



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 26 OCTOBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Monday, 26 October 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:30:44 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will take appearances, please.

6 MS HOLLIS: Morning, Mr President, your Honours, opposing
7 counsel. This morning for the Prosecution: Brenda J Hollis,
8 Christopher Santora, and our case manager Maja Dimitrova.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

09:32:53 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself, Courtenay
12 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah of counsel, Mr Silas Chekera,
13 and Mr Terry Munyard.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

09:33:48 15 Before we go ahead, Mr Taylor, I know you are very well
16 aware of this, but you are still bound by the oath to tell the
17 truth.

18 Yes, please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

19 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

20 [On former affirmation]

21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

22 Q. Mr Taylor, when we adjourned on 1 October we were looking
23 at the testimony of a particular witness TF1-585, and we had
24 looked at a suggestion made by that witness that you had sent
09:34:22 25 some 30 to 40 Liberians to assist with the Freetown invasion. Do
26 you recall that?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. Now I want to take up the testimony of that individual who
29 went on to say this. Dealing still with the Freetown invasion,

1 and I am looking at page 15722 of the transcript of 8 September
2 2008, line 6:

3 "It was on the radio. It was the one on the radio that I
4 heard. After he had asked him if it was true that his men
09:35:06 5 had entered Freetown and he said yes happily, Benjamin
6 Yeaten congratulated Sam Bockarie and he instructed him to
7 put the two-one on. That's the satellite phone. That was
8 the satellite phone and told him that his father, that's
9 you, would want to talk to him and if that was the case,
09:35:28 10 then he should expect him in two days' time.

11 Q. Who should expect who in two days' time?

12 A. Sam Bockarie was to expect Benjamin Yeaten in two days'
13 time.

14 Q. Who said this to who?

09:35:46 15 A. Benjamin Yeaten spoke to Sam Bockarie that if it was
16 true that his men had entered into Freetown, Sam Bockarie
17 should expect him, Benjamin Yeaten, in two days' time, and
18 that was in Buedu."

19 What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

09:36:03 20 A. Absolutely nothing. In fact, it would have been impossible
21 for Benjamin Yeaten to have said that or to go there, because he
22 would have no reason there. I know nothing about that, and I
23 doubt very much if there were any such conversations. But I'd
24 just like to add, the expression "two-one" is not unique to what
09:36:29 25 probably this witness is saying. I don't know the full codings,
26 but in all international police codes from one end of the planet
27 to the other, most police codes are trained in using tens:
28 ten-one; ten-two; ten-three; ten-four; all the way to
29 ten-nine-nine. In everywhere in the world, ten-two-one is a

1 telephone, whether it's in the United States or in Britain or
2 wherever. So that is not unique. I just wanted the Court to
3 know this. Like, ten-one is okay. Ten-two, you always hear them
4 say "ten-two", "ten-four". All police around the world use that.
09:37:18 5 So that ten-one - ten-two-one is not unique to any specific code
6 between the RUF and Benjamin Yeaten. It's universally used
7 across the planet.

8 Q. But what the witness is suggesting quite clearly,
9 Mr Taylor, bearing in mind the testimony we looked at before we
09:37:42 10 adjourned, is that you were deeply implicated in the Freetown
11 invasion. Do you follow?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. And that your right-hand man, Mr Yeaten, was in
14 communication with Sam Bockarie immediately the news broke that
09:37:59 15 Freetown had been captured. Do you see that?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. And the witness goes on to say this at line 26:

18 "Q. Do you know whether Sam Bockarie had communication on
19 the two-one with anybody after this conversation with
09:38:17 20 Benjamin Yeaten?

21 A. Yes. Just as I am saying. Just after he left the
22 radio room, he went straight to the open terrain and he
23 spoke on the satellite phone.

24 Q. Who did he speak to on the satellite phone?

09:38:35 25 A. Well, he said he had spoken to Charles Taylor.

26 Q. Did you know he was speaking to Charles Taylor when he
27 spoke on the satellite phone?

28 A. Well, before he spoke on the satellite phone, Benjamin
29 Yeaten had instructed him to switch on the satellite phone

1 because Benjamin Yeaten's father, Charles Taylor, had said
2 he wanted to talk to him."

3 Did you have such a conversation, Mr Taylor?

4 A. No, I did not. Never had any such conversation, no.

09:39:06 5 Q. And to your knowledge did Benjamin Yeaten, as suggested,
6 travel to Buedu within two days?

7 A. No, none whatsoever. And to my knowledge, Benjamin Yeaten
8 never entered Sierra Leone at any period prior to, during, or
9 after, no.

09:39:30 10 Q. Moving on. Now, it is also suggested by the witness,
11 Mr Taylor, that thereafter Sam Bockarie went to Buedu and from
12 thence to Monrovia. Page 15731 line 21:

13 "Q. Do you know why he went to Monrovia?

14 A. Well, he went to Monrovia for ammunition.

09:40:11 15 Q. Do you know what brought about his going to Monrovia?

16 A. He said that Charles Taylor had invited him to
17 Monrovia.

18 Q. Do you recall how long after the troops came from
19 Freetown that he went to Monrovia that Sam Bockarie went to
09:40:28 20 Monrovia?

21 A. It was not up to two weeks. It was around that time.

22 Q. And how did you know that Sam Bockarie had been invited
23 to go to Monrovia by Charles Taylor?

24 A. Well, he himself said it. He told Eddie Kanneh that
09:40:45 25 Charles Taylor had said - he said, 'The Pa said I should go
26 to Monrovia', Charles Taylor."

27 Again, Mr Taylor, you do appreciate, don't you, this is
28 clearly implicating you not only in the Freetown invasion, but
29 also that you were providing ammunition to Sam Bockarie within

1 two weeks of that invasion. What do you say about that?

2 A. That's a blatant lie. Sam Bockarie never came to Liberia
3 immediately after the Freetown invasion. Never did. Everyone
4 was upset about what had happened in Freetown. Within that time
09:41:26 5 we were so busy trying to see how we could get Sierra Leone on
6 track, and everybody was upset because we were not expecting such
7 a situation in Sierra Leone. That is not true. Totally false.

8 Q. Now, the witness goes on to suggest, Mr Taylor, that
9 thereafter - and I am taking up his account on that same page,
09:42:10 10 page 15732:

11 "Q. How did you know that Sam Bockarie had been invited to
12 Monrovia - or the purpose for his visit to Monrovia was for
13 ammunition, how did you know this?

14 A. Well, he himself - he himself said it even before he
09:42:29 15 left for Monrovia. He said the Pa had invited him, that is
16 Charles Taylor, that he should go to Monrovia, and when he
17 returned from Liberia two days and on the third Jungle came
18 with ammunition to Buedu."

19 And then he goes on:

09:42:51 20 "Q. Madam Witness, in your earlier evidence you told this
21 Court that Benjamin Yeaten came to Buedu on two occasions.
22 You have already explained or described one of those
23 occasions. Can you tell this Court about the second time
24 that Benjamin Yeaten came to Buedu?

09:43:09 25 A. Yes, I can recall the time when the LURD rebels
26 attacked Voinjama in Liberia, so Benjamin Yeaten and Sam
27 Bockarie spoke to each other and Sam Bockarie sent manpower
28 from Buedu to Voinjama. The RUF fighters who left Buedu
29 and the various front lines were the ones who went and

1 cleared Voinjama. After they had cleared Voinjama, then
2 Benjamin Yeaten came to Buedu. That was the second time he
3 came to Buedu. At that time he came together with Zigzag
4 Marzah and others. Well, Benjamin Yeaten came to Buedu
09:43:56 5 with Zigzag Marzah, Sampson, Junior and the other ones;
6 many people whose names I cannot recall."

7 Pausing there. Firstly, do you know anything about the RUF
8 assisting your government in clearing LURD rebels from Voinjama?

9 A. No, I am not aware of that. It's possible that Liberians
09:44:25 10 fighting with the RUF or in Sierra Leone, knowing about their
11 towns and villages, may have come. But, no, there were no
12 instructions or knowledge on my part of the RUF. And depending
13 on the period he is talking. I don't know which year he is
14 talking about, because LURD had at least three attacks into
09:44:46 15 Liberia that ran from about '98 through to 2000. So I am not
16 sure what time she is speaking about, but there were no requests
17 from me or any knowledge on my part of the RUF being called into
18 Liberia to fight.

19 Now, I do not - I would not argue with the fact that
09:45:06 20 Liberians that were on the other side from that region could have
21 come into Liberia because really you don't know the difference
22 between these combatants. That could be a possibility, but with
23 no knowledge of mine.

24 Q. And what about the further suggestion contained in that
09:45:24 25 passage that Benjamin Yeaten travelled to Buedu?

26 A. I am not aware of it. I wouldn't argue about that. It's
27 possible that Benjamin could have gone to Buedu, but I really do
28 not know. It was not under my instructions, neither did he or
29 anyone inform me. Buedu, from what I understand, is not too far

1 from the border, so coming into Foya on the part of Sierra
2 Leoneans or going into Buedu, I would say it's a possibility,
3 but, no, I am not aware that he did.

09:46:08

4 Q. What about him going in company with Zigzag Marzah, Sampson
5 and others?

09:46:24

6 A. Well, Zigzag Marzah, like I say, is a bodyguard of Benjamin
7 Yeaten, so it's possible. If Benjamin Yeaten went into Buedu, I
8 can say that Zigzag Marzah would have accompanied him because
9 that's - he was just a bodyguard to Benjamin Yeaten and I am sure
10 Benjamin, if he travelled, he could have travelled with him. He
11 had Sampson, who was the deputy I think to Benjamin Yeaten and
12 his cousin, Sampson Weah. That's possible. It's possible, I
13 would say.

09:46:41

14 Q. Sampson who?

15 A. Weah.

16 Q. How do you spell that?

17 A. That is on - it's been spelt two or three different ways
18 but it's on the records, Sampson Weah.

09:46:59

19 Q. Very well. And you said he was a relation of Benjamin
20 Yeaten, did you?

09:47:17

21 A. Sampson Weah is like what we call brother, I think it's a
22 first cousin to Benjamin Yeaten. Very close, very close. So if
23 Benjamin Yeaten travelled in that region during the period of the
24 crisis, the possibilities are and I would even say the
25 probabilities are that his bodyguards would have been with him.
26 So Zigzag, yes, would have been with him and even Sampson. I
27 wouldn't dispute that. I can't say I am confirming it because I
28 don't know. I am just saying here that these are his bodyguards
29 and I mean the rational thinking would be that if he travelled,

1 his bodyguards would be with him, if he did.

2 Q. Now, picking up on an earlier answer you gave, can you
3 think of any reason why the RUF would be fighting LURD?

09:48:02

4 A. At the time in question, no, I have no idea of why they
5 would want to fight LURD because the circumstances are different
6 from the circumstances with ULIMO. I would see no reason why,
7 but I know that most of the Liberians that were across the border
8 which were the Kissis, the Gbandis, the Lomas, the Mendes, they
9 have their home villages in that general area. So hearing of war
10 in that region, the possibilities are that they rushed home to
11 protect their families. That's just - I would suggest that that
12 would be one reason why there would be an influx of former
13 fighters in Sierra Leone in that region.

09:48:37

14 Q. Now, could they have fought LURD, that's the RUF, for
15 reasons unconnected to Liberia and your government?

09:49:00

16 A. Well, I would not go that far because for such an entry of
17 the RUF, Liberia is a sovereign country, it would take the
18 permission of my government to permit such an entry. There was
19 no such request. There was a legitimate government in Sierra
20 Leone and there was no permission from my government.

09:49:32

21 So the only thing I can really come up with is that because
22 you can hardly tell the differences between these family and
23 tribal groups on the border, hearing that there was fighting in
24 the region, if I am across the border and my mother, father,
25 brothers and sisters are well situated in Liberia and I hear that
26 people from Guinea, because LURD actually came from Guinea, are
27 attacking and not knowing what, I would probably rush across to
28 see what assistance I can give and that did not necessarily take
29 any official acquiescence from the central government in Monrovia

09:49:51

1 to do that. You would really not know. If people came and
2 volunteered wanting to fight, I think they would.

3 Q. Now, leaving that topic and going on to another matter now,
4 later in her testimony the witness said this, page 157535, line
09:50:37 5 14:

6 "Q. Do you know why he" - this is Sam Bockarie - "went to
7 Monrovia? Do you know whether he went to Monrovia of his
8 own accord?

9 A. Well, according to him, Sam Bockarie, what he told all
09:50:56 10 of us, he said that the Pa, who was Charles Taylor, had
11 invited him to go to Monrovia. Because Sankoh did not
12 realise the good things Sam Bockarie had done for Sankoh,
13 Charles Taylor said he had use for Sam Bockarie and so they
14 should not fight each other. Sam Bockarie should go to
09:51:25 15 Monrovia for him.

16 Q. Did Sam Bockarie go to Monrovia alone?

17 A. No, he did not go alone. He went with many soldiers
18 and even some civilians went with him."

19 Now, we are talking about the event in December 1999,

09:51:44 20 Mr Taylor --

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. -- when Sam Bockarie relocated to Monrovia. We have
23 already dealt with that in some detail with reference to various
24 UN documentation, but I want you to deal specifically with the
09:51:58 25 suggestion being made by this witness. Did you invite Sam

26 Bockarie to Monrovia, question one?

27 A. Yes, I did.

28 Q. Was it because, to quote the witness, you had use for Sam
29 Bockarie?

1 A. No, this is just - this is due to - no, in fact no, but
2 this is just due to the ignorance of individuals that are being
3 posed these questions. They have no idea on this planet what is
4 going on and just have to make suggestions. Here is a little
09:52:36 5 girl, a woman, whatever she is, with no insult to her, that does
6 not know what's going on and is asked a question and she is just
7 coming up with a suggestion.

8 Sam Bockarie was invited to Monrovia by me after several
9 meetings involving another President of West Africa, Obasanjo of
09:53:00 10 Nigeria, that sat in a meeting with Bockarie, Sankoh and myself
11 where we could not conclude on getting Sam Bockarie to accept the
12 process of disarmament with Sankoh. It was decided by ECOWAS,
13 represented by Obasanjo and myself, to extract Sam Bockarie and
14 we did. Now this is someone who has no idea what is going on and
09:53:24 15 is suggesting something and I think it's just due to just pure
16 ignorance on her part, I think with no prejudice whatsoever, but
17 I think she just does not know what she's talking about and is
18 asked about a situation far out of her league. This is what I
19 can say about this.

09:53:43 20 Q. Now, the witness went on, Mr Taylor, to suggest that Sam
21 Bockarie told her, and this is page 157542, I am picking up a
22 long answer at line 26 - told her, this is Sam Bockarie, that he
23 had spoken with Charles Taylor and Charles Taylor said he was
24 going to buy a house for him, that is for Sam Bockarie. But that
09:54:12 25 the place he was going to buy for him, not everybody would go and
26 stay there. He said there were just four houses in a single
27 fence and he went on to say that Charles Taylor said that he
28 should train his boys. And further, this is page 15743 at line
29 10, Sam Bockarie got the house, that was the new four houses all

1 in a single fence, but Sam Bockarie was living there together
2 with Sampson and Jungle.

3 First of all, did you buy a house for Sam Bockarie in
4 Monrovia?

09:54:54 5 A. Never did. No.

6 Q. Consisting of four new houses?

7 A. No. I never did. We leased a compound for Sam Bockarie
8 and his entourage that came in December of 1999. Never bought
9 it.

09:55:12 10 Q. And was he living there, as far as you're aware, with
11 Sampson and Jungle?

12 A. No. Sampson and Jungle never lived there. Sam Bockarie
13 lived in that compound with his mother, his wife, children and
14 some of his other senior individuals. But, no, Sampson and

09:55:31 15 Jungle, not to my knowledge, because Sampson would have had his
16 own place in Liberia long before Sam Bockarie came.

17 Q. But the witness goes on, Mr Taylor, to repeat, line 16 on
18 that same page:

19 "Jungle was living in that same fence in the same compound
09:55:50 20 together with Sampson and Sam Bockarie and his family and few
21 soldiers, his bodyguards who were with him at that time."

22 Is that the case?

23 A. That is not the case. And this is why I say, these people
24 are being asked questions and they try to put it - Charles Taylor

09:56:07 25 asked Sam Bockarie to train his men. Well, this Court has

26 documents where the United Nations experts went to South Africa

27 and interviewed General Fred Rindel whose name has been

28 introduced in records here. We know that the Government of

29 Liberia hired a retired South African general and his men to come

1 and train. So these are just lies these people make up. When
2 they do not know, they come up with explanations.

3 Sam Bockarie, we had people ten times better trained than
4 Sam Bockarie, I would bring him to Liberia to train? But Jabaty
09:56:45 5 Jaward, one of Sam Bockarie's men that came here that was trained
6 under the ATU also told this Court that Sam Bockarie had nothing
7 to do with them. So all this nonsense about - look, if Jungle or
8 Sampson visited the four houses, I am not in a position to
9 dispute that. I am President sitting down in the mansion, who
09:57:02 10 visits who - I mean, it's possible. I will even say probable. I
11 can't deny here that Jungle or Sampson visited. I know there
12 were four houses that were leased by the Government of the
13 Republic of Liberia for Sam Bockarie and his individuals that
14 came, they were hosted there. I say we did - I authorised it.

09:57:26 15 As far as training is concerned that is further suggested
16 in there, it's a blatant lie, it would not have taken any Sam
17 Bockarie to train anybody. We hired retired experienced military
18 people from outside to train our not military, but to train our
19 Special Forces in dealing with anti-terrorism activities. So
09:57:50 20 this is total foolishness that she is talking about here or
21 suggesting.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the witness goes on to describe some of the
23 men who had come to Liberia with Sam Bockarie being trained and
24 incorporated into the ATU. Now you accept that, don't you?

09:58:20 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. And you accept, do you not, that that training took place
27 at a place called Gbatala, close to Gbarnga?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And following their training they were assigned, were they

1 not, to, amongst other things, providing security at places such
2 as the Executive Mansion in Monrovia?

3 A. Amongst others, yes.

4 Q. And at embassies and the like?

09:58:55 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Now, the witness goes on to describe that thereafter
7 Bockarie left Liberia at some stage.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Why did he leave, Mr Taylor?

09:59:12 10 A. Well, Bockarie left because of the constant what I would
11 call near harassment on the part of the Government of Liberia;
12 accusations, disinformation, misinformation, about what he was
13 doing or not doing in Liberia. And because of the fact that we
14 had brought him there under the auspices of ECOWAS and everybody
09:59:40 15 else, we decided that we should ask him to leave the country
16 because his presence there was opposing additional harassment of
17 the Liberian government.

18 Q. Now, the witness goes on to describe this, however, and I
19 am looking at page 15749 commencing at line 14:

10:00:07 20 "Q. How did you get to know that Sam Bockarie was fighting
21 in the Ivory Coast at this time?

22 A. Well, at that time Sam Bockarie had gone on exile for a
23 long time, for close to a year, so it got to a time
24 sometimes in 2002 we had an understanding that he called
10:00:26 25 for all his former RUF fighters with whom he had crossed
26 from Sierra Leone to Liberia. He called them to Monrovia
27 so that they would undergo ATU training. He called on all
28 those to go and meet him in Ivory Coast for an operation.

29 Q. And did you know what this operation was about in the

1 Ivory Coast?

2 A. Yes. Well, they were fighting there against the
3 Ivorians. They were fighting there against the Ivorian
4 government.

10:01:04 5 Q. You said that Sam Bockarie left Liberia in 2002. Do
6 you know whether he had been anywhere before he went to the
7 Ivory Coast?

8 A. I did not say that he left Liberia in 2002. He left
9 Liberia in 2001 - sometime around 2001. But it was in 2002
10:01:29 10 that we heard about him in Ivory Coast. He had left
11 Monrovia before 2002.

12 Q. The instruction was do you know whether he had been
13 anywhere before he came to the Ivory Coast?

14 A. Well, about that we - before that we heard about him in
10:01:52 15 Libya. We heard that he was in Libya.

16 Q. Were you able to confirm any of this, the information
17 about him being in Libya?

18 A. Well, I heard that from his wife. I did not ask him
19 directly at the time I met with him because he was actually
10:02:11 20 in Libya, but that was what his wife told us, because by
21 then we did not have access to communication with him
22 directly.

23 Q. You said that Bockarie requested his men who had been
24 trained with the ATU to join him in Ivory Coast. Did they
10:02:30 25 join him there?

26 A. Yes, all of them went.

27 Q. About what time was this?

28 A. Well, the movement of his men from Monrovia to the
29 Ivory Coast was around 2000 - I mean, the year 2002.

1 Q. How long was Sam Bockarie in the Ivory Coast with his
2 men?

3 A. Between six to seven months."

4 Now, there is a lot there that we need to deal with,

10:03:00 5 Mr Taylor. Firstly, what's your knowledge of Bockarie going to
6 Libya upon leaving Monrovia?

7 A. None. I have no knowledge. Sam Bockarie was expelled from
8 Liberia, and I have no knowledge of where he went. I have some
9 knowledge later of what he did, but not where he went. I was not
10:03:19 10 aware, no. I had nothing to do or track him after he left

11 Liberia. No, nothing.

12 Q. The second aspect of this I want to ask you about,

13 Mr Taylor, is this. According to this witness, Bockarie decided
14 to recall his men who had joined the ATU to assist him in

10:03:47 15 fighting the Ivorian government in Cote d'Ivoire. What do you
16 know about that?

17 A. No, not that I know of. What I am aware of, I was told - I
18 was briefed at one point in 2002 that some of the Sierra Leoneans
19 that had been given Liberian citizenship that were with the ATU
10:04:17 20 wanted to leave the country and that a large majority of them
21 went - I would say of the total number of Sierra Leoneans that
22 were in the ATU, I would say about a third of them left and said
23 they wanted to leave the country because the war - by 2002, at
24 this time the war had intensified and --

10:04:42 25 Q. Which war?

26 A. LURD had approached Monrovia. I just figured that some -
27 in fact, a lot of Liberians that were in the security forces
28 left. People developed cold feet, and so I just figured they
29 wanted to go. But I was told that a large part of the Sierra

1 Leoneans that were with the ATU left the country.

2 Q. And went where?

3 A. Well, I learnt that they went to Cote d'Ivoire.

10:05:13

4 Q. Now, taking matters slowly. Firstly, where did you get
5 that information from?

6 A. The ATU commander told me that some of the Sierra Leoneans
7 had left.

10:05:35

8 Q. And so just so that we get the full picture, these are
9 former RUF combatants inducted into the ATU properly trained by
10 the South Africans at Gbatala who, when Bockarie is ready,
11 summonses them to assist him in Cote d'Ivoire. Wasn't that a
12 matter of concern to you, Mr Taylor?

10:05:58

13 A. Well, if I had known that Sam Bockarie summonsing them, it
14 would have been of concern to me. It was not told to me that Sam
15 Bockarie had summonsed anybody. What I was told by the ATU
16 commander, like, even Liberians ran away from the country,
17 soldiers of the armed forces. The fact of deserting - Americans
18 deserted in Canada right now. They did not want to go to Iraq.

10:06:18

19 So people deserting and leaving, it's not a matter of such
20 national concern that someone has to call, no. I was told
21 of - there was large desertion from the security forces all
22 across the border, including Liberians that left and went to
23 safety. Let's look at an example. How did ULIMO organise in
24 Sierra Leone all the way back to the early part of the war?

10:06:42

25 Armed forces of Liberian personnel deserted and said that they
26 were tired with the war and were going. So when a report came to
27 me: Oh, there are Sierra Leoneans that are with the RUF, I mean,
28 that came along with Bockarie are leaving the country, for me it
29 was just - the information was important, but it did not call for

1 any - it was not a national emergency for me, because we were
2 used to people deserting. So desertion is a part of the game.
3 People desert all the time.

4 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, but I am concentrating on something else.

10:07:17 5 When you discovered that men trained at your government's expense
6 inducted into the ATU and given Liberian citizenship were
7 fighting in a neighbouring country against a government of that
8 country, what did you about it?

9 A. Nothing. I could do nothing about it. Absolutely nothing.

10:07:44 10 Because those that leave the country and go and involve in what
11 they want to involve in another country, what did can I do about
12 it? It's just like Liberians that left and went to Sierra Leone
13 and fought along the Sierra Leonean government. What could
14 Samuel Doe do about it? Nothing. There's nothing you can do
10:08:03 15 about these things, okay? Absolutely nothing you can do about
16 it.

17 Q. Were they present in La Cote d'Ivoire with your consent,
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Not at all, no. That's what I am saying, no. Nobody
10:08:16 20 deserts with the consent of the commander-in-chief. When you
21 desert, you pack up and you go. Even your immediate commander
22 doesn't know that you are gone. You get the information that
23 people had crossed the border. I am sure, for example - and it's
24 important to get the full picture of this. When ULIMO started in
10:08:36 25 Sierra Leone, there was a famous general, General Kapay [phon], a
26 major general that was US trained and one of the best soldiers in
27 the Armed Forces of Liberia from the Krahn ethnic group, Major
28 General Kapay. According to the evidence, General Kapay was
29 killed before ULIMO came together. A major general deserted.

1 Samuel Doe could do nothing about it.

2 In direct answer to your question, they were not in La
3 Cote d'Ivoire with my knowledge, consent or acquiescence. As far
4 as I am concerned, Liberians and whoever deserted - deserters run
10:09:12 5 away. They desert, they run away, you hear later on what they
6 are doing. But for my information, the commander of the ATU at
7 that time informed me that some of the Sierra Leoneans, including
8 Liberians, had deserted and left their posts and some of them
9 went to Ivory Coast, but some of them also went to Guinea.

10:09:37 10 Q. Very well. The witness continued in this vein at page
11 15750:

12 "Q. You have said that you went to Ivory Coast yourself.
13 When did you go to the Ivory Coast?

14 A. In the same 2002. When I went there, I was there for
10:10:07 15 about three to four months and then I returned to Monrovia.

16 Q. Did you return to Monrovia alone?

17 A. In Monrovia city, I alone returned there during that
18 time, because it was not easy.

19 Q. Did you return from Ivory Coast alone?

10:10:24 20 A. We were many, including Sam Bockarie himself. We were
21 many who came from Man, Danane and from Danane that was
22 towards the border crossing into Nimba. We were many who
23 came there.

24 Q. Can you describe the group that left Ivory Coast to
10:10:46 25 come back into Liberia?

26 A. We were about 500 including civilians. I can say
27 roughly 500.

28 Q. What was the composition of this group?

29 A. In the same group we had civilians. We had Liberian

1 fighters who were loyal to Charles Taylor's government, and
2 we had the former RUF fighters who had trained as ATUs.
3 Their wives were amongst. Some ATU soldiers had had
4 Ivorian wives, and some Liberian soldiers who had had
10:11:23 5 Ivorian wives and civilians even followed us. The group
6 was a large group. We were many.
7 Q. Did Sam Bockarie return to Liberia with this group?
8 A. Yes, all of us crossed into Liberia, but not everybody
9 reached - arrived in Monrovia.
10:11:40 10 Q. Why did the group leave Ivory Coast to come back to
11 Liberia?
12 A. Well, we were persistently attacked. The Ivorian
13 soldiers persistently attacked our positions, so it was
14 difficult for us to easily cross at any point. And at that
10:11:57 15 time the Liberian soldiers who were under Charles Taylor's
16 command, most of them came to the border area and they were
17 deployed along the whole border area with all sorts of
18 heavy weapons. They said they would not allow us to cross
19 over at all. They said Charles Taylor said all of us who
10:12:20 20 were in the Ivory Coast who had crossed over to the Ivory
21 Coast who were fighting there, they shouldn't allow us to
22 cross at all. No Sam Bockarie's follower was to be allowed
23 to cross through Liberia, because they said the United
24 Nations had come to the realisation that Charles Taylor was
10:12:41 25 the one who called Sam Bockarie to come to Liberia and that
26 Sam Bockarie had left Liberia and he had crossed over to
27 Ivory Coast to fight there and that the same Sam Bockarie
28 had left Ivory Coast again and had crossed into Liberia.
29 They said the United Nations had known about that and that

1 they were all over Liberia looking out for Sam Bockarie,
2 and they said they were going to make sure that if the same
3 Sam Bockarie who had left Sierra Leone who was called on
4 by Charles Taylor to come to Liberia, whether it was the
10:13:22 5 same Charles Taylor who had crossed over to the Ivory Coast
6 to fight there and to see whether it was the same Sam
7 Bockarie again who is crossing over from the Ivory Coast to
8 Liberia. "

9 Now, again, Mr Taylor, there are a number of aspects to
10:13:39 10 that passage. First of all, the composition of the group:
11 Liberian fighters; loyal to Charles Taylor's government; former
12 RUF fighters who had trained as ATUs; some with Ivorian wives.
13 What do you say about that?

