



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 21 JULY 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

---

**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Mr Simon Meisenberg  
Ms Sidney Thompson

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Tuesday, 21 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:22:28 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution are Mohamed A  
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Maja Dimitrova and myself, Brenda J  
09:31:49 10 Hollis.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today are myself, Courtenay  
14 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah,  
09:32:04 15 Mr Silas Chekera and we're joined today by Mr Liam Loughlin, a  
16 member of the Bar of England and Wales who is with us as an  
17 intern.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Yes, go ahead,  
19 Mr Griffiths. Well, before you do I'll just remind the witness  
09:32:28 20 that you're still on your declaration to tell the truth.

21 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

22 [On former affirmation]

23 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

24 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday during the course of your testimony I  
09:32:43 25 asked you to indicate on a map the area of ULIMO incursion. Do  
26 you recall that?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. And do you recall indicating on a map which unfortunately  
29 we couldn't mark the particular area in question?

1 A. Yes.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I now have a blank map of Liberia which I  
3 would like to give to the witness and ask him to mark on this map  
4 the area in question.

09:34:21 5 THE WITNESS: Would you like me to start now?

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Yes, please.

8 A. ULIMO entered here around the Mano River Kongo area - I  
9 will just put an arrow here - with penetrations here and here.

09:34:45 10 This is the general area of entry into Liberia. They eventually  
11 captured Grand Cape Mount County, they captured Bomi County and  
12 eventually had this entire section of the country. That lasted  
13 for some time while we were still fighting and then they pursued  
14 another route here.

09:35:39 15 Q. Could you use a different colour here, please.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Because thereafter we can delineate the two areas of  
18 occupation in terms of date.

19 A. There's an important land feature here that I think will be  
09:35:59 20 very important. Here I will use this green to show the St Paul  
21 River, a very important landmark that had been mentioned here  
22 when you have heard witnesses speak about the St Paul River  
23 bridge. That expression has been used in testimony before this  
24 Court. That's the St Paul River bridge.

09:36:27 25 Now, what ULIMO did, ULIMO then pursued the route from  
26 Tubmanburg to the town of Bopolu. That's entering the area of  
27 the country we call the Gola forest. This is the beginning of  
28 the real rainforest area. They continued from Bopolu and  
29 penetrated to this area called Belle Yella as spelled here on the

1 map B-E-L-L-E and the last word is Y-E-L-L-A. It's Belle [phon]  
2 Yella. Not Belle, but Belle Yella. That's the very heart of the  
3 Gola forest in Liberia, the very heart of the forest. I'm  
4 talking about we have not been lucky to have elephants advertised  
09:37:38 5 on Animal Planet, but there are many elephants in this part of  
6 Liberia. This is very dense, dense forest.

7 They then continued from Belle Yella all the way across to  
8 the town of Zorzor. Now, Zorzor is located here on the main  
9 highway and for some clear understanding here - we've run out of  
09:38:17 10 colours here. It is important for the Court to know that there  
11 is this road, just for the sake of the judges - there is one and  
12 only one road that comes out of Monrovia. It comes through  
13 Kakata, Totota, Gbatala, Gbarnga and then begins to go all the  
14 way - this is the road that runs to Voinjama. It comes down to  
09:38:51 15 Kolahun here and then it continues on to Foya.

16 Now, when ULIMO cut Zorzor off, and I'll put an X here to  
17 mark a cut-off, the NPFL still had forces in - maybe I'll use a  
18 smaller line. Okay. In this part of the country I will just use  
19 lines across - small lines to demonstrate that we still had  
09:39:33 20 soldiers in this part of the country. This cut-off at Zorzor  
21 left all of our men in this section of the country virtually in  
22 space, cut off from the rest of the troops. This is what I  
23 explain on yesterday; that some of them retreated into Guinea,  
24 those that had strong connections on the Sierra Leonean side  
09:40:06 25 retreated into Sierra Leone, and those real experienced ones that  
26 were closer to the Zorzor region - and for even a better  
27 explanation for the Court, from Zorzor to Voinjama, from here to  
28 here, I would approximate it to be between 75 to 100 miles. I  
29 could be a little wrong on the numbers, but it is - I'm sure it's

1 not less than 75 miles. And let's not forget that we are still -  
2 this road is really going through the forest. Because right  
3 between Zorzor and Voinjama is a major forest area called the - I  
4 think it's Koyoma forest.

09:41:00 5 Q. How do you spell that?

6 A. I think it's K-O-Y-O-M-A, Koyoma. I think it's the Koyoma  
7 forest. But it's a part of this whole forest - this whole  
8 rainforest that I describe in this area, but depending on the  
9 villages in the area, they may call a section of the forest their  
10 own name.

09:41:22

11 Now, I'm mentioning this because the Court will understand  
12 how those that are closer to Zorzor at the time of the attack,  
13 how they are able to penetrate and come back and join what we  
14 call the mother units. Those that are in Voinjama are too far to  
15 track all the way 75 miles back to Zorzor, so some of them find  
16 their way into Guinea. Those that are closer to the Foya - and  
17 strangely we don't see Foya here but we know the general  
18 direction of Foya. Foya - this map strangely doesn't show Foya,  
19 but Foya continues along this road here going towards the Sierra  
20 Leonean border. Those that are in that region retreat to  
21 Sierra Leone. So that's the general situation.

09:41:46

09:42:26

22 So automatically by cutting us off at Zorzor, bringing  
23 disarray amongst the troops, ULIMO moves now - well, depending on  
24 what we say forward or backward, but for me they moved back into  
25 our territory towards Voinjama Kolahun and Foya and consolidate  
26 in that entire area. This entire area even where the small lines  
27 are drawn are all forest areas. So ULIMO in effect now takes  
28 control of Lofa, Grand Cape Mount/Bomi, along the lines and  
29 because they are in Zorzor they push forward all the way to the

09:42:59

1 St Paul River bridge and finally ULIMO stops at the St Paul River  
2 bridge. So the line now that divides the NPFL forces from the  
3 ULIMO forces now stands at the so-called St Paul River bridge,  
4 right at this point. That's the situation I was explaining.

09:44:08 5 Q. Just to assist us at a later date, Mr Taylor, I wonder if  
6 you could put a key at the bottom of that map so that firstly the  
7 orange arrows, that's the area of initial ULIMO incursion, yes?

8 A. I know what you're talking about. I have to just - is it  
9 okay to just move it aside to write?

09:44:37 10 Q. Of course.

11 A. Thank you.

12 Q. And then if we can put that the area bounded in orange is  
13 the initial area of ULIMO occupation and if you could put a date  
14 when they achieved that objective. Okay, Mr Taylor?

09:45:43 15 A. Yes, I understand.

16 Q. You can go around to the back of the map if necessary,  
17 Mr Taylor.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. I wonder if I could have a look at that, please. I think  
09:51:12 20 it might be easiest for your Honours to look at this directly,  
21 because I'm not so sure it will show up on the overhead.

22 A. If I can just read what I wrote too, if your Honours don't  
23 mind.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Show the Prosecution as well, please.

09:54:12 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I see a "1" which says  
26 "April to around June '91". I'm not sure how that relates to the  
27 map.

28 THE WITNESS: Well I can explain that, your Honour. I'm  
29 making reference to "1" as saying at the right-hand side because

1 there was no space I'm trying to describe the dates in question.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Is that clear, your Honour?

3 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Yes, the incursion, the orange arrows,  
4 that date relates to the orange arrows?

09:54:53 5 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Thank you.

7 THE WITNESS: If your Honours don't - since it is a  
8 question as raised by the Justice, I may just need to note that  
9 if your Honours don't mind for future purposes someone looking at  
10 this may have the same question that the Honourable Justice has.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you want that, Mr Griffiths?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes:

13 Q. Yes, very well, if you could just clarify that point.

14 A. Yes, just clarify what that '1" is.

09:55:41 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I think what is relevant is  
16 the time that ULIMO stopped at the St Paul River bridge.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay:

18 Q. Mr Taylor, could you also indicate on that map, please, the  
19 time when ULIMO penetrated as far as the St Paul's River bridge?

09:56:16 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, that time may well be shown on the  
21 map. Has it been given in evidence? Has he given evidence as to  
22 that particular time?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I think he has.

24 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure.

09:56:29 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I don't recall him giving evidence  
26 that --

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: He didn't. That's why I'm asking.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: If it's an important fact, that should  
29 not be left on a map alone. There should be some sworn evidence

1 about it.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm just a little uncomfortable. I'm not  
4 sure what your client is writing on the map, but I repeat I don't  
09:57:56 5 want facts alleged on a map that have not been sworn to in  
6 evidence. I don't think it's appropriate to allege facts on a  
7 map.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

9 Q. Mr Taylor, help us with this please. By what date did  
09:58:10 10 ULIMO penetrate as far as the St Paul's River bridge?

11 A. I would say that by or about August of 1991 ULIMO has taken  
12 control of the St Paul River bridge.

13 Q. 1991?

14 A. That's correct.

09:58:33 15 Q. And for how long do they retain control of the areas you've  
16 marked on that map?

17 A. Oh, ULIMO is in full control of the areas marked on this  
18 map until I would say mid-1995 when all of us withdraw and turn  
19 those areas over to the ECOMOG forces. Now, I have to clarify  
09:59:17 20 that. Withdrawal, but there is still some form of control by the  
21 military. We withdraw and ECOMOG is in as the peace process is  
22 going, but final and absolute control by ULIMO actually stopped  
23 in 1997 after the presidential elections. So it's important to  
24 understand one distinction here, because I am sure I am going to  
09:59:51 25 be confronted with, "Well, you say ULIMO did not have control as  
26 of 1995." 1995 is usual as a date that all of the warring  
27 factional leaders moved to Monrovia, including myself, and ECOMOG  
28 deploy. Men are still armed and the factional leaders have  
29 military command still over their people, but for the sake of



1 peace ECOMOG is deployed and there is the beginning of some  
2 movement. So there are two different levels of control: one  
3 with ECOMOG assisting, but final control actually comes in 1997  
4 after I'm elected as President.

10:00:34 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you may have other  
6 questions about that map and you may also want to see the map,  
7 but I would just say at this stage before we leave the map it  
8 will need to be shown to the Prosecution and we would like to see  
9 it again. But if you have other questions first, by all means  
10:00:53 10 put them.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Well can I enquire, Mr President, whether  
12 any further clarification is required as to the date?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I never raised the query anyway. I'll  
14 ask my learned colleague Justice Sebutinde whether she is now  
10:01:14 15 satisfied with that comment.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Mr Taylor, can we go over this again, please, because I  
18 want there to be ultimate certainty as to what you are saying.  
19 Let's start right at the outset. The orange arrows depict  
10:01:36 20 initial ULIMO incursion at what date, please?

21 A. The orange arrows show the initial incursion by ULIMO  
22 between April and May of 1991.

23 Q. Okay. The area bounded in orange, by what date had ULIMO  
24 achieved control of that area?

10:02:10 25 A. I would say around June. By June they have captured those  
26 two counties.

27 Q. June of which year?

28 A. 1991.

29 Q. The thick blue lines indicating the advance of ULIMO

1 towards Zorzor, when does that begin?

2 A. Ah, ULIMO begin their penetration - I wouldn't be able to  
3 tell just when because we were fighting, but I know that they get  
4 into Zorzor I would say on or about late June to July. They have  
10:02:53 5 already cut us off in Zorzor.

6 Q. Now the double-headed arrow in red, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Which we can see, that you indicated earlier represents  
9 ULIMO's penetration as far as the St Paul's River bridge. Am I  
10:03:21 10 right?

11 A. The double-headed arrow actually is used here to indicate  
12 the position of the St Paul River bridge. That's the position of  
13 the bridge. I just crossed that arrow to show where the bridge  
14 is located.

10:03:34 15 Q. Right. Now there came a time, if I understand your  
16 evidence, when ULIMO reached as far as that point?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. What date do you give to that?

19 A. I would put that to around August of 1991. They are moving  
10:03:55 20 this way and they are moving backward towards Voinjama, yes.

21 Q. Now when they reach as far as the St Paul's River bridge,  
22 do they control thereafter all of the area to the left as we look  
23 at it of the St Paul's River which you have marked in turquoise?

24 A. Yes. All of the areas, that green - well, that for me  
10:04:29 25 green - or turquoise, that's the river. Everything - everything  
26 - to if you want to call it the northwest of that line, the  
27 St Paul River becomes the line of demarcation that divides ULIMO  
28 forces from NPFL forces whether we are talking about at that  
29 point, but also all along the river. That's why I drew that

1 green line. That river runs all the way down and ends up into  
2 the Atlantic Ocean. Everything to the northwest side of that  
3 river is occupied fully by ULIMO. Everything coming what you  
4 want to say southwards is then NPFL area.

10:05:21 5 Q. So from that point in August 1991 did the NPFL have any  
6 access to the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia?

7 A. None whatsoever. We could not even cross the St Paul  
8 River, no.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I hope that assists. Now can we all be  
10:05:53 10 shown the map, please.

11 THE WITNESS: May I just add one thing in all fairness?  
12 What the President of the Court was speaking about when the issue  
13 was raised initially about a date for the St Paul River bridge  
14 occupation it was suggested that it be written in, so I began  
10:06:17 15 writing in that information. Then the President of the Court  
16 said that he did not want anything written on the map that had  
17 not been stated in sworn testimony. I want to make that clear  
18 that I had begun writing this before the President raised it. I  
19 think this is where the confusion came about.

10:06:37 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's clear.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Could that please be marked for  
23 identification MFI-3.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. The black and white map of Liberia  
10:10:29 25 marked in various colours by the accused and notated by the  
26 accused as well will be marked MFI-3.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I'm just wondering if he could, in line  
29 with our practice, perhaps sign the map and date it.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I think that would be most helpful:

2 Q. Perhaps if you can sign it right at the top, Mr Taylor,  
3 with a date, 21 July 2009. Thank you.

4 I think there is one final matter I want to ask you about  
10:11:39 5 about that in order to concretise this whole situation. The last  
6 answer you gave me was to the effect that from that date, August  
7 1991, the NPFL did not have access to the border. When did you  
8 and your forces next have access to the border with Sierra Leone?

9 A. I would say about - I would put it to August/September of  
10:12:30 10 1997. That is following my election as President and taking the  
11 oath in August, we then started the process of getting security  
12 and other personnel to begin to work along with ECOMOG that is  
13 posted at all of these areas. So I will put it to about  
14 August/September of 1997.

10:13:12 15 Q. And by then, August of '97, was the NPFL still in  
16 existence?

17 A. No. That's what I'm referring to when you say when did I  
18 and my people. No. Before elections are held in Liberia, all  
19 warring parties are dissolved. They create political parties and  
10:13:46 20 actually they cease to exist as warring factions. And this  
21 process I would say starts at around the beginning of 1997. On  
22 or about, I would say, January, and I may stand corrected on  
23 this. I can't be so certain because by this time I'm already -  
24 I'm not on the council of state. I'm very busy preparing for  
10:14:25 25 elections. But all parties are dissolved in line with certain  
26 dates that are set aside by electoral laws and so we cease to  
27 exist as the NPFL. I think at most I would say a year and at  
28 least not under eight months.

29 Q. Now, 1992, Mr Taylor, we were dealing with yesterday. Now,

1 in the second half of 1992 can you just give us a rough idea of  
2 what the situation was so far as you were concerned and the NPFL?

3 A. By the second half of 1992, there are quite a few things  
4 going on. I would say that we - there is a follow-up to  
10:15:45 5 Yamoussoukro and I think a significant thing is what I will want  
6 to call Cotonou I.

7 Q. How do you spell that?

8 A. C-O-T-O-N-O-U. Cotonou is the capital of the West African  
9 country of Benin. We begin the follow-up on the Yamoussoukro  
10:16:12 10 discussions pushing for peace. That's one of the important  
11 things that I would like to refer to at this time.

12 Q. And any other major event in the second half of '92?

13 A. Yes. If my recollection is correct I just want to mention  
14 we are talking, but there is conflict. We then have, after we  
10:16:47 15 have really, really felt that people were not serious about  
16 negotiating and just wanted to prolong this war, to the best of  
17 my recollection I think Operation Octopus is launched around that  
18 time to the best of my recollection.

19 Q. What is Operation Octopus?

10:17:09 20 A. We then decided that we would take the city of Monrovia and  
21 end the war.

22 Q. So what did it involve?

23 A. Military operations.

24 Q. And how costly was that operation, Mr Taylor, in terms of  
10:17:34 25 casualties?

26 A. These were - on our side we did have a lot of civilian  
27 casualties but we went after the peacekeepers or there to speak,  
28 they were not really peacekeepers. Don't let's forget and I know  
29 I used that word peacekeepers, maybe I shouldn't have even use it

1 because I've told this Court of the deceit and the hypocrisy that  
2 was involved at that time where on the one hand this Nigeria had  
3 armed the Armed Forces of Liberia fighting alongside them, Guinea  
4 had armed ULIMO and they had troops in Liberia, so while they  
10:18:19 5 were calling themselves peacekeepers, for us they were not  
6 peacekeepers. That's what I described on yesterday as the  
7 hypocrisy involved at that particular time.

8 And after we felt that their intention was just to prolong  
9 the war and really push the NPFL back out of the more than 80  
10:18:40 10 per cent of the country we had, and realising all the other lost  
11 opportunities we had and the suffering of the people, we decided  
12 that we should end the war by taking the capital because the big  
13 explanation at the time was: Well, the NPFL cannot do anything  
14 as long as the capital is not in their hands. So even before  
10:19:01 15 ULIMO comes in we have captured the entire country except the  
16 boroughs of Monrovia, but we can't take power. So the whole  
17 thing was stuck on you don't have power unless you have the  
18 capital. So we said, "Well, great. So we'll take the capital  
19 and end the suffering of the Liberian people".

10:19:20 20 Q. Was Operation Octopus successful?

21 A. In a way I would say yes. It is Operation Octopus that  
22 finally led to the serious discussions at Cotonou to bring about  
23 final peace to Liberia after those what I will call the - that  
24 I've described as hypocrites, after they realised that they would  
10:19:47 25 not defeat us militarily they then decided to talk seriously and  
26 so we go to Cotonou and right after Cotonou we go to Abuja and  
27 then it gets serious. So by the end of that particular year we  
28 then follow on with - by '93 we begin immediately with Cotonou II  
29 that finally sets up the framework for the final peace in

1 Liberia.

2 So I think to a great extent the show of force that went  
3 about in that particular time I think convinced them that they  
4 will not, and I mean not push the NPFL out. As the famous  
10:20:49 5 general that came, I think it was General Olarin, I think a  
6 Nigerian general, O-L-A-R-I-N, and General Olarin said that his  
7 mission then was to flush the NPFL out of Liberia. I think they  
8 realised that they couldn't do it.

9 Q. Now you told us yesterday, Mr Taylor, that you on occasions  
10:21:11 10 spoke to the press, including Robin White on BBC Focus on Africa.  
11 Do you remember telling us that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Now during this time in 1992, did you have any other access  
14 to not only the radio but to the print media as well?

10:21:30 15 A. Oh, yes. Amongst others I spoke extensively to the editor  
16 in chief of a magazine called New Africa, along with other  
17 journalists that were in and out of our area at the time, but I  
18 spoke extensively - the first and maybe the only one that I sat  
19 down with to talk to was the New Africa magazine chief editor.

10:22:16 20 Q. What was his name?

21 A. I remember the name Baffour. I think it is Baffour. The  
22 last name slips me a little, but I remember Baffour. Baffour I  
23 think is B-A-F-F-O-U-R, if I'm not - I stand corrected on that -  
24 that I spoke to at length in a sit-down interview to really get  
10:22:43 25 what was happening.

26 Q. And where did that conversation take place?

27 A. That conversation took place to the best of my recollection  
28 it had to be in Gbarnga, because - it had to be in Gbarnga.

29 Q. And can you recall now how long that individual remained in

1 Gbarnga?

2 A. Oh, no. Journalists were coming and going and I'm not too  
3 sure, but he had an opportunity to go around several areas of our  
4 NPFL control and it could have taken him a week or so. But  
10:23:28 5 journalists were in and out all the time and they were treated  
6 very fairly, unlike what one of the witnesses that came here and  
7 said - and I hate to get into this, but I don't want to pass this  
8 since we're dealing with journalists. There's this one man  
9 journalist called Stephen Smith that sat before this Court that I  
10:23:53 10 know very well, the gentleman that publishes Africa Confidential.  
11 I don't know how he managed to publish Africa Confidential, but  
12 the point I'm trying to make is that journalists were in there  
13 with all harassment.

14 But in the specific case - and I really want to talk about  
10:24:12 15 him - the specific case of Mr Stephen Smith, Mr Stephen Smith was  
16 picked up by NPFL forces truly as he said on request and it may  
17 be good for him to know that today. Stephen Smith became an  
18 embarrassment to his intelligence colleagues and we were asked by  
19 the United States through its embassy in Abidjan to pick up  
10:24:48 20 Stephen Smith for them and have him sent out of the country  
21 because he was doing things that were not right. We picked him  
22 up and his passport was eventually delivered to our handlers at  
23 the embassy in Abidjan.

24 So I'm just - I only brought that in to mention that we  
10:25:11 25 were treating journalists very well and Baffour could have stayed  
26 there much longer and if we have to talk about Stephen Smith  
27 later I'm sure we will.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness could be shown,  
29 please, the item - the document behind divider 5 in the documents



1 disclosed for week 29. It's the document which looks like that,  
2 your Honours.

3 MS HOLLIS: Could we ask what the DCT number is?

4 MR GRIFFITHS: It's - one moment. Sorry, I gave - I misled  
10:26:12 5 everyone. It's not for week 29, I'm sorry. It's for week 30 and  
6 the DCT number is 108, tab 5. Week 30, DCT-108, behind tab 5.  
7 That's not the document. That's the document behind tab --

8 MS IRURA: Tab 9.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I apologise for the confusion, but it's  
10:27:24 10 actually behind tab - I need to check that at the break. I see  
11 some confusion on the opposite bench. Has the document been  
12 found?

13 MS HOLLIS: We have a document 108 that has this cover.  
14 Are we talking about the same one?

10:28:07 15 MR GRIFFITHS: That is the document. That is the document.

16 MS HOLLIS: Thank you.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we've all got that document  
18 that's been catalogued as DCT-108, but I note that it's a copy of  
19 a New African whereas I thought the witness was talking about  
10:29:22 20 Africa Confidential.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: No, he was talking about Africa Confidential  
22 in relation to Stephen Smith, but initially he spoke about New  
23 African:

24 Q. Do you recall this interview, Mr Taylor?

10:29:50 25 A. May I now look at the document?

