



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 7 JUNE 2010  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Erica Bussey

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Ms Kathryn Howarth  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Terry Munday  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Ms Logan Hambriek

1 Monday, 7 June 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:28:31 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MS HOWARTH: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,  
8 your Honours. Good morning, counsel opposite. For the  
9 Prosecution this morning, Ms Brenda J Hollis, Mr Mohamed A  
09:31:46 10 Bangura, myself Kathryn Howarth, and Maja Dimitrova.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours.  
12 For the defence today - good morning, counsel opposite - myself  
13 Courtenay Griffiths, with me Ms Logan Hambri ck, and we're also  
14 joined by one our interns, Mr Hawi Alot.

09:32:08 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: This morning we are expecting witness  
16 DCT-190?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: And the witness is available and ready to  
18 come into court.

19 Before the witness comes into court though, your Honours,  
09:32:24 20 can I - having consulted with the witness this morning, he has  
21 asked that his name not be disclosed. That is the only  
22 protective measure he requests. And consequently, could I  
23 request that he been referred to merely by his DCT number.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps you could also tell the Court  
09:32:47 25 what language the witness will use.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: The witness will be giving evidence in  
27 English.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well then. The protective measures  
29 earlier granted to this witness, with the exception of the use of

1 the pseudonym, are rescinded at his request. Please call the  
2 witness in.

3 WITNESS: DCT-190 [Sworn]

09:34:36

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I wonder if we could go  
5 into a brief private session in order to have the witness's name  
6 on the record.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. For the protection of the  
8 witness's identity, as earlier ruled, we will go into a brief  
9 private session, please.

10 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of  
11 the transcript, pages 42713 to 42713, was  
12 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as  
13 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Mr Witness, where were you born?

09:37:39 5 A. I was born in Monrovia.

6 Q. And is it right that you are now 38 years old?

7 A. Yes, of course, because I was born 18 December, 1972.

8 Q. Where are your parents from?

9 A. Both of my parents are from Sierra Leone.

09:38:04 10 Q. And which religion do you belong to?

11 A. I am a Christian.

12 Q. And to what ethnic group do you belong?

13 A. I belong to the Mende and Mandingo ethnic groups  
14 respectively.

09:38:22 15 Q. Now, is it right that your father trained as an accountant?

16 A. Yes, he trained as an accountant and worked for CFAO  
17 Liberia.

18 Q. Pause there. He worked for what?

19 A. A company - a French company called CFAO Limited in

09:38:46 20 Liberia. They used to sell cars, Peugeots, and spare parts.

21 Q. So he worked for a company CFAO, a French company based in  
22 Monrovia, yes?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Specialising in the sale of Peugeots and spare parts, yes?

09:39:08 25 A. Correct.

26 Q. And your mother, is this right, trained as a nurse?

27 A. Yes. She was trained as a nurse.

28 Q. But in Monrovia, what did she do for a living?

29 A. She was overseeing an ice-cream shop that our dad opened

1 for her at Logan Town very close to the cinema. So she was  
2 overseeing the operations of this, the running of the ice-cream  
3 shop.

4 Q. So she ran the ice-cream shop, yes?

09:39:41 5 A. Correct.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: At what town?

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. In what town?

9 A. In front of Logan Town Cinema hall. Right by the side of  
09:39:51 10 Logan Town Cinema in Monrovia.

11 Q. And that is Logan, as in Ms Hambrick?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Yes, is that right?

14 A. Correct.

09:40:00 15 Q. Are your parents still alive?

16 A. Yeah, they are both alive.

17 Q. And is it right that they are currently living in Sierra  
18 Leone?

19 A. You are correct.

09:40:14 20 Q. Is it also right that you have several brothers and  
21 sisters?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. In fact, five sisters, yes?

24 A. Yes, correct.

09:40:28 25 Q. And two brothers?

26 A. You are right.

27 Q. One older than you, and one younger than you?

28 A. You are correct.

29 Q. And can I advise you at this stage, Mr Witness, that when

1 we come to any details which might concern your brother, that you  
2 exercise caution in referring to him. Do you follow me?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Because that could, in turn, identify you. Do you follow?

09:40:54 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. But it's right that you have two brothers; one older, one  
7 younger, yes?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Is it right that you attended the St Mary's Catholic School  
09:41:10 10 in Duala in Liberia?

11 A. Yes, you are correct.

12 Q. Duala is spelt D-U-A-L-A, yes?

13 A. Yes, sir, you are correct.

14 Q. And that you started attending that school at age 6?

09:41:25 15 A. You are correct.

16 Q. Leaving at age 12?

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. And thereafter you attended school in Sierra Leone?

19 A. Correct.

09:41:37 20 Q. The school you attended in Sierra Leone was called Christ  
21 the King College in Bo?

22 A. You are correct. That's right.

23 Q. And you left that school at what age?

24 A. At the age of 18 to 20, I have left Christ the King  
09:42:01 25 College.

26 Q. Now, what did you do with yourself, Mr Witness, upon  
27 leaving school?

28 A. When I left school immediately I travelled back Liberia,  
29 and I was there when my dad decided that - he had a logging

1 company --

2 Q. Pause there. He had a logging company and what did you  
3 say?

09:42:32

4 A. He asked me to oversee the operations of the logging  
5 company.

6 Q. And where was the logging company based?

7 A. In Grand Cape Mount County.

8 Q. Now, at that time, where was your elder brother?

9 A. He was in Sierra Leone doing his sixth form.

09:42:59

10 Q. Now, where were you when the war broke out in Sierra Leone?

11 A. In Liberia or in Sierra Leone?

12 Q. The war in Sierra Leone, to start with?

13 A. The war in Sierra Leone, I was in Bo.

09:43:25

14 Q. I ask for this reason: Your elder brother was at school in  
15 Bo. Was he still in Bo when the war broke out in Sierra Leone?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Now, coming back to the second part of your question, where  
18 were you when the NPFL invaded Liberia?

19 A. I was in Monrovia.

09:43:50

20 Q. With whom?

21 A. With my father, cousins and my younger brother.

22 Q. Mr Witness, could I ask you a favour, please. Could you  
23 move your chair a bit closer to the microphone.

24 A. Thank you.

09:44:10

25 Q. And could you move the microphone in such a way as so that  
26 you can speak into it. Do you follow me?

27 A. Correct, sir.

28 Q. Thank you. So you were in Liberia with whom?

29 A. With my father, my cousins and my younger brother.

1 Q. How many cousins?

2 A. Four of them.

3 Q. At this time when the war began in Liberia, where was your  
4 mother?

09:44:41 5 A. Usually when it's December she used to come across to see  
6 family in Sierra Leone, so she was in Sierra Leone with my  
7 sisters on vacation.

8 Q. So what happened to the logging company your father owned  
9 once the war broke out?

09:45:05 10 A. As the war was approaching very fast in Liberia, dad  
11 decided that we should fold up operations and collect all the  
12 machines and move all equipment to Monrovia, which we did.

13 Q. And did you remain in Monrovia?

14 A. Yeah, I was in Monrovia until when the final assault took  
09:45:32 15 place in Monrovia.

16 Q. And that final assault that you are telling us about, who  
17 led that final assault?

18 A. The area that we were living in was on Bushrod Island  
19 and --

09:45:45 20 Q. It was called what?

21 A. Bushrod Island. That's Duala. There is an island from all  
22 the way from Hotel Africa to the bridge. The island is called  
23 Bushrod Island and that island was attacked and occupied by  
24 Prince Johnson, a faction from the NPFL.

09:46:04 25 Q. So when Prince Johnson and his forces arrived in Bushrod  
26 Island, what did you and your family do?

27 A. Well, we were there for some few days, but we started  
28 running out of food and the movement in our name - our ethnic  
29 name was a threat. So we decided to discard the surname and



1 decided to just come back to Sierra Leone. So we left Monrovia.

2 Q. Now, taking things in stages, who is "we"?

3 A. Well, as I have told you, my ethnic background has Mandingo  
4 connection and Mende connection and initially the fighting

09:46:50 5 started in Liberia they were looking for Mandingos and Krahns.

6 Q. Now the "we" who left Monrovia to return to Sierra Leone,  
7 who were they?

8 A. My father, my younger brother and my four cousins.

9 Q. And by what means did you travel to Sierra Leone?

09:47:09 10 A. At that time it was impossible to use vehicle because  
11 anybody using vehicle means you are either a commando or a rebel,  
12 so we were walking on foot to trek.

13 Q. And the family group which you mentioned, did you remain  
14 alone during that trek by foot to Sierra Leone?

09:47:32 15 A. No, because it was a mass exodus. We saw a lot the Sierra  
16 Leoneans that were based in Liberia, a lot of friends. So there  
17 was that exodus, so we were just coming, that group.

18 Q. And did you manage to take anything with you when you fled?

19 A. We left everything in Monrovia; the parcels, the vehicles,  
09:47:56 20 everything. Why we took few personal belongings, because the  
21 distance was a very long distance to trek on foot, so we just  
22 carried few personal belongings in our bags.

23 Q. And by what route did you travel to Sierra Leone?

24 A. The main routes from Monrovia, Klay Junction, you take the  
09:48:20 25 left turn, right through Gbar. Gbar was not an easy place to  
26 pierce because there was this commando called Gbar Ray.

27 Q. Pause there, and I pause you just for this reason: Can I  
28 ask you for some spellings, Gbar, the town, how do you spell  
29 that?

1 A. Specifically I don't know how to spell that but the name is  
2 Gbar.

3 Q. I am told it's spelt G-B-A-R. And you said there was a  
4 commander there?

09:49:00 5 A. Yeah, there was a commander called Gbar Ray.

6 Q. How do you spell that?

7 A. The Gbar and he was called Ray but because of the town he  
8 was deployed, they initially called him Gbar Ray.

9 Q. So the name of the town with the name Ray?

09:49:15 10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. R-A-Y, yes?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. So he was the commander there and you were saying it was  
14 difficult to pierce the town because of him, yes?

09:49:25 15 A. Before we entered that town we saw a few dead bodies on the  
16 road and so anybody at that time will fear. So we have to keep  
17 on hiding in the bushes, get out until eventually that day he was  
18 not in Gbar, he left to Madina, so the commandos asked us to  
19 cross, so we have to survive that.

09:49:49 20 Q. And then from Gbar, where did you go?

21 A. We went to Madina. That's where we spent the night. We  
22 were there for under two days before we started trekking again.  
23 It was a long journey to the border, it lasted at least 12 days.  
24 We were at Tiene. Twelve days we were at Tiene because at times  
09:50:10 25 we used to go, divert our course into the bush to have some rest,  
26 when the road was hot. You have to come back and join the trek.

27 Q. And where did you cross the border into Sierra Leone?

28 A. We crossed through the main crossing point, at Bo  
29 Waterside. You cross into Sierra Leone and the other side of

1 Sierra Leone is called Gendema.

2 Q. And where did you finally halt your flight?

3 A. Well, we rested at Gendema the day - the other day, because  
4 the road was too bad - too very, very ugly between Gendema and

09:50:45 5 Zimmi. So the vehicles of the United Nations were based at  
6 Zimmi, so we were told that anybody who wanted protection should  
7 trek back to Zimmi. So we finally settled down at Zimmi.

8 Q. And who provided you with accommodation in Zimmi?

9 A. We were provided accommodation by the United Nations High  
09:51:09 10 Commission for Refugees.

11 Q. UNHCR?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And was that in a refugee camp?

14 A. Yes, it was a temporary shelter for emergency comers.

09:51:22 15 Q. How long did you stay in that refugee camp?

16 A. I spent few weeks there and I didn't ask them that I wanted  
17 to proceed to Bo but the procedure was not that direct. As long  
18 as you are under UN protection, they would take you to Bandajuma,  
19 that's another camp. Then from there you have a clearance that  
09:51:48 20 would identify that you have parents in Bo. Then they would give  
21 you a ticket that would qualify you to Bo. Then when you are in  
22 Bo you register with the UNHCR urban caseload. That was how the  
23 process worked.

24 Q. So when you got to Bo you registered with the UNHCR urban  
09:52:09 25 caseload?

26 A. That's correct.

27 Q. And by urban caseload what are we supposed to understand?

28 A. It means you are living within urban vicinity, not in the  
29 camps. You have a dwelling, but when there is time for supply

1 and these things, you will come at a particular point at the  
2 office, you collect your food. If you needed medication, you go  
3 there, they give you a slip, cover medication. So that was urban  
4 caseload.

09:52:35 5 Q. So when you arrived in Bo, were you reunited with your  
6 mother?

7 A. Yes, I was united with my mother, my sisters.

8 Q. Now, for how long did you thereafter remain in Bo?

9 A. Well, I was in Bo until when the NPFL crossed into Sierra  
09:53:02 10 Leone.

11 Q. Now, you say the NPFL crossed into Sierra Leone. Who led  
12 that invasion of Sierra Leone?

13 A. That invasion was led by a Corporal Foday Sankoh.

14 Q. And was Corporal Foday Sankoh head of any group?

09:53:32 15 A. Yes, he was heading the RUF.

16 Q. Now, as a consequence of that invasion led by Corporal  
17 Foday Sankoh, did that have any consequences for you and your  
18 family?

19 A. Of course.

09:53:53 20 Q. Why?

21 A. Because as the war was pushing closer to bigger towns in  
22 Sierra Leone, say Bo, Kenema - Bo is the second city of Sierra  
23 Leone - then there was these rumours that rebels were burning  
24 down villages and Liberians were involved, so anybody that has  
09:54:11 25 Liberian connection was a threat. So it became a warring  
26 situation for all of us.

27 Q. Now, your family originated in Sierra Leone?

28 A. Correct.

29 Q. Now, this perceived threat, how did that apply to you?

1 A. Yeah, you know we were all born in Monrovia and we schooled  
2 in Bo. A lot of friends knows very well that we are Liberians by  
3 descent and - Liberian by birth and Sierra Leone by descent, so  
4 they know that. And when we came back from Liberia we had a lot  
09:54:52 5 of Liberians that came across and we used visit one another, so  
6 they know.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. Yes, Ms Howarth.