14 A. Well, you see - no. I say that this - "no" as a direct
10:14:08 15 answer to your question. I really - but this is what makes this
16 case to complex. Here is a lady, what is she trying to explain?
17 And this Court has heard this testimony before. She is trying to
18 explain the return of Sam Bockarie and the group on the border
19 that the Liberian government refuses to permit a large
10:14:32 20 consignment of soldiers to re-enter the country, and she states
21 here that there are some Liberians. This is what I pointed out
22 earlier, deserters that left. Coming from in la Cote d'Ivoire to
23 enter Liberia, there is a large amount - she is referring to the
24 incident that thereafter leads to the death of Sam Bockarie.

10:14:55 25 That's what this girl is trying to explain here.

26 What she is explaining is - in fact she is talking about
27 500, there may have been a thousand or more well armed people
28 coming out of la Cote d'Ivoire in a major cover. Of course it is
29 the duty of the Government of Liberia to state that no one is

1 going to enter Liberia armed, no one. And those were my orders
2 that no one - we had no conflict with La Cote d'Ivoire and we had
3 a duty to protect our borders. This large amount of people,
4 including Sam Bockarie, came to the border and the orders were
10:15:32 5 that no one should enter the Republic of Liberia armed. And
6 those were my orders. That's what she is trying to explain.

7 They were disarmed at the border, some of them tried to
8 force their way. And one of the soldiers involved, a Jabaty
9 Jaward that sat in this chair, explained to this Court what
10:15:53 10 happened at the border at that particular time. We did stop
11 them. Those that forced their way in came under fire from the
12 Liberian forces, which were my orders also, because they should
13 have been disarmed. And not too long after that, the fracas,
14 that's what led to the death of Sam Bockarie.

10:16:14 15 This is what she is trying to explain but she was not
16 present in the whole fracas and knowing exactly what happened and
17 trying her little best to explain away something that she doesn't
18 know. So what is being explored here is this incident of the
19 return of this massive force out of La Cote d'Ivoire, the
10:16:34 20 resistance on the part of the Government of Liberia in preventing
21 armed men to enter that eventually leads to Sam Bockarie's death.
22 This is what she's explaining.

23 Q. Well, let me pose this question: Why did you, as President
24 of Liberia, not want these armed men to enter the country?

10:16:55 25 A. Why would any government want for armed men to enter their
26 country? There is a war across the border. Ivory Coast is a
27 friendly nation. We do not have a conflict with them. So if
28 someone is involved in a war in Ivory Coast, he cannot
29 legitimately cross into Liberia with a weapon. If that

1 individual is coming into Liberia seeking refugee status, you
2 come in unarmed and you will be welcomed and turned over to the
3 refugee agencies. But if you are coming into the country as a
4 force armed, then what are you? You are a hostile force and you
10:17:37 5 are construed to be an enemy. So you have to be disarmed. If
6 you want forcefully enter, you will come under fire. That's
7 normal.

8 Q. I ask for this reason, Mr Taylor, and I give you the
9 opportunity to deal with it: The suggestion here appears to be
10:17:58 10 that you were blocking the re-entry of these men into Liberia out
11 of embarrassment because the United Nations had got wise to your
12 game. Do you follow? Hence the witness says the UN had come to
13 the realisation that Charles Taylor was the one who called Sam
14 Bockarie to come to Liberia and that same Sam Bockarie had left
10:18:24 15 Liberia, crossed to Cote d'Ivoire to fight and was coming back in
16 effect. So you were embarrassed. Is that the case?

17 A. Total, total nonsense from this girl or whoever suggested
18 it to her. Total nonsense. Total nonsense. That's all I can
19 say to that, that I would be embarrassed that I sent Sam Bockarie
10:18:48 20 to go and fight in La Cote d'Ivoire for anyone to suggest this?
21 Total nonsense. We know from before this Court why Sam Bockarie
22 fled from La Cote d'Ivoire, one who fought in that war, Jabaty
23 Jaward, said we know that the evidence before this Court is that
24 Sam Bockarie had killed the rebel leader in La Cote d'Ivoire and
10:19:11 25 he was being chased, total nonsense. And this is a part of the
26 type of lies that are constructed. Total nonsense.

27 Sam Bockarie had been expelled from Liberia. And let me be
28 very, very bold about this. If Sam Bockarie had come back to
29 Liberia unarmed, under a stressful situation, probably we would

1 have permitted him in the country and arrested him. We would not
2 have attacked him. So she is talking total nonsense.

3 Q. So there was no sense of embarrassment involved, Mr Taylor,
4 is that what you are telling us?

10:19:54 5 A. Not at all. Not one sense of embarrassment. Not at all.

6 Q. Tell me, Mr Taylor, had you sent Sam Bockarie to Ia
7 Cote d'Ivoire with members of your ATU to become involved in
8 fighting in that country, your neighbour?

9 A. No, no, and no. And let's be reminded again, how and where
10:20:26 10 did Sam Bockarie enter Ia Cote d'Ivoire? We have evidence before
11 this Court that Sam Bockarie entered Ia Cote d'Ivoire from
12 Burkina Faso. The evidence is before this Court. He entered
13 from Burkina Faso and that witness brought the map and we went
14 through that. No, I did not send Sam Bockarie to Ia

10:20:50 15 Cote d'Ivoire to fight. No, I did not. Sam Bockarie left
16 Liberia in 2001, about a year later the Ia Cote d'Ivoire war
17 starts, he comes in, from a witness that fought in that war, from
18 Burkina Faso. He even showed the route that he used to enter. I
19 did not send Sam Bockarie to fight in Ia Cote d'Ivoire, no.

10:21:13 20 Q. Now, of course, Mr Taylor, your revolution in Liberia was
21 launched from Ia Cote d'Ivoire. Had you decided by 2002, given
22 your alleged grander ambitions in West Africa - did you decide to
23 destabilise that government as well?

24 A. Oh no, Ia Cote d'Ivoire was a very friendly government and
10:21:38 25 throughout the crisis in Liberia, before my being elected as
26 President, the Ivorian government would say, and in fact the
27 records are there, there was not even a pistol sold across the
28 Ivorian border. None whatsoever.

29 In fact, to even substantiate what I am saying, when the

1 conflict occurred between Guei Robert, and who I am referring to,
2 the general that overthrew the government, and the ensuing
3 conflict between Guei Robert and Laurent Gbagbo who is the
4 present President, I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, intervened and went
10:22:21 5 to Nigeria. I went and met with Gbagbo and it was a very
6 friendly government and we needed La Cote d'Ivoire even more than
7 they needed us. So no, no, absolutely no intent or no action on
8 my part to destabilise the Ivorian government, none whatsoever.

9 Q. Now, do you recall now, Mr Taylor, who was in charge of
10:22:45 10 those Liberian troops sent to the border to prevent the entry of
11 Sam Bockarie and these men - the armed entry, I should say?

12 A. I really do not know who was in charge of preventing the
13 entry. I know the commander in the region at that time, oh, boy,
14 I can't be exact, but I know one of the commanders was Ericson
10:23:24 15 Bardea was a general up there. But when the Bockarie incident
16 started flaring up, I sent Lieutenant General Moses Blah,
17 Vice-President, to the region to make sure that things did not
18 get totally out of hand. But he was not the commander, but I
19 sent him there to ensure that things did not get out of control.

10:23:53 20 Q. Did you send Benjamin Yeaten there?

21 A. Benjamin Yeaten went up with the Vice-President at that
22 time, yes, but Benjamin Yeaten was not the commander, as I am
23 saying.

24 Q. I ask for this reason: When we go on to page 15755 of this
10:24:25 25 witness's testimony, line 16, the witness is asked this question:

26 "Q. When you crossed over into Liberia, did you go
27 anywhere, I mean Sam Bockarie and his group?

28 A. Yes, immediately after we crossed the border there was
29 a small village and in that village there was no people

1 living there. There was a structure like a hospital,
2 something like an under five clinic, but nobody was living
3 there. And so that was where Sam Bockarie went and rested
4 for a while. We all went there, we were there, and some
10:24:59 5 wounded soldiers were brought to that location. We were
6 all seated there and Sam Bockarie was talking. We were on
7 that when 50 and others arrived - 50 being Benjamin Yeaten
8 - and they collected him from there and they said
9 Charles Taylor said they should take him to Monrovia, but
10:25:21 10 they did not take him to Monrovia at all and they blocked
11 every one of us who were there in the village and they took
12 him to a village where there was a rubber plantation. That
13 was where they took him."

14 Jumping a few lines:

10:25:40 15 "... 50 was there and I recall Joe Tuah. I recall just the
16 two of them, including their bodyguards.

17 Q. You said that they collected him from there and they
18 said Charles Taylor said they should take him to Monrovia.
19 Who are you referring to that was taken from there?

10:26:02 20 A. Benjamin Yeaten and Joe Tuah came and took Sam Bockarie
21 from that village where I said there was an under five.
22 They said Charles Taylor said they should take Sam Bockarie
23 to Monrovia."

24 Did you give such an order?

10:26:23 25 A. No, I did not give any such order. The fact of the matter
26 is - you know, the way they put these little people through these
27 explanations, I don't know. You know, as I am listening to this
28 trial, Charles Taylor said, the President alone knows everything,
29 he says everything, he acts, which is absolutely abnormal for any

1 President on this planet to know all these - the President gives
2 an order to the Vice-President, who is a trained Special Forces,
3 after I get to know that there is a group at the border putting
4 up resistance, including Sam Bockarie, and things are getting
10:27:10 5 nasty. I order this Moses Blah to go the region, okay, and to
6 make sure that everything is brought under control and to bring
7 Sam Bockarie to Monrovia, to have him disarmed and brought to
8 Monrovia. I don't know who he took with him. I don't know what
9 transpired, the little details, and so I can't fuss with this
10:27:33 10 lady about what little village or town. I don't know the details
11 of what happened. But the orders were given by me to go arrest
12 the situation and bring Sam Bockarie to Monrovia. Those were my
13 orders.

14 As to the little details that happened on the ground, I
10:27:52 15 have no idea. I cannot confirm or deny that she is telling the
16 truth. I don't know, really. I gave the orders to go. Who
17 Moses Blah took with him, I am aware that Benjamin Yeaten went.
18 Moses would not go without experienced people because we learnt
19 that there was - in fact when information first came it was said
10:28:14 20 that thousands of armed men had come to the border. So I said,
21 "Well, Moses, listen, you go up there and make sure that this
22 matter is handled as best as possible. We are already fighting
23 LURD here in Monrovia, we don't need another front open, you
24 know, with another war." So I can't fuss with the little
10:28:35 25 details, but the fact of the matter is I ordered Moses Blah to go
26 and bring the situation under control and bring Sam Bockarie to
27 Monrovia.

28 Q. And did you give such an order, Mr Taylor, because you had
29 certain business for Mr Bockarie to do for you?

1 A. No, come on, what - Bockarie was of no use to me. Why
2 would Bockarie be - no, I gave the orders because I did not want
3 anything nasty opening because we understand that Sam Bockarie
4 and the people that were trying to enter Liberia were well armed
10:29:16 5 with heavy weapons and opening up a front on that side would have
6 been terrible. I just wanted it handled as professionally as
7 possible to have Sam Bockarie brought to Monrovia.

8 Q. I ask for this reason, the witness continues in this vein,
9 page 15758. The witness speaks of Benjamin Yeaten addressing the
10:29:40 10 group and then continues:

11 "Benjamin Yeaten said now that the group, Sam Bockarie's
12 group, had crossed from the Ivory Coast and they had come
13 to Nimba, he said there was a problem already that they met
14 that the rebel forces - the LURD - had attacked and they
10:30:00 15 were based in Ganta at that present moment. And he said
16 every other day they were advancing and that Charles Taylor
17 had given order to all Sam Bockarie's forces that they
18 should clear up Ganta before any of those soldiers would be
19 allowed to move to Monrovia. He said without that, none of
10:30:25 20 them would be allowed to go there?"

21 Do you follow, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes. And it is such nonsense that maybe we need to look at
23 the map. Loguato is about 150 miles from Ganta. So if you would
24 let the people come into the country, they are already 150 miles
10:30:45 25 inside the country. So this is total nonsense that I say they
26 would not be permitted to enter and to go to Monrovia unless they
27 clear Ganta. Ganta - if you would reach to Ganta from Loguato,
28 you're already inside the country. Maybe if we look at a map the
29 judges will get to see, but this is total nonsense.

1 Q. No. What is being suggested, Mr Taylor, is that you
2 decided to utilise these fighting men?

3 A. How you utilise them when you say disarm them at the
4 border? You disarm people 150 miles away and say, "Come in.
10:31:18 5 We'll re-arm you to go and collect Ganta"? Total nonsense. She
6 is talking nonsense. The orders are to disarm the people. She
7 says earlier that at the border that the forces refused to let
8 them enter, and we know from Jabaty Jaward that there is an
9 exchange of fire on the border. So how, on the one hand, you
10:31:36 10 tell somebody, "We want you to come in 150 miles in the country
11 to come and clear Ganta," which is 150 miles or thereabouts from
12 Loguato, and by the same token you are saying that you are
13 disarming them. It doesn't work.

14 Q. To your knowledge, Mr Taylor, were any of the combatants
10:31:57 15 who came from La Cote d'Ivoire with Sam Bockarie utilised in any
16 way thereafter by the Liberian government?

17 A. No, I am not aware. I am not aware. It doesn't mean that
18 the Liberians that came back could have fought. That's probable.
19 Those Liberians that deserted that re-entered the country,
10:32:24 20 Ganta - Ganta is the heartland of Nimba County. Ganta, the
21 heartland of Nimba County. And if there was a deserter that came
22 - and Ganta had been attacked from across the border in Guinea.
23 Because again unless we really know the maps, Ganta is directly
24 on the border with Guinea, and from Ganta to the Guinean town of
10:32:51 25 Nzerekore is nowhere. There's brisk trade in Ganta. That's the
26 heart of Nimba. And if a deserter came and LURD, that were
27 fighting on the other side, decided that they were going to -
28 that they had already attacked Ganta, I would say almost 100
29 per cent if you were a deserter from the armed forces and you

1 were from Nimba and you learned that Ganta was under attack, of
2 course the chances are that you would join the fight. I would -
3 I'm in no position to say that that did not happen. Yes, it
4 could have happened.

10:33:23 5 Q. Now, the final matter I want to give you an opportunity to
6 deal with is this: Now, the witness says that she learnt that
7 Sam Bockarie and his family had been killed, and the account
8 unfolds in this way. I am looking at page 15769, line 20:

9 "Q. Did he tell you who had killed Sam Bockarie and his
10:34:00 10 family?"

11 A. Well, he told me that it was 50, but he said it was
12 an order from Charles Taylor.

13 Q. When you spoke to Toasty, this is the person who
14 supplied this information, and he also - he confirmed this
10:34:17 15 information to you, did Toasty tell you who killed Sam
16 Bockarie and his family as well as all the other fighters
17 that he told you had been killed?

18 A. Yes, he told me it was 50, but it was Charles Taylor's
19 order."

10:34:32 20 Taking matters in stages: Firstly, who is Toasty?

21 A. I have no idea. I do not know a Toasty.

22 Q. Did you give an order for Sam Bockarie to be killed?

23 A. The last person on this planet that I wanted killed was Sam
24 Bockarie. I never gave any such order. Sam Bockarie's death
10:34:57 25 hurt me. Sam Bockarie was someone that I actually liked, and I
26 can tell the world about this, and I did not want him dead. And
27 let me just go further, because I really want it to be clear.
28 Even if Sam Bockarie had been arrested and brought to me, I had
29 no intention of giving him to Kabbah, okay? So this nonsense I

1 have been hearing about Sam Bockarie being ordered - I never
2 wanted that boy dead. I liked him like a son. I never wanted
3 him dead, and I never intended to give him to Tejan Kabbah
4 either. I would have brought Sam Bockarie to Monrovia and to
10:35:36 5 expel him back out of the country. Never gave any such order
6 that Sam Bockarie should be killed. Never.

7 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let us be blunt about it, because we need
8 to deal with this suggestion. The suggestion clearly is that you
9 decided to kill Bockarie because he knew too much and you were
10:36:00 10 killing him, in effect, to silence him. Do you follow?

11 A. Yes, I follow that, but that --

12 Q. Well, deal with that.

13 A. That's nonsense. Well, who knows more than Issa Sesay?
14 Who knows more than all of the RUF people - the senior RUF people
10:36:16 15 that are on trial in Sierra Leone, who knows more than them? Sam
16 Bockarie was not - in fact, the person that dealt even longer
17 with the crisis, Issa Sesay dealt with the RUF issues longer than
18 Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie left in 1999; Issa Sesay stayed all
19 through, okay? But we've heard all kind of mention - remember
10:36:34 20 there's a witness that sat here that is a protected witness whose
21 name I cannot call that said he shot Sam Bockarie dead centre in
22 the forehead. Nonsense. We know from the autopsy he was never
23 shot in the head. There have been different versions of people
24 being brought over here to lie and carry on. What did Sam
10:36:53 25 Bockarie know that all the other senior people do not know?

26 What? Nothing.

27 Q. Well, the cynic would say, Mr Taylor, you didn't have an
28 opportunity to kill the others, but you had one to kill Sam
29 Bockarie. What do you say to that?

1 A. Well, when did I leave Liberia? I left in 2003 and by the
2 time I left Liberia, remember, Sam Bockarie was not even in
3 Liberia when the Sierra Leonean court started. He was not in
4 Liberia. Issa Sesay visited Liberia many times throughout 2001,
10:37:23 5 2002. Why didn't somebody kill him? This is total nonsense.
6 You know, I know lawyers - and this is not - you know, lawyers
7 are well trained and they are trained to turn black to white and
8 white to black. That's what --

9 Q. Does that include me?

10:37:41 10 A. Well, you know, I mean, no, not directly. But I mean, you
11 know - but this - you know, sometimes it's just so - look, I
12 loved that boy and I am saying - you didn't ask me this question;
13 I volunteered. I would have never turned him over to Tejan
14 Kabbah, you understand me? And I have my reason, and we'll get
10:38:04 15 to it, and I will talk about it.

16 So this thing about wanting Sam Bockarie killed, there was
17 no such thing. I was upset - very, very upset about the death of
18 Sam Bockarie when Moses Blah came and brought the body to
19 Monrovia and reported to me that Sam Bockarie had been killed,
10:38:18 20 because I sent him there to prevent the killing of Sam Bockarie.
21 I sent him there to prevent that. You go, you are an experienced
22 man, you're the Vice-President, you're a soldier; go and make
23 sure that this matter is done calmly, and you bring Sam Bockarie
24 to Monrovia. If I wanted Sam Bockarie killed, I would have never
10:38:36 25 sent Moses Blah to Nimba. That lie he told here about he was
26 just in the area, it's a blatant, blatant lie. He was sent by me
27 there to prevent this very situation. I did not want that boy
28 killed.

29 Q. Very well. That's all I'll ask you about that - the

1 testimony of that particular individual, Mr Taylor. Let's move
2 on.

3 Now, I am going to move on to another individual who gave
4 evidence under a pseudonym, so I will not mention the name. It's
10:39:23 5 TF1, for the assistance of everyone, 577. Now, that individual
6 gave evidence in June - the beginning of June of last year. Now,
7 the first matter that I want your assistance with is this: The
8 witness says that after the ECOMOG intervention, you sent some
9 engineers to Sierra Leone to repair a 40-barrel gun in February
10:40:14 10 1998. Did you?

11 A. No, I did not.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

13 MS HOLLIS: Could we have a transcript reference, please?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Page 10990 line 8.

10:40:36 15 "Q. Now, you said that they hit hid the 40-barrel missile.
16 So what happened to that 40-barrel missile, Mr Witness, to
17 your knowledge?

18 A. Well, as far as I know, the 40 barrel was at that river
19 bank for a long time up to during the period of the junta,
10:40:54 20 the RUF and the AFRC period when we were in the city until
21 the intervention. After the intervention, when we were
22 dislodged the 40 barrel was still at that river bank. It
23 was after the intervention that we saw some engineers who
24 came from Liberia and said they had come to repair that
10:41:14 25 40-barrel missile so it could be used by the RUF."

26 What do you know about that?

27 A. If I may just ask for some help, counsel, to kindly re-read
28 that. I heard something about "before the junta"?

29 Q. Well, let me read the answer to you again.

1 A. Yes, please.

2 Q. "As far as I know, the 40 barrel was at that river bank for
3 a long time up to during the period of the junta, the AFRC and
4 the RUF period when we were in the city until the intervention.

10:42:00 5 After the intervention when we were dislodged the 40 barrel was
6 still at that river bank. It was after the intervention that we
7 saw some engineers who came from Liberia and said that they had
8 come to repair the 40-barrel missile so it could be used by the
9 RUF."

10:42:25 10 A. Well, I did not send any engineers to Sierra Leone to
11 repair any 40 barrel. And as I am listening to the statement -
12 and if you listen very clearly - if you listen, the reason why I
13 really wanted to get this part - if I am understanding this
14 properly - and you see how littered this whole trial is with
10:42:56 15 lies. We have - if he say - if this person says what I am
16 hearing him saying, that means that this 40 barrel, if I'm right,
17 was taken before the AFRC took power. That is what is suggested
18 here if I'm right, and I stand corrected on this. And that means
19 that that 40 barrel was there during the tenure of the AFRC, that
10:43:27 20 is, from 1997. The intervention occurs in February of 1990.

21 Now, any logical human being - the junta comprised the RUF, the
22 SLA. Nobody fixes this 40 barrel during the time that things are
23 normal in the country. The intervention occurs in February 1990.
24 During the war we send engineers. Now, they should have thought
10:44:01 25 about this lie, because what would have been a logical time to
26 do - I'm elected President in July 1997. So all of the rest of
27 1997, nothing is done because they are in control. But when
28 ECOMOG intervenes, we send to fix the weapon. Come on, it's a
29 blatant lie. Okay, is the weapon fixed? Is it fixed? It

1 just - I don't know why these people do this. I never sent any
2 engineers to Sierra Leone to fix any weapon. No, I didn't.

3 Q. Now, the witness continues in saying that a helicopter
4 gunship intervened and so the repair was not successful, but that
10:44:56 5 it was intended, if it had been repaired, to use the weapon
6 against the Government of Sierra Leone, page 10993, top of the
7 page, answer:

8 "Well, that weapon, when the engineers came from
9 Liberia, when they were repairing it, what I knew was that if
10:45:14 10 they had succeeded in completing its repair the RUF would have
11 used it against the Government of Sierra Leone. That was the
12 plan."

13 Were you party to such a plan, Mr Taylor?

14 A. No. And I hope the helicopter gunship had dealt with them
10:45:33 15 really. It would have been so stupid during the heat of battle,
16 you have got a weapon sitting down for months when there is peace
17 you don't fix it, in the heat of battle you are going to say to
18 somebody go to the helicopter gunships, you have already dealt
19 with them. I didn't sent anybody, there was no plan and such
10:45:52 20 thing. But the whole lie is so silly that you don't fix it
21 during the time when you are not under attack, only when you are
22 under attack - even if anybody had suggested such nonsense to me
23 or anybody they would have taken it to be a stupid idea.

24 Q. Did you promote Sam Bockarie to general, Mr Taylor?

10:46:12 25 A. Never did.

26 Q. In a radio message?

27 A. Never did. The evidence before this Court is that Johnny
28 Paul Koroma himself, according to evidence in this Court,
29 appointed Sam Bockarie as chief of defence staff. That's the

1 evidence before this Court. That is a lie. Never did.

2 Q. Listen to this, page 11004, line 15:

3 "A. As we were now in Koindu there was a point in time
4 that Selasie called me and told me Sam Bockarie had got a
10:46:51 5 new promotion to general. He showed me the radio message.
6 That was what he told me, that Sam Bockarie had been
7 promoted to general and he was now General Sam Bockarie.

8 Q. Did Selasie tell you who promoted Bockarie to general
9 at that time?

10:47:14 10 A. He said it was Charles Taylor who promoted Sam Bockarie
11 to a general.

12 Q. Now how did Selasie know about that at that time?

13 A. They sent a radio message to him from Buedu, because
14 Buedu was the headquarters and that was where Sam Bockarie
10:47:36 15 was based. The radio operator whom Sam Bockarie had there
16 was the person who sent the message to him."

17 True or false, Mr Taylor?

18 A. That is totally false. And it cannot be any other thing
19 but false because there is evidence before this Court, even from
10:48:00 20 other witnesses, that Sam Bockarie went to me in Monrovia and he
21 was made general by me and he came back and told them that I had
22 made him general.

23 Q. Well, I think we need to proceed with care, Mr Taylor,
24 because I think that evidence was to the effect that he had been
10:48:21 25 promoted to a two star general?

26 A. Yeah, but chief of defence staff is a three star general
27 and he was not promoted at any point in time by me because Foday
28 Sankoh made him general when he was arrested. So this three star
29 generalship is by Johnny Paul Koroma and the two star is by

1 Sankoh. But now here we have now a promotion and what time are
2 we talking about here again, sometimes it gets mixed up, because
3 we don't know the time, but I would call on the radio and promote
4 Bockarie? No, no, no.

10:49:03 5 Q. Well, the witness continues in this vein, Mr Taylor, page
6 11005:

7 "Q. So you said that you read the message. So what was
8 written in that message exactly?

9 A. Well, the message came from Buedu and came to our
10:49:27 10 ground, that is Koindu, that the subject was promotion and
11 that Sam Bockarie had been promoted to the rank of general
12 in the RUF. That was the message that I read and it was by
13 Charles Taylor.

14 Q. Was it written in the message that it was by

10:49:47 15 Charles Taylor?

16 A. Yes, sir."

17 So it's written down, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Never, never did any such thing and never did such thing
19 happen ever. In fact, it is an impossibility, total

10:50:12 20 impossibility, that Sam Bockarie would be promoted by a radio
21 message from me and - totally no.

22 Q. Now, the witness speaks of another message, line 26 on the
23 same page:

24 "Another message came, but at that time I had said that the
10:50:40 25 AFRC and the RUF had already come together and we were in
26 the bush operating, but sometimes problems erupted between
27 the AFRC and the RUF, because the AFRC were the national
28 army at that time that overthrew the government and we were
29 in the bush as guerillas. So when we went and teamed up

1 with them, there was the problem during which they are
2 always said that we were not fully trained military
3 personnel. So during those times there were always
4 problems between the AFRC and the RUF. So a message came
10:51:20 5 at a time that the radio operator received that the AFRC
6 and the RUF should come together as one and that they
7 should work hand in glove to enable us to fight together
8 and achieve our goals.

