THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 7 JULY 2010
9.05 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:  Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
                     Justice Richard Lussick
                     Justice Teresa Doherty
                     Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:  Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:  Ms Advera Kamuzora
                  Mr Alhassan Fornah
                  Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:  Ms Brenda J Hollis
                      Mr Nicholas Koumjian
                      Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Ms Silas Chekera
Ms Logan Hambrick
Ms Fatiah Balfas
Wednesday, 7 July 2010

[Open session]

[The accused present]

[A Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.]

PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We’ll take appearances, please.

MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning, your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this morning: Brenda J Hollis, Maja Dimitrova, and Nicolas Koumjian.

MR GRIFFITHS: Morning, Madam President, your Honours, counsel opposite. For the Defence today: Myself, Courtenay Griffiths; with me, Mr Silas Chekera, Ms Logan Hambrick, Ms Fatiah Balfas and Ms Mason Hubbard.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning, Mr Sesay. I remind you, as I normally do, that you are under the oath you took to tell the truth.

Mr Griffiths, please continue.

WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont’d]

Q. Yesterday afternoon, Mr Sesay, when we adjourned, we were looking at the minutes of the first meeting of the AFRC held at the conference hall, defence headquarters, on Saturday, 19 July 1997. Do you recall that?

A. Yes, I recall.

Q. Now, you’ll recall that one of the matters that we looked at was a passage in those minutes to this effect: Colonel Isaac reported about the problem of recognition between the People’s Army and other servicemen. He emphasised that it is awkward to see the People’s Army on one side and the armed forces personnel
getting a confrontation in public. And you told us, if you recall, that there had been, as early as July 1997, some friction between members of the RUF and members of the AFRC. Is that right?

A. Yes, that's what I said.

Q. Now, did you take any steps, Mr Sesay, to try and resolve that conflict?

A. Well, that problem was not resolved because it continued for some time because it used to come right up to the intervention period, it used to happen. In fact, that was part of the things that made Bockarie to leave Freetown, and he went to base in Kenema.

Q. Now, in that regard, Mr Sesay, I would like us now, please, to have a look at another document, exhibit P-360, please. Now, if you turn to the second page of that document, there is a signature there. Whose signature is that?

A. This is my signature.

Q. Could we go to the first page of the document, please? Now, we see that the document is headed "The People's Army of Sierra Leone" and it's addressed to His Excellency, Major JP Koroma, Head of State and Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, State House, Freetown. And the document is from the Military High Command and War Council, People's Army of Sierra Leone. The subject is "Proposals for the tentative integration of the People's Army into the national army and the political circle." And we see that the date of this document is 13 August 1997. Just to remind ourselves, that first meeting of the AFRC, the document we looked at yesterday is dated 19 July 1997. So this is about a month or so after that meeting:
"Sir, after series of deliberation, members of the military high command and the People's War Council of the People's Army have adopted this proposal which, with all due respect, is being submitted to you for your perusal and timely consideration.

1. Military integration.

The People's Army deemed it expedient at this time to be tentatively integrated into the Sierra Leone Army which is to be dubbed 'National Army'. This will alleviate the numerous constraints which continue to bug the People's Army. Should this proposal be accepted, we suggest the initial integration of 5,000 men. In addition, we suggest the occupation of prominent positions by key commanders of the People's Army in the integrated National Army. This is unequivocally spelled out below.

A. Colonel Sam Bockarie, field commander of the People's Army, to be the second in command to the chief of defence staff.

B. Lieutenant Colonel Issa H Sesay, battle group commander of the People's Army, to be second in command to the chief of army staff.

C. Colonel Isaac Mongor to be second in command to the chairman of joint security.

2. Occupation of remaining ministries. It has been proposed that in order to keep the governmental machinery in motion, the remaining ministries which belong to the People's Army should be occupied by the following people:

A. Captain Lawrence Womandia, Ministry of Energy and Power.

B. Lieutenant Eldred Collins, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
C. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Vandi, Under-Secretary, Lands Housing and Environment.

D. Captain Patrick S Bainda, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education.

3. Supreme Council. A complete list of the members of the Supreme Council will be submitted soon. Colonel Michael Lamin has been named a member of the Supreme Council and the representative of the People's Army in any AFRC delegation.

Respectfully submitted, yours faithfully for Colonel Sam Bockarie, battlefield commander, People's Army of Sierra Leone.'

We see that the letter has been copied to various other individuals.

First of all, Mr Sesay, staying with the signature page, we see that this letter comes from Sam Bockarie but you've accepted that you signed it. Is that correct?

A. Yes, because it was on Sam Bockarie's instruction that I signed it. He said that I should sign the letter and present it to Johnny Paul Koroma for the Secretary-General of the AFRC.

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, what prompted Sam Bockarie to write this letter to Johnny Paul Koroma?

A. Well, up to this time we didn't have assigned positions in the AFRC government. For example, all the coupists had appointments. Some of them were monitoring the ministries. Some of us were just there without having any appointments. We did not have appointments. That's why Bockarie and Pa Rogers caused us to write this letter about the reintegration of the RUF commanders into the army, but this did not work because they did not accept it. Bockarie was not integrated. Even mine was not
accepted. Because there is no newspaper in Sierra Leone or broadcast on the radio that Bockarie or Issa was deputy chief of staff. No, it did not work.

Q. Let's turn now, please, to the first page of this document, and the first paragraph under "Military Integration". And we see there, "Should this proposal be accepted, we suggest the initial integration of 5,000 men." Where were these 5,000 men to come from?

A. That is the RUF men. For example, like the RUF men in the Western Jungle were with Superman. They were almost up to that figure. Because Superman had over 3,000 men in the Western Jungle, and Isaac too had over - up to 5,000 men in another jungle. So, if you are talking about 5,000 men, the Kangari Hills and the Western Area men, in fact there were more than that figure. There were more than that 5,000.

Q. So was it the intention then that those two groups from the Kangari Hills and the Western Area would comprise the 5,000 men to be integrated into the new national army?

A. No, that was not it. If the AFRC authorities had accepted that, we would have taken some other men from Kailahun and some from the Northern Jungle and some others from the Western Jungle for the reintegration to start, but that did not work.

Q. Now, at the time that this letter was written, Mr Sesay, where was Bockarie?

A. Bockarie was in Kenema at this time. I don't know if he had gone on attack or he had already captured Tongo, because it was in August that they left to attack Tongo, but he was in Kenema.

Q. And at the time of the writing of this letter, where were
you?

A. The time I recall was when Bockarie sent this instruction, we debated it together with Pa Rogers and Mike Lamin. I was in Benguema. I called a meeting in Benguema. So from there I prepared the letter and sent a radio message to Bockarie.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak slowly and repeat his answer.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Mr Sesay, could we start from "and sent a radio message to Bockarie", could you continue from there, please?

A. I said the document was prepared after we had a meeting in Benguema, because Bockarie had said we should write this letter, so he said I should have Pa Rogers's consent and Mike Lamin, so all of us were at the meeting at Benguema at Isaac Mongor's house in Benguema.

Q. Pause. And then?

A. And from there the letter was written in - with pen. It was handwritten, and I gave the operator the letter and it was sent to Bockarie as a message and Bockarie read the letter and he said okay. And he too proposed the ministers that were to fill in the allocated positions that Johnny Paul had allocated to the RUF. So from there, when I got the response about the ministers that he had appointed, the letter was typed out. Then he said I should sign it. Then I signed it and he said we should take it to Colonel AK Sesay for Johnny Paul's attention.

JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you proceed, I'm quite sure I heard the witness said Pa Rogers was at that meeting on two occasions and I want to make sure the record reflects, if I heard correctly.
MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Was Pa Rogers at those meetings, Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, Pa Rogers was present.

PRESIDING JUDGE: In fact, at page 9 there's a paragraph that begins with a question: "Could we start from 'and sent a radio message'" all the way to the end of the answer the witness gives Pa Rogers is mentioned at least three times in that paragraph, but he doesn't appear at all in the record.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. But he was present, Pa Rogers, at those meetings?

A. Yes, Pa Rogers was present.

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, taking matters slowly, what was Johnny Paul Koroma's response to this letter?

A. Okay. Before this letter was written Johnny Paul had spoken to Bockarie before Bockarie left for Kenema.

Q. And?

A. And Johnny Paul told Bockarie that Bockarie was to submit names to its council members, and he allocated ministries to the RUF, and Bockarie was to give names to fill those positions. So Bockarie suggested the names before he left for Kenema.

Q. Pause there. And?

A. And he spoke about the integration, but he said we should discuss it with Pa Rogers, Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor, so we would know the number of people that we should start the integration with. So when he left for Kenema, we held a meeting at Isaac's house at Benguema and we all agreed that we should send a message to Bockarie and, when I sent a message to Bockarie, he responded that I should put it into writing and it should be typed out and I should sign it on his behalf and I should take the letter to
Johnny Paul - sorry, to AK Sesay, for onward delivery to Johnny Paul.

Q. But did Johnny Paul, after he received this letter, take any practical steps to implement the proposals?

A. Yes, the only one that Johnny Paul accepted was what he told Bockarie, that is the council members, to the appointment of the ministers and their deputies. That was what Johnny Paul approved of, but the integration of the RUF commanders or the junior men into the army, he did not approve that. That did not work.

MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness now be shown, please,

exhibit P-58:

Q. Mr Sesay, have you ever seen this document?

A. Yes, I've seen it before, during my trial.

Q. Now, we see that it is dated 4 September 1997. So consequently, this is some weeks after that letter dated 13 August we've just been looking at. And if we look at the second page of the document, we see a declaration pursuant to paragraph - subparagraph 2 of paragraph 1 of the Administration of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Proclamation 1997:

"The following persons constitute the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council with effect from 25 May 1997. Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman; Corporal Foday Sankoh, Deputy Chairman."

And then we see a list of members, beginning with Captain SAJ Musa; Colonel A Sesay; Staff Sergeant Abu Sankoh; Staff Sergeant Alex Brima; Staff Sergeant Brima Kamara; Colonel Sam Bockarie; Major Morris Kallon; David Kallon; Colonel Issa Sesay; Colonel Gibril Massaquoi; Colonel Michael Lamin; Squadron Leader Victor L King; Major JB Carter-Tarawalli; Captain Lawrence
Womandia; Lieutenant Eldred Collins; Warrant Officer Franklyn Conteh; Warrant Officer Samuel Kargbo; Sergeant Bangura; Sergeant Koroma; Sergeant Adams, Sergeant Gborie; Sergeant Turay; Sergeant Kallay, Corporal Momoh Bangura; Lance Corporal Hector Bob-Lahai;

Lance Corporal Ibrahim Sesay;Staff Sergeant - I can't read it on my copy. Is that "Kabba" or "Kabbia"? I think it's Kabbia.

Lance Corporal Sesay; Mohamed Kamara; Bai Hinga?

PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, is that the best we could do for focus on this document?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Bai Hinga Kurrary-Bangura; and Abdulai Michael - is that, "Mumu", Mr Sesay? Thank you?
A. Yes, Munu.

Q. Then finally Kandeh Sorie-Sebba Bangura. First of all, we see that this is dated 3 September 1997 and appears above the name of Major Johnny Paul Koroma, but these positions are to take effect from 25 May 1997. So is it the case, Mr Sesay, that, effectively, this was being backdated?
A. What do you mean by "backdate"?

Q. Because this announcement is dated 3 September 1997, but these positions from the first paragraph are to take effect from 25 May 1997. Do you see what I mean? So that the pronouncement is made in September but the appointments are to take effect from 25 May?
A. Well, it was at this time that we were accepted to be members of the council, and it was at this time that we were members of the council. Now, from June to this time, we were not council members, because even the meeting that we attended at the army headquarters, that is the conference hall, we were not
council members at that time. So it was at this time that I
knew, and even my other colleagues, that we knew that we were
council members, September.

Q. I see. Now, help us to this extent, Mr Sesay. Could you
please go down that list of names for us and just indicate which
of those were members of the RUF?
PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, I would propose, if you are
having difficulty reading the document on the screen by reason of
a bad focus, that you be handed the original document for you to
be able to see.

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. Just go down the list, Mr Sesay, and just call out the
names of those who were RUF members.
A. My Lord, I think the screen is better because I have
problems with my eye. Mr Foday Sankoh was a member although he
was not present. Mr Colonel Sam Bockarie was a member. Morris
Kallon was a member. David B Kallon - G Kallon himself was a
member but he wasn't there; he was in Abidjan. Myself, Issa
Sesay, I was a member. Eldred Collins was not - sorry. Gibril
Massaquoi was a member. Gibril Massaquoi was a member. Colonel
Mike Lamin was a member. Captain Lawrence Womandia wasn't a
council member; he was a minister. And Eldred Collins was not a
member; he was a minister. I think those are the RUF names.

Q. So just to go through that list, we have Sankoh, Bockarie,
Kallon, Kallon, Sesay, Massaquoi, Lamin, Womandia and Collins.
So of the 34 members, it would appear that nine were members of
the RUF?
A. Yes, we were nine. But later the figure was above that 39
because Johnny Paul and others involved the civil society heads
into the council. But the RUF, we were the council members because we were the council members because when Gibril came from Nigeria, he brought a message to Mr Bockarie from Mr Sankoh that the Liberians who were with the RUF as members, they were not to become council members because it wouldn't tell well for them to be in higher positions because he said the AFRC members wouldn't like that one. So that's why the --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat that last part of his answer.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. That's why what, Mr Sesay?

A. That's why Isaac Mongor and Superman did not become council members because - actually they were to be because we were all senior members, but because they were Liberians, that's why they did not become council members, according to Mr Sankoh's instruction through Gibril to Bockarie.

Q. Just to examine that a little further, at the time of the coup on 25 May, where was Gibril Massaquoi?

A. Gibril Massaquoi was in Nigeria with Mr Sankoh.

Q. Did he remain in Nigeria?

A. No, he came, I think, in late June or early July. That was when he came to Freetown with letters from Mr Sankoh to Johnny Paul Koroma and Sam Bockarie.

Q. So he came bearing letters - carrying letters from Sankoh to Johnny Paul Koroma and Bockarie. Is that right?

A. Yes, the ones he brought to Freetown. But he brought some other letters, but he dropped some letters first in Burkina Faso, even before coming to Freetown. He brought four letters from Nigeria from Mr Sankoh, but two of them were dropped in Burkina.
Faso and the other two were brought to Freetown. The two for Burkina Faso were one for General Diendere, who was the chief of staff for the Burkinabe army, and the other one for General Ibrahim Bah. He dropped those letters before he came to Freetown with the letters for Johnny Paul and Sam Bockarie.

Q. Okay.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, you said one was for General who? The very first general.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreter heard General Diendere.

MR GRIFFITHS: That name is on the record. It's J-E-N-J-E-R-E?

MR KOUMJIAN: I believe it's spelt - I think we've been spelling it D-I-E.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Diendere with a D.

MR GRIFFITHS: I think we should stick with the spelling which is already on the record:

Q. So just to be clear, Massaquoi leaves Nigeria carrying four letters. To where does he travel first of all?

A. He travelled from Nigeria to Abidjan, Ivory Coast. From Abidjan, he went to the house where Mr Sankoh was, that is to Pa Kallon, and he explained to Pa Kallon the message that Pa - that Mr Sankoh had told him. And he left Abidjan by train to Ouagadougou and he delivered the letters in Burkina Faso and he came back to Abidjan. And he travelled by road to Guinea and from Guinea to Sierra Leone through Kambia, Port Loko to Freetown. That's how he travelled.

Q. Now, the letters to Diendere in Burkina Faso, do you know what the content of that letter was?
A. Well, the time he delivered the letters, I don't know, but when he came to Freetown he took Sam Bockarie's letters to Kenema and gave it to him, and --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat his answer.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So he comes to Freetown, and from Freetown he goes to where, Mr Sesay?

A. He went to Kenema because Bockarie was not in Freetown. So when he came to Freetown to deliver Johnny Paul's letter, he asked me about Mosquito's whereabouts, and I said he was in Kenema, and he told me he had a letter for him so he was going to take the letter to him, and the message that he had from Mr Sankoh for Bockarie. So he left Freetown for Kenema, he met Bockarie, and he returned to Freetown. So from that, Johnny Paul invited Bockarie, and Bockarie came to Freetown.

Q. Now, what was the content of the letter to Bockarie?

A. The one for Bockarie, Mr Sankoh said to Bockarie that Bockarie and us, the RUF commanders, that we should not accept ministerial positions because those positions were for civilians and we were not politicians, and so we should not become ministers. So he said he had sent to Ibrahim Bah because he had purchased ammunition from Burkina Faso so he should work with Johnny Paul and Ibrahim Bah so the AFRC and RUF will be able to defend themselves with the ammunitions if the ammunition got to Freetown. So he said Bockarie should continue to take orders and instruction from Johnny Paul, together with all the other RUF members, and the Liberians like for example Superman, Isaac Mongor and the senior commanders who were Liberians, he said
Bockarie should not allow them to become ministers or even council members. He said they should just be there as RUF commanders because of their nationalities. The Sierra Leonean people will not feel happy if they will become senior people in the country. That will not go down well with the Sierra Leoneans. So that was the instruction that he gave to the RUF and the letter from Mr Sankoh to Sam Bockarie.

Q. Now, you mentioned that Mr Sankoh had said something about purchasing ammunition in Burkina Faso. Is that right?

A. He said he had purchased ammunition before he travelled to Nigeria. He had purchased the ammunition. And I understood that the trip that he made to Libya to meet the leader of Libya, he got some money from him. So that was the money he used to buy the ammunition from Burkina Faso. But he did not tell the external delegation. That was why there was a problem between the external delegation and Mr Sankoh, because they had just thought that the money Mr Sankoh had from the Libyan leader, that he had just obtained it for his own personal use because Mr Sankoh was a man who was very security conscious. So when those external delegation members had become members of the ceasefire monitoring committee in Freetown, he was a man who was very meticulous. Whenever he would send you, he would send a security - someone to spy on you. So there was a time when he understood that the delegation were conniving with the government, so he did not used to send money to them. That was why the problem started between Mr Sankoh and the external delegates. They did not know that Mr Sankoh had used the money to purchase these arms, some of the money, because I understood that Mr Sankoh initially was given $2 million and later he said -
he sent a letter that the money he received was not sufficient to buy arms and ammunition or - and medicines, food for the troops.

So they sent some other money for him, $1.5 million, so the money was now in total 3.5 million that was given to him by the Libyan leader. That was the problem. That was why - what brought the problem between himself and the external delegation. So those ammunition, he had bought before he went to Nigeria. So he sent Gibril Massaquoi to go and meet Diendere --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak slowly,

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So he spent Gibril Massaquoi to go and meet Diendere, yes?

A. To go and meet Diendere and Mr Bah, Mr Ibrahim Bah, so Ibrahim Bah would make arrangements with Diendere and Ibrahim Bah would make arrangements with Diendere to transport the ammunition, and Mr Sankoh sent another letter to Johnny Paul, telling him that Johnny Paul should provide money so Ibrahim Bah would hire a flight to transport these arms and ammunition. That's what happened.

Q. Now, Diendere, who was he, Mr Sesay?

A. This person was the army chief of staff for Burkina Faso.

Q. And at this time where was Ibrahim Bah based?

A. At this time Ibrahim Bah was based in Burkina Faso. This Diendere was a friend of Bah's and a friend of Mr Sankoh's as well.

Q. Now these arms and ammunition purchased and to be transported, did those arms and ammunition in due course arrive in Sierra Leone?

A. Yes, the arms and ammunition arrived but, according to my
understanding, the flight was to transport the arms and ammunition on three different occasions but it only came once and landed in Magburaka. But before that when Gibril brought the letters to Johnny Paul, Johnny Paul invited Bockarie and they held a meeting and Johnny Paul said the best thing they should do was to send Gibril back to invite Ibrahim Bah. So Gibril travelled back through Ivory Coast to Burkina Faso and he invited Ibrahim Bah and they came together with Gibril and they held a meeting and Johnny Paul provided the money, that was $90,000, but I understood that the money was taken from the Bank of Sierra Leone. It was the manager for the Bank of Sierra Leone that was called to provide the money and he did. So that was the money that they took and they gave it to Ibrahim Bah and Johnny Paul gave two representatives to go with Ibrahim Bah and those were late Lieutenant Colonel Fonti Kanu and Lieutenant Arnold Bangura. Those people went with Ibrahim Bah through Guinea to Burkina Faso. So when they went - because at that time Ibrahim Bah and Johnny Paul were communicating together with the two military attaché that he sent with Ibrahim Bah. So Johnny Paul gave instructions to Steve Bio because Steve Bio had come at that time, he used to move with Gibril. And Steve Bio said they were to go and inspect the airfield in Bo, Kenema and Kono to they will see where the ammunition and arms would land. But the airstrips were really small, so he suggested that they prepare the one in Mayagba.

Q. And did they prepare the one in Moyamba?
A. No, Mayagba. The village is called Mayagba. But the field was between Makeni and Magburaka. The place where the field was constructed is called - the village is called Mayagba village.
So the Caterpillars and the graders were brought from Bumbuna Hydro and they used those machines to work on the field. It was the SOS works that organised the commanders to do the work for the field. The brigade commander for north who was Colonel Banya and the SOS who was Bush Fowl. They headed the construction of the airstrip in Mayagba.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, two questions. The witness mentioned a sum of money --

MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that now.

PRESIDING JUDGE: -- that appears as 90,000 something in the record. Please clear that or clarify that. Secondly, the time frame for this arrival of this shipment.

MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that:

Q. Mr Sesay, I didn't want to interrupt you, but I would like to clarify a couple of matters before we lose sight of them. First of all, the 90,000 which you say came from the Bank of Sierra Leone, 90,000 what currency?

A. US dollars. Because that was what Ibrahim said he would be able to hire the flight with.

Q. And how many flights were there supposed to be?

A. Well, it was one flight but it was to come three times. It would have come and off-loaded, returned to load again and off-load and go again and off-load for the last time but it did not work. It only came once.

Q. Pause there. Secondly this: Can you give us a date, a month, say, when Gibril Massaquoi arrived in Sierra Leone having dropped off two letters in Burkina Faso, bearing two letters for Johnny Paul Koroma and Bockarie? When did he arrive in Sierra Leone?
A. Gibril came to Sierra Leone - he came to Sierra Leone in late June or early July. It was during that time, but I can't be specific now because these are events that have taken place for a long time.

Q. We all appreciate that, Mr Sesay. Now, you later say that Gibril returned to Burkina Faso and came back with Ibrahim Bah. When was that?