26 Q. Yes, you can. I think it might be - I think you have the  
27 wrong one. Mr Taylor, you should be looking at a document headed  
28 "New African" dated October 1992. Thank you. Do you have the  
29 document now?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Do you recall giving this interview?

3 A. Oh, yes.

4 Q. Now if we turn over to the second page, please, we can

10:30:54 5 locate when this interview took place. Do you see it says

6 "Baffour Ankomah"? Do you see that in the box at the top?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Is that the journalist?

9 A. Yes, that's him. Baffour. Baffour Ankomah.

10:31:22 10 Q. "...spent a month behind the lines with Charles Taylor and

11 his forces in Liberia. Later he had further interviews with

12 ECOMOG and top ministers of the two governments in the country.

13 He also interviewed top journalists, politicians, civil servants

14 and ordinary people on both sides of the Liberian divide. In

10:31:39 15 this comprehensive report, he tells why Taylor will not lay down

16 his arms as long as he is under attack from ULIMO and why there

17 can be no solution to Liberia's problems and no withdrawal of

18 ECOMOG unless Taylor's position is taken into account."

19 And then I do not intend to take you through this document

10:32:01 20 word-for-word, but if we can just quickly skim some of the

21 details in order to put in context the direct quotes reported

22 from you. Do you see in the first paragraph it details how you

23 chose the tiny village of Butuo for the attack on Christmas Eve,

24 yes?

10:32:25 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. And it then sets out the symbolism of Butuo?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. It then in paragraph 3 applauds your intelligence, do you

29 see that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And then it says this:

3 "But the war spun so dangerously out of his control that he  
4 spent a good deal of last year apologising for the excesses  
10:33:05 5 committed by his troops."

6 Is that true?

7 A. Yes, that is true.

8 Q. And then it goes on to explain why the apology:

9 "Doe's soldiers, badly humiliated, were in retreat and were  
10:33:22 10 burning whole villages and towns in Nimba County as they fled to  
11 Monrovia (the capital). Anything Gio or Mano that moved was fair  
12 game.

13 Taylor's troops were in hot pursuit. And seeing the  
14 atrocities committed against their tribespeople by Doe's  
10:33:41 15 soldiers, they vented their spleen on Krahn and Mandingo  
16 civilians in a grotesque campaign of human destruction.

17 Human beings were worth less than chickens those days. I  
18 was told that some Krahn pregnant women had their stomachs slit  
19 open in front of their husbands and their babies thrown into the  
10:34:03 20 air and allowed to fall to their deaths in a sickening show of  
21 human insensitivity."

22 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Well, this is - this is his account. I have been very open  
24 about what happened during the war and I think to put this in  
10:34:23 25 some context, because this is a journalist trying to be as  
26 objective as he could, just to cap it off remembering what led to  
27 the crisis in the first place, the destruction in Nimba County  
28 and other counties by Doe that led to people going for training  
29 and coming back. Now, the war starts - and I'm not going to

1 misspeak this time about the date - on Christmas Eve of '89 and  
2 while the soldiers are retreating there is mayhem. In fact, I  
3 could probably --

10:35:25 4 Q. Mr Taylor, I really don't want to cut you off, but I did  
5 ask a very simple question. Did things like those described in  
6 that paragraph occur in fact?

7 A. Well, but that's the whole point. A "Yes" or a "No" here  
8 would have to be put into context. The excesses on the part of  
9 the Doe soldiers led to some excesses on the part of the - of the  
10:35:48 10 soldiers - the NPFL soldiers - that were pursuing them. And so  
11 there were these kinds of problems that it is true that I  
12 apologised for, but there were some excesses and that I admit  
13 here, yes.

14 Q. And was it because you had lost control of your troops?

10:36:08 15 A. No. That I disagree with. I disagree. There was not a  
16 loss of control. There were some bad apples that were trying to  
17 carry out this revenge and I would not have any of it. Let's go  
18 back and this is why these yes and nos can't work, especially for  
19 a politician like me.

10:36:33 20 I'm pursuing Prince Johnson because of excesses that he  
21 started already in Nimba, okay. Now, that's not losing control  
22 but I had to take action and that's why Prince Johnson is  
23 fleeing. So we have excesses now being carried out by our people  
24 and as we are finding out we are taking action and that's what  
10:36:53 25 led to a lot of - what has come before the Court is only a small  
26 amount of the disciplinary actions that were taken by the  
27 leadership of the NPFL. So I disagree totally that we lost  
28 control.

29 Q. Now let's continue, Mr Taylor:

1 "Small boy soldiers. Some as young as nine and ten years  
2 old would put a knife to the throat of some elderly Krahn man and  
3 tell him, 'Popee, don't worry, it won't hurt you'. In another  
4 minute his head would not be his."

10:37:36 5 Those things were going on, weren't they?

6 A. Yes, but I don't - I don't agree with - he is describing  
7 them as soldiers. These are individuals that are going along  
8 with their brothers, that have had their families killed and  
9 there is this revenge attitude going on. Some of this did go on  
10:38:07 10 where Krahns and Mandingos were killed along the way, yes.

11 Q. Let's continue and see how the report unfolds:

12 "Some teenage soldiers, both boys and girls, told me in  
13 separate interviews that they just wanted to seek revenge for the  
14 atrocities committed against their parents whose dismembered  
10:38:34 15 bodies were left to rot in the open by Doe soldiers.

16 One boy, who is now 14 years old, told me in a disarmament  
17 camp at Kwedin near Tappita, 'I returned to our village from  
18 school in Monrovia to find I had no mother, no father. They had  
19 been slaughtered like goats by Doe's men. What did you want me  
10:38:57 20 to do? Sit down and cry? I joined President Taylor's army and  
21 sought revenge.

22 More of such orphans, now put together in a Small Boys  
23 Unit, joined Taylor's forces. Not only them. Villagers, men  
24 women, boys and girls, who saw their lives threatened by Doe's  
10:39:24 25 retreating soldiers hopped over to Taylor's side. They were  
26 given some weeks training before joining the war. Some though  
27 may have been forced into Taylor's army but they no longer admit  
28 it."

29 Let's deal with that last sentence. Were people forced

1 into your army, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No. No. People were not forced - were not forced into my  
3 army, but force could also mean something else. I do not know  
4 what the journalist meant by we were forced into the army. I can  
10:39:56 5 say I was forced to do something and it did not have to be  
6 somebody maybe holding a gun or knife to me. By force it could  
7 be - an internal urge can be described as - I don't know what the  
8 journalist meant when he said - when this person says, "I was  
9 forced to join", force here - he would have to explain this, but  
10:40:19 10 I can see force being used in two separate ways. That one, by  
11 virtue of circumstances I must do something. That's self force.  
12 So I don't know what he meant.

13 Q. But, Mr Taylor, do you accept that children, yes some  
14 orphans, did become members of the NPFL?

10:40:44 15 A. Well, quite frankly I will tell you, if a child joined or  
16 went along with a unit, for me and the leadership of the NPFL, we  
17 did not encourage or recruit or train children. But I have said  
18 in this Court that children went along with their relatives to  
19 combat. They stopped at certain points and from my position that  
10:41:16 20 was not acceptable.

21 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you see the use of that phrase Small Boys  
22 Unit. Is it a phrase you are familiar with?

23 A. I've heard it used a lot, yes.

24 Q. Was that a phrase used at this time by the NPFL?

10:41:38 25 A. It was not a phrase used by the NPFL. It was a phrase that  
26 was used in NPFL area at the time. People used the word Small  
27 Boys. I've heard that, yes.

28 Q. It goes on:

29 "The courage, enthusiasm and fighting spirit shown by these

1 Liberian civilians as they pursued Doe's disgraced soldiers was  
2 so overwhelming that Taylor, who had started the war with a few  
3 hundred Liberian commanders trained and armed by Libya, he also  
4 drew support from a number of dissident soldiers from other West  
10:42:20 5 African countries, soon found that he could not control the venom  
6 of his now oversized army."

7 Do you agree with that?

8 A. Well, there is some truth to that. And I think that we,  
9 just reading a journalist's own opinion of a situation, have to  
10:42:53 10 be very, very - must - I mean, I have to put this in context of -  
11 because this is a journalist's view. And the Court must  
12 understand the context of this when I say there is some truth to  
13 that, because the reason why we did not and no one has been able  
14 to come up with a roster for the so-called NPFL is that there -  
10:43:32 15 thousands of people came and joined the NPFL. Some - using that  
16 word NPFL during that particular time, anywhere in that place  
17 there could have been units going on that the leadership of the  
18 NPFL would have never known about. We had grown to about what,  
19 40, 50,000 people. Some individuals, some districts may have  
10:44:00 20 just put their own people together, get their hunting guns.  
21 Without training they had become NPFL and were going after other  
22 people.

23 So there is a great deal of truth to the fact that there  
24 was a period that things really got really shaky. I mean, where  
10:44:22 25 groups and, you know, were carrying on so we had to try to begin  
26 to rein it in. But there's some truth to this that because of  
27 the sheer size of ordinary people that just took off and started  
28 doing things under the banner of NPFL, I can say there's a lot of  
29 truth to this.

1 Q. Shaky or out of control, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well, to a great extent I give some credence to out of  
3 control. I would not say 100 per cent, but I give some credence  
4 to things did get out of control at some point, yes.

10:45:08 5 Q. Now, where it says, "He also drew support from a number of  
6 dissident soldiers from other West African countries," is that  
7 true?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And which African countries are we talking about here,  
10:45:25 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. I'm sure he's speaking about the Gambians that he saw  
12 there. I'm sure he is talking about the Gambians. He is  
13 probably talking about some Nigerians that had served. In fact  
14 some people that had come to Liberia served with ECOMOG, left and  
10:45:54 15 came back and joined the movement. So there were some West  
16 African soldiers and I'm sure that's what he is talking about.

17 Q. Let's continue with the narrative, please:

18 "Taylor says he could have easily taken Monrovia had the  
19 Americans not stopped him. He says the UN Assistant Secretary of  
10:46:21 20 State For African Affairs, Herman Cohen, flew from Washington to  
21 the Ivorian capital Abidjan and came by road inside Liberia  
22 during the war. Fearing further bloodshed and destruction, Cohen  
23 asked Taylor not to attack Monrovia and also to leave the road to  
24 Sierra Leone open to enable Monrovians to flee to Sierra Leone."

10:46:51 25 Is that true?

26 A. That is true. That is true. In fact these accounts -  
27 these very accounts are given in Secretary Cohen's book  
28 Intervening in Africa. Specifically chapter 5 of that book deals  
29 exclusively with the subject matter of his meeting with me. The



1 title of his book is Intervening in Africa. Yes, Intervening in  
2 Africa. But it is covered at most in chapter 5 of that book. He  
3 narrates the entire situation.

4 Q. It continues:

10:47:31 5 "Taylor's reward would be the Americans putting pressure on  
6 Doe to leave Monrovia once Taylor captured the main airport,  
7 Roberts International, near Monrovia. He agreed and Herman Cohen  
8 left for Washington."

9 Was there such a deal, Mr Taylor?

10:47:51 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. "Roberts International did fall to Taylor. Doe took it  
12 back. Taylor recaptured it. Doe took it back again. Taylor  
13 finally recaptured it after fierce fighting. Today the mangled  
14 remains of the main passenger terminal and the adjacent VIP  
10:48:17 15 lounge look like a freshly dug out construction site. The 70  
16 room hotel nearby now stands as a white elephant on the banks of  
17 the huge and beautiful Famington River, stripped of all its  
18 furniture and fittings by the fighters.

19 After the final fall of Roberts International Airport, the  
10:48:38 20 Americans asked Doe to leave. He wouldn't. Taylor's troops then  
21 encircled Monrovia and actually sat on the campus of the  
22 University of Liberia for more than two months. There was just a  
23 street dividing them from Doe's executive mansion. 'We could  
24 have taken the mansion any moment but we had a promise to keep',  
10:49:06 25 Taylor told me."

26 Is that true?

27 A. That is very true and that's what I meant by lost  
28 opportunities by the United States. This is 100 per cent  
29 factual.

1 Q. So tell me, at what stage was it that your soldiers were  
2 actually on the campus of the University of Liberia? By what  
3 date?

4 A. We are talking about close to the last quarter of 1990.

10:49:45 5 Q. Then it continues:

6 "But Doe would not go. According to an independent source  
7 the mansion was under heavy attack from Johnson's INPFL and Doe  
8 would not leave without all his soldiers, but the Americans  
9 turned him down. Doe stuck to his guns until Prince Johnson  
10:50:05 10 finally captured him under the noses of the ECOWAS peacekeepers,  
11 ECOMOG, and tortured him to death. ECOMOG later bombed Taylor's  
12 army out of Monrovia."

13 Is all of that true?

14 A. Oh, yes, yes.

15 Q. [Overlapping speakers].

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And it continues:

18 "Taylor now regrets taking Herman Cohen at his word. 'I  
19 made a terrible mistake. Terrible mistake. Very, very bad  
10:50:44 20 mistake. But my concern at the time was also to avoid additional  
21 massive loss of life had we launched a major artillery assault on  
22 Monrovia. And if you check all the records, my soldiers never  
23 entered Monrovia proper. There was no fighting by our soldiers  
24 in Monrovia'."

10:51:10 25 Did you say that, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes, I did.

27 Q. And when you said it, did you mean it?

28 A. I think I've used the expression bittersweet here before  
29 this Court. You know, 20/20 hindsight is another - it's another

1 whole matter. I am glad that I took the decision not to bomb  
2 Monrovia and overrun the city because of the large numbers of  
3 civilians that would have died. There were close to I would say  
4 a million people in the city. And so on that count I have no  
10:52:02 5 real regrets.

6 But then if you look right on the other side, because of  
7 that the war lasted another five, six years with machinations on  
8 the part of these people I have described, deceit and all of  
9 this, and, yes, they started a whole campaign and actually bombed  
10:52:27 10 us out of Monrovia and killed a lot of people. So it's the type  
11 of situation from a legal perspective you can say yes and no, but  
12 for me it's a bittersweet situation. If we had taken Monrovia,  
13 there would have been loss of life, the war would have ended in  
14 1990. We made the right decision by not attacking the city with  
10:52:52 15 a million people. I think it was another good decision, so it's  
16 a bittersweet situation quite frankly.

17 Q. It continues:

18 "If ever there was a real people's army, Taylor had and  
19 still has one. Fathers, mothers, sons and daughters all fought  
10:53:10 20 as units in the war and still have their weapons tucked away in  
21 their huts in the small villages dotting the countryside and they  
22 are prepared, they tell me, to go into the bush again and fight  
23 if need be. Taylor now has about 12,000 men, women, boys and  
24 girls in uniform, his regular army, but he says he can call up  
10:53:34 25 over 85,000 reservists in a twinkle of an eye. And I believe  
26 him."

27 Could you?

28 A. Oh, yes. I know we want to go through this, but if we just  
29 rush through this we'll have a problem. Now, let's put this into

1 context because this is a journalist writing and I think the  
2 judges need to understand. There are thousands of people that  
3 come fight and because we are not running a regular paid army,  
4 the way this worked, some people come and fight, they may fight  
10:54:12 5 for a month or two and the guy is gone maybe back to his village  
6 to go and take care of his farm. So this total of 85,000, I'm  
7 saying there's just thousands of people that if we were to do an  
8 emergency call in because of a major problem and say all of those  
9 that fought before please come back, they will come back. But  
10:54:37 10 this is not any conventional army where you've got people ready  
11 and willing. It was always a situation where people could come  
12 and go.

13 And I want to point out when you touch the Herman Cohen  
14 situation and I mentioned his book, we've got to be very careful  
10:55:00 15 during this period as people are writing. Children and boys,  
16 girls, Secretary Cohen in his book in chapter 5 states that he is  
17 surprised to see a lot of young men - I think he says young men  
18 and women of the age 15 and 16 are holding guns. Well, we have  
19 to be very careful with that because that's Secretary Cohen's own  
10:55:37 20 explanation as to young people that he is seeing. But the  
21 question comes why doesn't - why can't they be 17 and 18? Or,  
22 for that matter, why can't they be 14 and 15? How can Secretary  
23 Cohen write and say he saw young men 15 and 16? So this has got  
24 to do also with perception.

10:56:00 25 And after Herman Cohen - and in fact I think I did mention  
26 it because you know he did some work for me later after he left  
27 the State Department for the government. I mean, this is a  
28 period where people are coming up with statements and some of  
29 them really you can't - they can't be factual.

1 Now, Secretary Cohen saw young faces but immediately and  
2 sadly he attaches an age. He did not interview any boys - I mean  
3 any of these people and say, "How old are you and how old are  
4 you?" So he comes. So we have to be very careful during this  
10:56:44 5 time of the writing maybe Europeans and Americans have a way of  
6 looking at faces and exaggerating ages, but in some African  
7 context you may see a face that may look younger than maybe on  
8 European standards or American standards that are quite older  
9 than that. Not to praise myself, but if you see a Caucasian in  
10:57:07 10 Europe or something at my age of near 62 I'm sure he looks older.  
11 I'm not trying to attack them.

12 I mean we're talking about different sets of people and I'm  
13 just pointing out here that just as he uses just a blanket  
14 expression "boys and girls", it's similar to what Secretary Cohen  
10:57:27 15 did when he talked about he saw 15 and 16 when he had not asked  
16 anyone but he came out with a number. So my question is, well,  
17 what makes you think they are not 17 or 18, or why don't you say  
18 they were 13 and 14? You come up with 15 and 16. So we've got  
19 to be careful and contextualise some of these things that  
10:57:47 20 journalists write. I mean I think it's important.

21 Q. Let's continue:

22 "As I drove up and down the country for four weeks through  
23 the dense rainforest that covers the country from border to  
24 border, I began to understand why there was such carnage during  
10:58:02 25 the war. The killing, however, was not limited to one side. All  
26 three factions that fought the war, President Doe's Armed Forces  
27 of Liberia (AFL), Taylor's National Patriotic Forces of Liberia,  
28 (NPFL) and Prince Johnson's Interim National Patriotic Forces of  
29 Liberia (INPFL), all share a common guilt for the atrocities.

1           An estimated 13,000 people, some say over 20,000, including  
2 other West African citizens were slaughtered by the three warring  
3 factions as they pushed towards Monrovia. Talking to the  
4 ordinary people in the street you begin to understand why there  
10:58:52 5 was such common hatred of Doe and his soldiers. Liberia, size  
6 111,400 square kilometres stretched over 13 counties with 579  
7 kilometres of coastline, an estimated population of three  
8 million, had been misruled and kept sickeningly backward for 133  
9 years by 18 Americo-Liberian Presidents before Doe's seized power  
10:59:24 10 in a coup d'etat in 1980.

11           To this day much of Liberia is still rainforest. What they  
12 call cities in the country are dilapidated large downs that do  
13 not in all sincerity deserve the name of cities.

14           To this day there is just one major highway asphalted from  
10:59:47 15 Monrovia to Ganta about 145 miles away. Apart from two other  
16 minor tar roads, one built free of charge for Doe by Nigerian  
17 President Ibrahim Babangida in Cape Mount County going to the  
18 Sierra Leone border, and another built by the American Firestone  
19 rubber company from Ganta from Gate 15, on the main  
11:00:17 20 Monrovia-Ganta Highway, to Buchanan - there is nothing more in  
21 the country deserving the name of a road. And this is in a  
22 nation that achieved independence 145 years ago."

23           Pause there. That last paragraph describing the transport  
24 infrastructure in 1992, Mr Taylor, is that correct?

11:00:41 25 A.    It's correct, including today.

26 Q.    So in terms of vehicular traffic from, say, Monrovia to  
27 Lofa and the border with Kailahun, was there an asphalted road  
28 running all the way which trucks could use?

29 A.    Not then; not now.

1 Q. Thus when Doe finally overthrew the Americo-Liberian  
2 oligarchy in 1980, native Liberians had hoped it was the time to  
3 redress the ills of 133 years of Americo-Liberian misrule.

4 Doe, a semi-illiterate who himself was a fruit of the  
11:01:40 5 Americo-Liberian neglect of the natives, actually did well  
6 initially according to some Liberian historians. Doe initially  
7 surrounded himself with the cream of the Liberian political  
8 elite. Togba-Nah Tipoteh was his planning minister. Amos  
9 Sawyer, the current Interim President of Liberia, was his special  
11:02:04 10 vi sor. Boima Fahnbulleh was his educational minister. Gabriel  
11 Baccus Matthews was his foreign minister. George Boley was his  
12 presidential affairs minister. And Charles Taylor himself was  
13 Doe's director general of the state-owned General Services  
14 Agency.

11:02:26 15 Because of Taylor's contribution to the consolidation of  
16 Doe's government in the early days, Doe gave him the rank of  
17 major, a 25 member bodyguard and a place in the cabinet even  
18 though he was not a minister.

19 But this broad, tolerant government lasted for only a  
11:02:45 20 while. Doe suddenly changed his tack and began promoting his  
21 small Krahn tribe to the disgust of the other tribes in the  
22 country. This, I was told, was largely due to bad advice from  
23 certain influential Krahn elites.

24 Suddenly the Krahn's became the privileged people who lived  
11:03:06 25 dangerously above the law and when Doe started persecuting the  
26 other tribes using his Krahn soldiers, his tribe, naturally,  
27 became a people living on borrowed time.

28 Taylor said that by 1983 when Doe's government began to rot  
29 from the head, he, General Quiwonkpa, Mohammed Wimpey and others

1 planned a coup to oust him. News leaked out. Wimpey and others  
2 were arrested. Taylor and Quiwonkpa escaped and Doe, fearful of  
3 what the Taylor/Quiwonkpa duo could do to his government from  
4 abroad, framed Taylor, accusing him of embezzling \$900,000 which  
11:03:58 5 led to his arrest in the US on extradition charges. He spent 18  
6 months in prison before escaping to Ghana.

7 Thus, thoroughly bitter about the way Doe's government had  
8 treated them for nearly ten years, the people of Liberia, at  
9 least the two million or so who live in Greater Liberia, saw in  
11:04:24 10 Charles Taylor, who himself is half Americo-Liberian and half  
11 native, a saviour who had come to liberate them from Doe's  
12 tyranny.

13 This is why, contrary to earlier press reports, there was  
14 such massive support for Taylor during the war and why Doe's  
11:04:44 15 soldiers were easily routed.

16 Today the scars of the war are all too visible to ignore.  
17 But compared to other war-destroyed African countries, especially  
18 Somalia, Liberia came out of the war looking quite good.