9 Q. Where did you read that message, Mr Witness?

10:51:43 10 A. In Koindu where I was based, in Selasie's logbook.

11 Q. And where was this message coming from?

12 A. That message also came directly from Buedu, but
13 according to what we read in the message, they said it was
14 Charles Taylor who sent the message and that there was a
10:52:11 15 dialogue that took place between him and Sam Bockarie. He
16 sent the message", that's you, "that unless we worked hand
17 in glove with the AFRC, if not we will lose our ground
18 because we will not be able to concentrate on what we were
19 doing because we were always engulfed by confusion between
10:52:33 20 the two sets. So it was only when we came together that we
21 will be able to achieve our goals."

22 Did you give such an instruction, Mr Taylor?

23 A. No, I did not. I never gave any such instruction. No such
24 instruction occurred, and it could not have been given. And let
10:52:58 25 me remind the Court why it could not have and I didn't give it.
26 We are talking now about what? 1997. That's what - that's the
27 coming into being of this junta, and this Court and all - this
28 entire - it's aware of how the AFRC and the RUF joined. Foday
29 Sankoh personally called. His message was recorded by Johnny

1 Paul Koroma. It was played on the national radio on the BBC.
2 That's how the RUF and the AFRC or the SLA joined to form the
3 junta. It had nothing to do with me. So whoever led this lie,
4 it's just a lie. I had nothing to do with the coming together of
10:53:56 5 the RUF and the SLA. This was all done by Foday Sankoh from
6 evidence led in this Court and the message that was played. It
7 had nothing to do with me. Nothing. I did not do what he
8 alleges here, no.

9 Q. Very well. Let's deal with another suggestion made by the
10 witness. Page 11008 line 27:

11 "A. Whilst I was in Koindu on 23 April 1998, we were in
12 Koindu when Sam Bockarie and his securities, driving in a
13 Land Cruiser van, came to Koindu. They met us there, but
14 we were somewhere about 100 metres off the main town,
10:54:54 15 Koindu, and we were sitting under some big trees, and that
16 was where the guard post was entering into Koindu. He
17 stopped there and he asked for us, and the securities said
18 that we were in town, and they told us that master was
19 around, he wanted to see us. They said master was calling
10:55:16 20 us, and it was Sam Bockarie that we were referred to as
21 master. So when they told us that I got up, together with
22 some other senior officers, and we all went to the security
23 post. So when we went there, we met him. One of the
24 securities had already given him a chair to sit down and he
10:55:36 25 had a satellite phone, which was the size of this thing,
26 and when we went close to him, he was talking to us and
27 then he took out the satellite phone and he was sitting
28 down. We were all standing around him. The securities
29 were all there. From there he started communicating

1 directly to Liberia with Charles Taylor, and whilst he was
2 communicating an Alpha Jet appeared from the Guinean side."

3 Note the date, Mr Taylor: 23 April, a specific date, 1998,
4 you speaking to Sam Bockarie on a satellite phone. True or

10:56:25 5 false?

6 A. False. Except he advanced into the future. Except this
7 witness is into the future, Sam Bockarie did not any contact with
8 me before August 1998, so he is talking about April. It's a
9 black lie. That's what I can put it to.

10:56:57 10 Q. Now, did you - were you ever sent a letter from Sam

11 Bockarie which came via Daniel Tamba, also known as Jungle?

12 A. I did not receive any letter from Sam Bockarie. In fact,
13 even after the contact with Sam Bockarie, Sam Bockarie would not
14 write me a letter like that, no. Never received any letter from

10:57:33 15 any Daniel Tamba from Sam Bockarie, no.

16 Q. Because the witness - putting matters together as quickly
17 as possible, beginning at page 11023 at line 25 - mentions taking
18 a trip to Foya Tenga. The purpose of the trip, over the page,
19 page 11024, picking matters up at line 24:

10:58:11 20 "I want you to take this letter to Jungle quickly. He is
21 now in Foya Tenga and you know that you are being faced with that
22 serious problem, so you should rush up with this letter to him
23 and give it to him because we were expecting something to come
24 quickly and so I am waiting on you. So I took the letter to Foya
10:58:35 25 Tenga."

26 It goes on to mention that that was done by motorbike.

27 Page 11026, picking it up, line 8:

28 "When I went, I met Colonel Jungle in Foya Tenga and I gave
29 him the letter and he said he was expecting somebody because he

1 said he had already spoken with Sam Bockarie, that is Jungle, and
2 Sam Bockarie said that he was going to send him a letter, so I
3 gave him the letter. He opened it. He read it. And then he
4 said, okay, he was now going to Monrovia to meet Charles Taylor."

10:59:17 5 And the consequence of that letter being sent, page 11029
6 line 2:

7 "Well, in the case of the letter that I took to him and
8 gave to him, when I returned to Koindu after a few days we
9 received some materials from Buedu, from Sam Bockarie, and the
10:59:38 10 materials were brought to us in Koindu that we should keep it
11 there to use it as our defensive."

12 You see what's being suggested: Bockarie sends a letter
13 via Jungle to you; a couple of days later, materials arrive.
14 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

11:00:00 15 A. That's not true. But, you know, again it cannot be true
16 because if you listen very well at this statement, a letter sent
17 to me is being opened by Jungle. The letter sent to me, if there
18 is a letter from Sam Bockarie, is being opened by Jungle. Now,
19 that's - I mean, realistically even if such a thing were to
11:00:34 20 happen that Sam Bockarie is sending a letter to me as President
21 of Liberia, the man bringing the letter would open it and read it
22 before he brings it to me? Some of these boys just lie without
23 reason. I mean, even - in the first place, how would that even
24 show any respect to Sam Bockarie or to me if anything like that
11:00:58 25 were to even have occurred, that a letter is sent by Bockarie -
26 and one must assume that this letter is closed, because Sam
27 Bockarie is not just going to take a piece of paper and say,
28 "Take it to the President." This is a sealed letter for the
29 President that Jungle opens. It sounds great? When they don't

1 know how to lie, they make - it never - Jungle did not ever bring
2 me any letter at this period or any other period, even when Sam
3 Bockarie was invited to Liberia. It just - it didn't happen.

11:01:36 4 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, Jungle may have opened the letter for this
5 reason. Because the witness goes on to say this, page 11027 line
6 22:

7 "Like, mostly when Jungle entered the RUF territory he was
8 somebody that used - he did not enter in secret. He was somebody
9 who travelled frequently between the RUF and Charles Taylor. He
11:01:59 10 was travelling between Charles Taylor and Sam Bockarie
11 frequently. Everybody knew about that. We all knew about it,
12 because they will always feel that he must have brought some
13 materials for us, the RUF, because our major problem in the RUF
14 was material, ammunition, arms and ammunition. That was our
11:02:19 15 major problem in the RUF. So at any time we saw him", that being
16 Jungle, "any time the RUF saw him, they will feel that he was
17 coming directly from Charles Taylor because he was working
18 directly with Charles Taylor."

19 I guess that's why he opened the letter. Was he,
11:02:40 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. Jungle never worked directly with me or for me. And Foya
22 Tenga is near the Sierra Leonean border so even if one were to
23 assume - I can tell you quite frankly the way how my presidency
24 worked - I don't know how others do theirs. If a letter came to
11:03:02 25 the Executive Mansion, I don't even care whether it was from even
26 another President, and that letter came opened, I don't even
27 think it would be received by even the beginning clearance area
28 before it even goes through the different clearance and security.
29 I don't even think that for somebody calling himself Jungle that

1 would be on the border of Sierra Leone and the letter for the
2 President that will open it and come to Monrovia, no. No.

3 Q. But the witness goes on, you see, Mr Taylor, at page 11052,
4 to say that it was common knowledge that you were the one
11:03:51 5 providing the RUF with their supplies. That's page 11052.
6 Common knowledge.

7 A. Well, that's the same type of - that is not true, but
8 that's the same type of common knowledge that we have here. You
9 hear something - you see, I don't even think this witness would
11:04:16 10 even mention or probably knows that his colleagues - if it's his
11 colleagues were coming into Liberia and buying weapons that
12 witnesses before this Court have talked about, they don't know
13 what's going on. Oh, where did these come from? And as I am
14 seeing this person, Jungle going to Charles Taylor, I can almost

11:04:39 15 see here he is equating Jungle going to Liberia with going to
16 Charles Taylor. You can tell the level of comprehension of these
17 people. Anybody going to Liberia, they are going to
18 Charles Taylor. This is the level that we are dealing with. You
19 know, Jungle is going to Charles Taylor. Every time he goes to

11:04:58 20 Liberia - in fact, some people would say they even equate
21 Monrovia - or Liberia with Monrovia. He went to Liberia. This
22 is all the way where - when you bring these people, you know,
23 before these courts and you ask them questions that they do not
24 know about, they come: Oh, it was common that we all knew. And
11:05:24 25 we know how rumours are spread over our - well, I can't speak for
26 the rest of Africa. West Africa, rumours? You will hear
27 something that nobody ever saw and would talk about it like they
28 were present. That's common knowledge. That's what he is
29 talking about.

1 Q. Now, the witness goes on to speak of attending a meeting in
2 1998, Mr Taylor. This is page 11054 line 15.

3 "Q. When did this meet take place?

4 A. That meeting took place in 1998."

11:06:05 5 The witness is asked:

6 "Q. What happened when you went to this meeting?

7 A. Well, we received a radio message from Sam Bockarie on
8 our grounds in Koindu that the battalion commander and the
9 adjutants, including two representatives, should report in
10 Buedu headquarters for a meeting, or a forum, so we went

11 there. So those who were in the jungles and the others
12 from the other battalions, Pendembu and other areas, they
13 also came. So we went to that meeting, and it was during
14 that meeting that I saw Colonel Jungle. It was a meeting

11:06:44 15 concerning Issa Sesay and the agenda was around Issa Sesay
16 and the pressure on RUF/AFRC by the ECOMOG and the CDF and
17 the way forward and how we could try and have nice things.

18 That was the agenda. The issue with Issa Sesay was that
19 Sam Bockarie had given diamonds to Issa Sesay to be taken
20 to Charles Taylor in Liberia and when he went, according to
21 Issa Sesay, I think he stayed there for about a week or so,
22 and he returned and on his return he reported that he

23 had - the diamonds had gone missing. So that was what he
24 said. It was only through the diamonds that we got that we

11:07:33 25 will pass over to Charles Taylor and he would provide us
26 with arms and ammunition, but now that Issa Sesay has gone
27 to Liberia to present these diamonds and on his return he
28 has reported that the diamonds got missing, he was now
29 trying to ask us all, the congregation, what we could do

1 about that, and it was during that meeting that I saw
2 Colonel Jungle. He was seated over the high table, and in
3 fact he brought with him another person that was a Liberian
4 general and I asked a colleague of mine, who was close to
11:08:07 5 me, that who was that other Liberian general that was
6 seated close to Colonel Jungle, and he told me it was
7 General Ibrahim, and it was during that meeting that I saw
8 Colonel Jungle. After Bockarie - Sam Bockarie had given us
9 his bits and he also told us that we had some visitors that
11:08:31 10 had come to join us, and after which Sam Bockarie
11 introduced Colonel Jungle and General Ibrahim during the
12 meeting. After he had done the introduction,
13 Colonel Jungle also got up and addressed the meeting and he
14 said - he thanked Sam Bockarie and all of us who came to
11:08:49 15 attend the meeting and that he was praying that the cause
16 of the revolution will be successful. He said he was there
17 to tell us that the RUF and the AFRC and the relationship
18 between them was recognised by Charles Taylor, and that he
19 was saying that although we have been pushed out of the
11:09:10 20 city, we shouldn't worry ourselves, but that he was
21 advising that we try and get hold over Kono, because that
22 was where we will get our resources. Then he also
23 discussed the maintenance of an airstrip."

24 Three matters I want to ask you about. Firstly, was
11:09:34 25 General Ibrahim a Liberian general?

26 A. No, he was not.

27 Q. Secondly, note this is after the ECOMOG intervention. Did
28 you send Jungle to the RUF to advise them to get hold of Kono in
29 order to exploit its resources?

1 A. No, I did not.

2 Q. Did you send Ibrahim - a General Ibrahim, Liberian or not,
3 to this meeting for that purpose?

4 A. No, I did not.

11:10:15 5 Q. What about the maintenance of an airstrip? Did you make
6 such a suggestion through your envoy, Colonel Jungle?

7 A. No, I did not. And all the records point to the no, I did
8 not. Here is somebody sitting here again talking about

9 something. This General Ibrahim he is talking about, isn't there
11:10:42 10 evidence before the Court that Ibrahim this General Ibrahim is in
11 Ivory Coast in 1996 with Foday Sankoh? He is with Foday Sankoh
12 in 1996 when Foday Sankoh goes for the peace talks. We also have
13 evidence before this Court in 1997 when the AFRC take over,

14 Jungle is in Freetown with the junta. We know this. We also

11:11:09 15 know before this Court that in 1997 there is an airstrip done at
16 Magburaka. It took Charles Taylor to talk about maintaining an
17 airstrip. We know what happened. So this is total, total,
18 totally a lie. Totally a lie. All three lies - four lies. No.

19 And it is no because of all of the evidence before this Court
11:11:31 20 pointing to the fact that Ibrahim's association come all the way
21 back from 1996 through in 1997 dealing with all of the AFRC and
22 the RUF people for so many years. We know this.

23 Q. Can I quickly ask you about one other matter, Mr Taylor.

24 Did Sam Bockarie provide you with diamonds in return for which
11:12:06 25 you provided him arms to capture Kono?

26 A. No. No. And no again because - just a quick reminder,
27 because there are two incidents that come up. Let's go back to
28 the diamonds that Sam Bockarie - I mean, that Issa Sesay was
29 supposed to have taken to Monrovia to me. We know two different

1 accounts of those diamonds. There is one account that it was
2 supposed to be taken to me and it got lost, but there is another
3 account that those diamonds were supposed to be taken where? To
4 Burkina Faso. And while he was in Monrovia they got lost. That
11:12:44 5 did not happen.

6 But there is another situation involving in this. Do not
7 forget there is also evidence led before this Court that the
8 first meeting that Johnny Paul Koroma presided over after the
9 retreat from Freetown had to do with Kono. There is also
11:13:03 10 evidence before this Court about Johnny Paul Koroma's desire that
11 Kono should be used also, that he will be able to get diamonds to
12 come either to me or go to Ghana and other places. So, I mean,
13 these people don't just - you know, they just got me sitting
14 here. I have to say "no" to these things because they are lies.

11:13:21 15 But just "no" is - "no" is so repetitive, you know, because they
16 have made all of these lies up, okay? There was no such thing
17 about me having to talk about meeting in an airfield. There is
18 no such thing about any Jungle being sent by me to go and address
19 them after the intervention. These are lies.

11:13:42 20 Q. Now, just so that we all know where this reference comes
21 from, Mr Taylor, if I could just quickly put together a couple of
22 references beginning at page 11067 at line 8:

23 "Sam Bockarie himself said that he himself should go after
24 he had got all the situation reports from the various front lines
11:14:06 25 like Koindu was serious. Koindu issue: There was an attempt on
26 Kono, but they were unable to capture Kono because RUF had run
27 out of ammunition. They were unable to get Kono, and we still
28 needed Kono so he, Sam Bockarie, said he himself should go and
29 meet Charles Taylor so that he would discuss with him to be able

1 to explain to him what the pressure was. It was at that time
2 that Sam Bockarie went."

3 Jumping ahead to page 11072, line 5.

4 "He said, 'I am trying to go to Charles Taylor.' Then he
11:14:45 5 took this paper, diamonds were in it and he said stones were in
6 it, he called it stones. He said, 'I am taking these stones to
7 the Father', because we called Charles Taylor the Father. That
8 was how we used to call him by code, the father. He said, 'These
9 are the stones I am taking to the Father for me to go and get
11:15:06 10 some materials quickly for us to launch a big offensive on those
11 men and to take back Kono?'"

12 Now, you deny that, Mr Taylor, is that right?

13 A. Totally deny it because, you know, if we go into my
14 recollection, I do not know how he could have come up with this
11:15:32 15 because, again, I hate to delay the Court, but I just want to - I
16 know the Court is well reminded, but we have another version of
17 Sam Bockarie going to Monrovia. Remember Sam Bockarie goes to
18 Monrovia. He can't wait because he cannot see me and then he has
19 to return and all these kinds of things because it's taking too
11:15:54 20 long and people told him that he could not see me, so this - of
21 course I deny this because it never happened.

22 Q. And did you ever provide Sam Bockarie, or anybody else for
23 that matter attached to the RUF, with dollar - cash money, dollar
24 bills in return for diamonds, Mr Taylor?

11:16:26 25 A. Never. Never. Never.

26 Q. Reference, page 11073, line 28:

27 "A. Being that we were doing diamond transactions with
28 Charles Taylor in Liberia, sometimes Sam Bockarie will go
29 and ask for physical cash to come and buy some items at the

1 ri verside..."

2 Was that you?

3 A. Never.

4 Q. Now, the final matter I want to deal with in relation to
11:17:21 5 this witness is this: The witness takes a letter to General 50,
6 Benjamin Yeaten, page 11108, line 2:

7 "A. ... I gave the letter to General 50 and he opened the
8 letter. He read it and he closed it again and he said,
9 'Okay, gentlemen, we will have to pass the night here and
11:17:53 10 tomorrow you will return. I will have to talk to the
11 Father. I will talk to the father and by tomorrow you will
12 return.

13 He called on one of the ground soldiers who was referred to
14 as a ground commander and General 50 told him, 'Now we have
11:18:10 15 got strangers you have to find a place for them to lodge'
16 and then they lodged us. They gave us some food to eat and
17 we ate, Prince Kosi a and I. The following morning they
18 gave us food again, we ate. Around 10 to 11 in the morning
19 General 50 called us and we went to him at his house. He
11:18:31 20 said, 'Gentlemen, the things you have come for, they are
21 ready.'

22 Then we left his house and we went to another place where
23 there were two vehicles waiting. That is myself, General
24 Kosi a and his bodyguard. We met two vehicles, a Land Rover
11:18:52 25 Defender and a pick-up, a Hilux pick-up. There were
26 ammuni tion in the vehicles and he gave us the vehicles and
27 the ammuni tion and he said, 'You are here for this
28 ammuni tion so we have to give you them to carry them.' So
29 he gave me fuel and I filled my tank, my motorbike tank and

1 he gave me two gallons of fuel in reserve and I tied them
2 by the side of the motorbike and Prince Kosi a sat at the
3 back."

4 What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

11:19:22 5 A. Nothing. Nothing about it. No, I don't.

6 Q. This person, General Kosi a, do you know anyone by that
7 name?

8 A. No, I don't know him. It sounds like a Sierra Leonean. I
9 don't know him.

11:19:40 10 Q. Do you recall having any dealings with anyone who goes by
11 that name?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Yes. Let's leave that witness, TF1-577, and move on.

14 Now, Mr Taylor, let's move on to another witness whose name
11:20:34 15 you mentioned this morning. It's TF1-388, Jabaty Jaward. Do you
16 remember mentioning that name?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. And do you recall the testimony of this witness?

19 A. Well, to a great extent, I do, yes.

11:20:51 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, prior to seeing that individual in this
21 courtroom, had you seen him before?

22 A. Now, I can recall seeing him. I didn't know him, really,
23 no.

24 Q. Now, let's begin at the outset of his testimony where he
11:21:39 25 told the Court in July of last year at page 13226 of the
26 transcript, beginning at line 6:

27 "Q. When you went to Pendembu, the vocational school,
28 what happened there?

29 A. Well, I was put in at that in a platoon called the

1 Small Boys Unit on the training base."

2 He is asked to explain what is meant by a Small Boys Unit.

3 And then he continues, page 13227, line 12:

4 "A. ... First of all before I left my village to go to the
11:22:32 5 training base I was instructed by Sam Tuah, who was at that
6 time identified as the battlefield commander, to go to the
7 training base and when I got there there were commanders
8 responsible for the various bases that were established and
9 I later came to understand that Charles Timber was the
11:23:01 10 training commandant for the Pendembu vocational training
11 base and they had some other instructors on the base at
12 that time like CO Joseph Diakpo, he was a Liberian by
13 nationality. CO Jah Glory was another Liberian by
14 nationality and we had - we also had others who used to
11:23:25 15 come and just give us some lessons and they will pass by.
16 And there was another Aloysius T Caulker who was also part
17 of the training base at that time."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, let's just ask you about one or two names,
19 shall we, bearing in mind this is a training base in Pendembu
11:23:49 20 inside Sierra Leone. Sam Tuah, you know him, don't you,
21 Liberian?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. What role did he have in Liberia?

24 A. Sam Tuah was the commander of the special operations unit
11:24:06 25 that I sent to the border with Sierra Leone in 1991.

26 Q. Charles Timber?

27 A. I - the name, I recognise. I don't - he was a part of that
28 unit with Sam Tuah. I do not know what position he had, but the
29 name Timber, because I can remember Timber got killed during an

1 operation against ULIMO inside there, so I remember the name.

2 Q. Was it, to your knowledge, that he was a training
3 commandant for the Pendembu vocational training base?

4 A. No, I doubt it too. He was a part of the special ops
11:24:54 5 people. I don't know, but I don't think so.

6 Q. C0 Joseph Diakpo, D-I-A-K-P-O, familiar?

7 A. No, I don't know Joseph Diakpo.

8 Q. C0 Jah Glory, known to you?

9 A. No.

11:25:13 10 Q. Aloysius T Caulker?

11 A. No. They could have very well been part of the unit, but
12 personally I don't know them. They could have been with that
13 special ops unit. Like I said, they were more than a company, so
14 they could have been a part of it. I don't dispute his - I can't
11:25:38 15 quarrel with his accounting here. I just don't know them

16 personally.

17 Q. But you do accept that - or do you accept that Sam Tuah was
18 the field commander for all the Liberians that crossed into
19 Sierra Leone?

11:25:53 20 A. No. As your question is, no. For all the Liberians that
21 crossed into Sierra Leone, no. He was the commander of the unit
22 that I sent into Sierra Leone to fight ULIMO because - I am
23 answering this way because there were other Liberians that went
24 in on their own that he had nothing to do with. For example, if
11:26:15 25 we talk about the Nyas, Lansanas of this world and some of the
26 other people, like the Isaac Mongors of this world, so no.

27 Q. I ask that question for this reason, at page 13229, the
28 witness says this in answer to this question:

29 "Q. Among the Liberians who came, do you know who was the

1 overall leader amongst the Liberians who came across?

2 A. At the time they entered, Sam Tuah was the field
3 commander for all the Liberians that crossed into Sierra
4 Leone."

11:26:53 5 A. Yeah. But that's not true. And I guess what this witness
6 is trying to really refer to, he is referring to all of the
7 Liberians that went in as the special operations unit, then he
8 will be right. And I have to distinguish between that because
9 there are a lot of other Liberians there that are not under the
11:27:14 10 command of Sam Tuah that have crossed voluntarily and are
11 fighting with the RUF that are different. I would assume, and
12 this is a mere assumption, that he is referring to the Liberians
13 that came on this special operations unit, then he is correct,
14 okay.

11:28:06 15 Q. I am moving to page 13253, transcript of 9 July 2008, line
16 6:

17 "Q. Now, Mr Witness, continuing from the point we left off
18 yesterday, you did say that the Top 20 fighting went on for
19 about a month. Do you recall that?

11:28:30 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Now, what happened after that month, after one month of
22 fighting?

23 A. Before I came to my village, Mendekeima, from the bush,
24 some other G2 agents who were first seen in Pendembu sent
11:28:52 25 their agents to the various villages calling us out to come
26 to town, so when we came the message that they used to
27 convince us was that during the Top 20 Foday Sankoh was in
28 Liberia and now he has come back and Charles Taylor has
29 sent another commander to relieve the commander who was in

1 charge of the fighters that were causing this problem and
2 that all the fighters who were involved should be withdrawn
3 to go back and were replaced with a new commander."

4 A couple things I want to ask you about that. Firstly

11:29:31 5 this: Did this Top 20 fighting between the RUF and the NPFL
6 forces last for a month, to your knowledge?

7 A. Not to my - well, I will have to qualify this. There were
8 little clashes and the conflict had lasted for about a month
9 because Foday Sankoh had come to Liberia to complain. Now - but
11:30:00 10 the actual fight that we are talking about did not take very
11 long. It's less than a month. But the duration of the conflict
12 could have taken about a month.

13 Q. And so do you accept, Mr Taylor, that during that period
14 Foday Sankoh did come to Liberia?

11:30:17 15 A. Oh, yes, yes, he was there, yeah.

16 Q. For what reason?

17 A. Well, Foday Sankoh - this is what made me annoyed. I said
18 Foday Sankoh was in Liberia in May when this thing - he had come
19 to report this matter, and this conflict occurred, and I felt
11:30:35 20 that he could have stopped it and he didn't. His claim was he
21 could not have, and that's when there was this major problem and
22 after he left - I have to put it to about the end of May, early
23 June. After he left, that was the end of everything.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you send in a different commander as a
11:30:59 25 result of this problem?

26 A. No, no, no. What he is talking about, I am sure I did not
27 send - I sent in a commander to withdraw the men. Because after
28 that Top Final, that was it. All links were severed. So what -
29 I guess - I don't know how this man is describing it, but I sent

1 in a commander to withdraw the forces.

2 Q. Well, I just want to --

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we are just about out of tape, Mr
4 Griffiths.

11:31:26 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will take the morning break.

7 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

8 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

9 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

12:02:21 10 Q. Mr Taylor, we were looking at passage just before we
11 adjourned dealing with that Top 20 episode and Foday Sankoh being
12 in Liberia at or about that time and the suggestion that you sent
13 someone to replace the then commander of the Liberian soldiers in
14 Sierra Leone. Just so that we get the full picture, can we move
12:02:49 15 on slightly and look at a couple more passages and I'll put
16 another question to you. At page 13254 the witness continued,
17 line 7:

18 "Q. Did anything happen to Sam Tuah at any point?

19 A. Yes, sir.

12:03:10 20 Q. What happened to him?

21 A. At some point in August 1991 when there was a massive
22 retreat of the rebels to the Manowa Ferry we heard of his
23 withdrawal to Liberia, they said on the orders of
24 Charles Taylor, and later we heard that when he went there,
12:03:28 25 he was executed."

26 Is that true?

27 A. Sam Tuah was court-martialed and executed.

28 Q. What for?

29 A. He was sent as commander of the special operations unit

1 that was sent into Sierra Leone, and he was involved in the
2 wanton murder of civilians in Sierra Leone and he personally - in
3 fact, one of the issues, he personally pulled a gun and shot one
4 of the soldiers in his head and killed him. And he was
12:04:09 5 court-martialed for his actions as commander of the special ops
6 division and what he did personally over there.

7 Q. And then the witness continues, and I'm picking things up
8 at page 13255, line 22:

9 "Q. What happened when Sam Tuah was executed - withdrawn
12:04:37 10 from Sierra Leone and executed?

11 A. He was replaced by Dopoe Menkarzon."

12 Pause there. Was he?

13 A. No, no, he's got it all wrong. And in fact, I'm confirming
14 the information here - I'm not sure - again I'm not sure how this
12:05:07 15 witness got this information, because he could not have - it's
16 still hearsay in his mind, because after Sam Tuah was withdrawn
17 to Liberia, Dopoe Menkarzon withdrew all of them and he was
18 court-martialed while in Liberia, and by this time the contact
19 had been severed. So again while I'm saying the information is
12:05:32 20 right up - he is getting it from a second source. Okay, the
21 information is right --

22 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Taylor, did you mean that Sam Tuah was
23 court-martialed, or Dopoe Menkarzon was court-martialed, or they
24 were both court-martialed?

