with Sam Bockarie and others as a radio operator. So he remained in Giema with Sylvester Miller from December '93 to June '94. When I came to Giema he was the one I met there as station commander in Giema. So he was working with me --

Q. From where?

A. From June when I met him there as station commander he worked with me from June '94 to early '95 when Mr Sankoh requested for them - himself and some other operators would went to Zogoda in '95. So from '95, Mr Sankoh posted him to the Kangari Hills, so he was there and worked with George and he came and --

Q. Who?

A. With one CO, George, he was the battalion commander in the Kangari Hills.

Q. How do you spell that name?

A. I think it is G-O-R-G-E, George, it's George.

Q. And for how long did he stay in the Kangari Hills?

A. He was at the Kangari Hills from '95 to May '97. He was
the station commander there for Isaac Mongor from January '96 to May '97.

Q. Now, after the coup in May '97, what happened to King Perry?

A. Well, when Isaac left with the RUF troops from the Kangari Hills to Matotoka, then Magburaka, Makeni, King Perry was in Makeni as the station commander for the radio that was there throughout the AFRC period up to the intervention. During the intervention, February '98, he withdrew to Kono and he operated with Superman as station commander from February '98 to July of '98 when Sam Bockarie sent him and Alfred Brown to go to the Koinadugu flank.

Q. Now, as Sam Bockarie sent him to the Koinadugu flank, who was in charge of that flank when Bockarie sent him there?

A. SAJ Musa was in charge of that area, together with Gullit, because at that time Gullit was in Rosos and SAJ Musa, Brigadier Mani and General Bropleh were in Kurubonla. Bockarie decided to send them there, together with Alfred Brown and others, because Bockarie did not know anything that was happening in that axes, so he sent those operators so they would be able to send messages to him so that he would know how the men were operating there. That was the purpose for him to send them there, so he was there. From Kurubonla he joined Gullit and others, up to the time that SAJ Musa join them in Major Eddie Town and all of them, together with SAJ Musa, came to Freetown, they came to Waterloo. SAJ Musa died and he - Gullit and others continued to Freetown. So in February they withdrew from Freetown and he came. I saw him in Waterloo, I saw him there. And he came to Makeni. He was operating with Superman in Lunsar during the infight, the
infighting. From that time he was in Makeni up until disarmament.

Q. Thank you very much. Now, another person I want you to assist me with is Monica Pearson. When did you first encounter Monica Pearson?

A. It was at the Naama training base.

Q. How did she come to be at the Naama training base?

A. Her sister brought them there, herself, her brothers, and some other people. That is Fatou Brown, Mr Sankoh's wife there.

Q. So Fatou Brown brought her to Camp Naama?

A. Yes.

Q. Along with who?

A. Monica Pearson, Fatou Gbembo and Monica's junior brother, that is, Theophilus Pearson, Musa Gbembo, Gabriel Decker and Anthony Decker, that was the woman that brought all of them together, that is the same group, Fatou Brown.

Q. And at Camp Naama, how close were you to Monica Pearson?

A. Well, when Monica Pearson came, because they were the ones who were cooking for Mr Sankoh, said the two of us had a relationship. She was my girlfriend at Camp Naama.

Q. Now, following the invasion of Sierra Leone, between 1992 to '94, where was Monica Pearson based?

A. Monica came to Kailahun because she was with the Koindu group with late CO Kargbo, together with Isaac Mongor and others.

So around May '91 she joined Mr Sankoh and they went to Pujehun. So from that time of - from '91 to '94 I was in Pujehun. They were the ones who joined Mr Sankoh from Pujehun.

Q. And what was she doing in Pujehun?

A. She was a WACs commander. They were there with the other
people.

Q. From 1994 to 1996 where was she?

A. Well, '94, Mr Sankoh sent her to the training base in Juikoya, around Zogoda --

Q. How do you spell that first name?

A. Juikoya?

Q. Yes.

A. No, I don't know how to spell it.

MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder, Mr Interpreter, if you can assist us?


MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Yes, and you were saying they were there with the other people - you were saying?

A. I said Mr Sankoh sent her to the training base at Juikoya that was very close to Camp Zogoda. She was there.

Q. Go on.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the witness said something like she was a WACs commander which appears as a works commander, could you please ascertain what the witness meant.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. She was a WACs commander, what is that?

A. Those - that is the women's commander in the Pujehun District during '91 to 1994 before they joined up with Mr Sankoh in Zogoda.

Q. WACs, is that WACs, as in W-A-C-S?

A. Yes, you're right.

Q. Now you say she was sent as training commander somewhere near Zogoda; is that right?
A. Yes, Juikoya. She was the training commandant there.

Q. And for how long did she hold that post?

A. She was there up until '95 when Mr Sankoh transferred her to open another base in Matru Jong after the capture of Sierra Rutile.

Q. And how long did she stay there?

A. Well, she was in Matru Jong where she established that training base. She was there as training commandant until around July/August 1996 because of the Kamajor attacks on the RUF position in Rutile to Matru Jong. That is why they withdrew to Camp Zogoda.