A. Well, when he came with the letters, it was within a week when they sent him. He went back for three to four days and he came along with Ibrahim Bah.

Q. So help us. Which month would that be?

A. I think that was in July.

Q. And the 90,000--

PRESIDING JUDGE: July of which year?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. July of which year?

A. 1997.

Q. And what happened - and the withdrawal of the 90,000 US dollars from the Bank of Sierra Leone, in which month did that take place?

A. Well, I think that could be - that could be between July, August. Within those times. But I think it was August.

Q. And the $90,000 was for what purpose?

A. It was to be given to Ibrahim Bah. The reason was to hire the flight. It was for that, because Mr Sankoh had said that Johnny Paul should provide the transportation because it was Mr Sankoh who owned the arms and ammunition, so Johnny Paul's own contribution was to provide the transport fares to transport the arms and ammunition.
1. Q. Now you've gone on to mention the preparation of an airfield. Just remind us of the location. Where was that airfield? It was near to a village, you tell us?

2. A. Mayagba. Mayagba village. This is the main road between Makeni and Magburaka. The main road going to Kono. In fact you would stand on the main road and see the airfield. It was close to the main road.

3. Q. The airfield having been prepared, in due course did any flight arrive at that airfield?

4. A. Yes.

5. Q. When did that flight arrive at the airfield?

6. A. I think that was around November. But it was in late 1997. I believe it was around November. November to December '97.

7. Q. And what was that flight carrying?

8. A. The flight brought the arms and ammunition. It also brought the one-barrel BZT. It brought 7 for the Alpha Jet. It brought ammunition, AA rounds, GPMG rounds, some G3 rounds. Those were the first ones that he brought.

9. Q. Now pause there. You said it brought seven for the Alpha Jet. Seven what?

10. A. SAM-7. That's what they call it. It's like an RPG but it's bigger. It's a big tube. You hold it like this. Because at that time the Alpha Jet was attacking Sierra Leone. The ECOMOG Alpha Jet was attacking Sierra Leone before the disarmament. So those things were among SAM-7.

11. Q. SAM-7?

12. A. Yes, that was what they called it.

13. Q. You were demonstrating holding something on your shoulder?

14. A. Yes. When you want to fire it you held it like this and if...
the jet was flying over you would fire it behind the jet and
where the smoke is coming from - you would fire it behind the
jet. Like it would trace the jet's smoke until it hit it
although we - they did not use it because we were in Freetown
when ECOMOG captured there.

Q. You mentioned that the flight also brought AK rounds. In
what quantity?
A. I said AA rounds.
Q. What are AA rounds?
A. Those are the rounds for the one barrel. That is the BZT.
Q. And in what quantity?
A. Well, I can't tell the exact quantity but we went with two
tucks and those two trucks were loaded and we off-loaded them.
When we off-loaded them we loaded them into the two trucks. We
loaded two trucks. Because I and the army chief of the AFRC
went. Johnny Paul told us to go and receive those things.
Together with some army officers from the State House, all of us
went. I went withColonel SO Williams. Johnny Paul told us to
go to Magburaka.

Q. Now, there's a few things that I want to clarify with you,
Mr Sesay. First of all, the evidence you've just given us, how
do you come by that knowledge?
A. Well, I knew because, like this one, I took part in it.
One, to go and receive the arms and ammunition together with SO
Williams. And the movement of the Ibrahim Bah. When Ibrahim Bah
came to Freetown he lodged at Cape Sierra and I used to know him.
I talked to him, and Sam Bockarie himself told me about the
movement. And even Gibril told me about letters that he had
brought. So I was one of the commanders, so I had the right to
know what was going on.

Q. So are you saying that you were physically present at that airfield when that flight arrived?

A. I and SO Williams were sent by Johnny Paul to go with the army officers. I was to represent the RUF while the army officer was to go to receive the ammunition, so the two of us went.

Johnny Paul sent us together with other staff.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly name the names again slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. I want you slowly to tell us the names of all the army officers sent by Johnny Paul Koroma to receive this shipment?

A. Okay. Johnny Paul sent me and SO Williams. He told SO Williams that he had dispatched other men who were to go with SO Williams from State House, that is from our own guards. Like by then this guy was a major, Savimbi.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly name the second name. It's not clear.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. What's the second name? You say Major Savimbi. What's the second name that you gave?

A. That's the same man. Emilin [phon] Dumbuya, but his nickname is Savimbi. He was a senior man. He was a senior person among Johnny Paul's guards. The security commander of State House, State House, the late Lieutenant AK Jalloh, Akim Turay, these were the officers from State House. And there were the other ranks as well, the other soldiers whose names I cannot remember now. We went. But these were the three officers.

After the army chief of staff, the brigade commander who was in
the north Colonel Banya and the SOS. We went to receive the
ammunition but these officers went by road whilst I and SO
Williams were airlifted by the helicopter from Cockerill to
Magburaka at the airfield.

Q. Now, one other detail I want you to help us with. Who
arrived on the aircraft at Magburaka?
A. Well, when we landed at the airfield we met - I met our own
RUF commander Kailondo from Makeni, he was the RUF commander in
Teko Barracks. We also had Rambo.

Q. Which Rambo?
A. Daniel Wankay, that is Foday Sankoh’s bodyguard commander -
former bodyguard commander. He was the commander in Magburaka.
So the two of them were at the airfield with me. So when the
plane landed at the airfield, I saw Fonti Kanu, Ibrahim Bah.

Q. And the crew of the plane were from which country?
A. Well, they looked like Russians, because they did not speak
English. They just said hi. I did not talk to them.

Q. How many truckloads of cargo were brought by that flight?
A. When the cargo arrived, we off-loaded. When we
off-loaded - there were two trucks anyway, but when we off-loaded
- when the flight was leaving, about five minutes later the Alpha
Jets appeared. It was after the Alpha Jet had bombarded that we
were able to load the arms and ammunition into the trucks. Two

Q. So the Alpha Jets came from Lungi and bombarded what?
A. It bombarded the airfield.

Q. Was the aircraft which brought the arms and ammunition
still on the ground when that bombardment took place?
A. No. In fact, the flight was lucky because as soon as the flight left, it was not up to five minutes when the Alpha Jet appeared. It bombarded the field - the edge of the field. It was not able to hit the target where the ammunition was parked. It was unable to drop any bomb there. But it bombarded the runway of the field, and it dropped heavy cluster bombs in the villages, and some of those bombs did not even explode - big bombs.

Q. Now, the material which was off-loaded and eventually loaded on to those two trucks, to where was that taken?

A. Well, when we had loaded the ammunition, we drove close to Makeni in an orange garden. Then SOS told us to park out there until nightfall, then we will pass through Makeni, because during the day people would see what was going on. So we stopped at the orange farm up to 7 o'clock to 8 o'clock p.m. Then we drove through Makeni up to Masiaka. Then we went to Waterloo, and we used the peninsular route because ECOMOG had blocked the road at Jui, you know. Only civilian vehicles were able to pass through Jui to enter Freetown. So we part from Waterloo. We used the peninsular route around and we surfaced at Goderich. Then we came up to Spur Road to Johnny Paul's lodge. That was where we parked the two trucks. The arms and ammunition, we brought them straight to JP's lodge. That was where we parked them, because that was the instruction from SO Williams. That was the instruction he gave. So we parked them there. That was around 6 a.m. in the morning. So we parked them there. Then SO said they should drop me. So we went - because SO was staying at the Wilberforce Barracks quarters and I was up Hill Station. So we drove in a Land Rover and went to his house. We went to his
Then he told his driver to drop me off, and the driver dropped me off at my own villa at Hill Station.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, who is JP? There's a reference to JP's lodge.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Who is JP?

PRESIDING JUDGE: There's also a reference to SO. "SO told me, SO went," et cetera. Who are those people?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Who is JP, Mr Sesay?

A. Well, SO is SO Williams. That's what I mean, but we just cut it short. That's what I - I just cut it short. That's why I said SO. SO Williams, he was --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, I didn't get the last answer.

A. Johnny Paul Koroma was JP. He was the chairman.

Q. So Johnny Paul Koroma is also known as JP, and SO is a reference to SO Williams; is that correct?

A. Yes, yes, you are correct.

Q. Now, I want to go back a bit, Mr Sesay, for good reason, and ask you, please, for some details. Which members of the RUF were present at Magburaka when that flight came in? I want you to take your time and just go through it slowly, please. You were there; is that right?

A. Yes, I was there. I and the RUF who were there - myself, I did not go with the bodyguard because I went with SO in the helicopter. I, Kailondo, the RUF commander from the north --

Q. How do you spell his name?
Q. And what was his position?
A. He was the commander who was in Teko Barracks because --
Q. He was the commander at Teko Barracks. Does Kailondo have any kind of nickname?
A. Well, his nickname was Kailondo. His real name was Varnicious Vandi.
Q. So that's two, you and Kailondo. Who else from the RUF was present?
A. The other was Daniel Wankay, aka Rambo. He was the bodyguard commander for Mr Sankoh.
Q. Who else?
A. Well, except their own bodyguards. But those were the only RUF together with whom I was at the field and the AFRC officers when the flight arrived.
Q. Now, you said that someone called Fonti Kanu arrived on the flight. Who is that?
A. Fonti Kanu was an army officer. They were with Johnny Paul. He was sent by Johnny Paul to Burkina Faso. In fact, before the coup, Fonti Kanu was in Kailahun. He was advancing with the troops when they were fighting against us. But when they overthrew, they called him so he was with the coup men. They supported the coup. And Johnny Paul sent him to Burkina Faso. He was a man who was trusted by Johnny Paul, because the people whom he sent with Ibrahim Bah were people whom he trusted.
Q. So Ibrahim Bah came on the flight, Fonti Kanu. Who else?
A. I said with the crew and the pilot of the plane.
Q. Apart from the pilot of the plane and the crew, who else came on the plane? Ibrahim Bah, Fonti Kanu; anybody else?
A. Well, I saw them, because I was not on the flight, because it was Arnold and Fonti Kanu that Johnny Paul sent with --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat his answer slowly?

10:07:15

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Could you repeat that answer, please, slowly? Start from who came on the flight?

A. I said Arnold Bangura and Fonti Kanu were the ones Johnny Paul sent with Ibrahim Bah on this mission. So when the flight came - arrived with ammunition, Ibrahim Bah and Fonti Kanu were the ones on the flight together with the crew and the pilot.

Q. Was there anyone from Burkina Faso on the flight?

A. No, no. I did not see that.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I would advise you to keep an eye on the record. You might get a message or two.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Okay. Let's recap a little bit, Mr Sesay, please. You've explained to us who Fonti Kanu is. Who is Arnold Bangura?

THE WITNESS: Arnold Bangura was a lieutenant - a flight lieutenant. He was a flight lieutenant working at the air wing of the Sierra Leone armed forces.

Q. Thank you. Secondly, just to recap, was there anyone from Burkina Faso on the flight?

A. No, no Burkinabe came. No, the men whom I have named were those who came.

Q. Secondly, the SAM-7s that you said was on the flight, did you or members of the AFRC have knowledge as to how to use them?

A. Yes, because Fonti Kanu explained how to fire them to us.

He explained. Because the thing was just like an RPG, you know.
The bomb was affixed to it. It was set on it, and it was in a plastic. You just open the back and remove the fuse, and underneath it you put the fuse and you will shoot it like an RPG.

Q. Thank you. Did Mike Lamin go to Magburaka to meet that flight?

A. Not at all. Mike Lamin did not go.

Q. Are you sure about that, Mr Sesay?

A. Well, I and Mike were living together. We were living together on a daily basis. He did not go. We were together at Hill Station. On that day that we were going, I left him and Morris Kallon. In fact, we were at Cape Sierra when Johnny Paul - Johnny Paul's operator called on the handset that Johnny Paul wanted to see me, when he gave me this instruction to join the army chief of staff. I left Morris Kallon and Mike Lamin together in Freetown, when I and the army chief of staff boarded the helicopter for Magburaka.

Q. I'm still seeking clarification of various matters, Mr Sesay. Who paid for the arms and ammunition which came on that flight in the autumn of 1997 landing at Magburaka? Who paid for it?

A. It was Mr Sankoh who bought the ammunition. It was Mr Sankoh who bought the arms and ammunition. It was Johnny Paul who was responsible to pay for its transportation.

Q. Mr Sesay, was it not Mr Taylor who paid for them with diamonds which he took to South Africa?

A. No. At that time Mr Taylor and Mr Sankoh had no business. Mr Sankoh bought those ammunition purely from the money he had got from the Libyan leader. I said that was what caused the conflict between himself and the external delegation. And Johnny
Paul and Mr Taylor at this time had no business. That money that was used to hire the flight they had gotten from the Bank of Sierra Leone. Johnny Paul got that money from the manager of the bank, and he gave the instruction to use that money. That was the money that was given to Ibrahim Bah.

Q. I really want to be clear about this, Mr Sesay, because it's very important. Was it not the case that Mr Taylor took some diamonds originating from Sierra Leone to South Africa with him and that he used that to pay for this shipment?

A. No. Before we joined the AFRC, we had no talk or business with Mr Taylor. And when we joined the AFRC, Johnny Paul had no business with Mr Taylor. At this time there was no transaction between the AFRC and Mr Taylor, no. Mr Sankoh had bought this ammunition and arms before he was arrested in Nigeria.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Which, I think, brings me to the question I've been meaning to ask of this witness. Given the timing of the purchase of this tranche of arms and ammunition, what was the purpose of purchasing these arms and ammunition at this particular time, if you know?

THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord, I know. Because at this time Mr Sankoh had signed the peace accord with President Kabbah, but Mr Sankoh was saying that the government by then was attacking his position and the peace had not held sway, so he himself decided to buy ammunition. He bought the ammunition in '97, before he went - between '96 and '97 before he went to Nigeria. He bought them in Burkina Faso through General Diendere, who was keeping them.

PRESIDING JUDGE: And now that the RUF had been invited to join the AFRC, why was it necessary to bring in these arms and...
ammunitions into Sierra Leone, if you know?

THE WITNESS: Well, that was why I said that Mr Sankoh sent

Gibril that Johnny Paul should hire a flight to get the arms and

ammunition to defend the AFRC and the RUF, because Mr Sankoh too

was suspicious that ECOMOG or any other person or any other group

would fight against the AFRC and RUF.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So just to be clear, Mr Sesay, when had the actual purchase

of these arms and ammunition taken place? When had Sankoh

actually bought them? In which year?

A. The arms and ammunition, he bought them in early 1997, you

know, because he had seen that without arms and ammunition or

support - without support for the -

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat his

answer slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Stop again, Mr Sesay, because this is all very important.

When had he bought the arms and ammunition?

A. I said it was in early '97 before he travelled to Nigeria.

Q. And you were going on to explain something to us. Take

your time.

A. He said why Mr Sankoh bought the arms and ammunition; was

that not the question that you asked me?

Q. Yes.

A. I said Mr Sankoh had seen that the RUF was losing the war,

so he too decided to buy the arms and ammunition. It was in

early 1997, and even when he bought the arms and ammunition, at

that time he did not make that known to us to the external
delegation, because he had suspected that the external delegation were playing double standard in Freetown with the government of Sierra Leone. Because Foday Sankoh had sent them to be members of the Ceasefire Committee in Freetown, so Mr Sankoh had suspected in early ’97 that they were playing a double role.

That was why he bought those arms and ammunition secretly in Burkina Faso. The RUF had more troops and more areas of control, although they were jungles, before Mr Sankoh left. But when you look at early 1997, RUF was just in part of Kailahun. Let me say, from - you are looking at it from Giehun, Bandajuma, Boubu up to the Liberian border coming down to Koindu. So they had been pushing the RUF out of Kailahun, so it was just jungles in which the RUF was in the Northern Jungle and Western Jungle, so the RUF was falling at that time. That was why the man bought arms and ammunition, for RUF to be able to get the armament and they wouldn’t be defeated in the war.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, is it your testimony that the funds that purchased these arms and ammunition came from the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi?

THE WITNESS: Yes, that was what I understood.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, having purchased the arms in early 1997, what happened to those arms until they were delivered in late 1997? Where were those arms and ammunition?

A. The arms and ammunition, it was the army chief of staff in Burkina Faso who was keeping them. What I knew was that Mr Sankoh bought them from General Diendere, and he was able to keep them because he was the Army Chief of Staff of Burkina Faso. If it was not for the arrest of Mr Sankoh, I believe that...
because Mr Sankoh in '96, he had given an order to Peter Vandi to 
prepare an airstrip in Buedu. So I believe that if they had not 
arrested Mr Sankoh in Nigeria before that time, Mr Sankoh would 
have told us to prepare that airstrip so that he would be able to 
receive flights and the flights would be able to take those arms 
and ammunition to Buedu, but because of his arrest he was unable 
to do that up to the time that we joined the AFRC.

Q. And Mr Sesay, that flight that came into Magburaka, where 
did it set off from?

A. It took off from Burkina Faso to the Magburaka airfield, 
Mayagba.

Q. Did it not travel via Liberia?

A. No, that was not possible at that time. Because the time 
that I'm talking about, ECOMOG was in charge of Liberia - 
security in Liberia, so that was not possible at RIA.

Q. Now, you told us a little while back now that there were to 
be three flights. Did three flights in fact occur?

A. No, they did not come. Only one came, the first one. It 
was because the Alpha Jet bombarded the runway, and that was why 
the flights did not continue to arrive.

Q. So those further two flights, what were they going to 
bring?

A. It's the same ammunition, especially the light ammunition 
like the AK rounds, RPG rockets, because they had those things 
that Mr Sankoh had bought. It was only the ammunition that they 
were to continue bringing.

Q. Now, did the remainder of the arms and ammunition purchased 
by Mr Sankoh, did they ever arrive in Sierra Leone?

A. No, after the first one had arrived it was not long when
the intervention took place, so that was the end of it.

Q. So do you know what happened to the remainder?

A. Well, it was left with the man to whom he had bought it.

That is Diendere.

Q. You recall me showing you that list published in the Sierra Leone Gazette of the members of the council?

A. Yes.

Q. One of the names contained on that list was Mike Lamin. Do you recall that?

A. I recall that.

Q. You told us yesterday that Lamin had left Sierra Leone in late 1991; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. When did he arrive in Sierra Leone in relation to the coup in - on 25 May 1997?

A. Well, as I have said in this Court yesterday or the day before yesterday, that Mike Lamin left the RUF in late '91 but he rejoined the RUF in January 1996. Then he left the RUF again and surrendered with the RUF troops in Liberia to ULIMO-K in November 1996. He rejoined the RUF and AFRC in June 1997.

Q. And from where did he come to join the AFRC in June 1997?

A. Well, when he came, what he told us - what he told me, when he had crossed into Liberia after they had surrendered to ECOMOG they went to Monrovia, and from Monrovia he travelled to - later from Monrovia he travelled to the Ivory Coast for him to meet Mr Sankoh, because at that time Mr Sankoh had travelled to Nigeria with the external - the external delegation had said that Philip Palmer was the leader. So when he got to Ivory Coast, the
external delegation asked the Ivorian security to arrest him, and he was detained. He was in detention up to the overthrow of the AFRC.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly be asked to repeat his answer slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. He was in detention up to the AFRC coup in Ivory Coast.

Then what happened to him?

A. After that the Ivorian security released him. Then he

tavel to Monrovia, and from Monrovia he went through Bomi Hills, and he went to Lofa Bridge. And from Lofa Bridge, according to him, he went to Vahun, and from Vahun he crossed in Kailahun. When he crossed to Kailahun he travelled to Kenema, where he met Sam Bockarie. From that --

Q. "From that", yes?

A. From that he explained to Sam Bockarie all this that I've explained to the Court, how he travelled and what happened. He explained to Sam Bockarie, and Sam Bockarie said, "Well, your men are in Freetown. You can go there so that they can take you to Johnny Paul so they would know that you are our senior man." So he came to Freetown, and I took him to the army chief of staff, SO Williams, and from there to the Chief of Defence Staff SFY Koroma, and from there to Johnny Paul. I introduced him, and he was now with the AFRC. Later, Johnny Paul appointed him as Director of Intelligence - Director of National Intelligence for the AFRC. So he had his office at the Wilberforce Barracks, and at the same time he was - he was at the same time a council member until intervention.

Q. Now, I see from the record that you say that - the record
reads that after he crossed into Liberia, after he surrendered to ECOMOG. To whom did he surrender?

A. I did not say "to ECOMOG". I said "to ULIMO" - "ULIMO-K". In fact, he surrendered to Abu Keita. That was where he became friends with Abu Keita.

Q. When he returned in June 1997, did he return alone?

A. No, he came with some of his bodyguards like OG, that is Augustine Mallah, and others, and later Monica and others too join him.

Q. Monica who?

A. Monica Pearson.

Q. Joined him from where?

A. Monica Pearson and others too came from Liberia around October. Rocky CO, Sylvester Keh, all of them came and joined Mike Lamin. But Rocky CO was living somewhere else whilst Monica was staying with Mike at his house at Hill Station, the house where he was staying.

Q. And help us. When did she return from Liberia?

A. Monica, they left Liberia in - they reached Freetown in November 1997. When she arrived in Freetown, she was at Mike Lamin's house until the intervention in February 1998.

Q. Earlier you mentioned various difficulties which arose between Sankoh and the external delegation. What was at the root of those difficulties between Sankoh and the external delegation?

A. After the signing of the Abidjan Accord in November 1996, the government - the President of Sierra Leone asked Mr Sankoh to provide a representative to join the ceasefire committee. Mr Sankoh appointed Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh and Philip Palmer for them to come to Freetown to join this committee. So they came to
Freetown. The Government of Sierra Leone lodged them at Bintumani Hotel. That was where they were, you know. From that, after some time they used to go to Mr Sankoh. That was where the problem started between the external delegation and Mr Sankoh, because Mr Sankoh was suspecting that the - what the --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can the witness kindly repeat his answer again slowly.

JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, when the witness does repeat it, I'm fairly sure I heard him say three names went to Freetown, and I would like to hear them again.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Who were the three persons sent to Freetown by Sankoh?

A. Philip Palmer, Deen-Jalloh and Fayia Musa.

Q. Secondly, for what purpose were they sent to Freetown by Foday Sankoh?

A. They were to go there as representatives of the RUF on the ceasefire committee.

Q. And you - sorry.

A. The ceasefire monitoring committee.

Q. Now, you told us that they were housed at the Bintumani Hotel. Is that right?

A. Yes, you are right.

Q. Now, you were going on to say that that was where the problem started between the external delegation and Mr Sankoh because Mr Sankoh was suspecting what?