19 Much of the infrastructure is still intact, perhaps because  
11:05:05 20 there wasn't much in Liberia to destroy anyway. Even the capital  
21 Monrovia, despite the exaggerated press reports of destruction in  
22 the city, does not look too bad. There are still bullet marks on  
23 a number of houses in the northern suburb of Paynesville and the  
24 charred remains of a few houses could still be seen in other  
11:05:27 25 suburbs. But much of the city is intact, though water and  
26 electricity are scarce.

27 The real miracle of Liberia is that after the war there has  
28 been no famine and outbreaks of disease in the country as in  
29 Somalia or Mozambique. The people are well fed, strong and



1 beautiful as if there has been no war - and there are people who  
2 have work for two years or more in Taylor's area without pay."

3 Pause there. Is that true, working without pay?

11:06:03

4 A. Well, it depends on who he is talking about here. The  
5 military was not paid. But civilians were paid.

6 Q. And it continues: "They get a bag of rice each month and  
7 an allowance every Independence Day, 26 July."

8 And then it goes on to deal with the celebrations and then  
9 it carries on:

11:06:29

10 "What is striking is the enthusiasm and dedication shown by  
11 these unpaid people in Greater Liberia towards their jobs.  
12 Taylor's minister for health and social welfare, Dr Kou Nehway" -  
13 pronounce that last word for me, Mr Taylor.

14 A. That is pronounced Gbokolo.

11:06:49

15 Q. "...Gbokolo, a very enterprising young woman, says, 'It's a  
16 joy. Liberians know they were working for themselves. Pay or no  
17 pay we know that there is a great future we must work for'."

18 Now in describing these events in Greater Liberia, what was  
19 the entity known as Greater Liberia?

11:07:10

20 A. The entire country minus the borough of Monrovia.

21 Q. "Thus if the leaders of the country could sort out their  
22 political differences in a fair manner, Liberia could quickly put  
23 the horrors of the war behind it and look to the future with  
24 hope, but this is not so.

11:07:36

25 Today there are two governments running the country, each  
26 pursuing different agendas. Amos Sawyer, one of the leading  
27 lights of Liberian politics, heads one of the governments called  
28 the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), which controls  
29 only the city of Monrovia and its suburbs.

1 Sawyer does not even control the whole of Monrovia. He  
2 shares the control of the city with Prince Johnson's INPFL which  
3 broke away from Taylor's NPFL during the war. Johnson's  
4 stronghold of Caldwell is one of the suburbs of Monrovia where  
11:08:18 5 Sawyer's laws do not apply.

6 For example, when Sawyer printed a new currency last year  
7 and outlawed the old Liberian dollar bills throughout the whole  
8 of Liberia, Prince Johnson, like Taylor, refused to allow the new  
9 currency to circulate in Caldwell. The new currency is therefore  
11:08:40 10 circulating in only about four-fifths of Monrovia, and thus its  
11 value against the old outlawed currency has been spinning  
12 dangerously out of control. It was exchanging for nearly two to  
13 one by mid August."

14 Can we skip the next few paragraphs, please, and jump to  
11:09:18 15 the third paragraph from the bottom in the next column:

16 "The other government, the National Patriotic  
17 Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), which controls all of  
18 Liberia except the one city of Monrovia, is headed by Charles  
19 Taylor. Though the West Africa Economic Community (ECOWAS) and  
11:09:43 20 Sawyer's IGNU do not recognise the NPRAG, Taylor nonetheless is  
21 running a functioning government at Gbarnga complete with  
22 ministries and ministers."

23 Can we pause again, please. Is that true, Mr Taylor?

24 A. That is true. I have explained to the Court that we kept a  
11:10:13 25 civilian structure into place and I think the Court can recall  
26 that I mentioned that by the middle of 1991 it moved to Gbarnga.  
27 The assembly is sitting at Cuttington University College and  
28 there is order. Courts are in existence. Schools are open. The  
29 children are going to school and not fighting war. Tribunals are

1 operating. There's a functioning government. And again I  
2 disagree with just one little part here where he says that ECOWAS  
3 - in fact this is a mistake here. ECOWAS has in fact accepted  
4 the NPRAG.

11:11:14 5 Q. Can we go over the page, please:

6 "The US, the traditional godmother of Liberia, does not  
7 recognise either of the two governments, a decision which of  
8 itself is a destabilising factor that has deepened the stalemate  
9 in Liberia.

11:11:36 10 Yet the differences between the two Presidents of Liberia,  
11 Sawyer and Taylor, are not fundamentally unresolvable. Both want  
12 elections badly but they can't agree how. Sawyer wants  
13 disarmament and encampment of fighting forces first to facilitate  
14 the electoral campaigning in the whole country. Taylor agrees,  
11:12:00 15 but he says he cannot disarm and encamp his forces when Sawyer's  
16 government and other West African nations are supporting Doe's  
17 soldiers who fled to Sierra Leone, now calling themselves ULIMO,  
18 to regroup and attack him."

19 Pause there. Did you want elections?

11:12:21 20 A. Oh, yes.

21 Q. And did you consider elections to be feasible at this time  
22 in 1992?

23 A. Well, it's the process. We were in favour of a process,  
24 and that process had been described here before; the disarmament,  
11:12:51 25 demobilisation and encampment of soldiers that we had agreed to.  
26 But he is right here that once that process was put into place  
27 properly we agreed to submit to that process. We could not at  
28 that time because we saw it as a trick. So I do agree, we had a  
29 process and now we have submitted to a process, that's separate

1 from if we had assumed power, I have described that process  
2 already to the Court, but we are now going through the peace  
3 process and we would have submitted to a process that we felt was  
4 fair.

11:13:37 5 Q. It goes on, if we skip the next paragraph:

6 "Sawyer was next elected and installed as interim President  
7 of Liberia by 22 Liberian exiles who flew from the US and  
8 elsewhere during the war to the Gambian capital Banjul in  
9 mid-1990. At the time Samuel Doe was still alive and holed up in  
10 the Executive Mansion and was effectively the President of  
11 Liberia. All three warring factions rejected Sawyer's election."

11:14:02

12 Was that the method by which Sawyer was made President,  
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. In fact I disagree with the term "elected". He was  
15 selected and this is the crux of the problem. Not having to  
16 repeat myself, but I think it's important here for the Court to  
17 understand. If you see what he is describing here, this is what  
18 I described earlier as lost opportunities by this, what he calls  
19 here, traditional godmother. Here we are, Samuel Doe is not

11:14:21

11:14:48

20 killed until when? September of 1990. I'm at the university  
21 campus by I would say August. Doe is in the mansion. Herman  
22 Cohen has said don't take the city. Doe is still in Liberia when  
23 these people I have described as hypocrites have convened a  
24 meeting to talk about peace, but they go and put an interim  
25 President while the elected President of Liberia is still alive  
26 and sitting in the mansion.

11:15:19

27 So of course these people did not want peace. How? How?  
28 How could you want peace when Doe is alive in the mansion? They  
29 put 22 little fellows, you know, from the United States come in,

1 we're going to put in the President. So they put him in and  
2 nobody accepts him. I don't accept him. Doe doesn't accept him.  
3 No one accepts him. So that's the chaotic situation existing at  
4 that particular time.

11:15:55 5 So except for the electoral process - no 22 Liberians can  
6 claim election. I disagree. They selected him.

7 Q. "Then came the ceasefire agreement on 28 November 1990,  
8 signed in the Malian capital Bamako". You've dealt with that.

9 A. Yes.

11:16:15 10 Q. "That effectively ended Liberian civil war. This was  
11 followed by the All Liberian Conference in March 1991 to elect an  
12 interim administration pending free and fair elections.

13 A misunderstanding arose at the conference over the  
14 participation of the representatives of Liberia's 13 counties.

11:16:37 15 Taylor was for it because he felt they would be sympathetic to  
16 him. Sawyer and his politicians were against it because they  
17 thought the county representatives would vote against them. This  
18 forced Taylor's faction to withdraw from the conference which  
19 went ahead to elect and install Sawyer yet again as interim  
11:16:59 20 President. Taylor's faction rejected the decision, leading to  
21 the current stalemate in the country."

22 Now, that's March 1991, the All Liberian Conference. Did  
23 you attend that conference, Mr Taylor?

24 A. No, that was - I didn't attend that conference.

11:17:19 25 Q. Where was the conference held?

26 A. To the best of my recollection, it was held in Monrovia.

27 Q. "Enter ECOWAS and its peacekeepers ECOMOG.

28 Although it is difficult to find agreement on anything  
29 Liberian these days, everyone agrees that the ECOWAS

1 peacekeepers, ECOMOG, did a good job in stopping the carnage when  
2 they first entered Monrovia in mid-1990.

3 However, the overall performance of ECOMOG and its  
4 impartiality in the conflict are questioned. The Nigerian ECOMOG  
11:18:00 5 field commander General Ishaya Bakut told me, 'ECOMOG under my  
6 command will not partake in double dealing and telling lies,  
7 because the moment you lose credibility then you lose credibility  
8 of being a peacekeeper.'

9 But this is exactly what has happened. Last year Ghana  
11:18:25 10 which conceived the ECOMOG idea and provided its first commander,  
11 was so worried about the political agenda being pushed by ECOMOG  
12 in Liberia that the Rawlings government announced publicly that  
13 if ECOMOG deviated any further from its earlier stated goals  
14 Ghana would withdraw.

11:18:46 15 Since the statement, Ghana has withdrawn itself totally  
16 from the internal politics of Liberia to the extent that Ghanaian  
17 soldiers in Liberia now concentrate on peacekeeping only. This  
18 has endeared the Ghanaians to all the factions and indeed  
19 everybody in Liberia. While I was there a leading Monrovia  
11:19:10 20 newspaper The Inquirer described them as the 'ECOMOG heroes from  
21 Ghana'. Sadly the same cannot be said about the other countries  
22 in ECOMOG - Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Senegal.  
23 All of them seem to be pursuing a hidden agenda and appear to say  
24 they would gladly accept anybody as head of a united Liberia if  
11:19:37 25 his name is not Charles Taylor."

26 Pause there. The description about the role of the  
27 Ghanaians, Mr Taylor, is that something you were aware of at the  
28 time?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "For example, Sierra Leone and Guinea have units serving  
2 with ECOMOG supposedly to keep the peace in Liberia, yet the two  
3 countries provide operational and training bases for the United  
4 Liberation Movement (ULIMO) which has been fighting Taylor since  
11:20:19 5 late last year.

6 ULIMO, now led by the former Liberian banker Raleigh  
7 Seekie, is mostly made up of Doe's former Krahn soldiers who fled  
8 to Sierra Leone during the war. They also have in their ranks  
9 Mandingo Muslims led by Alhaji Kromah who felt persecuted during  
11:20:45 10 the war by Taylor's forces. Alhaji Kromah is concerned with  
11 fighting a religious war but the other ULIMO faction led by  
12 Seekie thinks this is bad public relations. So on the surface,  
13 ULIMO says it is fighting to force Taylor to obey the West  
14 African peace plan but the group's real objective is to drive  
11:21:12 15 Taylor out of Liberia. As Togba-Nah Tipoteh one of doyens of  
16 Liberian politics puts it: 'You don't make cold water cold with  
17 hot water. That is a bad policy'.

18 Taylor believes ULIMO is supported openly by Sierra Leone  
19 and Guinea, and covertly by Sawyer, ECOMOG and Nigeria."

11:21:37 20 Did you believe that?

21 A. I believed it and it was true.

22 Q. "Monrovia newspapers which are stridently anti-Taylor have  
23 reported for months that Sawyer's government is training  
24 'Liberians' (an euphemism for ULIMO fighters) in camps in Guinea  
11:22:02 25 and Sierra Leone. Though Sawyer himself has denied it, one of  
26 his ministers was seen by BBC reporters visiting one of the camps  
27 at Kankan (Guinea) in late July.

28 Whilst this article was being written in early September in  
29 London, ULIMO was announcing successes in its war with Taylor.

1 It said it had captured Cape Mount, Bomi and part of Lofa  
2 Counties bordering Sierra Leone. It had launched a surprise  
3 attack on Taylor's troops along the border and was making good  
4 grounds inland. ULIMO later rejected ceasefire proposals put  
11:22:45 5 forward by ECOMOG.

6 The ULIMO war has now focused attention on the double role  
7 being played by ECOWAS in Liberia. By their own peace plan, the  
8 famous 'Yamoussoukro IV Accord' signed in the Ivorian political  
9 capital in October 1991 which Taylor stands accused of not  
11:23:08 10 implementing, ECOWAS ought to have removed all 'hostile foreign  
11 forces' from the territory of Sierra Leone by now and ECOMOG  
12 should have 'eliminated all external threats to Liberia to  
13 facilitate disarmament and encampment of troops by the warring  
14 factions'.

11:23:29 15 ECOWAS and ECOMOG have not implemented their sides of the  
16 Accord, yet they threatened at the recent ECOWAS meeting in the  
17 Senegalese capital of Dakar (27-29 July), that if Taylor did not  
18 disarm and encamp his troops by 30 August, ECOMOG would impose  
19 economic sanctions, with UN blessing, on his areas of control.

11:23:59 20 When ECOWAS issued this threat, ULIMO was fighting Taylor's  
21 troops on the Sierra Leonean border yet not a word was said by  
22 the West African Leaders about ULIMO and its war against Taylor.

23 When the 30 August ultimatum expired, ULIMO was still  
24 engaged in fierce fighting in Cape Mount County, so ECOWAS could  
11:24:24 25 not impose the threatened sanctions - an act which proved, beyond  
26 doubt, the partiality of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in the crisis.  
27 Taylor, naturally, rejected the sanctions threat and said he  
28 could not disarm his troops while ULIMO was shooting at him - a  
29 demand Togba-Nah Tipoteh in a rare show of political acuity



1 Lacking in Monrovia these days, calls 'a reasonable demand'.

2 Most impartial politicians and journalists in Monrovia,  
3 also a rare breed these days, say that Sierra Leone and Guinea's  
4 provision of operational bases for ULIMO should disqualify them  
11:25:10 5 from participating in ECOMOG. ECOWAS, however, does not see  
6 anything wrong with the two countries' continued participation in  
7 ECOMOG.

8 Sierra Leone justifies its support for ULIMO on Taylor's  
9 continued support for the Sierra Leonean rebel group, the  
11:25:31 10 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Captain Foday Sankoh  
11 which has been fighting a guerrilla war inside Sierra Leone since  
12 early 1991.

13 Sankoh, who has had problems with the Sierra Leonean  
14 leadership for years, fought alongside Taylor against Doe.  
11:25:52 15 According to conventional thinking in Monrovia, Taylor used  
16 Sankoh to 'invade' Sierra Leone as a way of putting pressure on  
17 Sierra Leone to remove the ECOMOG supply base in Freetown."

18 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That is not true and that's what I'm saying that I disagree  
11:26:14 20 with some of the things he said. This is exactly what he said  
21 "conventional thinking". That's all it is.

22 Q. "But this tit for tat could be easily removed by ECOWAS.  
23 But it hasn't. ECOWAS would only say in the Dakar communique  
24 that 'some progress had been made' in the implementation of  
11:26:35 25 Yamoussoukro IV without elaborating.

26 For instance, ECOWAS would not say that its troops had been  
27 deployed at all the major entry points into Liberia since April  
28 1992 - including Gbarnga, Taylor's headquarters - and that the  
29 most substantial point in the Accord left for Taylor to implement

1 was disarming and encamping his troops.

2 Neither would ECOWAS admit that its troops had been on the  
3 Sierra Leone border since 30 April and that it withdrew its  
4 troops from the border in mid-July as soon as ULIMO intensified  
11:27:19 5 the war against Taylor. Which brings into focus again the  
6 partiality of ECOWAS in the conflict."

7 Pause there. Was it the case that ECOWAS had deployed  
8 troops along the Liberian Sierra Leone border, Mr Taylor?

9 A. That is true.

11:27:39 10 Q. When was that?

11 A. That is just before the ULIMO incursion into Liberia, which  
12 started around I would say, oh, '91, on or around I would say  
13 April, not to be too exact. But they were there and not only  
14 were they getting them into Liberia, but they had posted ECOMOG  
11:28:19 15 inside Sierra Leone maybe as a security precaution. This is just  
16 describing what I have tried to describe as best as I could and  
17 I've used one word that that's it. The hypocrisy at that time  
18 and the people - and the lost opportunities for peace. No-one  
19 could be serious about telling us to - these people were just not  
11:28:41 20 serious.

21 Q. So was it true that they were there guarding the border and  
22 then withdrew immediately ULIMO attacked?

23 A. Yes. I must say yes. Yes.

24 Q. "Since the ceasefire in November 1990, no fighting has gone  
11:29:03 25 on between the three main warring factions. Thus the only  
26 external threats to Liberia has come from ULIMO. The ECOWAS  
27 troops were on the border in the first place to prevent just what  
28 ULIMO is doing, but ECOMOG, while I was still in Liberia, was  
29 happily issuing press releases showing the position of ULIMO in

1 the war instead of concentrating on 'eliminating' the threat  
2 posed by ULIMO as Yamoussoukro IV had agreed.

3 There is a general feeling among the two million or so  
4 people living under Taylor that if ECOWAS and ECOMOG do not  
11:29:45 5 change their tune, they would soon drive Liberia into another  
6 major war which could be bloodier than the first.

7 According to the people, the much-reported 'intransigence'  
8 of Taylor stems from the fact that ECOWAS has not been impartial  
9 in brokering the peace. It has treated Taylor largely like a  
11:30:08 10 'warlord' not worthy of any proper hearing.

11 Up till now, Taylor says, he has not been able to meet  
12 one-on-one with some of the leaders brokering the peace - like  
13 Nigeria's Babangida and Ghana's Rawlings. 'How do you want peace  
14 in Liberia when you don't even want to sit down and really listen  
11:30:32 15 to one of the major actors in the conflict?', Taylor asks."

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think the tape has almost run out  
17 Mr Griffiths. That would probably be a very good spot to stop at  
18 this stage.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

11:30:49 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will take a short break and resume at  
21 12 o'clock.

22 [Break taken at 11.30 p.m.]

23 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

12:01:47 25 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, I would simply note for the  
26 record that Mr Bangura has departed the courtroom.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you. Go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

29 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were looking at

1 the middle column of this report and can I now invite your  
2 attention, please, to the last paragraph in that middle column:

3 "Up until now, Taylor says he has not been able to meet  
4 one on one with some of the leaders brokering the peace like  
12:02:34 5 Nigeria's Babangida and Ghana's Rawlings. 'How do you want peace  
6 in Liberia when you don't even want to sit down and really listen  
7 to one of the major actors in the conflict?' says Taylor".

8 Mr Taylor, during this period from the start of the  
9 revolution until 1992, where we are now, had you spoken to any of  
12:03:01 10 the ECOWAS leaders?

11 A. Oh, I [microphone not activated] had spoken - when you say  
12 ECOWAS leaders, that is - oh, excuse me, your Honours. When you  
13 say ECOWAS leaders, I had spoken to some ECOWAS leaders, okay,  
14 now - but the leaders mentioned here, I had not spoke to them.

12:03:48 15 But ECOWAS is a 16 member state.

16 Q. Yes, but those leaders who had sent troops to Liberia, had  
17 you spoken to any of them?

18 A. No, no. Excuse me, Mr President, may I have the privilege  
19 of just pointing out one little point that I have reflected upon?  
12:04:23 20 With your permission if I may state it?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, you are --

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I have no difficulty.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Please go ahead.

24 THE WITNESS: You know, I am running - we are talking about  
12:04:36 25 a 20 year or more period. I am running through dates and  
26 different things and on reflection, there was a question posed by  
27 counsel about the time that ULIMO took possession of the St Paul  
28 River bridge, and I know the date is August 1992. Now on  
29 reflection I think I did say 1991. That would be incorrect. I

1 wanted to make it very - you know, you are talking using dates,  
2 but that would be totally incorrect. If I said August 1991, it  
3 is incorrect. It is August 1992, and I just wanted to correct  
4 that.

12:05:19

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Thank you. Let's complete the article. Then I am going to  
7 ask you one or two more questions about it. "For example, one  
8 major Taylor complaint ignored by ECOWAS is that he cannot trust  
9 Amos Sawyer to organise a fair transitional period leading to  
10 elections. He complains that Sawyer, Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson, and  
11 other politicians now serving in Sawyer's government failed to  
12 support him financially in his war with Doe, despite their  
13 promises. Taylor is bitter that Sawyer and his friends who  
14 abandoned the war effort in midstream, despite their promises,  
15 are now hiding behind ECOWAS leaders to take the prize they  
16 didn't fight for. One doyen of Liberian politics told me  
17 off-the-record that Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson and other friends of  
18 Sawyer were collecting money in the US in support of Taylor  
19 before the war. Sawyer denies this, and Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson  
20 said last year that the money was for refugee relief only".

12:06:27

21 Pause there. Were you receiving that kind of financial  
22 backing from Sawyer and Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson, Mr Taylor?

23 A. I received the money from Ellen. Sawyer and these people  
24 may have contributed. I have no evidence to that. But the money  
25 was raised by Ellen.

12:06:54

26 Q. And was the money only for refugee relief?

27 A. The money was not for refugee relief. I had met Ellen and  
28 had shown her in Paris the photos of the men that were already in  
29 training. What kind of relief is that when men are in Libya

1 training? I mean, if Ellen said that, Ellen is lying, and she  
2 knows that she is lying, okay? Ellen was in America raising  
3 money. What kind of release is that? You know people are in  
4 training. Well, what is she saying in another interview in  
12:07:35 5 another magazine that she is going to drink champagne when we  
6 finally take Monrovia. Do you take a government by relief  
7 supplies? Nonsense. I mean, Ellen raised the money. She  
8 visited me in Gborplay in the bush, not for - she saw the  
9 soldiers, she spent a few days there and she bent back. This is  
12:07:55 10 totally not true. Totally.

11 Q. Let's go to the final page of this document, Mr Taylor, and  
12 there are only four sections of this --

13 MS HOLLIS: Are we talking about page 16?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, we are.

12:08:22 15 MS HOLLIS: We do have an objection to this. This is not  
16 in fact the final page of the article. The final page of the  
17 article is the prior page with the little square after "Nobody  
18 could have said it better". That is the end of the article that  
19 deals with the interview with this accused. If you look at the  
12:08:41 20 next page, it is purely and simply the opinions of another  
21 person. There is no foundation for this, and we would object to  
22 this, and they do have other means available to put this  
23 information in. This is not a matter of the accused speaking on  
24 his own behalf.