Q. And what happened to her after she went to Camp Zogoda?

A. When she came to Camp Zogoda she was there up until October when the Kamajors and the SLA attacked Zogoda. She was among the group that Mike Lamin headed and they went to Pujeahun and crossed over the border to the ULIMO zone and they surrendered. So from October '96 she was in Liberia to around November '97 when she returned to Freetown, when she came back to Sierra Leone through Kailahun and Kenema and she joined Mike Lamin. She was at Mike Lamin's house at Hill Station November '97. So she was in Freetown up until the intervention and they retreated with Mike Lamin through the peninsula to Tombo and they crossed to Fogbo and to Masiaka and she was with Mike Lamin when they went to Makeni. And from Makeni they went to Kono. All of them went to Kono. From Kono - February '98 she was in Kono up until March.

Then Sam Bockarie sent a radio message for her to report to Kailahun. So when she reported in Kailahun, Sam Bockarie appointed her as deputy training commandant at the training base in Bunumbu under the command of Jah Glory because Jah Glory was
the training commandant there.

Q. Jah Glory, how do you spell that?
A. J-A-H G-O-L-R-Y.
Q. And how long was she there for?

A. She was there as deputy training commandant Jah Glory until around April an unknown person shot Jah Glory and he was taken to Buedu and he died, so Bockarie appointed her as training commandant. So from that time she was in Bunumbu up to February --

Q. February of which year?
A. Up to January/February of 1999 when Sam Bockarie instructed her and the other instructors to transfer the training base from Bunumbu to Yengema to Kono. So from January/February of '99 to the disarmament she was in Kono. After the disarmament she transferred to Magburaka.

Q. Do you know someone called Alimamy Bobson Sesay?
A. Yes.
Q. Who is that person?
A. He was one of the honourable, one of the 17 members that overthrew the SLPP. He was the bodyguard to that person. That is Papa Bangura, Bomb Blast.

Q. Have you met Alimamy Bobson Sesay?
A. Yes. During the retreat I saw him in Kono. I met with him in Kono during the retreat because during the retreat I was together with Bomb Blast and he was with Bomb Blast from Makeni to Kono. From that time I did not meet with him, but during the retreat from Freetown to Kono I met with him.

Q. Who is Samuel Kargbo?
A. Samuel Kargbo was one of the honourables for the AFRC.
Q. Have you met him?
A. Yes, I met with him during the AFRC time in Freetown. And during the retreat I was at Four Mile, that is Songo, coming to Waterloo. When the troops retreated from Freetown, he and the others were in Kono, to oversee the mining in Kono. So when they came from Kono they met me at Fogbo - sorry Four Mile. So all of us drove to where the group crossed the river from Tombo. So all of us retreated to Masiaka and from Masiaka I saw him again in Makeni when I came from Bo and we met in Johnny Paul’s village.

Q. December of which year?
A. I said ’98. He was in Pendembu. And I left him there. He remained in Pendembu until after the signing of the Lome Accord and he joined Johnny Paul to go to Monrovia. From there they came back to Freetown.

Q. To your knowledge, Mr Sesay, when was the first time Samuel Kargbo went to Monrovia?
A. Well, the first time Kargbo went to Monrovia, that was between August until September of 1999. That was the first time he went to Monrovia with Johnny Paul Koroma and Jumu Jalloh, because I recall I was the one who drove them, I took them to Foya where they were collected - picked up by the helicopter. That was the first time he went to Monrovia.
Q. Now you said he went to Monrovia with Johnny Paul Koroma and another. Give us the name of that another, please?

A. Mr Jumu Jalloh.

Q. Can you help us with the spelling of the first name?

A. I think it is J-U-M-U.

Q. Thank you. That's helpful. Now another individual I want to ask you about. Does the name Albert Hindowa Saidu mean anything to you?

A. Yes, very well. I know him.

Q. Who is he?

A. Well, that was Albert Saidu, commonly called Eyeball.

Q. Commonly called what?

A. That his nickname, Eyeball. Eyeball.

Q. Eyeball?

A. Yes.

Q. As in --

A. Yes.

Q. And when did this person join the RUF?

A. In 1991.

Q. Where?

A. In Kailahun District.

Q. And thereafter what - did he achieve any rank within the RUF?

A. Yes. He became a lieutenant before we joined the AFRC and during the AFRC he was a lieutenant. He was operating around Kenema, Tongo Field, Kailahun, up to the time they retreated back into Kailahun. And before - he was in the Peyima Jungle before. They were the ones who retreated from Peyima to Giema in October '96 and before the AFRC he was staying in Giema up to the for the
AFRC coup in ’97. He was in Giema before the AFRC coup. And after the AFRC coup he was in Kenema, Tongo and later he withdrew to Kailahun. So from March - in March he was in Daru, so February, March - and part of March, he was in Daru. That was in ’98. And from March to December up to part of 1999 he was in Baiima in the Kailahun District.

Q. Did he remain in the RUF until disarmament?
A. Yes. Some part of ’99 he was at Jormu Kafebu and I recall at the time I came Mr Sankoh said I should go and inform them about a disarmament in 2000.