A. He said the external delegation, after they had gone to Freetown they were travelling to Bo, to Kenema, and they were going up to Daru, and they witnessed a violation of the ceasefire by the government troops but --
Q. But?

A. But they did not send any report except when Mr Sankoh used to get reports from us, the men in Kailahun, Kangari Hills, and the Western Jungle that our positions were being attacked. Those of them who were in Freetown and they were moving into the provinces witnessing the activities of the witnesses and the Kamajors against the RUF positions, they never said anything to Mr Sankoh. So Mr Sankoh himself saw that the delegation was beginning to be in support of the government against the RUF, so that was how the misunderstanding started between them before he travelled to Nigeria. Because there came a time even when Mr Sankoh invited them to go to Abidjan, they did not go until the time he left.

Q. Now, you also mentioned earlier difficulties between Sankoh and them over money. What was the source of that?

A. It was about the moneys received from the Libyan leader. He received the first money, and he wrote a letter and he said that money was not sufficient. So he sent back that the money was not sufficient, so they sent the money through the ambassador in Ghana. I knew his name, but I've forgotten his name. He was the Libyan ambassador to Ghana during this time. So it was through him that the money was sent, the second money. Because the first one, it was Mr Sankoh himself who went. The first money was - when Mr Sankoh went to Libya, that was when it was given to him. So the second one - after Mr Sankoh had written a letter that the money was not sufficient to purchase the items he wanted for the RUF, they sent the second money through the ambassador for Mr Sankoh. So it was because of those money that the problem started.
Q. Through which ambassador? Where was that ambassador based?
A. That ambassador was in Accra. He was the Libyan ambassador to Ghana. He was based in Accra.

Q. Now, you were going on to explain why that caused difficulties. Why did it?
A. I said the external delegation - after Mr Sankoh had taken some of the money and he bought these arms and ammunition, they did not know. They were thinking that Mr Sankoh had misused the funds and that Mr Sankoh was insensitive to his fighters and that all he cared about was womanising. So they were grumbling among themselves. That’s why they took the action against Mr Sankoh.

And Philip Palmer spoke on the BBC that he was then the new leader of the RUF, and from there Bockarie contacted the radio station in Danane where they were based. So from there the external delegation - he spoke to Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh and he said, "We’ve heard on the BBC that you, Philip Palmer, say that you are the leader. So how come that is happening?"

Q. Go on.
A. He said, "How is it that that is happening?" And Philip Palmer replied that this is an action that they had taken as external delegation on behalf of the RUF. And Bockarie said no, it’s only you. You are comrades with the vanguards, and you cannot take that decision singularly without informing us - without informing your colleague vanguards or myself, the commander on the ground, and the other commanders, he said, because Fayia Musa and Deen-Jalloh, they have no right to change leadership. They are civilians. They should work with the leader. And Philip Palmer said they took that action in the
interests of the RUF. It was not for any personal reasons. And Bockarie said, "Well, if that's the case, you guys should come to Sierra Leone. We should hold a meeting and we would know the reason why you've taken this action. If we think it is necessary, then we'll give you our support."

Q. And?

A. So Bockarie told them that the reason that they will explain to us in the meeting when they come, if we, the RUF on ground, if we think that the reason that they had dethroned Mr Sankoh was necessary, they will give them our support. He spoke to Philip Palmer and Fayia Musa, and they should do another date to talk. And so they accepted to come. They promised Sam Bockarie that they would come to hold the meeting with the RUF in Kailahun, and they stated a date on which they would travel. And after a week their radio contacted Sam Bockarie's radio, and they said they were in Conakry and they were talking with the Government of Guinea for them to be given passage to come through Nongowa to cross into the RUF territory. And they were in Guinea for another three days to come to Conakry and to the border. On that day that they were travelling was when they called Bockarie, but they said they were going to pass the night in Gueckedou, and so the following morning they would go to the riverbank. That was - and to go to Nongowa. So Bockarie told the junior commanders and the senior commanders, the nurses, workers, War Council members --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this listing.

THE WITNESS: They said we were to go and meet the delegation at the riverbank, and so we went. Because at that
time Bockarie called me from Giema and we left Buedu, we walked.

Q. Where was Bockarie based at this time?

A. At this time Bockarie was now based in Buedu and I was in Giema, because at this time Giema was a hot battlefront. The Kamajors and the SLA have captured Kailahun from us, Kailahun Town, so they would be coming from Kailahun Town, attacking Giema, and they would come from Bomaru, Baiwala, they would attack Boubu towards Giema. At that same they would come from Pendembu and they would attack Giema.

Q. Let's go back a bit, Mr Sesay, because I see I'm told that those transcribing this are having difficulty. So let's go back. Your answer began in this way:

"At this time Bockarie was now based in Buedu and I was in Giema, because at this time Giema was a hot battlefront. The Kamajors and the SLA had captured Kailahun from us, Kailahun Town, so they would be coming from..."

A. I said they used to come from Kailahun and they would attack us in Giema. We would repel them and they would withdraw to Kailahun. They would come from Giehun, Pendembu and they would come and attack Giema. And even the ones who were in Baiwala, Bomaru they too would cross over. They too would cross the river and they will attack Gaveru, and they will come to Bobu Gao and attack Giema, and we would repel them and they would withdraw.

Q. [Microphone not activated]

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, could I ask you not to talk over the interpreter, because we're trying to hear the rest of the interpretation and you interject. That's because you are
tuned into the Krio channel. Which is fine. You are free to
tune into whichever channel. But we need to hear the rest of the
interpretation without interruption, please.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. "They too would cross the river and they will come to
Boubu" - give us the name, please?

A. They will cross the river from Baiwala, Bomaru, and they
will come to --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness give the
name of that town.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. The interpreter is asking for you to give the names of the
villages you just named again, please, Mr Sesay.

A. Yes. There was a river that you would cross from Bomaru,
because the soldiers, the Kamajors, were in Bomaru and Baiwala.
So they would cross by Bomaru and they will come to Salonworo.
From Salonworo they come to Gaveru. From Gaveru they attack the
RUF in Boubu Gao, because they were in Boubu Gao and we were also
in Giema.

Q. Can you help us with the spellings of those locations
you've just given, please, Mr Sesay?

A. Salonworo.

MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the interpreters could provide
us with some assistance on this.

THE INTERPRETER: Salonworo is phonetically spelled
S-A-L-O-N-W-O-R-O.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. The other location, Mr Sesay, please, that you gave us?

A. Gaveru.
Q. Can you attempt a spelling for that one for us?
A. I think it is G-A-V-E-R-U.
Q. And I think there was a third name that you gave us?
A. Yes, but it was spelled yesterday by the interpreter, Boubu Gao.

MR GRIFFITHS: And, Mr Interpreter, I wonder if you could assist me with a spelling?
THE INTERPRETER: Boubu Gao is B-O-U-B-U G-A-O.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So you were under attack in Giema and Sam Bockarie sent for you, yes, to go and meet this external delegation?
A. Yes, I also went with some joint security officers, IDU, MP. Because MP Jalloh also went with us, Kaisuku. Because at this time Kaisuku was at Giema. At that time Sandi was in Buedu as MP commander to Bockarie.

Q. And where were you going to meet this external delegation?
A. We were to go and meet them at the main road - the main crossing point between Sierra Leone and Guinea in Koindu. That is Yanga. On the Sierra Leonean side it was called Yanga. On the Guinean side it was called Nongowa Crossing Point. That was the popular name for the place, Nongowa Crossing Point. So since the RUF invaded Sierra Leone in 1991. This was the second time the movement had happened at that crossing point. Because that crossing point, the Guinean troops were based there 24 hours with heavy artilleries. They were there up to this time, so the first time that the Guinean government allowed movement at that crossing point was when the ICRC were crossing into the RUF area to do survey and when the ICRC started distributing supplies to the civilians in the RUF areas. So after that time, this was the
second time that civilians were allowed to go through that crossing point.

Q. Mr Sesay, can you help us with a month and a year for this meeting at this Nongowa Crossing Point?

A. I think it was around April 1997.

Q. And just help us --

A. Late March to April. Something like that.

Q. And what happened on that day?

A. So we left Buedu in a large group and we walked from - in fact, before we left Buedu that morning they called on their own set. They had a mobile radio set, Thompson radio set. They had a radio operator called Gbassy James. He was with them.

Q. What's the name of the radio operator who was with them?

A. A lady called Gbassy James.

Q. Can you spell the name?


Q. So they had a mobile radio set, and you were saying?

A. Yes, they were in communication since they left Ivory Coast to Conakry, Conakry to Gueckedou, Gueckedou coming back to Nongowa. They were talking to Bockarie in all of those areas.

Q. Yes. Go on?

A. So Gbassy James called Bockarie's radio and this time the radio operator that was operating Bockarie's set was called T Boy. And so T Boy responded - T Man. T Man responded to the call, and Gbassy said they should tell Bockarie that Fayia Musa wanted to talk to Bockarie. In fact, that morning they were speaking in Mende. They said they were on their way coming, and so Bockarie said, "Okay, so we too should hurry up and we should go."
Q. Go on.

A. Bockarie asked them the time they thought they would be at the riverbank, and they said they would be at the riverbank by midday. So we hurried up from Buedu. We came to Koindu and to the border, and we came to the border line. And we were sitting there for some time, but the Guinean soldiers had known that there was going to be some movement at the border. So when they saw us they started waving to us, and we too responded, but we were with the RUF dancing group. That was the cultural dance band, they were playing their drums and they were dancing. They were playing their drums. They were sitting under the mango tree, so people are dancing. When they came in a convoy, we saw the vehicles and they stopped, because we could see the movement from across the river. When they came, they walked to the riverbank. They greeted us and we responded. And Philip Palmer told Bockarie that they had come. So Bockarie - that the canoes should be sent to there to paddle them across, so Bockarie should appoint some people to be part of the meeting. But that was - that was said in a loud tone because if you are talking from across the river, you would have to kind of shout. So when they were talking, everybody would hear them. So there was a conversation between Bockarie and Philip Palmer, and Philip Palmer said they should send the canoe for the ones that were to attend the meeting to cross over. And Bockarie said, "No, this is an RUF issue, and RUF issues should not be discussed on the Guinean soil." So those who were there who were in support of the RUF men on the ground, they should cross over. So they got panic. They said "No. You know we've brought some other people with us. We don't want them to cross over. It would be good for
you guys to cross over to us." Sam Bockarie said, "No. We're not
going to Guinea." They attempted to persuade Bockarie, but they
were unsuccessful.

Q. They said "No, you know we brought some other people with
us. We don't want them to cross over." Pick it up from there,
please, because it hasn't been recorded on the record.

A. So this debate went on between them, and Bockarie said,
"Well, if you guys say you are not coming, then we're going to
return, but we're not going to cross over into Guinea. We cannot
discuss RUF issue on the Guinean soil."

Q. Go on.

A. He said, "If you guys are not coming, then we will return.
But we are not crossing over."

Q. Cross over to where?

A. Return to Buedu where we had come from. He said, "If you
cross over, then we hold a meeting, and after the meeting if you
ask us to go to Guinea, then we'll do that. But for the first
time you are coming after you had" --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak
slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. He said "If you cross over, then we hold a meeting, and
after the meeting if you ask us to go to Guinea we will do that,
but for the first time you are coming." Pick it up from there,
please.

A. He said, "For the first time that you are coming to discuss
the RUF issue about replacing Mr Sankoh and you are saying you
are not coming across, then we're going to return." So the
people that they had come with, they started discussing among
themselves and they said, "Okay we'll come over." So Philip Palmer, Deen-Jalloh boarded a boat and they crossed over. When they came across, we hugged each other and we greeted each other, and Gbassy James as well crossed with Deen-Jalloh - no, Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh, Gbassy James and Dr Barrie, they were the ones in the second canoe. They crossed over. So they came, we greeted them, and they responded, and they all sat. From that --

Q. Did anybody else come with them?

A. Yes. From the other canoe - from that, the other canoe left, that is the ambassador to Guinea with his security. He was called Ambassador Diaby with the security, a soldier. They too crossed in the other canoe. So when they crossed, Bockarie said we should start the meeting. So we were sitting under the mango tree, and Deen-Jalloh was the head of the delegation. He stood up and he addressed us. He thanked us for making us available for the meeting, and he explained the reason why they had decided to change Mr Sankoh - to replace him. The reasons that they told us was that they had given money to Mr Sankoh from Libya and Mr Sankoh was just using the money on women, he was just womanising, and that Mr Sankoh was insensitive to the welfare of the men on the ground who were suffering; whenever Mr Sankoh had money, he would just spend the money on women. So they had thought that Mr Sankoh was a man who did not care about the fighters. That's why they had decided to change Mr Sankoh, to replace him. So Philip - Fayia Musa also got up and he spoke, and Philip Palmer also spoke. While Philip Palmer was talking, Sam Bockarie said, "Oh, the things that you are talking about here to replace Sankoh are just personal issues, they are not" --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak
slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. "They are just personal issues", what? Go on?

A. He said, "All the things that you have said here about

Mr Sankoh is about money."

Q. Go on?

A. He said, "So we're not going to buy your story, and in fact
from now on everybody is under arrest." Sam Bockarie, he shot in
the air twice, and he ordered the arrest and they were arrested,
including ambassador.

Q. Pause there. Go on?

A. So immediately after he had fired two shots in the air, he
ordered their arrest. They were arrested, and we walked with
them to Koindu. From - before we got there, in fact, they had
taken off their shirts from them, and we came to Buedu. But the
ambassador, nobody touched him, nobody beat him. Himself and the
security guard, nobody did them anything.

Q. I was going to ask you about that. Those members of the
external delegation who were arrested, how were they treated on
that walk to Buedu?

A. Honestly speaking, when we arrived in Koindu Town, Bockarie
ordered that they should be tied up, and their hands were tied at
their back and we walked. When we got to Kangama - Deen-Jalloh
was an old man, so he said the rope that was used to tie him up
was disturbing him. And so he was untied until we got to Buedu,
and they were ordered to be locked up by Bockarie, so they were
locked up.

Q. You said their shirts were taken off them. Who by?

A. You know, that was done by both the civilians and the
fighters. Everybody was aggressive with them because they were angry with them.

Q. Aggressive with them? In what way? Were they beaten?
A. Yes, they were beaten.

Q. With what?
A. Some people had canes which they used to beat them.

Q. What happened to their footwear?
A. They were taken away from them and they said, "You are wearing these beautiful shoes. You are in Abidjan in joy and we are in the bushes suffering", so they took off their shoes from them.

Q. And for how long were these individuals kept in custody, Mr Sesay?
A. When we arrived in Buedu, Bockarie ordered the MP Kaisuku to take them to the MP office and lock them up, and we passed the night. The following morning Mr Rogers, Pa Blue, some elders and some chiefs came to Bockarie, and Bockarie told Pa Rogers to set up a court system where they should try those people. So all the unit members were to be present and to try them. So they were tried, investigated. After the trial, they both recommended to Bockarie that those people should not be killed, but that they were to be under custody until Mr Sankoh's return to Sierra Leone. And indeed, they were under custody. Because before that time when we came - within the next two days I returned to the front line in Giema. So after the conclusion of the investigation they reported to Bockarie, and Bockarie said they were to be at the MP right until the AFRC overthrew. Bockarie sent them to the former training base, that is Baima, and they were under the custody of the training commandants there. That
is Jah Glory. And from there they were transferred to Kailahun Town. They were under custody there in Kailahun Town during the intervention until after the intervention, when Bockarie withdrew to Kailahun from Kenema. That was in '98. That was when Bockarie sent them to back to Buedu. From Buedu they went to Kangama, and later he sent them, after they had established a training base at Baima - sorry, Bunumbu. Then he sent them to Bunumbu. So they were in Bunumbu throughout 199 - some part of '98 and they were sent back to Kangama, and they were there up to '99 and they brought them to Buedu. They were there until the Lome Accord. And after the Lome Accord they were released. When Foday Sankoh returned, they were released. That was in October 1999.

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, during that period when the members of the external delegation were incarcerated, were you at any stage responsible for their detention?

A. I participated in their arrest because all of us went there to arrest them. But after the arrest when we brought them to Buedu, from Buedu, I went back to the front line. So throughout the investigation until the time the board submitted their report, I wasn't there. So throughout the detention period - in fact, during the AFRC, I left Kailahun in June. Late May when they came to Daru, I left Daru. I did not come to Kailahun Town, nor did I go to Buedu throughout the AFRC time even. I did not go to where they were under detention, so I was not responsible for their detention.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you will have to continue after the midmorning break, please. We will take half an hour's break and reconvene at 11.30.
[Break taken at 11.00 a.m.]

[Upon resuming at 11.34 a.m.]

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, please continue.

MR GRIFFITHS:

11:34:31 Q. Mr Sesay, before we continue I think you and I really do

6 need to get our act together, because there are a number of

7 complaints about both of us going too quickly. So we really need

8 to break things down, because what you have to tell us is so

9 important we have to ensure it gets on the record, okay? So what

11:34:59 I'm going to suggest is, Mr Sesay, after each sentence just pause

12 before you continue to the next sentence, okay?

12 Now, before we broke we were talking about the arrest and

13 detention of the external delegation, weren't we?

A. Yes.

11:35:22 Q. I'd like us now, please, to look at an account of what

16 happened to them during their detention, and then I will seek

17 your comment on it, okay?

A. Okay.

11:35:45 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be shown pages 62

19 to 64 of exhibit P-277, please?

21 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, the noise that I complained

22 about yesterday has started again today.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm advised that the head of sub-office

24 is being informed immediately. We'll wait until these pages are

11:37:17 put up and, Mr Interpreter, we'll take it from there. If you

25 still feel that you can't hear in the next five minutes, please

27 let me know.

28 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: This was an exhibit that we had brought
up yesterday. It's a confidential exhibit, 277.

In order to expedite matters, our chambers' Senior Legal Officer will print out --

MR GRIFFITHS: I've got a spare copy. Here we are. I'm just checking that the particular pages aren't marked. Yes, if we could just open it there, please, Madam Court Manager, page 62, 63, both of which are unmarked:

Q. Mr Sesay, I'm merely concerned at this stage with the description given in this document of how the external delegation were treated during the time they were in detention - do you follow me - in order to seek your comment, okay?

A. Okay.

Q. Page 62:

"On the fateful day, 29 March 1997, the delegation arrived at Nongowa where numerous Sierra Leonean refugees were jubilating because they were informed that the peace envoys were there to receive the new RUF leader, who was going to implement the Abidjan Accord. Across the River Moa, there was dancing and jubilation orchestrated by Sam Bockarie to fool and trick the peace envoys in believing that they, the RUF, were ready for peace. The arrangement was that the RUF delegation from Kailahun was to cross over to Guinea to have discussions with the peace envoys to appoint the new leader for the RUF. Because of Sam Bockarie's hidden agenda, he did not allow any of his men to cross to Guinea. However, the peace envoys were persuaded by Ambassador Diaby to cross, even though they were very sceptical of the intentions of Sam Bockarie and his men.

No sooner had the peace envoys crossed than they were all arrested and abducted to Buedu. There was firing on the Sierra
Leone side of the river, which resulted in the drowning of over 30 Sierra Leoneans, including the second in command of the garrison at Nongowa. From that moment, the peace envoys, Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh, Dr Mohamed S Barrie, Fayia Musa, Philip Palmer and Miss Juliet G James, were stripped of everything and made to walk a distance of 20 miles barefooted while being flogged to walk faster despite the blisters all over their feet."

Now, pausing there, Mr Sesay, you do agree that they were stripped of their clothing and footwear?

A. Yes. I said, yes, they took their shoes off and they took their shirts off. They were only - they only had their pants on. But for the lady, they did not touch her, Gbassy James.

Q. "On arrival in Buedu on 30 March 1997, the envoys were ordered to lie down on the bare floor while they were in briefs. This was followed later in the day by mob flogging while both hands were tightly tied at the back of the chest with nylon ropes. This ordeal continued for two consecutive days, each day being more horrible than the previous one.

On the third day, the peace envoys were put on trial charged with high treason. It was alleged that the members of the CCP had collaborated with the Tejan Kabbah government and the United Nations to have Sankoh arrested and detained in Nigeria for the sum of US $100,000, which was paid to the members of the CCP. When this allegation was refuted by the peace envoys, more torture was ordered by Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie insisted that the peace envoys should admit that they were bribed by the SLPP government and the United Nations to betray Sankoh. The peace envoys were finally put on trial for two days and sentenced to death and to suffer death by a firing squad. From the time the
pronomination of guilty was made, the envoys were subjected to
the most barbaric and the most inhuman treatment ordered by
Generalissimo Sam Bockarie. The condemned prisoners were to
receive 50 solid lashes in the mornings and in the evenings every
day, and the exercise lasted for two weeks. The condemned
prisoners were kept under lock and key for 24 hours and the
process lasted for 30 months until October 1999 when Sankoh
ordered their release from jail, in compliance with the Lome
Accord of July 1999."

Now, dealing with the details of that paragraph, Mr Sesay,
were the members of the external delegation charged with high
treason?

A. Well, yes, they were charged for treason against Mr Sankoh
because --

Q. Pause. Because?

A. Because what brought about the treasonable charge was the
changing of the leadership of the RUF. When they had announced
over the BBC and when they came towards - across the borderline
in Kailahun, they explained the same to us.

Q. And were the details of the charge as set out here, that
they had collaborated with the Tejan Kabbah government to have
Sankoh arrested in return for money? Was that the detail of the
charge?

A. No. They were not accused of collaboration to arrest
Sankoh. They were accused of changing Mr Sankoh from the
leadership. That is what I know. And Bockarie told them that,
in fact, Mr Sankoh had known that you people have been conniving
with the Government of Sierra Leone for the RUF to become victim
of the peace process because --
Q. Pause there. Because, yes?
A. Because he said the government had been violating the accord, but you were paying deaf ears to it. So now that you have heard that Mr Sankoh has been arrested in Nigeria, you people are saying that you have changed Mr Sankoh. So it's like the things Mr Sankoh had been saying, that you have been conniving with the government to RUF to become victim of peace, that is what you have confirmed to us. So those were some of things that Bockarie said. But to say that Bockarie accused them that they connived with Tejan Kabbah to arrest Mr Sankoh in Nigeria, at that initial stage we did not know whether Kabbah had any hands in the Nigerian government arresting Mr Sankoh.
Q. And were they sentenced to death?
A. Well, the board of investigation said they should keep them in prison until Mr Sankoh's return into Sierra Leone, so it was Mr Sankoh who was to pronounce the last decision about the issue. That was what I understood.
Q. So where it says here that they were sentenced to death, is that true or false, by the board of investigation?
A. Not true. Because if they were sentenced to death, then Mr Sankoh wouldn't have met them there.
Q. Now, this board of investigation that was set up, Mr Sesay, who was on that board of investigation?
A. In fact, the chairman of that board, I think, was the late SYB Rogers and --
Q. Pause. Who else was on it?
A. I think Prince Taylor was their defence. He was the one arguing on behalf of Philip Palmer and others. And they had Pa Blue, they had Patrick PS Binda, they had the MP commander,
Rashid Sandi, who was the acting general adjutant to Bockarie, and some IDUs who were present in Buedu.