8 MS HOWARTH: I hesitate to interrupt. It's not for an  
9 objection. It's merely in relation to the LiveNote. I notice  
09:55:09 10 that something wasn't captured. I heard the witness say there  
11 was this rumour that rebels were burning down and that Liberians  
12 were involved and that Liberian connections was a threat, that  
13 initial Liberians being involved wasn't captured. I am only  
14 rising so that it is noted.

09:55:31 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I do recall the witness saying that.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. I am sure it will be  
17 corrected in due course.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. So this perceived threat that individuals with Liberian  
09:55:49 20 connections were supposed to pose, how did the local Sierra  
21 Leonean population react to you?

22 A. They were acting very negatively. A lot of people lost  
23 their life in that saga, because if you were a Liberian and you  
24 cannot properly identify yourself and you are caught in an area  
09:56:15 25 that you don't have your ID card, that one, as long as you are a  
26 male you are gone because initially when the war started nobody  
27 knew the exact difference between a pure civilian and a rebel.  
28 So they mistook anybody with any Liberian accent that you are a  
29 rebel, so.

1 Q. Now, what happened as a consequence of these attacks on  
2 Liberians in Sierra Leone?

3 A. Well, when these threats were going on, we were all afraid  
4 and there was this problem of hiding in the house the whole day.

09:56:58

5 But eventually we - most of the males were contacted one  
6 afternoon that the ambassador in Sierra Leone at that time,  
7 General Karpeh, was in Kenema together with some Liberian elders  
8 and they were appealing that a group of Liberians were accepted  
9 to fight alongside the Sierra Leonean army.

09:57:26

10 Q. Pause there. You have told us a lot there and I would just  
11 like to clarify before we move on. Who was the Liberian  
12 ambassador in Sierra Leone?

13 A. At that time it was Karpeh.

14 Q. How do you spell that name?

09:57:41

15 A. The name I know but the spelling - I don't want to give you  
16 wrong spellings here.

17 Q. K-A-R-P-E-H. General Karpeh, yes?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Now, you have gone on to tell us that General Karpeh, you  
20 discovered, was in Kenema with some Liberians?

09:57:58

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Elders, yes? And they were appealing that a group of  
23 Liberians be accepted to fight alongside the Sierra Leonean army.  
24 Is that right?

09:58:09

25 A. You are correct.

26 Q. So what did you do when you heard about that?

27 A. Well, everybody was, I mean, happy to go and join, because  
28 the threat was so much that the only way to protect yourself  
29 initially at that time was to join. And when you are in fatigue,

1 you protect yourself and you will be able to protect your family.

2 So we eventually left Kenema - Bo for Kenema.

3 Q. Now, did you go by yourself?

09:58:47

4 A. Well, they gave us a vehicle. They gave us a vehicle, but  
5 voluntarily we left on our own.

6 Q. How many of you left?

7 A. Well, I left with my younger brother, then with a group of  
8 other Liberians. We were 18 in number that left that day.

09:59:01

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the witness hasn't given us  
10 any time frames other than mentioning when events - like, when  
11 the war broke out in this location or in that location. It would  
12 be helpful to have some time frames if he is able to.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

09:59:20

14 Q. Can you help us, Mr Witness, as to roughly when it was that  
15 you heard of the Liberian ambassador's presence in Sierra Leone?

16 A. I believe that should have been in 1991.

17 Q. Can you help us with a month, or whether was in the rainy  
18 season, the dry season or what?

09:59:48

19 A. It was mid - going towards - around March. February,  
20 March, it was those times. Because we were training when it  
21 started raining.

22 Q. Now, at this time when you arrived in Kenema, this group  
23 that was to be formed, did it have a title or name?

10:00:13

24 A. Yes. Initially when we got to Kenema we were met by a  
25 group of Sierra Leonean officers, and Free Kalay. Of course,  
26 Free Kalay was our recruiting officer.

27 Q. Pause. Free Kalay?

28 A. He was Major Free Kalay.

29 Q. Major Free Kalay?

- 1 A. Correct.
- 2 Q. Free as in freedom?
- 3 A. Yeah.
- 4 Q. Kalay, K-A-L-A-Y?
- 10:00:36 5 A. Yeah, correct.
- 6 Q. Go on. So you met him in Kenema, yes?
- 7 A. Yeah. And we were briefed about exactly what you are in
- 8 Kenema for, that we were going to be trained as a LUDF.
- 9 Q. LUDF?
- 10:00:59 10 A. Yeah.
- 11 Q. And what did that stand for?
- 12 A. Liberia United Democratic Forces. That was the initial
- 13 name that we started with.
- 14 Q. Now, what was the aims and objectives of the LUDF which you
- 10:01:22 15 joined in Kenema?
- 16 A. Well, initially our first aim was to train, and the main
- 17 objective at that initial time was to help the Sierra Leonean
- 18 army fight back the rebels. But we are having our agenda that if
- 19 we push back to the - because most of these people were working
- 10:01:42 20 with the previous government, the Doe regime, like Karpeh and
- 21 Free Kalay and these other people, so our main objective was to
- 22 get to the borders and make sure we get back to Liberia to
- 23 overthrow the government that was there at that time.
- 24 Q. So one objective was to support the Sierra Leonean army?
- 10:02:01 25 A. Correct.
- 26 Q. And the second objective was to return to Liberia?
- 27 A. Correct.
- 28 Q. Now, you mentioned that you were to be trained. Where did
- 29 that training take place?



1 A. At Tormah Base.

2 Q. Tormah --

3 A. Tormah Base.

4 Q. -- is spelled T-O-R-M-A-H, yes?

10:02:25 5 A. Correct.

6 Q. And where was Tormah Base?

7 A. Tormah Base is out of Kenema. It's roughly about 8 or 9  
8 miles from Kenema.

9 Q. Now, who obtained training at Tormah Base?

10:02:47 10 A. Well, most of us were Liberians, but we were - there are  
11 also a few Sierra Leoneans that joined us there that have  
12 Liberian connections. So we were on that base.

13 Q. And were you all trained together?

14 A. Yeah, we were all trained together by the joint combined  
10:03:09 15 training force of Sierra Leonean officers and Liberian officers.

16 Q. Now, help us. Who was in charge of training?

17 A. Jointly on the Liberian side was Major Wright.

18 Q. Major Wright. W-R-I-G-H-T, yes?

19 A. Correct.

10:03:28 20 Q. And?

21 A. Colonel Momodou, late. He was a captain at that time.

22 Colonel - now colonel. Colonel Momodou.

23 Q. Colonel Momodou, yes?

24 A. By that time he was a captain.

10:03:40 25 Q. And he was a captain in which armed forces?

26 A. The armed forces of Sierra Leone.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, you have to let counsel  
28 finish his question before you jump in to answer. That is  
29 because somebody is writing everything that you both are saying,

1 and he cannot write when you both are speaking.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:04:11

4 Q. So the training was jointly supervised by Major Wright, a  
5 Liberian, yes?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And captain, as he then was, Momodou of the Sierra Leonean  
8 armed forces?

9 A. You are correct.

10:04:22

10 Q. Who provided these Liberian trainees with food, arms,  
11 uniforms and accommodation?

12 A. The Sierra Leonean government.

13 Q. Were you paid?

14 A. We were only begin stipend. There was no pay.

10:04:44

15 Q. You were given a stipend, but no pay?

16 A. No pay at all.

17 Q. Was the stipend sufficient to live on?

18 A. Not at all. Not at all.

19 Q. So how did you supplement the stipend?

10:04:57

20 A. Well, when you are in the front line, you see - just look  
21 out for yourself. So when you enter any town, everything we get  
22 their is our booty. So we used to commandeer vehicles, run it as  
23 transportation. And money that we will get from there we used to  
24 supplement most of our problems.

10:05:17

25 Q. Now, before we move on to deal more specifically with  
26 training, that name --

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry. Before you move, the witness said  
28 something which is recorded as such: So we used - he said well,  
29 when you are in the front line you see for yourself, so when you

1 enter any town anything. What does that mean?

2 THE WITNESS: Can I clarify that.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please clarify.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:05:52 5 Q. You clarify, Mr Witness.

6 A. In operations, when you are on the front line, for  
7 instance, we are not provided with everything that we needed. So  
8 if we enter certain towns and we bulldoze those towns, we loot.

9 And those looted items are what you use to come and sell in

10:06:11 10 Kenema, and we used to commandeer vehicles. That's an open  
11 secret. So we used to commandeer vehicles to run them as  
12 transportation to supplement our effort.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:06:24 15 Q. Now, you told us that the organisation you joined bore the  
16 title LUDF. Did that title remain?

17 A. Yeah, that title remained until when we were in Liberia.  
18 Before we left to Liberia it changed.

19 Q. To what?

10:06:46 20 A. To ULIMO.

21 Q. We will come back to that in a while. But let's go to  
22 training now, shall we, at Tormah Base. How long did the  
23 training last?

24 A. Well, the training specifically was to last for a month or  
10:07:06 25 two, but because of the pressure, we were only able to train for  
26 two weeks. The third week was front line training, because they  
27 would take you to the front line and they would tell you this  
28 particularly is what you are going to be doing here, and you will  
29 be at the front line.

1 Q. So after two weeks you were assigned to the front line?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Where?

4 A. At Joru, 18 miles off Kenema.

5 Q. Joru?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Now, prior to being assigned to the front line and prior to  
8 going to Tormah Base, had you received any military training at  
9 all?

10:07:52 10 A. Yeah, I received - I have told you we received two weeks of  
11 basic training.

12 Q. But before that had you received any military training?

13 A. No. I was --

14 Q. So the training that you received in those two weeks, what  
10:08:07 15 did it actually involve?

16 A. Well, the first week basically we were - they trained us  
17 stripping and assembling of rifles.

18 Q. Stripping and assembling rifles.

19 A. Correct.

10:08:21 20 Q. Anything else?

21 A. Safety precautions. Safety precaution.

22 Q. Anything else?

23 A. Yes. Your firing order.

24 Q. Anything else?

10:08:33 25 A. The line of fire.

26 Q. Go on.

27 A. And those were the basic things that you are trained. We  
28 were supposed to be doing the four phase of war, but the war was  
29 so pressing that that training was never completed. So we are

1 just forced to take us to the front line.

2 Q. The four phases of war were supposed to have been part of  
3 the training?

4 A. Correct.

10:08:58 5 Q. But because of the pressure, the training was not completed  
6 and you were sent to the front line?

7 A. Yes, correct.

8 Q. Now, you say you were sent to Joru, 18 miles from Kenema?

9 A. That's correct.

10:09:14 10 Q. What happened there?

11 A. Well, we were there for a day or two when we were attacked  
12 the very first time.

13 Q. By whom?

14 A. By the RUF.

10:09:29 15 Q. Just pausing there, was this the first time you had  
16 actually been in battle?

17 A. That's the very first time. Very first time to be in  
18 battle.

19 Q. How did you feel?

10:09:41 20 A. Terrible situation. For the first time going to the front  
21 line, you hear RPG, I almost - I almost killed myself. I thought  
22 I was just dead. It's a terrible situation.

23 Q. For how long were you deployed at Joru fighting the RUF?

24 A. Well, we were there roughly 24, 28 days. That's 28 days.

10:10:07 25 Q. And was it continuous fighting throughout that time?

26 A. Almost every one, two days. Because that was the main  
27 junction that RUF has wanted to penetrate to Kenema, and we were  
28 heavily deployed at that location. So there was persistent  
29 attack - attack because they wanted us to push from there.

- 1 Because Joru is situated at a strategic junction with a very big  
2 hill. So we were deployed against the hill and the town to make  
3 it impossible for anybody pass for Kenema. So it was very  
4 difficult to fight us, because we were fighting from the built-up  
10:10:44 5 area, where they were fighting in sloping area. So it's  
6 difficult for them. So they were persistently attacking so that  
7 we will give up.
- 8 Q. You say you were there for 24 to 28 days?
- 9 A. Correct.
- 10:11:00 10 Q. Help us: Where did you go thereafter?
- 11 A. Well, after there was - the front line was quiet a little  
12 bit, we were told that there was another pressure around Pujehun  
13 axis.
- 14 Q. Pujehun axis?
- 10:11:16 15 A. Yes. Correct.
- 16 Q. So what were you ordered to do?
- 17 A. They ordered our unit to move to Kenema, to proceed to Bo.  
18 Then from Bo we were received by our front line commander, Major  
19 Free Kalay. Then he led us to Koribondo, where - Koribondo was  
10:11:39 20 initially our tactical headquarter at that time.
- 21 Q. So you go to Koribondo, and then what happens thereafter?
- 22 A. We were then moved to our forward base in Pujehun. Pewala,  
23 Pahala - Payala was our headquarter. When we moved from  
24 Koribondo, Payala became our tactical headquarter.
- 10:11:59 25 Q. And then?
- 26 A. We were fighting along there, because at that time it was  
27 now raining in Sierra Leone so --
- 28 Q. It was what?
- 29 A. It started raining in Sierra Leone at that time now. We

1 were in the rainy season, so it was very difficult because the  
2 rivers from full, you know. Areas that we used to take bypasses,  
3 it was very difficult. So we were fighting a very tedious war,  
4 you know.

10:12:25 5 Q. Help me with two things: Firstly, how long did this  
6 particular operation last?

7 A. The whole of the Pujehun operation?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. I cannot tell you the exact date and time because it's a  
10:12:45 10 long time now, I cannot remember. But it lasted for a long time  
11 because immediately after the rains we made a very big push for  
12 Pujehun, we captured Pujehun, we went across to Zimmi, we retook  
13 Zimmi, then we moved towards the borders at Gendema.

14 Q. Which border?

10:13:02 15 A. The border between Liberia and Sierra Leone.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness said towards the border at -  
17 did you say Gendema?

18 THE WITNESS: Correct, Gendema.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:13:17 20 Q. Now, as you were pushing through these various places -  
21 yes?