Q. What was that name, he was at - what’s the location?
A. Jormu Kafebu, something like that.

MR GRIFFITHS: Mr Interpreter, I wonder if you can assist us.

THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honours. It’s J-O-R-M-U

MR GRIFFITHS: I’m grateful.

Q. Go on. You were saying, Mr Sesay?
A. Yes, I said he was - around ’99 he was in Jormu Kafebu as adjutant to the commander who was there and that was Harris Momoh. And in March of 2000 when Foday Sankoh said I should go to Segbwema to organise the men and all the surrounding - all the fighters in the surrounding of Segbwema for them to assemble at Segbwema for the disarmament. I met Eyeball, he was at Jormu Kafebu with Harris Momoh and all of them came to Segbwema at the disarmament time and after the disarmament in Segbwema he stayed in Segbwema until the end of the war.

Q. I want your assistance with another individual now, please. Who is Idriss Kamara?
A. Idriss Kamara. Idriss Kamara was AFRC.

Q. What can you tell us about him?

A. Well, Idriss Kamara was part of the AFRC group that was with Brigadier Mani at the Koinadugu flank. They were there with Brigadier Mani and they moved with Brigadier Mani in December '98 to Makeni. But he was operating with Brigadier Mani and Colonel T. That was what I knew about him.

Q. Have you ever heard of a Red Goat battalion, Mr Sesay?

A. Those were the AFRC who were in the Koinadugu District.

This Idriss Kamara we are talking about, that was their group.

Q. And this Red Goat Battalion, was it involved in the Freetown invasion at all?

A. No. They were not part of the Freetown attack because, at the time Gullit and others attack Freetown, this group was based in Makeni.

Q. Did you know someone called Alice Pyne?

A. Very well.

Q. Who is she?

A. That was the wife of CO Nya, who joined the RUF in Kailahun District and was a radio operator.

Q. Who joined the RUF in the Kailahun district, just to be clear?

A. Alice.

Q. And CO Nya, when did he join the RUF?

A. In 1991.

Q. Where?

A. In Kailahun. Those were the ones that Anthony Mekunagbe brought with him, so he stayed.

Q. So what nationality was CO Nya?
A. A Liberian.

Q. And what about his wife, Alice Pyne, what nationality was she?

A. A Sierra Leonean.

MR GRIFFITHS: Now, for the assistance of the stenographer, Nya is N-Y-A-H. It is on the record already. It is on the record.

PRESIDING JUDGE: It is N-Y-A.

MR GRIFFITHS: What did I say?


MR GRIFFITHS: Okay.

MR KOUMJIAN: I don't think Mia Farrow is Nya, as the transcript currently shows.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So help us: What can you tell us about Alice Pyne?

A. Well, Alice Pyne was one of those trained in Pendembu as a radio operator in 1992. So she was with Nya as her partner to the time the RUF was pushed from Kailahun. So she was with Nya in a village called Taidu in late 1993, together with Mohamed Tarawalli.

Q. What's the name of the village?

A. Taidu.

Q. How do you spell that?

A. T-A-I-D-U.

Q. Go on. You were saying she was there in late 1993 together with Mohamed Tarawalli. What else were you telling us?

A. Yes, yes. So around February of 1994, they moved Nya, his wife, all of them moved with Mohamed Tarawalli from Taidu and came to Giema, and from Giema they moved to go and establish the...
Northern Jungle in Kangari Hills through the Peyima Jungle. So since that time Nya - Alice was with Nya at the Kangari Hills, and she was at the Kangari Hills with Nya up until 1997.

Q. When in 1997?

A. In May '97, when the RUF joined the AFRC in Makeni she was part of that group. They used to come to Freetown, she and Nya, and then return to Makeni. And they were in Freetown up until the time for the intervention. They retreated through Tombo to Makeni and to Kono. And then she was with Nya in Kono from February up until August, and they moved to the Koinadugu District together with Superman, up to December of '98, they came to Makeni, and from Makeni they went and based in Lunsar, and they were there after renewed fighting, they were in Lunsar sometimes and in Makeni. And in '99, they were in Lunsar. In 2000, she came to Makeni. So during the May 8 incident, Alice was in Makeni, whilst Nya was arrested in Freetown. So Alice left Makeni in 2000. She was in Makeni in 2000, up to 2001, the disarmament time.

Q. Thank you very much. Another individual now please. Do you know a Rashid Foday?

A. Yes, I know him.

Q. Who is he?

A. He was a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh.

Q. From when?

A. From 199' - I can say 1992, from 1992 up until 2000, when Mr Sankoh left him in Monrovia.

Q. When did he go to Monrovia?

A. In 2000.

Q. And why did he go to Monrovia?
A. Well, he was with Mr Sankoh in Freetown, and Mr Sankoh sent him to stay in the guesthouse in Monrovia. He was there, together with Memunatu Deen as the caretaker of the guesthouse.

Q. And for how long did he stay in that capacity?

A. Well, he was there because the guesthouse was there for us. He was there until around December of 2000 to January of 2000, when they said the guesthouse - we were not supposed to use the guesthouse any longer because by then peace had almost started reigning back in Sierra Leone.