Q. Were they all on the investigative panel?

A. Yes, they were all there.

Q. And were they the ones who pronounced guilt or innocence on the external delegation members?

A. They were the ones. Because they were asked - they asked them questions, saying if they had the right to change Mr Sankoh, like Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh and Dr Barrie, who did - they were civilians who joined the RUF in '91. Fayia Musa and Deen-Jalloh, they joined the RUF in '91, in Kailahun District. Dr Barrie was captured at the Sierra Rutile during the '95 attack. So it was him and the white people who were taken to Foday Sankoh in Zogoda. So he decided to stay with the RUF whilst the white people were released. So even the other War Council members who were on the panel of investigation and the other members of the panel, they told them all that they did not have any right as civilians to change Mr Sankoh from his leadership - for them to take over his work. And for Philip Palmer, they asked him questions. They said, "Philip Palmer, you were a training commander at the Dia training base in 199" --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the date was not clear to the interpreter.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Pause there. He was the training commander at the Dia training base in which year?

A. In 1993 until we were pushed out. That base dissolved in November 1993 because of the pressure from the government troops.

Q. So what were they saying to Philip Palmer?
A. Well, they were asking him questions, the IDUs, the MPs and the War Council members who were present, the G5s, because all units gave representatives from all spheres to set up that panel.

Q. Go on.

A. So they were asking Philip Palmer, they said, "You were a training commander at the Dia training base and you were training recruits."

Q. Go on.

A. "You were training hundreds of recruits and whom you told that if they betray the cause, they will die. And now you have betrayed Mr Sankoh. Now you have said you are the leader. You have changed Mr Sankoh, isn't this a betrayal?" And they said - that was it. So that was the investigation that went on.

Q. Very well. Thank you for that, Mr Sesay. Now I want to close that particular chapter.

JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, was the witness present when all this was being said? Because I do recall him saying he went to Giema a couple of days after the arrest of these people.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Mr Sesay, were you present at the trial of the external delegates?

A. I was not present at the trial. Because after we brought the men to Buedu I went back to Giema. But the unit members who were present on the panel of investigation - Kaisuku was there, and after the investigation he went back to Giema. So they informed us about all that happened during the investigation. And later Sam Bockarie himself came and explained to us what and what was said during the investigation and what was the outcome. He came and explained to us during parade to all fighters and
officers in Giema.

Q. Thank you. Now, we dealt at length with a topic this morning, Mr Sesay, and I allowed you at that stage to continue your explanation of the matter, but now that certain documents are to hand, I would like us, please, to just return briefly to top and tail one or two details.

Now, you remember telling us at length about Foday Sankoh's purchase of arms in Burkina Faso. Do you remember that, Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, I recall.

Q. And you told us - just remind us, when did Mr Sankoh purchase that material?

A. I said it was in early '97 before he travelled to Nigeria.

Q. And you also mentioned that some of the finances for that came through the Libyan ambassador in Ghana. Is that right?

A. Yes, that was what I heard.

Q. And also that you at that stage could not recollect the name of the ambassador?

A. No, because it was an Arabic name.

MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness now could be shown exhibit D-15:

Q. I'd like you to look first of all, Mr Sesay, at the first page of this two-page letter. First of all, have you seen this letter before?

A. Well, this is the man I was referring to. I have seen this letter before.

Q. Where did you see this letter?

A. This letter was an exhibit during my trials against me.

Q. Now, you'll see that the letter is headed "Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone" and it's dated 26 June 1996. Now, in June of 1996, Mr Sesay, where was Mr Sankoh?

A. Mr Sankoh was in Abidjan.

Q. You see that the letter is addressed - is from Corporal Foday Sankoh, leader, RUF/SL to brother Mohamed Talibi, Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana. Now, you said that is the name you were trying to remember. Is that right?

A. Yes, Talibi.

Q. And looking now at the detail of the letter, "Follow-up request" - what do you understand by the term "follow-up request", Mr Sesay?

A. "Follow-up request", that means he had requested and he was trying to reinforce the request.

Q. Now just remind us, the first sum received by Corporal Sankoh, how much was it?

A. Well, what I heard was they said it was $2 million. That was what I heard.

Q. Now, it goes on:

"I want to thank you and the other brothers back home again very much for the US$500,000 which I received through you for the purchase of needed material to pursue the military mission."

Now pause again, Mr Sesay. Where was Mr Sankoh when he received the $2 million that you heard about?

A. Well, I testified yesterday or the day before yesterday saying that after the signing - after the declaration of the ceasefire in Yamoussoukro between Mr Sankoh and Maada Bio we travelled to Abidjan, and Mr Sankoh moved with his delegation and he went through Burkina Faso and went to Libya. That was around --
Q. Pause. Around when?
A. That was around April 1996, something like that. And during that visit, when Mr Sankoh got to Burkina Faso he sent Peter Vandi back. So Mr Sankoh continued with Pa Kallon, Deen-Jalloh, Fayia Musa and others. They went to Libya. So when they went --
Q.Pause. Yes, when they went?
A. When they went to Libya, it was when they returned that Mr Sankoh himself made me to understand that he got some money from Mr Gaddafi, which was up to the sum of $2 million. That was the first visit he made to Libya. He himself went on that visit.
Q. Right. So just help us, Mr Sesay, because it's your evidence. Was that money to given Mr Sankoh in his hand in Libya, do you know?
A. Yes, that was what I understood, that the money was given to he himself, he and the delegation that went with him. That was before the signing of the - that was so many months before the signing of the Accord in November.
Q. Just help us. What was the date of that trip to Libya?
A. I said it was April.
Q. We come to this letter now in June, and we see from the first paragraph: "I want to thank you and the other brothers back home again very much for the US$500,000 which I received through you".
Mohamed Talibi, "for the purchase of needed material to pursue the military mission. However, I wish to let you --
MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me. I believe counsel misread. It
speak, "I received through you". He added the name "Mohamed Talibi".

PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, it follows logically, doesn’t it?

MR KOUMJIAN: Well, I think there are several interpretations, since “you” in English can be singular or plural.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well, I suppose. That’s a point. But do continue. All the comments are on the record anyway.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. "... I received through you for the purchase of needed material to pursue the military mission. However, I wish to let you all be informed that my business partners for these materials are here with me and we have had extensive discussions on this subject."

Pause there. Who were Mr Sankoh’s business partners, Mr Sesay?

A. Well, as far as I knew, was the man in Burkina Faso, Diendere, because he was the one who he bought the ammunition from.

Q. Very well:

"Attached to this letter you will find a list of materials, arms and ammunition and their costs for your serious and urgent attention. I now need US$1.5 million in order to purchase twice the listed materials for effective and smooth operations."

Pause there. To your knowledge, Mr Sesay, did Foday Sankoh receive this further US$1.5 million from the Libyans?

A. Well, what I knew was that Mr Sankoh received money which he used to buy the materials from Burkina Faso before his trip to Nigeria. Because even when Gibril Massaquoi came to Freetown, he
confirmed that the ammunition that the Papay had bought - it was
Mr Sankoh we used to call Papay - he said the ammunition that the
Papay had bought was - he got them through the money that he got
from the Libyan leader. He said even the external delegation was
not there. He said even the external delegation did not know
about the purchase of the ammunition - the arms and ammunition
that Mr Sankoh bought in Burkina Faso.
Q. Pause there. Can I ask you this question, Mr Sesay: Do
you know how much in total Foday Sankoh paid for that consignment
of arms and ammunition?
A. Well, I did not know the exact amount that he paid, but I
only knew that the money they gave him was the money he used to
buy the ammunition. Because, minus that money, Mr Sankoh did not
have any other means to get money to buy such a quantity of arms

Q. Let's go back to the letter, please:
"My representative Captain Philip S Palmer will elaborate
on this all important and urgent mission as he is expected to
travel along with my business partners somewhere for these
materials, if and only if the above-mentioned amount is
available."
Pause again. Now, we've gone through the members of the
external delegation. Were they all civilians, or were there any
of them military personnel?
A. No, Philip Palmer was a vanguard. We all trained together.
So he was a military man. He was the military attache to the
external delegation.
Q. Did anybody else on the external delegation have a military
background?
A. Well, except for Gbassy James, he was an operator. She was not a fighter, the lady that I was talking about. It was only Philip Palmer that had a huge amount of military experience as a member of the external delegation. Because even for Gbassy James, it was later that she went to Ivory Coast. But at the early stage she was not a member of the external delegation. So when we talk about members of the external delegation, it was only Philip Palmer that had military experience.

Q. Now, given that this letter is speaking about the purchase of arms and ammunition, Mr Sesay, is there any particular reason why Philip Palmer was chosen as the representative to deal with this matter?

A. Yes, because Philip Palmer knew the type of basic materials that the RUF needed at that time, and he knew the different types of ammunition. He knew those things more than Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh or Dr Barrie. They did not know.

Q. Then he continued:

"These materials will be given to me at discount rates and the requested amount, plus the one already at hand, will cover in addition all transportation costs for airlifting these materials."

Now, pause again. You mentioned this morning that instructions had come from Foday Sankoh about the construction of an airstrip. Do you remember telling us that?

A. Yes, I recall.

Q. Now, first of all, Mr Sesay, when was it that Foday Sankoh gave that instruction?

A. Well, at the time Mr Sankoh gave the instruction, it was in
April. That was the reason why he stopped Peter Vandi in Burkina Faso to come back to Abidjan, so that I will go back with him to Sierra Leone. Foday Sankoh sent Peter Vandi back, and he did not join the group to go to Libya because he said he should come for us to start preparing the airstrip.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked to slow down.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Pause. So Peter Vandi was sent from where to where?

A. I said - I did say yesterday that Peter Vandi was part of the group that was supposed to travel with Mr Sankoh to Libya. But when they got to Burkina Faso, Mr Sankoh told him that he should return and when he came back to Abidjan --

Q. [Overlapping speakers]

A. -- so he and I were to travel back to Kailahun District in Sierra Leone, because at this time Peter Vandi was the area commander. So when Peter Vandi returned, Mr Sankoh sent instruction that Peter Vandi should construct the airstrip, so the airstrip was constructed. They started work on the airstrip in '96.

Q. In what month in '96?

A. Well, we came back in April and I went to Zogoda, because in April, May they had started brushing the place. It was around May that they started work on the place in Buedu. It was just quarter of a mile from Buedu. It was just a place that was covered by savannah grass.

Q. And tell me, Mr Sesay, did they complete construction of the airstrip near Buedu?

A. No, no, they did not complete it. Because they worked...
there, and it got to a point when Mr Sankoh sent two white men.
They came, they surveyed the place, and they went back. But he
told Peter Vandi to stop the work for the moment.
Q. Pause there.
A. So when --
Q. He told Peter Vandi to stop the work at the moment. Why?
A. Well, I did not know the reason, but that was what I
understood later when I went back to Kailahun.
Q. When were these two white men sent?
A. The two white men came in Kailahun. By then I was in
Zogoda. They came around June to July.
Q. Of which year?
A. 1996.
Q. For what purpose did they come to Kailahun?
A. Well, what I understood, they came to inspect the airfield,
and that was what they came for.
Q. And where did they come from?
A. Well, they were Belgian nationals, according to what I
understood. They came from Ivory Coast, they travelled through
Guinea, and then they came - they crossed the river.
Q. And who sent them?
A. It was just Mr Sankoh who sent them with Steve Kamanda, who
was a radio operator. He led them through Guinea to Sierra Leone
border.
Q. Do you know their names?
A. No, I was not in Kailahun, so I could not talk to them. I
was in Zogoda. But that was what happened in Kailahun that I
heard about later, but I was not there.
Q. And from whom did you hear this?
A. I don't know. Well, I heard it from the commander who was in Buedu at that time - by then he was Big Daddy - when I came to Kailahun. And even Peter Vandi too told me that the Papay sent two white men to come and inspect the field, but they have gone back. It was not a secret. That was something everybody knew about in Kailahun.

Q. Let's go back to the letter, please, second page:

"The airlifting of these materials to our controlled territory will be done before any payment for this mission is done by me. This is why I am urgently appealing to you and the other brothers back home for your usual cooperation in providing this time the one and a half million US dollars to be at hand with me so that my business partners and my representative can proceed for these materials very quickly for fast and smooth operations."

Two things. First of all, in June - late June 1996, at the time that this letter was written, what areas did the RUF control? Because you see the phrase there "to our controlled territory". In late June, what areas did the RUF control in Sierra Leone?

A. In late June, RUF was in Kailahun, Pujehun District, Koribundu Jungle, Zogoda, Peyima, Kangari Hills, Western Jungle, the Bo Jungle. RUF was in all those areas. And even the Koribundu Jungle going towards Matru, the RUF was there.

Q. At this time, did the RUF control the area around Buedu?

A. Yes, yes, that is Kailahun. RUF controlled from Giehun up to Kailahun, up to Buedu, up to Kangama, up to Koindu.

Q. So at this time, the place where the airstrip was being constructed, was that in RUF-controlled territory?
A. Yes, it was deep inside the RUF-controlled territory.

Q. Now, the final thing I want to ask you about is: That signature, whose signature is it?

A. It's Mr Sankoh's signature.

Q. Now I want to ask you about a second letter, please. We can put that one away. It's P-272. Do we have it?

Now, we see, Mr Sesay, this letter, as with the last letter we looked at, is headed "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone". We see that the date of this letter is 4 December 1996.

As with the previous letter, it's from Corporal Foday Sankoh and it's addressed to the same recipient, Brother Mohamed Talibi, People's Bureau of Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana.

Subject, urgent information:

"I received the 29,000 USD through Mr Daniel Kallon, for which I am very grateful to you and the other brothers back home."

Pause. Who is this Daniel Kallon?

A. This is Mamie I Kallon's husband.

Q. Is this the same Daniel Kallon who you told us on Monday was responsible for bringing a number of recruits from Harbel and Kakata to Camp Sokoto? Is this the same Daniel Kallon?

A. Yes, that's the same man, the same Pa.

Q. In 1996, where was Daniel Kallon located?

A. He was with Foday Sankoh in the same house in Cocody in Abidjan.

Q. When had Daniel Kallon arrived in Cocody?

A. Well, Daniel Kallon was with the external delegation from December of '94 in Ivory Coast up to the time Mr Sankoh arrived in 1996 in Yamoussoukro. And then all of us travelled from

SCSL - TRIAL CHAMBER II
Yamoussoukro to Abidjan, and then they went with Mr Sankoh to Libya through Burkina Faso, and then I returned. So their trip back from Libya to Abidjan, they were staying in the hotel with Mr Sankoh, and the Ivorian government by then realised that they should rent a house for Mr Sankoh. So Mr Daniel Kallon and Mr Sankoh transferred from the hotel to the house in Cocody.

Q. So help me with this: Did Daniel Kallon accompany Foday Sankoh to Abidjan and - to Burkina Faso and Libya?
A. Yes, he was among the group that went. All of them went.

Q. Now, let's go back to the letter: "We have signed the peace accord on November 29, 1996." Which peace accord was signed on 29 November 1996, Mr Sesay?
A. That is the Abidjan Peace Accord between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.

Q. "Just so as to relieve our movement of the enormous pressure from the international community while I will use this opportunity to transact my business in getting our fighting materials freely and easily.

I have already finished negotiations with my business partners and I have so far paid 300,000 USD. Our agreement is that they should receive 700,000 USD from me in Sierra Leone upon their arrival with the materials into my controlled territory.

The total cost of the material is 2 million USD. The balance of the amount will be paid when the operation is completed.

I am therefore asking you and your brothers to urgently provide the needed 700,000 USD so that I will be in a position to live up to my commitment to my business partners who will be coming very soon with these materials. As I have always learnt from you people, there is some money with the Burkinabe
government for the provision of our needed materials. But as you
might have known by now, that government have really not shown
any keen interest in assisting us as a movement. I even had
conversation with Commandant Diendere these past few days but
with no positive result."

Is that the same Diendere that you mentioned this morning,
Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, that's the man.

Q. "I would therefore suggest that you prepare a letter for me
to meet President Compaore on this issue as we never received
anything from them and even my delegates at Ouagadougou have
returned ever since to my location here. Please advise on this
issue."

Who were the delegates at Ouagadougou who returned to 'my
location here'?

A. Well, the same delegation that had left with Ibrahim Bah
because Ibrahim Bah was based in Ouagadougou for most of the
time. So when he was going, he would come and pick them in
Abidjan and take them to Ouagadougou. So he provided their
lodging --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat the
last bit of his answer?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. He provided their lodging where?

A. I said he provided lodging for the RUF delegation that left
Abidjan because Ibrahim Bah was representing - in fact, he was
taking the RUF delegation to Burkina Faso, and he was working
with Mr Sankoh at this time. He was his friend.

Q. So when you say he was providing lodging, who is the "he"?
A. I mean Ibrahim Bah, because he had a place in Burkina Faso. So when people were going, he would lodge them. That's what I mean.

Q. Thank you. "When I went in last week, I was able to organise serious mining operations." Now, we see from the first page, Mr Sesay, that the accord was signed on 29 November. After the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord, did Mr Sankoh travel anywhere thereafter?

A. No. Mr Sankoh only travelled to sign the accord. After they had signed the accord, he did not return to RUF-controlled area until October 1999. That was the first time that he came back to RUF-controlled areas in the Kailahun District. But from the time that he left to sign the Abidjan Peace Accord that November 1996, Mr Sankoh never returned to Kailahun until October '99. He did not go to the Kangari Hills, and he did not go to the Western Jungle, because during that time in '96, it was only the Western Jungle, because during that time in '96, it was only the only three areas that the RUF was occupying, the Kailahun axis, the Kangari Jungle and the Western Jungle.

Q. In late November 1996, did Mr Sankoh travel to Sierra Leone?

A. No. The only time that he travelled to Sierra Leone was before the signing of the accord, but after the signing of the accord, he did not go back to Sierra Leone.

Q. Now, on that occasion before the signing of the accord when he came to Sierra Leone, what parts of Sierra Leone did he visit?

A. He went to Kailahun. From Kailahun, he went to Kangari Hills in a helicopter. He went first to the Western Jungle in Bradford because the Western Jungle was located in the Bradford area. He went there with a helicopter, and he met with
Superman's commanders there, and he flew to the Kangari Hills where he met Isaac Mongor and his commanders, and he met - he had a meeting with them. From --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this area slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. [Overlapping speakers] and where did he go thereafter? He went to Western Jungle, you've told us, in the Bradford district. He then went to the Kangari Hills. Where did he go after that, Mr Sesay?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, those three places that he visited, Kailahun, Western Jungle and Kangari Hills, are any of those diamond mining areas?

A. No, no. They are not diamond mining areas.

Q. When Mr Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone on that occasion, did he discuss diamond mining with you or any other RUF leader?

A. No, he did not talk - we did not talk about diamond mining.

Q. When we see in this paragraph the writer saying, "When I went in last week and was able to organise serious mining operations in precious minerals, which I believe will help us to generate the needed foreign exchange for our mission," do you understand what that is about?

A. Yes, I understand what that is about. But at the time that Mr Sankoh came with Deen-Jalloh and others to talk to us about the signing - about the peace accord before he goes to sign it,
he first - the pressure that was on him was the invasion of the
government troops and the Kamajors. He did not talk about
mining. I know about Mr Sankoh sending instruction for Bockarie
to start prospecting around that Dia area in February - January
to February 1997. He said Bockarie should start prospecting for
diamond in that Dia area. But that February, March they did not
see any diamonds, so Bockarie stopped before the AFRC took over
power.
Q. Thank you.
12:30:33
PRESIDING JUDGE: Could I seek clarification from the
witness. Mr Witness, you said in late November 1996 Mr Sankoh
travelled to Sierra Leone. Where did he travel from?
THE WITNESS: November '96 he came from Abidjan. He and
Amara Essy, who was the Foreign Minister, they came together.
They came through Guinea, and from Guinea they used an ICRC
helicopter from Kissidougou and went to Kailahun, and they
visited the other areas.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
12:31:19
MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. And what was the purpose of that visit?
A. The purpose of that visit was to inform the RUF and consult
with the RUF about the signing of the Abidjan Accord. That was
it.
12:31:48
Q. And was the visit before or after the signing of the
Abidjan Accord?
A. Before the signing of the Accord.
Q. Thank you. Going back to the letter:
"For now I am highly in need of this US $700,000 in order
to go in and be waiting for the arrival of my business partners. Please help me in this great hour of need and I promise not to let you down. Palmer will give you the rest of my message. My best regard to you and your family."

And then we see a signature below that. Whose signature is that, Mr Sesay?

A. It is Mr Sankoh's.

Q. Now, you went on this morning, Mr Sesay, to assist us with the arrival of that shipment from Burkina Faso and you told us the time of that arrival in - sometime in late 1997. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And how it was transported to Johnny Paul Koroma's address in Freetown; is that right?

A. Yes, that was what I said.

Q. What happened to that material after it was left at Johnny Paul's address?

A. Well, it was Johnny Paul himself who was distributing the material. He gave some to the army, he sent that to the Colonel GS.

Q. Pause there. Colonel GS is what?

A. Colonel GS used to receive the supplies and distribute them, something like that.

Q. Is GS a name or a title?

A. I think it's a title, although I don't know what "GS" stands for. But that was what they were calling the man who was in charge. The man's name, he's in the army now. He is the - RY Koroma. He is a brigadier now but he was a colonel then. RY Koroma, he was in charge of
distribution of ammunition at Cockerill. So Johnny Paul gave some of the material to him for distribution, and at the same time Johnny Paul called Mike Lamin and gave him one of the one-barrel BZT and ammunition for him to take to Sam Bockarie.