22 A. We were facing a lot of petty ambushes here and there. And  
23 there was this problem between us and the Sierra Leonean army  
24 because initially when we were pushing, they were not giving us  
10:13:37 25 basic heavy artilleries because they were afraid. They never  
26 trusted a hundred per cent anyway because there was an incident -  
27 there was some funny funny incident - even if the RUF bypassed an  
28 ambush their convoy, they would start to accuse us that we have  
29 started behaving like rebels. We bypass and attack them for

1 food. All sorts of things. So we were just given basic infantry  
2 rifles. Our biggest support was an anti-aircraft van that they  
3 gave to us and RPGs and one commando mortar, but the rest were  
4 using infantry rifles, G3 and AK-47.

10:14:15 5 Q. Now, you reached to - you pushed the RUF to Zimmi?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And from Zimmi to where?

8 A. To the border at Gendema.

9 Q. Now, let us pause there for a moment, please, and I seek  
10:14:35 10 your assistance with one or two details. The RUF forces that you  
11 were fighting in that operation where you pushed them from  
12 Pujehun through to Zimmi, do you recall the names of any of their  
13 commanders?

14 A. Yeah, I do remember a few names.

10:14:54 15 Q. Such as?

16 A. Mike Lamin.

17 Q. Yes?

18 A. Gibril Massaquoi of course is from Pujehun and from that  
19 area.

10:15:04 20 Q. Anybody else?

21 A. Yeah, AB. AB was one commando that he was killed and we  
22 ambushed him and killed him. That's the name I know, AB.

23 Q. AB?

24 A. Yes.

10:15:14 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: The second name that the witness  
26 mentioned was Gibril Massaquoi, yes?

27 THE WITNESS: Correct, Gibril Massaquoi.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now that commander Mike Lamin, what happened to him?



1 A. Well, initially when we attacked Pujehun we understood they  
2 never went through the border to Liberia, so - because they were  
3 fighting on two fronts. There was this other group in Kailahun  
4 and the Pujehun group. So when we attacked Zimmi, there is a  
10:15:41 5 jungle, because there is the Gola Forest from there to Kailahun  
6 so they used that axis to Kailahun.

7 Q. Who used that axis to Kailahun?

8 A. Mike Lamin.

9 Q. Now, did your forces stop at the Liberian border?

10:16:02 10 A. No, we crossed.

11 Q. Now, I appreciate you have expressed some difficulties with  
12 dates, Mr Witness, but can you give us a rough idea of - let's  
13 start with the year, the year in which this operation took place?

14 A. I told you we started training '91 and that was going now  
10:16:28 15 towards '92. Early '92 we almost crossed into Liberia.

16 Q. Early '92?

17 A. You are correct.

18 Q. Now, you tell us that you crossed into Liberia at this  
19 time?

10:16:40 20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. How far into Liberia did you cross?

22 A. Well, we crossed into Liberia at two fronts, from Gissiwulo  
23 from Zimmi.

24 Q. From where?

10:16:54 25 A. Gissiwulo. There is a crossing point Zimmi very short with  
26 the border with Liberia. Then our units crossed from the main  
27 border at Gendema.

28 Q. Pause there. I am told that the spelling for Gissiwulo is  
29 G-I-S-S-I-W-U-L-O. So carry on, you crossed at those two points?

1 A. Yeah, because there is a direct route from Gissiwulo to  
2 Tiene and so we thought it fit that if there was a bypassing unit  
3 from Gissiwulo, when we hit Gendema, the pressure will be on  
4 Tiene, then we will move, so we just have an easy vacuum to link  
10:17:42 5 up with our brothers in Tiene. And it worked exactly that way.  
6 We were in Tiene, we regrouped, we pushed all the way to  
7 Sanganama.

8 Q. Sanganama is spelt S-A-N-G-A-N-A-M-A?

9 A. Correct.

10:17:57 10 Q. So happened when you got as far as Sanganama?

11 A. We started facing stiff resistance from the NPFL now in  
12 Liberia, very stiff resistance.

13 Q. And what about the resources available to you by this  
14 point?

10:18:17 15 A. At that time the ammunition that we crossed with, we  
16 started running out of ammunition. So we were trying to resort  
17 to guerilla tactics, bypassing and ambushing, but the NPFL was  
18 not coming. They are very clever. They formed a defensive lines  
19 and they would only come, fight and go back. So anytime they  
10:18:40 20 come and attack we used the remaining - the small ammunition we  
21 have - ammunition reduces, so we were forced to come back to  
22 Tiene.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, can I ask you to speak a  
24 little slower. I think the transcribers are having difficulty  
10:18:51 25 keeping up with the speed at which you are talking. So please  
26 give your answers a little slower.

27 THE WITNESS: Okay.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Yes. So you retreated back to Tiene?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And help us, what happened when you got to Tiene?

3 A. Yeah, Tiene became our tactical headquarters and then the  
4 NPFL pursued us to Tiene. We defended Tiene for days but we  
10:19:29 5 couldn't make it, so we decided to retreat back to Bo Waterside.  
6 It was during that exercise that we lost our commander because  
7 there was a bypass ambush, we were ambushed, and our commander  
8 was killed initially in that ambush.

9 Q. What was the name of your commander who was killed?

10:19:50 10 A. Major Free Kalay.

11 Q. Now pausing again, Mr Witness, in search of another detail.  
12 Roughly how many of you comprised the force that entered Liberia  
13 and pushed its way as far as Sanginama? How many of you were  
14 there?

10:20:12 15 A. The total strength initially that crossed the first time  
16 was 250.

17 Q. So Major Free Kalay is killed, yes? Is that right?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. And you told us that you retreated from Tiene to where?

10:20:36 20 A. To Bo Waterside, the crossing point.

21 Q. And did you cross back into Sierra Leone?

22 A. Yeah, we crossed back into Sierra Leone - but there was  
23 even a tussle out there because the people never wanted us  
24 to - because they are afraid that the NPFL will pursue us across  
10:20:52 25 the borders again. But we assured them that we would put up our  
26 defensive postures and nothing would happen. So they allowed us  
27 to cross back into Sierra Leone.

28 Q. And when you crossed back into Sierra Leone, what happened  
29 to you thereafter?

1 A. We were there for some time and our unit was called back to  
2 Bo for briefings. Then we escorted the younger brother to our  
3 commander who was T Kalay, he was in Sumbuya, he took over  
4 command, so we moved back to Bo. Then I took a pass to have a  
10:21:31 5 rest. They allowed me to have a rest for some time. Then we  
6 were called back to base for briefings one early morning.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness did mention a name. He said  
8 the younger brother. I don't know if he was referring to his own  
9 younger brother, but, in view of the caution that you gave him,  
10:21:54 10 please find out who this was.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. You said the younger brother to our commander who was  
13 called what?

14 A. T Kalay.

10:22:09 15 Q. So that's the younger brother of Free Kalay?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Major Free Kalay?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Now, you mentioned obtaining a pass. Is that right?

10:22:23 20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. A pass to do what?

22 A. I mean after you have done at least a month or two at the  
23 front line you are entitled to a week or two weeks' pass. So I  
24 requested for that pass and I was granted two weeks' pass to  
10:22:40 25 rest, to see my family and my people.

26 Q. And were your family still in Bo?

27 A. Yeah, they were still in Bo.

28 Q. So you were able to spend some time with your family in Bo.  
29 Is that correct?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Now, you tell us that thereafter you were recalled for  
3 what?

4 A. For briefings.

10:22:58 5 Q. And where was that briefing held?

6 A. It was held in Bo at a hotel called Denby Hotel.

7 Q. D-E-N-B-I-G-A?

8 A. No, D-E-N-B-Y.

9 Q. And who led the briefing?

10:23:26 10 A. It was at this briefing that we were presented by  
11 Roosevelt Johnson who became our leader. It was at this briefing  
12 that they told us he was in charge now and that - because there  
13 was a problem between Karpeh in Kenema and he was killed. So he  
14 was the man in charge now. We were told that he was in charge  
10:23:51 15 and that we should take all command from him.

16 Q. So was that the first time you had met Roosevelt Johnson?

17 A. Yes, that was the very first time we met him.

18 Q. And what was Roosevelt Johnson doing there?

19 A. Well, he came from Freetown and he told us he was now in  
10:24:14 20 charge. He has negotiated with the government.

21 Q. Which government?

22 A. The Government of Sierra Leone at that time. And that  
23 everything was fine. That we have - they would supply us fresh  
24 arms and ammunition and that we should be brave, we should finish  
10:24:33 25 the job in Pujehun, then we have the free way to go to Liberia  
26 now.

27 Q. Now, who was supplying the arms and ammunition which  
28 Mr Johnson told you about?

29 A. The Government of Sierra Leone.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness I think said that we should  
2 be brave, we should finish the job. Did you say brave or  
3 briefed?

4 THE WITNESS: Brave.

10:24:59

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. And finish the job in Pujehun, yes?

7 A. He told us to finish, because we were still having pockets  
8 of resistance in Pujehun. So it was impossible for us to cross  
9 into Liberia and leave that job undone. So the first operation

10:25:10

10 was to finish the pocket of resistance in Pujehun, they would  
11 have a free way to enter Liberia and you would have the backup of  
12 the government at that time.

13 Q. Now, this promise of arms and ammunition from the  
14 Government of Sierra Leone, did it materialise?

10:25:28

15 A. Of course. The arms came. After Roosevelt Johnson left  
16 for Freetown --

17 Q. Pause, just taking it slowly. Roosevelt Johnson left for  
18 Freetown?

19 A. For Freetown, yeah.

10:25:40

20 Q. And then?

21 A. After one week, the other week he came back with the truck  
22 loaded of arms and ammunition.

23 Q. And help us, what arms and ammunition did he return with?

10:26:09

24 A. Well, bulk of it was AK and G3 rifles, RPG tubes, two  
25 anti-aircraft guns, the initial ones that we received. Then  
26 mortars, I don't know the number because at that time I was an  
27 infantry soldier, not an artillery man. And huge boxes of  
28 ammunition. Huge boxes of ammunition. Truck full, filling the  
29 truck.

1 Q. Now, help us again, can you give us a rough idea as to when  
2 it was that this took place, Roosevelt Johnson going to Freetown  
3 and returning with a truckload of arms and ammunition?

4 A. Well, as I have said, it's a long time now, I cannot  
10:26:56 5 remember all the dates, but we were moving now - it was in 1992  
6 going - mid-1992, around those times, because we were in Liberia  
7 and we were pushed back across the border. We came back.

8 Q. So those arms and ammunition, as you have told us, were  
9 intended to be used to clear up the pockets of resistance which  
10:27:25 10 remained in Pujehun, yes?

11 A. Correct. Then after that job is done, we have a free  
12 leeway now to cross into Liberia.

13 Q. Now, was that plan to clear up the pockets of resistance in  
14 Pujehun - was that carried out?

10:27:42 15 A. Yes. That was the first job. It was done jointly by us  
16 and the SLA.

17 Q. And your opposition, the RUF, what happened to them?

18 A. Well, most of them flee from that area. Those that were  
19 killed, were killed. Then a lot of them crossed back into  
10:28:05 20 Liberia, and the bulk of them moved towards Kailahun.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, didn't the witness say the  
22 opposition was the RUF and NPFL that crossed? Am I wrong to make  
23 that assumption?

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Initially.

10:28:24 25 Q. But help me. At this point when you are fighting in  
26 Pujehun clearing up pockets of resistance, who are you opposed  
27 to?

28 A. Well --

29 Q. Who is on the other side?

1 A. Initially we were told we were fighting the NPFL. But  
2 after a few days when we started engaging them, there was a call  
3 by Corporal Foday Sankoh that it was not NPFL fighting, it was  
4 RUF. So we were now fighting RUF in Sierra Leone.

10:28:56 5 Q. So you tell us that some of them fled across the border  
6 into Liberia; is that right?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And some moved towards Kailahun?

9 A. Yes.

10:29:08 10 Q. So what did you do you, you and your comrades?

11 A. We then crossed into Liberia. After clearing Sierra Leone,  
12 the operation that they gave us, we then crossed into Liberia.

13 Q. Now, on this occasion, Mr Witness, how many of you  
14 comprised the force which crossed into Liberia?

10:29:32 15 A. It was a very large force now, because we were combined  
16 with another force that came from Alhaji Kromah's people, the  
17 Mandingos. They teamed up with us. We initially crossed with  
18 two battalion - that was about 1,000 men - initially first  
19 crossed. Because at that time the force were combined together.

10:29:51 20 That's why it was called ULIMO.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just signaling to you, Mr Witness, to  
22 slow down your pace at which you speak. More or less like  
23 counsel. The pace at which counsel speaks is good.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:30:08 25 Q. Now, I just want to go through what you have just told us  
26 with a little care. Are you telling us that you went - there  
27 were two battalions of you?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Who entered Liberia?



1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Having cleared up pockets of resistance in Pujehun?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. When you entered Liberia, where did you go to?

10:30:35 5 A. Well, our objective initially was to make sure that Cape  
6 Mount is hold; then we should move for Bomi Hills.

7 Q. And did you achieve that?

8 A. Yes, we achieved that.

9 Q. And when you arrived in Bomi Hills - or let me ask the  
10:30:53 10 question differently. Where was it that you met up with this  
11 other group of Mandingo ULIMO fighters?

12 A. Some of them came through Sierra Leone. Then a lot of them  
13 came through Lofa, because they were also fighting from the  
14 Guinean axis. So they came from Lofa.

10:31:12 15 Q. And where did you meet up with them?

16 A. In Bomi.

17 Q. In Bomi.

18 A. Exactly.

19 Q. Now, the combined forces, those with whom you had crossed,  
10:31:25 20 the two battalions, and the others who had crossed from Sierra  
21 Leone and Guinea, the Mandingos, when you met us in Bomi Hills,  
22 how many of you were there?

23 A. Well, the strength was just building up. But --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause, Mr Witness. Yes,  
10:31:44 25 Ms Howarth.

26 MS HOWARTH: I am not pursuing my objection.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry for the interruption, Mr Griffiths.  
28 Perhaps you could ask the question again.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. When you got to Bomi Hills and met up with the Mandingos,  
2 the combined force, how much did they - how many did they number?