Q. Mr Sesay, I need your help here. You said he was there up until around December of 2000 to January of 2000.

A. Yes. We stopped using the guesthouse around January to February of 2001. We stopped using it.

Q. So help me, just so that we're clear for the purpose of the transcript: Which month did he go to be the caretaker at the guesthouse, and which month and year?

A. Well, he went there around - Mr Sankoh sent him there around - around January of 2000.

Q. And he remained there until when?

A. Until around January 2001. The guesthouse was closed to us. They asked us to stop using it. So I had to provide money for them to rent another place for the meantime, and after some time they could return back to Sierra Leone.

Q. And in the course of that answer you said, "They asked us to stop using it." Who is the "they"?

A. The Liberian government.

Q. And you say that you had to rent somewhere else; is that right?

A. Yes. Because I gave money to him, Rashid, because he had
three children with him, together with his wife. I said, okay, they should go and rent a place, he and Memuna, until they were able to organise themselves and return to Sierra Leone.

Q. Thank you. Now, there is somebody else I want your assistance with. Do you know someone called Jabati Jaward?

A. Yes, very well.

Q. Who is he?

A. Well, Jabati Jaward was born in the village close to Pendembu called Mandekiema, and he joined the RUF and trained at the vocational secondary school in Pendembu in '91.

Q. He was born in a village close to somewhere, close to where?

A. I said the village was called Mandekiema, five miles away from Pendembu.

Q. How do you spell that name, Mande --

A. M-A-N-D-E.

Q. Yes?

A. K-I-E-M-A.

Q. And you were saying he trained where?

A. He was trained at the vocational secondary school in Pendembu.

Q. Trained as what?

A. He was trained as a fighter.

Q. And thereafter, what postings did he have?

A. Well, he was just a fighter within the RUF up to the time the RUF was pushed in '93, and then he was with me at Pomodu in '94, because he and my bodyguards were brothers. So he was with my bodyguards, '94 at Pomodu. And when I came to Giema later, he stayed in Pomodu with Peter Vandi. So when the government troops
retracted from Kailahun in April '95 and he came to Buedu and he
now based in Buedu with Peter Vandi.
Q. Pause there. And did he have any particular role when he
was with Peter Vandi?
A. Yes. He was adjutant to Peter Vandi.
Q. And what happened to him thereafter?
A. So when Peter Vandi moved to Giema, he left him in Buedu,
so he was with Peter Vandi's family in Buedu up until 1995, '96 -
up to the time of the coup. So in 1998, he became Sam Bockarie's
S4. That was when Sam Bockarie retreated to Kailahun.
Q. As S4, what were his responsibilities?
A. He was responsible for the storage of food stuff. He was
in charge of the food store in Buedu. Food, fuel, used clothing,
he was in charge of the store.
Q. And for how long did he remain in that position?
A. From February/March of '98 up until December of 1999, when
he joined Sam Bockarie and they went to Liberia.
Q. Do you know someone called Matthew Sesay?
A. Yes, very well.
Q. Where did you first meet him?
A. We first met at Camp Naama in 1990.
Q. How was he popularly known?
A. CO Kennedy.
Q. From 1991 to 1992 what was his responsibility within the
RUF?
A. He was a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh up until '93.
Q. And, as far as you're aware, how far back did he go with
Mr Sankoh? For how long had he known Mr Sankoh?
A. Well, I do not understand the question.
Q. Do you know when CO Kennedy and Foday Sankoh first met?
A. Well, CO Kennedy was one of the people who were recruited around the Harbel, Kakata areas. Mr Sankoh brought them to Naama.

Q. Did he know Sankoh from before then?
A. Well, I can't tell.

Q. From 1995 until 1996 did CO Kennedy have any particular responsibility?
A. Yes.

Q. What was that?
A. He was the area commander at the Peyima Jungle.

Q. And where was Sam Bockarie at that time?
A. Sam Bockarie too was in the Peyima Jungle but he was working under Kennedy as one of the battalion commanders.

Q. In December of 1996 was CO Kennedy given any particular assignment?
A. Yes.

Q. What was that?
A. Well, in December '96 Sam Bockarie became boss to Kennedy, so Sam Bockarie posted him to Koindu. He was in Koindu. He was receiving the ULIMO, he used to buy the ammunition from the ULIMO.

Q. And for how long was he retained in that position?
A. He was there from December '96 to May of '97.

Q. And then where did he go?
A. Sam Bockarie then withdrew him and he was now in Kailahun Town, so around July Sam Bockarie asked him to come to Kenema and Sam Bockarie took him from Kenema to Freetown and --

Q. And what did he do in Freetown?
A. Well, he was the commander responsible for sharing of food and monies, salaries. So Sam Bockarie placed him in charge of that. He was in charge of logistics.