12:09:00 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, what do you say to that objection,  
26 Mr Griffiths?

27 MR GRIFFITHS: That is why I prefaced what I had to say  
28 about this by saying I only want to ask about particular  
29 passages. I am aware this is an editorial and it is the opinion

1 of the writer, but if one looks at the top of the third column  
2 for it by way of example, we see a quote from the Guinean  
3 President, "Charles Taylor is a bad example. Civilians shouldn't  
4 be encouraged to overthrow military regimes". Can I not put that  
12:09:35 5 to the witness and ask the witness if he is aware of that as a  
6 fact? That is a statement of fact, not opinion, and in  
7 consequence where particular facts are mentioned in the editorial  
8 in that way, it seems to us that it does not contravene the rule  
9 against opinion evidence to ask the witness about it.

12:09:59 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Where did you quote that passage from  
11 again, Mr Griffiths?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: The top of the third column.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Oh, I see. Yes, just excuse me a moment.

14 [Trial Chamber conferred]

12:10:26 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we will overrule the objection. We  
16 will allow you to put those quotations that you have already  
17 referred to to the witness.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Mr Taylor --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- I am only dealing with particular quotations here, okay?

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Now if we look at the penultimate paragraph in the middle  
24 column which begins "This being the background", do you see that?

12:11:05 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Do you see that comment that "Taylor's virus must be  
27 stopped before it contaminates the whole West African  
28 sub-region"? Had you heard that being said?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Who by?

2 A. Oh, it started with Dawda Kairaba Jawara, and this was the  
3 basis upon which they launched this deceitful campaign against  
4 me. So Conteh saying it was normal, there were quite a few of  
12:11:50 5 them saying that.

6 Q. Now when we go to the next column do you see there is a  
7 quote attributed to the Guinean President Lansana Conte, "Charles  
8 Taylor is a bad example. Civilians shouldn't be encouraged to  
9 overthrow military regimes". Do you recall that being said by  
12:12:17 10 the President of Guinea?

11 A. I do recall that, and I've mentioned to this Court that  
12 most of the military juntas in West Africa at that particular  
13 time were in fact afraid, and he did say that.

14 Q. And if you look - miss a paragraph - at the paragraph  
12:12:40 15 thereafter which begins "According to", do you see a quote  
16 attributed to the ECOWAS Secretary-General Abbas Bundu, "'It is  
17 no longer fashionable to ascend to power through the barrel of  
18 the gun,' he told the Voice of America in late August". Do you  
19 recall that being said?

12:13:00 20 A. Oh, yes, I recall Bundu and I do recall that I responded to  
21 this one by Abbas, and I think my reference was that well: Fine,  
22 what do you call what just happened in Nigeria? What do you do  
23 about Nigeria? When military governments come, what do you do  
24 about them? They came by the barrel of the gun. I recall this  
12:13:29 25 very well.

26 Q. And in similar vein what had quite recently happened in  
27 Sierra Leone?

28 A. It had a military regime in Sierra Leone.

29 Q. Yes, but what had happened quite recently in Sierra Leone?



1 What had happened to Momoh?

2 A. Well, President Momoh had been overthrown.

3 Q. Who by?

4 A. Momoh was overthrown by Captain Valentine Strasser.

12:14:00 5 Q. And help me. At the time did you hear any ECOWAS leader  
6 complaining about what had happened in Sierra Leone?

7 A. Oh, well to tell the truth, there were some complaints  
8 about the takeover because one of the fellow generals had been  
9 removed from power, and I think pressure commenced immediately

12:14:30 10 for what they call return to a democratic process. Yes, but  
11 there were some questions about it.

12 Q. Now the final thing I want to ask you about is this. Go  
13 back to the first column, please. Yes?

14 A. Yes.

12:14:50 15 Q. The second to last paragraph speaks of two stories against  
16 Taylor being carried in the local press and later carried by the  
17 BBC. Do you know about that?

18 A. I am not sure about the exact stories. There could have  
19 been so many, I'm not sure which stories the author is referring  
12:15:19 20 to here.

21 Q. Very well.

22 A. All the newspapers in Monrovia are owned by Sawyer, so --

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want now to ask you in general terms  
24 about a couple of things, bearing in mind the indictment, and so  
12:15:43 25 can we go back a page to page 15 of the article, please. Okay?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. So the penultimate page. I have in mind in asking you the  
28 suggestion of joint criminal enterprise. First column, third  
29 paragraph from the bottom of the column:

1 "Sankoh, who had had problems with the Sierra Leonean  
2 leadership for years, fought alongside Taylor against Doe.  
3 According to conventional thinking in Monrovia, Taylor used  
4 Sankoh to invade Sierra Leone as a way of putting pressure on  
12:16:37 5 Sierra Leone to remove the ECOMOG supply base in Freetown".

6 Question number 1: Were you aware of Sankoh fighting  
7 alongside the NPFL?

8 A. No, I was not aware and in fact Sankoh did not, because if  
9 he had fought alongside the NPFL I would have known. But even if  
12:17:10 10 we go one step further, by all accounts before this Court I don't  
11 recall - and I stand corrected on this - any evidence that was  
12 led in this Court that suggested that Sankoh and Mohamed  
13 Tarawalli and the other fought alongside any NPFL unit by the  
14 Prosecution's own account of evidence before this Court, and I  
12:17:37 15 stand corrected.

16 Q. Now the second aspect of this, this suggests that you used  
17 Sankoh to invade in order to put pressure on Sierra Leone to  
18 remove the ECOMOG supply base in Freetown. Did you at any stage  
19 harbour such an intention?

12:18:05 20 A. Never, ever harboured any such intention, never planned any  
21 such intention. There was no reason to plan any such intention.

22 Q. Now yesterday you accepted that for a period you did  
23 provide support to Sankoh?

24 A. That is correct.

12:18:32 25 Q. Question: Why?

26 A. Let's look at - my thinking at that time cannot be  
27 considered any less important than the conventional thinking of  
28 any major Western or other country or let's say educated person,  
29 even today. What do I mean by that? I have explained to this

1 Court that here we have - Guinea has armed a group of individuals  
2 called ULIMO. Here is Sierra Leone, and they have armed another  
3 group called the Liberian United For Democracy, finally coming  
4 together forming ULIMO. Two countries are waging war against me.

12:19:38 5 I don't think anyone in his sound mind expected me to just sit  
6 there and do nothing about it. My relationship with Sankoh was a  
7 pure and simple security relationship to protect my border, that  
8 we would fight ULIMO in Sierra Leone without having to fight them  
9 in Liberia.

12:20:01 10 Look, I don't - for the love of facts and truth this - the  
11 Prosecution can construct, they can construe, they can design  
12 whatever plans, and it is up to these wonderful judges to decide.  
13 I never went or ordered troops on that border in Sierra Leone for  
14 no other reason except security. Now whatever way the

12:20:35 15 Prosecution puts it would be the decision of the judges. The  
16 fact of the matter is it is that and only that reason. No other  
17 reason.

18 Q. Now the other general matter I want you to help me with,  
19 based on that article, is this. You appreciate, Mr Taylor, that  
12:21:04 20 on Count 9 of this indictment you are charged with the use of  
21 child soldiers, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now did you, as leader of the NPFL, use children as  
24 soldiers?

12:21:32 25 A. No.

26 Q. Now in that article it states quite clearly, or suggests  
27 quite clearly, that children were being so used and that they had  
28 a specific name, Small Boys Unit. So what are you saying about  
29 this allegation, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Well, I have said to this Court so many times I do not  
2 dispute and will not sit here and dispute today that children at  
3 different points in Liberia at the time were out with soldiers,  
4 they went into areas where military activities occurred, they  
12:22:28 5 went with their families, they went with their brothers, they  
6 were at gates, there was no official policy of the NPFL to  
7 recruit, train, arm and send into combat soldiers.

8 In fact, we may probably be able to get the individual - I  
9 even had one of the largest orphanages during the war in the city  
12:22:56 10 of Gbarnga. We hoped that the lady, she is very old now - we  
11 hope she is alive before this is over because we lost one of our  
12 older women in Liberia.

13 The whole phenomena of children in combat situations I will  
14 call it is not a new one. It's an old one. In the West African  
12:23:23 15 sub-region whether it is Liberia, whether you go into the central  
16 African region, there is always - whenever you have a crisis  
17 where there is massive loss of lives you will always find  
18 soldiers, I mean, moving around with children, using them for  
19 different purposes. And it can be construed as them being used  
12:23:48 20 for combat, because soldiers carry - these children carry arms  
21 and then you and your brother walk and they hold arms. Some of  
22 them that look like children are of age. But the fact of the  
23 matter is I will not sit here and say that children were not  
24 involved in the whole scenario of the civil war for other  
12:24:10 25 purposes, but not directly officially for combat, no.

26 Q. Were SBUs, that is children, used to provide security at  
27 the Executive Mansion in Gbarnga?

28 A. At the Executive Mansion in Gbarnga there were many younger  
29 people. Yes, there were some young people there, not for

1 security purposes. I have heard the name mentioned here in this  
2 Court about Zobon has been used who is in fact related to me, he  
3 and his cousin, that also his cousin was a soldier, it is a she,  
4 and they were around there. Even from the orphanage they will  
12:25:09 5 come to the yard, they will cut grass in the yard, they would sit  
6 at the gates with the soldiers, yes. Observe what they are doing  
7 when they are not in school. Yes, there were many children that  
8 were around the Executive Mansion, yes.

9 Q. My question is more specific, Mr Taylor.

12:25:29 10 A. Not as an SBU, no.

11 Q. Did you knowingly employ children to provide security at  
12 the Executive Mansion?

13 A. No, not at all. No.

14 Q. In your relations with Foday Sankoh and what you later  
12:25:57 15 learnt to be the RUF, did you instruct them or incite them in any  
16 way to employ children as soldiers?

17 A. No. How can I instruct a leader of another country almost?  
18 No.

19 Q. Did you implore Sankoh or any RUF leader to employ children  
12:26:34 20 as soldiers?

21 A. No. And I understand the question. The answer is no, but  
22 I want to give a little explanation here. Look, I know these  
23 questions are designed because of the type of story that we have  
24 from the side of the Prosecution, but it must be established.

12:27:06 25 The whole issue of what is going on in Sierra Leone in fact is  
26 none of my business. Look, if ULIMO had not attacked Liberia you  
27 have never - you would have never heard of this foolishness,  
28 because there would have been no need to secure some cooperation  
29 to protect my border. As simple as that.

1           So I want to lay it in concrete. This belief that Foday  
2 Sankoh and his people are a bunch of idiots, don't know what they  
3 are doing, they are almost my wards, that I am feeding them,  
4 clothing them, instructing them, is pure nonsense and that is  
12:28:19 5 what is giving rise to these specific questions as to this  
6 indictment.

7           These people with their own ambitions, that started years  
8 before Taylor. They own there problem in Sierra Leone. There  
9 were coup d'etats in Sierra Leone before it ever reached Liberia.  
12:28:42 10 The first coup d'etat in Africa I think was staged in Togo by  
11 Eyadema against Sylvanus Olympio. Other than that, Sierra Leone  
12 had their crisis.

13           As a young man I remember coming to my father's office. He  
14 worked briefly at the immigration before I left for the States  
12:29:03 15 and there was a gentleman I met in my father's office. There was  
16 a General Lansana. He was involved in a coup d'etat - an  
17 attempted coup d'etat in Sierra Leone and had fled to Liberia  
18 during the administration of Siaka Stevens and there were long  
19 negotiations. He was eventually extradited to Sierra Leone and  
12:29:31 20 executed by Siaka Stevens. I am not sure if this is the same  
21 area that Foday Sankoh and Hinga Norman and that group were all  
22 involved, I am not too sure, but what am I trying to say?

23           I am trying to say that you have got a history of problem  
24 in Sierra Leone with people wanting to take what they call the  
12:29:51 25 government. I have said to this Court I go to Libya. I meet the  
26 Sierra Leoneans there preparing for what they wanted to do. So  
27 for someone to believe that all of a sudden Charles Taylor has  
28 met a bunch of sheep that are lost, they don't know what they are  
29 doing, and he is guiding them, he is directing them. There is

1 nothing further removed from the truth than this. This is  
2 beyond, your Honours - beyond my own thinking.

3 Maybe, you know, for whatever reason I am going through  
4 this crisis, you know, is my own fate, but this is sheer  
12:30:44 5 foolishness, that somebody would believe that these people who  
6 have been fighting all their lives, coups, counter-coups,  
7 executions here and there, who go to Libya, receive training,  
8 that Taylor who has never had military training in his life is  
9 now teleguiding them is a lie.

12:31:15 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I assist with a spelling, please,  
11 Mr President. Sylvanus Olympio, S-Y-L-V-A-N-U-S O-L-Y-M-P-I-O.  
12 He was the first Head of State of Togo.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: What about Zobon?

12:31:47 15 THE WITNESS: Zobon, Z-O-B-O-N. Zobon.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: That should be on the record.

17 THE WITNESS: It is on the record, yes. He is a little  
18 cousin of mine.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:32:05 20 Q. And speaking of Zobon, did he have any particular area of  
21 responsibility?

22 A. No, he lived practically with me. He was always at the  
23 mansion and he was taken to be in testimony here an SBU leader.  
24 He is my little cousin and his other cousin also worked with me,  
12:32:23 25 a lady, that was one of our principal commanders.

26 Q. Was he leader of the SBU?

27 A. No.

28 Q. Was there a formal organisation within the NPFL called SBU?

29 A. The truth of the matter is - well, there was a group that

1 was referred to in I will almost say like a joke form that there  
2 is a unit of young people, almost like an auxiliary, like you  
3 have a boy scout, they were just called a unit of boys, yes. It  
4 was known - that word was used throughout Gbarnga, yes.

12:33:14 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Would your Honour give me a moment. I would  
6 now like us, please, to put that document away and before we do  
7 that I am helpfully reminded could I have that document marked  
8 for identification, please, MFI-4.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the document catalogued DCT-108  
12:34:24 10 being a copy of an article from the New African, October 1992  
11 will be marked MFI-4.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, can we now continue the narrative, please.

14 Now, you have helpfully told us that ULIMO control and its

12:35:05 15 extension to the St Paul's bridge was achieved by August 1992,  
16 yes?

17 A. That is correct. That is correct.

18 Q. Now, help us. By that stage, August 1992, was there still  
19 existing a relationship between you and Foday Sankoh?

12:35:30 20 A. No, no, no, no. That relationship had been severed some  
21 months earlier than that.

22 Q. Were you providing any - were you continuing to provide  
23 supplies to Mr Foday Sankoh after this date?

24 A. No, we were not and we could not.

12:36:12 25 Q. You will recall, Mr Taylor, that this Court has heard  
26 testimony to the effect that bush paths were being used through  
27 the forests which border Sierra Leone to conduct supplies to  
28 Mr Sankoh. Was that going on?

29 A. Counsel, your Honours, first, I heard that testimony. It



1 is - in direct answer to your question, it is false, misleading  
2 and really vicious. A vicious lie. Now, let me take this Court  
3 back to the records and if I recall, that precise statement could  
4 have been - and I stand corrected - made by an unprotected  
12:37:16 5 witness, so I can mention his name, General Varmuyan Sherif, if I  
6 am right. Now, who is Varmuyan Sherif? Varmuyan Sherif at this  
7 time is a ULIMO general. Now Varmuyan Sherif is not an NPFL  
8 general at this time. Now, if Varmuyan Sherif says - and if  
9 there is any truth to this - that the NPFL is still having  
12:37:57 10 relationship with the RUF and is using bush routes to get arms  
11 and ammunition, or arms, whatever he said, to the RUF, it is very  
12 clear then he is not a very good general. He is not a very good  
13 general, because if he is an enemy general, and arms are passing  
14 through his territory and he knows of it, and he permits the arms  
12:38:31 15 to pass, he is a useless general, and that is what makes it even  
16 a bigger lie. These people, I don't know how they got to these  
17 lies. I have said to this Court with all honesty the St Paul  
18 River marked the line of demarcation after May of 1992 when Top  
19 20, Top 40 and Top Final occurred and we subsequently withdrew.  
12:39:01 20 And I'd said to this Court we withdrew our men from Sierra Leone  
21 before ULIMO took full control of that bridge. That is why I  
22 said to the Court that if I said 1991, it was misleading. It is  
23 1992. We had severed relationship even before ULIMO fully  
24 controlled Lofa. Now here is a general sitting before a fellow  
12:39:25 25 sitting down here saying there were bush paths. Just for the  
26 sake of the court, let's look at the area. We are talking about  
27 the rainforest. It would be normal that the first line of  
28 defence for ULIMO forces - and I am trying to go through this  
29 slowly because we are dealing with military. ULIMO has captured

1 this area from us. On our side of the river at every available  
2 point we are putting, what, security to keep ULIMO from  
3 infiltrating because there were so many attempts on the part of  
4 ULIMO to come across the St Paul River to come to Gbarnga. From  
12:40:23 5 the St Paul River bridge to the city of Gbarnga is about 20/25  
6 miles and ULIMO did not just come to the St Paul River bridge and  
7 say, "Okay, we are happy. This is it. We are going to stop".  
8 They were prodding. They wanted to get to Gbarnga. So there was  
9 combat. We were fighting, and so there were heavy defences on  
12:40:46 10 both sides; on the ULIMO side on that side of the St Paul River,  
11 on the NPFL side on this side of the St Paul River, along the  
12 river for as long as we could go in a horizontal fashion.

13 Now if someone comes and sits and tells these judges  
14 that things were going, then he should not have been a general.  
12:41:10 15 Where we would have - how did we break through ULIMO's line to  
16 travel almost 150 miles from the St Paul River to Sierra Leone to  
17 penetrate with arms and ammunition? It just could not happen; it  
18 did not happen; and this Varmuyan Sheriff lied. Because of all of  
19 the reasons I have mentioned, he lied. He lied.

12:41:40 20 Q. Were you aware that he was a ULIMO general?

21 A. Who, Sheriff? Those days during the war we got to know some  
22 of their names. I have mentioned there were Mandingos fighting  
23 for me too, yes? We got to know. It is a part of military  
24 intelligence work to get to know the names of the top commanders  
12:42:08 25 on the other side. It is also a part of their duty to find out  
26 which areas that particular general is commanding, because there  
27 are some very good officers and there are some not so good  
28 officers. So there are certain areas that if you know certain  
29 officers are commanding, from your side you would try to put a

1 counter officer to command the area because when two top  
2 commanders meet, it is a matter of trying to see who can outwit  
3 the other. I guess one - this Court can be reminded of the dual  
4 between - I think it is General ^ Rambo and Patton during World  
12:42:58 5 War II in Northern Africa. Wherever General ^ ram BOES was,  
6 Patten wanted to know what happened there, and so it is the same  
7 procedure. And so we knew of their names. We knew and we tried  
8 to pick out where they were so we could counter them with certain  
9 officers. So we did know that General Sherif was a senior ULIMO  
12:43:19 10 commander, yes.

11 Q. And did he belong to a particular faction within ULIMO?

12 A. Oh, yes, yes. General Sheriff is Mandingo and he was a  
13 ULIMO-K.

14 Q. And ULIMO-K after the split within ULIMO ended up  
12:43:38 15 controlling what part of Liberia?

16 A. ULIMO-K controlled Lofa County in full. ULIMO-J controlled  
17 Cape Mount and Bomi Counties.

18 Q. So did Varmuyan Sherif later - was he later appointed to  
19 any post by you after you became President?

12:44:11 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What post was that?

22 A. Varmuyan Sherif was left or permitted - I permitted him to  
23 remain in a position of assistant director of the Special  
24 Security Services for - he was responsible for what we called the  
12:44:44 25 - it is operations, but his primary responsibility was for  
26 arranging the convoy of the President. He was in charge of the  
27 convoy, we call it, the operational convoy.

28 Q. So, let us try and put together what you have told us,  
29 please. So Varmuyan Sherif starts off as a general in a force

1 fighting against the NPFL, is that right?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. He is later assistant director of what group?

4 A. Of the SSS, the Special Security Services.

12:45:27 5 Q. He is also Mandingo?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Did you, as suggested to this Court by him, use him at any  
8 time to transport arms to Sierra Leone?

9 A. Never. When I use the expression he was permitted to stay,  
12:45:53 10 we have got to put this into context. The context is as follows.

11 During the transitional government where I sat on the Council of  
12 State as of 1995, I was in the mansion, Alhaji Kromah, Boley,  
13 George Boley, the members of the Council of State, brought in  
14 different personnel to work in the building because no-one really  
15 trusted the other, and Varmuyan Sherif was in that position  
16 acting when Alhaji Kromah sat on the Council of State. So after  
17 my election as President, in an act of reconciliation and making  
18 sure that we can unite all sides, we left him stay there, but  
19 cognizant of the fact that he was before then an enemy soldier.

12:46:31 20 And so Varmuyan Sherif actually being put at where he was put was  
21 a demonstration of the fact that there was an issue of trust.

22 Because the SSS, the Special Security Services, is something like  
23 the - what in other countries is called the Secret Service, and  
24 that position that had to do with the - the actual word used at  
12:47:15 25 that particular time is motorcade, okay? It was called the

26 motorcade. That did not involve being directly in the presence  
27 of the President or being armed around the President. It was a  
28 secure position away from the President where you could work with  
29 the motorcade, prepare, make sure that everyone is ready and on

1 board and did not call for him being close to the President,  
2 because in fact there was this issue of doubt. And so I could  
3 not and did not send Varmuyan Sherif to carry any arms into  
4 Sierra Leone; number 1, because he was not what you could call a  
12:48:34 5 confidante, he was not close to me that I could trust him. Now,  
6 I have gone through a war with hundreds of what I will call very  
7 trusted soldiers and generals. Now, I would have to be out - I  
8 would be cuckoo to take an enemy soldier and tell him to go and  
9 take arms to anyone, even if it's a - even to a unit inside  
12:48:59 10 Liberia. I do not know why Varmuyan alleged that, but I guess he  
11 has to make his story look good, but I have explained this to  
12 show the distance. I don't disclaim that Varmuyan worked there,  
13 but the motorcade was a secure position away from the President  
14 and that he was not a confidante, no.

12:49:27 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, when the witness said that  
16 Varmuyan Sherif was a director in the SSS, was this under the  
17 NPFL?

18 THE WITNESS: No, that's - I presume that question was  
19 during my presidency. The question was did I appoint him  
12:49:47 20 subsequently. It is during my presidency.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. And on that note, just so that we are clear, does there  
23 come a time when the NPFL ceases to exist?