3 A. Well, specifically I cannot tell the total strength that we  
4 are having because, you know, when we are fighting wars, there  
10:32:25 5 are a lot of lies going on in there. You say you have ten  
6 battalions in order for the enemy to know that the strength was  
7 good, but really on the ground in Bomi, we are but 1,000 to 2,000  
8 men on the ground roughly.

9 Q. Now going into a little more detail. This group that you  
10:32:44 10 met up with, the Mandingos, yes?

11 A. One minute.

12 Q. Pardon?

13 A. One minute.

14 Q. Of course you can. Who were they led by?

10:33:05 15 A. They were led by Alhaji Kromah.

16 Q. Do you have any idea where they were formed?

17 A. Yes. They were formed in Guinea.

18 Q. Did they receive any support from anyone?

19 A. Yes. They initially had their support from Guinea, but  
10:33:31 20 they also had support from us. Because we initially had support  
21 from the Government of Sierra Leone, so we would supplement each  
22 other initially.

23 Q. Now, this group of ULIMO fighters you met up with, you tell  
24 us they had come from Guinea and through Sierra Leone, yes?

10:33:59 25 A. You are correct.

26 Q. You had come through the Pujehun axis into Liberia; is that  
27 correct?

28 A. Correct.

29 Q. As a consequence of your two forces meeting up in Bomi

1 Hills, what was the effect on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border?

2 A. Well, effectively that border was sealed off because we  
3 were deployed all along in Cape Mount, so there was no way  
4 anybody can cross into Pujehun. Then ULIMO-K and other forces  
10:34:38 5 deployed along the Kailahun axis, so the border was sealed off.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: That was ULIMO-K and who?

7 THE WITNESS: ULIMO-J.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Just to clarify, ULIMO-J was the group to which you  
10:34:57 10 belonged?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Taking the name from Roosevelt Johnson, yes?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. That was the group which was initially formed at Tormah  
10:35:09 15 Base outside Kenema, yes?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. And then we have ULIMO-K formed in Guinea, as you have told  
18 us, yes?

19 A. That's correct.

10:35:19 20 Q. Supported by the Guinean government, yes?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Howarth.

22 MS HOWARTH: Yes, I just wonder if we could get this  
23 evidence from the witness rather than from counsel, please.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I am merely restating what the witness has  
10:35:34 25 already said.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am not sure - I'm not sure if the  
27 witness has in fact said this. Sometimes he speaks so quickly,  
28 that you can't see what he's said on the record.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, he did say that the group of Mandingos

1 he met up with had been formed in Guinea and had received support  
2 from Guinea. He said that.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well then. Please proceed.

4 Again, Mr Witness, please speak. Slowly because when you  
10:36:12 5 speak fast, some of the things are not recorded because you are  
6 speaking too fast, and yet you have given the evidence.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now, you tell us that as a consequence of you linking up  
9 with ULIMO-K, the border was sealed off, yes?

10:36:32 10 A. You are correct.

11 Q. Again, I appreciate the difficulty, Mr Witness. Can you  
12 help us possibly with a time frame when that took place?

13 A. Repeat the question again.

14 Q. Can you help us with a rough timing for when it was that  
10:36:57 15 the two forces linked up together and sealed off the border?

16 A. That was - we are now moving towards '93, I believe, so --

17 Q. What part of '93? Beginning, middle, end?

18 A. Specifically I cannot remember all these things. But it  
19 was, I believe, the beginning '93.

10:37:18 20 Q. Now, after you had secured these positions with the  
21 assistance of ULIMO-K, yes, were your lines being penetrated by  
22 the NPFL to get to Sierra Leone?

23 A. It was impossible. It was very much impossible for them,  
24 because their focus was now Monrovia. Because Tubmanburg is not  
10:37:59 25 too far from Monrovia, so their focus was purely to defend  
26 Monrovia. So they were not even thinking about pushing towards  
27 the border, because that border was fully safe and secure.

28 Q. Now, at this time when you have linked up with ULIMO-K,  
29 were there any forces in Monrovia?

1 A. In Monrovia?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Yes, ECOMOG was in Monrovia.

4 Q. Anybody else?

10:38:34 5 A. In Monrovia?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. The INPFL.

8 Q. And they were led by who?

9 A. Prince Johnson.

10:38:40 10 Q. So they were in Monrovia, were they?

11 A. Yeah, they were at their Caldwell Base.

12 Q. Where did - having linked up with the others, where did you

13 go?

14 A. Well, initially we decided to push towards Monrovia. We

10:39:00 15 came as far as around Ricks Institute. Then the other unit moved

16 towards Bong Mines. Our focus was now to go towards their

17 headquarters at Gbarnga.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Did you say your focus was now to go, or

19 not to go?

10:39:24 20 THE WITNESS: Was to go for Gbarnga.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, at this time, Mr Witness, what was the State of

23 relations between ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J?

24 A. Well, there was a very big friction. We fought among

10:39:42 25 ourselves in Bomi seriously, and it was at that time that this

26 ULIMO-K and J name came up. Because we were together as one

27 force, ULIMO; but after that infighting, when the Mandingos

28 pushed up towards Lofa, they were called now ULIMO-K, and we that

29 came from Sierra Leone, we were called ULIMO-J because we were

1 supporting Johnson.

2 Q. What caused the infighting?

3 A. Well, you know, we were junior officers at that time, but  
4 there were a lot of accusations. We were accusing ULIMO-K of  
10:40:24 5 collaborating with ECOMOG, where, of course, ULIMO-K were  
6 accusing Roosevelt Johnson of collaborating with NPFL. So there  
7 were these counteraccusations, and so that led to fighting one  
8 early morning. We were really surprised to just see our  
9 colleagues that we were talking two or three days take up arms  
10:40:45 10 and started killing one another. So that split came up in Bomi.  
11 But our faction was able to push the ULIMO-K back, and we were in  
12 complete control of Bomi.

13 Q. Following that infighting which led to the formation of  
14 ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, did you stay in Liberia, you personally?

10:41:09 15 A. Me? Yes, I was in Liberia for some time. Then I decided  
16 to come and check on my family in Sierra Leone.

17 Q. And did you do that?

18 A. Yes. I came on pass.

19 Q. You came on a pass?

10:41:22 20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. For how long?

22 A. Well, I came for a month or so.

23 Q. And so you went to see your family where?

24 A. In Bo, Sierra Leone.

10:41:32 25 Q. And did you stay for the full month of your pass in Bo?

26 A. No.

27 Q. How long did you stay in Bo?

28 A. I did almost three weeks. Then I got a call from a friend  
29 that told me that we were - there was a plan for an all out

1 assault on Gbarnga, and all fighters were needed to report back  
2 on base.

3 Q. Have you ever heard the name Operation Octopus, Mr Witness?

4 A. Yes, I heard the name Operation Octopus.

10:42:23 5 Q. What was Operation Octopus?

6 A. Operation Octopus was an operation launched by the then  
7 NPFL. You know, the name Octopus, you know it's a deep sea  
8 creature with eight arms, so the initial objective was to attack  
9 Monrovia from all eight positions. So that operation was carried  
10:42:44 10 out in Monrovia, but we were called to reinforce ECOMOG and  
11 re-entered Monrovia to help.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, the witness was explaining what  
13 Octopus is and he said something even I didn't catch. You know  
14 it's a deep something.

10:43:03 15 MR GRIFFITHS: It's a deep sea creature and the idea was to  
16 attack from eight different positions. That's what he said.

17 THE WITNESS: Correct.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Now, help us, where were you when Operation Octopus was  
10:43:25 20 launched?

21 A. Well, as I told you, I was in Sierra Leone, but we were all  
22 ordered to come back to base and we came. And we - they took us  
23 straight to the front line in Monrovia to backup ECOMOG.

24 Q. Who took you to the front line in Monrovia to backup  
10:43:49 25 ECOMOG?

26 A. Well, ECOMOG sent trucks for us and we were collected from  
27 Bomi, straight down to Monrovia to assist them.

28 Q. Now, ECOMOG you said provided you with transport, picked  
29 you up from Bomi to assist them in Monrovia, yes?

1 A. That's right.

2 Q. Apart from transport did they provide you with anything  
3 else?

4 A. Yes, they helped us with arms and ammunition.

10:44:23 5 Q. So were you involved in fighting alongside ECOMOG in  
6 Operation Octopus?

7 A. Correct. We fought along the Bushrod Island all the way to  
8 Caldwell base.

9 Q. Which base?

10 A. Caldwell base.

11 Q. C-A-L-D-W-E-L-L. And was your defence of Monrovia  
12 successful?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. And what effect did your assistance along with ECOMOG have  
10:45:14 15 on the NPFL?

16 A. Say again.

17 Q. What happened to the NPFL?

18 A. They retreated back, back to Bomi, Bong Mines and Gbarnga  
19 respectively.

10:45:31 20 Q. Did you pursue them?

21 A. Yes, we pursued them.

22 Q. Did anything happen to you during that pursuit?

23 A. Yes. In Bong Mines I was shot on my leg, my left leg, and  
24 I was there in hospital, but the medication was not too good, so  
10:45:51 25 I was then moved back to Monrovia.

26 Q. So you were shot in the leg in Bong Mines?

27 A. Yeah.

28 Q. Received some treatment there, but it wasn't very good, and  
29 then you were moved to hospital in Monrovia, yes?



1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Did anything of note happen whilst you were in hospital in  
3 Monrovia?

4 A. Yes. It was at this stage that the forces then united to  
10:46:24 5 at least flush NPFL out of Gbarnga.

6 Q. Which forces united?

7 A. The ULIMO-J, K. And then I was in hospital, we heard about  
8 LPC. They also assisted them to attack Gbarnga.

9 Q. And did they capture Gbarnga?

10:46:43 10 A. Yes, they captured Gbarnga briefly, but we were not able to  
11 hold because there was still that split among them and the NPFL  
12 came back and retook the town.

13 Q. Did all of this occur whilst you were in hospital?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

10:47:02 15 Q. Any idea how long you were in hospital for?

16 A. Five months.

17 Q. Did there come a time when you were discharged from  
18 hospital?

19 A. Yes.

10:47:18 20 Q. What did you do when you were discharged?

21 A. Well, the first thing I did was to make sure that I  
22 returned home because my family heard about the incident and I  
23 decided to travel back for them to see me that I was still alive,  
24 so I came back to Sierra Leone.

10:47:39 25 Q. To where in Sierra Leone?

26 A. To Bo. The second capital, Bo.

27 Q. And how long did you spend in Sierra Leone on that visit?

28 A. Well, I stayed a little longer until when there was  
29 elections in Liberia and there was now election in Liberia and

1 after the elections I decided that, I mean, there is peace in  
2 Liberia now so I could come back and at least start looking for a  
3 job and other things.

10:48:19 4 Q. So can you give us any idea how long you spent in Sierra  
5 Leone on that occasion?

6 A. Briefly I cannot tell you but I was there until the  
7 election in Liberia, that was 1997, I think so.

8 Q. So you decided to go back to Liberia, yes?

9 A. Yes.

10:48:36 10 Q. Who was running Liberia at the time?

11 A. Liberia, it was ECOMOG in control after the elections.

12 Q. And was there a government in Liberia at the time?

13 A. Yes. There was an interim government headed by Dr Amos  
14 Sawyer.

10:48:57 15 Q. Now, whilst you were in Sierra Leone who was in charge of  
16 the government at that time? This is after you have been  
17 discharged from hospital, you go back to Bo, who is running the  
18 country in Sierra Leone at that time?

19 A. The President was Dr Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Then we  
10:49:22 20 were in Sierra Leone for some time before I crossed to Liberia,  
21 then this coup happened, this AFRC took over Sierra Leone and the  
22 condition was not so bearable. So I just decided to switch over  
23 to Liberia because there was now peace, so I came back on the  
24 other side.

10:49:37 25 Q. So help me with some detail then. Did you return to  
26 Liberia before or after that AFRC coup in Sierra Leone?

27 A. Just after the coup, two weeks after the coup, I came back  
28 into Liberia.

29 Q. And you say that when you go back to Liberia, Amos Sawyer

1 is in charge of the interim government, yes?

2 A. There was now election in Liberia. I left Amos Sawyer in  
3 power, but there was elections in Liberia and there was now a  
4 government in Liberia.

10:50:12 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, are you saying you went back  
6 to Liberia after the elections?

7 THE WITNESS: After the elections, correct.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. And also after the coup in Sierra Leone?

10:50:22 10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Now, what did you do when you went back to Liberia?

12 A. Well, we were just legal hustlers because at that time we  
13 look for something to eat, try to see if you can have jobs and  
14 that's what exactly we were doing in Monrovia.

10:50:48 15 Q. Now, this Court has heard much evidence that the elections  
16 in Liberia was preceded by a process of disarmament. Were you  
17 involved in that process?

18 A. The first disarmament?

19 Q. In Liberia.

10:51:09 20 A. No, I was not part of that particular - I was in Sierra  
21 Leone at that time.

22 Q. But help me, so far as ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K are concerned,  
23 did they disarm during that process?

24 A. Well, I will tell you about ULIMO-K - ULIMO-J because  
10:51:27 25 that's the faction I belong to. Before disarmament started we  
26 never trusted the NPFL and we heard information that they were  
27 burying arms. So they told us even before disarming that we  
28 should not give up all the arms in case of any eventuality. So  
29 most of our friends buried their arms in Duala and New Kru Town,

1 all the along the beach areas they were burying arms and few  
2 people disarmed really.

3 Q. Now you say they were burying arms in Duala and what was  
4 the other location you gave us?

10:52:02 5 A. New Kru Town.

6 Q. New Kru Town, K-R-U, yes?

7 A. And along the beach.

8 Q. And you said something about only a few actually disarmed,  
9 a few people disarmed, yes?

10:52:20 10 A. Yes, that first disarmament, only very few people disarmed.

11 Q. Now, who gave the instruction that arms should be buried in  
12 the way you have described?

13 A. Our then leader Roosevelt Johnson, because he was not too  
14 comfortable with his position in Monrovia, so he was anticipating

10:52:45 15 an attack on him at any time. So that's why he told us not to  
16 disarm all the rifles in Monrovia in particular, that we should  
17 just do - people should just do symbolic disarmament and should  
18 bury some arms in case of any eventuality.