Q. Was he still in Freetown at the time of the intervention?

A. Yes, yes. He was in Freetown until February. All of them withdrew from Freetown through the peninsula to Tombo and they crossed through Fogbo and they met me across the river. And he retreated to Masiaka and from Masiaka he was with the group with Superman, Mike Lamin and others went they went to Makeni with Isaac Mongor. And then I met them later in Makeni. All of us went to Kono and I left him in Kono. So from February to March he was in Kono up until the time the bank was broken into in Kono when Superman got the information and arrested the people who broke into the bank and he was able to retrieve some of the monies from them.

Q. Pause.

A. So he had to put those monies together.

Q. Who retrieved the money from them?

A. It was Superman.

Q. And what happened to that money?

A. He gave the money to Kennedy to be taken to Sam Bockarie, because he sent a message to Sam Bockarie saying that the monies that they had looted from the bank, he had collected some and he had given that to Kennedy to take it to Sam Bockarie. That was in ’98.

Q. Which month in ’98?

A. Early April. They arrived in Buedu in early April with the money.

Q. And when he returned with that money was he given any
particular assignment by Sam Bockarie?

A. Yes. Sam Bockarie sent him to Voinjama where he was up to July, where he was buying ammunition from the ULIMO, the ammunition that they had buried during the disarmament in Liberia. And at the time I came from Monrovia when Major Mulbah called me from Monrovia, whilst we were coming we met Kennedy in Voinjama. In fact, the pick-up that took him there was the one that brought us.

Q. Now, that trip to Monrovia, just so that we're clear, did anything happen to you during the course of that trip?

A. Yes. That was the time I lost the diamonds, at the time I was supposed to transit to Burkina Faso.

Q. So you travelled back from Voinjama with CO Kennedy?

A. No, no. I travelled back to Voinjama with CO Mulbah and we met Kennedy in Voinjama.

Q. And then what happened?

A. And then myself and Mulbah came to Buedu where — whilst Kennedy was in Voinjama.

Q. Thank you. Now, you tell us that in July you were withdrawn from Voinjama?

A. Yes.

Q. Firstly, why?

A. Well, he had informed Sam Bockarie that the ammunition that he had been buying, he said the men have said that the ammunition is finished. He said the onces that they had buried into the earth, so —

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness be asked to continue from where I stopped.

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. He said that the ammunition is finished, the ones that they had buried in the earth, so Sam Bockarie did what?

A. Sam Bockarie said he should return to Sierra Leone, to Buedu.

Q. And when he returned to Sierra Leone where was he posted?

A. Sam Bockarie posted him to Kono as mining commander and he was in a village near Superman Ground.

Q. And from then, which you tell us was July '98, for how long did he remain as mining commander?

A. He remained as mining commander until February 2000.

Q. And thereafter did he remain in the RUF?

A. Yes, he was in Kono until the disarmament and he came to Magburaka.

Q. Why was CO Kennedy removed as mining commander?

A. It was Mr Sankoh who gave me the instruction. He said the man had taken a long time there as mining commander, so I should relieve him. That was the time I was sent to supervise the mining in Kono. He said I should change Kennedy because he had taken a long time there.

Q. There are a few other individuals I want to ask you about. Do you know someone called Francis Oscar Charles?

A. Yes, very well.

Q. How was he commonly known?

A. FOC.

Q. When did he join the RUF?

A. '91.

Q. Where?

A. Kailahun District, Kailahun Town.

MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. I see the witness appears a bit
tired, and I have a matter I would like to bring up in private session outside the witness's presence that requires five or ten minutes.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Is the matter related to the current testimony?

MR KOUMJIAN: It is related to today's testimony, yes.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Can it wait until towards the end of the current testimony, say in the last five minutes or so?

MR KOUMJIAN: I believe I would be taking a risk if I did that. I would prefer to do it now.

MR GRIFFITHS: I am in no position because I am entirely in the dark as to what this is about.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian, you say, "I see the witness appears a little tired." I don't know where you get that impression from.

MR KOUMJIAN: He was hanging his head down, staring at his feet and sighing.

PRESIDING JUDGE: And your application is relating to his demeanour?

MR KOUMJIAN: No, your Honour. I simply wanted to take advantage of the fact that it appeared that he could use a break and I would like to do something outside his presence.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, this has nothing to do with your apparent tiredness. I don't believe that you are tired.

But counsel here opposite wants to raise an issue with the Court, I don't know what exactly, that we won't trouble you with. So you take a break of about 10 to 15 minutes and we will call you back.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, my Lord.
[In the absence of the witness]

MR KOUmjIAN: Your Honour, I would make an application to go into private session because it concerns the privacy and security of witnesses.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. Madam Court Manager, please organise a private session. This will not take long for the members of the public. You will be able to see into the well of the Court but you won't hear what is being said for a few minutes.

[At this point in the proceedings, a portion of the transcript, pages 44928 to 44933, was extracted and sealed under separate cover, as the proceeding was heard in private session.]
[Open session]

[In the presence of the witness]

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please proceed.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Mr Sesay, I was asking you about your knowledge of a man called Francis Oscar Charles who you told us was also known as FOC?