24 A. Oh, yes.

12:50:05 25 Q. When is that?

26 A. Again, that question, you know, we passed through it. I  
27 would say - I would say about a year or so before the elections  
28 the NPFL - all warring factions had to disband, form political  
29 parties, become certified before you could participate in the

1 election, so that process had to happen. The NPFL did not cease  
2 to exist at the time in 1995 of the deployment of ECOMOG  
3 throughout the country. I want to draw that distinction.

4 Q. Now just to deal with another aspect of Mr Sheriff, that  
12:51:11 5 Prosecution witness. As far as you are aware, Mr Taylor, was he  
6 all of sound mind?

7 A. No, no, no, no, no, no, no. Varmuyan - I don't know this  
8 boy. When I became President and Varmuyan remained in that  
9 position, actually Varmuyan went, sadly - and I say this  
12:51:37 10 earnestly - sadly because I wish no bad fate for him, but  
11 Varmuyan went out of his mind and what which call in Liberia he  
12 went crazy. Varmuyan was on the streets naked and eating from  
13 garbage areas. We took him and I sent him to Mali to - there is  
14 an area. I am not sure if it is on the map. There is an area in  
12:52:09 15 Mali, it is called Jenny.

16 Q. How do you spell that?

17 A. Oh, my God. J-E-N-N-Y. Jenny is a highly religious part  
18 of Mali, very, very - they have very senior - senior clerics,  
19 Islamic clerics there. It is called Jenny. We sent him there  
12:52:34 20 for treatment because Sheriff is also Muslim, and thank God he was  
21 healed and he was returned.

22 Q. And can you recall when those problems beset him,  
23 Mr Taylor, just roughly?

24 A. Oh, that had to be I would say round about - not too long.  
12:53:00 25 About late '97 or thereabouts. It was not too long. It was not  
26 too long that Varmuyan got sick. It was not too long after my  
27 presidency that he got sick.

28 Q. And after his return from Djenne in Mali did he maintain  
29 his role within the SSS?

1 A. No, after Varmuyan returned there were some little problems  
2 and he was transferred to the - what we call the bureau of  
3 immigration and naturalisation services. That is where he was  
4 transferred to.

12:53:40 5 Q. Now we have sidetracked somewhat to deal with other  
6 matters. Can we now return to the narrative, August 1992. I am  
7 being assisted helpfully by my learned friend, Mr Anyah. Djenne,  
8 D-J-E-N-N-E.

9 THE WITNESS: Djenne. It is pronounced Djenne.

12:54:21 10 MR GRIFFITHS: And, yes, there is an acute accent over the  
11 two Es:

12 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, let's return to the narrative. August  
13 1992. You have already explained at length what is the state of  
14 affairs on the ground. What is happening during the second half  
15 of '92?

12:54:48 16 A. Well, you have peace talks again start up. We also mention  
17 the problem with Octopus, we have mentioned that already, but it  
18 is mostly - I think it's Cotonou, that we are pursuing Cotonou,  
19 and Abuja during that particular time. Cotonou and Abuja. I  
12:55:31 20 think, you know, we are talking about a long period. I have - we  
21 have - I have gone through extensively with - because of this  
22 period and not being caught up later with some of these dates,  
23 because this whole thing is date oriented. There is a whole - in  
24 my archives a whole time line dealing with this whole thing  
12:56:00 25 because if I am not wrong there may be as many as a dozen peace  
26 agreements. I mean there is Cotonou I, Cotonou II, there is  
27 Abuja, there is Banjul, there is Dakar. So I guess I would  
28 really be able not to mislead this Court if at some point we can  
29 be helped with - there is a document in my archives of a full

1 time line. I can give the years and probably we can - because I  
2 could probably get mixed up with this and I don't want to mislead  
3 the Court. Because in '92 we are talking about at least two  
4 major discussions going on. We are talking about Cotonou and we  
12:56:44 5 are talking about Abuja.

6 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, this is not a memory test and the document  
7 you referred to is available. It is in a bundle entitled  
8 "Additional Documents For Week 30" and it should be behind  
9 divider 3.

12:57:17 10 A. Yes, I am saying this because in '93 you have got Cotonou,  
11 you've got all kinds of agreements going. '94 we have got the  
12 first interim government taking seat. So it's a lot of --

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Do your Honours have the document? It  
14 should be headed page 1 "Preface". I am grateful:

12:57:52 15 Q. Mr Taylor, you can look at the document. It is behind  
16 divider 3.

17 A. Okay. Yes, this is the --

18 Q. You have got it?

19 A. Yes.

12:58:18 20 Q. Now, first of all just help us, please. What is this  
21 document, please, Mr Taylor?

22 A. This is a document that is setting out the time line. I  
23 just mentioned to the Court that by late 1992 we are dealing with  
24 two different talks that follow combat and the reason why I had  
12:58:48 25 asked to refer to this, as we go into 1993 we have got a second  
26 set as early as the first half of 1993 where we go back into  
27 Cotonou, which is Cotonou II, to begin to set out the groundwork  
28 for the establishment of a transitional government system in  
29 Liberia.



1 That particular whole situation, Cotonou II, in my opinion  
2 is the actual document that finally establishes a road map for  
3 peace in Liberia and then that goes on, we push it around and  
4 there is still a little conflict here and there. That is the  
12:59:41 5 government that set up the first Council of State. We are  
6 represented on this Council of State by one of our senior  
7 generals, the late General Isaac Musa. That particular council  
8 is headed by Professor David Kpomakpor.

9 Q. Spelling, please?

13:00:04 10 A. It is a Gola name. It is K-P-O-M-A-K-P-O-R. I think it is  
11 Kpomakpor, yes. I stand corrected. I think it  
12 K-P-O-M-A-K-P-O-R, Kpomakpor. Professor Kpomakpor is heading  
13 that particular government and they take over actually in 1994  
14 and then they are there and so then there is problem again. He  
13:00:41 15 is trying to put into place a mechanism for election, it doesn't  
16 work too well and then another guy comes in later on and we go to  
17 Abuja again. So there is this confusion that I am glad that we  
18 can come to this document because they are all tied in and I  
19 could mislead the Court, but I just did this to give a general  
13:01:04 20 view that the Court may know that I am very aware of this  
21 particular period.

22 Q. As I say, Mr Taylor, this should not be a test of memory.  
23 If there are historical documents available, let's refer to them.  
24 But help me before we look at the document with this: What is  
13:01:22 25 the source of this document? Where does it come in?

26 A. This document is put together really by, you know, a  
27 research group that did it to establish a chronology of the  
28 events in Liberia.

29 Q. Yes, but the particular document physically where does it

1 come from?

2 A. From my archives.

3 Q. Whose archives?

4 A. Mine. Mine.

13:01:47 5 Q. Now we see from the --

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Could we be a little bit more specific  
7 with the author of the document? He said a particular group.

8 THE WITNESS: Well, we had a bunch of historians and  
9 journalists, a group that put it together for our study. And I  
10 know you want the name of the group. I did not have a name. It  
11 was a committee put together to put this into chronology.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now we see that the document is entitled, "Analytical  
14 Chronology of the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia: Banjul to  
15 Akosombo and Beyond". We then have the Taylor contents which  
16 need not delay us, and then, just to put the document in context,  
17 let's have a look at the introduction briefly, please:

18 "In the 14 October 1994 report to the Security Council the  
19 Secretary-General recommends a three month extension of the  
20 mandate of UNOMIL until 13 January 1995."

21 The purpose of that is to execute a fact-finding mission  
22 upon which the Secretary-General's recommendation on UNOMIL's  
23 future roles in Liberia will be based.

24 I don't delay any further with that. Let's go over to page  
13:03:54 25 6, please, and we see that the document starts with a description  
26 of the humanitarian conflict situation in Liberia on the eve of  
27 the Banjul ECOWAS meeting in 1990 and there is then set out in  
28 numbered paragraphs the thinking behind the deployment in due  
29 course of ECOMOG in Liberia. So let's just take a moment and

1 reacquaint ourselves with this:

2 "While pressures for change in the conduct and governance  
3 of President Doe's government had been mounting in the years  
4 preceding the invasion of Liberia by the forces of the National  
13:05:00 5 Patriotic Front of Liberia in 1989, the mounting of that invasion  
6 marked the shift of the struggle of state power contestation in  
7 Liberia from constitutionalist politics to that of national  
8 security politics. With the invasion the main issue of politics  
9 in Liberia had become that of securing or changing an order of  
13:05:25 10 power through war. From December 1989 to February 1990 NPFL  
11 invasion" --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis?

13 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Mr President, this does not appear to be a  
14 straightforward chronology. It appears to be comment by someone  
13:05:49 15 we do not know, prepared for what purpose we don't know and I  
16 don't think sufficient foundation has been established for this  
17 to be put to this witness. This entire document is something of  
18 a mystery. Some research group and somehow it ended up in an  
19 archive. So I would suggest there is not enough of a foundation  
13:06:11 20 for this witness to have this information put to him in this  
21 document.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I preface my response, Mr President, with  
24 this observation: Here we have a witness being required  
13:06:30 25 effectively to give an account of his whole life, in particular a  
26 period of more than a decade during which for several years he  
27 was the President of a nation state. Bearing in mind of course  
28 that the giving of evidence should not be solely a memory testing  
29 exercise, and furthermore that it is incumbent upon this Court to

1 ensure that it avails itself of the best evidence possible, it  
2 seems to us the wisest course is to allow such a man to have  
3 access to necessary and available historical records to assist  
4 him in the giving of his account.

13:07:21 5 In relation to this particular document, he has told us who  
6 prepared it, where it comes from - his own archives - which  
7 suggests of course his own familiarity with the document. It  
8 seems to me, bearing in mind all of those facts, that there can  
9 be nothing wrong in allowing a witness in Mr Taylor's unique  
13:07:44 10 position to avail himself of the assistance this document  
11 necessarily can provide.

12 And before I sit down, I am dealing with this initial part  
13 in order to put into context the remainder of the document which  
14 truly does set out a chronology.

13:08:04 15 A. I know not whether my learned friends have read the  
16 document properly, because if so they would be able to confirm  
17 that it is in fact a chronology and I don't propose to go through  
18 it word for word. I was merely seeking at this preliminary stage  
19 to introduce the chronology. So we would say there is nothing  
13:08:25 20 wrong in these circumstances in the witness being able to assist  
21 the giving of his account by reference to this document.

22 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, sir, but as a matter of law and  
23 procedure, there are official documents relating to Security  
24 Council resolutions, or discussions, or minutes, or reports, and  
13:08:50 25 there are official documents which set out all of the numerous  
26 peace agreements, ceasefires, and other accords that were  
27 involved in the war in Liberia. That would be the official  
28 record, not this unknown document that seems to have someone's  
29 opinion about things.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths - firstly, Ms Hollis,  
2 Mr Griffiths asked the question and you objected, and he replied  
3 to your objection. In future you don't have a reply to his  
4 reply. But, Mr Griffiths, we are going to confer on this, but  
13:09:28 5 before we do, I just wanted to clarify one thing. Before showing  
6 this document to the witness, you said that this is not a memory  
7 test. Now did you show the document to the witness to refresh  
8 his memory of facts that he knows himself without extracting them  
9 from a document, or are you showing him the document so as to put  
13:09:57 10 to him facts alleged in the document with which he may or may not  
11 agree?

12           MR GRIFFITHS: Well, it is the former primarily,  
13 Mr President, because he has already mentioned that there has  
14 been a number of agreements during this period - ceasefire  
13:10:14 15 agreements - and those are detailed in the document. So the  
16 document is being used to refresh his memory to prevent the kind  
17 of mistake made earlier in his testimony on more than one  
18 occasion when he gives an erroneous date which only later  
19 reflection allows him to correct. And so it is to prevent that  
13:10:37 20 kind of hiatus in the giving of his account that we submit  
21 reference to the dates given in this document should be allowed.

22           PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I think I see what Ms Hollis was  
23 objecting to. Because in putting the document to the witness,  
24 you were in fact reading the document on to the record as  
13:10:58 25 evidence of itself, not as evidence of a refreshment of the  
26 witness's memory, but of itself being evidence. I think  
27 Ms Hollis has objected on the grounds that if you are going to do  
28 that, then there is not sufficient foundation. Anyway, I am just  
29 summarising the objection at this stage. We will confer briefly.

1 [Trial Chamber conferred]

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we are not satisfied at the  
3 moment that you have in fact laid sufficient foundation for the  
4 use of the document in the manner that you were proceeding to do.  
13:13:39 5 We really are in the dark as to its origin and when it was  
6 prepared and for what purpose. Was it prepared specifically for  
7 the purposes of this litigation, or for some other purpose? We  
8 would like further clarification on those matters.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

13:13:59 10 Q. Mr Taylor, help us. Do you recall when this document was  
11 first prepared?

12 A. This document was first prepared - I would put it to around  
13 the beginning of 1994.

14 Q. Why do you put it at that date?

13:14:22 15 A. That is about the time when the first Council of State is  
16 really put together in 1994.

17 Q. And who ordered the preparation of this document?

18 A. This document was prepared by - I think under the  
19 instructions of the council, if I am not mistaken, at the time,  
13:14:55 20 because this was a copy that was brought to me by the member of  
21 the council that sat there, General Musa, and I have kept it over  
22 the years.

23 Q. Which council are we talking about?

24 A. The first council in 1994. It was also called the Council  
13:15:11 25 of State.

26 Q. And was this a document prepared with litigation in mind?

27 A. No, no, no. This was a document prepared for historical  
28 records.

29 Q. Who by?

1 A. Quite frankly, I have said before I don't know the name  
2 given to the committee, but it was an instruction for a  
3 government committee that prepared this during the council.

4 Q. A government of which country?

13:15:39 5 A. Liberia.

6 Q. And how did you come by a copy?

7 A. This copy was given to me by our representative on the  
8 Council of State, the late General Musa.

9 Q. And have you had it since?

13:15:55 10 A. Yes. The whole thing here is that I am sure the Court  
11 wants to proceed. Whether it is Cotonou, Abuja, I can go through  
12 these agreements without even - if this is a major problem, we  
13 can - I can tell you the year. We are dealing with the year in  
14 1992 or '93 or '94 to the council. We can be specific about it,

13:16:34 15 because it is not something that I would just need this document  
16 to teach me about what happened. I just want to make sure that  
17 we do not mislead. Sometimes, you know, when you are at this  
18 place, your Honour, your head is telling you one thing and by the  
19 time you speak it out, it comes out a different thing. It

13:16:55 20 happened to me here before. I am thinking August 1992. By the  
21 time I speak it, it comes out as August 1991 as regards the issue  
22 with the St Paul River bridge. So I mean, while I do not know  
23 the entry cat details of every agreement, but at least a  
24 timeframe and what they were all about, I know this. I don't  
13:17:14 25 think this is a fight. So, you know, we can proceed. I can tell  
26 you the period we are talking about there are two agreements in  
27 question, Cotonou and --

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, perhaps allow Mr Griffiths to  
29 finish laying the foundation he intended to do.

1 THE WITNESS: Very good. Thank you, your Honour.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. And, Mr Taylor, what was the purpose of preparing this  
4 record?

13:17:42 5 A. Historical. Purely historical to have a record of what is  
6 going on - what happened before and what is going on at the time.  
7 It is a historical document.

8 Q. To assist whom?

9 A. The government at the time and interested people in the  
13:17:55 10 future that may want to study it.

11 Q. And why have you kept it?

12 A. Because it has been important for me. I have planned - or  
13 I had, up until now, planned to have for the first time in  
14 Liberia a presidential library set up to display historical  
13:18:22 15 documents and if my recollection serves me well, you counsel  
16 asked this Bench for permission to extend the time given the new  
17 team when you informed this Court that you had just come across  
18 some documents from my archives, and the Court did give you  
19 permission and extended time to look at those documents. So  
13:18:51 20 there is no question about the historical nature of my archives,  
21 even though the whole details are not known.

22 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. Whilst we are dealing with your  
23 archives, in an effort to put this particular topic to bed, how  
24 many documents were in the archives that we, your legal team,  
13:19:15 25 came into possession of?

26 A. Oh, Jesus. There were several cartons. Maybe more than a  
27 dozen cartons of documents.

28 Q. Cartons?

29 A. Yes.



1 Q. And help us. What kind of documents were in your archives?

2 A. Ah, they include documents from all of the crises of  
3 Liberia from the war, the inception, different publications that  
4 had been done by even Liberian historians, copies of agreements  
13:19:54 5 that had been signed at these different venues. These are all  
6 there. We have also some historical documents from our previous  
7 administrations, and then documents relating to my own  
8 administration from the time I came into office.

9 Q. What kind of documents?

13:20:17 10 A. Decisions on the part of government of my administration,  
11 programmes that were put into place, bills that were passed by  
12 the legislature, all of these. Just a mixture of history,  
13 economics, everything - in fact, some analysis even done, some  
14 notes by me as to why certain decisions were taken at particular  
13:20:46 15 times, what reasons that posterity would be able to know why this  
16 happened. It is a very rich archive that involved all of these  
17 historical documents of all the agreements during the war, it  
18 dealt with - there are so many copies of UN resolutions, ECOWAS  
19 resolutions. Just this --

13:21:14 20 Q. What about correspondence?

21 A. Oh, yes. Yes, there were correspondence that I received  
22 from both ends that I sent to leaders around the world,  
23 correspondence that I received in return from them. Also  
24 included in my archives were the electoral report, the entire  
13:21:43 25 report that was documented by the election commission at the time  
26 of my coming to the presidency. So can I just say it involves  
27 almost every piece of historical document that I was putting  
28 together to form a library for posterity.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I pause there. And I have

1 quite deliberately extended the area of my questioning of  
2 Mr Taylor on this topic because in our submission, this is a  
3 point of some importance and significance, and I have quite  
4 deliberately allowed him to elaborate on what is contained within  
13:22:28 5 the archives that have been available to us so that hopefully we  
6 can resolve a fundamental issue - a procedural issue - at this  
7 stage.

8 I will be frank with your Honours. Yes, we have a  
9 substantial amount of material, several large cartons full. We  
13:22:52 10 have reduced that down in total for this witness to somewhere in  
11 the region of seven A4 lever arch files and I don't apologise for  
12 the fact that your Honours will be receiving in the next few days  
13 all of that material. And in particular when we come to the  
14 period after 1996 we are going to slow down considerably, because  
13:23:22 15 effectively we can go through on an almost daily basis and detail  
16 through the use of documents what was happening in this man's  
17 life.

18 And so consequently it seems to us important that we  
19 establish certain fundamental principles at this stage; how are  
13:23:43 20 these documents to be used. I appreciate that the conventional  
21 form is to lay foundation and I am not disputing that, but when  
22 one is dealing with that quantity of material, how is a witness  
23 expected to recall every single item, every single document,  
24 which he may have amassed over a period of over a decade? That  
13:24:09 25 is asking too much of the human memory and it seems to us that a  
26 more flexible approach needs to be adopted in these particular  
27 circumstances if we are to provide, as we seek to do, the best  
28 possible assistance available to this Court.

29 It seems to us where documents like this are available to

1 assist not only the witness but the Court, that we should retain  
2 within the procedural discretion of the Court the power and  
3 ability to avail ourselves of it and that's all we are asking to  
4 do, so that there is available to the Court a historical record  
13:24:57 5 independent of the oral evidence of the witness, but which in  
6 itself tells the story. That is all we are seeking to do.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, we started off with this one  
8 document and your showing it to the witness was challenged by the  
9 Prosecution on the basis that you had not laid sufficient  
13:25:20 10 foundation. You have now led further evidence on foundation and  
11 in fairness we will hear from Ms Hollis as to whether she now  
12 regards that as sufficient foundation, but I don't want to expand  
13 this present issue into a consideration of every document in the  
14 archive.

13:25:47 15 There is already jurisprudence to the fact that if a  
16 witness can prove - is familiar with the facts of a document he  
17 can prove them by oral evidence and if he is not then you are  
18 looking at Rule 92 bis. But I think at this stage surely we can  
19 confine ourselves to this present document.

13:26:15 20 Your objection, Ms Hollis, was that there was not  
21 sufficient foundation. You have now heard the witness give  
22 certain facts in foundation. Are you still maintaining your  
23 objection?

24 MS HOLLIS: No, Mr President. We think now there is  
13:26:31 25 sufficient foundation.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Yes, go ahead,  
27 Mr Griffiths.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful, Mr President, but I do note  
29 the time.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think this is an appropriate time to  
2 break for lunch.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I am most grateful.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will adjourn now and we will resume at  
13:26:50 5 2.30.

6 [Lunch break taken at 1.26 p.m.]

7 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honour:

14:32:09 10 Q. Mr Taylor, it is not my intention to go through this  
11 document word for word. All we want to do is to use this to set  
12 out as briefly as we can a chronology so that we get the dates  
13 correct. Do you follow me?

14 A. Yes, I do.

14:32:31 15 Q. Can we turn then, please, to page 12 first of all. Do you  
16 have it, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Paragraph 19, you see that briefly there set out we have a  
19 short chronology, "August 90 - ECOMOG was deployed in Monrovia",  
14:33:24 20 yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. "September 90 - President Doe was captured and killed".

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Also September, "September 90 - A Nigerian Commander  
14:33:34 25 replaces the Ghanaian Commander".

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. "October 90 - ECOMOG establishes control over Monrovia",  
28 yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "November 90 - an Interim Government of National Unity with  
2 Dr Amos Claudius Sawyer its installed President", yes?

3 A. Yes.

14:34:02

4 Q. Then "March 91 - NPFL-backed rebel raided into Sierra Leone  
5 and a new party, United Liberation Movement for Democracy, fought  
6 alongside Sierra Leone forces", yes?

7 A. Yes.

14:34:19

8 Q. "September 91 - ULIMO inaugurated its own bid for state  
9 power in cross border war with NPFL in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount  
10 counties", yes?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. Do you agree with all of that, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And then we see paragraph 20:

14:34:27

15 "Dr Amos C Sawyer invited to Yamoussoukro was in attendance  
16 as President of the Interim Government of Liberia, and  
17 Mr Charles Taylor similarly invited also attended as Head of the  
18 National Patriotic Front of Liberia."

14:34:49

19 And then we jump to the bottom of the page, "Yamoussoukro  
20 during its last meeting of 16 and 17 September 1991", was that  
21 the date you recall, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. And were you in attendance at that meeting?