19 Q. Now at this stage did ULIMO-J have any difficulties with  
10:53:07 20 ECOMOG?

21 A. After disarmament?

22 Q. Either before or after.

23 A. Yeah, we had some - there was a very good working  
24 relationship between us and them until when we one day heard that

10:53:25 25 before they deployed in Bomi we heard that they were taking huge  
26 arms and ammunition on the other side because they were doing our  
27 business with Kromah. So Johnson --

28 Q. On which other side?

29 A. ULIMO-K.

1 Q. And who was taking huge arms and ammunition to ULIMO-K?

2 A. The ECOMOG forces. So at that time we were ordered to stop  
3 and search those vehicles and to know whether they were really  
4 going to deploy and to see what was in those trucks.

10:53:59 5 Q. So what happened?

6 A. At the checkpoint at Amadu Town the ECOMOG forces refused  
7 their vehicles to be checked so they bulldozed, so there was no  
8 other alternative but to engage them.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness named a town, what town?

10:54:18 10 THE WITNESS: Amadu Town.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: A-M-A-D-U:

12 Q. So what was the consequence of all of that?

13 A. We eventually forced the convoy - we eventually forced them  
14 because our fire power was too heavy, so they were forced to  
10:54:47 15 stop. The vehicles were searched and we saw these ammunitions in  
16 it and we have to contact headquarter back by radio and there was  
17 that initial stuffle [phon], because we wanted to disarm all  
18 these rifles and the - but we only took few arms from them and we  
19 were given orders to release the trucks and the ammunition back  
10:55:07 20 to Monrovia. So it was done.

21 Q. And did they return to Monrovia with the trucks and the  
22 arms and ammunition?

23 A. Yes, that particular day they returned back to Monrovia.

24 Q. But did ULIMO-J take any of the arms and ammunition?

10:55:22 25 A. Yeah, we took some arms and ammunition.

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I don't understand the terms  
27 used by the witness that the vehicles - they refused to allow the  
28 search and they bulldozed. I don't know what that means.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. What did you mean when you told us that the ECOMOG convoy  
2 refused to be searched and so they bulldozed?

3 A. When they met us at the checkpoint in Amadu Town, we told  
4 them we have specific instructions that every vehicle that will  
10:55:53 5 pass through this highway would be checked and thoroughly  
6 searched. And they told us that they have a mandate from  
7 Monrovia that they were going to deploy in Bomi. And that  
8 argument pursued between us and they told us they would not even  
9 listen to us. So they just get down from their vehicles, opened  
10:56:16 10 the checkpoint - opened it for themselves with no checking and  
11 they started moving towards Klay. So that's what we called  
12 bulldoze. They bulldozed the checkpoint.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: And this was a checkpoint of who exactly?

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:56:35 15 Q. Who manned the checkpoint?

16 A. ULIMO-J, that's our faction, was in control of this area.

17 Q. And what were the final consequences of that incident?

18 A. Well, finally some of our fighters were wounded and the  
19 final thing that happened was negotiation went on in Monrovia and  
10:57:00 20 we were ordered to release the truck back to Monrovia and they  
21 turned back the convoy to Monrovia.

22 Q. Who gave that order?

23 A. Roosevelt Johnson gave us the order.

24 Q. And who had had the discussion which led to that order in  
10:57:14 25 Monrovia?

26 A. Roosevelt Johnson with ECOMOG.

27 Q. With ECOMOG?

28 A. That's correct.

29 Q. Now, so you come back to Liberia after the elections, yes.

1 What do you do thereafter? You told us you were hustling in  
2 Monrovia, yes?

3 A. Yes, we were just doing legal hustling. In the evening we  
4 get to Caldwell Junction to --

10:57:48 5 Q. To where?

6 A. Caldwell Junction, up Point 4 where most of the factions  
7 meet. We celebrate together, eat, drink together, just --

8 Q. Pause a minute.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're just wondering what "illegal  
10 hustling" means.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. What does "illegal hustling" mean?

13 A. No, I said we were doing legal hustling. Not illegal.  
14 Legal hustling.

15 Q. Legal hustling?

16 A. At times we go to the port --

17 Q. What did that involve? Just give us an example?

18 A. You go to the port like Freeport, you look for labour jobs.  
19 You do it, they pay you. At the end of the day we come back in  
20 the evening to Caldwell, have drinks, sit down with old friends,  
21 fighters, we discuss. That was the routine.

22 Q. And for how long were you doing that?

23 A. We were doing that for some time until when we were met by  
24 one Eddie Mansallay, that told us he wanted to see us and that he  
10:59:00 25 has already spoken to somebody that I don't want to name now.

26 Q. Okay. Pause there. Now, we will come to that. Now, you  
27 tell us - well, you have told us that you return to Liberia after  
28 the elections, yes? Who had been elected?

29 A. The President at that time was President

1 Charles Ghankay Taylor. He was elected as President.

2 Q. Now, following his election, yes, is this the period when  
3 you tell us you were engaged in legal hustling in Monrovia?

4 A. That's correct.

10:59:47 5 Q. Now, during that time, following that - the election of  
6 Charles Ghankay Taylor, did any difficulties arise between him  
7 and your leader, Roosevelt Johnson?

8 A. Yes, of course. There was this - as I told you, we had  
9 arms buried in Monrovia. We had these arms and, you know, Taylor  
11:00:15 10 had a lot of intelligent network going around, and I guess he  
11 must have heard of some of these things, so - and the house  
12 Roosevelt Johnson was occupying in Njala Town was at a strategic  
13 point and a threat, so they decided that they should serve me  
14 notice early to quit. But that never went down well. In that  
11:00:40 15 incidence, skirmishes occurred and fighting broke out.

16 Q. Fighting broke out between whom?

17 A. The forces of Mr Taylor and our forces, ULIMO-J.

18 Q. And where did that fighting take place?

19 A. Camp Johnson Road.

11:01:04 20 Q. Camp Johnson Road?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. You mentioned the name Njala. N-J-A-L-A, is that right?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Now, just explain to us taking your time, Mr Witness. What  
11:01:15 25 actually happened during that incident? You have spoken of the  
26 Taylor - Mr Taylor having intelligence about arms having been  
27 buried by ULIMO-J, yes?

28 A. But --

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please pause.



1 MS HOWARTH: Yes, I'm just looking at my LiveNote above in  
2 the answer. There is mention made of Taylor had a lot of  
3 intelligence network, but he didn't say that the intelligence  
4 related specifically to --

11:01:54 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, he did.

6 MS HOWARTH: I don't believe he did. It's my 56 - page 56,  
7 lines 1 on a 20 font. He says there - it was this, as I told  
8 you, we had arms buried in Monrovia. They had these arms and,  
9 you know, Taylor had a lot of intelligence network going around,  
10 and I guess he may have heard something of these things going on.  
11 So --

12 MR GRIFFITHS: And that these things he had mentioned  
13 earlier was arms being buried.

14 MS HOWARTH: I certainly submit that there is some  
11:02:30 15 ambiguity there and it ought to be for the witness, rather than  
16 counsel, to clarify it.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's true. I think so too. I mean, you  
18 could piece the evidence that way, but I think we would prefer to  
19 hear it from the witness himself.

11:02:43 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Mr Witness, you have told us about arms being buried in  
22 Duala and other locations by ULIMO-J upon the instruction of  
23 Roosevelt Johnson; is that right?

24 A. That's correct.

11:02:57 25 Q. When you mentioned earlier a few minutes ago about  
26 President Taylor having intelligence, intelligence about what?

27 A. Well, we were closely monitored. All activities of ULIMO-J  
28 was completely monitored in Monrovia by the security operators.  
29 That was why we're not - illegal gathering was even band, so we

1 used to talk to ourselves as soldiers. We know how --

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, I'm going to stop you. I  
3 asked you to speak slowly. Obviously the transcribers are having  
4 difficulty recording what you are saying. Why can't you speak

11:03:35 5 slower - more slowly?

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. What were you saying, Mr Witness?

8 A. So as I said, most of the arms that we - Taylor was  
9 surveillancing our movement, and all our movement was completely  
10 surveillance, and they had people that had already infiltrated  
11 some of our people, so they knew exactly what was going on on the  
12 ground.

11:03:55

13 Q. What was going - and what was going on on the ground?

14 A. Well, Roosevelt Johnson was not at all comfortable with his  
15 position, and he made that known to ECOMOG many a time. He  
16 thought he was not fairly treated, and so that ill feeling was  
17 there.

11:04:14

18 Q. And what happened as a result?

19 A. Well, I was in - as I told you, I was in Duala when we got  
20 a call one night from our commander, who was Ibrahim Jalloh, that  
21 there was a mission and we should assemble at Logan Town in the  
22 morning.

11:04:42

23 Q. Logan Town?

24 A. In the morning.

11:04:58

25 Q. Yes. And did you so assemble?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. How many of you?

28 A. We came in bits. That was about a platoon. We are 35.

29 Q. And what happened?

1 A. We were given instruction that an ECOMOG truck was coming  
2 to convey us to West Point.

3 Q. That an ECOMOG truck was coming to convey you to West  
4 Point?

11:05:22 5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. To do what?

7 A. Well, it was during that time that we knew that skirmishes  
8 have already started at Njala house and we were to go and support  
9 Roosevelt Johnson.

11:05:37 10 Q. And did an ECOMOG truck come to collect you?

11 A. Indeed, they came and they collected us.

12 Q. So you were being taken by an ECOMOG truck driven by whom?

13 A. By ECOMOG.

14 Q. To do what?

11:05:55 15 A. Well, they were initially linking us up with our unit in  
16 West Point. Then from there we were moved to Njala house at Camp  
17 Johnson Road to defend the house.

18 Q. So ECOMOG - and at this time were you armed?

19 A. They gave us arms.

11:06:14 20 Q. Who gave you arms?

21 A. ECOMOG gave us arms.

22 Q. So ECOMOG gave you arms and transport to go to where?

23 A. To Camp Johnson Road.

24 Q. To fight whom?

11:06:25 25 A. To fight Taylor's forces.

26 Q. And did they take you to that location?

27 A. Yes. We get to that location, but it was not easy getting  
28 there.

29 Q. Why not?

1 A. There was already fighting at that location.

2 Q. And how many trucks did ECOMOG provide to transport you?

3 A. Well, there were two trucks, but in the first truck was our  
4 own unit. The first 35 manpower.

11:07:01 5 Q. And who or what was in the second truck?

6 A. The second truck was Passaway. Passaway and others were in  
7 the other truck. They came to reinforce us.

8 Q. Does Passaway have a first name?

9 A. Of course. He is called Sylvester.

11:07:18 10 Q. So he was in the second truck, was he?

11 A. Yeah, they were the second truck.

12 Q. By himself or with others?

13 A. With others.

14 Q. And so having been armed by ECOMOG and transported by  
11:07:36 15 ECOMOG, you finally get to where?

16 A. We got to Njala House at Camp Johnson Road.

17 Q. And what happened when you got there?

18 A. Well, we got two instructions. That we should, first and  
19 foremost, escort the leader. Then the second operations was to  
11:07:56 20 make sure that if we succeed to take BTC, that we should fight to  
21 the last in Monrovia.

22 Q. So if you succeed in taking what?

23 A. The BTC was the Barclays Training Centre in Monrovia.

24 Q. The Barclay Training Centre in Monrovia?

25 A. Correct.

26 Q. So was that an objective?

27 A. That was our objective.

28 Q. Why did you want to capture the BTC?

29 A. Because we had very few arms, so if we shall have succeeded

1 in taking BTC, we shall have been properly armed. And there was  
2 also some Krahn resentment at the barracks, so we thought taking  
3 the barracks they will sympathise with us and reinforce us so we  
4 would drive Mr Taylor out of Monrovia.

11:08:44 5 Q. And so I just want to be clear what it is you are telling  
6 us. Your objective was to secure Roosevelt Johnson, capture BTC  
7 with a view to obtaining arms and ammunition in order to  
8 overthrow Mr Taylor, yes?

9 A. That was the objective.

11:09:07 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: And, Mr Griffiths, if I may intervene, I  
11 need to understand, so ECOMOG armed these ULIMO-K in order to  
12 carry out the stated objectives?

13 MR GRIFFITHS: ULIMO-J.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, ULIMO-J in order to carry out the  
11:09:27 15 stated objectives?

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Did ECOMOG provide you with arms and ammunition and  
18 transport to carry out this objective?

19 A. That's right.

11:09:42 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Namely, to secure Roosevelt Johnson, to  
21 capture BTC and finally to overthrow Taylor, this was the  
22 objective that ULIMO armed you for?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: That ECOMOG armed them for.

24 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

11:10:02 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, that ECOMOG armed you for.

26 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Was the mission successful?

29 A. The mission was a failure, total failure because we were

1 not able to take BTC. So - and then we called back our unit to  
2 tell them that it is not easy to take BTC, and the next objective  
3 was to escort the leader to the American embassy.

4 Q. And was he escorted to the American embassy?

11:10:36 5 A. Yes. He was escorted by the advance unit, Passaway and  
6 others; they advanced to the American embassy.

7 Q. Did you go to the American embassy?

8 A. No. You know, when we retreated from BTC, we were not able  
9 to link up with the forces now. So Passaway and others, that  
11:10:56 10 came in as reinforcement, were fortunate to move with the leader  
11 to the American embassy.

12 Q. What happened to you?

13 A. When we retreated we came back to the ECOMOG post and we  
14 told them we cannot make it and they told us that we should wait,  
11:11:20 15 there will be a truck coming evacuate us back to our point.

16 Q. And did a truck come to evacuate you?

17 A. Yes. Because there was now pressure from the ATU in  
18 Monrovia pressurising ECOMOG, and so they just dumped us in one  
19 truck. We were disarmed in that truck.

11:11:39 20 Q. You were disarmed in the truck?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. By whom?

23 A. By ECOMOG now.

24 Q. And then?

11:11:43 25 A. We were taken back to Logan Town.