They gave Mike Lamin one Land Cruiser where he mounted the weapon and took it to Sam Bockarie in Kenema. The material was with Johnny Paul and he was the one distributing them. When they attacked in February 1998 the rest of that material left at the house, at his lodge.

Q. And what happened to it?
A. ECOMOG and the SLPP captured them.

Q. Now in late 1997, Mr Sesay, where were you based?
A. I was in Freetown. I was in Hill Station. That was where I was in Freetown.

Q. And at that time which other senior RUF commanders were located in Freetown?
A. Well, I - Issa Sesay, was in Freetown. Mike Lamin was in Freetown. Superman was in Freetown. Isaac Mongor was in Freetown. Peter Vandi was in Freetown. It was only Sam Bockarie who was in Kenema, while Morris Kallon was in Bo.

Q. And what were you and the others you've named doing in Freetown?
A. Well, we were in Freetown as administrators for the RUF working with the AFRC.

Q. And what was your particular role?
A. Well, my own job was to receive the slips from the chief of defence staff, slips for rice, because every month they used to give us rice and money. They used to give the RUF 50 million leones and they used to also give us 1,000 bags of rice, about
that. Then they also gave us diesel and petrol. So they would give me the slip of those supplies and I would go and give that to the man in charge of distribution - the man in charge of distributing or distributing to the RUF rank and file, including us, the commanders. I'll --

12:37:34

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this last part slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Pause there. You say that you would distribute it to the -

12:37:52

"the man in charge of distribution or distributing to the RUF rank and file, including us, the commanders." Could you pick up from there, please, what you were telling us?

A. I said I would receive the slips from the chief of defence staff, and I would take the slips to the man who is in charge.

12:38:15

Sometimes I will take him, we will go do the bank and we'll receive the money, because the man who was in charge of distribution was Kennedy Sesay, he was in charge of distributing - paying us, the commanders, how many bags of rice we should receive. So the admin sat in the office and they worked on that and they carried out the distribution. For the slips for the rice, I would receive the slip from the chief of defence staff. He would say, okay, you'll get 1,000 bags, 1,000 bags of rice, because they started at first with 500, and later it went to 1,000 and later it came back to 800. It was not stagnant.

12:38:39

Sometimes they would give us 500. So I would take the slip - I would take the slip from the chief of defence staff, talk to the army chief of staff for them to assist us with trucks so that we can transport the rice from Water Quay. They gave us a place at Army Ordinance at Murray Town; that was where we used to store
the rice. "I will take Kennedy and show him where we should store the rice and I'll take the slip to the Lebanese man, who was distributing the rice, and I will tell Kennedy you can follow up with the trucks to get that from the Army Chief of Staff to the - from the army" --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this last part slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. [Overlapping speakers] Who?

A. From the army transport officer. That was why SO Williams used to send us to Major Komrabai.

Q. Go on?

A. He would allocate two or three trucks to transport the RUF rice, our own monthly supply from Water Quay to the army ordinance. I would tell Kennedy to follow that up for the rice to be transported, and when they would have transported that the various commanders, the S4, the commander in Kailahun would send the S4 to come to Freetown for the supply. The one in Makeni would send. The battalion commander too would send for his from Kenema. At the time that we had a deployment in Bo from August, Morris Kallon too used to come, and the other deployment areas in Freetown, Lokosama, they too would send their own S4s to take their own supplies from Kennedy. So when, like those who were far off, I would meet the army chief of staff to ensure that they provided trucks for us to take the rice to Kailahun to supply the other areas - Kailahun, Makeni, Kenema - they used to take them. Sometimes when they gave these monies they allocated certain sum to Kailahun. Kennedy himself, the S4 who comes from Kailahun, they would decide to buy - the S4 used to come with a list. If
they gave Kailahun 15 million or 10 million, the S4 would come
with a list of condiments that are needed materials on the
ground, fish, onions, Maggi. So Kennedy and the S4 would take 2
or 3 million to buy those items and would give the rest of the
money to the S4 who would come to take the money, the condiments
and the rice supplies to the Kailahun commander. They would sign
for that in Kennedy's own record and they would take that to
Kailahun. The senior man in Kenema, that was the same in Kenema,
Makeni, Bo, Freetown and Lungi, Lokosama.

Q. Thank you. Could the witness please be shown exhibit D-9,
please.

PRESIDING JUDGE: While the exhibit is being found, there
is a location that the witness mentioned that appears as
indiscernible and frankly I think was a new name on the record,
Mr Griffiths. Perhaps you might clarify.

MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if your Honour could assist me with
a page reference.

PRESIDING JUDGE: It's just the last answer that the
witness gave at page 89. He says - he named a number of
locations, Kenema, Makeni, Bo, Freetown, Lungi and something.

MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I see:

Q. Mr Sesay, you said that the senior man in Kenema, that is
the same in Kenema, Makeni, Bo, Freetown, Lungi, and you gave
another location. What was it?

A. Lungi, because we withdrew from Lungi to Lokosama. That's
Lokosama at the junction. That was where our men were, the RUF,
because ECOMOG attacked them from Lungi and they withdrew to
Lokosama, that was where they were until the intervention.

Q. Can you help us with the spelling for Lokosama?

Q. This is a document we've looked at before, Mr Sesay, but in the context of what you're telling us about now, I'd just like to direct your attention to one passage on page 4, paragraph 2.

"The AFRC made available 50 million leones to the RUF monthly, though only for a couple of months. This and other monies received were used for providing rations to our troops and assisting all deployment areas. The civilian populace were not forgotten and special consignments were dispatched by me to Kailahun. All financial reports and returns will be presented by Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy who was in charge of all logistics. Kennedy you might recall, sir, is one of your senior bodyguards and served as G-SO1 (logistics) during our stay in Freetown."

Is that an accurate description, Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Now you're still in Freetown --

A. Well, this Kennedy was the mining commander. That's the same Kennedy.

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, so we're now in late 1997. You're in Freetown and you've just explained what you were doing. Now at this stage - so we're talking about six month or so after the coup - what was the state of the relationship between the RUF and the AFRC?

A. Well, the relationship, you know, we had hiccups, we had hiccups. In fact, that led to so many of the RUF to leave Freetown and follow Sam Bockarie to Kenema, because those were some of the things that caused Sam Bockarie to stay in Kenema. One, he said at one time he narrowly escaped accident - one
officer almost hit him with a car. Then there was another incident where he went to Johnny Paul - when he went to visit Johnny Paul in the morning at State House, he was in Johnny Paul's office when FSY Koroma and some senior army officers, including Nigerian generals, came in State House, they had come from Jui. Johnny Paul asked Bockarie to excuse me them. So Bockarie went out of the office, and later Bockarie knew that they had discussed about the release of the 350 Nigerians who were held as hostages and prisoners of war. They had come to negotiate about their release. When Bockarie knew all of that he said, "Oh, I am representing Foday Sankoh. Foday Sankoh is not here now." And we are working with this man to release the Nigerians and I am in his office, and now he's asking me to go out? He said, "This man does not trust me. He trusts the officers, my subordinates and the Nigerians more than me."

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he take this last slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now he said he trusts - he trusted the Nigerians and his junior officers "more than me". Go on. Carry on?

A. He said because that was why Johnny Paul asked him to leave. Why is Johnny Paul hiding the release of the Nigerians from him. So Johnny Paul did not trust him. So that accident that he narrowly escaped, all of that made him conclude that they wanted to kill him. So he said the best thing to do was to go in Kenema; whatever happened in Freetown, he would be able to reinforce the RUF.

Q. Now at this time where was Gibril Massaquoi?

A. Well, at this time Gibril Massaquoi was in prison.
Q. Why?
A. Because they plotted a coup, he and Steve Bio, they organised a coup against Johnny Paul and the AFRC, and that was exposed, and Johnny Paul got the information in time, and he called Bockarie and they approached me in Kenema because I went to Kenema when Bockarie called me. So, when I got to Kenema, as soon as I arrived in Kenema then Bockarie received a message that Johnny Paul wanted to see him on the radio - to talk to him on the radio. He said Johnny Paul wanted to see him immediately.

So, when I arrived in Kenema, Bockarie said Johnny Paul had called him and he was coming to Freetown and I should wait for him. So when I was going to Kenema, because my vehicle had a problem - so I borrowed Eldred Collins's vehicle so I used a Nissan Pathfinder, yes - so, when I got to Kenema, the vehicle developed an under-carrier problem. So the following day I went to one of my civilian friends at Koroma Street for him to repair the under-carrier, so I was at the garage; I, Edwin Bockarie, we were at the garage. We were sitting down with the mechanics when I saw two vehicles approach, one Discovery Land Rover and a pick-up. They came with armed men. The people whom I saw alight were Gibril Massaquoi and Steve Bio and they met me. When they met me, they greeted me and I responded to them. So Gibril started saying that, "We've come to you because this government, we do not understand. We do not understand." And he started talking and I said, "What has happened?" Then I said, "You've met me in the company of civilians." And I said, "What happened?" And I walked together we walked and stood aside and they starting grumbling. Then Steve said, "Issa, Gibril is just saying let's go to the point", and I said, "What was the topic?"
and he said, "You know me from the Ivory Coast. I'm the Pa's
good friend. I'm Pa Sankoh's good friend. I said, "Yes, I know
you." He said, "So it is Johnny Paul who sent us to come and
inspect the field, the airfield in Bo. We've gone to Kono and
they said we should inspect the three airfields in Bo, Kono,
Yengema and Kenema. He said, "So we've looked at the government.
It's not balanced. This whole thing they are out-muscling the
RUF. The power has not been shared equally. What benefit is the
RUF getting in this government? RUF was just there to take
instructions", he said, "And Johnny Paul has sent us to come and
inspect the fields. The ammunition that was coming was RUF
ammunition." He said, "Why shouldn't we organise ourselves, the
RUF, to seize this ammunition and seize power from the AFRC?"
Then I said this topic is better to discuss it with Sam
Bockarie." And Gibril said, "Issa, you know your man. You know
Sam Bockarie." He said, "I - Gibril Massaquoi knows I and Sam
Bockarie do not get on well. Since 1994 you know what has been
happening, so I would be afraid to take that topic to Sam
Bockarie. That was why I told Steve Bio and come and meet you.
If you accept, then you can meet Bockarie and talk to him." Then
I said, "This involves a coup and that, your man, I'm working
with him but I'm afraid of him." I said, "But all the same, now
that you've seen a reason for us to do this, well it's better for
you to meet Bockarie while I would be present." Then I said,
"So, it would be better for you to be in Kenema when Bockarie
arrives. He will be coming back tomorrow." Then Gibril said,
"Well, it's better for them to go to Bo, to be in Bo and wait for
Bockarie, so when they see Bockarie they will join Bockarie's
convoy and they will drive to Kenema to meet me." Then I said,
"Okay." They left me at the garage and they drove to Eddie Kanneh, who was the resident minister. Then they left for Kenema.

Q. Resident minister for where?

A. Resident minister for the Eastern Region for the AFRC.

Q. Pause again. Now, this meeting you're telling us about with Gibril Massaquoi and Steve Bio, when did this take place?

A. Well, I think that was in October.

Q. Of which year?

A. 1997.

Q. Now take up the account, please. How do things develop thereafter?

A. So they left - I think that was in late October, something like that - they left and went to Bo. When they went to Bo - when they left me in the garage they went first to Eddie Kanneh, because Steve Bio and Eddie Kanneh were friends. They went to Eddie Kanneh then they left and went to Bo. So they repaired my vehicle. I and Edwin Bockarie drove off and I went to the place where I was staying at, Bockarie's place where he was in one building just after the Bank of Sierra Leone in Kenema. The building has a name anyway. Maybe I'll recall that name later. That was the building where Bockarie was staying. So I came to that place. In the evening, I laid down and slept. In the night, almost around midnight, around 1 to 2, Bockarie arrived from Freetown, he had returned from Freetown, because he was staying upstairs and where I was staying is downstairs, so he came and slept, and I was sleeping when he came. The following morning when I woke up, I saw the vehicles. I saw the bodyguards. I said okay. Then I too went up, I greeted his
wife, and the wife responded, and I asked for him and she said he
was sleeping. So I was sitting in the living room with the radio
operators when he woke up. When he woke up, he came outside and
all of us stood up and saluted him and he said, "My man, come
here, let me tell you something. Let me tell you what Johnny
Paul called me for." So he took - we left the living room and
went to the veranda. Then he said, "Guess what happened."

Q. Pause. Who left and went to the veranda?

A. I and Bockarie. We went to the veranda. He said, "My man
guess why JP called me." And I said, "What about?" And he said,
"JP said he's gotten an information that some of the RUF
commanders are planning a coup to overthrow him." And I said I
was really surprised as to how Johnny Paul is beginning to make
allegations against us. Then I said, "If that man has told you
that, let me too explain what happened in Kenema yesterday when
Gibril Massaquoi and Steve Bio spoke to me." He said, "The man
is not telling lies to you? So I too explained to Bockarie, then
Bockarie said, "Eh", then he said, "Johnny Paul has gotten the
information even before these men spoke to me." Then I said, "I
believe so." Then he said, "What should we do?" Then I said,
"Well, the men had promised to wait for you in Bo Town. Now that
you've come and said you've not seen them, let us wait." And I
said I believed they would come then Bockarie said, "Don't you
think it is better to go to Bo and arrest those men?" And I
said, "No, let's wait for them." Then we were in Kenema. At
around midday 12 to 1 o'clock their convoy arrived. Gibril
Massaquoi and Steven Bio arrived in their vehicles. They passed,
because the place where Bockarie was to the roundabout it was a
short distance. So the security guards came, they saw them when
the vehicles passed by, and went straight to Eddie Kanneh's house because Eddie Kanneh was staying off Hangha Road by - close to the brigade headquarters at Sesay Street. That was where Eddie was. So they came and went to Eddie Kanneh's place. And he came and told us that one of the boys - one of the boy said he saw Steve Bio's vehicle has arrived, and I said, "You see. Now that the men have seen you, that is why they have come." Then Bockarie said, "Well, it's better for you to go to Eddie's house so that those men's arrest could be effected, or what do you want to do?" Then I said, "Well, I will call them. Then I went to Eddie Kanneh's house and I met him. All of three of them were sitting in Eddie Kanneh's living room.

Q. Pause. Which three?

A. Steve Bio, Gibril Massaquoi, and Eddie Kanneh. So when I got there I told them - they greeted me and I greeted them, and I said, "Oh, yesterday you people told me that you were going to wait for Mosquito in Bo. Now Mosquito is in Kenema. What happened?" And they said, "Well," they understood that Mosquito passed through at midnight, that was why they too have come.

Then I said, "Okay. Let's go to him." So they came, they boarded their vehicles and I boarded mine, and we went to Mosquito, and I told them that I have explained what they said to Mosquito, and I said they too could explain, and Mosquito said - Mosquito said - asked Gibril, "Gibril, you, are you not the one that Mr Sankoh sent to tell me that I should take all instructions and work with Johnny Paul? But then how could you tell me again that we should seize this ammunition and overthrow the AFRC? Don't you think this would cause another serious war in Sierra Leone?" And he said, "Well, I have been called by
Johnny Paul and he's told me that some of our commanders were about to organise a coup, and I was not going to be a part of that. Now I'm going to arrest you because the instruction that was given to me by Foday Sankoh was that I should take orders from Foday Sankoh, and it is you who brought another letter that said I should take orders from Johnny Paul." So Mosquito ordered their arrest. He informed Johnny Paul, and Johnny Paul spoke on the radio that the men should be brought to Freetown, and Mosquito said I should take them. So I, Steve Bio, Gibril, we boarded the same vehicle, nobody hit them, nobody tied them up, we boarded the same vehicle, and we drove off. We drove all night, and we got there about 3 in the morning, 3 to 4, at Hill Station at my quarters. I said, "Okay. Let's just sit in the living room." And we were sitting in the living room till 6 o'clock, because from my place to Mike Lamin's to Isaac's was not a far distance. So I sent my security guards to call Isaac and Mike Lamin because I didn't want to take the people upon Bockarie's orders without the other senior commanders knowing what had happened in Kenema. So Mike Lamin first came. I explained to him. He was angry in my living room. He said, "What? These people want to cause problems and we cannot be a part of it. Let's take them over and hand them over." So when Isaac too came, he was angry with them. He said, "No. This type of thing that you want to start, you want these soldiers to come and kill all of us in Freetown? Now we are among the people, and you are talking about an overthrow. What if we are unable? Do you think we would open fire and those people wouldn't return fire?" So Isaac, Mike Lamin, all of them were angry. So we boarded our vehicles and we drove off to Johnny Paul's house.
together with Isaac, Mike Lamin. Then we went, we parked the vehicles, we disembarked. Johnny Paul was sitting in his veranda. As soon as he saw us, he said, "Oh, Issa, how are you guys doing? So you've brought them?" And I said, "Yes, sir."

And he said, "Okay. Let them sit there. You come." Then he called the provost, the provost marshal of the Military Police, and he said, "These men were under arrest and they should be investigated." Then he handed them over to the MP for investigation. Then the MP took Steve Bio and others to Pademba Road.---

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat this last part slowly?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So who took them to Pademba Road?

A. The provost marshal them took them to Pademba Road. They were at Pademba Road in custody whilst they were being investigated. This was going on until the intervention took place.

Q. So in which month were they placed in custody?

A. If it was not October, then it was November, one of the two, but I can't remember the exact month, but I think so.

Q. Now, we've heard you say a lot about Steve Bio. Who was Steve Bio, Mr Sesay?

A. Well, Steve Bio was the elder - was Maada Bio's elder brother, the former chairman of the NPRC. That was his elder brother, Steve Bio.

Q. And what's the connection between Steve Bio, if any, and Foday Sankoh?

A. Well, during the Abidjan Accord ---
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat his entire answer slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Start again. During the Abidjan Peace Accord, you were saying, what happened?

A. I said during the Abidjan Peace Accord, Steve Bio and Mr Sankoh got a relationship because of Deen-Jalloh's wife, who was Steve Bio's elder sister. Steve Bio and Maada Bio, that was their elder sister, Mammy Agnes, Deen-Jalloh's wife.

Q. And prior to Abidjan, was there any connection between Steve Bio and Foday Sankoh?

A. No. In fact, before the Abidjan, Steve Bio, what I understood later, he had a helicopter - he had helicopters that were doing transportation in Sierra Leone. In fact, he was running missions for the NPRC at that time. That was what I understood. He and Foday Sankoh were on the same move when Mr Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria. It was he, Bio, who took Mr Sankoh to Nigeria to meet one international businessman. That was where Mr Sankoh was arrested.

Q. Now, this international businessman - no, let me start again. So the trip to Nigeria when Sankoh was arrested was for what purpose?

A. What I understood was that Steve Bio had a friend who was an international businessman, but it looked like the man was a Russian who had said they should meet in Lagos. That was where he and Mr Sankoh were to meet with Maada Bio. That was why Maada Bio met Mr Sankoh, because at this time Maada Bio was in Freetown but he used to go to Abidjan to meet Mr Sankoh. So he left Freetown and went to Abidjan, and they planned this trip with
Mr Sankoh, and he went to Nigeria and Mr Sankoh was arrested.

Q. Now Mr Sesay, in that last answer you mentioned Maada Bio.
The answer was, "That was why Maada Bio met Mr Sankoh, because at this time Maada Bio was in Freetown but he used to go to Abidjan to meet Mr Sankoh." Are we talking about Maada Bio or Steve Bio?

A. We are talking about Steve Bio, not Maada. If I said so, then that's a mistake. But we are talking about Steve Bio.

Q. So it was Steve Bio was in Freetown and he used to go to Abidjan to meet Mr Sankoh. Is that right?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And for what purpose were they planning on meeting this Russian businessman in Nigeria?

A. Well, Steve Bio told that man - he told Mr Sankoh that he had a friend who was supplying the NPRC, so he would be able to make contact between Mr Sankoh and this friend, so whatever Mr Sankoh wanted, in terms of fighting material, this friend would be able to make provision to Mr Sankoh. That was the purpose of going to Nigeria.

Q. So Mr Sankoh was going to Nigeria to meet a Russian businessman in order to buy arms. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. When he was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know the name of this Russian businessman?

A. No, I don't know the name. I did not know the name.

Q. And was that the trip when Mr Sankoh was arrested?

A. Yes, that was it.

Q. And who organised that trip?

A. Well, it was Steve Bio who organised that trip. He
organised it to go to Nigeria.

Q. Now, who else was arrested at that time in Nigeria?

A. They arrested Foday Sankoh, Gibril Massaquoi, one radio
operator who went with Mr Sankoh. What was his name? In fact,
Martin. And then one Ansu. Four of them went. Including Steve,
that summed up to five.

Q. So let's just go through the five again so that we're sure.

Foday Sankoh. And who were the others? Just go through it
slowly.

A. Foday Sankoh; Gibril Massaquoi; Martin, he was a native of
the Jojoima area; and one Ansu. They were four. Including Steve
Bio, summing it up to five.

Q. And were all five of them arrested?

A. Well, I did not know about Steve Bio being detained, but I
knew about the detention of Foday Sankoh and his three men in the
hotel where they were detained because they said they discovered
that Mr Sankoh had a pistol rounds in his bag at the airport, so
that was all about the arrest.

Q. Mr Sesay, you've told us now of contact you had with Johnny
Paul Koroma when he ordered you to go to Magburaka to meet that
shipment. You've also mentioned contact with Johnny Paul Koroma
when you brought Gibril Massaquoi and Steve Bio back to Freetown.
The question I ask is this: During this period in late 1997, how
much contact did you have with Johnny Paul Koroma?

A. Well, I was getting contact with Johnny Paul Koroma because
sometimes Johnny Paul Koroma would call for Issa, sometimes he
would call for Isaac, sometimes he would call for Superman. He
will call for Mike Lamin when Bockarie was not in town.
to repeat that last bit slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Could you repeat that last part slowly, please?

A. I said sometimes he would call for Bockarie also, and he would travel from Kenema. But he would call for any of the commanders he wanted to talk to, including me.

Q. So how regularly would you speak to Johnny Paul Koroma?

A. Well, it depended on at any time Johnny Paul wanted to send me on a mission or that he wanted to see me. If he wanted to see me, he would call me. My radio operator - his radio operator Control would call me because I had a handset. Control would call me and say the Pa wanted to see me and I would go there.

Sometimes, if we had meetings, because since October - October, we used to attend meetings, and sometimes the meetings took place every Thursday. So every Thursday I used to go to the lodge because it was at his lodge that the meeting used to take place, the council meeting.