12:06:00 25 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour. Sam Tuah was
26 court-martialed for personally killing one of his men, but
27 murdering Sierra Leonean civilians. But the time of the Top 20,
28 Top 40, Top Final, Dopoe Menkarzon was sent in as the senior
29 general to withdraw them. Dopoe Menkarzon did not act any time

1 after Sam Tuah. He was the general that withdrew them.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Well, can I just, at the risk of boring everyone, just see
4 if we can clarify something here, Mr Taylor.

12:06:34 5 A. Okay.

6 Q. Is Joe Tuah withdrawn and executed before Dopoe Menkarzon
7 is sent into Sierra Leone?

8 A. You mean Sam Tuah?

9 Q. Sam Tuah.

12:06:46 10 A. Yes. No, no, no, no. He is withdrawn with the men. The
11 charges that are levelled against him, he is charged because he
12 failed to carry out his duties as the commanding officer.

13 Q. So Menkarzon goes in, withdraws them all, including Tuah?

14 A. Tuah, yes.

12:07:08 15 Q. Then he's put on trial?

16 A. He's put on trial because of his actions as commander, what
17 he did personally, by executing some of his personal soldiers and
18 killing individuals in Sierra Leone.

19 Q. Right. So where we see here on this page:

12:07:26 20 "Q. What happened when Sam Tuah was executed - withdrawn
21 from Sierra Leone and executed?

22 A. He was replaced by Dopoe Menkarzon."

23 Is that correct?

24 A. That is incorrect. There is no further actions after the
12:07:40 25 withdrawal. None.

26 Q. Right.

27 "Q. And you say that Dopoe Menkarzon was the commander
28 that was in control up until the time of the Top 20
29 fighting. Is that correct?"

1 Are you okay, Mr Taylor?

2 A. [Microphone not activated].

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'll go off the Bench. Give
4 word to the Court Manager --

12:08:56 5 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm sure the security officers will inform
6 us when we're ready to proceed.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. We'll adjourn temporarily.

8 [Break taken at 12.09 p.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 12.15 p.m.]

12:16:49 10 THE WITNESS: I apologise, your Honours, for the
11 disruption.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, that's quite all right. Are you all
13 right now, Mr Taylor?

14 THE WITNESS: I'm much better, yes.

12:16:57 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Mr Taylor, you were telling us just before the short break
18 that Sam Tuah was not replaced by Dopoe Menkarzon?

19 A. That is correct.

12:17:11 20 Q. Now let me just put together one or two other passages and
21 then seek your comment. The witness continues:

22 "Q. And you say that Dopoe Menkarzon was the commander
23 that was in control up until the time of the Top 20
24 fighting. Is that correct?

12:17:27 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. And the Top 20 fighting took place about what time?

27 A. That was in early 1992.

28 Q. Now, you said that Foday Sankoh came from Liberia and
29 there was - Dopoe Menkarzon was relieved, do you recall

1 that?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Who was his replacement as a commander?

4 A. Pa James Karway replaced Dopoe Menkarzon after the Top
12:18:06 5 20.

6 Q. How did you know this, that James Karway was his
7 replacement?

8 A. This was among the pieces of information given to us.
9 That was the courage they gave us in the bush to come to
12:18:21 10 town, that the Top 20 was over.

11 Q. Now, did you yourself come out of the bush?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Where had you been during the Top 20?

14 A. Well, I started my hiding from the Pendembu bushes and
12:18:44 15 ended up in the Mendekeima bush."

16 Pause there. Who is this Pa James Karway, Mr Taylor?

17 A. I don't know him. He could be part of the unit. I don't
18 know him.

19 Q. Was Dopoe Menkarzon replaced?

12:19:02 20 A. Dopoe Menkarzon - well, let's look at this young man who
21 has confused things. This young man says that he was a child
22 soldier at the time of his recruitment and he's in the bush. So
23 really a lot of the information he's getting is secondhand
24 information. He is saying that he is not there, and really he is
12:19:21 25 not there and he has got it all wrong. There was nobody that
26 replaced Sam Tuah. Dopoe Menkarzon went in there to withdraw the
27 men. It could have taken him, I think, about a week or more and
28 when he got there, Sam Tuah was no longer in command. Now, for a
29 young man - or maybe people that don't understand military, a

1 senior general comes, it did not - the men were not in one
2 location when the withdrawal was ordered. They were not in one
3 spot, so he had to wait there to wait for some people to come
4 from the different locations. While Dopoe was on the ground, he
12:20:03 5 was in command and Sam Tuah was no longer in command. Now, I'm
6 just trying to suggest that he looks at that or what he heard as
7 the replacement of Sam Tuah with Dopoe Menkarzon, I mean,
8 depending on how he understood it, Dopoe Menkarzon in a way did
9 replace Sam Tuah for the short time he was there for the
12:20:24 10 withdrawal. If he's - with his limited knowledge is looking at
11 in that way and it's a mere suggestion, then he could be right.
12 But Dopoe Menkarzon's orders were to go in and withdraw the men.
13 He stayed in Sierra Leone for I think about a week, and he
14 withdrew all of these men, and that was the end of the operation
12:20:44 15 as far as all of - even the witnesses that were there have said.
16 That's the way it ended. Now, I don't think he knows the full
17 information, but he's getting it secondhand and trying to piece
18 together.
19 Now, the names that he's calling, I'm not going to fight
12:21:01 20 with that. I sent more than a company inside Sierra Leone. I
21 don't know the different elements of the company - of the unit
22 that was sent there. I know Sam Tuah and I mentioned here
23 Charles Timber. I remember the name, I don't associate the face
24 but there was a Charles Timber, but I don't know the other
12:21:23 25 people. And I'm not here to deny that there was a Pa John Brown.
26 I mean, I admit that there was a unit there, and these people
27 that he's talking about could very well have been members of that
28 unit, but I don't know them personally.
29 Q. Well, let's look at a few more passages and see if we can

1 clarify matters then. I'm still on page 13256, transcript of 9
2 July, line 19:

3 "Q. Were you told why Dopoe Menkarzon was replaced?

4 A. Yes, sir.

12:22:00 5 Q. What did you learn about the reason for his
6 replacement?

7 A. Well, they said his administration was causing serious
8 problems in Sierra Leone at that time behind the rebel
9 lines, especially that Top 20 that was conducted by his
10 men."

11 Now what, do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No, the young man doesn't know what he's talking about. Like
13 he said, he's in another bush. He's doesn't really know. Dopoe
14 Menkarzon - even the name Pa James that he talks about, I don't
12:22:37 15 know him. But what I do know is he's not one of my Special
16 Forces. And Dopoe Menkarzon, a senior general and a Special
17 Forces would not be replaced by a junior officer. It doesn't
18 happen that way.

19 Q. What I'm seeking your comment on, Mr Taylor, is this: What
12:22:54 20 is being suggested here - you have told us, let me start again,
21 that you sent Dopoe Menkarzon into Sierra Leone, in effect, to
22 clear up the mess caused by Joe Tuah and withdraw --

23 A. No, by Sam Tuah.

24 Q. Sam Tuah, sorry. I keep saying Joe. By Sam Tuah and
12:23:12 25 withdraw the Liberian fighters from Sierra Leone, yes?

26 A. Yes, yes.

27 Q. What the witness is suggesting is that it was the same
28 Dopoe Menkarzon who was causing problems in Sierra Leone?

29 A. And had to be replaced.

1 Q. And that he was the one responsible for Top 20, because
2 he's saying it's Dopoe Menkarzon's men who were responsible for
3 Top 20. Do you follow?

4 A. That's what I'm --

12:23:41 5 Q. And I'm seeking your assistance with that.

6 A. No, that's what I'm saying, it's not - I mean, that's
7 totally wrong and it's totally foolish because Dopoe Menkarzon,
8 number one, never commanded the unit in Sierra Leone. But when
9 he goes further he says that Dopoe Menkarzon's men were causing
10 trouble and Dopoe Menkarzon was withdrawn and replaced. So I'm
11 saying that whole thing is crazy and he doesn't know what he's
12 talking. It is not true, because the name even that he mentions
13 as supposedly the replacement of Dopoe Menkarzon could have never
14 been. Dopoe Menkarzon was a Special Force and a senior general.

12:24:18 15 James - this Pa James he's talking about is not one of my Special
16 Forces. So a junior officer would not have replaced General
17 Menkarzon, because General Menkarzon was not there.

18 So the whole point that Dopoe Menkarzon's men were there
19 causing trouble I'm saying is totally wrong. I sent men into
12:24:37 20 Sierra Leone under the command of Sam Tuah. The trouble was
21 caused on Sam Tuah's watch. I sent General Menkarzon in to quell
22 the problem and to withdraw them. This young man in the bush on
23 the other side does not know the details. So no. No, he's wrong
24 about the fact that Dopoe Menkarzon caused Top 20 and that Dopoe
12:25:01 25 Menkarzon's men were causing trouble. That's no.

26 Q. A few more passages on the same topic, please. Let's move
27 to the top of page 13257, line 1:

28 "Q. Did Foday Sankoh have any message for the Sierra
29 Leonean fighters who had been hiding in the bush when he

1 came back from Liberia?"

2 We're still talking about the same Top 20 period,

3 Mr Taylor.

4 "A. Yes, sir.

12:25:32 5 Q. What was his message?

6 A. According to these same G2 agents who brought these
7 messages to us, they said Foday Sankoh himself had given
8 that encouragement to all the RUF fighters at that time,
9 you know, to forget about what those brothers have done.

12:25:54 10 Some of them would face the consequences when they return
11 to Charles Taylor and that was the revolution was ours and
12 that we needed to put ourselves together and continue the
13 fight. Especially, he said, at that time he was happy to
14 hear that there were some strong, intelligent junior
12:26:17 15 commanders among his forces now."

16 Now, there's a particular aspect of this I want to ask you
17 about. You have told us Menkarzon is sent in to withdraw the
18 soldiers, yes, and that after that withdrawal Sam Tuah is put on
19 trial, court-martialed, executed; yes?

12:26:38 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Where this witness has Foday Sankoh saying to these members
22 of the RUF that those brothers, what they have done, some of them
23 would face the consequences when they returned to Charles Taylor,
24 did you tell Foday Sankoh that?

12:27:02 25 A. No, I did not tell Foday Sankoh that per se. What - well,
26 in a way. When Foday Sankoh complained that Sam Tuah and other
27 individuals sent to Sierra Leone were murdering Sierra Leonean
28 citizens, I told Sam - I told Sankoh at the time, I said: Look,
29 if a commander that is sent to Sierra Leone on this security

1 border control is involved in any atrocities, I can assure you we
2 have rules here. He will be court-martialed. That's the rule
3 here. So I guess what Foday Sankoh is explaining, he's talking
4 about the knowledge that there is - I mean, there are rules over
12:27:49 5 there and that people that violate those rules of engagement
6 would be punished.

7 But you have to again - we have to be very careful here
8 with the Court in understanding this witness. This witness, I
9 think, is a little confused. He mentions this as beginning in
12:28:08 10 early 1992. This doesn't start in no early 1992, you see? So
11 again we have to be careful in his knowledge. He's passing
12 information here from what he says intelligence officers bringing
13 it. He doesn't have first-hand knowledge of what he's talking
14 about, so he's wrong. It doesn't happen in early 1992. This
12:28:30 15 operation occurs in May 1992. Now - well, on the one hand, maybe
16 some can argue that May is early, but for me, May is not early
17 1992. So we have to be very careful here about - I mean,
18 understanding his actual knowledge of what's going on. He
19 doesn't really know.

12:28:54 20 Q. Now, on the same topic, at page 13258, beginning at line
21 22, the witness says this:

22 "Q. Now, in the case of James Karway who was sent to
23 replace Dopoe Menkarzon - and this was when Foday Sankoh
24 came from Liberia. Is that correct?

12:29:15 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. Did Foday Sankoh himself say anything about this change
27 of command from Dopoe Menkarzon to James Karway?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 Q. What did he say?

1 A. As I have told you earlier, according to the G2
2 officers who went to persuade us to come to town, they said
3 Foday Sankoh had said Charles Taylor had sent James Karway
4 to relieve Dopoe Menkarzon and his men who were causing
12:29:53 5 this problem so that James Karway would come and take over
6 his place."

7 So you sent this James Karway, Mr Taylor?

8 A. This kid doesn't know what he's talking about. For God's
9 sake. All of the witnesses, even the worst of the liars that
12:30:15 10 came here admit that Top 20, Top 40 and Top Final were the end of
11 the participation of my men in Sierra Leone in 1992. So for this
12 young man who is still a young child soldier in the bush hiding
13 some place and in giving this kind of information to the Court, I
14 mean, what do we think of this? I mean, what's the - I don't
12:30:36 15 understand. What's the real issue here the Prosecution is trying
16 to verify through this witness? There is no doubt, I have said I
17 sent men there. I said they went on security operations to fight
18 ULIMO. I've said that. And everyone has come here and said that
19 the operation ended in May 1992. So now if this kid is saying
12:30:56 20 that it extended beyond that, then that's another matter, that
21 he's from a different planet. It just did not happen this way.
22 So I don't know what else I can say about this.

23 I have told this Court factually that I sent the men. I
24 have told them they were commanded by Sam Tuah. I have said to
12:31:11 25 this Court that I sent Dopoe Menkarzon to relieve them. All of
26 the Prosecution witnesses have said that Top Final ended our
27 association. So this witness, I don't know why they permitted
28 him to lead this type of thing. It is totally whack. It never
29 happened this way. Never.

1 Q. Pause there.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, I just want to seek
3 clarification. Top 20, Top 40 and Top Final, were there three
4 different operations?

12:31:38 5 THE WITNESS: There were three different operations.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: In what sequence?

7 THE WITNESS: Almost immediately. There was an initial
8 attack or there was some fracas, nothing happened so seriously,
9 people tried to, oh, friends fighting friends. About another
10 week or two after that Top 40 occurred. There was some more
11 exchange of fire, some civilians got killed. Then finally they
12 had - they pulled most of their people, including Liberians, from
13 different parts of the region and came and said, "Now we've had
14 it. They've got to leave." And that's when they attacked our
15 forces in Top Final.

12:32:15 16 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: So at what stage does Dopee Menkarzon get
17 involved in pulling out your men?

18 THE WITNESS: After Top Final. After Top Final, that's
19 when the men have withdrawn. That's in late May 1992.

12:32:33 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Let me ask you specifically: When do you send Dopee
22 Menkarzon to Sierra Leone in relation to Top 20, Top 40 and Top
23 Final?

24 A. Late May 1992.

12:32:48 25 Q. Now, my question is very specific, Mr Taylor. When in
26 relation to Top 20, Top 40 or Top Final, before or after those
27 events?

28 A. He went there after Top Final.

29 Q. Right. Okay.

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And if I may ask further around these
2 three operations, Top 20, was it an operation by - well, was it
3 an operation whereby the Liberians were misbehaving or was it an
4 operation to pull out the top Liberians that were misbehaving?

12:33:26 5 THE WITNESS: No, no, not to pull out. Top 20, the
6 Liberians were misbehaving and some of the Sierra Leonean
7 soldiers decided that they would confront them and there were
8 exchanges of fire. They fought. By the time we reached to Top
9 40, it's a similar situation. There was bad blood. It
12:33:45 10 continued. Foday Sankoh comes to Liberia. And Foday Sankoh is
11 in Liberia, in fact, at the time of Top Final. While he's there,
12 and I have promised him that we would take action against anybody
13 responsible, this massive fight occurs where quite a few people
14 get killed. I get angry with Foday Sankoh and say, "This is it."
12:34:07 15 He leaves Liberia and he returns and that's the end of it.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Is there anything else, your Honour?

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: [Microphone not activated].

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just for clarity's sake, I should mention
12:34:25 20 to you that the witness says that this James Karway, and I'm
21 looking at line 5 on page 13258, he is asked what nationality was
22 he and he says he's a Liberian.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you know of a Liberian by that name, James Karway, a
12:34:42 25 military individual?

26 A. I do not know James Karway, but I do not dispute that he
27 was one of the people. And James Karway, I'm saying again, could
28 not - even if there was a replacement of Dopoe Menkarzon, this
29 kid has got it wrong. James Karway at this time, in 1992, James

1 Karway or no other junior commando could have, would have ever
2 been in a position to replace a Special Force, no. If we assume
3 for the sake of argument that Dopoe Menkarzon was there, another
4 Special Force would have gone to replace him, not one of his
12:35:23 5 junior people, no. So I'm saying that he's got it all wrong and
6 I guess he has it wrong because he's not there and he says he's
7 not there.

8 Q. Now, the final passage that I want to refer you to on this
9 aspect is to be found at page 13259, beginning at line 16, and I
12:35:53 10 want you to listen to this carefully, Mr Taylor:

11 "Q. Mr Witness, at this time you've said that the
12 appointments were made - appointments of Liberian
13 commanders to Sierra Leone were made by Charles Taylor who
14 was the head of the NPFL. What was the relationship that
12:36:16 15 you knew at this time between the NPFL in Liberia and the
16 RUF in Sierra Leone?

17 A. Well, what I observed and was told again was that the
18 NPFL and the RUF were fighting for similar goals. What I
19 mean is that they said Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor and
12:36:42 20 some other rebel leaders they used to mention, they said
21 they came with a revolution that would not only end in
22 Liberia and Sierra Leone and that if Sierra Leone is
23 fortunate to have control over their own rebellion at the
24 end of the day they may even pursue other countries. They
12:37:05 25 were making examples of even Guinea."

26 Now, what do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Total nonsense. Total nonsense. Now, this kid - now, it
28 depends on, is he speaking now at the time that he's sitting here
29 in his age and military experience, or is he speaking as a minor

1 at this time in 1992 that he's supposed to be told this nonsense?
2 Because I want to say that my understanding of this, he's
3 speaking about 1992 when he's still a minor and he says he's
4 recruited as a child soldier, so, I mean, really, this is total,
12:37:47 5 total, total nonsense that I had said with other rebel leaders
6 that Guinea was - come on, let's be serious here. That's not
7 true at all, no.

8 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, you appreciate that part of the allegation
9 against you is that you were a party to a plan. You appreciate
12:38:10 10 that, don't you?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And you see where this answer is going. It is suggesting
13 that in lending your support to Foday Sankoh, you had much wider
14 ambitions extending as far as Guinea. That is what this witness
12:38:26 15 is claiming. Now, what do you say about that?

16 A. Total, total lie. Total lie. But that's the whole -
17 that's the way to make their plan stick they way they've designed
18 it. He's a little poor country like Liberia now out of a
19 conflict, they're not taking about rich countries that are
12:38:47 20 capable of advancing a revolution. Little Liberia,
21 Charles Taylor is supposed to be wanting to destabilise West
22 Africa. Can a lie get any bigger than this? This is a lie.
23 There was no such thing that this kid in 1992, because that's the
24 period he's speaking about, no way this kid in 1992 in some bush
12:39:09 25 hiding is told all of this. Somebody put him up to this in the
26 age and time that he's called to testify because we're talking
27 about two different periods, what he's saying as his testimony
28 and what he remembers as a kid in 1992.

29 Q. Because what we know about the background is that this

1 individual was born in 1973, so in 1992 he would have been aged
2 19.

3 A. Well, he said in his testimony that, what, he was recruited
4 as a child soldier, so which is true? If I recall his testimony
12:39:42 5 earlier, he talks about being a child soldier or recruited when
6 he was a kid. Well, if he was recruited - if this birth date
7 then is correct, then he's lying. He was never brought in as a
8 child at the time, if that date is correct.

9 Q. Well, what we know, and this at page 13218 of the
12:40:07 10 transcript, is that his date of birth is 3 October 1973.

11 A. Yes, but --

12 Q. Which would make his 19 in 1992.

13 A. But then why would he say - well, let's go back to the text
14 where he says that when he was first picked up he was picked up
12:40:32 15 as a child. So which is true? So that means then he is lying
16 about his birth date. Why would he say he was a child if he knew
17 at the time then he was not a child? I don't remember the page
18 of the text, but he refers to himself, at the beginning of the
19 first part that you read to me -

12:40:53 20 Q. That was at page 13226:

21 "Q. When you went to Pendembu, the vocational school, what
22 happened there?

23 A. Well, I was put in a platoon called the Small Boys Unit
24 on the training base.

12:41:08 25 Q. When you say a Small Boys Unit, what do you mean?

26 A. Well, those days on the training base we had categories
27 of people who were trained. There were those who were as
28 young as ranging between 5 years to 15 who were considered
29 to be the SBUs or the Small Boys Unit. So I was put in

1 that platoon."

2 A. So the assumption must be he was 15 or thereabout.

3 Q. Well, 5 years to 15.

12:41:39

4 A. So, then he was not born in 1970 something, so he's lying
5 about - so he's lying about being in a Small Boy Unit because he
6 had to be around 15, according to what he's saying here. So what
7 is his real birth date?

8 Q. 3 October 1973, he told us.

12:41:57

9 A. Then he was not born in 1973 because if he was born in
10 1973, at the period he is talking about here, he would have been
11 of age.

12 Q. But, in any event, he continues in the same vein, this
13 19-year-old, Mr Taylor, talking of your designs on that part of
14 West Africa. He continues, page 13259, line 29:

12:42:26

15 "A. ... They said it was like they have started with
16 Liberia and they have succeeded, they have almost
17 established a very good foundation there, now they were in
18 Sierra Leone headed by Foday Sankoh. Foday Sankoh - if
19 Foday Sankoh was able to get control a similar thing would
20 also happen to other countries. They were mentioning
21 Guinea at that particular time. So it was like a sort of -
22 the same organisation spreading in the various subregions.

12:42:43

23 Q. Now, you have said that what you observed at this time
24 and you were told. Now, who told you this? Who give you
25 this information about how the RUF and the NPFL were
26 supposed to be working?

12:43:11

27 A. I can say, sir, this information that I have just
28 established here was gathered from two different areas at
29 that time. I told you of the ideology at the base. They

1 were some of the issues they used to express about the
2 relationship between the NPFL and the RUF and also among
3 the commanders who used to come to take control over us in
4 these areas - in the various areas, most of them used to
12:43:44 5 express these various concerns as well."

6 He's then asked to explain what he means by "revolution"
7 and he says this at page 13261, line 1:

8 "From my guerilla point of view, in those days they used
9 to define it to us as a complete change, and this was like a
12:44:11 10 change in government and at that time they were talking about
11 especially when they considered those governments to be a sort of
12 a rotten system that they were implementing in the sub-region at
13 that time."

14 Now, you see where the witness is going with that, don't
12:44:26 15 you, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, but the witness is going down a very, very lying road,
17 and I guess unless we put this whole thing in focus, we will be
18 led down this road. This witness here does not know what he's
19 talking about, and here is a 15-year-old boy or thereabouts.
12:44:53 20 Because if he was brought into that unit, he was born about 1976
21 or '77, he's 15 to put in - well, he said in the Small Boy Unit
22 and hear him going through all of this explanation at this
23 particular time - and if I've got the time correct, because I
24 could be corrected - I know the Prosecution is hearing this, we
12:45:13 25 are still talking about around about 1992. '91, '92. If I have
26 this period correct this little boy at this time - I'm not
27 talking about the Jabaty Jaward that sat here, but the little boy
28 in him at that time doesn't know what he's talk about here
29 because he's got it all wrong, okay? He's got it all wrong, and

1 he's getting into things maybe reflecting on his age as he sat
2 here. But he's got it all wrong at that period, at his age of 15
3 or thereabout, he doesn't know what he's talking about.

12:46:02 4 Q. And for completeness, because in one sense this is the
5 indictment in a couple of pages, the witness continues, having
6 said that - at line 5 on page 13261, a rotten system that they
7 were implementing in the sub-region at that time, he's then asked
8 the very next question:

9 "Q. Do you know where the fighters in Sierra Leone were
12:46:22 10 getting supplies from at this time?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Where were they getting their supplies from?

13 A. The supplies were coming from Liberia, from the NPFL
14 territory.

12:46:33 15 Q. And what kind of supplies came from Liberia at this
16 time?

17 A. Mainly the supplies were arms and ammunition and food
18 supplies.

19 Q. How did you know that these supplies were coming from
12:46:44 20 Liberia?

21 A. First, as I told you people earlier, they said that the
22 arms and ammunition that even introduced the war in Sierra
23 Leone, they said was used - I mean, was sent by
24 Charles Taylor to introduce the revolution into Sierra

12:46:57 25 Leone and give a starting support to the revolution. Also,
26 I was working as a G2 in Pendembu. We usually saw Foday
27 Sankoh when he was passing to Gbarnga - from Gbarnga. We
28 saw him in trucks loaded with arms and ammunition passing
29 by. Thirdly, most of the time when we were along the front

1 line areas we used to see new weapons, these AK-47 and
2 RPGs. Sometimes they always said that these were the
3 weapons just sent by Charles Taylor from Liberia."
4 And he goes on into more detail about trucks arriving.

12:47:48 5 Now, what's your comment on that, Mr Taylor?

6 A. You know, we really, really have to take some time to go
7 and take apart this little - this big lie. This gentleman at the
8 time when we go back to his initial recruitment, if I'm having
9 the year correct, would that be '91? Late '91, '92, at the time
12:48:27 10 of his recruitment. We don't know yet when he graduates, but I
11 would assume that he is working now as a G2 now, he's in
12 intelligence, this must be after his graduation. He recalls Top
13 20. His knowledge at the time he's still in the bush. I'm not
14 sure as to whether he's being trained in the bush at that time,
12:48:53 15 but then if we look at the cut-off date for this operation, we're
16 talking about May of 1992. Now we are seeing arms and ammunition
17 coming from Liberia, and again I don't want to be jumped on to
18 say: Well, he didn't say that this happened after 1992. Well,
19 we don't have the dates here, but what we are looking at at the
12:49:24 20 time of his initial recruitment, we're talking about 1992. So
21 here is one of the witnesses now that is coming up with arms and
22 ammunition going into Sierra Leone from Liberia as of the end of
23 Top Final. That's a blatant, blatant, blatant lie. And I'm
24 saying this young man, and I'm talking about Jabaty Jaward, at 15
12:49:54 25 does not know what he's talk about. And just as he's saying he's
26 hearing things and saying things, he did not see and I don't
27 think anybody told him that after Top Final in May of 1992, arms
28 and ammunition went into Sierra Leone. Again that's a pack of
29 lies. That's all it is.

1 Q. Moving on now to another area that I'd like your assistance
2 with, please. At page 13353 at line 10 the witness was asked
3 this question:

12:50:38

4 "Q. Did you know of any other form of contact that Sam
5 Bockarie had with anyone outside Sierra Leone during the
6 junta period?

7 A. Yes, sir. I can verify this from the coming of Jungle
8 in late 19 - I can say early 1998.

9 Q. Now, who is Jungle?

12:51:00

10 A. The Jungle I'm referring to here was one of the SSS - I
11 mean the Special Security Service who was part of the
12 Charles Taylor security forces in Liberia, but he had been
13 with the RUF since 1994.

12:51:25

14 Q. Now, you said he'd been with the RUF since '94. Can
15 you explain how or in what circumstances he came to be with
16 the RUF since '94?

12:51:50

17 A. Yes, sir. If you can recall when I spoke of the time
18 the NPRC government pushed the RUF along the borders, some
19 NPFL soldiers who were also in the Lofa County had also
20 been cut off by ULIMO and so that group of NPFL fighters
21 who remained and who were forced to join the RUF along the
22 Pumbudu axis that I made mention of today were commanded by
23 this Jungle at that time.

12:52:17

24 Q. Now, do you know how long Jungle remained in Sierra
25 Leone - on Sierra Leone territory after he'd been cut off
26 himself and his troop had been cut off by activities on the
27 border?