26 Q. Logan Town?

27 A. Yeah.

28 Q. What's the ATU?

29 A. They were the Anti-Terrorist Unit that were in Monrovia.

1 Q. Now, you were mentioning earlier something else when you  
2 expressed some caution. Do you remember that?

3 A. I could remember it quite well.

11:12:49

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I wonder if we could go  
5 briefly into private session to deal with an introduction to a  
6 particular topic, because it involves the disclosure of details  
7 which might identify the witness.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Prosecution object to a brief  
9 private session?

11:13:12

10 MS HOWARTH: No.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well then. For the sake of  
12 protecting the identity of this witness, who is entitled to use a  
13 pseudonym, we will go into a brief private session.

14 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of  
15 the transcript, pages 42226 to 42229, was  
16 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as  
17 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Now, Mr Witness, you have told us about a recruitment drive  
11:21:39 5 led by someone, yes? When you heard about that recruitment  
6 drive, what did - what was your response?

7 A. Because my brother was leading the whole team, so I was  
8 happy and we decided to go on the drive together with Eddie  
9 Mansallay, General Ibrahim Jalloh who happens to be our  
11:22:06 10 commanding officer for that operation.

11 Q. And where did you go?

12 A. They took us to Ricks Institute.

13 Q. And where is Ricks Institute?

14 A. Ricks Institute is just outside Monrovia.

11:22:28 15 Q. Now, this recruitment drive, was it public knowledge? Do  
16 you understand what I mean by that? Did everybody know about it  
17 in Monrovia?

18 A. It was a very big secret because there was a government in  
19 Liberia now, so recruiting people to come into Sierra Leone was a  
11:23:05 20 very, very, very risky job. So it was in one of those even  
21 recruitment drive that he, my brother, was arrested.

22 Q. By whom?

23 A. By Taylor government.

24 Q. And was he detained?

11:23:27 25 A. Yeah, he was detained for a long time.

26 Q. For a long time?

27 A. Yeah.

28 Q. Okay. Let's put that issue to one side for a moment, okay,  
29 we will come back to it, yes. But you are recruited and you go



1 to Ricks Institute, yes? Now, were you safe at Ricks Institute  
2 given the delicacy of what you have told us?

3 A. Well, ECOMOG told us the area was safe because they were  
4 controlling the area, so initially it was safe.

11:24:06 5 Q. ECOMOG was controlling what area?

6 A. The Ricks Institute area, they were deployed around us and  
7 they were in that particular base.

8 Q. So ECOMOG was in the base and they were deployed around it,  
9 yes?

11:24:18 10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. To do what?

12 A. To protect us.

13 Q. And, help us, what were you being recruited to do?

14 A. Well, when we entered Ricks Institute, we were met by the  
11:24:38 15 then Chief Sam Hinga Norman, one General Wan Mohamed.

16 Q. General what?

17 A. General Wan Mohamed, that is the name we used to call him.

18 Q. W-A-N Mohamed, yes?

19 A. That's correct.

11:24:57 20 Q. You were met by those two and what happened?

21 A. And Eddie Mansallay. And he told us, "My children, you  
22 know that this government is a democratically elected government  
23 that we serving and these guys have just overthrown this  
24 government and you have the backing of the international  
11:25:19 25 community. As you can see, I am here protected by ECOMOG and you  
26 are protected by ECOMOG. So we need you guys to fight and make  
27 sure we restore back the democratically elected government in  
28 Sierra Leone."

29 Q. And this group to which you were being recruited, did it

1 have a name?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. What was it?

4 A. Well, Chief Sam Hinga Norman initially had the CDF, the  
11:25:47 5 Civil Defence Forces, but because they were ill-trained and the  
6 unit that we were coming have war experience, we have fought a  
7 lot, so we were named as the Special Forces. We were special  
8 among them.

9 Q. Now those who were being recruited into this Special  
11:26:07 10 Forces, to what group had they previously belonged?

11 A. Well, we cut across because since we were coming in Sierra  
12 Leone and we had no more fighting in Liberia, we decided to bury  
13 that ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J so we came together as Special Forces.

14 Q. So those who comprised the Special Forces, were they from  
11:26:28 15 both ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J?

16 A. That's correct.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, a bit of a clarification  
18 sought. This Eddie Mansallay, when he is addressing the witness  
19 and saying this government is a democratically elected government  
11:26:50 20 and these guys have just overthrown the government, what is that  
21 a reference to?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

23 Q. When you got to Ricks Institute, Mr Witness, you told us  
24 that you were addressed by someone, yes? Is that right?

11:27:08 25 A. Yes, you are correct.

26 Q. Firstly, who addressed you?

27 A. Chief Sam Hinga Norman.

28 Q. And he spoke of a democratically elected government being  
29 overthrown. Which government was that?

1 A. That was the Kabbah-led SLP government that was overthrown  
2 in Sierra Leone.

3 Q. By whom?

4 A. By the AFRC and RUF juntas.

11:27:37 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Does that suffice, Madam President?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I suppose so.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. And so you appreciated, did you, that you were being  
9 recruited to go and fight where?

11:27:56 10 A. In Sierra Leone.

11 Q. Now, was the Liberian government aware of this military  
12 presence at the Ricks Institute being protected by ECOMOG?

13 A. I believe so, because it was based on this intelligence  
14 that even they managed arrest Sparrow.

11:28:33 15 Q. And as a consequence of that, how were you surviving at  
16 that time? Were you all out in the open or what?

17 A. At Ricks Institute?

18 Q. Uh-huh.

19 A. We were being fed, taken care of by ECOMOG.

11:29:08 20 Q. Were you provided with arms and ammunition?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Who by?

23 A. By ECOMOG directly.

24 Q. And what kind of training - did you go through any training  
11:29:19 25 there?

26 A. Yes, because they knew we were fighters. So basically what  
27 they needed was effective command and control on the ground, that  
28 was basically what we trained at Ricks Institute, effective  
29 command and control.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, please finish your sentence before  
2 we break.

3 THE WITNESS: Basically what we were trained was effective  
4 command and control.

11:29:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. I think that would be an  
6 appropriate time to take the morning break. We will reconvene at  
7 12 noon.

8 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 12.02 p.m.]

12:02:38 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I mention a change in  
11 appearance. We're now joined by Mr Morris Anyah.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly that's noted. Thank you.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Witness, before the short adjournment you were telling  
12:02:48 15 us about the training you had received at Ricks Institute,  
16 specifically that you were trained in effective command and  
17 control, yes?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. What does that mean?

12:03:04 20 A. Well, this was basically to know exactly what you are going  
21 for and that command should be coordinated very effectively and  
22 that precautions must be taken.

23 Q. Now just help us with a few more details, please. This  
24 force of which you were a member which gathered at Ricks  
12:03:35 25 Institute, how many did they number?

26 A. Well, you know, as we were coming in people were still  
27 recruiting and people were coming, but the initial force that we  
28 started with was 180. 180 men.

29 Q. And were they all former members of either ULIMO-K or

1 ULI MO-J?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And help us, what was the command structure?

4 A. Say again.

12:04:03 5 Q. What was the command structure?

6 A. Be precise.

7 Q. Now, you've mentioned Chief Hinga Norman, yes. What was  
8 his role?

9 A. Well, he was the - he was to be in total command and  
12:04:23 10 control. And then Sparrow was in charge of all our operations  
11 especially the Special Forces, but when he was not there  
12 initially because he was in prison in Monrovia, we decided to  
13 appoint General Ibrahim Jalloh to take that role.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. What are the Special  
12:04:53 15 Forces?

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. What was the name you told us that was given to those who  
18 gathered at the Ricks Institute?

19 A. Special Forces.

12:05:05 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: When he says when Sparrow was in charge  
21 of all operations, especially the Special Forces, that  
22 presupposes there were other forces.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Let me address it in this way: What was Sparrow in charge  
12:05:32 25 of?

26 A. Well, you know, Chief Hinga Norman was in charge of the  
27 Civil Defence Forces and the Civil Defence Forces comprised of  
28 the Kamajors and most of these Kamajors were traditional people.  
29 They were not well trained and as such they needed a force that

1 was well trained and that will lead these people and be training  
2 them whilst we move along and that trained force among the CDF  
3 was known as the Special Forces.

4 Q. And who was in charge of them?

12:06:07 5 A. Sparrow was to be the commander of those forces but he was  
6 captured in Monrovia in recruitment so Ibrahim Jalloh was  
7 appointed to assist him whilst we start the jungle operations.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Does that suffice, Madam President?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that makes things very clear,  
10 thank you. Perhaps one other matter. The witness has told us of  
11 the composition of the initial force. May I also inquire what  
12 the nationalities were of the initial force. The Special Forces,  
13 what nationality they were.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:06:52 15 Q. What was the nationality of the Special Forces?

16 A. We are all Liberians.

17 Q. And had you belonged to any organisations before?

18 A. Of course. The ULIMO-Johnson faction and the ULIMO-K  
19 Kromah faction.

12:07:15 20 Q. So were all the Special Forces from the beginning former  
21 members of ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Now, help us. You've already mentioned ECOMOG's role, but  
24 just a few more details. Whilst you were at Ricks Institute, who  
12:07:42 25 was feeding you?

26 A. ECOMOG was doing all the feeding.

27 Q. Who provided protection for the institute?

28 A. ECOMOG.

29 Q. Who was providing arms and ammunition?

1 A. ECOMOG, of course.

2 Q. How long were you at Ricks Institute?

3 A. Three weeks.

4 Q. Then what happened?

12:08:16 5 A. We were told that our first assignment was to open corridor  
6 from the Liberian border all the way to Zimmi. That will enable  
7 ECOMOG to follow suit, because they told us they were not too  
8 familiar with that terrain.

9 Q. Who was not too familiar with that terrain?

12:08:41 10 A. ECOMOG.

11 Q. Yes?

12 A. And they told us they needed backup force on the ground and  
13 so it will be difficult for them to go in because they didn't  
14 know that terrain too well and we do. So they ask us that we  
12:08:54 15 make a requisition of arms and ammunition that we deem fit for  
16 that operation, which we did, and our first objective was to open  
17 that corridor from Gendema to Zimmi.

18 Q. Now initially when you were given that assignment were you  
19 and your colleagues happy and ready to go?

12:09:17 20 A. Well, we had other issues to discuss, because we told Chief  
21 Sam Hinga Norman that, yes, we are coming and we are going to do  
22 the job but at the end of the day what will be our remunerations.  
23 And he made a promise that after everything has finished we shall  
24 each be paid - after the first operation to Kenema we shall each  
12:09:46 25 be paid \$1,000 each and that was our agreement.

26 Q. \$1,000 what dollars? What kind of dollars?

27 A. US dollars.

28 Q. So each of you were to receive 1,000 US dollars after that  
29 operation?

1 A. That was the initial arrangement, correct.

2 Q. And who was going to pay you the \$1,000?

3 A. Well, that was the issue we raised before we left Ricks  
4 Institute. Then chief told us give him time to discuss it. He  
12:10:20 5 later briefed us that he has contacted the President of Sierra  
6 Leone at that time in exile and that funds will be available  
7 through ECOMOG and that everything will pass through ECOMOG and  
8 we will receive it.

9 Q. And just to clarify, the President in exile was who?

12:10:38 10 A. Tejan Kabbah.

11 Q. Thank you. Now, at the time when you were ready to depart  
12 Ricks Institute where was Sparrow?

13 A. He was still in detention.

14 Q. And what was the attitude of you and your colleagues about  
12:11:00 15 that?

16 A. We raised that issue seriously because he was - we saw him  
17 as a icon and he has been very much articulating and moving us  
18 and we admired him, so for him to be in prison, we raised that  
19 concern that it will be impossible, one, for us to move and leave  
12:11:23 20 him in detention and the operation will not be coordinated very  
21 well because first and foremost he did the recruitment, it is him  
22 most of the fighters know and they were not too familiar with  
23 General Ibrahim Jalloh. But ECOMOG told us we shouldn't worry  
24 about that. It is a very sensitive issue. They are dealing with  
12:11:50 25 it and they don't want to be seen as taking sides too early. But  
26 they assured us they would do everything possible in their  
27 capacity to see that he would be released.

28 Q. Now, this operation, did it go ahead?

29 A. Yes.



1 Q. And taking it slowly, just talk us through precisely what  
2 happened on that operation, starting with where did you start  
3 from?

4 A. We started from Gendema crossing point.

12:12:30 5 Q. How did you get from the Ricks Institute to Gendema  
6 crossing point?

7 A. We were conveyed by ECOMOG because ECOMOG was deployed at  
8 the border and they were deployed at Klay Junction, so that was  
9 the access route. They were deployed on the highway, so we used  
12:12:47 10 their trucks and they move us to the crossing point.

11 Q. What happens when you get to the crossing point?

12 A. The first thing that we did was to make sure that our CTRs  
13 were in Sierra Leone.

14 Q. That your what?

12:13:07 15 A. Our CTRs, our Close Target Recces. We have people that spy  
16 that we call recces.

17 Q. Close Target Recces as in reconnaissance?

18 A. Yeah, that's good.

19 Q. Go on. You say you had your CTRs where?

12:13:27 20 A. In Sierra Leone already.

21 Q. When had they gone into Sierra Leone?

22 A. As the plan was being done at Ricks Institute, we initiated  
23 the idea that we should have, first, an information about the  
24 ground and the terrain, and initially we were told that we have  
12:13:48 25 women that were already at the border and they were moving in and  
26 out and they were giving/given sensitive military informations  
27 right at the border.

28 Q. Okay. So carry on. Sorry I interrupted.

29 A. So when we got to the border - you know, the border is a

1 very long and porous borders. We have about 18 to 20 crossing  
2 points to cross into Sierra Leone and we use eight of those  
3 crossing points at midnight. We used canoes to cross.