24 A. Yes.

14:35:03

25 Q. So that's 16 and 17 September 1991. Now, was that the  
26 first peace meeting that you attended?

27 A. No, that was not the first.

28 Q. Which was the first?

29 A. The first was actually Bamako.

1 Q. And that was when?

2 A. Bamako was I would say very late in 1990.

3 Q. Very well. So, anyway, we've set out those dates there.

4 Let's skip a few pages, because as I say I'm not interested in

14:35:47 5 all of this document, and can we go to page 16 please. I just

6 want to look at the three dates at paragraph 23 which your

7 Honours might find has not been photocopied properly.

8 "November 1991 - ULIMO war for territory". Can you expand

9 on that for us, Mr Taylor, so that we can give some meaning to

14:36:19 10 that event?

11 A. "ULIMO war for territory" is the continued movement out of

12 Bomi coming towards the Lofa side.

13 Q. "April 1992 - the junta led by Captain" - no doubt that's

14 Valentine Strasser - "overthrows government of President Momoh".

14:36:43 15 Then "May 1992 - ULIMO gains more" - and should that be "ground",

16 do you think, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes, that should be "ground". Yes.

18 Q. Okay. Can we go over the page, please, to page 17. Now at

19 Yamoussoukro, Mr Taylor, what had been the essence of the

14:37:10 20 agreement?

21 A. Yamoussoukro was about trying to set up a commission to

22 deal with the process of going to elections.

23 Q. And were there practical decisions made as to how that

24 decision - how you would come to that process?

14:37:35 25 A. Yes, there were some real good suggestions. May I just add

26 that at that meeting in Yamoussoukro President Babangida of

27 Nigeria attended that meeting along with President

28 Houphouet-Boigny and so the whole point now that we do have the

29 groups here. In fact, at the beginning of the meeting it was

1 decided that the NPFL I had told them that, "Listen, we have a  
2 government in what you call Greater Liberia and it's called the  
3 NPRAG", so the first order of business was to agree that there  
4 would be a government called the NPRAG which stands for the  
14:38:22 5 National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government. That  
6 basis then led to the next stop which was, fine, two governments,  
7 so the next step would be putting into place a mechanism for  
8 elections.

9 Q. Right. Now, let's go to page 17 and do you see that at  
14:38:48 10 paragraph 29.5 it says:

11 "The following revised Programme of Implementation be  
12 carried out by ECOMOG without delay:

13 April 1992 - ECOMOG operations commence.

14 May 1992 - ECOMOG completes the occupation of the buffer  
14:39:08 15 zone between Liberia and Sierra Leone."

16 Now do you recall this event, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Oh, yes.

18 Q. Now help us, please, and it may be that if you can just  
19 briefly pause for a moment and with the assistance of another  
14:39:26 20 map, which actually is I should have indicated this morning a  
21 Prosecution exhibit and if memory serves me this map is  
22 Prosecution exhibit 62, or is it 96?

23 MS HOLLIS: I believe that is 26.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: 26, I'm grateful. So I failed to mention  
14:39:54 25 that this morning:

26 Q. I wonder if you could just indicate on this map, Mr Taylor,  
27 where the buffer zone was?

28 A. The buffer zone set up at the time concentrated for the  
29 most part in this general area around where we call Bo Waterside.

1 This area in here was set up as the buffer zone. There was no  
2 buffer set up in the forest area and ECOMOG then came into the  
3 Voinjama area. So I would say from about here, the area that I  
4 have crossed, that's the zone of separation really.

14:41:31 5 Q. So that's where the buffer zones were?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Could you sign and date that, please.

8 A. What date do you want to show on this one?

9 Q. It's the 21st today.

10 A. Yes.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Would your Honours like to see that up  
12 close?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, but perhaps show the Prosecution  
14 first.

14:42:18 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, after my learned friend has seen it.  
16 I've seen it on the screen. I don't need to see it.

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps you could have the  
18 witness explain exactly what this buffer zone was all about.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I come to that in a moment, your Honour,  
14:42:37 20 after we've all seen the map:

21 Q. Mr Taylor, take back the map, please. Just a couple of  
22 questions about that and, because I'm told the reception is not  
23 so good when you're sitting in that seat, could you ensure that  
24 you keep your voice up. Firstly, why were those buffer zones  
14:43:41 25 established?

26 A. A buffer really is a separation buffer - a separation zone  
27 - the argument being that supplies and assistance are coming out  
28 of Sierra Leone to ULIMO and that we want ULIMO forces far from  
29 the border. So what the UN would do is that they would move in -



1 they would have ULIMO move inland and within a space, I would  
2 approximate it depending on the area that it could be anywhere  
3 from a quarter of a mile, is set up along the border where ULIMO  
4 men could not enter. They would be occupied by United Nations  
14:44:33 5 forces, or ECOMOG forces I mean.

6 Q. And that was the next question. Who was going to man these  
7 buffer zones?

8 A. We will see a little further that at the height of the  
9 negotiations and because the ECOMOG forces have lost their I  
14:44:57 10 would call it capacity for neutrality, then we argued for UN  
11 forces to occupy that and eventually United Nations forces did  
12 get involved.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Is there any further assistance I can  
14 provide on that, your Honour?

14:45:20 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Was this like a projected time frame of  
16 events, or is this the time indicated that events actually  
17 happened?

18 THE WITNESS: This is a time that events are taking place.  
19 They are happening.

14:45:40 20 JUDGE DOHERTY: Could I clarify what is meant by "The  
21 Group"? It has referred to, "The Group made the following  
22 clarifications", and you have referred to some of those  
23 clarifications in evidence.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm trying to locate that. Is this a --

14:45:56 25 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, if you look at the opening to  
26 paragraph 27, 28 and then again at 29, and you have referred us  
27 to 29.5, it says, "The Group made the following".

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I see. I'm grateful:

29 Q. Mr Taylor, do you see numbered paragraph 28 on that page?

1 A. I'm going to move back there.

2 Q. Mr Taylor, do you see paragraph 27 on that page, page 17?

3 A. Yes, I do.

14:46:50

4 Q. You see that it begins "The Group reaffirmed its belief",  
5 yes? Do you see that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Just for clarification, go back a page to page 16. At  
8 paragraph 26 do you see a reference to "The Consultative Group"?

9 A. Uh-huh.

14:47:05

10 Q. Now, help us. Who was that?

11 A. Oh, let me think very much. The consultative group spoken  
12 about constituted the committee. There was also a Committee on  
13 Liberia of ECOWAS member states on Liberia, that's the group, of  
14 which Nigeria was on it, Ivory Coast, La Cote d'Ivoire. That's  
15 the group being referred to here.

14:47:33

16 Q. That's the group being referred to?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay, can we go back then to page 17. Do you see, "All  
19 seaports, including Buchanan, Greenville and Harper, to be  
20 secured by ECOMOG"?

14:47:58

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is that correct?

23 A. That is the correct. That is correct.

24 Q. And did that in fact take place?

14:48:04

25 A. Yes, ECOMOG did secure the seaports, yeah.

26 Q. And was that in May 1992?

27 A. Let me see. By this - this particular situation here comes  
28 back to the question - excuse me for pointing, your Honour, I  
29 will put my hand down - that was advanced by Justice Sebutinde.

1 What we are looking at are the historical facts of agreements and  
2 things that are to be apparently implemented, okay, that is  
3 expected as far as these discussions are concerned. The fact of  
4 the matter is it's like an ongoing process, all of these don't  
14:49:22 5 take place at the time. So when I say that they are actually  
6 ongoing, so if you read the language, it's not saying they had  
7 actually gone. They had occupied some of these places, but it's  
8 an ongoing process. The real process is not completed until  
9 later on at a later year, around 1995. So this is an ongoing  
14:49:47 10 process. This is I can almost say an agreement of what must take  
11 place, and it has not all taken place.

12 Q. Okay. And then we see "ECOMOG secures all airports and  
13 airfields" and again do we need to look at that with the caveat  
14 you've just explained?

14:50:09 15 A. The same thing.

16 Q. Over the page, please:

17 "All roadblocks maintained by all factions to be  
18 dismantled. Encampment and disarmament of all warring factions  
19 commence at all selected sites. Documentation of personnel,  
14:50:26 20 weapons and ammunition as well as crating and storage of weapons  
21 at designated centres run concurrently" and then confirmatory  
22 ECOMOG patrol commences.

23 Then 1992, "Only ECOMOG and Mr Charles Taylor's security  
24 company shall bear arms after 1 June 1992."

14:50:49 25 What's that a reference to, Mr Taylor?

26 A. They are trying to really assure me of my security, which  
27 is a principal concern. By "company" here they are not referring  
28 to an association as you have. This is as referring to - this is  
29 more a military terminology as a company which comprise I would

1 say, what, 160 men. These are people that are supposed to guide  
2 me, because my concern is that these are ECOMOG soldiers who are  
3 firing at me, you want all of these things so I want some  
4 security. And they permitted, in this agreement, that a company  
14:51:45 5 size could protect me.

6 Q. Now let's jump to letter B towards the bottom of that page.  
7 Do you see reference is made to the 15th session of the authority  
8 of Heads of State and government in Dakar?

9 A. Yes.

14:52:12 10 Q. What was that meeting about, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Well, all of these agreements and discussions are being  
12 conducted by various Heads of State and whatnot, but they have to  
13 all be taken - those decisions have to be taken to the Heads of  
14 State meeting. And so when they talk about the section of the  
14:52:35 15 authority of Heads of State, the ECOWAS is called the authority  
16 of Heads of State. So what this meeting was about was receiving  
17 these recommendations that had come from the - remember they've  
18 used this word "group" - from those responsible for carrying out  
19 the negotiations to finally take a decision.

14:53:06 20 Q. And then if we go to page 20. At page 20 you see at 32.5  
21 reference to the authority. Now is that the authority you've  
22 just described?

23 A. Yes, the "authority" here refers to the Heads of State of  
24 ECOWAS countries. That's the authority.

14:53:35 25 Q. And you will notice at 33.7 that the authority decided,  
26 33.7.2, that:

27 "Unless Charles Taylor and the NPFL comply fully with the  
28 implementation of the said programme, the authority shall impose  
29 comprehensive sanctions against Charles Taylor and the NPFL

1 controlled areas of Liberia and any other party that fails to  
2 comply with the implementation of the programme."

3 Now do you recall that, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, I do.

14:54:16 5 Q. And was this something that was communicated to this?

6 A. This was a decision in form of a threat to put pressure on  
7 all of the parties. I was fully aware of it.

8 Q. Now did you attend that Dakar summit?

9 A. Yes, I went to Dakar.

14:54:38 10 Q. Yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Go over the page, please, to page 21. So you went to the  
13 Dakar summit and help us, do you have any kind of record of that,  
14 Mr Taylor?

14:54:54 15 A. Yes. There are photographs of my attending that summit and  
16 my meeting with the then President Abdou Diouf that I do have,  
17 and I'm sure the Defence should have it.

18 Q. We'll have to look at those at a later stage. Now, after  
19 Dakar what was the - where was the next meeting?

14:55:29 20 A. After Dakar then we went - I think we went on to Cotonou.  
21 We went to Cotonou for another set of discussions.

22 Q. And we there at later C on that page, page 21, "Pre-Cotonou  
23 Accord Diplomatic Activities". We're not going to delay overlong  
24 on that section. Let's move on, though. Page 23, please.

14:56:07 25 Whilst we're all finding that page, a spelling. Abdou Diouf,  
26 A-B-D-O-U D-I-O-U-F. We see a reference on page 23, Mr Taylor --

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. -- to peace talks on Liberia held at Geneva, 10 to 17 July  
29 1993. Do you recall that event?

1 A. Yes. These events occur a little before Cotonou. We come  
2 to Geneva, there are all of the sponsors. In all of this cases  
3 these sponsors are also major countries, European and North  
4 American states. We come to Geneva and all of the principal  
14:57:09 5 players in Africa are present, and President Houphouet-Boigny is  
6 very generous in hosting the conference in Geneva really.

7 Q. And did you attend?

8 A. Yes, I came to the conference.

9 Q. And we see that the dates are 10 to 17 July 1993.

14:57:30 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. How did you physically get from  
12 Gbarnga to Geneva at this time?

13 A. We drove across the border.

14 Q. To where?

14:57:49 15 A. To La Cote d'Ivoire. President Houphouet-Boigny, who was  
16 sponsoring the talks, had vehicles at the border. We were driven  
17 to the international airport. There is an international airport  
18 at Yamoussoukro, and he was generous enough to provide the  
19 transportation for us to go to Geneva.

14:58:16 20 Q. Okay. And how long did you stay in Geneva?

21 A. The talks lasted a few days and we returned. It was not a  
22 very long time.

23 Q. Now following Geneva when is the next meeting?

24 A. Then we go on to Cotonou.

14:58:35 25 Q. And if we go on to page 24 now we see 25 July 1993, Cotonou  
26 Agreement. First of all, Mr Taylor, where is Cotonou?

27 A. Cotonou is the capital of the West African country of  
28 Benin.

29 Q. And how significant was this agreement on 25 July 1993?

1 A. In my personal opinion, I think this Cotonou Agreement for  
2 the first time throughout the crisis actually lay the groundwork  
3 for what eventually became the peace that we all wanted, and let  
4 me tell you why I am saying that. We have agreed that these two  
14:59:43 5 governments, the NPRAG and the IGNU, would dissolve and that a  
6 process would be put into place where a government will come and  
7 set up the mechanism for free and fair elections, and under this  
8 agreement the idea stuck of a Council of State. That is  
9 interpreted almost as a collective presidency. At stake is who  
15:00:23 10 do you trust, who do you believe? No one wanted to give up for  
11 the next guy to lead the government. I had the largest faction.  
12 They did not want me to lead the transitional government. We  
13 could not let Kromah lead the transitional government because he  
14 had a small faction. By this time there are other little groups.  
15:00:48 15 The AFL, the Armed Forces of Liberia, is operating now not as a  
16 national army, it's operating as a factional force. We are not  
17 going to let them take over the government, so for the first time  
18 we decided to put into place what is called a collective  
19 presidency that is often referred to as the Council of State,  
15:01:09 20 which was the collective presidency. That put into place this  
21 collective presidency and under that government the entire fabric  
22 for the Court, the Court system, the legislative system, the  
23 executive system were all put into agreement for this Council of  
24 State to move with and eventually bring piece to the country. So  
15:01:38 25 I considered this really the most important agreement during that  
26 particular period.

27 Q. So would you say this date is something of a watershed in  
28 the history of the Liberian conflict?

29 A. By my own calculations. I'm sure that there may be many

1 that would disagree. So by my own calculations, yes.

2 Q. Now what was to be done in terms of the presence of a force  
3 to enforce this agreement? Who was to be given that role?

15:02:23

4 A. There was a joint role given. The United Nations would  
5 send forces, and they would work along with ECOMOG to make sure  
6 that this whole question of trust would then be looked at more  
7 seriously.

8 Q. And when we go to page 33 - yes, Mr Taylor, are you there?

9 A. Yes.

15:02:55

10 Q. We see at letter F in the middle of the page, "The  
11 Establishment of UNOMIL", yes?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And was that to be the force?

14 A. That is the force.

15:03:11

15 Q. And then if we skip a number of pages and go to page 42 we  
16 see at paragraph 71, do we not, what the responsibilities of that  
17 UNOMIL force was to be? Is that right, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, that is right.

19 Q. And we see:

15:03:38

20 "UNOMIL is deploying throughout Liberia. It has  
21 established 4 regional headquarters namely:

22 Monrovia (Central region)

23 Tubmanburg (Western region)

24 Gbarnga (Northern region)

15:03:57

25 Tapeta (Eastern region)

26 ECOMOG has deployed in:

27 The western region (Tubmanburg)

28 The northern region (Gbarnga)."

29 Now help us, Mr Taylor. When they say, "UNOMIL has



1 established 4 regional headquarters", just explain to me  
2 precisely what UNOMIL did on the ground?

3 A. When UNOMIL arrived, if you look at this - I just want to  
4 remind the Court - Monrovia, yes, that's aside from me, but if  
15:04:41 5 you look at this you will see 71.1.3 you see "Gbarnga (Northern  
6 region)", that's an NPFL area, and then you see 71.1.4 "Tapeta"  
7 and that's also an NPFL area. So you can then deduce from here  
8 that UNOMIL - because of the concerns of the NPFL/NPRAG at the  
9 time, UNOMIL comes more into our areas as a way of trying to  
15:05:17 10 satisfy our concerns for security and so they actually deploy.

11 Now they are not large in numbers, the UNOMIL force is not  
12 in the thousands, but their mere presence - and, again, not to  
13 enforce. Their presence was to serve almost like referees to  
14 make sure that they observe - because they really didn't have  
15:05:45 15 enforcement powers at the time. To observe and I guess to allay  
16 our fears at the time.

17 Q. Now I am pressing you for more information on this,  
18 Mr Taylor, for good reason. Now when you say they were there to  
19 observe, in practical terms how did they go about doing that?  
15:06:09 20 Did they patrol, or were they totally reliant on people coming to  
21 them with information? What are we talking about? Help us,  
22 please.

23 A. Oh, they did those and many more. UNOMIL set up  
24 checkpoints where they could - if arms were coming through those  
15:06:30 25 checkpoints they could stop them. They would not disarm the  
26 soldier, but they would not permit arms to come out. UNOMIL  
27 would patrol. They would patrol, because a part of this  
28 agreement called for the free movement of citizens wherever they  
29 wanted to go without hindrance from ULIMO, NPFL or whoever. So

1 they patrolled also to make absolutely sure that that part of the  
2 agreement, you know, was okay.

3 Now by deploying, as is mentioned here, these are the  
4 headquarter positions, but they could drive anywhere they wanted  
15:07:17 5 to drive within any part of Liberia. So the fact that they were  
6 deployed in let's say in Tappita, if you look on the map Tappita  
7 is a long way from Monrovia. So to get to Tappita you have to,  
8 what, come from Tappita back through Ganta, you have to come  
9 through Gbarnga and you have to go through Kakata based on the  
15:07:44 10 map that I showed here. So these are headquarter division - I  
11 mean areas, but they have free movement through a vast space.

12 Q. And when you say they also set up road blocks, road blocks  
13 where?

14 A. At these central points that are mentioned here, at major  
15:08:06 15 intersections they had road blocks. For example, take for  
16 example in Gbarnga. If you look at the map, when you get to the  
17 town of Gbarnga there is one road that leads towards Lofa. So  
18 you can go Gbarnga, you can then go through this very thing that  
19 we talked about here today, the St Paul River bridge, and then  
15:08:40 20 you can go through Zorzor and Voinjama. There's only one road.  
21 It takes off from Gbarnga. Also from Gbarnga there's a road that  
22 continues southeastward that's going towards Ganta and going  
23 towards Tappita and all that way.

24 So Gbarnga is a central point. So at as central point as  
15:09:01 25 Gbarnga in the main intersecting road they would then, what, set  
26 up a checkpoint to check people going through. And let's say for  
27 example vehicles that are coming from Lofa, don't forget now  
28 ULIMO is just at the St Paul River bridge and so maybe somebody  
29 mischievous could get in a pick-up with his arms and say, "I'm

1 going down to Monrovia", because you cannot get to Monrovia  
2 unless you pass through Gbarnga.

3 So they were there to make sure that if there were any  
4 little difficulties that there would be no altercations and so  
15:09:43 5 they had these checkpoints. I want to emphasise they were not  
6 authorised to disarm, or enforce. They were there to observe and  
7 if anybody came to that they would ask them to return, or  
8 something like that.

9 Q. Now when were these checkpoints set up, Mr Taylor?

15:09:57 10 A. When they arrived in the country.

11 Q. When?

12 A. Before the Council of State - by the Council of State I'm  
13 referring to the 1994 Council of State, because this agreement  
14 that we are talking about, Cotonou, is actually put together in  
15:10:15 15 1993. So I would say this Council of State came into place I  
16 would put it to around mid-1994, or thereabouts. They are  
17 deployed before the Council of State is seated; that is late 1993  
18 to early 1994 that process is put into place.

19 Q. And so by that stage we have in position throughout Liberia a  
15:10:48 20 road blocks manned by an independent foreign UN backed force, is  
21 that right?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And how long do they stay in Liberia?

24 A. Oh, they stay there - they stay there for I think a couple  
15:11:07 25 of years, because by 1995/'96 - they are there for at least two  
26 or three years to the best of my recollection. They are there in  
27 Liberia. Even as I go to Monrovia on the Council of State in '95  
28 they still have some presence.

29 Q. I ask for this reason, Mr Taylor. You appreciate of

1 course, don't you, that it's suggested that throughout this  
2 period you're supplying arms to the RUF? You appreciate that,  
3 don't you?

4 A. Yes, I do, but it doesn't mean --

15:11:41 5 Q. What do you say to that allegation in light of what you've  
6 just told us?

7 A. It's just nothing else but an allegation. It's false.

8 It's a falsehood because - and let's just clarify this again.

9 Yes, these forces are there and if you look here we have, what,  
15:12:05 10 two separate forces deployed in Gbarnga at the time. It is not  
11 just the United Nations, but if you look there also there is a  
12 second force in Gbarnga which is ECOMOG. ECOMOG is also in  
13 Gbarnga. But even if for the sake of argument we were to remove  
14 these forces, how would we get these so-called arms and

15:12:30 15 ammunition across ULIMO? How do we get it from Gbarnga to the  
16 border? How do we get it? Except where there is, what, a  
17 collaboration between ULIMO and the NPFL, which is not the case.

18 Q. So during these years up to 1994 - and we're taking things  
19 in stages - were you supplying arms to the RUF, Mr Taylor?

15:13:06 20 A. No.

21 Q. Or any kind of assistance?

22 A. No assistance whatsoever. No contact whatsoever.

23 Q. Was it physically possible during these years for you to  
24 provide that kind of assistance?

15:13:23 25 A. It was not - not - physically possible and the reason is  
26 very simple. How do you get to these people? Somebody - I mean,  
27 you know, somebody must be able to reason this thing out. You've  
28 got enemy forces that have been facing each other, fighting for  
29 years. ULIMO fought tooth and nail and captured the Lofa, Bomi

1 and Grand Cape Mount counties. They had been prodding us, trying  
2 to get to Gbarnga. We had been fighting. And even when we get  
3 to understand that, even with all of this, this first Council of  
4 State does not resolve the problem. There is still trouble. How  
15:14:17 5 do we get a hundred or more - in fact, 150 miles from Gbarnga  
6 through enemy territory? How do we get to the border? Somebody  
7 must understand it does not make sense.

8 Now these forces are there, so where do we go to with this?  
9 How do we go? Where do we go? What do we use? What is it? I  
15:14:44 10 mean these phantom ideas of near impossibilities I will call it,  
11 your Honours. I mean really there may be a whole lot of other  
12 things that can be maybe hypothesised about this whole process  
13 and maybe, you know, people have to think about it, but there are  
14 some really impossible things that - this, you will have to face  
15:15:23 15 death.