28 A. Yes, sir. He almost - he took about a year with us in
29 the jungle and later he crossed through Guinea and entered

1 into Liberia.

2 Q. And do you recall what time he went back - he crossed
3 through Guinea and entered Liberia?

12:52:45

4 A. The only time I saw him was the time I was referring
5 to, 1998.

6 Q. The question was whether you knew about what time he
7 went back into Liberia, the time you said he went back
8 through Guinea and into Liberian territory. Do you recall
9 when this was?

12:53:03

10 A. To be specific, sir, I can't recall the month or the
11 date, but he spent some time with us in the jungle before
12 he left.

13 Q. The next time you saw him, you say, was in 1998. Is
14 that correct?

12:53:18

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Where did you see him?

17 A. I saw him in Kenema at Sam Bockarie's house.

18 Q. And do you know why he had come to Sam Bockarie in
19 Kenema?

12:53:28

20 A. Well, the only message I heard from him was that he
21 brought some ammunition and that the truck got stuck close
22 to Buedu, but that he came ahead to inform Sam Bockarie.

23 Q. Did he say where he was coming from with the
24 ammunition?

12:53:49

25 A. Well, at that point in time I knew that he was coming
26 from Liberia, but he did not say that he was coming from
27 anywhere else."

28 This is 1998, Mr Taylor. Jungle, who was cut off in '94,
29 spent some time with the RUF, returns to Liberia via Guinea, and

1 then he's returning now in 1998 laden with arms from you. True?

12:54:45 2 A. That is not true. But you know, counsel, we can't leave
3 this. I think we can dismantle this lie. Let's go back to page
4 - the page that ends in 54 - the same page number that ends in 54
5 where he's saying yes, sir, he also - he took a year with us in
6 the jungle and later he crossed through Guinea and entered into
7 Liberia. Let's look at that, because this little boy has packed
8 up these lies and the only way we're going to dismantle it is to
9 go back into the years. According to this man, he's brought in
10 at 15. We're talking about at the time that's around 1992.

11 Jungle and his people are cut off from our side in 1991. They
12 move into Sierra Leone. Where is this little boy at the time?
13 Is he in this training camp or he's with his parents? Because
14 we've got to get a period - the period of the time that Jungle is
12:55:54 15 cut off, is this boy now in this recruitment camp where - is that
16 in Pendembu where he is first taken, he says, in this Small Boys
17 Unit camp?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. So what is Jungle? Jungle now who is with Sam Bockarie -
12:56:11 20 because there is evidence before this Court by one of the last
21 witnesses that was brought by this Prosecution, okay, that is
22 protected and I can't call his name, one of the very last, that
23 speak about Jungle's coming in and Sam Bockarie - and being close
24 to Sam Bockarie. So where is Sam Bockarie at this particular
12:56:30 25 time? Because Jungle finally introduces - I mean, Sam Bockarie
26 introduces Jungle to Foday Sankoh and Jungle is with them. So is
27 Jungle in Pendembu at this base with these Small Boys Unit, or is
28 he with Sam Bockarie? Because you can't say here that Jungle
29 comes and he takes a year with us in the jungle. It would mean

1 that the jungle that he refers is to the jungle where they are
2 supposed to be doing this training, okay, and getting the
3 information from G2, but they are small boys. So it can't be
4 this, your Honours. It can't be. Is he a part of the RUF at 13,
12:57:15 5 14 when Jungle is there? Or he is talking about again when he
6 becomes a man and begins to hear all these rumours about Jungle?
7 Because in 1994 that he's talking about it is true, but Jungle is
8 there from 1991, according to other witnesses, and I think very
9 credible witnesses, that have come before this Court, I think one
12:57:37 10 of the last ones, that talk about this cut-off period. So this
11 kid is lying. He does not have it right. He doesn't know what
12 he's talking about, and I think we need to remind the Court. So
13 all of these things that he's trying to line up, his date of
14 birth, his age at the time he's brought in the Small Boys Unit.
12:58:00 15 Now he's gone into the time that Jungle joins them - no, no.
16 He's got it all wrong and he's lying about dates, times, places
17 and including his own age. He is just a liar.
18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want you to answer my next question yes
19 or no, because this is a topic we've dealt with ad nauseam, but I
12:58:25 20 merely put it to you for completeness so it cannot be said in due
21 course that you didn't specifically challenge this allegation.
22 Did Jungle bring, at this time, a parcel of diamonds to you?
23 A. Are we talking about 1994?
24 Q. Well, no, no, no. We're talking about, according to the
12:58:47 25 evidence of this witness, sometime in 1998?
26 A. No, never did.
27 Q. And for completeness, page 13356, commencing at line 10
28 where the witness said that Bockarie gave Jungle a parcel of
29 diamonds to take to you. True or false, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Totally false.

2 Q. And he goes on to say at page 13642, and again for
3 completeness, that Jungle was a coordinator between Sam Bockarie
4 and you. True or false?

12:59:24 5 A. False.

6 Q. That's page 13642, lines 10 to 12.

7 Now, you accept, do you not, Mr Taylor, that you provided
8 Sam Bockarie with a satellite phone?

9 A. Yes, I do.

12:59:56 10 Q. And remind us, when was that?

11 A. That was in October 1998.

12 Q. This witness told this Court this on 10 July 2008 in regard
13 to that, page 13382, line 7:

14 "A. I only came to learn that Sam Bockarie had gone to
13:00:23 15 Monrovia before my arrival. That was when at one time he
16 was trying to compare the two satellite phones that he had.
17 He said that when he came he was picked up by one Varmuyan
18 Sheriff who I made mention of before who was beyond the
19 rebel lines and that he was a ULIMO commander. He said he
13:00:44 20 came and collected him and they went to Monrovia and he
21 said that was the time he got the other satellite phone
22 that he was talking about. According to him, he said the
23 satellite phone was given to him by President
24 Charles Taylor at that time."

13:01:01 25 Now, you note the circumstances in which this witness is
26 saying you gave him the satellite phone and you notice also in
27 passing the correspondence between this account and that given by
28 Varmuyan Sheriff.

29 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. That you sent him to collect Bockarie and it's on that
2 occasion you gave Bockarie a satellite phone. What do you say
3 about that?

4 A. Total nonsense. That's not true. I gave Bockarie a
13:01:36 5 satellite phone. They concocted this, he and Varmuyan and God
6 knows whoever else. Varmuyan Sheriff never went to pick up Sam
7 Bockarie from any place. It would have been silly and it would
8 not make any sense for Varmuyan Sheriff to have brought Sam
9 Bockarie to me at the time that he's talking about only to send
13:02:03 10 Eddie Kanneh across the border into Guinea to my embassy, okay,
11 in August 1998 to say, "There is one Sam Bockarie that wants to
12 go to the President." Now, either that they - either the
13 ambassador lied, Eddie Kanneh lied, or that letter is a forgery,
14 or somebody is lying. So it can't be both ways. Sam Bockarie
13:02:22 15 did not come to Liberia before August 1998 and no Sheriff or
16 nothing brought him. I sent for Sam Bockarie in September at the
17 border. General Menkarzon went and brought him down to him. So
18 that arrangement he and what do you call it or whoever else is a
19 lie.

13:02:48 20 Q. Mr Taylor, did you ever discuss - do you recall having a
21 discussion with Sam Bockarie on that satellite phone at a time
22 when Bockarie's position was under attack from Guinean forces?

23 A. No, no. I don't know of any time that Bockarie's forces
24 were under attack from Guinean forces. What year?

13:03:14 25 Q. Well, let me provide you with another detail in the hope
26 that perhaps it may jog your memory. This was a conversation
27 which was taking place at around about midnight.

28 A. The President would get out of his bed and come out in the
29 mildew [sic] to talk to Sam Bockarie by satellite phone? No.

1 Never, no. Because these satellite phones are not operated
2 indoor. I would have to get out of my bed to come out to talk to
3 him. No.

4 Q. I put that proposition to you for this reason: At page

13:03:58 5 13423 we find this passage beginning at line 10:

6 "Q. Now, you said that on one occasion he had been on the
7 satellite phone with President Taylor. Do you recall that?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. When was this?

13:04:11 10 A. I cannot remember the specific time, but it was on the
11 occasion when we were under attack from the Guinean force
12 troops that had crossed from Guinea.

13 Q. Do you know where this communication took place; where
14 Sam Bockarie was when he communicated to Charles Taylor?

13:04:30 15 A. That was at midnight and later he was saying that he
16 was talking to the old man regarding the situation
17 prevailing on the ground."

18 Now that you've had an opportunity of hearing the full
19 passage, Mr Taylor, can you assist us?

13:04:47 20 A. Total nonsense. That's what it is. Total, total nonsense.

21 And, you know, it's a little strange because even times are not
22 mentioned here. Anybody can say, "Did I ever speak to Sam

23 Bockarie on a satellite phone? Yes." So somebody says, "Well,
24 if he gave him a satellite phone, then he should have been

13:05:07 25 talking to him." That's the whole argument here that is being

26 brought, which is total nonsense. I did not get on the phone at

27 any time with Sam Bockarie. I swear to God, this is just a

28 situation that - you know, I don't know how you - you know, it's

29 - how you get through this kind of thing, I mean, when people

1 deliberately sit up and design things?

2 I gave Sam Bockarie a telephone. If I spoke to him on the
3 telephone, wouldn't I say I spoke to him at this time or that
4 time? I could say I didn't give to him, which would be a lie. I
13:05:48 5 wouldn't lie. I gave the man the phone and I didn't speak - in
6 fact, I tell you what happened, I have said to this Court, Sam
7 Bockarie did not - we were - Sam Bockarie was not my friend where
8 we were like colleagues where he could pick up a phone and call
9 me. That was not the case, okay. Sam Bockarie had a telephone
13:06:08 10 to be reached. He did not have my direct line that he could just
11 get up and, "Oh, let me call my buddy." Why would people believe
12 that?

13 He was given a phone that he could be reached. If he was
14 needed he was called. Sam Bockarie made calls to get to me, it
13:06:29 15 would have to be answered by others and a time would have to be
16 set if I want to speak to him. And in most cases, if I had to
17 speak to Sam Bockarie on his satellite phone, I did not have to
18 call him from a satellite telephone. I would call Sam Bockarie
19 from the main line to the satellite. So for somebody to just
13:06:51 20 bring this whole thing that I would have to get out of my bed -
21 if you say I spoke to Sam Bockarie, if it were true that I spoke
22 to him, I wouldn't have to get out of my bed. You can call from
23 the landline to the satellite phone, of course. So why would
24 anybody think that I get out of my bed at 12 o'clock, midnight,
13:07:12 25 no other time, not 11, not 10 but 12, and then come to speak to
26 Sam Bockarie. It's a lie. As plain and simple it's a lie.

27 Q. Now, I want to ask you about a particular allegation made
28 by the witness. And this is again a recurring theme, Mr Taylor,
29 so perhaps we can deal with this swiftly. The passage to which I

1 want to refer your attention begins at page 13424 beginning at
2 line 11:

3 "Q. ... Do you recall any particular supply that remains
4 in mind?

13:07:58 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Which one do you recall?

7 A. I can remember a large consignment of ammunition came
8 in late 1998 for the Kono operation, sir.

9 Q. Do you recall who escorted - you've said that there
13:08:22 10 were escorts usually. Do you recall who escorted that
11 consignment?

12 A. To be specific the case of this particular consignment
13 that came in 1998 I can't recall the specific escorts, but
14 a large consignment came at one time when Pa Sheku and
13:08:49 15 Colonel Jungle, Zigzag Marzah and Abu Keita and others, I
16 saw them when the consignment came.

17 Q. And you said that this consignment was for Kono
18 operation. How did you know it was for Kono operation?

19 A. When I received one of those large consignments that
13:09:12 20 I'm talking about, especially the one that came in '98,
21 Brigadier Issa came to Buedu and I was instructed to list
22 down some of the material that were to be taken to Kono for
23 Koidu to be attacked.

24 Q. Do you recall about what time this was?

13:09:33 25 A. Let's say that was some time in December 1998.

26 Q. And do you recall some of the material that came in
27 that supply?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 There were large consignments of AK ammunition. There were

1 G3 rounds. There were RPG rounds rockets. We had GPMG
2 rounds, we had GMG rounds, we some bazooka rockets and we
3 had mortar bombs. We had a good number of drums of petrol,
4 diesel, engine oil, we had some bags of rice and we had
13:10:18 5 other materials that we needed like salt, Maggi and even
6 batteries.

7 Q. Now, you said that this supply was for the Kono
8 operation. How did the supply get distributed for that
9 operation?

13:10:33 10 A. Well, as I told you earlier, you know, the distribution
11 to Kono area I'm not aware of, but what happened in Buedu
12 is that a large quantity of this supply went to Kono and
13 smaller quantities were allocated to other defensive
14 positions."

13:10:55 15 December 1998, Mr Taylor, and let's remind ourselves, in
16 December 1998 you accept Sam Bockarie travelled to Ouagadougou to
17 meet the then African Union chairman Blaise Compaore, yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. At or about that time, did you send a large consignment of
13:11:26 20 war material and other supplies to the RUF for the capture of
21 Kono?

22 A. No, I did not.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr Taylor, the witness goes on to describe
24 and provide the names of individuals who escorted these materials
13:12:10 25 coming from Liberia and he names at page 13386 Colonel Jungle,

26 Sampson, one Mike, Senegal ese, Junior, Zigzag Marzah, Pa Sheku.

27 Who is Pa Sheku?

28 A. I don't know Pa Sheku.

29 Q. Who is Sampson?

1 A. Sampson is - if it's the Sampson I know, it's Benjamin's
2 brother. But you say you didn't want us to prolong this, but
3 there's something to prolong on this because if we go through it
4 like this when these boys mix up these things, we get it mixed
13:12:59 5 up, the first thing is that we've got to know what this boy is
6 talking about. And if we go back to page 24, this boy says -
7 he's talking about two sets of ammunition, according to my
8 understanding of this.

9 Q. He was talking about what?

13:13:15 10 A. Two sets of ammunition here, arms and ammunition, and we
11 need to find out from him - before he jumps into December, he
12 deals with - go back to 24, that ends with 24 on that. We'll see
13 what I'm talking about at 24.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, you were saying the Sampson
13:13:38 15 you know is what?

16 THE WITNESS: The Sampson that I know is a cousin to
17 Benjamin Yeaten and his deputy bodyguard commander, Sampson Weah.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. I've got the page ending in 24, Mr Taylor. 13424, is that
13:14:03 20 the page?

21 A. Yes, that ends in 424 where he talks about --

22 Q. Do you have the passage on the screen, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes, yes. "I can remember a large consignment of
24 ammunition." He goes down in the answer:

13:14:18 25 "To be specific the case of this particular consignment
26 that came in 1998 I cannot recall the specific escorts, but a
27 large consignment came at one time when Pa Sheku and Colonel
28 Jungle, Zigzag Marzah and Abu ..."

29 So we're talking about two sets, am I correct here? He

1 cannot remember this first escort, but he can remember a large
2 consignment that came at one time. So as they're constructing
3 these lies - so what he is talking about here? I mean, I don't
4 know if a consignment went in, but evidence before this Court -
13:15:01 5 the people that went to Burkina Faso have been mentioned to this
6 Court. There was Sam Bockarie, there was Eddie Kanneh, there was
7 - what do you call this old man? Excuse me, I can't remember --
8 Q. SYB Rogers?

9 A. Rogers and others that went on this thing. Now, these
13:15:26 10 supplies are supposed to come, and they are being escorted by
11 Jungle and Sampson and Abu Keita and all this thing here at this
12 particular time. But don't let's forget Abu Keita. Abu Keita is
13 involved in the September 1998 attack against my government with
14 Roosevelt Johnson. He is imprisoned and released and he flees
13:15:55 15 the country. This Abu Keita is the same man that claims later on
16 now that he's assigned in Sierra Leone on these special
17 operations. Here is Abu Keita now inside Liberia again escorting
18 arms and ammunition out.

19 So, I mean, these boys just - I mean, so we have to prolong
13:16:12 20 it here because these facts as they lie about them just - are
21 just to destroy people. So this escort that he says came - well,
22 he doesn't say really when in 1998, but now we've got one set
23 that came in somewhere in 1998 that he doesn't know the escorts;
24 another set came at one time; and then there's another set now
13:16:35 25 that he's specific about in December. So where does that put me
26 now? So what do I respond to, okay: These lies that they
27 themselves can't patch together? So if ammunition went into
28 Sierra Leone in 1998, I had nothing to do with it and did not
29 even know. And I don't believe it in fact, but the people that

1 travelled with Sam - so if the question is did Sam Bockarie go
2 to - yes, he went, but the construct of this lie by answering yes
3 and yes and yes to Bockarie did go and he did return, it puts us
4 in a position where we almost acquiesce with this lie which is
13:17:15 5 not the truth, you understand me, because he is confused about
6 this. So you can see people are telling these people things that
7 they cannot remember and in trying to explain it to this Court,
8 they come up with different things. So are we talking about one,
9 two or three sets of ammunition when he doesn't really know? You
13:17:35 10 see what I'm trying to say? So it just can't be that yes Sam
11 Bockarie went through, but then if we leave it at that and say
12 that arm - the crux of the Prosecution situation here is that the
13 arms for the Sierra Leonean invasion were supplied by me in 1998.
14 We know that the RUF did not - was not responsible for the 6
13:17:58 15 January operation. We know that, okay? There have been
16 decisions in this Court in dealing with that. Now here is
17 somebody coming in trying to tie up things. We also know this
18 Fitti-Fatta operation. We also know that it is alleged there
19 were some other ammunition supplied by me for Fitti-Fatta, and it
13:18:18 20 is Fitti-Fatta - after Fitti-Fatta that led to Kono.

21 So it's so twined - intertwined that, you know, they have
22 all forgotten their script. So what is he talking about here?
23 What is he talking about that I supplied or these weapons were
24 escorted by? So all of the names that came up here are familiar
13:18:43 25 names that they've all been told to keep calling: Jungle,
26 Marzah, Abu Keita. We know a lot, and a lot more will be known
27 about Abu Keita later on as we go in this Defence and the lie
28 that he told. But you can see here they are to repeat these
29 names and keep them up and in the web of lies.

1 Q. That's why I was concentrating on the names which haven't
2 occurred so regularly. Pa Sheku, who's he?

3 A. I don't know him.

4 Q. Because the names mentioned - and I'm looking at page
13:19:17 5 13386. The names mentioned by the witness as escorts are -
6 Colonel Jungle was one of them; we had Sampson; then we had one
7 Mike; and we had others who had nicknames like Senegalese and
8 Junior. "I can remember a consignment came where I saw Zigzag
9 Marzah and one Pa Sheku." So they were the some of the people
13:19:45 10 when these consignments came. So Jungle we've heard before, so I
11 went tax you with that. Sampson, you've told us Benjamin Yeaten
12 had a cousin of that name. Who's Mike?

13 A. I don't know a Mike.

14 Q. And the witnesses goes on at page 13387 to elaborate and
13:20:10 15 say that all those persons he named were working for President
16 Charles Taylor.

17 "First of all, Jungle had been well known as one of the
18 members of the Special Security Services of President
19 Charles Taylor and Sampson was also part of the Special Security
13:20:33 20 Service. Senegalese, he was always dressed in the SOD uniform,
21 black suit known as SOD. In addition to that they also used to
22 express most of their relationships with Charles Taylor's
23 government in Liberia when they come."

24 And he is asked how did he know that Jungle played that
13:21:00 25 role?

26 "A. He always used to say it. From what they used to even
27 me when I entered Liberia, I proved all they had been
28 saying about their relationship with Charles Taylor at that
29 time.

1 Q. And this was in relation to Jungle, is that right?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. You talked about Senegalese and you said he was dressed
4 in SOD - dressed as SOD. What do you mean?

13:21:29 5 A. When I entered Liberia in 2000, you know, I came to
6 understand that this SOD that Senegalese used to talk about
7 was one of the security groups of President
8 Charles Taylor's government at that time. They used to
9 call them Special Operational Division unit.

13:21:48 10 Q. What about Junior? Do you know whether he belonged to
11 any group or any unit?

12 A. He belonged to the SS unit, sir.

13 Q. How were you able to tell?

14 A. When I entered Liberia, I met him working as an SS and
13:22:04 15 even during the interim government of Gyude Bryant I saw
16 him working as SS in Liberia."

17 So there he is spelling it all out, Mr Taylor, that people
18 who were escorting these weapons were employed, for the most
19 part, in the SSS and the SOD in Liberia. Isn't that the case?

13:22:28 20 A. I really don't - you know, really I was not elected
21 President of Liberia - and in fact the presidency of Liberia is
22 really nothing. It's really nothing. I mean, it's - this is one
23 of those cases where, you know, I really don't - I really don't
24 know how to put it. Even if some of these things were possible,
13:22:58 25 the burden on the President of knowing every little Tom, Dick and
26 Harry in every little police force and every little security
27 force and everything that they do or don't do, as the President
28 I'd need really to - this is it. I mean, it's just - of all of
29 these people, I swear, I saw Zigzag Marzah here. I did not know

1 that boy. I don't dispute he worked with the SSS. I didn't know
2 him. Sampson a brother of Benjamin. I know Sampson Weah very
3 well. Bring him here tomorrow.

13:23:43 4 I don't know these people. Secret Service working with me,
5 I'm supposed to know all of them. That's not the case. So, you
6 know, I don't know how you explain this. This boy is naming
7 people that run - somebody called Senegalese, I don't know. From
8 what I understood after I talked to a lot of the people back
9 there, this word "Senegalese", from what I have been told even
13:24:05 10 during this trial, is not somebody's name. It's not a name.

11 It's something like an AKA. And they said somebody - if you are
12 tall and dark you look like a Senegalese, quote unquote, and they
13 call you Senegalese. These are all AKAs. I don't know these
14 things. And there's somebody called Senegalese, but we've gotten
13:24:27 15 a lot of information on who this Senegalese is, who is a ULIMO
16 personnel that works with Abu Keita, okay? So I don't know.

17 But this explanation here really - I don't know how you -
18 in a typical factual - I don't know how you answer some of these
19 things here, they're just so outrageous that he's working for
13:24:53 20 Charles Taylor. Of course every employee of the Liberian
21 government works - if you want to say for the President. I
22 thought they worked for the country. But everybody works for the
23 President. I don't know most of these people, and I can't even
24 verify that some of these boys even travelled to Sierra Leone.

13:25:12 25 The President sitting out - carrying his functions, somebody -
26 Liberians and Sierra Leoneans run across the border all of the
27 time. I tell you, counsel, I don't know. I can just say
28 factually that this explanation that - on the arms being escorted
29 or coming out of Liberia, no arms came from me into Sierra Leone

1 in 1998. I didn't have it. I didn't have that quantity. I did
2 not receive any reports that arms came from Burkina Faso at the
3 time. I'm saying it's possible, but I'm saying that I do not
4 think Blaise Compaore, okay, would have given - in his capacity
13:25:55 5 as OAU chairman would have given arms to Sam Bockarie to bring
6 through into Sierra Leone. I doubt it very much. I doubt it
7 very much. But if some arrangements were made where arms are
8 passed through Burkina Faso or even passed through Liberia,
9 that's possible and even probable. Possible, and I would go
13:26:17 10 beyond the possible, I would put it into the probable.

11 Look, arms go through these countries. You, as President
12 sitting down, when a bunch of crooks want to do what they want to
13 do it, they will do it. You understand me? The most powerful
14 nations in the world have these problems. I don't - I don't
13:26:40 15 know, but it's like sitting here defending and defending but it's
16 not true, counsel. I didn't. If these people were involved in
17 escorting material, I would suppose it could be like the usual
18 things that apparently I can - I have accepted since I have sat
19 here that small arms and - I mean small ammunition went across.
13:26:58 20 People buying and smuggling through, I can accept that. And
21 maybe Marzah or the other little boys hustling did do that. But
22 not from my government; not being authorised by me in any way.

23 Q. Now, speaking of consignments, and you recall you drew my
24 attention to that earlier passage on page - the page ending in
13:27:27 25 424 as to the number of consignments of arms which were sent.
26 Well, let me give you an opportunity of dealing with another
27 allegation made by the witness in the same vein. Page 13390,
28 picking it up at line 27:

29 "I would hear from Sam Bockarie that he had made a request

1 because of the situation on the ground before these
2 supplies came, so it was not something regular.

13:28:08 3 Q. And when you say you would hear from Sam Bockarie that
4 he had made a request, what exactly would Sam Bockarie tell
5 you about the request that he made?

6 A. Well, at the time that I was serving as storekeeper
7 there were times when the RUF was highly in need of
8 ammunition. Like, I can set a typical example. Like the
9 day the Guineans crossed over from Guinea towards Koindu he
13:28:31 10 was given the courage that he had already called to
11 Monrovia and that they have already dispatched men to come
12 with some supplies.

13 Q. Now, the example you have just given, when did this
14 happen? You said when the Guineans crossed to Koindu.
13:28:50 15 When did this happen?

16 A. This was in late 1998.

17 Q. And what happened on this occasion?

18 A. Well, we just heard a serious bombardment from the
19 Guinean troops crossing into Sierra Leone territory towards
13:29:10 20 Koindu.

21 Q. What happened after that?

22 A. RUF sent a reinforcement and after some serious
23 fighting they finally established a defensive position near
24 Koindu.

13:29:22 25 Q. And you talk about Sam Bockarie assuring - making a
26 request at this time. Can you say exactly how this went
27 about?

28 A. Well, as one of the examples I just mentioned, the way
29 that I used to know that he made requests, that even the

1 commanders from Koindu came for supplies and there was
2 nothing in store then. That was the time he said he had
3 called at that time to the Papay in Liberia. At that time
4 when he said Papay in Liberia he was referring to Charles
13:29:54 5 Ghankay Taylor. So he said that there was hope that men
6 were on the way coming with something for us. This was
7 arms and ammunition. After this we saw these people I have
8 just mentioned, they brought arms and ammunition."

9 So there's one in December 1998, Mr Taylor, to attack Kono,
13:30:18 10 yes?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. There is this one in late 1998 when the cupboards are bare
13 and the RUF are under attack from the Guineans. What about that
14 one?

13:30:31 15 A. But is there anything later in 1998 than December? There's
16 nothing later than December. But we - they were supposed to
17 receive this massive amount of ammunition in December 1998. So
18 what are you calling me for again to send you whatever? You just
19 - if this is true, you just received trucks, massive amounts in
13:30:58 20 December 1998. There's nothing later than that. Nothing later

21 than December. Now, here is he now that the Guineans attack and
22 then they call again in December and I'm supposed to be sending a
23 little something. Now, how truthful can this be? How truthful
24 can this be? What are you calling me for if that is true when
13:31:23 25 you just received this massive amount of ammunition in December?

26 And this is supposed to be the arms and ammunition that you are
27 supposed to have in such big supplies to go and attack Freetown.
28 And then what? There are not eight weeks in December. Only four
29 weeks in December. So if we begin to divide them up, you're

1 supposed to be well equipped to fight off the Guineans, so what
2 are you calling me for? So it's just not true. And I guess,
3 like I say, he forgot his script. I will just leave it. I've
4 talked enough about this particular man. It is not true. It
13:32:03 5 does not make sense because it is a lie.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'll take the lunch hour now.
7 We'll resume at 2.30.

8 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:31:49 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor. Let's pick up where we left off, please.
12 This witness, and you recall we're dealing with Jabaty Jaward --

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Goes on to say that around mid 1998 Sam Bockarie travelled
14:32:08 15 to Liberia twice, specifically page 13412, picking it up at line
16 18:

17 "Q. Do you recall how often Sam Bockarie travelled to
18 Liberia whilst you were in Buedu?