4 Q. You used what to cross?

5 A. Canoe.

6 Q. Canoes?

7 A. Yes, canoes. And we crossed undercover into Sierra Leone  
8 where we started the operation.

9 Q. And just help us. Give us the details of what the  
10 operation comprised. What did you personally actually do?  
12:14:40

11 A. Well, initially our unit was - the first operational  
12 instruction was to make sure that we ambush any patrol from  
13 Malema Junction to Gendema to enable our colleagues that will  
14 cross for the Gendema attack to make it very easy for them,  
15 because according to the reconnaissance we were told that the RUF  
12:15:03 16 were using three anti-aircraft vehicles on that major highway.  
17 So our first operation was to make sure that those vehicles don't  
18 get to Gendema at all.

19 Q. And did you achieve that?

12:15:20 20 A. Yes, we did.

21 Q. And then what happened?

22 A. After we ambushed the first anti-aircraft vehicle very  
23 close to Malema Junction, the other two were forced to go back to  
24 Fairo. Fairo is 7 miles from Gendema.

12:15:39 25 Q. Can you spell that for us?

26 A. I cannot - I don't know how to spell the correct name, but  
27 Fairo.

28 Q. So what happened after that?

29 A. After that there was a breathing space for our men to

1 attack Gendema which they did the day and then Gendema fall. So  
2 we then decided to use Gendema as our tactical headquarters for  
3 the operation [overlapping speakers].

12:16:20 4 Q. Pause. Now, again, I appreciate how difficult it may be,  
5 but can you help us with some timing for when you entered Sierra  
6 Leone on this occasion?

7 A. That's why I've asked the Court dates. I'm too poor with  
8 dates, but that was --

12:16:43 9 Q. All right. Let's see if we can put together a little  
10 timeline to get a date. The elections in Liberia, yes, they're  
11 in early summer in 1997, aren't they?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. We then have the Camp Johnson Road incident, which is  
14 September 1997, yes?

12:17:08 15 A. Correct.

16 Q. How long after that was it --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. Yes, Ms Howarth?

18 MS HOWARTH: Yes, again, I'm going to object on the basis  
19 of leading. I don't believe that's agreed date in this case and  
12:17:17 20 the evidence should come from the witness.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: I absolutely agree with you.

22 Mr Griffiths, please do take care how you ask your  
23 questions.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

12:17:26 25 Q. Let me put it differently because we can get the date from  
26 elsewhere. How long after that incident was it that you went to  
27 the Ricks Institute, the Camp Johnson Road incident, roughly?

28 A. Well, after the Camp Johnson Road incident, it was just a  
29 month before we were taken to Ricks Institute.

1 Q. And how long did you spend at Ricks Institute?

2 A. I told you we spent three weeks at Ricks Institute.

3 Q. And then you launched this operation you were telling us  
4 about?

12:17:59 5 A. Yes. We came for a week at the border crossing before we  
6 crossed to launch this operation.

7 Q. Thank you very much. Now, you've captured Gendema, made it  
8 your headquarters. What happens then?

9 A. We initially started facing problems. One, the CDF that we  
12:18:23 10 were supposed to be fighting along, we are poorly armed. Most of  
11 them were using machetes, sticks. They have very few arms. And  
12 there was a manpower but no ammunition. So our initial objective  
13 was to have been moving - taking towns and leave them to defend  
14 these towns. But any time we move for any town and leave it in  
12:18:51 15 their care, then there is problem. They don't have enough  
16 weapons to defend. Then the RUF will make a comeback. So we  
17 started facing such problems here and there.

18 Q. However, were you in due course able to overcome those  
19 problems?

12:19:11 20 A. Yes. We made it known to ECOMOG, because they were also  
21 interested in our movement. We made it known to them that if  
22 they do not arm these people, I believe we will be on that axis  
23 for the whole year. There will be no progress. So they decided  
24 to supply these arms and they supplied the arms. So we started  
12:19:33 25 using Gendema as both our tactical headquarter and a training  
26 base to retrain few of the CDFs that were fortunate to have arms.  
27 So they started moving along with us.

28 Q. So those arms to arm the CDF came from ECOMOG, did they?

29 A. Directly. Correct.

1 Q. And from where did ECOMOG supply those arms? From which  
2 country?

3 A. We are told the arms were coming directly from Nigeria.

4 Q. From Nigeria to where?

12:20:12 5 A. To Liberia.

6 Q. And then from Liberia to where?

7 A. To us in Sierra Leone.

8 Q. And who was conducting the training of the CDF in Gendema?

9 A. Well, there was Eddie Mansallay in charge. Then we have  
12:20:31 10 one Mr Nallo, Albert Nallo.

11 Q. N-A-L-L-O. And can I have a spelling for Fairo, F-A-I-R-O.

12 Now, with these developments, the arming of the CDF by  
13 ECOMOG and the training of the CDF by the individuals you've just  
14 mentioned. Were you thereafter able to make progress?

12:21:10 15 A. Yes. We then made progress and were able to retake Zimmi  
16 from the combined forces of the AFRC and RUF, and we are there  
17 now when ECOMOG started supplying us arms by air.

18 Q. From where?

19 A. From Monrovia straight - helicopters were flying straight  
12:21:38 20 to our base in Zimmi, and the other one was directly from their  
21 base at Lungi, Base Zero, because that was the tactical  
22 headquarter for the eastern operation that was around Bonthe  
23 District.

24 Q. Base Zero in which district?

12:21:55 25 A. Bonthe District.

26 Q. So ECOMOG is supplying arms to the CDF from Lungi airport  
27 and also from Monrovia, yes?

28 A. That's correct.

29 Q. Transporting it by air?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. I see the spelling of Bonthe District at line 9 on 84. I'm  
3 told the spelling is B-O-N-T-H-E. And so that's Base Zero in  
4 Bonthe District, yes?

12:22:31 5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Thank you. So with this assistance, what progress were you  
7 able to make?

8 A. Well, our progress were now rapid because basic things that  
9 we used to lack, like cooking salt, medicines for wounded men,  
10 and even if we have big casualty from senior commanders, it was  
11 then very easy for us that they will evacuate them by air. So it  
12 was - we started making progress.

13 Q. So you captured Zimmi. Where did you go after that?

14 A. Then we opened the corridor for Kenema. At that time  
12:23:12 15 ECOMOG has started linking up with us. They cross - at that time  
16 they started pulling out of Liberia, so they cross through our  
17 territory all the way to Zimmi, which was our first base, and  
18 they deployed.

19 Q. ECOMOG are pulling out of Liberia and entering Sierra  
12:23:33 20 Leone, yes?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Basing at Zimmi?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. And are they providing - apart from the airlifting of war  
12:23:42 25 materials and so on that you have mentioned and the evacuation of  
26 wounded, are ECOMOG also providing manpower on the ground?

27 A. Yes, they did. Because when we left Zimmi, the first unit  
28 that came and based at Zimmi, we told them we are moving forward  
29 and Zimmi is very volatile because it is surrounded by this Gola

1 Forest, that they should be very much careful and only push as  
2 far as coming to Gorahun Tunkia. The RUF took a bypass and  
3 attacked Zimmi and ECOMOG were forced to pull out with the CDF  
4 and they just abandoned everything there, arms, ammunition. So  
12:24:31 5 we are now far away when we got the call that Zimmi has fallen  
6 back to AFRC. It was a very big shock. So we have to retreat  
7 back to come and defend that town. And when we retook it, we  
8 have already lost a lot of arms and ammunition which was taken by  
9 the RUF. They took it and carried it.

12:24:53 10 Q. Can I assist with a spelling. Gorahun Tunkia, G-O-L-A,  
11 T-O-N-K-I-A. So --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Before you move, the witness said that  
13 Zimmi had fallen back to the AFRC and then he said, "It was a  
14 very big shock, so we have to retreat back to come and defend the  
12:25:20 15 town. When we retook it, a lot of arms and ammunition that was  
16 taken by the RUF." So was it the AFRC or the RUF? I don't  
17 understand.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Who captured Zimmi from your forces?

12:25:41 20 A. At the Zimmi axis, the AFRC were the military people and  
21 the RUF juntas have collaborated and were controlling the area  
22 from Zimmi all the way coming to Joru, because that's an easy  
23 axis for them to Kailahun. So the attack was done by RUF.

24 Q. And who captured the arms and ammunition which was left  
12:26:00 25 behind in Zimmi?

26 A. The RUF.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I would like to know how the witness  
28 knows this. Since there were two forces that went into Zimmi,  
29 how does he know which of the two forces took the arms?

1 MR GRIFFITHS :

2 Q. How many forces went into Zimmi?

3 A. Well, initially when Zimmi fell to our forces, to RUF, it  
4 was announced. You know Mosquito was very loud, so immediately  
12:26:25 5 that happen, he went over air that his forces has retaken Zimmi  
6 and that they have even captured ECOMOG soldiers and they were  
7 moving them on base. So we knew straight that it was the RUF  
8 because it was announced by Sam Bockarie, Mosquito.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, but this doesn't clarify the matters  
12:26:46 10 to me. He says that the AFRC took Zimmi from the CDF. Is that  
11 correct?

12 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: And then you said the RUF took Zimmi from  
14 the AFRC. Is that correct?

12:27:02 15 THE WITNESS: No. We were now in Zimmi. Not AFRC any  
16 more. We took Zimmi from AFRC. Because it's a combined force,  
17 the RUF and the military people were called AFRC/RUF juntas. So  
18 when we took Zimmi we were there until ECOMOG came to reinforce  
19 Zimmi to enable us to move towards Kenema. It was when we left  
12:27:24 20 and we are already at Gorahun Tunkia that they bypassed from  
21 their jungle positions.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Who bypassed?

24 A. The RUF.

12:27:33 25 Q. And did what?

26 A. And retook Zimmi by night.

27 Q. From whom?

28 A. From ECOMOG.

29 Q. Were the AFRC involved in that attack on Zimmi which



1 resulted in arms and ammunition being taken?

2 A. Well, I don't believe that because most of the fighters  
3 that were even capturing at that axis were purely RUF.

12:28:02

4 Q. So just to be clear, when you captured Zimmi in the first  
5 place, who was in control of it?

6 A. It was completely controlled by the RUF.

7 Q. And this attack that you are telling us about, who  
8 conducted that attack which captured Zimmi from ECOMOG?

9 A. That was the RUF again.

12:28:23

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: So at what stage did the AFRC get  
11 involved at Zimmi? Perhaps the witness misspoke.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Was the AFRC ever involved at Zimmi?

12:28:37

14 A. The government in Sierra Leone at that time was headed by  
15 Johnny Paul Koroma, who was a military personnel, and they were  
16 called the AFRC. But they called the RUF from the jungle to  
17 assist them. So they were called AFRC/RUF juntas. But the axis  
18 I'm telling you about was completely dominated by RUF. They were  
19 fighting as a combined force but RUF was dominating that  
20 particular area. Just like the Western Area, they have a lot of  
21 military personnels.

12:29:02

22 Q. Let's move on, Mr Witness. Now, you told us that your  
23 objective when this operation started was Kenema. Is that right?

24 A. That's correct.

12:29:31

25 Q. Did you achieve that objective?

26 A. Yeah, after that setback we regrouped again and we  
27 accomplished that objective.

28 Q. And in completing that objective, just talk us through the  
29 route you took.

1 A. From Zimmi, Gorahun Tunkia, Gegbwema, Joru, Dama Giema, SS  
2 Camp, Kenema.

3 Q. SS Camp?

4 A. That's correct.

12:30:09 5 Q. And what does the SS stand for [microphone not activated]?

6 A. There's a problem with the mic.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Something has happened. Something has  
8 happened, I'm sure you can't even hear me, but the audio has  
9 suddenly gone off. Perhaps Madam Court Manager you can look into  
10 what's happened. It seems to be back on now, so please repeat  
11 the question.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. I was asking, Mr Witness - can you hear me now.

14 A. Correct.

12:30:59 15 Q. SS camp, what does the SS stand for?

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's gone again. I'm sorry, it's gone  
17 again. Can you please establish what is going on, Madam Court  
18 Manager.

19 Mr Griffiths, before you go too far there were a number of  
12:32:01 20 locations mentioned by the witness starting from Zimmi. Could we  
21 have some spellings on the record, please. This is at the  
22 beginning of page 89.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. You said from Zimmi you went Gorahun Tunkia?

12:32:31 25 A. Gorahun Tunkia.

26 Q. And we've had that spelling, G-O-L-A T-O-N-K-I-A, yes?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's Gorahun Tunkia?

28 THE WITNESS: Correct.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Gorahun Tunkia.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's gone again.

2 MS IRURA: [Microphone not activated].

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Apparently, Madam President, some  
4 technicians are on their way to look into this problem, but if  
12:33:11 5 this is going to continue, in my respectful submission, perhaps  
6 we ought to adjourn, because it's so - the evidence comes out so  
7 disjointed with these constant interruptions.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think in the circumstances we will  
9 adjourn for 10 to 15 minutes and we will see what happens  
12:33:44 10 [microphone not activated].

11 [Break taken at 12.33 p.m.]

12 [Upon resuming at 12.57 p.m.]

13 MS IRURA: Users could please revert to the right channel  
14 as the microphone system was reset.

12:57:46 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: We've been informed that the system is  
16 now in working condition. Please continue.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Mr Witness, before we were interrupted, you were helping us  
19 with certain place names on the route between Zimmi and Kenema.  
12:58:18 20 Do you recall that?

21 A. That's correct.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be shown a map  
23 S3-F, please. Whilst that is being done, could he also be  
24 provided with map S14. Could we start, please, with map  
12:59:30 25 S3-F.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps the witness should switch seats.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Mr Witness, could you move to the other seat, please. Now,  
29 you've been very helpfully provided with a pen, yes? Now, I'm

1 not asking you to write anything but just using the pen as a  
2 pointer, do you see Zimmi on that map. Could you put it back on  
3 the overhead and indicate where you are talking about where Zimmi  
4 is?

13:01:04 5 A. Zimmi is right here.

6 Q. Now, if you go towards the top of the map, do you see  
7 Kenema?

8 A. Yes. That's Kenema here.

9 Q. Now, using those two points, can you trace for us the route  
10 you took which led to the capture of Kenema?

11 A. Zimmi, Gorahun Tunkia, Gegbwema, Joru. There's supposed to  
12 be Dama Giema around this route but I'm not seeing it from Joru.