A. Yes.

Q. Let's just pick up the threads of that. When did he join the RUF?


Q. Where?

A. Kailahun Town.

Q. And following - was he trained at all?

A. Yes. He was trained and in 1992 he became bodyguard to Mr Sankoh.

Q. Where was he trained?

A. He was trained at the National Secondary School training base in Kailahun Town.

Q. For how long did he remain a bodyguard to Foday Sankoh?

A. Well, he remained a bodyguard for Foday Sankoh from '92 to '96, Zogoda. Mr Sankoh went to Ivory Coast, his team carried the name of bodyguard, and when Mr Sankoh returned in 1999 --

Q. Yes?

A. He was still a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh in Freetown up to the May 8th incident. He was among the group of Superman, Gibril Massaquoi and others who escaped from Freetown as a result of demonstration and they rejoined the RUF in Lunsar. From there he was in Makeni, he went to Kono and joined me. He was with me in
Kono up to the disarmament in Kono and we came to Makeni.

Q. Now a couple of details. Was he in Zogoda at the time when Zogoda fell to the Kamajors?

A. Yes, yes. He was in Zogoda. In fact he was one of the people who was lucky to survive the attack and arrived in Giema in October '96. Because when he arrived in Giema he had swollen feet and a swollen face, except when he had to be treated, even up to the time Mr Sankoh came he was not fully recuperated.

Q. Now I see the record says a swollen feet and a swollen fist. The witness actually said face. And what had caused the swelling, Mr Sesay?

A. It was the type of food. Because he was in the bush for a long time. He was in the bush and he could not have access to salt and there were thorns in the bush. When he came, there was no slippers even. He did not even wear a slippers. He was living in the bush up to the time he went to - when he went to Kailahun, he used to live on raw food in the bush.

Q. Now where was he at the time of the coup in May 1997?

A. He was in Giema. All of us were in Giema in the village.

Q. And did he remain in Giema after the AFRC took over?

A. No. He moved with us, all of us came to Daru and he together with Mosquito and others came to Freetown and I remained in Daru.

Q. Now you mentioned that he was in Freetown with Foday Sankoh at the time of the May 2000 incident. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And you told us that he escaped with Gibril Massaquoi to Lunsar, yes?
A. Yes.

Q. After your escape, did you meet up with him?

A. Yes. I said I met with him in Makeni and he went to Kono and stayed with me. In fact, the meeting that we attended, the first meeting with the ECOWAS at the Executive Mansion he went with me to Monrovia. I took him along.

Q. You took him along to Monrovia. Which Monrovia trip?

A. I'm referring to the time that we attended a meeting with the five ECOWAS Heads of State at the Executive Mansion, the five ECOWAS Heads of State in July 2000. The first meeting, he was among the group that I went with.

Q. Now, when you met him after the May incident was this before or after the UNAMSIL personnel had been released?

A. It was after I had released the UNAMSIL personnel. It was the following week that they came because they arrived in Lunsar and came to Makeni in early June of 2000, and I released the UNAMSIL in late May.

Q. And when you saw him following the release of the UNAMSIL personnel, did you discuss what others within the RUF thought about the decision to release those people?

A. In fact he was one of the men who told me that when they got to Lunsar they heard that - that is himself, Superman and Gibril, together with Jackson Swarray and others. They heard that I had released the UNAMSIL.

Q. Go on?

A. He said Gibril and Superman had said, "Issa has finally sold Pa Sankoh out." He was the number one man who gave me that information. He said Gibril and others were grumbling that I had released the UNAMSIL personnel, that I had no right to do that,
it was only Pa Sankoh who was to have released the UNAMSIL and not me. I should have negotiated and gave them conditions that Pa Sankoh must have been released before I should have released the UNAMSIL, but I did not do that, so that I had sold out Pa Sankoh.

Q. Let's move on to somebody else. Do you know someone called Seibatu Jusu?

A. Yes, I know her.

Q. Who is that person?

A. Well, first she was a girlfriend to one of Mohamed Tarawalli's bodyguards, but the man eventually died in the Western Jungle around '95. So from that she was trained in the Western Jungle as an RUF operator, radio operator, around '95 and she was with a radio operator as her boyfriend called Waco-Waco.

Q. Pause there. How do you spell Waco-Waco?

A. Well, except you help me out - if the interpreter assists.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please, Mr Interpreter.


Q. Now, let's take things chronologically before we come on to her various postings. First of all, did Mosquito have a wife?

A. Yes. He had a wife called Hawa.

Q. And was there any particular relationship between Seibatu Jusu and Mosquito's wife?

A. Yes. They were cousins.

Q. When did she join the RUF?

A. Because she and Hawa trained in the same '91, all of them trained together.
Q. Hawa being?
A. Who later became Mosquito's wife, together with Seibatu and others.
Q. And you say that she was married. What was her first husband's - what was her husband's name?
A. Ansu Sillah.

JUDGE DOHERTY: I don't think he said married, Mr Griffiths. He said she had a boyfriend.
MR GRIFFITHS: I am sorry. My fault.

Q. What was her boyfriend's name?
A. Ansu Sillah.
Q. How do you spell the first name?
A. A-N-S-U.
Q. And how do you spell the second name?
A. S-I-L-L-A-H.