19 A. Yes, sir."

14:32:26 20 Jump to line 25:

21 "... Whilst in Buedu at that time I can remember he went to
22 Liberia two times.

23 Over the page, 13413:

24 "Q. When he returned from those trips to Liberia did he
14:32:42 25 discuss anything about his trips?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. What did he discuss, to your knowledge?

28 A. After one of the trips he made with some delegation
29 that I can remember, when they returned he said we soon be

1 expecting to have more supplies of arms and ammunition."

2 Line 27:

3 "Q. What supplies did you get following that trip?

14:33:13

4 A. We received a large consignment of arms, ammunition
5 including food supplies, fuel, gasoline, engine oil and
6 other commodities we needed at that time for the soldiers.

7 Q. Do you know who he had gone to see in Liberia on that
8 trip?

14:33:34

9 A. His trips I made mention of here that he made to
10 Liberia were to go to President Charles Taylor at that
11 time. On his return he would explain something about his
12 trip like the thing I've just made mention of, like when he
13 said we should soon be expecting ammunition to come."

14 Now what do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

14:33:57

15 A. Well, that is false, but I'll tell you why it's false.
16 Let's look at line 12 on the back page, at the back of this.

17 Q. Which page are we talking about, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Right at the back of this, line 12 on the page before this,
19 page 13.

14:34:20

20 Q. Yes?

21 A. What does he say at line 12? He tells who these people are
22 supposed to be; Pa Rogers, Eddie Kanneh. So it's got to be this
23 boy now is talking about the November/December 1998 trip. So
24 this is the fourth trip now. This the fourth set of arms and
14:34:43 25 ammunition. Because on this line here, "At this time he
26 travelled with one Pa SB Rogers, one of his bodyguards Foday, he
27 also travelled with Eddie Kanneh." That's the 1998 trip to
28 Burkina Faso that he has now - this is the fourth set of arms
29 between that late November and December which is a lie. You see,

1 and as they are packing these it's hard because there's a lot of
2 testimony here, but there's a blatant, blatant lie. But he just
3 before this page you just went to talks about who was supposed to
4 be on this particular time.

14:35:30 5 Q. I'm grateful, Mr Taylor, for you indicating that. Let's
6 have a look in a little bit more detail about this passage then,
7 please. Let's go back to 13412, line 25:

8 "... Whilst I was in Buedu at that time I can remember he
9 went to Liberia two times.

14:35:47 10 Q. Do you know what was the purpose of his visits to
11 Liberia?

12 A. No, sir.

13 Q. On those occasions that he visited Liberia did he
14 discuss anything before he travelled to Liberia?

14:35:58 15 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.

16 Q. When he returned from those trips to Liberia did he
17 discuss anything about his trips?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. What did he discuss, to your knowledge?

14:36:10 20 A. After one of the trips he made with some delegation
21 that I can remember when they returned he said we soon be
22 expecting to have more supplies of arms and ammunition.

23 Q. You say he travelled with some delegation. Who were in
24 that delegation?

14:36:27 25 A. At that time he travelled with one Pa SB Rogers and one
26 of his bodyguard commanders Foday and he also had one Eddie
27 Kanneh with him.

28 Q. Do you recall when this visit was made to Liberia?

29 A. I can remember the year. That was in 1998.

1 Q. Are you also able to remember about what month in '98
2 he made that visit?

3 A. No, sir.

4 Q. Was it early or was it mid or was it late?

14:37:05 5 A. Sometime in mid 1998."

6 Sometime in mid 1998, Mr Taylor, were you visited by Sam
7 Bockarie and a delegation?

8 A. Not at all, no. Not at all.

9 Q. Do you recall Sam Bockarie making a trip to Liberia with
14:37:35 10 those named individuals?

11 A. Yes, in passing through in November/December of 1998.

12 Q. According to this witness then, Mr Taylor, there is this
13 shipment which comes in mid 1998. He's already mentioned one
14 that came in December 1998 for the attack on Kono. Another one
14:38:04 15 which came, to quote, in late 1998. Now help me, what do you
16 know about all of these large consignments that the witness is
17 talking about?

18 A. Absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing because these
19 so-called trips as he has them just don't happen and there's the
14:38:26 20 confusion in these people's minds in not remembering what they
21 are supposed to say. That's all. Mid 1998 - he referred to
22 early 1992 as being in May, so mid year we are saying - for me
23 mid 1998 would be June, July, about that particular time. But,
24 you know, when we look at his interpretation of early, mid or
14:38:58 25 late, I can't speak for him.

26 But the individuals that he is talking about, I admit that
27 they came with Bockarie en route to Burkina Faso in November -
28 late November, early December of 1998. That's when they passed
29 through. And that's the same time that he referred to in

1 previous testimony as a large amount of ammunition coming.
2 Unless he's saying that in mid 1998 there was this huge amount
3 and then in late 1998 there's a second huge amount he is
4 blatantly telling a lie. So he is mixing up this - trying to
14:39:38 5 associate this lie, he expands it backwards now again to mid
6 1998. It's just not true.

7 There is no Sam Bockarie in Liberia. And he starts off in
8 remembering some of it. Sam Bockarie does come to Liberia twice
9 in mid - I mean in late 1998. That is the October and November
14:39:58 10 trip. Yes, those are the two trips. The third trip is when he
11 comes with his delegation and goes on to Burkina Faso. And I
12 said that it did happen.

13 Q. Let's move on to another matter. I'm looking now at page
14 13441 of the transcript of 10 July 2008, line 1:

14:40:31 15 Q. Exactly what time in 1999 was this that you left Buedu
16 with Sam Bockarie?

17 A. Well, that was in December 1999.

18 Q. Where did you go when you left Buedu?

19 A. We crossed over to Liberia.

14:40:58 20 Q. Can you describe the composition of you that left Buedu
21 for Liberia? How many of you left Buedu?

22 A. The movement we made to Buedu with Sam Bockarie were in
23 different phases. By that I mean when we left with Sam
24 Bockarie across the border other people came later.

14:41:23 25 Q. Now, when you left - at the time that you left are you
26 able to tell the Court the number of you that left?

27 A. No, sir.

28 Q. Was there a reason why Sam Bockarie left Buedu?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. What was that reason?

2 A. At that time there was a misunderstanding between him
3 and the RUF leader at that time.

4 Q. When you say the RUF leader, who was he at that time?

14:41:59 5 A. At that time Foday Sankoh had returned to Sierra Leone
6 and I am referring to him as being the rebel leader at that
7 time.

8 Q. And what happened following this misunderstanding?

9 A. The other authorities, like Brigadier Issa Sesay, from
14:42:23 10 conversations we heard between Mosquito and other
11 authorities in Buedu, they said they were coming to attack
12 General Mosquito's position in Buedu, so he decided to
13 leave to avoid infighting.

14 Q. Where did you go when you left Buedu? Where did you go
14:42:43 15 to in Liberia when you left Buedu?

16 A. Well, we entered Foya but later we went as far as
17 Monrovia.

18 Q. Can you describe those of you who were in this group
19 that left Buedu?

14:42:57 20 A. Those of us who left together with Mosquito at that
21 time comprised some civilians, ordinary fighters and some
22 senior officers. When we entered Foya we moved to
23 Voinjama.

24 Q. Did anything happen at Voinjama?

14:43:20 25 A. I and some other groups stayed in Voinjama and Sam
26 Bockarie continued to go to Monrovia with some other
27 people.

28 Q. Why did some of you stay at Voinjama whilst Bockarie
29 and others went to Monrovia?

1 A. Our understanding - I mean my understanding about the
2 instruction given to us at that time to stay there, from
3 Sam Bockarie, was that he said Charles Taylor said that the
4 group entering into Liberia was too large and that
14:43:51 5 Foday Sankoh had come to Monrovia to have discussions to
6 settle the misunderstanding between him and Sam Bockarie.
7 So he said we should stay in Voinjama until the matter got
8 settled and we should return back to Sierra Leone.

9 Q. How did you know that this was what Taylor said to
14:44:14 10 Bockarie?

11 A. Those informations were directly said to us by Sam
12 Bockarie."

13 Pause. What do you make of that, Mr Taylor? Mr Taylor, I
14 appreciate we know the background to how he came to be there, but
14:44:34 15 I'm just asking for your comment on this interpretation.

16 A. This for me is typical of a young man that does not know
17 the details of what's going on and is trying to say something to
18 maybe impress the Court, because he doesn't know the details. I
19 just put it to ignorance. That's what I put it to.

14:44:59 20 Q. What about this business that the group entering - you said
21 that the group entering Liberia was too large?

22 A. If a million people had come with Sam Bockarie, I would
23 have accepted them. One million Sierra Leoneans, I would have
24 accepted them because the deal was for Sam Bockarie to leave
14:45:18 25 Sierra Leone with those that were with him. That was not just my
26 decision. It was an ECOWAS decision. So if he - he's talking
27 nonsense. If he had brought a million, we would have accepted
28 them. So this is total nonsense. Nobody said anything about any
29 group. Whoever came with Sam Bockarie, we accepted, we disarmed

1 them. That's all.

2 Q. Now, there's another aspect of this which might not
3 immediately strike the eye, but just in case of any later
4 misunderstanding, let's deal with it. You'll note that the
14:45:47 5 witness continues in this vein: That Foday Sankoh had come to
6 Monrovia to have discussions to settle the misunderstanding
7 between him and Sam Bockarie. So he said we should stay in
8 Voinjama until the matter got settled.

9 Now, taking things slowly, Mr Taylor, firstly: Do you
14:46:10 10 accept there was discussions in Monrovia between Bockarie and
11 Sankoh in an attempt to resolve the difficulties between the two
12 men?

13 A. Well, yes. Not just Bockarie and Sankoh. Along with me,
14 yes.

14:46:30 15 Q. Yes. Now, that's point 1. Stage 2: At the time of those
16 discussions, had Bockarie already left Sierra Leone with his
17 followers?

18 A. Definitely not. No.

19 Q. Because you see the point, what this witness is saying is,
14:46:57 20 they are waiting in Voinjama, having already left Sierra Leone.
21 Do you follow?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. They are waiting in Voinjama for this discussion about the
24 misunderstanding to take place. Do you follow me?

14:47:10 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. Now, is that correct?

27 A. Totally, totally wrong.

28 Q. Well, you tell us, what was the sequence of events then?

29 A. I had a preliminary discussion with Foday Sankoh and Sam

1 Bockarie in Liberia I would say round about late November 1999.
2 Those discussions did not bring about any solution to the
3 disarmament. What were the discussions, just in case we remind
4 the Court, that the problem between Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh
14:47:50 5 at that time was disarmament and demobilisation of RUF fighters
6 in line with the ECOWAS agreement of July 1999. That's the
7 problem that we're discussing. It did not work.

8 I called Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria. Obasanjo decided
9 that he would come and join me in Liberia for the second
14:48:15 10 discussion. It was at the second discussion that there was total
11 failure, but also involved in those discussions on the sidelines,
12 we have also the United Nations involved in that. And this is
13 why, presented to this Court, Downes-Thomas in his report back to
14 the Secretary-General reported the decision that had been taken
14:48:36 15 by ECOWAS to extract Sam Bockarie, and it is only after that
16 final decision with Obasanjo, Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, Sam
17 Bockarie and the special representative in Monrovia, before one
18 citizen left Sierra Leone, with the acquiescence of Tejani Kabbah
19 who knew about the discussions going on in Monrovia. Nobody
14:49:00 20 extracted anyone from Sierra Leone before that final decision in
21 about the third or fourth week of December 1999.

22 Q. Okay. Now, another detail about this episode that I would
23 like to ask you about. The witness continues from where I left
24 off in this vein:

14:49:33 25 "Q. When Bockarie left to go to Monrovia, are you able to
26 tell what part of the group he went with to Monrovia?

27 A. Yes, sir.

28 Q. Who were in the group that he went with?

29 A. Officers at that time. Like Eddie Kanneh, he was among

1 that group. When we came to Foya, we also met Jungle and
2 others who had left Monrovia and they went to Sierra Leone
3 and they returned with Sam Bockarie and all of them drove
4 back to Monrovia. One Kaisaku was also another senior
14:50:09 5 officer in the RUF, he too was among that group. One
6 Papay, Pa Moriba, was also among that group and all of them
7 travelled to Monrovia and even Dr Magona. So all of them
8 travelled together whilst we stayed in Voijnjama."

9 Detail: When Bockarie arrived, did he arrive with - in
14:50:39 10 company with Eddie Kanneh and the other persons named?

11 A. I don't know all these other people. He very well could
12 have. I know Eddie Kanneh's name, but Sam Bockarie did come to
13 Liberia - to Monrovia with the advanced group, that is true. I
14 do not know the composition of the group, but --

14:51:09 15 Q. Was Eddie Kanneh in that group?

16 A. Yes, Eddie Kanneh did come as a senior officer with him on
17 that first group, but I don't know all. He very well could be
18 telling the truth. I can't fight about this. I do not know who
19 came, but I know some people came in the preliminary group.

14:51:22 20 Q. Now, listen to this other detail, Mr Taylor, line 26, page
21 13443:

22 "A. When we left Buedu that evening to go to Foya, we met
23 Jungle and others who usually brought the supplies and they
24 had a supply in the truck and they were going to Buedu. So
14:51:48 25 from there all of them joined Sam Bockarie's convoy and
26 returned to Monrovia.

27 Q. Now, what supply were Jungle and the others bringing to
28 Buedu?

29 A. Rice in the truck and used clothing."

1 Are you following, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes, I am.

3 Q. Miss a few lines, 12:

14:52:15

4 "A. I said the items I recognised at that time in the
5 truck were rice, used clothing and they left some of that
6 with us in Voinjama.

7 Q. Why did they leave these items with you?

14:52:33

8 A. The group that was with us in Voinjama, most of them
9 left without properties and we didn't have food and we had
10 civilians with us, so they left these items for us to be
11 managing with them until they settled what they went for to
12 Monrovia at that time.

13 Q. So who took the decision not to have these items taken
14 to Buedu where they were being taken to?

14:52:50

15 A. That was Sam Bockarie, sir."

16 Pause. You understand that, Mr Taylor? So there's a
17 supply going to Buedu undoubtedly from you. It's intercepted in
18 Voinjama by Sam Bockarie who decides to use at least some of it
19 to feed and clothe his followers who had to leave Sierra Leone in
20 haste. Do you follow?

14:53:19

21 A. Uh-huh. Yes, I do.

22 Q. What do you say about that?

23 A. Well, there is some truth to this, except that he's got it
24 mixed up, but there's some - some truth. But when we look at it,
25 Sam Bockarie - upon knowing that there are a lot of people
26 coming, the government does send food to feed this large mass of
27 population coming out of Sierra Leone, but this food was designed
28 for Voinjama where they would be, because the quantity of people
29 that were coming in, we knew that there was going to be a

1 problem. So we prepared for that problem. When that decision
2 was taken that they will leave, we had a calculation of maybe
3 2,000, 3,000 people. So what we wanted to do, instead of
4 bringing them from Sierra Leone straight down into Monrovia, that
14:54:18 5 they would spend some time in Voinjama, and the government did
6 provide clothing, food, medicine, and if I'm not mistaken, a
7 nurse may have been sent up there to treat the children. So we
8 prepared for this human mass coming in. It was not designed for
9 - at least he goes a little bit into it. But others said there
14:54:41 10 were arms and ammunition. He doesn't mention that. Remember,
11 there's other testimony. At least he covers this part. But it
12 was not designated - it was not designed for Buedu because we
13 knew that the people were coming. This was assistance from the
14 government to feed those people while we were trying to find
14:55:00 15 accommodation for them that were coming to Monrovia. So there is
16 some truth to that.

17 Q. Very well. Then this, page 13445, beginning at line 4 -
18 no, let's pick it up at 2:

19 "Q. How long were you at Voinjama?

14:55:25 20 A. I spent one week in Voinjama, sir.

21 Q. And did anything happen after that one week?

22 A. When Mosquito left for Monrovia, two days later Jungle
23 came to us and said that we were going to stay in Liberia
24 for the meantime, because he said Sam Bockarie had been
14:55:47 25 removed from the membership of the RUF and I too monitored
26 on the BBC when they confirmed the same thing that evening:
27 That he, Sam Bockarie, and one Omrie Golley were no longer
28 members of the RUF. In addition to what Jungle told me,
29 Jungle said Sam Bockarie warned that anyone who came with

1 him to Liberia who attempts to go back beyond the rebel
2 lines, the other people he left behind like Issa will
3 obviously harm us or kill us because they have considered
4 us to be sympathisers to him who had entered with him into
14:56:27 5 Liberia."

6 So was it whilst Mosquito was in Monrovia that it was
7 announced, Mr Taylor, that he had been removed from membership of
8 the RUF?

9 A. No, I doubt that. I doubt that because you have evidence
14:56:47 10 here - in fact, that's - it did not happen. In fact, Sam
11 Bockarie's leaving the RUF was known by RUF before he left Sierra
12 Leone. And so, at what time it got on the radio, I don't know,
13 because from my recollection in this courtroom, a so-called
14 logbook was read in this Court where Sam Bockarie, speaking on
14:57:11 15 the radio, announced to all of the senior people in Sierra Leone
16 that he was leaving in a logbook that I sat over there and they
17 read right here. So when it got on the BBC, I don't know, but it
18 known to the hierarchy of the RUF that Sam Bockarie was leaving
19 because he addressed them. If - I mean, if that witness is
14:57:32 20 correct, he addressed them. If that logbook is authentic, then
21 he addressed them before he left. So there was no secret. Most
22 of them - and before he left Buedu, he told everybody that he was
23 leaving Liberia. He had to. Why would this mass of people
24 follow him like that if he was not leaving for good? I mean, so
14:57:51 25 while I - his account here, I disagree with his account of what
26 he is talking about.

27 Q. Now, at this stage I want to deal in a little detail with
28 something which the witness then comes on to, because you recall
29 this is someone who in due course came to train and become a

1 member of the ATU.

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And, remember, we were dealing with aspects of that this
4 morning --

14:58:16 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- hence the need for a little detail here.

7 He goes on, page 13445, line 21:

8 "A. After that one week in Voinjama we decided - we sent a
9 message that they should move us from the border area and
10 later on we received an instruction that Sam Bockarie have
11 had an arrangement with President Charles Taylor that all
12 of those who followed him into Liberia should go to the
13 training base and train as securities to President Charles
14 Taylor in order for us to be protected and to be recognised
15 in the country."

14:59:02

16 What do you say about that?

17 A. I can't fight with that. How he understands it is a little
18 - there's not a lie in there, but his understanding is something
19 that I cannot fight with, not in a - what they are told - what
20 Sam Bockarie is told, that they train individuals. Everyone is
21 given citizenship, and the trained soldiers, instead of being
22 idle and getting into trouble, that they would join the security
23 - you know, the ATU. I don't have any quarrel with how - it's a
24 little off interpretation, but I don't have a quarrel with it.

14:59:22

25 Q. Very well. Now, he continues. He is asked who he is
26 referring to as we and he says over the page:

27 "A. A large number of us in this group I'm referring to
28 that left Voinjama.

14:59:45

29 Q. Who made the request?

1 A. Well, it was - the request was from every one of us who
2 were in Voinjama.

3 Q. Now, you said you were given the option of going to be
4 trained as security for President Taylor at that time. Is
15:00:21 5 that correct?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Were any other options discussed with you if you did
8 not take the option of going to be trained?

9 A. Well, it was not until we had travelled for another one
15:00:35 10 week to Gbarnga because the day we had - we left Voinjama
11 to go we had a breakdown at Zorzor and so we spent another
12 one week in Zorzor. So when we finally arrived in Gbarnga,
13 Sam Bockarie came and met us and some of us complained
14 about the information we got, that is going to train in
15:00:57 15 Liberia. And I was one of the spokespersons for those that
16 stayed behind and I made him to understand that we escaped
17 from war and Liberia was strange to us, it was not our home
18 country, so how was it possible for us to come and train as
19 securities for a nation that we were not citizens of.

15:01:21 20 So in that respect Sam Bockarie responded that it was very
21 important for us to be part of that training and that those
22 who refused to go to the training will live on their own
23 and if anything happened to them they will not give account
24 of them. And there were some other things he explained
15:01:40 25 that instilled fear in us because of the security situation
26 in the country at that time. And he said again that we
27 should not even ask him for any help in Liberia in the form
28 of supports to our families, so the only option left to us
29 at that time was that we were forced to go and undergo the

1 training.

2 Q. Now you said that he explained certain other things to
3 you regarding the security situation in the country at the
4 time. What was the security situation at that time that
15:02:19 5 you knew about?

6 A. From the complaint I gave to him concerning the order,
7 I told him that I had decided to take my family to any of
8 the refugee camps and then he said that, if I can recall,
9 about a few months ago they had just driven the rebels that
15:02:39 10 crossed from Guinea and attacked Kolahun and Voinjama and
11 they were still threatening to come and re-attack."

12 Now I pause there to ask this, Mr Taylor: The clear
13 suggestion there is that Sam Bockarie used fear to in effect
14 coerce these RUF combatants into joining the ATU. What do you
15:03:11 15 know about that?

16 A. I know nothing about that. And if I had gotten to know
17 that Sam Bockarie threatened anyone that would have been
18 unacceptable to me. The individuals were told by even our
19 individuals, our senior officers at the time, that this was a
15:03:40 20 voluntary programme. They were Liberian citizens. In fact some
21 of them were in your cross-examination - in the cross-examination
22 here admitted that they were told they were Liberian citizens.

23 I do not believe this story because the individuals that
24 went to the ATU training who were told of their citizenship and
15:04:00 25 were told they were free, in fact they lived in different places,
26 and the point that he makes here about not - he, Sam Bockarie,
27 not having anything to do with them is true. That is true,
28 because what the government made very clear to Sam Bockarie was
29 that once they entered Liberia they were no longer RUF soldiers

1 under his command and that he would have nothing to do with those
2 individuals in Liberia, and this was done to prevent the
3 appearance of Sam Bockarie re-grouping in Liberia to stage an
4 attack on Sierra Leone.

15:04:42 5 So what we set out to do as a government was to totally
6 separate Sam Bockarie from the fighting men, gave them an
7 opportunity to train, everybody was given citizenship and that
8 they could exercise their rights on their own. So there is some
9 truth to what he is saying about Sam Bockarie not being - excuse
15:05:05 10 me, telling them that he would have nothing to do with them,
11 which was the case, but they were not threatened. If they were
12 threatened we would not have put them in the security force, no.

13 Q. Now tell me, Mr Taylor, were the ATU desperately in need of
14 manpower at that time?

15:05:22 15 A. Absolutely not. There were thousands of Liberians that
16 were prepared. We only used them because we wanted to prevent
17 what we say an idle mind is the devil's workshop. We didn't want
18 trained, hardened RUF fighters lingering around the country and
19 preparing for trouble. So we wanted to give them a profession
15:05:49 20 that we could use them properly. But we were not desperate for
21 additional people, no.

22 Q. The witness continues, last line on page 13447:

23 "Q. You said you were reminded about recent events in
24 Kolahun and Voinjama by Sam Bockarie and I'm not sure
15:06:13 25 whether you quite completed what you were saying. What
26 recent events in Kolahun and Voinjama were you reminded
27 about?

28 A. Like I said, I said he reminded us about the attack
29 that the LURD rebels, later we came know them by that name,

1 that came from Guinea and attacked those areas that we were
2 occupying, I mean Voinjama and Kolahun. He said that the
3 area was not that safe for anybody to go to the refugee
4 camps in the area so it was better for us to be in areas
15:06:46 5 that were under the control of the government.

6 Q. So as a result of these discussions that you had with
7 Sam Bockarie, what became your position, all of you?

8 A. There was no other option left. We were all taken to
9 Gbatala base for training.

15:07:02 10 Q. Where was Gbatala base?

11 A. Gbatala base was about a few miles away from Gbarnga
12 going towards Monrovia on the Monrovia-Gbarnga Highway.

13 Q. Can you recall when exactly you went to Gbatala base?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15:07:20 15 Q. When was it?

16 A. That was in January 2000.

17 Q. And at this time that you went to Gbatala, are you in a
18 position now to recall the number of you that went there
19 who were in Sam Bockarie's group?"

15:07:34 20 I'm going to pause there for a moment to ask you this
21 question: The decision to recruit these men into the ATU,
22 Mr Taylor, when was that taken?

23 A. Oh, I would say somewhere in a very, very early - no, not
24 really. I would say from the government's standpoint we took a
15:08:09 25 decision around about early January of 2000. About early
26 January.

27 Q. Now, that prompts one other question and then I'll come
28 back to another point. What discussions and with whom took place
29 prior to that decision being made?

1 A. Well, that was made - that discussion was held by the
2 national security council. The question before us was with this
3 human mass coming into the country and these very hardened
4 guerilla fighters what do we do with them? It was a national -
15:08:54 5 it was a national security council discussion. And the decision
6 that came up from there was that since there was an ongoing very,
7 very professional training and these men were used to fighting
8 bush fight and that the only way to keep them out of trouble was
9 to incorporate them in a force to observe them and to monitor and
15:09:21 10 make sure they had a professional background. It was a national
11 government decision.

12 Q. So in short, Mr Taylor, was it your individual decision or
13 was it a decision of a wider body?

14 A. It was the national security council. A wider body, yes.

15:09:39 15 Q. Thank you. Now I asked my original question for this
16 reason: Note the sequence of events as described by this
17 witness. They enter. They stay at Voinjama for a week, okay?
18 They then travel to Gbarnga. In between times they are told that
19 they are being - and remember they travel to Voinjama at a time
15:10:04 20 when Bockarie travels to Monrovia. Whilst in Monrovia it's
21 announced Bockarie is no longer a member of the RUF. Remember
22 the sequence now?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. A week in Voinjama. Then on to Gbarnga. In between times
15:10:21 25 told, in effect, "You've got no option, you've got to join the
26 ATU. Leave from Gbarnga then, go to Gbatala a few miles away for
27 induction." You follow the sequence?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. So help me: Was it the case that so soon after the arrival

1 in Liberia that decision was made to incorporate them into the
2 ATU?

3 A. No.

4 Q. You follow me?

15:10:55 5 A. I follow you. I follow you. Let's just make one very
6 important point here. The civilians that come along with Sam
7 Bockarie are not sent to training. They are not. Because they
8 are not a threat to - not to our security or a threat to Sierra
9 Leone. We're talking about the trained combatants that are sent.
15:11:17 10 So this is a very carefully thought out process of what to do
11 with the trained combatants, okay.

12 We do not send civilians that come out to go to force them.
13 We are not looking for fighting men. What we are trying to do is
14 to make sure that those trained individuals are not misused or
15:11:39 15 abused while they are in the country in any way or get into any
16 trouble, okay.

17 Let me just make another important point. These are
18 fighting men that have had many years of combat experience. He
19 mentions the issue of - if we wanted to use them for any other
15:11:59 20 purpose wouldn't it have been simple to use these trained and
21 hardened fighters to join the forces to fight against LURD? It
22 would have been easy. Why did we have to send them for
23 professional training? Simply because we did not want them
24 involved in combat in Liberia and, like I say, it was a national
15:12:21 25 security council decision that was very, very well discussed in
26 how to handle the combatants that came.

27 Q. When was it, page 133 --

28 A. And again excuse me, counsel. I'm not sure if the
29 shortness in time that he is giving, a week here and a week

1 there, I don't recall quite when they go to the base. It could
2 have been March. It could have been February. I don't agree
3 with these little weekly sequence. We stay in this place a week,
4 we break down in Zorzor, we stay a week. Nobody breaks down in
15:13:05 5 Zorzor, a truck on the road, and keep people on the road for a
6 week. So while there is a lot of little factual evidence in here
7 that makes up the sequence it's not - I would disagree with the
8 time frame because people are being settled. If they are just
9 packed up and they move what happens to the other people? So I
15:13:26 10 disagree with the shortness of the sequence, but they do end up
11 on the base anyway.