Q. Pause. And which meetings were these at the lodge?

A. I said council, the AFRC council meetings. Because --

Q. Are those meetings attended by the individuals we looked at in the Sierra Leone Gazette? So those people would meet at the lodge every Thursday, yes?

A. Yes, because it was an under-cellar, a bunker, like. The place was built - there was an under-cellar. That was where the meeting used to take place. Because by then the ECOMOG used to attack Freetown, so that was where we have to hold the meetings. And the only time after that July meeting was at Cockerill, but by then we were not members of the council. And after that meeting, all the other meetings starting from September used to
take place at that place. The only meeting that we wanted to
hold in Cockerill - the only meeting that was supposed to be held
out of that bunker at Johnny Paul's house was that the emergency
meeting that he called at State House. But when so many people
went there with so many vehicles at State House for the meeting,
and then he came out of his office and said the venue for the
meeting must be changed. No, no, sorry. He said the meeting
should go and take - should take place at Cockerill. So when
everybody went to Cockerill, and then automatically he decided to
change the venue of the meeting. He said instead of Cockerill,
the meeting should take place at State House. So that was the
only meeting that I recall about the council that took place at
the State House that did not take place at Johnny Paul's
residence. But all other meetings took place in his residence.

In fact, we were - it was only by the grace of God that we
changed the venue. Because we were at State House during the
meeting when they had just opened the floor for the meeting, and
we heard heavy bombardment taking place at Cockerill when the
Alpha Jet came and dropped about four cluster bombs and killed so
many people, damaged people seriously. It damaged the whole
building. Where the bomb dropped, you can see that a pool of
water came out of there. So if all of us had gone to that
particular meeting - to hold a meeting there, then I think the
AFRC would have dissolved immediately that particular day,
because that was what happened there.

Q. Thanks. Now, Mr Sesay, on the same note, I want now to ask
you this: At those Thursday meetings - first of all, did you
always attend those meetings?
A. Yes, I used to attend except if I was not in Freetown or
that I was not feeling well.

Q. And at those meetings what kind of business was discussed?
A. Well, at times - because at the meeting - the meeting was like the table where I'm sitting here, because the table was not as big as this. You know, Johnny Paul, SAJ Musa, AK Sesay, they will sit in the front of the benches because they were long benches. So Johnny Paul, AK Sesay and SAJ Musa, they will sit at the high table and the rest of us would sit in front of them. The PLOs will sit in front, the honourables and the coup makers.

Then we would sit with army officers and then civilians will come at the back, because we had civilians who were also part of the council, they were council members. So that was how the meeting used to take place where we discussed the security of the state. They discussed about the harassment of civilians, how they should put it to a stop, and they also discussed about revenue generation.

Q. Did you also discuss relationships with other countries in the sub-region?
A. No, no, no, we did not discuss that except - yes, about the going of the delegation to Abidjan to try and meet the ECOWAS and meeting in Guinea, when at one stage Lansana Conte wanted to host a meeting by inviting Johnny Paul and Mr Kabbah's government so that they could sit together and have a meeting. Those meetings used to take place. And also about the delegation that we sent to Abidjan, when about two or three times the delegation went to Abidjan --
Q. Could you repeat that again, please, and also about the delegation that was sent. The delegation went about two or three times. The delegation went to Abidjan. Go on?

A. Yes, I said a delegation went to Abidjan about two or three times when army officers and civilians and ministers also went, including RUF members, to go and meet with the ECOWAS Government of Nigeria about resolving the issue of Sierra Leone opposing to the intervention and that the intervention will cause a serious problem. So after those - it was out of those meetings that they gave the AFRC nine months and that after nine months, they should return the country to civilian rule. But the nine months did not come by.

Q. Pause. Who gave the AFRC nine months to return the country to civilian rule?

A. Well, what I understood during the meetings, it was from the meetings that they held in Abidjan that --

Q. Who held in Abidjan?

A. Well, I think ECOWAS was involved. Because I recall when this guy from the Ghanaian Foreign Minister came to Freetown when they interviewed him over the BBC, and when he said he did not see corpses in the street, he said people were going about his business, the markets were running. I have forgotten the man's name, but he was the Foreign Minister of Ghana at that time.

Q. Now, you said that the nine months didn't finish before what?

A. I said they gave that provision during the meeting that they held with the ECOWAS representatives and even the international community representatives. They said they were advising that they ruled for only nine months, and after nine
months they should return the country to civilian rule. But the
nine months did not finish when ECOMOG attacked - ECOMOG together
with the Kamajors attacked the AFRC.
Q. Pause there. Now, during this period, given your position
on that council and your contacts with Johnny Paul Koroma, help
us. What, if any, contact was there between the AFRC and
Charles Taylor?
A. Well, I do not recall any contact between the AFRC and
Mr Taylor. I did not know about any contact until the
intervention, and even when the intervention took place - like,
there is one name on that list that is - on that gazette, a name
Victor King. Victor King's name is on that list. Victor King
was a council member, and Victor King was the commander of the
air force wing of the Sierra Leone Army. He was the commander of
the air force wing. When the intervention took place, he took
his family members - because he was in control of the helicopter
gunship. So he took the helicopter gunship and he went to
Liberia for rescue. But at the end of the day he was arrested
and sent back to Sierra Leone, because he was amongst those 24
officers who were killed.
Q. Now, I do want us to go through this rather carefully,
because you began by saying, "I do not recall any contact between
the AFRC and Mr Taylor. I did not know about any contact until
the intervention."
Could you explain to us, please, Mr Sesay, in simple terms
what it is you're saying? And let's take it in stages. From the
time that you went to Freetown after the coup until the end of
that year 1997, tell us about any contact between the AFRC and
Charles Taylor, please.
A. For me, from the start - from the beginning when we joined the AFRC to the end of the AFRC we did not have any contacts with Mr Taylor, and I did not know about any contact between Mr Taylor and Johnny Paul Koroma. And in fact, during this time it was through the Liberian border that ECOMOG used to arm the Kamajors to fight against the AFRC and RUF. All the Kamajors in '97 were armed by ECOMOG through the Mano River Bridge and they were given weapons, HMG, G3 and ammunition. Kamajors were coming all the way from Yele. They would trek on food and then go to the Mano River Bridge from Bonthe District, Kenema District, Bo District, and even part of Tonkolili District.

Q. And who was arming those Kamajors?

A. It was ECOMOG who was arming them. It was ECOMOG arming them.

Q. And where were they being organised, those Kamajors? In which country?

A. It was in Liberia that ECOMOG used to bring the arms and ammunition that they would transport to the Mano River Bridge. And the late Hinga Norman, who was the Defence Minister, he was in Liberia, he was coordinating all of these things with the ECOMOG. And they used to bring these arms and ammunition to the Mano River Bridge, where they armed the Kamajors.

Q. How do you know this?

A. Well, that was not a secret within the AFRC/RUF. We knew about that. And even when we were in detention with the late Hinga Norman, he used to discuss these things with us. He used to tell us these things. But we had known that even before the war came to an end. During the intervention we knew that, because I knew of an attack that Mosquito moved with up to the
Mano River Bridge in 1997, and it was as a result of those
information that he was getting that ECOMOG was arming the
Kamajors; that they were going there in their thousands and
hundreds to the Mano River and they were getting arms and supply.
And that gave the cause to Bockarie to leave Kenema to go and
attack Zimmi up to the Mano River Bridge.
Q. So for example, Mr Sesay, as far as you were aware, was
there radio or telephone contact between Charles Taylor and
Johnny Paul Koroma during that period May 1997 down to December
1997?
A. Well, Johnny Paul never told us that at the times he used
to meet with us, or at the time I used to meet with him, or that
any of my colleagues who used to visit him, none told me that
Johnny Paul said he used to talk to Mr Taylor through that
telephone contact or radio contact, no. And I strongly believe
that Johnny Paul did not have any dealings with Mr Taylor. And
even if he wanted to deal with Mr Taylor or talk to Mr Taylor, he
would have wanted to get Bockarie involved or any of the RUF
members. But I did not see that happen, not at all.
Q. During that same period - so we're talking about May 1997
down to December 1997 - Mr Sesay, are you aware of any contact
between Sam Bockarie and Mr Taylor?
A. No, Bockarie was not in contact with Mr Taylor. All orders
at that time Bockarie received from Johnny Paul. But he did not
have any contact with Mr Taylor in '97, no.
Q. How do you know that?
A. Well, I was a battle group. So if Bockarie used to talk to
Mr Taylor, I was in the position for Bockarie to tell me that.
And I was closely working with Bockarie, so I was supposed to
Q. Let’s move on into 1998 now, Mr Sesay. Now, you’ve already mentioned that before the nine-month deadline was up, ECOMOG intervened in Freetown. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the date of that intervention?

A. I think it was around 12 February. Because on the day of the intervention I was not in Freetown; I was in Makeni. I was in Makeni when I was in Makeni because the army chief of staff had sent me to go to Kono, and I was supposed to take Base Marine there so that the RUF would be able to get deployment in Kono. Because throughout the AFRC time, since May up to that moment we did not have RUF troops who were deployed in Kono. So the SO said that it would be nice for us to get the RUF commanders deployed there. So --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked to slowly repeat that last bit.

THE WITNESS: SO Williams, sorry. He was the army chief of staff who said I should take the commander - RUF commanders to go and work with the battalion commanders in Kono.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Now, I’m going to come on, hopefully after the luncheon adjournment, to deal with the ECOMOG intervention, okay?

A. Okay.

PRESIDING JUDGE: We will adjourn for an hour and reconvene at 2.30.

[Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

[Upon resuming at 2.38 p.m.]

PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. I apologise for starting
a little late. We had some matters to attend to.

Mr Griffiths, please continue.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Mr Sesay, I would like to clarify a matter you dealt with before the luncheon adjournment before we move on, and it's this. Do you remember telling us - and this is at page 111 of the transcript at line 9 - "Bockarie had to leave Kenema to go and attack Zimmi up to the Moa River." Do you remember telling us about that?

A. Yes, it's the Mano River; down to the Mano River Bridge.

Q. Now help me. Did Bockarie take with him any forces in order to attack Zimmi?

A. Yes, he went with fighters.

Q. Those fighters, were they members of the RUF, or were they AFRC?

A. They were members of the RUF.

Q. And who was being attacked in Zimmi by Sam Bockarie using these RUF combatants?

A. It was - you know, at Zimmi, the SLA were deployed there, so Sam Bockarie left Kenema to Zimmi and attacked the Kamajors in the villages towards the Mano River Bridge - right up to the Mano River Bridge.

Q. And when was that operation, Mr Sesay?

A. That was around - that was around November.

Q. Of which year?

A. Of '97.

Q. And was Bockarie able to hold Zimmi?

A. No, Zimmi was under the control of the soldiers, the AFRC; but Bockarie went and attacked from behind Zimmi towards the
borderline, because the guys used to come and attack Zimmi the Kamajors used to come and attack Zimmi and the villages towards the border, right up to Mano River. So Bockarie went and joined the soldiers in Zimmi and they launched the attack up to Mano River Bridge and they captured the place and withdrew back to Kenema.

Q. So were they able to hold that position?
A. No, no, they weren't because the Kamajors and the Nigerian ECOMOG came from Liberia and they attacked the place and they recontrolled the place, Mano River Bridge, and they controlled right across into the Sierra Leonean side.

Q. Could the witness now be shown exhibit D-4, please. Now Mr Sesay, do you recall me asking you before lunch about contact between Johnny Paul Koroma and Charles Taylor? Do you remember that?
A. Yes, I remember.

Q. In the context of that I would like you to have a look at this letter, please. Now, do you recognise this letterheaded paper? Do you see the letterhead "State House" --
A. Yes, I see it.

Q. Do you recognise that?
A. Yes, I know the logo. I know the State House. But I cannot talk on this letter.

Q. But in the context of what you told us about before lunch, I would like us to go through the contents of this letter, please. You see the letter is dated 3 October 1997?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, that date, is that before or after the Magburaka shipment?
A. The Magburaka shipment, I said it was around November.
November to December of '97. I don't recall the exact time, but it was late '97. That was what I said.

Q. So let me ask my question again: Was the Magburaka shipment before or after 3 October 1997?

A. I think it was after October 3, '97.

Q. Now, you'll see that this letter is addressed to His Excellency Charles G Taylor, President of the Republic of Liberia, Monrovia. Do you see that?

A. I see it.

Q. It reads as follows:

"Your Excellency and dear brother, I wish, on behalf of every living Sierra Leonean and the Government of Sierra Leone, to express our sincere gratitude and appreciation for the staunch supportive position you took during your last intervention at the United Nations General Assembly on the pacific resolution of the crisis in our country. The people of this country shall be ever grateful to Your Excellency for your hand of brotherhood of understanding and friendship in this our moment of dire need.

Your Excellency, in spite of this and in spite of everything that we ourselves here in Sierra Leone are doing to avert disaster for our war-weary people, based on intelligence that we have received, Nigeria appears intent and bent on invading our capital city of Freetown and imposing their will on our people. For a succession of days, the Nigerian component of ECOMOG, occupying the Lungi International Airport has been indiscriminately Shelling and Bombarding Freetown on a nightly basis, evidently in preparation for their invasion plan. We have no option but to defend our sovereignty and to protect our
citizens from the carnage and wanton destruction that will be
intensified by such an impending act of aggression by the
Nigerians.

Your Excellency, we need your help and we call on you to
come to our rescue. Let us together defend Sierra Leone for, in
doing so, we shall be defending each other and consolidating
peace within our sub-region. We are cognisant of the tremendous
constraints that you are currently confronted with at this
material point in time. We, however, entreat you to support us
with the following list of arms and ammunitions: 2,000 AK-47
rifles; 500 G3 rifles; 300 RPG 7 tubes; one hundred 60 mm mortar
tubes; six 105 Howitzer guns. And then ammunition: 1,000 boxes
of 7.62 times 39 (CH); 500 boxes 7.62x51 (NATO), 1,000 rounds 60
mm mortar; 2,000 rounds 105 mm Howitzer.

Your Excellency, our situation is grave and our determining
strong. It is our sacred duty to defend our country and to
protect our people and to create the basis for lasting peace
amongst all our peoples."

If you go over the page to the final page, you will see
that it's signed by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman, Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council. Taking matters in stages, first of
all, have you seen this letter before?
A. No, it is my first time to see this letter.
Q. You were nonetheless a member of the AFRC Council in
October 1997, weren't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware that a letter such as this was being sent
under the name of the chairman of that council to Charles Taylor?
A. No, I wasn't aware of this.
Q. Well, let's go through some of the details of the letter to see to what extent you can help us. Where, in the first paragraph, it reads, "That the governments of Sierra Leone express their sincere gratitude and appreciation for the staunch supportive position you," that being Charles Taylor, "took during your last intervention at the UN General Assembly", do you know what that's about?

A. Well, the meeting about the UN General Assembly, the comments that Mr Taylor made about the crisis in Sierra Leone.

Q. Yes, do you know about that?

A. Yes, I heard about it.

Q. And to what effect was that intervention by Charles Taylor? What was he saying?

A. What I understood was that the United Nations was to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone and that they should restore peace to Sierra Leone.

Q. Pause there. Go on.

A. That's what I understood, that they were part of the comments he made during the General Assembly in 1997.

Q. And what were those comments?

A. That the United Nations should put efforts together, or to look at the crisis in Sierra Leone, and find a way to peacefully resolve it - to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone.

Q. Thank you. Moving on to the second paragraph in this letter now. Now, in October 1997 we see that it says in the second paragraph, third line, "Nigeria appears intent and bent on invading our capital city of Freetown." In October of 1997 was that the understanding of the AFRC Council of which you were a member?
A. Yes, yes. Because during this time the Alpha Jet used to attack Freetown and other towns in Sierra Leone, and at the same time the ECOMOG Nigerians across in Lungi used to shell bombs, and the bombs used to fall --

Q. The bombs used to fall where?

A. Like Old Wharf; a bomb dropped there once and a lot of people died, and the corpses were taken to Siaka Stevens Street and the journalists were there. Everybody went there to see. It was the Nigerians who were shelling the bombs from across Lungi and they were dropping in Freetown.

Q. Now, you were asked this morning by the learned judge why the AFRC were seeking to get arms and ammunition from Burkina Faso in the latter part of 1997. Why were the AFRC regime at that time seeking to obtain arms from Burkina Faso?

A. It was because of the situation. When the Nigerians were using the Alpha Jets bombarding Freetown and other towns in Sierra Leone at the same time they would be in Lungi shelling and they didn't know where the bombs were dropping. The AFRC saw the Nigerians were shelling and they were killing innocent civilians. What about the AFRC members? They too would be killed. So we observed also helicopters flying 24/7 from Lungi, bringing more reinforcements to Jui, so everybody knew the Nigerians were preparing for attack. So the AFRC knew of that, of the imminent attack. And even the Kamajors from the Liberian border, the Moa River, when they set ambushes between Bo and Kenema, they were attacking other towns and villages where the AFRC members were. So everybody saw that the people were organising themselves and preparing themselves, and even some parts of the southern region, the AFRC couldn't go there, throughout the nine months of their
rule. It was the Kamajors, the Civil Defence controlled areas.

Q. Thank you. Now, before we leave this exhibit, Mr Sesay, help us with a little detail. Go to the second page, please.

Under "Ammunition" where reference is made to 7.62x39 (CH) what does the "CH" stand for?

A. I think it is cartridge.

Q. Very well. Yes, we can put that away now, please. I would like us now to take up the narrative in 1998, okay? In January 1998 where were you based, Mr Sesay?

A. I was in Freetown.

Q. Doing what?

A. Well, the same job. To supervise the work that Kennedy was doing, to make sure people received their rations and to oversee any other problems that was between our men, because there used to be some problems, because there were times the soldiers would beat our RUF men, except when we would go there and we would investigate and resolve the issues. Those were the things that were going on.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, some of the things you say are not clear to us. You said to supervise the work that who was doing?

THE INTERPRETER: Kennedy.

THE WITNESS: Like I said, to supervise the distribution that Kennedy was carrying out to distribute among the RUF, the diverse deployment areas, and to supervise the slips for the supplies.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. And were you still attending meetings of the AFRC Council in January?
A. Well, there was a time when a problem cropped up when I did not attend meetings. It took some time. I did not attend meetings.

Q. What was the problem?

A. Well, some AFRC members, including PLO-1 and Abu Zagalo and some other AFRC members like Gborie, Foday Kallay, Papa Bomb Blast.

Q. Start again and give us those names again, please. Like who?

A. Like the PLO-1, Abu Zagalo.

Q. Yes?

A. Honourable Gborie, Honourable Papa Bangura, alias Bomb Blast, Honourable Foday Kallay, I think with one or two more. I cannot recall their names now. They were involved in the looting of the Iranian embassy. They looted the embassy. Gborie brought some of the chairs for me and Mike Lamin. That's what brought the problem, so I was suspended from the council.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Who did you say brought the chairs?

THE WITNESS: Honourable Gborie was the one who brought the chairs for myself and Mike Lamin.

MR GRIFFITHS: Could we have a look at exhibit D-9, please:

Q. Whilst that document is being brought to you, Mr Sesay, when did that problem crop up concerning the Iranian embassy?

A. I think it was around December.

Q. Of which year?


Q. Could we have a look, please, at page 4 of exhibit D-9.

Have a look at the first paragraph on that page:

"On 31 January 1997", somebody has written 1998 in
handwriting above that, “the late Abu Sankoh (PLO-1) and the late Honourable Tamba Gborie looted the Iranian embassy at Murray Town. They later called on Brigadier Issa and offered him a set of chairs. Not being aware of the source of the chairs and the fact that it was indeed the late Tamba Gborie who was instrumental in welcoming the RUF and meeting the demands of the RUF when the government was doing everything to discourage us, Brigadier Issa accepted the gift in good faith. Without any investigation into the issue, Johnny Paul Koroma ordered that it be announced on national radio that Brigadier Issa had looted the Iranian embassy and that as a result he was suspended from the Supreme Council of the AFRC. His arrest was ordered and it was announced that the RUF had planned a coup. This situation led to the heightening of tension in Freetown between the RUF and the AFRC and an ultimate breakdown in its marriage.”

Now, is that accurate account, Mr Sesay, of what occurred.

A. Yes, that’s what happened.

Q. So were you arrested?

A. Yes, my arrest was ordered. SAJ Musa came. We crossed on the way and he stopped me and he said I was under arrest and I said for what? He said because of the Iranian embassy looting and I said, oh, but I did not go to the embassy.” I said the honourable who was in charge of receiving the RUF was the one who came - who brought the stuff and he was my friend and if the man brought chairs to me, that is Gborie, and you are here in the street ordering my arrest I said, no, I think that is not fair. So I went to my house.

Q. Go on. So you did what?

A. And I turned the vehicle back, the vehicle that I was using
where I met with SAJ Musa and I returned to my house. When I came back home I informed Bockarie about the situation. Bockarie said no, we are not - that we are not under the command of SAJ Musa and that we were under the command of Johnny Paul Koroma and if Johnny Paul Koroma wanted to arrest us -

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. If Johnny Paul wanted to arrest us then what?

A. Then he would call me or investigate the matter and if he found out that I was guilty or involved then I would be arrested. But SAJ Musa would not just meet me in the street without investigating the matter. And I knew that I did not go to the embassy.

Q. Go on?

A. He said if I knew that I did not go to the embassy and that the chairs were given to me by Gborie, then SAJ Musa should not arrest me. And I told him - I said, no, I did not go to the embassy and indeed I did not go there. I said it was Gborie who gave the chairs to me and he said but then don't subject yourself to any arrest. That was when he called Mike Lamin and others and he informed other commanders.

Q. Who called Mike Lamin and others?

A. Sam Bockarie. He called Mike Lamin. He asked Mike Lamin and Mike Lamin explained that I did not go to the embassy. And he said Mike Lamin should inform the other commanders that I should not subject myself to any arrest - that I should not accept the arrest.

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, where it says here in this paragraph that
Johnny Paul Koroma announced that the RUF had planned a coup, had
the RUF planned a coup against the Johnny Paul Koroma regime?
A. Why they said this was because - why Bockarie said this
because there was a shoot out during that incident because a
Allieu Kamara who was a spokesman for the RUF spoke on the BBC
that I had put up resistance when I was to be arrested and there
was firing and --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat
that.

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. Mr Sesay, what you said was this: Why they said this was
because - why Bockarie said this because there was a shoot out
during the incident and then you gave a name of a person who was
a spokesman for the RUF. Who is that person? What's the name?
A. Not the RUF. Spokesman for the AFRC. That is Allieu
Kamara. He was the one who spoke on the BBC to say that, because
of the looting of the Iranian embassy, arrests were about to take
place and firing took place and he claimed that that was an
attempted mutiny against Johnny Paul and the AFRC.