Q. Now, you say she became a radio operator. Where did she train to become a radio operator?
A. In the Western Jungle.
Q. And to whom was she assigned as a radio operator?
A. To Superman.
Q. For how long did she remain with Superman as a radio operator?
A. She was with Superman until May '97.
Q. Then what happened to her?

MR KOUMJIAN: I would ask for a redaction of basically all of these personal details.
PRESIDING JUDGE: On what grounds?
MR KOUMJIAN: I would prefer to say it in private session, but - because otherwise I will be compounding the problem.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Just give me a moment to read this.

MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honours, I could make my point in one minute in private session.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Just give me a moment to read this and to consult my colleagues.

[Trial chamber conferred]

PRESIDING JUDGE: We are of the view that nothing so far that has transpired in the manner in which counsel is questioning jeopardises the security of any witness, or the protection of any witness; and I think sometimes it is the interventions that do draw attention unnecessarily to these issues. We are of the view that we cannot - for me to start now ordering a general redaction would be going back on the order that I made that we're not going to make general redactions.

So please proceed.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. What happened to her after May 1997?

A. Well, she went to her parents' in Kenema.

Q. Why?

A. Well, her father was in Kenema, her mother too was there.

She went and stayed with them. And when Mosquito transferred to Kenema, she was almost like staying with Hawa at the same time staying with her parents. So she was in Kenema. So I can say up to - from August up until the intervention.

Q. And after the intervention?

A. Well, she withdrew to Kailahun town with her parents because her mother and father, they all moved from Kenema to Kailahun town, including her younger sisters.

Q. And did she remain in Kenema?
A. No, in Kailahun. They withdrew to Kailahun in February '98.

Q. And did she remain in Kailahun?

A. Yes. She was in Kailahun up to June/July and May. Then she went to Buedu. June/July of '98. She then went to Buedu.

Q. And what did she do in Buedu?

A. Well, she used to assist Hawa in the kitchen, and at the same time she would go on the radio set. But most time she concentrated on the domestic work, the domestic chores, assisting Hawa in the kitchen.

Q. Page 157, line 4: To assist Hawa, H-A-W-A. And at this time, when she was assisting Hawa in the kitchen doing domestic work, where was she living?

A. She was staying in one house in Buedu, but in the morning she will come over to Hawa and spend a day with her, and then at night she goes back to her house and sleep.

Q. And where was she doing this domestic work with Hawa? In whose home?

A. Sam Bockarie's house. Sometimes she was the one who even served Sam Bockarie food, and other times she used to serve us. When she brought the food outside, she would dish the food, and then Sam Bockarie would invite us to come and eat with him.

Q. And what happened to her in December 1999?

A. Well, she went with Sam Bockarie. She went with Hawa to Liberia.

Q. Does the name Mohamed Kabba mean anything to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he a member of the RUF?

A. Yes.

SCSL - TRIAL CHAMBER II
Q. When did he join the RUF?
Q. Where?
A. In Kailahun town.

Q. What role did he play within the RUF?
A. Well, around '93 he trained as a radio operator. And around '94 he was at Peyima. And he was with Mr Sankoh later at Zogoda. And then --

Q. Pause. Let us just put a full stop at Zogoda. I want to get a few more details. Did he have any brothers or sisters?
A. Yes. His younger brother was my bodyguard. He was called Isaka Kabba.
Q. And Isaka, is that spelled I-S-A-K-A, and then the surname is Kabba, K-A-B-B-A?
A. Yes, yes.

Q. And for how long was his younger brother your bodyguard?
A. Well, he served as my bodyguard from December '93 to the disarmament.
Q. Now, you said that Mohamed Kabba trained as a radio operator and then went to Zogoda. To whom was he assigned in Zogoda?
A. He was with Mr Sankoh as one of the operators.
Q. What happened to him when Sankoh went to the Ivory Coast for the peace talks?
A. Well, Mr Sankoh invited him, and he too went to Ivory Coast, he, Kabba. He went to Ivory Coast in '96 but later returned and stayed in Giema. He came through Guinea, and he stayed in Giema.
Q. And help us: When was it that he went to Abidjan at
Mr Sankoh’s invitation?

Q. Can you give us a month?

A. No, I do not recall the exact month.

6 A. But he later returned. He, Ray and others came back around October ‘96 and they stayed in Giema. So he was now in Giema as one of the operators up to the time the May ‘97 coup took place.

7 We were all in Giema. He was with me. Himself, Tiger, they were operating the sets.

8 A. But he later returned. He, Ray and others came back around October ‘96 and they stayed in Giema. So he was now in Giema as one of the operators up to the time the May ‘97 coup took place.

9 Very well.

Q. And then where was he assigned after the coup?

A. Well, after the coup - after the coup, he stayed in Kailahun, but he later joined Sam Bockarie in Kenema.

Q. And for how long was he with Sam Bockarie in Kenema?

A. Well, after the coup, he was with Sam Bockarie up to the intervention, and then the station commander in Kailahun Town. He was after the retreat he went and stayed in Kailahun Town. He was then the station commander in Kailahun Town in ‘98.