12 Q. "That was in January 2000", he continued at line 21:

13 "Q. At this time that you went to Gbatala are you in a
14 position now to recall the number of you that went there
15:13:47 15 who were in Sam Bockarie's group?

16 A. After our graduation, that of our group, we were about
17 100 - I mean about 120 who graduated in my own batch.

18 Q. Now the question was how many of you actually went
19 there initially. The number you have given us is of those
15:14:08 20 who graduated. Was that the same number that went to
21 Gbatala base initially?

22 A. What I'm trying to say here is that the total number of
23 men who left Gbarnga with us I cannot recall now, but when
24 we entered Gbarnga - I mean Gbatala base, some other
15:14:27 25 brothers who had gone ahead with Sam Bockarie to Monrovia
26 were also brought to the base and whilst we were on the
27 base I was not completely having control over our own men,
28 because we were now mixed up with the Liberian brothers.
29 But we only came to know ourselves after we had graduated

1 because we wanted to know those who were all members of our
2 group that came.

3 Q. Do you know whether any other people from Sierra Leone
4 came across after you left from the RUF?

15:15:06 5 A. Yes, sir, people continued to cross into Liberia from
6 the RUF to Sam Bockarie.

7 Q. And when you went to Gbatala to start training did your
8 group include those who came afterwards?

9 A. No, sir, after our graduation another group of people
15:15:24 10 were - from Sierra Leone were also trained in the name of
11 Sam Bockarie's group.

12 Q. How long was your training for at Gbatala?

13 A. The first training I underwent, generally with those
14 with whom I went to the base, was for three months and that
15:15:43 15 one was referred to as the basic training.

16 Q. And who was responsible for training you at Gbatala?

17 A. At that time we had white instructors and they had
18 Liberian assistants.

19 Q. Now, these white instructors that trained you, do you
15:16:02 20 know which nationality they were?

21 A. Well, from our interaction with them during the course
22 of my training, we came to understand that they were
23 related to South Africans.

24 Q. Now, the question is what was their nationality. Can
15:16:21 25 you be very clear with your answer?

26 A. What I'm trying to say here is that, you know, they
27 never said to me that they are South Africans, but during
28 the course of the training one of them made mention of the
29 fact that he was one of the Executive Outcome instructors

1 in Sierra Leone before and on two occasions - on some
2 occasions they used to travel and on their return they used
3 to say they travelled to South Africa. So those were the
4 indications to me that they had connections with South
15:16:53 5 Africa.

6 Q. Now, you just mentioned the Executive Outcome and you
7 said one of them said he was with the Executive Outcome in
8 Sierra Leone. Who were the Executive Outcome?

9 A. Well, I knew the Executive Outcome in Sierra Leone
15:17:13 10 beyond the rebel lines when at one time the RUF positions
11 were attacked by parachuters and they described the
12 mercenaries as Executive Outcome.

13 Q. And what time was this?

14 A. Between '95 to '96."

15:17:30 15 Pause there. Those recruited by your government to conduct
16 training at Gbatalla, Mr Taylor, were they former members of
17 Executive Outcome?

18 A. Quite frankly, I do not know. They very well could have
19 been. I hired a retired general and he brought his training
15:17:50 20 staff, so they very well could have been - could have trained
21 with the Executive Outcome. I'm not in any position to confirm
22 or deny that, but there was a contract that was signed by this
23 general and he brought a team in to do the work. In fact, I
24 think evidence to that is even given by the UN panel of experts,
15:18:16 25 individuals spoke to General Fred Rindel. I don't know, but like
26 I said, there very well could have been. I don't know.

27 Q. And he continues:

28 "Q. What kind of training did you receive at Gbatalla?

29 A. During the basic training we were trained on subjects

1 I like musketry, which was introduction of weapons to us, how
2 to fire them, the various ranges and the types of
3 ammunition that were used. Then we were also trained on
4 attacks, and we were trained on the different types of
15:18:50 5 ambushes. And we were also trained on how to give VIP
6 protection to a President, that is, the movement of his
7 convoy, and how to deploy around an important area, and
8 also, you know, the different types of patrols whilst we
9 were on particular assignments. And we were also trained
15:19:08 10 on how to mount roadblocks; and we were also train at that
11 time to do cordon and search operations; and we used to do
12 some other drills like movement on parades, I mean, weapon
13 drills. We used to practise all of those during the basic
14 training."

15:19:28 15 He is then asked to explain what cordon and search means,
16 which he does. Then he is asked this, line 18:

17 "Q. Were you trained as part of any particular group or
18 unit within Liberia?

19 A. Yes, sir.

15:19:43 20 Q. What group was this?

21 A. Well, at that time they dissolved the SSU who were at
22 that time the presidential securities in Liberia, and they
23 were transformed into the ATU."

24 Is that correct, Mr Taylor? SSU became the ATU?

15:20:02 25 A. Yes, but we have to go beyond this. Now, this is where
26 some of these things become important. This Sierra Leonean group
27 is not the first group to train with the ATU. By the time 2000,
28 the first basic group of ATU people have been trained. Now, when
29 he talks about, "Well, at this time they had dissolved the SSU,"

1 uh-uh, somebody has told him this because you are a stranger
2 coming into the country; you are not the first group to say they
3 dissolved this group into us. So what business - there are other
4 people before you. So when you say that they had dissolved the
15:20:46 5 SSU, so - I mean, again, you can see how the information is
6 flowing here. There is an SSU which is a special security. We
7 had this group. But when we decided to professionalise it to
8 bring it to international standards, we called it the
9 Anti-Terrorist Unit, but this is - a unit exists, trained before
15:21:08 10 they get there.

11 Q. And it continues. Having explained what SSU stands for and
12 what ATU stands for, when we go over the page to page 13452, he
13 is asked what the function of the ATU was and his answer is to
14 this effect:

15:21:35 15 "A. What we were told about this unit as our
16 responsibilities was that we he were the active force to
17 protect President Taylor in particular at that time: 1, to
18 take care of the movement of his convoy; 2, to take care of
19 his residence and other areas of his interest; and if the
15:21:55 20 need arose to even fight against any insurgents in the
21 country. We were also trained to be able to contribute to
22 that as well."

23 Was that the order of priorities, Mr Taylor, the ATU was
24 primarily a protective force for you?

15:22:18 25 A. No, no, no. The ATU was trained as a protection force
26 against terrorism that is why they were deployed at embassies,
27 government institutions including other VIPs. They were given
28 that speciality. Not for me. If they were just for me, they
29 would not have, as he mentions in other parts of his thing, that

1 they would not have been sent to diplomatic missions. They were
2 trained professionally to counter - at this time terrorism,
3 terrorism, little Liberia, who knows what would happen one day,
4 we could have an incident in the country, there was nobody to
15:22:54 5 handle it. So we trained an anti-terrorist force and not
6 specifically - they did give protection for the President and
7 they had sufficient training, of course, to attack an enemy. Of
8 course they would. But not specifically for the President
9 because they were spread out on official duties to all important
15:23:13 10 - all important installations within the Republic of Liberia,
11 they were assigned to protect those installations.

12 Q. Now, the testimony of the witness continues in this way,
13 and I'm still on page 13452:

14 "Q. Now, during the period that you were in training at
15:23:38 15 Gbatala, do you know where Sam Bockarie was?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Where was he?

18 A. At that time he was in Monrovia.

19 Q. Do you know what he was doing in Monrovia?

15:23:54 20 A. While at Gbatala base, once in a while when we heard
21 about the President's movement from his farm coming towards
22 Gbarnga, he used to be in his convoy. That is he used to
23 initially move with President Taylor at that time."

24 Was that the case, Mr Taylor?

15:24:15 25 A. Not the case. Sam Bockarie could have very well been in my
26 convoy, I think. I would not dispute that. If Sam Bockarie - if
27 I'm coming from Gbarnga and - he and Benjamin Yeaten were friends
28 - and he is driving in one of the security cars, that's a strong
29 possibility. But moving with me, no. Sam Bockarie was not my

1 friend. But I don't rule out the fact that he could have been by
2 that convoy. Sometimes the convoy used to be 30, 40 vehicles in
3 the convoy. The security vehicles alone could have been as many
4 as 20 jeeps, trucks mounted with weapons. Because we're talking
15:25:04 5 about what? Between Monrovia and Gbarnga, we're talking about a
6 lot of forest. So I do not dispute that Sam Bockarie could have
7 ridden in one car in the convoy. I do not dispute that.

8 Q. Was Bockarie a visitor to your farm, Mr Taylor?

9 A. I want to believe yes. He went - he - yes, he went there
15:25:28 10 with Benjamin, I'm sure. I was told by Benjamin on some
11 occasions. He didn't go to visit me. Sam Bockarie was a good
12 friend of Benjamin Yeaten and from time to time he would visit
13 Benjamin. I wouldn't know even when he was on the farm because
14 the distance from Benjamin's - where the security lived, he would
15:25:48 15 live at the security quarters, but I want to - I wouldn't deny
16 that he could have gone on the farm. I wouldn't deny that.

17 Q. Did he ever go to the farm to visit you?

18 A. No. No.

19 Q. Or at your invitation?

15:25:59 20 A. Not at all. No.

21 Q. Let's go ahead a few pages to page 13463, please, and pick
22 matters up at the beginning of that page:

23 "A. I graduated as a second lieutenant, sir.

24 Q. Now, amongst the Sierra Leoneans who were trained with
15:26:41 25 you originally, was there anybody - anyone else on this
26 course?

27 A. Yes, sir.

28 Q. Do you recall how many of them were with you on the
29 course?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. How many?

3 A. Five of us graduated from this course.

15:26:57

4 Q. Now, earlier you said you had visited Sam Bockarie in
5 Monrovia, do you recall? This was after your first
6 training, your basic training at Gbatala, do you recall
7 that?

8 A. Yes, sir.

15:27:07

9 Q. At that time do you know what Sam Bockarie was up to or
10 what he was doing in Monrovia?

11 A. Before our graduation from this platoon commander
12 course, we heard that Sam Bockarie had left Liberia.

15:27:28

13 Q. The question actually was going back to a time before
14 this. At that time, that is, after your basic training, do
15 you know whether he was busy with anything else, anything?

16 A. As I told you earlier, the only activity that I used to
17 see him officially do was that he was most times found
18 where Charles Taylor was, like when he visits, when he was
19 going on this patrol to his farm or his village,
20 Arthington."

15:27:52

21 Now, this man is suggesting, Mr Taylor, that Bockarie on
22 his arrival in Liberia was a regular travelling companion of
23 yours. True?

15:28:13

24 A. No, that's not true. I doubt if he's really suggesting
25 that. But, look, let's just be very clear about this. This boy
26 has said, rightly so, that while they are in training, Sam
27 Bockarie does not go on the base. That is true. He does not go
28 on the base because he has nothing to do with the training camp.

29 Now, Sam Bockarie is in Liberia. He's invited there by me.

1 And I'll tell this Court, if and when I needed to see Sam
2 Bockarie, I sent for him. Sam Bockarie is not an enemy that - he
3 is not an enemy to me. Sam Bockarie is not a companion. He is
4 not a friend to me. For me, he is a younger man and he is there
15:29:02 5 and I'm trying to be as good as I can to him. So if Sam Bockarie
6 is regularly visiting me, I will say so. I wouldn't deny - he is
7 in Liberia. He is not a serpent that I would say, "Oh, my God,
8 he is here. I'm going to get away from him." If I wanted to get
9 away from him, I would not have invited him to Liberia.

15:29:21 10 So he is in the country, counsel, and around Charles
11 Taylor, where I am, sometimes if he calls, Benjamin - he and
12 Benjamin were constantly - I'm sure they met many times. They
13 were about the same age and he had a lot of friends in Liberia.
14 So if the President is in an area on my farm and Sam Bockarie
15:29:42 15 goes to visit many of the security, senior security people that
16 knew me, I'm saying that I can almost say with certainty it
17 happened. And if I had known, I would not have stopped it
18 because there was no reason to stop it, okay.

19 But as a companion, no. As a friend and buddy, buddy - Sam
15:30:04 20 Bockarie was not a buddy of mine, so I wouldn't put it that way
21 as a companion. But I wouldn't - I mean, he visited Arthington,
22 of course. I'm sure he would. Here is an individual in the
23 country, he is invited, he doesn't go to the base, his people are
24 all around, he's got nothing to do. Where is the President? The
15:30:25 25 President has gone to Arthington. He calls Benjamin, "Can I
26 come?" Maybe he goes and sees Benjamin and to even be blunt
27 about it, I mean I think it was a good thing. At least we knew
28 where he was at all times, okay, and we would have known where he
29 was, that he would not get in mischief with all the accusations

1 Sam Bockarie is planning to regroup. So I don't have a fight
2 with - I only have a problem or disagreement in how he's trying
3 to be led into trying to show that close association. It was not
4 that. There was no friend, companion relationship, no.

15:31:03 5 Q. Just to remind ourselves, Arthington of course is your home
6 town?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. And there was a White Flower in Arthington when you were
9 there?

15:31:14 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now would you describe yourself, Mr Taylor, as having been
12 the host of Sam Bockarie whilst he was in Liberia?

13 A. No, I wouldn't describe myself as being the host. I would
14 describe the Government of Liberia being the host of Sam Bockarie
15 because all of the bills - all of the expenses were paid by the
16 taxpayers of Liberia. So the Government of Liberia, yes.

15:31:37 17 Q. Line 16, page 13495 for completeness: "I believe that his
18 presence in Monrovia at that time, his host was Charles Taylor."
19 Now you've given us your answer so we'll move on. Who was in
15:32:02 20 charge of the ATU at that time, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Let me see.

22 Q. The senior commander?

23 A. Yes. We're talking about 2000. Oh, boy. I think at this
24 time it - I think General Dgiba is by then the commander. I'm
15:32:29 25 not too certain about this because my son Chucky was in charge, I
26 removed him for certain improprieties and made Dgiba - I can't
27 recall the exact time right now, I'm sorry.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, this isn't a guessing game. Let's go to page
29 13457, line 3:

1 "Q. Who did you report to?

2 A. Well, at that time General Momo Dgiba was in charge of
3 the ATU at that time.

4 Q. Who was General Momo Dgiba?

15:32:59 5 A. He was one of the aide-de-camps to President Taylor and
6 at the time I'm talking about he was the commander of the
7 ATU."

8 And he says a couple of lines below that that that was in
9 the year 2000.

15:33:13 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Any reason to disagree with that?

12 A. None whatsoever.

13 Q. Why was Chucky removed as head of the ATU do you say?

14 A. Oh, you know, that unit was a very specialised unit and the
15:33:32 15 time and attention that he was paying to the unit, I think he was
16 - it was not too - you know, there were complaints that there
17 were days he was not there. We needed somebody that would be on
18 top of the activities and treat - we were paying a lot of money
19 to this general. I think in the neighbourhood of a couple
15:33:56 20 hundred thousand dollars almost a month with he and his staff.

21 So we needed somebody and I didn't want him as my son taking
22 advantage of that fact. And because of that particular I think
23 and a few other things we decided that, "Look, we'll remove you
24 and put somebody that we know will be on top of the situation."

15:34:18 25 Q. When did you remove him, roughly?

26 A. Somewhere in '99. Late - about the last quarter I think in
27 '99 or so that Dgiba took over.

28 Q. And help us just so that we get a time frame, roughly for
29 how long had Chucky been in charge of the ATU?

1 A. Close to a year. Close to about a year. Because he had
2 presided over the first and second training programmes. So I
3 will put it to about a year or so.

15:35:11

4 Q. Following his removal, Mr Taylor, you say sometime in the
5 last quarter of '99, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Was Chucky reappointed head of the ATU at any stage?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. When?

15:35:22

10 A. You've got me on this one.

11 Q. Roughly?

12 A. I would say about 2002. At the very, very high peak of the
13 war he was reappointed and Dgiba went back to his post as senior
14 aide-de-camp.

15:35:47

15 Q. Yes, and when we go to page 13473, picking it up at line
16 17:

17 "Q. What assignment was that?

18 A. A few months after I had been assigned company
19 commander protecting the Executive Mansion an order was
20 published at the ATU headquarters ordering us - I mean the
21 Sierra Leoneans who were in the ATU to go for reassignment
22 at Gbarnga in the Bong County.

15:36:26

23 Q. When you say an order was published, who published that
24 order?

15:36:44

25 A. Well, at this time that I am talking about it was - the
26 order came from the ATU high command at that time and at
27 this point in time, 2002 I am speaking about, it was
28 Chucky, the son of Charles Taylor, that had re-taken over
29 the ATU."

1 Then he goes on to give details about Chucky.

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Now let's go on, shall we, and go to page 13475, line 3:

4 "Q. When this order was published that all the Sierra

15:37:48 5 Leoneans who were RUF before were to go to Gbarnga, did all
6 the RUF members - did that include those other members that
7 came after your group?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. What happened after this order was published? You said
15:38:05 10 you did not go and some of them were forced to go. What
11 about you? What happened?

12 A. The furthest time there was a lot of disgruntlement
13 among us, the ATUs, for the ATU not being paid for a long
14 time. One of our own suggestions at that time was that
15:38:29 15 over eight months they had not paid us, before we go into
16 that assignment they should give us something to leave with
17 our families. So we were, you know, what can I say? We
18 were on this struggle with the commanders for them to see
19 our interest when finally I was picked up with some other
15:38:48 20 friends one evening, you know, to go to the airport to go
21 to Ivory Coast".

22 Now pause there. This suggestion that they weren't being
23 paid, Mr Taylor, is that correct?

24 A. At some point in time there was some delay. The ATU was
15:39:11 25 paid better than ministers in my government. A private in the
26 ATU made in excess of I think 250 United States dollars so they
27 were very - the best - they were paid higher than any other
28 person. There was a time at the time he is talking about here,
29 2002 we were at the very heat of the war so there were some

1 difficulties. They were being provided food and all the things,
2 but in terms of salary I don't think they received their full
3 salaries because of the very tough economic times at that time.
4 So there is some truth to that.

15:39:50 5 Q. And he goes on to say at line 24 that it was - the failure
6 to pay, that was happening to the entire ATU:

7 "That even for some of our colleagues who had chances to
8 start running away. Some of us sent our families to
9 refugee camps because we were not able to afford to feed
10 them any more. So when this order came again that was the
11 time some of us were resisting that we wouldn't go.

15:40:13 10

12 Q. Now you said that finally you were picked up along with
13 some friends one evening. Who picked you up?

14 A. Well, as far as my own movement was concerned at that

15:40:33 15 time, while we were at the house that I had rented
16 discussing this matter with some friends, I saw a man whom
17 I later identified as Joe Tuah. He came in a white pick-up
18 and said the chief - at that time he was referring to

19 Benjamin Yeaten and that he had sent him to come and tell
20 the officers of the RUF and the ATU who had remained here
21 and who had not gone to get together and that he wanted to
22 send us to a different direction and not Gbarnga, but that
23 he would explain to us when he comes back and that whoever
24 resisted to go at that particular time would face the
15:41:13 25 consequences."

26 Then he goes on to say - he is asked about Joe Tuah, how
27 he'd met him. Then let's go over the page. Page 13477, line 7:

28 "Q. Did Joe Tuah come back?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. What happened when he came back?

2 A. He ended up persuading us with three points with
3 reasons for us to go to Ivory Coast. First he said you
4 know the UN is trying - they are expecting the UN to go to
15:42:00 5 Monrovia to check whether all this connection of Charles
6 Taylor with the RUF - as they were always alleging that he
7 had RUF within the ATU, in order to prove it they were
8 trying to say - he said they were trying to see whether we
9 were there, so this was a means for them to hide us away.
10 He said this was one of the reasons."

11 Now I'm going to pause there, Mr Taylor, because there is a
12 lot encapsulated here and I don't want us to lose track. Now
13 let's put some of this together. At this particular time the
14 witness says financial hardship, they are not being paid, forcing
15:42:50 15 certain members of the ATU to send their families to refugee
16 camps, yes?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. He is also saying that he is visited by Joe Tuah - now
19 pausing there. At this time in 2002 who is - or what role, if
15:43:14 20 any, does Joe Tuah perform within Liberia?

21 A. Joe Tuah is assistant director of the SSS and an assistant
22 to Benjamin Yeaten.

23 Q. Right. And he says whoever resists this order would face
24 the consequences. Do you see that?

15:43:40 25 A. Yes, I see that.

26 Q. And the order is to go to Cote d'Ivoire. Do you follow?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, we'll come to the three points that were made in a
29 moment. But you see what's being said, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. That in effect, contrary to what you told us this morning
3 that former RUF combatants who had been inducted into the ATU
4 left of their own according to the Cote d'Ivoire, he is saying in
15:44:16 5 effect they he were coerced into going. Do you follow?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. They were coerced by the deputy director of the SSS. Now
8 what do you say about that?

9 A. I'm saying no. That didn't happen. But that's not the end
15:44:33 10 of this story because there's another part to this story that
11 will outdo this part, because I don't know why he is using la
12 Cote d'Ivoire here. Don't let's forget that this is the very man
13 that said how he entered la Cote d'Ivoire. This is Jabaty Jaward
14 that explained how he came through Burkina Faso and he talked
15:44:54 15 about the towns and villages coming on. So he can't have it both
16 ways. I remember that testimony very well. You know, so that's
17 not the case that somebody is being encouraged to go. I don't
18 believe this story. It was not with my instruction and no such
19 thing could happen because if you look at the second tale to this
15:45:13 20 story it is that the United Nations is supposed to be
21 investigating and I'm trying to hide --

22 Q. No, I'm coming to that. I am coming to that.

23 A. It's all linked, you see.

24 Q. No, I'm coming to that, Mr Taylor. But I just want us to
15:45:24 25 take it slowly?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. Because, in effect, what is being said here is that senior
28 members of a Liberian government organisation controlled by you,
29 in effect, forced these men to go the Cote d'Ivoire. So,

1 bluntly, your hand is behind it. Do you follow?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Is that the case, Mr Taylor?

4 A. That's not the case. That's not the case. Even his own
15:45:58 5 testimony contradicts that assertion. When we go deeper into his
6 testimony, that's not the case. That's not the case.

7 And if this were the case, why upon their return would I
8 attack them on the border and say, "You can't come in"? You
9 understand me? If I am encouraging them to go to Ivory Coast,
15:46:25 10 okay, when he has already said that he entered Ivory Coast from
11 Burkina Faso, and doesn't let's forget about this where there is
12 also testimony here where a plane was supposed to be sent to
13 Robertsfield to evacuate people to Burkina Faso of which he was
14 on that plane, in other testimony I remember from this witness.
15:46:45 15 So this is totally whacked. That's not true, that he was being
16 encouraged to go to no Ivory Coast.

17 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let's look in detail at the next passage,
18 and then we come back to the question you just posed about why
19 you would have tried to prevent them from re-entering Liberia.
15:47:09 20 Let's look at the passage again:

21 "He," that being Joe Tuah, "ended up persuading us with
22 three points with reasons for us to go to Ivory Coast. First, he
23 said, you know, the UN is trying - they are expecting the UN to
24 go to Monrovia to check whether all this connection of Charles
15:47:30 25 Taylor with the RUF - as they were always alleging that he had
26 RUF within the ATU. In order to prove it, they were trying to
27 say - he said they were trying to see whether we were there, so
28 this was a means for them to hide us away. He said that was one
29 of the reasons."

1 Okay. So let's just hold that very much in mind. Hiding
2 them away. Reason number 2:

3 "Since they have not been paying the ATU for quite a long
4 time, we were all the same army. They do not want to pay us in
15:48:13 5 Monrovia, leaving the other ATUs unpaid. So they want to go and
6 pay us in Gbarnga."

7 Okay. So that out of the sight of Monrovia and other
8 elements of the armed forces, you can pay them without causing
9 disgruntlement amongst the others. Do you follow?

15:48:37 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thirdly, "When we came to know that we were going to Ivory
12 Coast, he said Sam Bockarie was already in Ivory Coast and so he
13 was there, and he has been given a certain operation and that he
14 needs our presence around him. So they were taking us to him to
15:48:58 15 be with him."

16 "They were taking us to him to be with him." Now, taking
17 it in stages, Mr Taylor, was there not some concern being
18 expressed by President Kabbah that you were training RUF elements
19 in Liberia?

15:49:23 20 A. Well, yes, Kabbah had said to me that there was information
21 as far back as 1998.

22 Q. And was that not a recurring theme of your relationship
23 with him?

24 A. Yes.

15:49:38 25 Q. And was it not a matter which had been taken up with the
26 United Nations?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And was it also not a matter which the United Nations were
29 seeking to investigate?

1 A. Not just seeking; they did investigate.

2 Q. And tell me, were you seeking to hide the fact that you had
3 incorporated former RUF combatants into the ATU? Were you
4 seeking to hide that from them?

15:50:06 5 A. No, it would be silly. Listen, you take ATU personnel and
6 you send them to guide the United States embassy in Monrovia and
7 you're going to hide somebody? What a place to hide someone at
8 the US embassy. That's a place to hide people? These ATU people
9 protected diplomatic missions across Monrovia including the
10 United States embassy. What a place to hide. Total nonsense.

11 Nobody was hiding anybody. We made it very clear that Sierra
12 Leoneans that came to Liberia were professional people. They
13 were there in Mamba Point at that embassy. And if anybody would
14 be able to find out whoever who is, they would be able to find
15 out. So no one is hiding anybody. That's total nonsense.

15:50:47 16 Q. Well, let's just complete the equation then.

17 A. And excuse me, the - oh, I forgot. The chief - in fact,
18 the chief military man at the embassy at the time - in fact, the
19 US embassy contributed office supplies, pens and - they were very
20 happy with the training programme. And, in fact, at a graduation
21 ceremony, a military officer from the United States embassy went
22 to Gbatata and witnessed that particular ceremony. So there was
23 a low level of cooperation. So nobody is hiding. Okay. They
24 had given pens, pencils. I didn't say guns. Pens, pencils,
25 papers to encourage because they felt that that was a

15:51:36 26 professionally trained group. They knew the South Africans were
27 there. And I sure would not take a Sierra Leonean who I am
28 trying to hide and send him to go and guard the embassy when they
29 are open to speak. Of course, it would be rude if somebody

1 walked up to the embassy and spoke to the officer - just by
2 opening your mouth, everybody - all Liberians would know whether
3 you were Sierra Leonean. Liberians knew that Sierra Leoneans
4 were there. So there was no hiding.

15:52:05 5 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, just to give you an opportunity to deal
6 with it, let's complete the equation, shall we. The suggestion
7 is, you want them out of the country in order to prevent any
8 embarrassment. Now, returning to the question you posed, is that
9 why, when they were trying to return, you sought to block their
10 entry?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Because having got rid of them, the very last thing you
13 would have wanted was for them to return. Do you see?

14 A. Yes, I see the point you're raising, but that's not the
15:52:42 15 case. The first instance is that we were not trying to hide
16 them. It's like trying to put an elephant in the room and say
17 I'm hiding it. Like I said, to debunk that whole argument, we
18 sent them to guard every embassy, including - the largest
19 contingent were assigned at the US embassy and that's not the way
15:52:59 20 to hide.