Q. Where at the end of that paragraph, Mr Sesay - and I ask
you this in light of what we'll be going on to discuss in a
moment - where the writer of this report says that this situation
led to the heightening of tension in Freetown between the RUF and
the AFRC and an ultimate breakdown in its marriage, do you agree
with that?
A. Well, yes, I agree with that because at this time while
Bockarie was in Kenema I was working with Johnny Paul Koroma and
the other commanders. So he who was on the ground - I was at the
ground. I was suspended and I stopped attending the council
meetings. I was in Freetown, but most of the things that were going on in the council I didn't know because I didn't attend meetings.

Q. Bear in mind the date, 31 January. Would you agree, Mr Sesay, that at that time, the end of January, the marriage between the AFRC and the RUF had broken down?

A. Yes, the relationship started breaking down.

Q. And this would have been prior to the ECOMOG intervention, wouldn't it?

A. Yes. Although after this - after this situation Johnny Paul invited me and I went after a day - the third day Johnny Paul invited me, I reported at his lodge and he told me that I should explain what happened and I did. After my explanation, he sent me - he said he had understood that Gborie had hidden but that Gborie had gone to Brigadier Mani's house along the same Spur Road.

Q. And?

A. Just opposite a short distance to Johnny Paul's house where Johnny Paul was to where Brigadier Mani was. People who know that area know that the distance is a short one. So Johnny Paul - that is myself, Zagalo and Johnny Paul were in the living room Johnny Paul said, "Okay, Issa, if that is the truth that what you are saying go to Mani's house and invite Gborie here." So I went outside, took my vehicle, I went to Brigadier Mani's house and I told Brigadier Mani that Johnny Paul had told me to go to with Gborie, that he wanted to see Gborie. So I drove with Gborie in my vehicle and we came to Johnny Paul. And Johnny Paul asked Gborie what I had explained and he asked me to explain again and I did that Gborie had given me the chairs. And Gborie said,
"Yes, this one, I was the one who gave him the chairs." And Gborie said, "I'm pleading with you. Please forgive me." And Gborie prostrated on the floor and he was rolling, begging.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness slow down.

He is saying something about his wife.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Stop there. He was rolling around on the floor and what was happening?

A. Pleading with Johnny Paul to forgive him for the last time, that that would never be repeated.

Q. Go on now.

A. And Johnny Paul instructed me to take Gborie to Pademba Road Prisons and to hand him over. This was around --

Q. This was around when?

A. This was around 11. After 11 p.m. In fact that was my first day to enter the Pademba Road Prisons right up to the reception area. So I went with Gborie at the reception. I met the prison officers who were on duty and I identified myself to them and the gate was opened. I entered the reception and told them that it was the chairman who had sent me to bring Honourable Gborie to them and that the man should be there for custody. And the officers said they asked me for my name and they wrote it down and they asked me to sign and I did. They brought the document and I signed it.

From there I did not go to Johnny Paul. I went there the following morning and I told him that I had left the man at the prisons, the Pademba Road Prisons. But even after that I did not attend council meetings because I was still on suspension.

Q. Very well. Now, you mentioned earlier that you were not in
Freetown at the time of the ECOMOG intervention. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you?

A. Well, the army chief of staff said that I should inform Mosquito that they wanted RUF to have a commander in Kono. So I informed Mosquito and Mosquito asked me whom did I think should be in Kono, because there were complaints that the soldiers and even some RUF were working in Kono. He said some RUF were going to Kono and they joined forces with the soldiers harassing the civilians. So he advised that the best thing to do was the RUF to have a commander in Kono so that will stop the flow of the RUF into Kono.

So I discussed that with Bockarie, because at that time Base Marine had just come. Base Marine came together Monica and others that October. But Bockarie said I should go with Base Marine there to become the commander there for the RUF in Kono.

Q. Did you go to Kono?

A. That was the first time that I was to go to Kono. But I didn't get there. When we left Freetown we passed the night in Makeni. And the following morning we went to a restaurant to eat for us to continue our journey to Kono. We passed the night at Teko Barracks. We were at the restaurant after we had left Teko Barracks for us to have some food in the morning to start our journey, that was when King Perry met me, the radio station commander in Makeni, Teko Barracks, and he told me, he said oh - he greeted me and I said, "Perry, how are you?" And he said he wanted to talk to me because he met me in the company of civilians and bodyguards, everybody was there eating, so he said he wanted to talk to me. So I got up from where I was; the two
of us walked out and he told me that ECOMOG had captured Hastings
and in fact said that they had captured Hastings and that they
were advancing to us. And they had captured Allen Town, they
were advancing towards - they had captured Hastings and they were
advancing towards Waterloo.

Q. Pause there. Did you have a radio with you at that time,
Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, I had a radio but I did not travel with my radio. My
radio was in Freetown with my operator. But King Perry was at
the Teko Barracks in Makeni, so he got the information that
morning. So he took his bicycle and he came to town. That was
when he met me. Because I slept at Teko at Kailondo's place so
he --

Q. Pause. Go on.

A. He took the bicycle in search of me - searching for me, so
he found me at the restaurant and he told me so I --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak
slowly and repeat this.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. So he found you at the restaurant and told you, yes? What
did you do when you were told that?

A. Yes, he found me at the restaurant. The restaurant was at
Mabanta Road. He found me there. And after he had given me the
information I told Kailondo, I said that is the commander at Teko
Barracks. I called Kailondo outside. I said, "Have you heard
the information that King Perry brought?" And he said, "What is
that?" And I said, "He said ECOMOG has attacked. They are
advancing on Freetown. They have captured Allen Town, they are
advancing on Freetown and they are also advancing towards
Waterloo." And I said, "So I cannot continue my journey to Kono."

I'm returning to Freetown."

Q. Did you go back to Freetown?

A. Yes, I made an attempt to return to Freetown but before I arrived - before I got to Waterloo, ECOMOG had already captured Waterloo so there was no way I could take any bypass to go to Freetown so I decided --

Q. How close did you get to Freetown?

A. I went as far as RDF. From RDF.

Q. What is RDF?

A. RDF was a camp created by the NPRC around Sumbuya. The meaning of RDF is Rapid Deployment Force.

Q. Pause there.

A. Something like that.

Q. And where was that force located or based?

A. It was a base. It was a base that had a force. It's Sumbuya. It's a village called Sumbuya.

Q. How do you spell Sumbuya?

A. I think it's S-U-M-B-U-Y-A.

Q. So you got as far as there, and effectively you couldn't go any further so what did you do?

A. I met the major who was at RDF and I spoke with him and he said he understood that even the senior commanders were at Benguema Barracks had withdrawn with the troops. They were at Four Mile, so I decided to drive Four Mile. So when I arrived at Four Mile I met the current Chief of Defence Staff in Sierra Leone.

Q. What's his name?

A. He was a colonel then, Colonel Nelson Williams. Now he's a
brigadier. I met him at RDF. I asked, I said, "Colonel, how is the area?" And he said, "Oh, Issa, those men have captured the entire Waterloo. That's why we have withdrawn to this place. Then I said, "So what's the next step", I asked him, "What's the next step to take?" And he said he too was trying to withdraw to RDF so that he could contact Freetown. We were there and the two of us drove to RDF. When we got there, we got an understanding from the major that Johnny Paul had sent two senior officers. We were to join that commandant from Benguema, that is Nelson Williams and myself, for us to repel the ECOMOG attack in Waterloo.

PRESIDING JUDGE: This colonel's name was who?
MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. How do you spell Nelson?
A. I think it's N-E-L-S-O-N.
Q. Thank you. Were you in a position to repel the ECOMOG attack?
A. Yes. On the arrival of Colonel Mansaray and Colonel RY Koroma - they were the two that came with the helicopter - they landed at RDF. So the four of us, together with the major, five of us were sitting together, and Colonel RY Mansaray said it would be better for Colonel Mansaray to go and be at Masiaka, because Johnny Paul Koroma gave them money for them to buy and cook and prepare food for the soldiers who were to carry out the attack.
Q. Yes. And?
A. So RY Koroma said Colonel Mansaray was to go and base in Masiaka, so they would prepare food from there and send it to RDF.
and that the food will get on to the front line at Four Mile. So
that evening I decided to send one of my bodyguards named Victor
Kamara and Isiaka, two of them, that they should bypass Waterloo
and they would get to Tombu. When they got to Tombu they would
take a vehicle and use the peninsula to Freetown so they would
get my wife and kid and the other family members and that they
will drive through the Tombu axis. So --
Q. Were they able to do that?
A. Yes, they did it. Because that's the same route that the
entire AFRC/RUF used to withdraw from Freetown.
Q. So your family and children were able to escape from
Freetown?
A. Yes, my wife and my child and my other family members.
Q. What about our members of the RUF/AFRC who were in Freetown
at the time? Were they able to escape?
A. Yes, because we attacked Lumpa three times but we failed,
so we had to withdraw and set a defensive position between Four
Mile and Lumpa. While the entire AFRC/RUF from in Freetown
withdrew through the peninsula, through Goderich, the peninsula
to Tombu. They came and abandoned all the vehicles in Tombu, and
they used boats to cross the river over to Fogbo, and from Fogbo
some of them walked and we were --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be
advised to repeat this slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. The translator is asking for you to repeat that part again
slowly, please.
A. I said the AFRC/RUF, starting from Johnny Paul Koroma and
all the RUF who left Freetown including all the commanders of the
RUF they withdrew, including civilians. Some were family members of the AFRC; some were families of the RUF; and some were sympathisers who were afraid, so they joined the retreating AFRC, because they were concerned about their life, because at this time that ECOMOG was advancing and capturing Freetown, they started burning people alive; when they caught people they had to spill petrol on them and put fire on them, so anybody who had any contact with the government of the AFRC --

Q. Who was pouring petrol on people and setting them alight?
A. The attackers; the ECOMOG, and the CDF who came with the ECOMOG, together with their supporters.

Q. Pause there?
A. They were doing that?

Q. Now, in terms of those who were retreating from Freetown in the face of the attack by ECOMOG, who was in charge?
A. Of the retreating group?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, the chairman was Johnny Paul, he was in charge of the AFRC.

Q. Was he amongst those who were retreating?
A. Yes. He too abandoned his own vehicles in Tombu because he was running for his life.
Q. In terms of those who were retreating, were senior members of the RUF amongst them?
A. Yes.
Q. Like who?
A. Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor - Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor, Superman, Denis Mingo, Peter Vandi, CO Nya. All these guys were
in Freetown. All of them withdrew through Goderich, the
peninsula to Tombu, and they used boats to cross the river to
Fogbo, Fogbo village.

Q. Now, that group who retreated from - which retreated from
Freetown, were they composed of both AFRC and RUF?

A. Yes.

Q. And at that time what was the state of the relationship
between the two?

A. Well, the relationship was not that good cordial, but there
was no way out, but it was actually not a tight relationship.

Q. So that group who went down to Tombu and then by boat over
the river, where did they end up, having crossed the river?

A. I said Fogbo. The village was called Fogbo.

Q. Where did they go from there?

A. From there I too went to the village, because I went in
search of my family too. I went to the village. I was able to
see my wife, my child, and my bodyguard that I sent, and some
other family members, and I saw the late SYB Rogers, I saw
Mohamed Tarawalli's wife among them, and I had to put them on
board the Land Rover vehicle that I had. So from there we drove
to - it was then Pa Rogers told me, "This other man is my
brother, I would not want to leave him here", and he too was a
minister during the AFRC. He was Joe Amara Bangali.

Q. From that village where you met up with your family, where
did you travel to?

PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you satisfied with the spelling of
that village?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. What's the name of the village, Mr Sesay?
A. Fogbo.

MR GRIFFITHS: I think this name is already on the record, Madam President. It is F-O-B-G-O:

Q. From Fogbo, where did you go?

A. From Fogbo I drove my family to Masiaka, because it was only Masiaka that was the main destination for everybody. So all the thousands of AFRC who had retreated from Freetown, together with the RUF and civilians, everybody was heading towards Masiaka. Because at this time the Alpha Jet too was flying over, you know, so you will see people carrying bundles on their heads, some had bags strapped on their backs, so you will see soldiers going without arms. So that was just it.

Q. And those retreating, Mr Sesay, what kind of numbers of people are we talking about?

A. It's a large number. Thousands of people. We're talking about thousands of people. Because the situation that took place in Freetown then was that everybody had been sent to the AFRC government, so they were all trying to hide away, and all the escape was just to try to get out of Freetown because if a civilian saw a fellow civilian being burnt, who was just a mere supporter to the AFRC, being burnt alive, then the other will not stand there to watch, so that was the situation. People were running away for their own safety just to secure their lives after Freetown.

Q. So what happened when you got to Masiaka?

A. When we got to Masiaka, from that point Johnny Paul too came and - Johnny Paul came, all the AFRC people came, the RUF, the STF, including their own general, General Bropleh, all - everybody retreated to Masiaka.
Q. Pause there. "STF", what does that stand for?
A. That is Special Task Force. They were former ULIMO people who later changed their name to Task Force because, you know, the ULIMO was divided. That was the ULIMO Roosevelt Johnson group.

Q. Now, those who made up the STF, what nationality were they?
A. Liberians.

Q. And those STF members who you met up with in Masiaka, what kind of numbers are we talking about?
A. Well, I did not make a head count of the STF by then, but it was a force that was fighting alongside the Sierra Leone Army. They too had their own separate office in Cockerill.

Q. Can you give us any idea as to their strength? Was it the size of a platoon, a battalion, or what?
A. No, it was the size of - the size of a company or maybe more than a company.

Q. So and how many are in a company?
A. A company was about 200, 250 men.

Q. And you say their leader was one General Bropleh, yes?
A. Yes, general David Livingston Bropleh.

Q. Now help me, Mr Sesay. When did you first encounter the STF?
A. I knew the STF when I came to Freetown, in the first week during the time I came to Freetown, because their office is located close to the RUF in Cockerill. Look at the STF office and look at the RUF office. So they were our neighbours, in terms of office. So the time they gave us quarters at the OAU Village, there was only one quarter in between my quarter and General Bropleh's quarters. So sometimes he would move from his own place, come to me, then we would sit down and discuss. So he
was my neighbour. So I've been used to him before the time the
intervention took place.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that how you spell Bropleh, as it's
spelled in the record?

MR GRIFFITHS: It's B-R-O-P-L-E-H. I see at line 9 that
it's spelled as Gborplay but I'm not blaming the shorthand writer
because I appreciate that she is struggling:

Q. Now, as these various forces retreated, Mr Sesay, how were
they behaving towards the civilian population?

A. Well, I cannot tell about what happened because the retreat
from out of Freetown - and you can talk about seven battalions
starting from Goderich up to York, through York up to the
peninsula to Tombu. That I cannot speak about, but what I saw
starting from Fogbo to Masiaka, at this time there was no control
because everything had gone out of hands because each and
everybody was running for the safety of their own lives. So even
the authorities - you will see, even the authorities concerned
and caring about just their immediate family. That was the kind
of situation that was on, when they retreated from Freetown to
Fogbo. So when the group arrived in Masiaka that first day,
everybody passed the night in Masiaka, and the following day I
had to speak with Sam Bockarie over the radio then. I had to
speak with Sam Bockarie over the radio for me to inform him about
the situation and where we were at that present moment. And
Bockarie too told me that they had been pushed out of Kenema, but
he said he was trying to repel the attack in Kenema.

Q. So at this time, you're saying that there was no control or
discipline amongst those retreating from Freetown. Is that
right?
A. No, honestly.

Q. No, honestly what?

A. I said honestly there was no control, because the way they withdrew from Freetown and the way I saw things, there was no control. Everybody was running for the safety of his or her own life, because by then the Alpha Jet too was flying over. So when we got to Masiaka, people were entering people's houses. Before reaching Masiaka, we saw fighters entering people's houses. That situation took place. The only thing, they did not kill anybody because the civilians too, when they saw a heavy retreating force coming, they left Masiaka and they moved to the surrounding villages, but --

Q. Pause there. You say you saw fighters entering people's houses. To do what?

A. Well, they were looking for food. Some people go and take food to eat. They had come from Freetown. They were hungry. There was no food. And that was the situation until they got to Masiaka.

Q. Mr Sesay, what is Operation Pay Yourself?

A. Well, that was the time I started hearing those words, Operation Pay Yourself, taking people's property, especially --

Q. Now, you say "that was the time". What time?

A. The retreating time that we are talking about.

Q. So that was the time when you heard what?

A. Operation Pay Yourself.

PRESIDING JUDGE: But, Mr Witness, you didn't answer the question. What was Operation Pay Yourself, if you know?

THE WITNESS: I said Operation Pay Yourself was when they started taking people's properties forcefully from them. They
started looting people's properties. That was what they called Operation Pay Yourself. Because if you saw someone's vehicle and you commandeered it, when the person was not willing to hand it over to you, that was paying yourself. And that actually happened amongst the retreating group that came to Masiaka up to Lunsar. And it was the same group that went and looted in Port Loko. They did it in Masiaka, up to Makeni.

PRESIDING JUDGE: And when the witness says "they" started looting people's properties and "they" paid themselves, who are "they" that he is referring to?

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Who was behaving in this way, Mr Sesay?
A. Well, both the AFRC and the RUF.

Q. And just take us through the route where this took place.
A. Yes, it started in Masiaka.

Q. And went where?
A. And it went up to Gberi Junction, Port Loko, Lunsar and Makeni.

Q. And who gave the order for Operation Pay Yourself?
A. Well, I wouldn't know that. I can't point at anyone that he did it, because even the senior men were involved doing the same thing, especially the group that left Masiaka to the towns that I have referred to.

Q. Pause. What group? "Especially the group". What group are you talking about?
A. Well, both the AFRC and the RUF, they took that route. That's Superman, Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor. They retreated from Masiaka with a group of RUF, including their bodyguards, from
Masiaka to Gberi Junction, Lunsar, Makeni, and even some of them went to Port Loko, just for them to get vehicles. And it was Mike Lamin --

Q. Pause. Who did what?

A. It was Mike Lamin especially who looted the Catholic hospital in Makeni because he collected their Land Rover and it was the Land Rover that took him to Kono up to Gandorhun. That was where he left it.

Q. When you say that even the senior men were involved, even the senior men like who? Just give us some names.

A. Well, for example, Mike. Mike trained me. So if he himself went to the clinic and looted a vehicle when he was supposed to be the one to advise me, to say, "Hey, look." So that was why I said Mike, Isaac, Superman, who was one of the most senior RUF commanders who had retreated towards that area at that time, because myself and Peter Vandi, we stayed in Masiaka, we went to Mile 91 to attack the Kamajors in Bo. So --

MR GRIFFITHS: I haven't said a word:

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, was it merely senior RUF commanders who were involved in this looting spree?

A. No.

Q. So help us.

A. I can say - I can say the only authority that I knew about whom they took a vehicle to, because the whole thing - all the RUF whom retreated from Freetown, they left their vehicles in Tombu. In fact, ECOMOG collected all those vehicles. It was ECOMOG that looted all those vehicles in Tombu.
Q. Was it merely RUF commanders who were involved in this looting?

A. Not at all. I said the whole AFRC and RUF commanders who withdrew from Freetown, they were all involved in this looting.

Q. Did that involve Johnny Paul Koroma?

A. Well, that was what I wanted to say when you said I should hold on. I said he was the only person that I saw that came from Freetown who met me on the other side. Someone brought a vehicle for him. That was Honourable Samuel Kargbo, one of the coup makers. Samuel Kargbo, before that time, before the intervention, he had been posted to Kono. He - they were in Kono trying to organise the AFRC mining. So when the intervention took place, he and Honourable Samuel Kargbo and - Samuel Kargbo and Honourable Five-Five, they came from Kono and they came down - they came down to Masiaka, and when they got to Masiaka, Johnny Paul - the AFRC/RUF had not yet crossed. So they came down to RDF and met us there, so we explained the situation to them. So we heard that the retreating group, the AFRC/RUF, had now got to Fogbo and Johnny Paul too had arrived there. So Honourable Sammy was in his Nissan Patrol, so he took it to Johnny Paul, he took that one to Johnny Paul. That was the vehicle that Johnny Paul used from the river bank up to Makani, to his village, to Kono, up to the time he got to Gandorhun and left it there. But minus Johnny Paul, all the other commanders, the AFRC, the RUF, anyone that you saw a vehicle with, these were vehicles that were either looted in Lunsar, Port Loko, Makani, including Kabala.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreter would want to make a correction somewhere. Somewhere around where he spoke about - the witness spoke about the clinic, it's eye clinic.
JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before we get much further, according to my notes, the original question was who gave the order for Operation Pay Yourself, if the witness knew that, and I still haven't worked out an answer to that particular question.

MR GRIFFITHS: I will come to that in a moment, but --

PRESIDING JUDGE: If I may say something, Mr Griffiths, as Presiding Judge, I've really let you run off and gallop with this evidence simply because I said the other day that I had given up on the speed of the witness and left you in control. But now we're getting complaints both from the recorders and the interpreters, and it's my duty to implore you, both of you, to please respect the services of these people and to slow down for the sake of the record. We're not asking an impossibility of you, Mr Sesay, to speak in a way that can enable the service providers to do their job. The record is littered with these pleas, and if every time the interpreter said, "Your Honours, please slow down the" - if I interrupted every time, we would not be out of here. But I've deliberately refused to interrupt because I believe that your lawyer can handle this, but it's just not working.

Mr Griffiths, this is your challenge.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Mr Sesay?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Let's just backtrack a little bit, just to clarify the record, shall we? Now, are you saying that apart from Johnny Paul Koroma, all the other commanders were involved in looting?

A. Yes. I said apart from Johnny Paul Koroma, whom Honourable Samuel Kargbo brought his Nissan Patrol jeep for, all other
commanders who retreated from Freetown, who were AFRC/RUF, their vehicles that they got later were looted. They were looted vehicles. They looted them.

Q. Now, Mr Sesay, was it just vehicles that were looted?

A. Well, it was not just vehicles because when I got to Makeni they had looted the shops, the Lebanese shops of the Lebanese men. People's houses, they entered there. That was the condition I met in Makeni. And even the time when I got there that was the condition I saw.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked to slow down and repeat slowly that area.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. When you got to Makeni what was the situation there, Mr Sesay?