16 But mind you, mind you, let me just interject one thing.  
17 When you listen to this evidence as given by Varmuyan Sherif, he  
18 forgets one thing. He doesn't say anywhere in the evidence that,  
19 "Look, on one occasion they were going and we intercepted them  
15:15:47 20 and we took everything from them and we killed a whole lot of  
21 them and we captured some people." He said, "There were roads  
22 that we were going." I mean, it's just not possible and anybody  
23 playing this kind of trick to try to get from Gbarnga to go to  
24 Sierra Leone is really looking for his death. It's as simple as  
15:16:17 25 that.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, in that last answer you said amongst other  
27 things, "He doesn't say anywhere in the evidence that, 'Look, on  
28 one occasion they were going and we intercepted them and we took  
29 everything from them.'" Who is the "them" you're talking about?

1 A. Well to say that NPFL people are travelling to Sierra Leone  
2 to go and give Sierra Leoneans weapons, because when you look at  
3 the process in his testimony he does I think mention - I stand  
4 corrected, either him or some other witness - that some people  
15:17:05 5 are coming from Sierra Leone trying to enter Liberia and I think  
6 they are attacked. I think this is what he said. I'm not too  
7 certain. But he does not mention that NPFL people are leaving  
8 Gbarnga with ammunition going into Sierra Leone, no.

9 Q. Before I leave this document, can I invite your attention  
15:17:33 10 to page 44, please, and just briefly seek your assistance with  
11 one matter. Do you see at paragraph 72.1:

12 "In his acceptance speech on 7 March, 1994, the Chairman of  
13 the Council of State, Mr David Kpomakpor, stated that the holding  
14 of free and fair elections on 7 September 1994 was foremost for  
15:18:21 15 the LNTG."

16 Firstly, taking things slowly, what's the LNTG?

17 A. That's the Liberian National Transitional Government.

18 Q. And when was that established?

19 A. That is in 1994. That's a result, remember I said it, from  
15:18:46 20 Cotonou.

21 Q. Right. And when it refers to an acceptance speech, as  
22 Chairman of the Council of State, what is the role of that  
23 Council of State?

24 A. The Council of State again is the collective presidency  
15:19:04 25 that is chaired by an individual who is then you want to consider  
26 as the - what's the best way - the best analysis I can give of it  
27 is maybe something that is along the line of what I think is  
28 practiced in Malaysia where you have Presidents, but somebody  
29 must chair at a particular time. He is the chair and is

1 considered the leader at this particular time. But let me  
2 emphasise, the rest of the people are not Vice-Presidents. They  
3 are all Presidents.

15:19:59 4 Q. And were you a part of this transitional government,  
5 Mr Taylor?

6 A. Well, I don't know, counsel. Help me what you mean by  
7 "you". If "you" is plural as the NPFL, yes. If it's singular,  
8 no, I was not personally there. I was represented by this  
9 council, on this council.

15:20:17 10 Q. And who represented you on that council?

11 A. We were represented by the late General Isaac Musa.

12 Q. And where did the Council of State sit?

13 A. Fine, this is the interesting part where I say that this is  
14 the most important agreement. They sat in Monrovia. They had to  
15:20:40 15 sit in Monrovia at the Executive Mansion, the office of the  
16 President. They all held all of their meetings, all official  
17 businesses were conducted at the mansion by this collective  
18 presidency and in fact what had to be done, like what you do in  
19 certain fora, they set around a round table. The table was not -  
15:21:05 20 they sat around a round table to ensure that all sides were  
21 equal.

22 Q. Did you ever attend any of their meetings?

23 A. No. No, I did not. General Musa attended and he came up  
24 almost every weekend. I am still in Gbarnga. He came up every  
15:21:24 25 week and briefed me and the Vice-President of the NPRAG and the  
26 Legislature. Because there's a full government going on, so he  
27 will come and brief me, report to the National Patriotic  
28 Reconstruction Assembly, he would report to them about the  
29 activities down there and would receive instructions on matters

1 of state that were pending.

2 Q. Why did you not attend any of these meetings?

3 A. Monrovia was still not secured, we felt, enough for me to  
4 go. Yes, they had made all these promises, but Monrovia was  
15:22:10 5 still a very dangerous place to be.

6 Q. And so we've now traversed, have we not, Mr Taylor, up to  
7 1994?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And is there anything further with which you can assist  
15:22:27 10 these judges in terms of events in 1993 and '94?

11 A. Well, except by informing the judges that as good as this  
12 is, it goes along for a little while. Things are put into place,  
13 but it doesn't really, really, really gel and then we have to go  
14 off again to another meeting. This time we go on to Abuja.

15:22:58 15 Q. In which year is this?

16 A. We are talking about 1994. By late 1994 we are back in  
17 Abuja trying to patch up the little things. It doesn't - what  
18 goes on here that is really important is this: Things are not  
19 working. Our representative is down there and we go - while this  
15:23:24 20 is going on we go to - before Abuja we go to Akosombo. And while  
21 I'm in Akosombo at this meeting, my headquarters Gbarnga is taken  
22 over by ECOMOG, ULIMO and the rest of them while I'm sitting at  
23 the meeting table at Akosombo.

24 Q. Which year is this?

15:23:53 25 A. Yes, we're talking about 1994.

26 Q. So 1994, what time of the year?

27 A. Akosombo is held around August/September, around that time.

28 Q. And whilst you're in Akosombo what do you say happens?

29 A. Gbarnga falls.



1 Q. Captured by whom?

2 A. The same people that are talking to me, ECOMOG, ULIMO. By  
3 this time there's another group calling itself the LPC, the Armed  
4 Forces of Liberia. They are all together. They capture my  
15:24:31 5 headquarters.

6 Q. This is 1994, yes?

7 A. Yes, it's 1994.

8 Q. And so what happens thereafter?

9 A. I return.

15:24:45 10 Q. To where?

11 A. To Liberia, to Ganta and there is - and we begin a fight to  
12 recapture my headquarters.

13 Q. And was it recaptured?

14 A. Yes.

15:24:57 15 Q. When?

16 A. Some two, three months later we took it back.

17 Q. And was it costly in terms of lives?

18 A. Well, lives were lost. Lives were lost.

19 Q. And thereafter for the remainder of 1994 what occurs?

15:25:19 20 A. Well, then we have a very interesting thing happens where  
21 the then President of Nigeria, by this time Babangida, has left  
22 office and General Sani Abacha now takes over, and he extends an  
23 invitation to me to visit Abuja to discuss how we could bring  
24 final peace to Liberia.

15:26:02 25 Q. And did you take him up on his offer?

26 A. Yes, I did.

27 Q. And help us, when was that visit?

28 A. This visit had to be I would say at the very beginning of  
29 '95 or thereabouts. About the first - I would put it to about

1 the first quarter in '95.

2 Q. Okay. Now have we effectively now covered, Mr Taylor, up  
3 to the end of 1994?

4 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.

15:26:37 5 Q. Can we pause then for a moment, please, and seek your  
6 assistance in this way: As far as you're aware, during the years  
7 1993-1994 where was Foday Sankoh? And I'm not interested in your  
8 knowledge now; I'm interested in your knowledge at the time. Do  
9 you follow me?

15:27:06 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Where was he?

12 A. If I answer this properly, quite frankly I don't know. I  
13 assume he has to be in Sierra Leone. I really don't know for  
14 sure, but I can say he had to be in Sierra Leone.

15:27:30 15 Q. And help us further. What about Dr Manneh, where is he?

16 A. Dr Manneh is - by '94 Dr Manneh leaves Liberia. He leaves.

17 Q. For where?

18 A. Quite frankly I'm not sure exactly where he went, where he  
19 ended up, but I think he probably returned to Burkina Faso or  
15:28:09 20 Ghana. I'm not too sure where he went at the time.

21 Q. And so in those two years, 1993-1994, what was your main  
22 preoccupation?

23 A. As you can see, these various agreements, there is war. By  
24 "war" I mean trying to get back Gbarnga. Dealing with mostly the  
15:28:39 25 consolidation of peace. We were very, very, very busy. You  
26 know, things may look a little short here to your Honours, but  
27 some of these discussions for these agreements did not just take  
28 place over one day. Some of these agreements took two, three  
29 months to negotiate before we would go for final signature to the

1 document. But they took extensive negotiations, periods of time,  
2 going, coming, delegations going and negotiating, coming back,  
3 before the leadership finally would get there. So we are very  
4 occupied with strategies and moving people from one country to  
15:29:27 5 the other on these peace agreements. If you see in one year you  
6 could have Cotonou. We had, what? We had Yamoussoukro. Then  
7 before you look you're going to Abuja or you're in Accra. So we  
8 were very, very busy those two years trying to make peace, and at  
9 the same time war was going on here and there.

15:29:51 10 Q. Well, help us, Mr Taylor. Because you appreciate the  
11 suggestion is you're controlling the RUF, giving them orders and  
12 the like in nearby Sierra Leone. So the matters you've just told  
13 us about, how much of your time did it actually occupy? You  
14 know, the peace agreements, the planings and so on, how much of  
15:30:20 15 your time did it occupy?

16 A. I would say - besides my family I would say, what, 98 per  
17 cent of my time. Look, the very documents that this Court will  
18 have, the whole bunch will have to be brought to them, the number  
19 of papers and the agreements and I, as a leader of the NPFL, at  
15:30:38 20 the time NPRAG, with the legislature up there, and all of our  
21 court system and different things, there are at least maybe a  
22 dozen and a half or more agreements being negotiated over the 24  
23 month period. I am extremely busy trying to bring peace. I'm  
24 extremely busy trying to secure my territory, because while we  
15:31:08 25 are making peace, there is war going on.

26 You know, it reminds me - and the Court can be reminded of  
27 the famous Vietnam War where Le Duc Tho, the Vietnamese  
28 representative, and Henry Kissinger were in Paris talking peace  
29 and Vietnam was being bombed into smithereens. So the fact that

1 discussions are going on, it does not mean that that is the  
2 absence of war. So I'm busy trying to - in the first place you  
3 have the very ULIMO, the very LPC, the armed forces, what are  
4 they trying to do during this time? They are trying to gain  
15:31:56 5 territory while we are negotiating, because the more territory  
6 you gain, the more strength you have at the negotiating table,  
7 okay? So I am too busy trying to save my back in the first place  
8 and trying to make peace. So it is total foolishness for anybody  
9 to suggest anything to the contrary. I mean, I'm busy trying to  
15:32:20 10 secure my own situation and not worry about anybody else. In  
11 fact with the confusion, the problem that had happened in '92 I  
12 have no interest, I have no reason to be in touch with Sankoh or  
13 anybody else, so that suggestion is total nonsense.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I pause for a spelling break please,  
15:32:47 15 Mr President. Le Duc Tho is L-E new word D-U-C and the final  
16 word T-H-O.

17 Now lest I forget, can I ask please that this document,  
18 which I now ask be put away, be marked for identification MFI-6,  
19 please, and it's the "Analytical Chronology of the ECOWAS Peace  
15:33:15 20 Plan for Liberia: Banjul to Akosombo and Beyond". That  
21 description appears on the first page, Mr President.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Did you say --

23 MR GRIFFITHS: MFI-6.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Should it be 5, or 6?

15:33:42 25 MR GRIFFITHS: 5 was the map of Liberia, the buffer zone.

26 MS IRURA: Your Honours, it is MFI-5.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, I don't think you had that marked.

28 JUDGE DOHERTY: No, you didn't tender that. You didn't  
29 mark that.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, before I forget can I ask that that be  
2 marked so that would be 5 and this then would become 6. I'm  
3 sorry.

15:33:58

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, firstly the black and  
5 white map entitled "Liberia", on which the witness has marked the  
6 buffer zones between Liberia and Sierra Leone, will be marked  
7 MFI-5. The copy of the document entitled "Analytical Chronology  
8 of the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia: Banjul to Akosombo and  
9 Beyond" will be marked MFI-6.

15:34:40

10 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm most grateful:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, in 1994, despite what you have told us about  
12 your preoccupations and the absence of any support for the RUF  
13 and Foday Sankoh, were you aware of any public suggestions at the  
14 time that you were indeed supporting the RUF and Foday Sankoh?

15:35:28

15 A. If I'm aware of any public suggestion?

16 Q. At that time.

17 A. Well, I was not aware of any real public suggestion at that  
18 particular time. It may have been around. I was not aware. I  
19 became aware of that here in this Court.

15:35:57

20 Q. Were you aware of any public statement made by the RUF in  
21 1994 about your alleged involvement in that conflict?

22 A. Yes, I am aware. Some time in 1994 there was a statement  
23 that was released out of Ghana by the RUF I think detailing their  
24 own programmes. That was a matter that was on the news and I did  
25 hear of a statement that had been published by the RUF detailing  
26 their programme and what their programme was all about and even  
27 refuting the fact that there was any connection between  
28 themselves and the NPFL/NPRAG.

15:36:56

29 Q. And have you ever seen a copy of that statement?

1 A. Yes, I have.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder, please, if the witness can be  
3 shown from the additional documents for week 30 - yes - behind  
4 divider 1 DCT number 87.

15:38:36 5 THE WITNESS: What did you say? Which divider?

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Divider 1. Is this the document you were referring to,  
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, this is the document. Yes.

15:39:03 10 Q. And we see then the document is headed, "Revolutionary  
11 United Front of Sierra Leone, RUF, Office of the Special  
12 Political and Foreign Affairs Coordinator, PO Box 1339, Accra,  
13 Ghana, West Africa", with a telephone number. Pause there. Help  
14 us, were you aware that the RUF had such an office in Ghana?

15:39:38 15 A. No, I was not aware. I was not aware, but it would not be  
16 unusual for this to have happened. Because of the Anglophone  
17 link with Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, I would not be surprised.

18 Q. Now we see it's entitled "Public Release Statement" and is  
19 dated 23 March 1994. Now let's look, please, at the content of  
15:40:14 20 this press release:

21 "There has been a lot of questions asked by the outside  
22 world about the existence of the RUF. Many are of the saying  
23 that the RUF is an agent for the National Patriotic Front of  
24 Liberia led by Mr Charles Taylor. Even the ECOWAS backed  
15:40:40 25 military dictators in Freetown are going from country to country  
26 misleading governments that the RUF has no programme for the  
27 benefit of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leonean people. And now,  
28 therefore, the RUF declares to the Sierra Leonean people and to  
29 the international community its aims and objectives."

1 Now pausing there, Mr Taylor. That suggestion which the  
2 writer of this document is seeking to refute in the second  
3 sentence, were you aware at this time that you were being  
4 labelled as the masters of the RUF in effect?

15:41:35 5 A. Yes, I was aware. That had happened, from what I explained  
6 to this Court, from the administration of Joseph Momoh that had  
7 been the saying out there, yes.

8 Q. And in light of the suggestion that you were party to a  
9 design - a plan - in Sierra Leone with the RUF, let us now look  
15:42:15 10 at their statement of their aims and objectives:

11 "Today, March 23rd 1994, marks the third anniversary of  
12 the popular and progressive struggle against the evils of Black  
13 Neo-Colonialism in Sierra Leone. The RUF is composed of sons and  
14 daughters of Sierra Leone committed to the renewal of the country  
15:42:46 15 after decades of robbery, victimisation and misrule. We put  
16 heads together in search of the appropriate antidote to the  
17 country's problem and discovered that the only panacea to Sierra  
18 Leone's political, economic, social and cultural malaise is for  
19 us, the sons and daughters of the soil, to be in the forefront of  
15:43:15 20 the struggle against Black Neo-Colonialism in Sierra Leone. To  
21 say that the RUF is an agent for the National Patriotic Front of  
22 Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor is not only false and  
23 misleading but also outrageous."

24 What do you say about the sentiments expressed in that last  
15:43:48 25 sentence, Mr Taylor, false, misleading, outrageous?

26 A. I think this states the sentiments I think properly. I  
27 probably would have used harsher words.

28 Q. Now in case it might be suggested, did you have any hand in  
29 the preparation of this document, Mr Taylor, dated March 1994?

1 A. No, how could I have? This is occurring in Ghana. The RUF  
2 gives what they have. No, how can I? I had nothing to do with  
3 these people at this time. Nothing.

4 Q. "On the 23rd March 1991, in carrying out the message of the  
15:44:39 5 people, Foday Saybana Sankoh led the Sierra Leonean masses into  
6 the bush paths and launched Operation Liberate the Motherland.  
7 An operation aimed at destroying the corrupt, tribalistic and  
8 decadent system or status quo which has inflicted a lot of  
9 injuries on Sierra Leone. As was inaugurated in 1982, the  
15:45:10 10 Revolutionary United Front under the charismatic leadership of  
11 Foday Sankoh is undergoing through five Revolutions and not one:  
12 Territorial Revolution, by which it wrests the right to be free  
13 from the aggression and occupation of Sierra Leone by Nigerians,  
14 Guinean, ULIMO and ECOWAS forces of aggression and extermination,  
15:45:42 15 stationed in the Sierra Leonean soil against the will and wishes  
16 of the Sierra Leonean people; Political Revolution, from the  
17 hands of ruthless domestic dictators in favour of complete  
18 freedom and true democracy, via political pluralism; Economic  
19 Revolution, to fully utilise and transform the country's economy  
15:46:07 20 from economic enslavement to economic emancipation through which  
21 the masses shall participate equally in the economic activity of  
22 their country; Social Revolution, to uplift the present poor  
23 status of the Sierra Leonean masses to complete with other free,  
24 independent and democratic nations; and Cultural Revolution, to  
15:46:34 25 preserve the integrity of our own cultural heritage."

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: [Microphone not activated].

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Pardon?

28 JUDGE DOHERTY: I thought it said "unique".

29 MR GRIFFITHS: You're right, your Honour. You're right:



1 Q. "...unique cultural heritage. No coercion or foreign  
2 intimidation, neither charity, nor millions or sacrifice will  
3 deter the RUF in this course. Therefore, the RUF will continue  
4 the struggle uncompromisingly until a free, just and democratic  
15:47:19 5 Sierra Leone is attained.

6 It is only disappointing that the civilised world,  
7 particularly the United Nations, the Organisation of African  
8 Unity, the Commonwealth, Britain and France must be allowed  
9 themselves to become financiers for the imposed military  
15:47:38 10 dictators in Freetown. What the so-called Abbas Bundu (the  
11 propaganda spokesman) and James Joanah (the betrayer) are doing  
12 in Sierra Leone is nothing but a ploy to destroy the future of  
13 Sierra Leoneans for their own selfish political ambition."

14 Mr Taylor, help me. James Joanah, who is he?

15:48:08 15 A. I do not know who this Joanah is, but I know a James Jonah.

16 Q. James Jonah?

17 A. A Sierra Leonean former Under-Secretary-General of the  
18 United Nations retired that became the de facto leader of Sierra  
19 Leone and caused all this problem anyway.

15:48:27 20 Q. De facto leader of Sierra Leone when?

21 A. He was there when Kabbah was there, so I know we  
22 encountered Jonah and his own explanations of the war and this  
23 whole theory that we see here, these are some of the constructors  
24 of the - so I know James Jonah, yes.

15:48:48 25 Q. And help me, remind us who Abbas Bundu is?

26 A. Abbas Bundu is a Sierra Leonean. He's the former Executive  
27 Secretary of the Community of West African States and as we also  
28 know from documents, that he was one of the representatives later  
29 on in 1997 when - that represented the junta at peace talks in Ia

1 Cote d'Ivoire. So I know Abbas very well.

2 Q. Now there's some handwriting at the bottom of the page from  
3 - I don't know if that is an "S" or a "T" - "SOS Brigade  
4 Commanding General, Brigadier General Kiokoyega Issa." Do you  
15:49:54 5 know who that is?

6 A. No, I don't.

7 Q. Can we go over the page then, please:

8 "The RUF do not understand why at this time, when the  
9 Sierra Leonean people are desperately in need of jobs, food,  
15:50:15 10 housing, education and medical supplies, the ruthless military  
11 dictators in Freetown continue to go here and there with lies,  
12 collecting monies to buy mansions overseas and to pursue an  
13 unjust war of aggression and extermination against Sierra Leone  
14 and the Sierra Leonean people. The imposed military dictators in  
15:50:40 15 Freetown, the National Provisional Ruling Council, NPRC, led by a  
16 once disco dancer Valentine Strasser, as evidenced by the Sierra  
17 Leonean people, is a military gang of dissipation and inactivity.  
18 The issues that led to the overthrow of the government and  
19 kidnapping of President Joseph Saidu Momoh and his family by  
15:51:16 20 Nigeria, Guinea, ULIMO and ECOWAS, have not been addressed at  
21 all. Instead, the ruthless military dictators in Freetown has  
22 commenced a systematic clampdown on patriotic and committed  
23 Sierra Leoneans and undiplomatic blunders which now threaten the  
24 peace and stability of the Sierra Leonean state.

15:51:46 25 As long as Nigeria, Guinea, ULIMO and ECOWAS forces of  
26 aggression and extermination continue to grow uncompromising  
27 hostilities against Foday Sankoh, the Sierra Leonean people, and  
28 against Sierra Leone's territory, the RUF will struggle until  
29 death. The heart of the Sierra Leonean crisis is the callous

1 pursuit of selfish or criminal interest by Nigeria, Guinea, ULIMO  
2 and ECOWAS bandits influencing the United Nations, the  
3 Commonwealth, and the Organisation of African Unity. The  
4 barbaric meddling of Nigeria, Guinea, ULIMO and ECOWAS in the  
15:52:37 5 Sierra Leonean crisis is nothing but a characteristic Fascist  
6 fashion attempting to subjugate and dominate the freedom and  
7 democratic loving people of Sierra Leone and also an all-out  
8 attempt to tear down everything the civilised world, particularly  
9 the United States of America, and the US administration (with the  
15:53:02 10 Democrats) is trying to do throughout Africa.

11 It is against this background that the RUF is appealing to  
12 the United Nations Security Council to wake from its present  
13 slumber devoid of (deaf and blind) approach to the Sierra Leonean  
14 crisis and act quickly before another Cambodia in Africa stirs  
15:53:31 15 the conscience of the international community. We want that the  
16 United Nations Security Council demand for the immediate and  
17 unconditional withdrawal of ECOWAS, Nigerian, Guinean and ULIMO  
18 forces of aggression and extermination, along with their jet  
19 bombers, cluster bombs, aerial bombs, land and sea mines,  
15:53:58 20 chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction,  
21 including their warships, from all parts of Sierra Leone. The  
22 fact here is that the aggression by Nigeria, Guinea, ULIMO and  
23 ECOWAS against the national sovereignty of Sierra Leone (the  
24 100th member state of the UN) do not only violate the fundamental  
15:54:24 25 principle of the United Nations which should operate without bias  
26 or neglect, but also threaten the very existence of the United  
27 Nations. Sierra Leone must be free today and not tomorrow.