21 The problem at the border was pure and simple, and let me
22 be very clear about this. All of those people that wanted to
23 come to Liberia from La Cote d'Ivoire, if they had agreed to
24 disarm at the border, we would have accepted them in the country
15:53:17 25 as refugees. We would have. It is their refusal that led to the
26 fracas. So nobody was trying to stop any embarrassment or what.
27 Very clearly, if they had voluntarily handed in those weapons at
28 the border, we would have brought them in and we would have
29 announced that they came in and that they had - they were

1 disarmed at the border. We would have turned them over to the
2 International Committee of the Red Cross, as we had done with the
3 RUF back in 1996 after the Zogoda attack when they came into
4 Liberia. I would have done the same thing again. I was on the
15:53:57 5 Council of State when we took that decision. I would have taken
6 that decision as President.

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, can I ask the witness:

8 The fact that these - this section of RUF people were now
9 integrated into the ATU, did this sit well with Mr Kabbah? Did
15:54:19 10 he agree to it? Was he happy with it?

11 THE WITNESS: In all fairness, I would not say he agreed
12 with it. I don't know. He knew of it. But what I can say, your
13 Honour, he did not express any displeasure to me about having the
14 ATU personnel in the - I mean, that they had been trained. He
15:54:46 15 did not express that to me.

16 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: You're saying Mr Kabbah was not unhappy
17 that you had trained these RUF now and integrated them into the
18 ATU?

19 THE WITNESS: Well, no, not exactly, your Honour. I'm
15:55:04 20 saying I cannot describe whether he was unhappy, your Honour.
21 What I'm saying is that he did not state that to me. "Listen, my
22 brother, I think this is a bad idea. I don't want it." He was
23 aware, but he did not express his displeasure to me about that
24 incident.

15:55:21 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: What about the United Nations, were they
26 happy?

27 THE WITNESS: The United Nations never expressed to me that
28 that was unacceptable, that they should be taken - they knew that
29 they had become citizens of Liberia. Nobody - if you read all

1 the memos, nobody told me that they - that it was a wrong move
2 and that they did not want them in the country, no.

3 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And is it your testimony, sir, that the
4 UN was, in fact, investigating this claim that there were RUF
15:55:51 5 integrated in the ATU?

6 THE WITNESS: No.

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Or they were not?

8 THE WITNESS: No. I do not know of their - there was no
9 investigation. The investigation of the United Nations was in

15:56:00 10 1998 where they claimed that people were being trained at Camp
11 Naama to attack, and this is when the delegation of Colonel
12 Dempsey and all these people went to investigate. There was no

13 investigation launched by the United Nations - and all the
14 records are very clear - of the involvement of Sierra Leoneans
15:56:22 15 trained and being part of the ATU. No, none whatsoever. If
16 there was so, it would have been contained in one of the
17 Secretary-General's reports. There was no such investigation.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Mr Taylor, for completeness, let me ask you a few more
15:56:40 20 questions on that topic, which is highly relevant. Firstly this:
21 When Bockarie and this rather large group of his followers
22 crossed over into Liberia in December 1999 - I appreciate that
23 Foday Sankoh knew about this - did you discuss that exodus with
24 President Kabbah?

15:57:09 25 A. Yes. Kabbah, yes.

26 Q. Did you further discuss with him the decision made by the
27 security council to incorporate them - some of those combatants
28 into the ATU?

29 A. Kabbah was told that some of the - not some. That the

1 combatants that came with Sankoh - I mean with Bockarie had been
2 given professional training in the ATU.

3 Q. No, no, no Mr Taylor. Prior to the - after the national
4 security council comes to that decision, and before the process
15:57:46 5 is put in motion, did you phone up President Kabbah and say,
6 "Listen, my brother, this is what my national security council
7 has decided to do. Do you have any problems with that"? Did
8 you?

9 A. No, I did not.

10 Q. Why not?
15:58:05

11 A. It was not necessary.

12 Q. Why?

13 A. These people have come into Liberia. They have become
14 Liberian citizens, and how I use them is my business, once they
15:58:14 15 do not attack Sierra Leone. Kabbah had been assured that no
16 Sierra Leonean that came with Sam Bockarie would ever be used
17 against his government. So for me it do not take any - any
18 advice to him before the action was taken.

19 Q. When had you give him that - sorry to interrupt you,
15:58:35 20 Mr Taylor, but I don't want us to lose the thought. When had you
21 given that assurance that they wouldn't be used against his
22 country?

23 A. In December, during the discussion of the instruction of
24 Sam Bockarie and the issue of people coming along with him with
15:58:52 25 his supporters, Kabbah was given that full assurance. Obasanjo
26 was given - also helped to give him that assurance, that nothing
27 would be done to use those people against his government, yes.

28 Q. Okay. Very well. And sorry to have interrupted you,
29 Mr Taylor.

1 A. No, it's okay.

2 Q. Is there something else that you wanted to tell us?

3 A. No, no, no, no. I mean - nothing. It's just that the
4 process - I would just like to remind the Court, I am not acting
15:59:19 5 on my own. And, of course, these discussions did anticipate a
6 large amount of combatants coming into Liberia with Sam Bockarie.
7 We knew that there was a conflict because at that time there was
8 a group supporting Bockarie. There was a group supporting
9 Sankoh. So it was known that there would be an exodus. We did
15:59:44 10 not know how many, and the concern arose at that particular time,
11 what to do with these people. And I had assured everybody in
12 ECOWAS, including Kabbah, that nothing would be done to give
13 those people an opportunity to attack Sierra Leone, and this is
14 why it became a major discussion in the national security
16:00:09 15 council. What do we do with these people? Because we had put
16 into motion a process - by the third week of December we knew
17 that Sam Bockarie would have ended up in Liberia. Because after
18 the first meeting between Bockarie and Sankoh it was very clear
19 to me that Bockarie was disrespecting Sankoh at a level that he
16:00:31 20 would not bend. It was very clear. And this is why I asked
21 Obasanjo to come and join me and see if we could bring reason.
22 And so when Obasanjo came we had a clear idea that we were up for
23 an incident and we started preparing for it, okay. So I'm just
24 trying to mention here that they, my colleagues in ECOWAS,
16:00:51 25 including Kabbah, had all assurance that I would do everything
26 that those men would not be used and they were not.

27 Q. Very well. Let's pick up where we left off before that
28 helpful intervention by the learned judge. Let's go to page
29 13478, please, and finish off this passage, line 2: "So they

1 were taking us to him to be with him." Now you do understand the
2 sense of that, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Uh-huh.

16:01:39

4 Q. It's not a question of voluntary movement. It's being
5 directed by you, in effect, yes?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. And there is a purpose behind it?

8 A. Uh-huh.

16:01:53

9 Q. To reunite Bockarie with his combatants. Now, was that the
10 plan?

11 A. No. That was not the plan. No, not at all. Not at all.

12 Q. And he continues:

16:02:09

13 "From that point we had no option. About 20 of us were
14 available. We were taken to the Roberts International Airport
15 where we met a plane waiting for us. We boarded the plane and
16 later arrived at the Ouagadougou airport in Burkina Faso."

17 Now, Mr Taylor, help me. Why Ouagadougou airport in
18 Burkina Faso from Roberts International Airport?

16:02:39

19 A. There was a group of these boys that - in fact he mentions
20 rightly so that some of them had run away. They started causing
21 - some of them started causing a lot of trouble and they wanted
22 to leave the country. And they were asked where they wanted to
23 go and they wanted to go to Burkina Faso with their families and
24 they were given an opportunity to do so and I think Jabaty was
25 one of them.

16:03:03

26 Q. Now I want to be clear about this, because at present I'm
27 uncertain. Were you aware of a flight from Roberts International
28 Airport to Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso containing members of your
29 ATU?

1 A. Well, yes, I was aware. I was aware, yes.

2 Q. And did you do anything to stop it?

3 A. No. Well, you have a situation - what Jabaty is explaining
4 here, he doesn't go into all the details. They are not paid,

16:03:43 5 there is massive confusion. People have deserted. Some people

6 are threatening to attack other members of the unit. There's

7 massive confusion. There's not - you didn't ask me so I didn't

8 get into the confusion. Some of them have run away. They have

9 gone. They have deserted the unit. Some of them are saying that

16:04:04 10 they do not want Liberian citizenship, we are not Liberians, we

11 are Sierra Leoneans, we want to go. And they are causing so much

12 trouble and this bunch, where do you want to go? Late 1992

13 people are fighting in Monrovia. People are fighting in

14 Monrovia. You want to go, you can leave.

16:04:20 15 Q. What year? 1992 you said?

16 A. 2002, excuse me. 2002. We're fighting in Monrovia late

17 2002. We're fighting in Monrovia. I leave in 2003. We're

18 fighting in Monrovia and there's also - all this massive - they

19 cause a lot of unnecessary trouble. Some of these boys were

16:04:41 20 getting involved in looting. There were a lot of disturbances

21 being caused. So we said, "Look, you say you're no longer

22 Liberians, you want to leave. We have sufficient trouble. Where

23 do you want to go?" Those that wanted to go, we put them on the

24 plane and [i ndi scerni ble].

16:04:58 25 Q. Yes, but, Mr Taylor, pause for a moment and think about it.

26 Here you are sending a relatively large group of well-trained

27 combatants to a neighbouring country. Did you not consider there

28 may be some danger in that?

29 A. No, I did not consider. There's one word I don't agree

1 with in the question, "sending". I did not send. Free people
2 wanted to leave the country.

3 Q. All right. My fault. Allowing to leave?

4 A. Yes.

16:05:29 5 Q. You're permitting to leave people you had spent a lot of
6 money training to a very high level?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Hardened combatants in the first place. You were allowing
9 them to go to a neighbouring country?

16:05:47 10 A. Well, not a neighbouring.

11 Q. Well, to Burkina Faso?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you not consider some danger in that?

14 A. Not at all. I did not consider any danger in that.

16:05:59 15 Burkina Faso had no conflict and they wanted to go to Burkina
16 Faso where they wanted to get away. There was fighting in La
17 Cote d'Ivoire. There is fighting in Liberia. Conflict in - they
18 did say they wanted to go to Burkina Faso. They had an
19 opportunity to board a flight and we let them go.

16:06:22 20 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, did you for example take the precaution of
21 calling your brother Blaise Compaore and saying, "Listen, Blaise,
22 these people are arriving in your country?" Did you?

23 A. Blaise knew that --

24 Q. Did you tell him?

16:06:36 25 A. No, I did not tell him.

26 Q. So how did he find out?

27 A. The security people. You come, they will see your travel
28 documents and you will be asked questions. I mean it's almost
29 like if somebody said he wants to leave the country what do you

1 do? Stop them? They wanted to go, they had caused sufficient
2 trouble and they felt that Burkina Faso was a safer place for
3 them to be so we said, "Fine, you can leave."

4 Q. Were other West African Leaders aware of this relocation?

16:07:07 5 A. Why would other West African Leaders have to know that one
6 West African is travelling to another country? There is no need
7 for them to know.

8 Q. Well, these aren't just ordinary West Africans, Mr Taylor.
9 These are highly trained former members of your Anti-Terrorist
16:07:24 10 Unit.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Help us, wasn't there a need to inform other Presidents in
13 the area of this relocation?

14 A. No. No.

16:07:38 15 Q. Particularly when, surprise surprise, they end up in La
16 Cote d'Ivoire doing what? Precisely what they had been trained
17 to do. Do you follow?

18 A. No, there was no need to do that. That's not the way that
19 people function where people are leaving your country, you call
16:07:54 20 everybody in the region, "Guess what happened. There's a bunch
21 of 20 people, they are armed, they are coming." Unless these
22 people are going out - for me these are almost like refugees now
23 that want to leave. They leave. It did not call for me

24 informing any other state except where if I knew that they were
16:08:12 25 going to another state or something for a purpose yes, but what?
26 People want to leave the country and they left with their wives
27 and children. So they want to leave, they left with their wives
28 and children. They had a flight and they left. So there is
29 nothing to call any another Head of State to say - to sound an

1 alarm, "Guess what happened. There is some - what do you want to
2 say - people travelling so be careful with them." Burkina Faso
3 was prepared to receive them and they went.

4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: If I may ask a supplementary question.

16:08:45 5 Did they leave as refugees or did they leave as Liberians?

6 THE WITNESS: They left as Liberians fleeing the conflict
7 with their wives and children, yes.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you told us that, for a number of reasons,
16:09:20 10 members of the ATU were causing confusion in Monrovia, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Did you try to address that in any way?

13 A. Yes, we did. We had different officers speak to them. We
14 did find some of their pay. I guess we had shot too high in the
16:09:45 15 beginning by paying them so much money and they were getting
16 little amounts, but they were really not satisfied. And this is
17 why you hear him say that they sent some of their families to
18 refugee camps and were looking for other places to be. But we
19 did try to give them some of the money and talk to them and tell
16:10:06 20 them times were hard, they should wait. But some people were
21 impatient.

22 Q. Tell me, did you personally address them or any of them?

23 A. No.

24 Q. I ask for this reason. I'm looking at page 13484. Last
16:10:33 25 line on that page:

26 "Q. After that training was any official ceremony held
27 apart from this party that you've mentioned? Was any
28 official ceremony held at all for you, the graduates?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. What was that ceremony?

2 A. We had a meeting with President Taylor in his
3 residence.

4 Q. Who had this meeting with President Taylor?

16:10:56 5 A. We the officers who graduated from this course had this
6 meeting with President Taylor.

7 Q. And when you say at his residence where are you
8 referring to?

9 A. I'm referring to his living quarters. I mean White
16:11:09 10 Flower in his living room."

11 Line 27, same page:

12 "Q. You said in the living room was where you met with
13 Mr Taylor. In the living room of his residence at White
14 Flower. Is that correct?"

16:11:26 15 And he goes on, the witness: "I said his living quarters.
16 I'm referring to his house." Then he goes on to mention the word
17 "parlour". Line 16:

18 "Q. And who led you to the meeting?

19 A. General Momo Dgiba who was the head of the ATU led us
16:11:49 20 to that meeting, sir.

21 Q. And about what time was this?

22 A. That was after our graduation from this course. Late
23 2000.

24 Q. Thank you. Do you recall what happened?

16:12:03 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. Please tell the Court.

27 A. As we were told, they said this meeting was the usual
28 routine, you know, by Charles Taylor with the officers who
29 graduated from this course. They said even the first batch

1 that graduated before us also had a meeting with him, you
2 know. So when we had the meeting he welcomed us and
3 appreciated our efforts. But on that day he just expressed
4 more concern about the indiscipline. He said he was
16:12:31 5 hearing about the ATU soldiers that were on deployment. He
6 said he regretted the kind of courses the white instructors
7 were giving us. He was surprised I mean to hear that the
8 ATU who have graduated from this course were still causing
9 problems on the street. So he started asking the officers
16:12:55 10 to really bring forward reasons for this indiscipline."

11 Did you have such a meeting?

12 A. Yes, but I disagree with the time. If you remember what
13 this witness said, he went to the ATU training in January of 2000
14 and he was trained preliminarily for three months.

16:13:13 15 Q. Yes and then he went on another course --

16 A. And then another course.

17 Q. -- to become a platoon commander.

18 A. Exactly. So what I can remember - this had to be maybe in
19 2001. The most senior - not just Sierra Leoneans. The people
16:13:29 20 that made - I think this is about the time they have reached
21 company commander level which had to be more than two years. So
22 I think he's got a date here wrong. But I did have - that means
23 the last group. That would be about of all of the trainees the
24 most senior officers, I did have a meeting with them.

16:13:53 25 Q. At White Flower?

26 A. At White Flower, yes. I would say it was later than 2000.
27 I think it was later in 2001. Maybe late 2001. To find out why
28 - you know, to congratulate them because, like you say, we had
29 spent a lot of money and, "Well, gentlemen, what is the problem?"

1 How can I help?" and different things. Yes, I did have a meeting
2 with them.

3 Q. Now after that slight diversion, let us get back to this
4 movement to Burkina Faso because it continues. Page 13498 the
16:14:42 5 witness's attention is redirected to this issue, line 5:

6 "Q. Yesterday in your testimony you said that you were met
7 by Joe Tuah, do you recall? And he said to you that you
8 were to go - instead of going to Gbarnga where all the
9 other Sierra Leoneans were supposed to go, you and your
16:15:00 10 group were to go somewhere else. Do you recall?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. And that place was where?

13 A. Ivory Coast, sir.

14 Q. How many of you boarded the flight" - that's the flight
16:15:14 15 from Roberts International Airport.

16 "A. On that particular trip we were 21 including Joe Tuah
17 himself, sir.

18 Q. Did Joe Tuah tell you on whose instructions you were
19 going on this flight to Ouagadougou?

16:15:30 20 A. He only referred to Benjamin Yeaten at that time, sir.

21 Q. And did he say exactly where you were going to?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Where did he say you were going to?

24 A. He said Sam Bockarie was already in Ivory Coast and
16:15:51 25 that some other people from Liberia had already joined him
26 from Ivory Coast, so he was also expecting us and more
27 people to join him in Ivory Coast."

28 Pause there. Did Joe Tuah accompany them to Ouagadougou?

29 A. I'm not aware. I'm not aware. He could have very well

1 gone. I don't know who accompanied them.

2 Q. Why would the deputy, head of the SSS --

3 A. Not the deputy. He is an assistant director.

4 Q. Assistant director of the SSS, why would he be accompanying
16:16:29 5 these, in effect, deserters to Ouagadougou? Why?

6 A. If he did, that's why I'm saying I don't know. I don't
7 even know if he did. I'm not too sure. I was aware that these
8 people were leaving the country. If he accompanied them, I was
9 not aware that he accompanied them, no.

16:16:45 10 Q. And the witness goes on to suggest that the instructions to
11 get on the flight came from the director of the SSS, Benjamin
12 Yeaten.

13 A. It's possible. I was aware that they were going, so if
14 Benjamin told them to get on the plane, yes, that's possible.

16:17:10 15 Q. To Ouagadougou?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But note: It's quite clear when one looks at the evidence
18 of this witness in the round that what the witness is saying is
19 Ouagadougou was just a staging post. The intention all along was
16:17:29 20 for them to end up in the Ivory Coast. Now, why would, help us,
21 Benjamin Yeaten give such an instruction?

22 A. I don't think Benjamin Yeaten gave any such instruction.
23 And I do not dispute - maybe their mission was La Cote d'Ivoire.
24 Maybe that's why they caused so much trouble in the country and
16:17:52 25 wanted to leave. So I don't dispute that their mission - their
26 final destination would be La Cote d'Ivoire. I'm not in a
27 position to say. But they caused sufficient confusion and
28 trouble in the country for me to agree and other officials of
29 government that they wanted to leave the country, and wherever

1 they wanted to go they should be permitted to go. So I - maybe
2 it was their plan, but I don't think Benjamin Yeaten ordered them
3 into La Cote d'Ivoire. That's total nonsense, okay.

16:18:25 4 I knew that they were going and Benjamin had to know that
5 they were going. Maybe they had arrangement with Sam Bockarie.
6 They had been speaking to him. The trouble that these boys
7 caused was just so much in the country that I was personally fed
8 up with them, and to be blunt about it, I was trying to off-load
9 them as much as I could. So nobody gave any instruction to go to
16:18:43 10 La Cote d'Ivoire. I was aware fully. As far as their little
11 secret back-up plan, I don't think Benjamin or anybody was aware
12 of that, no.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, if you could elaborate. What
14 trouble had they caused?

16:18:59 15 THE WITNESS: These boys, because of their pay, your
16 Honour, got involved in looting. There were exchange of fire
17 between them and other members of the ATU. They refused to go on
18 assignment. They just became almost like belligerent soldiers in
19 the country. And what they had been saying all along, they did
16:19:23 20 not want to stay in Liberia anymore. They wanted to leave. And
21 so we said, "Well, fine. Instead of you continuing to make
22 trouble, failing to go on assignment, looting in areas, causing
23 trouble, we'll let you go."

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:19:45 25 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you appreciate the significance of this
26 body of evidence, don't you? Because the underlying suggestion
27 undoubtedly will be, back in 1991 you send soldiers into
28 neighbouring Sierra Leone to assist Foday Sankoh and guess what?
29 A decade later you're doing exactly the same thing to your other

1 neighbour, Cote d'Ivoire. Do you follow?

2 A. No, I don't follow that. Anybody that would want to carry
3 that line of thinking must be --

4 Q. You're a serial disrupter.

16:20:25 5 A. That person would be sick to make such a nonsensical
6 conclusion, okay. These are not Liberians. And everybody knows
7 that the war in La Cote d'Ivoire is already going on and they
8 know who is carrying out the war in La Cote d'Ivoire, okay. Here
9 are individuals that come to Liberia, just as people have gone to
16:20:42 10 other countries. They were not the only ones. When the Gambians
11 got ready to leave Liberia, we packed them up and we put them on
12 the plane also. So should we conclude that Senegal would say,
13 "Since you are sending the Gambians back, they are going to
14 attack Senegal"? I think it would be foolish for anybody to
16:21:00 15 conclude - of course, people can conclude whatever they want.

16 My view was very, very, very clear. These people had been
17 a part of the security forces. They had been given citizenship.
18 When they got upset and caused trouble, they said they didn't
19 want Liberian citizenship, all they wanted was to get out of
16:21:17 20 Liberia. They get involved in attacks and. They get involved in
21 sabotage. They get involved in looting. We packed them you and
22 we get them out. And, of course, people will make whatever
23 conclusion that they want to make, but I'm telling this Court
24 from the bottom of my heart that if I wanted to send people to
16:21:34 25 get involved in La Cote d'Ivoire, why fly them to Burkina Faso
26 when you're five miles from the Ivorian border?

27 Q. To hide the fact that you are doing it.

28 A. But why would anybody want to hide the fact - well, then
29 that would mean that Blaise Compaore would be in complicity.

1 Then Blaise Compaore would be in complicity because after all --

2 Q. That's the allegation being made by the Prosecution, he is
3 one of your co-conspirators.

16:22:01

4 A. Well, I'm not sure if I'm under indictment for a war in
5 Sierra Leone here, but the Prosecutor can do whatever they want.

6 Q. You understand what I am saying, Mr Taylor?

7 A. I understand you.

8 Q. I have to give you an opportunity of dealing with whatever
9 suggestion might be made in due course. Do you follow?

16:22:14

10 A. I know. I follow very well.

11 Q. So that's why I'm putting this to you to give you now an
12 opportunity of dealing with it. So was that the overall plan?

13 A. There was not any plan.

16:22:35

14 Q. You're at it again why your arch conspirator, Blaise
15 Compaore. Is that the situation?

16 A. That's not the situation because Blaise Compaore was not -
17 is not even now accused. In fact, he is the peacemaker and was
18 never accused of being in complicity with the war in Cote

16:22:51

19 d'Ivoire. So, as far as, you know, what I said to you earlier I
20 think on - today when I talked about making white black and black

21 white, it's alleged that I've got billions of dollars, ADS, and
22 no one has found a cent. So people allege things all the time.

23 All the time there are allegations. All I'm trying to do is to
24 off-load some troublemakers and get them out of Liberia as quick

16:23:07

25 as I can. And they leave with their wives and their children,
26 and that's it.

27 Q. Now, what the witness goes on to describe, Mr Taylor, is
28 this, page 13499, line 2:

29 "Q. What happened when you arrived at Ouagadougou?

1 A. After almost an hour's flight, when we finally landed
2 at the airport, I never knew where we landed at that time.
3 But we left on the plane. Because only 21 of us were at
4 the back of the plane with the exception of the pilot who
16:23:47 5 was piloting the plane. So Joe Tuah alighted from the
6 plane and the pilot also. They walked to the securities
7 who were in uniforms standing. I was looking through the
8 window of the plane and they walked with their securities
9 who were in uniform standing. They were discussing
16:24:00 10 something I did not know. But while we were looking at the
11 sign boards along the airport I saw the spelling of
12 Ouagadougou airport so I knew that we were in Burkina Faso.
13 A few minutes later Joe Tuah returned to the plane and said
14 that they were waiting for a bus to come and we will get
16:24:17 15 into the bus. And within that period a bus came with only
16 the driver in it. When we alighted from the plane about
17 two steps from the plane we were in the bus. We all got
18 into the bus and Joe Tuah stayed behind. Then the driver
19 drove us through Ouagadougou until we finally continued our
16:24:39 20 journey throughout the day until midnight. We crossed the
21 border. According to the description that was made to us
22 later we crossed closer to the Mali-Burkina-Ivory Coast
23 borders. One of the big towns along the border that night
24 that we stopped at was Korhogo."

16:25:03 25 Now, were you aware at the time, Mr Taylor - note at the
26 time - that Ouagadougou was not the final destination?

27 A. Not at all. Not at all. No.

28 Q. How soon did you discover that it was not?

29 A. I did not even know these people were in - were a part of

1 Sam Bockarie's watchamacallit until they got to the border in
2 2003, before I got to know that they were all together in 2003.

3 Q. So at this time you're saying you knew nothing at all about
4 this - well, let me start again.

16:25:54 5 You've accepted that you knew about the departure?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. But you knew nothing about the final destination being Cote
8 d'Ivoire?

9 A. Nothing whatsoever.

16:26:01 10 Q. Until when these individuals resurfaced on the
11 Ivorian-Liberian border a couple of years later?

12 A. 2003, yes.

13 Q. So this journey by bus across the border from Ouagadougou,
14 you knew nothing about it?

16:26:17 15 A. Nothing. Nothing. But it's not a couple of years now.
16 Because they actually leave Liberia in late - I mean in 2002. So
17 not too long. It's about - it's about a year or so. It's about
18 a year or so. I do not know that they are involved in la Cote
19 d'Ivoire at all. I am aware - we are hearing that Sam Bockarie
16:26:43 20 is somewhere in that region. It's in la Cote d'Ivoire, but I did
21 not know that these men - and I'm sure that they were in contact
22 with Sam Bockarie before they left Liberia. They had to be.
23 Maybe that's why they made so much trouble.

24 Q. Now, Mr Bangura who was dealing with this witness was asked
16:27:20 25 by the learned Presiding Judge to clarify an aspect of the
26 witness's testimony. And in seeking to do so, he asked at line 5
27 on page 13500 this question:

28 "Q. Mr Witness, I asked you earlier whether you knew on
29 whose instructions you were being sent to Ouagadougou, and

1 the answer you gave is not very clear. Can you say again
2 whose instructions Joe Tuah was acting on?

3 A. Yes, sir. As I told you, you know, the name mentioned
4 on that particular operation on that day, particularly from
16:27:57 5 Joe Tuah - directly from Joe Tuah, was that he said chief
6 Benjamin Yeaten. At that particular time instructions like
7 those do not personally come from Benjamin Yeaten at that
8 time. It must be approved by Charles Taylor, especially in
9 terms of our group - our group's movement, because over two
16:28:21 10 weeks when that order was published that we should go to
11 Gbarnga, we were getting these rumours of that war in the
12 Ivory Coast, of Sam Bockarie's involvement, but officially
13 at that time we had not - I was not officially informed by
14 an officer like this that this was what was going to
16:28:40 15 happen."

16 Now, nothing could be clearer, Mr Taylor.

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Your hand is behind it.

19 A. My hand is not behind anything. I was aware. I take full
16:28:58 20 responsibility for - nothing hiding here like hiding hand. I
21 take full responsibility for their leaving Liberia and going to
22 Burkina Faso. I was aware. Surely, Benjamin could not have sent
23 them or let them go. I was fully aware. I wanted them out of
24 Liberia and I'm glad they went. I was fully aware. There's no -
16:29:22 25 I am - I take responsibility. I was fully aware that those
26 people and their families were leaving Liberia, yes.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: We've got somewhat less than two minutes
28 of tape left, Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't think there's any point in me trying

1 to go any further, Mr President. I think this is as good a point
2 as any.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We'll adjourn until tomorrow
4 morning.

16:29:49 5 Mr Taylor, I'll remind you that there's an order that you
6 are not to discuss your evidence with any other person.

7 We'll adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

8 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.

9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 27 October 2009 at

16:30:15 10 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

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