Q. And did he remain in that position?

A. Yes. He was in Kailahun town up to 1999. He then went to Buedu.

Q. In what capacity?

A. Well, he went to Buedu and became the signals commander in ‘99.

Q. Who appointed him as signals commander?

A. Sam Bockarie. It was around - around October/November of ‘99.

Q. What happened to him after Sam Bockarie departed in December 1999?

A. Well, he was in Kailahun, and then he later went to
Freetown because Mr Sankoh invited him to Freetown, because from Freetown he met me in Kono. As he came as signals commander, he was in Kono for some time and later went to Makeni, and then he went back to Kailahun during the disarmament.

Q. Do you know someone called Sonia Beggs, Mr Sesay?
A. Sonia Beggs? I don't know that person facially, but somebody who was that person's family member - my family member told me about Sonia Beggs when I was in the detention centre because my wife's sister had a child with Sonia Begg's elder brother, from the same father and the same mother, because an incident took place - can I go ahead?

Q. Yes, go ahead.
A. {Redacted} and it was during that time that I heard about this name when the woman called Tata, because it was Tata's sister who got a baby for Tonia [phon], and they are from the same mum and the same dad, so they - she explained all the story to me, that they were living in the same house when they attacked and captured her during the AFRC intervention in Freetown.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. Please pause. I personally am getting lost. Is this Tonia or Sonia? Is this character a man or a woman?

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. Is Sonia a man or a woman?
A. A woman.
Q. And you mentioned a name, Tata?
Q. How do you spell that?
A. It's T-A-T-A.
Q. And you say that she was captured during the AFRC intervention in Freetown, yes?
A. Yes. So she was telling Tata that she never knew me before but that we were not the ones who came to Freetown during the intervention in Freetown, and she told Tata that she knew the people who captured her and those were the people that she was going to prosecute, those were the people who captured her, not the ones who did not take part in her capture.
Q. Now, does the name Augustine Mallah mean anything to you?
A. Yes, yes, I know that person very well.
Q. Was that person a member of the RUF?
A. Yes, an RUF member. Alias, OG is an RUF member.
Q. Is that letter O, letter G, OG?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. When did he join the RUF?
A. He joined the RUF in 1991 in Pujehun District.
Q. What happened to him in Pujehun District?
A. Well, they were with Gibril Massaquoi and others. They were with Gibril Massaquoi and others in the Pujehun District from '91 to '94 and he was among the group that joined Mr Sankoh at Zogoda in '94 and became a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh in '94/'95 and then in '96, early '96.
Q. Mr Sankoh assigned him to whom?
A. To Mike Lamin, before Mr Sankoh departed to the Ivory Coast.
Q. And did he remain with Mike Lamin?
A. Yes, he was with Mike Lamin, and they used to go on patrols.
to the Western Jungle and Northern Jungle from Zogoda, and after Zogoda was moved, then he and Mike Lamin moved through Pujehun and then they surrendered in Liberia. So he stayed in Liberia whilst Mike Lamin came back in in June of '97 and rejoined the RUF. And then OG and others came in the second batch around August of '97. So when they came they were with Mosquito in Kenema.

Q. Pause there. I want to clarify a couple of things there. You say that he was with Mike Lamin when they surrendered in Liberia, to whom?

A. To ULIMO, ULIMO, okay.

Q. And you say he came in a second batch around August of '97, came from where?

A. Came from Liberia, from Bomi Hills. They came through Lofa Bridge and then they came to Sierra Leone through Vahun.

Q. And went to where?

A. They came to Kailahun and went to Kenema where they met Sam Bockarie. And from there, he was with the fighting group in Tongo, and from there he went to Freetown, he met Mike Lamin there. And Mike Lamin gave him a Land Cruiser. He gave him a Land cruiser jeep with mining equipment, and then went back to Tongo and was doing mining there for Mike Lamin until January when they were attacked in Tongo. And when they were attacked in Tongo, he withdrew to Kenema. And from Kenema he went to Kailahun. From Kailahun he was with the group that Sam Bockarie sent to receive us in Gandorhun. And from there, after that, when we got to Kailahun, Sam Bockarie asked him to go and stay in Baiima. So he was in Baiima throughout '98.

Q. Thank you.
A. And in '99 - in '99 he was in Baiima up until after the Lome when Mike Lamin went to Kailahun and collected Mr Sankoh's bodyguards, OG was one of them, and he too joined Mike Lamin to go to Freetown. So they went to Freetown. They stayed in Freetown until around December of - until - I mean, November 1999. Mr Sankoh sent he, OG, and two other people, who were Black Guards, to go to Segbwema and talk to their brother RUF people, for them not to team up with Sam Bockarie. So they were there until the time Sam Bockarie left. He was in Segbwema and around 2000, he was in Tongo Field up to 2001.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr Sesay.

MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I am moving on to another topic and I note the time.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Indeed. We have come to the end of today's proceedings. We will continue tomorrow at nine. And, Mr Sesay, as usual do not discuss your evidence with anyone.

[Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m. to be reconvened on Thursday, 29 July 2010 at 9.00 a.m.]
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