A. When I went to Makeni all the shops in Makeni had been looted. Some people had run away and left their houses and they broke into their houses. Stores belonging to Lebanese men had been broken. That was the situation that I saw in Makeni. And soldiers were on the rampage in the streets. That was the situation. And you would see people in vehicles.

Q. Mr Sesay, were you involved in that looting?

A. No, I went to Bo. From Masiaka I went to Bo. I went to attack Bo. So from Bo - during the attack in Bo I got wounded. So before we could come back to Mile 91 to get treatment I came to Mile 91, they brought me there, I got treatment and I then decided - I then decided to withdraw back to Masiaka. When I came to Masiaka I did not meet anybody there, it was only the Guinean contingent that was in Masiaka, so I too decided to take the route to Makeni through Gberi Junction and Lunsar. When I
got to Gberi Junction I saw that people were not in their houses, their doors were all open, wide open, you see. That was the same - and that was the same situation that I saw in Lunsar. Shops were open, houses, things were scattered all about in the streets.

Q. Pause there. Let me ask you this: How did you travel to Fogbo to pick up your family?
A. Well, I had a vehicle. I had a Land Rover and a pick-up.
Q. Where did you get that Land Rover and pick-up from?
A. Well, the Land Rover was a military Land Rover and the pick-up was given to me by the PLO-2. That was the time we came to Freetown. That was the time they gave me that pick-up and the military Land Rover that I was using. So I had had those vehicles with me for over six months, up to seven months before the intervention time.

Q. So I'm going back to the original question now. Were you involved in looting?
A. No, I was not involved because I had vehicles that I had moved with from Freetown. Those were the same vehicles that I used to go and collect my family. I came to Masiaka and I went on the attack to Bo, I got wounded there. Those were the same vehicles I continued with. Those were the same two vehicles that I used to come to Makeni and I was still using, those were the same vehicles I again used to go to Kono.

PRESIDING JUDGE: If I may seek clarification, when the witness says, "I went to Bo, I went to attack Bo", who exactly in Bo was he attacking?
MR GRIFFITHS: I'll come to that:
Q. Who did you go to attack in Bo, Mr Sesay?
A. Well, during the intervention in Freetown - during the
attack in Freetown, how do you call it?
Q. Say again. During the attack in Freetown, you were saying?
A. I said during the attack in Freetown it was a general
attack. ECOMOG attacked Freetown and the Kamajors attacked Bo.
And then ECOMOG Nigerians came from the Liberian border area and
they attacked Kenema. So they captured Kenema and they captured
Bo and they captured Freetown at the same time.
Q. Pause there. So they captured those three places at the
same time, yes? So you went to Bo to do what?
A. Well, before I came to Bo they had the SOS in Bo and the
brigade commander and Morris Kallon. They were in Bo. So when
those guys captured Bo they withdrew from Bo. When they attacked
Bo, they also withdrew from Bo and they came to Mile 91. So
Kallon --
Q. Let's just take things slowly, please. You say before I
came to Bo they had SOS in Bo. Who is SOS?
A. Secretary of State South. That was AF Kamara. And they
had the brigade commander for the south who was Boise Palmer.
Q. And you say that they were in Bo, so when those guys
captured Bo. When which guys captured Bo?
A. The CDF attacked Bo. The Kamajors attacked Bo and they
captured Bo.
Q. And so who withdrew from Bo?
A. The AFRC troops and the RUF troops withdrew from Bo and
they came to Moyamba Junction where they built a defensive
position. And the commanders came to Mile 91 and came to
Masiaka. AF Kamara, Boise Palmer came to Masiaka. They came to
Masiaka to meet Johnny Paul, the army chief of staff, the army
chief of defence staff.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps the witness could answer my
question now after going through all that. I asked what or who
did he go to attack in Bo. He still hasn’t answered that.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Who did you go to attack in Bo, Mr Sesay?
A. My Lord, the Kamajors.

PRESIDING JUDGE: You said that the AFRC troops and the RUF
troops were all withdrawing from Bo, but you went to Bo to attack
the Kamajors. Is that your evidence?

THE WITNESS: No, my Lord. I can explain that better. The
AFRC/RUF withdrew from Bo. And the fighting troops stayed at
Moyamba Junction. The commanders - the brigade commander and the
resident minister, the SOS, came to Masiaka and they left Kallon
in Mile 91. So when we now got instruction and we heard that
Bockarie was trying to attack Kenema, so the army chief of staff
and chief of defence staff said since Mosquito was trying to
attack Kenema we too should - they said I should join AF Kamara
and others to attack Bo. So myself Issa, Boise Palmer, AF
Kamara, Peter Vandi, all of us left Masiaka and we met Morris
Kallon at Mile 91 and we joined the troops at Moyamba Junction.
All of us marched and we went to Bo and attacked the Kamajors.
And it was during the attack that I got wounded. That was what I
meant.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Where were you wounded?
A. I was wounded on - by my left side by my ribs.
Q. Was it a serious wound?
A. Yes, because it was from an AK bullet that hit me and at that moment I was unable to do anything. So they had to tie the place and they brought me on a vehicle to Moyamba Junction and to Mile 91 where they gave me stitches.

Q. Pause there. Now, I don't want to forget so let's go back. Who ordered Operation Pay Yourself?

A. I said before I left Masiaka I did not know any specific commander who ordered Operation Pay Yourself. This was a word that came up from amongst the troops retreating on their way from Masiaka to Makeni. But before I left and went to Bo I did not hear that from any commander.

Q. Let me ask another question on that same issue. When did you first start hearing this phrase "Operation Pay Yourself"?

A. I heard that expression at the time I retreated from Bo, after I had got wounded from the war when I came and came to Makeni, that was the time I heard the expression. They said the operation that is taking place now is Operation Pay Yourself.

Q. I know this may be difficult, Mr Sesay, but we still - it's an important point and we need to try as best we can to assist on this matter. Can you remember who it was who first used that phrase in your presence?

A. Well, when I came to Makeni, you know, because from Gberi Junction I saw the looting that had taken place and when I came I ran into the AFRC Under-Secretary of State - I mean the AFRC Under-Secretary of Defence Avivavo. Colonel Avivavo. He was coming from Makeni.

Q. Pause there. How do you spell his name?


Q. And he was his position?
A. He was the Deputy Defence Minister for the AFRC.

Q. And you say when you came into Makeni, you met him. You ran into him and what happened?

A. I said we met on the way whilst I was going to Makeni. He was coming from Makeni. I said he was going to Port Loko. So the two of us had interaction, because he was a big man, so we greeted each other and we spoke to each other. He asked me about the attack and I told him I got wounded. So he asked me. I raised my hand up, he saw the place, he sympathised with me and he said he too was going to Port Loko to get some of his family members and then I said okay. So he told me he was going to meet me in Makeni later, so he left and went. So I continued my move and it did not take long when I saw Abu Zagalo also with one pick-up and he was - and it was loaded with zinc, brand new bundles of zinc, and I knew straightaway that those things were looted zinc.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked to slow down and repeat that area.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. You knew immediately those zincs were looted zincs. But before we go on, who is Abu Zagalo?

A. Abu Zagalo was the PLO-1. He was the commander of the coup makers. He was the number one man of the AFRC.

Q. And how did you know straightaway that these were looted bundles of zinc?

A. Because the man did not retreat with a vehicle. He met me at Four Mile and I saw him in Fogbo, I did not see him with a vehicle and then later I saw him in the pick-up with loaded bundles of zinc, so I knew.
Q. So did you speak to him?
A. Yes, he stopped and he asked me about the attack in Bo and I told him I got wounded so he too tried to look at the place and he also sympathised with me. And he told me that he was going to Port Loko and that he will return that very night back to Makeni.

I then continued my journey and I arrived in Makeni at night.

Q. So when did you first hear that phrase "Operation Pay Yourself" used - somebody actually used those words in your presence?
A. Well, I think it was in Makeni when I arrived and it was the following morning that I heard that expression from the people. They were saying oh, the operation that took place in Makeni, they were saying it was Operation Pay Yourself. They said the people who retreated from Makeni, that was the expression they came with.

Q. So who is the "they" who were saying the operation that took place in Makeni, they were saying it was Operation Pay Yourself? Who is the "they"?
A. My Lord, this was an expression that both the AFRC and RUF used when they retreated from Masiaka to Makeni.

Q. So who did you first hear saying these words? Were they members of the AFRC and RUF, or were they civilians who had had their property looted? Who was the first person that you heard using that phrase?
A. When I arrived in Makeni, I passed the night at St Francis. Because I met some RUF people there, like Pa Rogers and others, they were assembled at St Francis. Because when I got there that night, the doctor - I was suffering from pain - the doctor gave me some pain pills.
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked to repeat that area again slowly.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Stop. You met some RUF people there like Pa Rogers and others, they were assembled at St Francis because, when I got there that night, the doctor - I was suffering from pain - the doctor gave me some pain pills, yes? And what else happened that night?

A. From there they brought me a mattress where Dr Fabai and others were lodged, and that was where I passed the night. And the following morning Mike Lamin came there, and one of my old friends, whose father's house was close to St Francis, he too came there.

Q. Let me just clarify a couple of things. What's the doctor's name?

A. Dr Fabai. He was the chief medical officer for the RUF.

Q. How do you spell his surname?

A. F-A-B-I-A [sic]

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you asked the witness at page 158, line 9: "Who was the first person that you heard using that phrase?" We were trying to still follow the evidence of what is - we are trying to understand what is Operation Pay Yourself, and the witness is telling us about his - his hospitalisation and doctor's names, et cetera. He still hasn't answered the question. Like, two pages down the road he still hasn't answered the question.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. You tell us the next morning Mike Lamin and others came to where you were. Now, the question is: Who did you first
physically hear using that phrase "Operation Pay Yourself"?

A. I said the following morning Mike Lamin came to the place where I was, but the RUF people whom I met there --

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, do you understand the question that was asked of you? What was the question?

THE WITNESS: The question was from whom I heard the expression "Operation Pay Yourself" - from whom I first heard the expression "Operation Pay Yourself". But I said, when I got to Makeni --

PRESIDING JUDGE: The answer consists of a name of a person. That's all we want to hear, if a name exists.

THE WITNESS: But at that time I cannot recall specifically to say this was a specific name from whom I heard the "Operation Pay Yourself", but the following morning in the school compound I heard people talking about the Operation Pay Yourself.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Then your answer would be "I can't remember who specifically", instead of going around in circles steering us away from the topic, the way you are doing.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. These persons, Mr Sesay, who you heard in the school compound, were they civilians, members of the RUF, members of the AFRC, who were they?

A. They were RUF members whom I met at the secondary school, and it was at that St Francis that I heard that word at first operation - that expression Operation Pay Yourself.

Q. Did you hear any senior commander from either the RUF or from the AFRC use that expression?

A. Yes, Mike Lamin used that expression when he visited me the following morning, because he was in fact one of - with one of
the looted Land Rovers.

Q. And what was it that Mike Lamin said to you about this?

A. Well, when Mike Lamin came, he greeted me and I greeted him too, and he told me that he heard that I had arrived at the secondary school overnight. I said yes. He asked me whether my wound was a big one. I said, yes, it's near so, but that I started taking treatment yesterday and I will continue taking my treatment this morning. So I asked him whether he was now a doctor, because I saw it that this is from an eye clinic.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, that was not the question that was asked of you, please. The question was: "And what was it that Mike Lamin said to you about this?" meaning the expression "Operation Pay Yourself". Wasn't that the question, Mr Griffiths?

MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, it was.

PRESIDING JUDGE: Why don't you try answering that question: What exactly did Mike Lamin tell you about Operation Pay Yourself? That's all we want to hear.

THE WITNESS: When I asked - Mike Lamin would not just come and see me and tell me about expressions if I had not started a discussion with him.

Q. So you said to him, "Are you now a doctor?" Yes? Did you say that to him?

A. Yes.

Q. And why did you say that to him?

A. It was because I knew that the vehicle that he was using did not belong to him, and the vehicle belonged to the eye clinic hospital.
Q. So what was his response when you made that comment?
A. And then he said it was during the operation. He said that vehicle was what he got at Lunsar, so that was what he took, that is what he was using.

Q. Did he actually use the phrase "Operation Pay Yourself", Mike Lamin?
A. Well, he didn’t use the expression to me, but he did use the expression that this is the vehicle that he took from the hospital, and I knew that it was a looted vehicle.

Q. Very well. Mr Sesay, how did you come to be wounded in Bo?
A. Well, when we attacked Bo and once we were fighting, we went as far as the Government Hospital. By then the Kamajors had withdrawn. They were towards the road going to Mongeri, so I sent some men because we had heard that so many people were under custody in the police station. So at that time I told Kallon and others to go to the police station to free the people who were under custody. And indeed they went there, and they opened the cells and they freed the people whom they met there. And they were prominent people who were with us. They were AFRC/RUF sympathisers in Bo. So we released them. So whilst we were on that process some AFRC soldiers - right by the government hospital there were Lebanese shops. They wanted to go and break into those Lebanese shops, but I told them that they are not supposed to do that, it’s not called for. I said no one of them should do - should break into those shops. So whilst I was saying that to them --

Q. Whilst you were saying that to them, what happened?
A. So I said that was not the reason why we came here. Nobody should go and break into those stores. So I heard some kind of
sporadic firing sound, and one of the bullets pierced me and cut me by my side. The people at whom I was shouting that they should not break into people's shops, that was where the shot came from.

Q. And who were these people who were trying to break into the shop and you were trying to stop them? Who were they?
A. I said they were soldiers, AFRC soldiers, because they were all in combat fatigue.

Q. On that note, Mr Sesay, let me ask you something else. So there you are in Bo, on your account, seeking to stop these AFRC soldiers from looting. When you heard in Makeni about Operation Pay Yourself, what steps did you take as a senior commander to try and stop it?
A. My Lord, if anyone expected me to do anything, they --

Q. Say that again. If anybody would expect you to do what? Go on.
A. I said if anybody would expect me, at the time I arrived in Makeni, that I should have put stop to that and I should have taken an action, maybe you would have just wanted something else from me. Because by the time I got to Makeni, the crime had already been committed, the crime of looting. So, before I came there I was suffering from a pain. I was suffering from a pain. I was wounded. I had just been wounded for a day before I travelled to Makeni - just about a day. So I was in pain. Two senior commanders were there with the RUF members in Makeni, and these senior commanders had their responsibility and they - but
they were operating on their own. They were not taking
instructions, so all of those commanders were there.

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked
to slow down again and pick up that area.

MR GRIFFITHS:

Q. Can we just go over that answer again, please. You were
saying that these senior commanders had their responsibility but
they were operating on their own, they were not taking
instructions. So all of these commanders were there. What are
you saying about your ability to control them?

A. Well, even before this time - even before this time these
commanders, these three colonels, did not used to take
instruction from me during the AFRC. They were referring to me
that I was a lieutenant.

Q. Pause there. Which three commanders?

A. Isaac Mongor, Superman and Mike Lamin.

Q. They were saying what to you?

A. They were saying - they used to tell me - and they even
used to say it to all the people - that I was a lieutenant.

Q. So you're in Makeni now. At this point, Mr Sesay, where
was your family? When you get back to Makeni wounded, where is
your family?

A. I went with my family from Masiaka. I left them in Mile 91
because I met - Kallon's family was there. His wife and his
mother was there. So I left my family with Kallon's wife's family. So when I took the treatment, I took my family and all of us went to Makeni.

Q. And from Makeni where did you go?

A. From Makeni we went to Kono. We retreated to Kono.

Q. Where was Bockarie at this time?

A. Bockarie was in Buedu.

Q. Did you remain in Kono?

A. No, we did not remain in Kono. We proceeded to Kailahun, Buedu.

Q. And when you got there what did you do?

A. When I got where?

Q. When you got to Buedu.

A. When I went to Buedu, I was there for some time. And from there Sam Bockarie sent me to Liberia - sorry, to Burkina Faso through Liberia, and I got a problem because I lost diamonds.

Q. We'll come back to the diamond issue in a moment, but how long did you stay in Buedu before you were sent to Burkina Faso via Liberia?

A. I was in Buedu March. It was in April that I was sent, because I think we arrived in Buedu in late February, late February to early February. I think so.

Q. And why were you going to Burkina Faso?

A. I was to go to Burkina Faso with General Ibrahim Bah to get ammunition. That was the purpose.

Q. We'll come back to that trip later - at a later stage. But for now, at the stage when you get to Buedu, Mr Sesay, where is Johnny Paul Koroma?

A. Well, Johnny Paul Koroma, we travelled together from Kono
to Buedu. When we arrived there, Sam Bockarie lodged him in his room. He was lodged in his room.

Q. Did Johnny Paul Koroma travel with you to Kono?
A. He did not travel with me. But all of us travelled together to Kono, because it was Superman who picked him up from Makeni and they went to Kono.

Q. When you arrived in Makeni wounded, was Johnny Paul Koroma in Makeni at that time?
A. No. He was in his village. That is 10 miles away from Makeni.

Q. Now, that group which had retreated from Freetown, across the river to Fogbo, ending up in Makeni, a group composed of RUF members, AFRC members, STF combatants, did that group remain together after Makeni?
A. No. After Makeni, the group divided. Because from Makeni, in February '98 SAJ Musa - late SAJ Musa and Brigadier Mani, General Bropleh, they withdrew. General Bropleh went with some of the STF in Kabala, and Brigadier Mani went with the SLA soldiers, the AFRC, to Kabala, and same with SAJ Musa. So they went to the Koinadugu axis. They did not go to Kono.

Q. And the RUF members who were retreating from Freetown, where did they go?
A. The RUF who were retreating from Freetown to Makeni, they went to Kono. They went to Kono with some of the AFRC members, like the PLO2 - the PLO3, sorry.

Q. Who was that?
A. That is Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, Honourable Papa, Santigie Borbor Kanu, with other honourables, Samuel Kargbo and others. There were many. Some of them joined Johnny Paul and retreated.
to Kono. They were with the group to Kono.

Q. Why did SAJ Musa and that group go off to the Koinadugu axis?

A. Well, at that initial stage I didn't know, but later I came to know that SAJ Musa himself wanted to be a leader on his own. He did not want to be part of Johnny Paul Koroma's convoy. That's why he went to the Koinadugu axis.

Q. Help us: Was there no discussion prior to this split with one group going up to Koinadugu and the other group going off to Kono?

A. No. I did not know about any discussion that there was an arrangement that the group should be divided. Johnny Paul wanted everybody to go to Kono, and from Kono people would have defended Kono, either you would have been going to Kailahun. But the others, like Brigadier Mani, SAJ Musa and Bropleh, they did not accept going to Kono. That's why they went to Koinadugu on their own together with their troops.

Q. Now, just help us with this: That group who went with SAJ Musa up to Koinadugu, what was its composition?

A. They were Sierra Leonean soldiers.

Q. Were there any members of the RUF who went with them?

A. No. No RUF member went with SAJ Musa in that February 1998, no.

Q. So that group goes off to Koinadugu in February 1998. Is that right, Mr Sesay?

A. Please repeat.

Q. That group led by SAJ Musa goes off to Koinadugu in February 1998. Is that right?

A. Yes.
Q. Following their departure, did Sam Bockarie or Johnny Paul Koroma retain any control over that group thereafter?
A. No, no. From that February, nobody was in control of SAJ Musa right up to his death in December '98. Not Johnny Paul, nor Sam Bockarie was in control of SAJ Musa.

Q. And that was from February 1998?
A. Yes.

Q. So that group which went up to Koinadugu, who was in control of them from February 1998?
A. Well, it was SAJ Musa who controlled that group from February '98 to, I think, around September or around August, when Superman came from Kono and joined that group and there was a fight between himself and SAJ Musa. So SAJ Musa left Mani there and --

THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak slowly and repeat from that point?

MR GRIFFITHS:
Q. So SAJ Musa left Mani there and what?
A. And General Bropleh. He left them in the Koinadugu District, and from that time when they left the place, those two generals were in control of their men, Bropleh and Brigadier Mani.

Q. Could the witness please be shown exhibit D-9, and could we look, please, at page 4? I'm looking at the third paragraph which begins from the bottom of the page: "Before Gibril was arrested." Now remind us, when was Gibril Massaquoi arrested, Mr Sesay?
A. Gibril, I said maybe it was around October.
Q. Of which year?
A.  1997.

Q.  "Before Gibril was arrested, he exposed to the AFRC information on materials that the RUF held in stock. Unknown to me and the rest of the RUF high command, Gibril and the AFRC made arrangements for the stock to be moved in place for their use. They then took control of the entire load, leaving the bulk of it stashed away at the residence of Johnny Paul Koroma, and fled the city whilst our troops fought the enemy from house to house with nearly empty magazines and no support fire. In the end, Freetown fell and the majority of soldiers, both RUF and SLA retreated safely from the capital."

Is that accurate description, Mr Sesay?

A. Well, to say that the ammunition that they had brought was left at Johnny Paul's residence - what's the question there?

Q. Is it the case that Massaquoi exposed to the RUF information on materials that the RUF held in stock?

A. To the AFRC you mean; not the RUF.

Q. To the AFRC.

A. Well, I felt that Mosquito should have known about this, because the only ammunition that I know about stock was the ammunition in Burkina Faso when he came and explained to Johnny Paul. Mosquito knew about this. He knew that Johnny Paul had given money to transport those arms and ammunition to Sierra Leone.

Q. Very well. Now --

A. And it was those arms and ammunition that were left at the residence of Johnny Paul that the troops - when the troops withdrew from Freetown and the materials were left at Johnny Paul's residence.
Q. "We also rescued Johnny Paul Koroma and his family, and under the escort of Brigadier Issa and Brigadier Mike, he was brought to Kailahun as was advised by your brother. His mother-in-law had to be carried on a hammock the duration of the journey."

Now, did you escort him to - Johnny Paul Koroma - to Kailahun? Were you part of his escort?

A. Yes, all of us left Kono to Kailahun. But according to what I understood when I met Johnny Paul from Masiaka, before I departed for Bo until the time I met Johnny Paul in his village, he wanted to come to Kailahun because he thought that it was safer in Kailahun than any other places. So from there Mike Lamin and myself took him to Kailahun.

MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient time, Madam President?

PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we will adjourn for the rest of today.

Mr Sesay, I caution you, as I normally do, not to discuss your evidence with anyone. Proceedings are adjourned to tomorrow, 9 o'clock.

[Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m. to be reconvened on Thursday, 8 July 2010 at 9.00 a.m.]
## Index

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCT-172</td>
<td>43845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS</td>
<td>43845</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>