28 Down will the military dictators in Freetown.

29 Down with the Nigerian war criminals.

1 Down with the Guinean warlords.

2 Down with the ECOWAS dogs (ECOMOG).

3 Down with the ULIMO bandits.

4 Victory is ours."

15:54:59 5 Whose signature is that at the bottom of the page,

6 Mr Taylor, do you recognise it?

7 A. No, I have no idea. No.

8 Q. Now, in case I haven't asked you this, Mr Taylor, did you  
9 play any part at all in the creation of this document?

15:55:18 10 A. No, I have no idea how or when this document.

11 Q. The sentiments expressed in this document, do you share  
12 them at all?

13 A. Well, I'll put it this way. I'm not aware of all of the  
14 circumstances surrounding the Sierra Leonean situation, so their  
15:55:49 15 sentiments here will dictate what they were thinking about. But

16 the language here sounds like - you know, during this trial you  
17 read some documents in closed session, and I'm not going to

18 mention it, to the particular witness. This sounds like these

19 hot-headed MOJA type boys that wrote a lot of things, and I do

15:56:21 20 not want to - I cannot call that witness's name or even the

21 number. But the references have been made and were redacted.

22 I'm just saying it remind me of that - those types of sentiments

23 and it looks like them, these --

24 Q. Why does it remind you of that? What is it about the

15:56:38 25 document that reminds you of that?

26 A. We heard similar language like this as quoted to that

27 witness that he had said, and so you get an idea of this - this

28 is MOJA type language.

29 Q. What do you mean by "MOJA type language"?

1 A. Well, you know, this "hot-headed dogs" and all of this kind  
2 of stuff, you know, you're referring to - yeah, you know, we've  
3 been angry during the war, I fought ECOMOG, but I didn't call  
4 them dogs. I mean, when you begin to refer to nation states and  
15:57:15 5 different things in this way, this is not the type of language,  
6 let's put it, that I would use. And so I don't appreciate this  
7 kind of language in dealing with these kinds of situations.

8 Q. MOJA, remind us, who are they?

9 A. That's the Movement of Justice in Africa, and they were  
15:57:34 10 located in Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Ghana. Ghana, you know, is  
11 one of the major headquarters of MOJA. So this looks like that  
12 MOJA type thing.

13 Q. And remind us, did MOJA have any particular slant?

14 A. These are the - oh, we mentioned that. These are the  
15:58:01 15 Marxist-Leninist ideologues that just spew out nonsense, I mean,  
16 I really call it. I mean, no one in his sound mind, regardless  
17 of all the fighting we did - we fought everybody - but this is  
18 not the type of language that would be associated with people  
19 that should know better, I'll put it that way.

15:58:24 20 Q. Well, would you use language like "the status of the Sierra  
21 Leonean masses"? Is that your language, Mr Taylor?

22 A. As soon as you get into that word "masses", the "masses of  
23 the people", I mean that word is what? It's synonymous with  
24 what? Communism, Marxism. When we talk about masses, I mean,  
15:58:56 25 normally when we talk about the people, we don't refer to them in  
26 my own leanings as masses. We refer to them as citizens.

27 Q. I'm making these inquiries for a very simple reason,  
28 Mr Taylor. You appreciate of course, don't you, that you're  
29 supposed to have been party to a design with the RUF. Now, given

1 the language of this document, were you conspiring with the RUF?

2 A. No. Impossible. I could have never. I am just so far  
3 from them. We are just so far divided, so far apart that I could  
4 have never been associated with this. And let me just add: If

15:59:43 5 at that time - and we are talking about 1994 when we are long  
6 apart - if at that time I had anything to do with the RUF, I  
7 would not - and as suggested by the Prosecution - have such  
8 control, I would not have permitted this type of thing. Because

9 if you look throughout all of the conflict in Liberia, you are  
16:00:03 10 not going to see one document that came from the NPFL with this  
11 kind of language and venom and insults and all - insults. This  
12 is not the way we operated. So I know they are capable of  
13 hypothesising in any way they can. I think it's a part of the -  
14 you know, some people take it for a job. For me it's my life.

16:00:34 15 But for me, this would not ever happen with me.

16 Q. Right, can we put that document away now, please, and can  
17 we mark it identification before I forget. MFI-7, please.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: The copy of the document headed  
19 "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Office of the  
16:01:13 20 Special Political and Foreign Affairs Coordinator, Public Release  
21 Statement" dated 23 March 1994 will be marked MFI-7.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm helpfully reminded by one of my colleagues.  
24 Can we just return for a moment to what you told us about  
16:01:42 25 Dr Manneh's departure from Liberia. What occasioned that?

26 A. Well, Doc got a little despondent.

27 Q. Who got a little despondent?

28 A. Dr Manneh - I call him Doc. Dr Manneh, Kukoi Samba Sanyang  
29 - decided that he wanted to move on and that he had other things

1 to do. We did not have a conflict. He left with some of his  
2 men, a few of them, and left the vast majority of them in  
3 Liberia. But he said he wanted to move on to some other things  
4 because he had seen Cotonou put together. We had gone ahead and  
16:02:45 5 put together the council. Now he has seen the 1994 amendment,  
6 what is called an amendment to Cotonou. I think it's the Abuja  
7 amendment to Cotonou that was finally carrying me into Monrovia,  
8 and he saw that peace had just about arrived and said that he  
9 wanted to leave to go on to do other things.

16:03:16 10 Q. The Gambians who were left behind, taking things in stages,  
11 firstly roughly how many of those were left behind?

12 A. I would say approximately 10/15 of them. At least 10 were  
13 left behind, I would say.

14 Q. And what happened to them?

16:03:52 15 A. The Gambians remained with me in Liberia on to Monrovia.  
16 Following my election as President they were granted citizenship.  
17 Then I informed the President of The Gambia, my friend Yayah AJJ  
18 Jammeh, of the presence of these men. I even took some of them  
19 with me on a trip to Gambia. They remained in Liberia until my  
16:04:36 20 departure from Liberia in 2003. In fact, President Jammeh sent  
21 an aircraft to Liberia to pick them up along with other Gambians.  
22 So they in fact stayed with me throughout until 2003.

23 Q. Now when Dr Manneh left Liberia, did you offer him any  
24 assistance after that?

16:05:13 25 A. No, I did not. No, nothing.

26 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor. Let us now close that chapter, 1994,  
27 and move on. 1995, help us. What happens during the course of  
28 that year?

29 A. The most significant that really comes to mind - in fact,

1 there are two things. The first thing is that the - this  
2 amendment to Cotonou that I talked about. I mentioned to the  
3 Court that I visited Nigeria on an invitation from President Sani  
4 Abacha, and I think that's a landmark visit. I go to Abuja on  
16:06:20 5 this invitation and I mention it had to be somewhere late '94  
6 early '95, to be exact. And President Abacha and I, in a  
7 conversation, he asks me, he says, "Mr Taylor, what can I do?  
8 What can we do to bring peace?" And I said to him, I said, "It's  
9 very simple." He said, "What do you mean by 'simple' when we've  
16:06:56 10 been fighting all these years?" I said "Look, if you order the  
11 Nigerian troops, the largest contingent in Liberia, ECOMOG, if  
12 you order them to, as of this date, be neutral, the war is over."  
13 You know I can remember very, very clearly he became confused.  
14 He said, "Listen, I'm talking something serious now. That's why  
16:07:25 15 I should" - I said, "But I'm dead serious. You order them to be  
16 neutral, peace is here because I'll go to Monrovia if they are  
17 neutral."

18 And you asked me earlier why didn't I go to Monrovia on the  
19 first Council of State? Because I said Monrovia was still a  
16:07:43 20 dangerous place. So I said to him, "I'll go to Monrovia if you  
21 promise me that you will order ECOMOG, your troops, to be  
22 neutral."

23 Look, we're talking ECOMOG, but the Court must know Nigeria  
24 remains the powerhouse of West Africa - and we will get into that  
16:08:02 25 part of it - what caused some of the problems in Sierra Leone  
26 when I was elected as President, and the conflict between Nigeria  
27 and Britain over Britain's idea that Nigeria could dominate West  
28 Africa and they're trying to stop it. We'll get into that a  
29 little later, because that was one of the problems we had in



1 extending this war in Sierra Leone too.

2 But he says to me, he says, "Well, if that is the case, I  
3 promise you on my honour that from now on the Nigerian unit in  
4 ECOMOG will be neutral." I said to him, "Then I'll go to  
16:08:43 5 Monrovia," and that is what brought the peace. We left from that  
6 meeting, I came, and by the middle of 1995 I was on my way to  
7 Monrovia. Because let's not forget the mechanism for going to  
8 Monrovia had already been set from the first Council of State.  
9 And what am I referring to?

16:09:10 10 The deployment - this is important. Very, very important.  
11 The deployment of the peacekeepers within the Republic of Liberia  
12 from 1994 is very important. ECOMOG and the UN, by the time this  
13 decision is taken for me to go to Monrovia, the document that  
14 just was presented to the judges, to the Court, showed deployment  
16:09:47 15 in, I would say, a total of - if you look at roughly there, about  
16 five locations. It talks about Gbarnga - and the reason why I'm  
17 saying five, because ECOMOG is deployed in Gbarnga, the UN is  
18 deployed in Gbarnga. So while it shows ECOMOG has having been  
19 deployed in two locations, I'm looking at Gbarnga because the two  
16:10:12 20 of them are there as one location. But if you look at that they  
21 talk about - that documents speaks about Tappita, it speaks about  
22 Tubmanburg, Bomi, it speaks about Gbarnga, and it speaks about  
23 Monrovia. These are the locations of deployment.

24 Now, this deployment now that takes me into Monrovia is the  
16:10:40 25 total deployment throughout the entire country; that is, ECOMOG  
26 is deployed as far as Mendekoma. On the map that I drew - that I  
27 marked, Mendekoma, to remind the Court, I've said, is the last  
28 border town when you leave Foya between Sierra Leone and Liberia.  
29 ECOMOG is deployed in Mendekoma; they are deployed in Foya; they

1 are deployed in Kolahun; in Voinjama, in Gbarnga. Going eastward  
2 they are deployed in Gbarnga - I mean Ganta; they are deployed in  
3 Sanniquellie. Sanniquellie is the actual capital of Nimba  
4 County. They are deployed there. They are deployed on the  
16:11:30 5 Ivorian border. Remember I mentioned in my testimony the town of  
6 Loguato where Assistant Secretary of State For African Affairs of  
7 the United States Herman Cohen came to to meet me. That's a  
8 major land entry point. They are deployed there because it is  
9 alleged that during that period we are trucking in arms out of  
16:11:58 10 Cote d'Ivoire, and that's the only land route coming in. Going  
11 towards the western part - I would say east - western -  
12 southwestern part out of Tappita they are deployed all the way  
13 through Grand Gedeh County --

14 Q. Mr Taylor, can I just pause you for a moment. Because I  
16:12:24 15 hesitated to interrupt because the continuity of your flow, but  
16 you're giving us so many references now, it seems to me that it  
17 might be best if we have a map and you assist us by indicating.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. All right. So can we have the coloured map, please. Just  
16:13:07 20 help us, Mr Taylor. And sorry to have to ask you to repeat that,  
21 but just give us an idea of this deployment. Mr Taylor, if  
22 there's no - if the particular place name is not on the map,  
23 could you just indicate the general area that you're talking  
24 about. Don't mark it, please.

16:13:38 25 A. Your Honour, the point I'm trying to make when I talk about  
26 the importance, every major town, every border entry, every  
27 seaport, every airport within the territorial confines of Liberia  
28 are then overtaken by ECOMOG, and so that is ECOMOG is deployed  
29 the start of - immediately. Roberts International Airport, the

1 only international airport in Liberia - there is a second one in  
2 Monrovia. It is not international. It can be used as an  
3 international airport for smaller jets. Roberts International  
4 Airport is now the headquarters of the Nigerian contingent, the  
16:14:42 5 air force. They are there. They are also using Spriggs Payne  
6 Airport in Monrovia. From here their aircrafts take off and  
7 land.

8 So I want to start for your Honours with the seaports.  
9 Monrovia is a major seaport. That is occupied by the ECOMOG  
16:15:07 10 unit. The next seaport is Buchanan. ECOMOG occupies Buchanan.  
11 The next seaport is at Greenville. ECOMOG occupies Greenville.  
12 The last seaport is at Harper. So in Liberia then and now --

13 Q. Where is Harper, Mr Taylor?

14 A. I just pointed it out right here. Harper. Right here:

16:15:44 15 Harper. These are ports that ships land. The port of Harper is  
16 about the smallest. It's a little shallow, so very large vessels  
17 cannot come here. The two areas that very large vessels - I'm  
18 talking about maybe 75,000 tonne vessels can come into Buchanan  
19 and Monrovia. Little smaller I would say by around 50,000 metric  
16:16:17 20 tonnes can come into Greenville. So to prevent arms, ammunition,  
21 and anything from coming into the country - because these areas  
22 are now - are controlled by the NPFL/NPRAG, so ECOMOG takes  
23 position into the ports. They are already at Monrovia,  
24 Robertsfield and Spriggs Payne Airport.

16:16:39 25 Now, let's look at border entries. From the Ivorian side,  
26 the main land entry is at a place called Loguato. Let me just -  
27 very good. Right here, your Honours, this is the town - this is  
28 the border, land border, and there's a bridge over here. This  
29 town is called Loguato. That's the land entry. ECOMOG takes

1 that point.

2 Across the - down, going down to the southwest part of the  
3 country near with the border again with La Cote d'Ivoire, this is  
4 the town of Webo. The spelling is W-E-B-O. There is also a  
16:17:47 5 barge on the river here - there is a river - and they take  
6 position there.

7 On the Guinean side, we come up to the town of Ganta up  
8 here. There is a link going into Guinea, ECOMOG takes that  
9 particular position and back here towards the Sierra Leonean  
16:18:17 10 border you have ECOMOG taking position there. The last position  
11 is down here at where it says "Bo" there is a bridge across  
12 Liberia and Sierra Leone and they deployed there. That's the  
13 deployment at entry points in Liberia.

14 Then they move one step further. They deploy now in  
16:18:53 15 Gbarnga, they are deployed in Monrovia and they are deployed here  
16 in Kakata. We are on the main road going upcountry. They have a  
17 unit even here in Gbatala. They have a unit in Gbarnga. Then  
18 they have a unit in Ganta on this line.

19 Now going up towards the northern part of Liberia, they  
16:19:21 20 deploy in Zorzor. Where is Zorzor? They deploy here in Zorzor.  
21 They deploy at this famous St Paul River bridge. They deploy in  
22 Voi njama. They deploy in Kolahun. They deploy in Foya.

23 On the northwestern side they've already deployed I  
24 mentioned at the Bo Waterside, but they deploy at Robertsport.  
16:20:00 25 Even though they call this Robertsport it is not a seaport, but  
26 here there is a very large lake here. It's called Lake Piso.  
27 It's the largest lake in Monrovia. Very light boats can actually  
28 come into Piso.

29 So they deploy in Robertsport. They deploy in Tubmanburg.

1 They deploy in Klay, that's spelt K-L-A-Y, right here at this  
2 intersection. This intersection here at Klay is a very important  
3 intersection, because out of Monrovia at Klay you turn left and  
4 you are going into Cape Mount/Bomi. You're actually going into  
16:20:48 5 Cape Mount, but if you continue straight up you are going into  
6 Bomi.

7 Then coming on towards the southeast I mentioned that they  
8 had already deployed in Tappita - here in Tappita. So they are  
9 now deployed in Tappita and this is the only road going down to  
16:21:11 10 the southeast. They deploy in Tappita, you come all the way here  
11 and they deploy at this place called Toe Town. What Toe Town is,  
12 this is another immigration border point that leads into La Cote  
13 d'Ivoire here. It is called Toe town. They deploy here.

14 They deploy at Zwedru. Zwedru here is the capital of Grand  
16:21:45 15 Gedeh County where - this is predominantly Krahn. This is where  
16 the late President Doe is from. They come all the way down, they  
17 deploy at Fish Town near the capital Maryland and come all the  
18 way down here to Harper. This is Maryland County where they  
19 deploy.

16:22:06 20 On the Sinoe side they come down and deploy all the way  
21 into Greenville, including the port.

22 Now, the reason why I mentioned that this is important is  
23 because the agreement was to turn over total security in the  
24 country to ECOMOG and the UN forces there. That would enable all  
16:22:34 25 sides to feel confident that they were secure. So there's not  
26 one junction or important road area that is in the Republic of  
27 Liberia that the peacekeeping force is not in control of.

28 In essence, this Cotonou that was amended by Abuja simply  
29 meant that, "Listen, you guys are now the Presidents. That's why

1 the collective presidency was put into place. So if you are  
2 President, why are you fighting for territory? Give it up and go  
3 and do your political work or your administrative work in  
4 Monrovia."

16:23:22 5 That's why I said this is important, because this will show  
6 - and I'm hoping and praying that a senior commander of ECOMOG  
7 will be able to finally reach here. This is important because  
8 no-one is going through any major town or intersection or exit  
9 from Liberia. There is no circulation of arms.

16:23:46 10 While this process is going on, your Honours, all soldiers  
11 are beginning to assemble at assembly points to prepare for this  
12 eventual process of disarmament and, if you are moving, you are  
13 not permitted to move with any arms or warlike material. This  
14 meant that, regardless of the war, someone with NPFL in Gbarnga  
16:24:18 15 could get up and drive straight through Monrovia through an LPC  
16 or Armed Forces of Liberia checkpoint without intimidation. So  
17 this was in fact the surrender of this military control totally -  
18 and say this with emphasis, totally - in the hands of ECOMOG.

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, thank you for that. I think can we put the  
16:24:41 20 map away now.

21 A. Yes, sir. Can I move back to my --

22 Q. Yes, please.

23 A. Thank you.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I'm grateful for all of that, but could you  
16:25:01 25 help us with a time frame for what you have just described,  
26 please?

27 A. This is the process 1994 throughout and into my election as  
28 President of the Republic of Liberia in 1997, July, and in fact  
29 it continues for some time after my presidency while we are

1 consolidating.

2 Q. And we're talking about all of the deployments you've just  
3 described, are we?

4 A. That is correct. Yes, yes.

16:25:51 5 Q. And are you saying that they were in place before the end  
6 of 1994?

7 A. I would not be that categorical, but I will say this much.  
8 They were all in place before I left Gbarnga to go to Monrovia in  
9 mid-1995. So may I just say in - I mean factually that that  
16:26:30 10 process is far advanced, may I say.

11 Q. And I am not sure if you provided us with this piece of  
12 information and so can I ask. When was it that you met with  
13 President Sani Abacha? Can you help us?

14 A. I said that the meeting with Abacha that led to this I'd  
16:27:03 15 said it happened somewhere late '94, or early '95. Based on my  
16 recollection it's not very clear, but it was somewhere around  
17 there.

18 Q. And whilst we're on that topic, Mr Taylor, can you help us  
19 with this? What's the sequence of Nigerian Presidents during  
16:27:27 20 this period 1989 down to 2003? Who do we start off with?

21 A. 1989?

22 Q. Is?

23 A. Well --

24 Q. Because it's somewhat confusing.

16:27:42 25 A. No, it shouldn't be. Babangida - let me go a little  
26 further. After Babangida turned over power, power was given - I  
27 don't know all these guys, but someone took power and then  
28 General Sani Abacha seized power from that person.

29 Q. Okay.

1 A. Okay. I'm sorry I don't know him, but there's somebody  
2 briefly because General Babangida, power is not taken from I mean  
3 General Babangida by General Abacha. There is someone in between  
4 there and then Sani Abacha comes and he removes that person,  
16:28:21 5 okay? So it's not one general overthrowing another.

6 Q. All right, and then who comes after Abacha?

7 A. Sani Abacha, don't forget, is in office until he either  
8 dies or is killed and he is succeeded by General Abdul salami  
9 Abubakar.

16:28:46 10 Q. And who comes after him?

11 A. My good old friend and brother General Olusegun Obasanjo.

12 Q. He's really a friend, is he?

13 A. Well, what can I say? This gentleman, what can I say?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: How much time do we have, Mr President?

16:29:22 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have about a minute.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I don't think it's helpful then for me  
17 to start because I was going to show another map. Can I just  
18 alert the Prosecution it's D-25 and can I mention one other  
19 matter. Do you recall yesterday that I made an erroneous  
16:29:35 20 suggestion regarding Sam Bockarie and Libya?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I in consequence of my admission of  
23 error seek the redaction or withdrawal of page 24754 of the  
24 transcript, lines 9 to 29.

16:29:59 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have anything to say about that?

26 MS HOLLIS: We would object to that. It's on the record,  
27 it's part of the record and because you made a mistake you can't  
28 simply take it off the record.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.



1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I tend to agree with Ms Hollis and  
2 really I don't think any harm was done now that you've conceded  
3 that it was a mistake to refer to TF1-540, because you'll note  
4 that Mr Taylor didn't really respond to that part of the  
16:30:32 5 question. The question was, "Mr Taylor, I want to ask you about  
6 one more detail about Libya before we move on. Do you recall a  
7 Prosecution witness TF1-540 saying that you had met Sam Bockarie  
8 in Libya?", and then, "Did you meet Sam Bockarie in Libya?" That  
9 is the question that Mr Taylor referred to and he only had a very  
16:30:57 10 brief reference to that witness who he may or may not have known,  
11 but I don't think he did because all he said at the end of his  
12 answer was, "So this witness, whoever he is, is lying, lying,  
13 lying."

14           MR GRIFFITHS: Just through an excess of caution,  
16:31:14 15 Mr President, I thought I had better hold my hands up and accept  
16 my guilt.

17           PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand that, Mr Griffiths, but  
18 we'll let the evidence rest as it is.

19           MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

16:31:25 20           PRESIDING JUDGE: Now we're going to adjourn now until 9.30  
21 tomorrow morning. I will give you the caution, Mr Taylor. You  
22 are ordered not to discuss your evidence with any other person.  
23 We'll adjourn now.

24                                 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
25                                 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 22 July 2009 at  
26                                 9.30 a.m.]

27  
28  
29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR 24848

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS 24848