13 Q. That's why we have a more detailed map, S14.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: What was the location of that last place  
13:02:39 15 that the witness mentioned? Mr Witness, what is that location  
16 that is not on the map?

17 THE WITNESS: Dama Giema.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Now, we had reached Joru but my suspicion is now that we've  
13:03:24 20 got there, that Joru may not be on this map. Well, Mr Witness,  
21 can you find Zimmi on this map? Do you see it?

22 A. Yes, I've seen Zimmi here.

23 Q. If you follow the red route going up through Nyeyama - do  
24 you see it? And then you come to Nemahugoiima, do you see that?

13:04:19 25 A. I've seen that.

26 Q. Then you come to Gorahun, yes? Just above the word Tunkia?  
27 Have you got it?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. And then beyond that you've got Damawuro, do you see that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, those places we've just mentioned, do you recognise  
3 those locations?

4 A. I recognise the locations.

13:05:05 5 Q. And help us, using this map as a guide, can you assist as  
6 to the route you took?

7 A. Well, this map is looking a little bit complicated for me,  
8 but I really prefer the first one which was very easy for me.

9 There's only one missing name on that one which was the Dama

13:05:37 10 Giema.

11 Q. Let's go back to the other map then. So you've taken us  
12 from Zimmi to Gorahun, yes?

13 A. Gegbwema here, all the way to Joru.

14 Q. Yes?

13:06:06 15 A. Then in between here there's supposed to be - this Giema.  
16 There is the Giema Dama. This junction. It's called Dama.

17 Q. It's called what?

18 A. Dama Giema. The Giema is on the map.

19 Q. And from there?

13:06:26 20 A. We proceeded to this crossing point. There is a bridge  
21 here and at this bridge is where they call SS Camp.

22 Q. At that bridge across the blue river that we can see there,  
23 yes?

24 A. That's where they call the SS Camp.

13:06:43 25 Q. And then from there to where?

26 A. To Kenema.

27 Q. Okay. I hope that's clear. How long did it take to you  
28 traverse that route?

29 A. Roughly because we had support from ECOMOG now we were

1 moving at a fast pace, so it took us about two months to get to  
2 Kenema.

3 Q. And what happened when you got to Kenema?

4 A. Can I go back to my seat?

13:07:20 5 Q. Yes, you can go back to your seat, thank you. So what  
6 happened when you got to Kenema?

7 A. When we got back to Kenema, we were ordered to wait for  
8 ECOMOG to proceed to Kenema. So we were in Kenema for a week.  
9 Then we were told ECOMOG that the road is now safe so they have  
10 to move their tanks, their shakers, and their artilleries to  
11 Kenema.

12 Q. Their tanks, their what?

13 A. They were having a tank that they call shaker.

14 Q. Who do you spell that?

13:08:10 15 A. S-H-A-K-E-R, something like that.

16 Q. Thank you. So did they move that heavy equipment up to  
17 Kenema?

18 A. Correct.

13:08:28 19 Q. Now, at this stage after the capture of Kenema did you  
20 remain there?

21 A. Well, we were called to help because there was problem in  
22 Bo, the second capital Bo. That was attacked by the CDF. Purely  
23 CDF operation led by Albert Nallo. And they were not able to  
24 sustain the town. So the AFRC overrun Bo again and we are called  
13:08:53 25 together with ECOMOG to go and repel that attack in Bo and to  
26 base permanently in Bo. So we moved on to Bo.

27 Q. Now pause there because I want to clear up any possible  
28 possibility of misunderstanding at a later stage. When you say  
29 AFRC was in Bo, who are you talking about?

1 A. I'm talking physically about the military. They were in Bo  
2 in their numbers.

3 Q. Was there RUF in Bo as well?

4 A. Yeah, they were combined but the military was more visible.

13:09:29 5 Q. When you use the term AFRC, Mr Witness, who are you  
6 referring to?

7 A. I'm referring to the government that was in power at that  
8 time headed by Johnny Paul Koroma.

9 Q. And are you speaking, when you use that term, solely about  
13:09:51 10 the Sierra Leone military or are you talking about the RUF as  
11 well?

12 A. Both of them. The Sierra Leone military and the RUF.

13 Q. So you go to Bo to secure the situation, yes?

14 A. Which we did.

13:10:13 15 Q. How long did you remain in Bo?

16 A. We are in Bo for another two weeks. Then we are recalled  
17 by Chief Sam Hinga Norman for all forces to report at Base Zero.  
18 Senior commanders to report at Base Zero.

19 Q. Base Zero you've mentioned before in Bonthe county, yes?

13:10:35 20 Is that right?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. What's the nearest town to Base Zero?

23 A. The nearest town to?

24 Q. Base Zero?

13:10:45 25 A. Well, you have a few towns around Base Zero. You have -  
26 it's not too far from Matru Jong. Then it is very close to Banta  
27 Taninahun. So those are the major towns.

28 Q. Matru Jong I'm told is spelt M-A-T-R-U J-O-N-G. Could you  
29 repeat the second name, please, that you mentioned? You

1 mentioned Matru Jong?

2 A. Banta Tani nahun.

3 Q. Thank you. So you were told --

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps the witness can spell this town  
13:11:37 5 for us.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Can you spell it for us?

8 A. I can spell the Banta, not the Tani nahun. B-A-N-T-A.  
9 Tani nahun, I don't know the correct spelling.

13:11:52 10 Q. And did you go to Base Zero?

11 A. Yes, we moved to Base Zero.

12 Q. When you say we moved to Base Zero, who is the "we"?

13 A. The Special Forces together with the CDF commander Nallo,  
14 that was the regional commander for the south, we all moved  
13:12:10 15 together to Base Zero.

16 Q. And what happened when you got to Base Zero?

17 A. When we got to Base Zero, we were told that now that we  
18 have secured the corridors of Bo and Kenema but there is still  
19 resistance in Tongo Fields, Kono, and the main highway going to  
13:12:33 20 Freetown. They were planning an operation called Operation Black  
21 December and that the sole aim of that operation was to make sure  
22 that we cut off all major roads leading to Freetown, all major  
23 roads leading from the mines from Kono and Tongo respectively.  
24 So that was the first briefing.

13:13:16 25 Q. Okay. Now, who was the ECOMOG commander at this time?

26 A. It was Khobe. General Khobe.

27 Q. What was his first name?

28 A. Mmm?

29 Q. What was his first name?



1 A. General Mitiki she Maxwell Khobe. That was the name they  
2 used to give us. I didn't know his Nigerian spelling.

3 Q. Can you spell it?

4 A. No, no.

13:13:41 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you say it slowly, please.

6 THE WITNESS: The Nigerian name, I don't know how to call  
7 it perfectly well.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Well, just try. General - what was the first name?

13:13:56 10 A. It was Mitiki she Maxwell Khobe, but I'm familiar with the  
11 Maxwell Khobe.

12 Q. Now, did that general have an involvement with your group,  
13 the Special Forces?

14 A. Of course.

13:14:15 15 Q. What was that?

16 A. Well, he came - he flew from Lungi to Base Zero on the  
17 helicopter, so he met us and he told us that we should wait at  
18 Base Zero and that we are going to receive special rifles for  
19 that operation, and that rifle is what we will use for the Black  
13:14:46 20 December operation.

21 Q. So General Maxwell Khobe told you this, yes?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Whilst at Base Zero?

24 A. That is correct.

13:14:52 25 Q. And where were these special rifles to come from?

26 A. Well, we were told it was coming from a British company  
27 called Sandline through the - because we receive it through  
28 Rutile, through South Africans, because they were guiding the  
29 mines. So receive it through from them.

1 Q. And, as far as you were aware, who was responsible for  
2 organising those arms to come in through Sandline?

3 A. Well, we were told by the late Sam Hinga Norman that there  
4 was a deal directly with the British High Commissioner at that  
13:15:27 5 time, Peter Penfold. In fact, we started calling the rifle  
6 "Peter Penfold, the Black December rifle", but we were told to  
7 stop calling that name.

8 Q. And these rifles, what were they?

9 A. They were black AK-47 rifles.

13:15:47 10 Q. The colour black?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And did you receive those rifles?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Where were you when you received those rifles?

13:15:58 15 A. At Base Zero, but the rifles were deposited at Sierra  
16 Rutile, the mines, so we collected the rifles from the mines to  
17 Base Zero where it was distributed evenly among the forces.

18 Q. How many rifles are we talking about that was provided via  
19 Sandline organised by the British High Commissioner Peter  
13:16:21 20 Penfold?

21 A. The rifles were plenty, because the one we received our own  
22 unit was 240 rifles, AK-47, and then we were told 40 of those  
23 rifles were for onward movement because our objective now was  
24 Tongo. And few of the CDF that were at the location we were  
13:16:41 25 supposed to move, they didn't have rifles, so we should  
26 distribute 40 of that to them so that they will give us access to  
27 the Tongo Fields.

28 Q. Now, were you provided with ammunition for those rifles?

29 A. Yes. Every rifle - there was ammunition for every rifle.

1 Enough ammunition.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's not - is it not possible to get some  
3 kind of time frame for these 240 rifles?

4 THE WITNESS: Well, I cannot give you the exact date, but  
13:17:14 5 at that time we were now in Base Zero. After we have moved from  
6 Zimmi, Kenema, we're in Base Zero. I don't quite remember the  
7 exact timing.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not asking for the exact timing. I'm  
9 asking for a year. Maybe even a part of the year. Beginning,  
13:17:33 10 middle, end.

11 THE WITNESS: I think we were moving very close to the  
12 ending of '98 going towards '99, I believe so.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, having received - no, let me start again. Apart from  
13:18:02 15 rifles and ammunition, did you receive any other equipment?

16 A. Yes. We received medicine, food and fuel for the vehicles  
17 that we were using.

18 Q. Now, you mentioned --

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: He received these from who, the medicines  
13:18:24 20 and things? These were received from who?

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Who did you get the medicines and other things from?

23 A. We received that directly upon the orders of Chief Sam  
24 Hinga Norman.

13:18:35 25 Q. From whom?

26 A. Chief Sam Hinga Norman.

27 Q. Where did he get them from?

28 A. Directly from - because Khobe came and told us the arms  
29 were coming, he received it from ECOMOG and passed it over to us.

1 Q. Now, you mentioned Tongo. These arms, ammunition and other  
2 war materials that you received, what was the objective?

3 A. Well, we were told by Khobe that they have instruction that  
4 all the mines in Sierra Leone must be captured so that the RUF  
13:19:18 5 will not have any power to be extracting diamonds illegally and  
6 selling them for arms. So that was the initial instruction, that  
7 we should make sure that the mines are secure.

8 Q. Now, who was concerned to secure the mines?

9 A. ECOMOG was concerned to secure the mines completely.

13:19:41 10 Q. Now, just diverting for a moment. At this time where is  
11 Sparrow?

12 A. Sparrow was still in Liberia.

13 Q. Where in Liberia?

14 A. He was still in detention.

13:20:08 15 Q. Now, did you embark on that operation, Black December?

16 A. We took part fully in that operation.

17 Q. And was the operation successful?

18 A. Yes, because it was a combined force of CDF, a Special  
19 Forces, and the forces that surrendered to the army that was  
13:20:40 20 called the Loyal forces and ECOMOG. But the operation became bad  
21 at the end of the day because we attacked Tongo in the night till  
22 daybreak and ECOMOG was using a whole lot of artilleries. So by  
23 the time we took Tongo in the morning, there was casualty  
24 everywhere, so --

13:21:05 25 Q. Pause there. Those casualties, were they soldiers or  
26 civilians?

27 A. They were civilians and military casualties, because at the  
28 field - because there was an airstrip there. That was where the  
29 military was based. You see civilian and military casualties.

1 Whilst we were moving deep in town, you see where mortars were  
2 dropping and civilians were being killed, you know.

3 Q. And who had used those mortars to kill civilians?

13:21:36

4 A. Well, ECOMOG told us they were giving us covering fire and  
5 they were shelling, but they told us they have specific targets.  
6 But by the time we took Tongo in the morning, we realised that  
7 civilians were killed, a lot of civilians were killed.

8 Q. How did you feel about that?

13:21:53

9 A. Well, we are soldiers initially, we felt bad because that  
10 was not the plan of the operation, to see a lot of civilians  
11 being killed, and so we are not that more happy anyway.

12 Q. Did you eventually capture Tongo?

13:22:21

13 A. Yes, we captured Tongo. And after we have done  
14 house-to-house search, and then we are told to make sure that the  
15 periphery of Tongo, that's the immediate vicinity of Tongo,  
16 should be combed properly from enemy. Then we came back on base  
17 in Tongo Town now.

18 Q. And did you remain in Tongo Town?

13:22:42

19 A. Well, that was the problem. Immediately we took Tongo.  
20 After ten days, ECOMOG told us, the area, they have orders that  
21 they should secure the mines and that we should leave the mines.

22 Q. Who should leave the mines?

23 A. The CDF and the Special Forces.

24 Q. Should leave the mines?

13:22:58

25 A. Leave the mining areas.

26 Q. Leaving who behind?

27 A. ECOMOG.

28 Q. And did that happen?

29 A. There was a lot of tussle, because it's not easy for them

1 to move us because we ourselves wanted to just start digging,  
2 because everybody wanted money. But there was a scuffle, but  
3 finally Chief Norman called us that it has just been arranged  
4 that ECOMOG should be in control of the mines and we should pull  
13:23:24 5 back to Kenema.

6 Q. And did you do that?

7 A. Yes. We moved upon that instruction.

8 Q. And what happened to the mines in Tongo after you left?

9 A. Well, we left ECOMOG deployed there and they were there.

13:23:40 10 Q. Doing what?

11 A. Well, friends were going there, other people were going  
12 there. We were told they were doing business with people on the  
13 ground.

14 Q. What business?

13:23:51 15 A. Diamonds, because that's a diamond fields area. They were  
16 buying diamond and doing business.

17 Q. So just so that we're clear, that was ECOMOG doing that,  
18 wasn't it?

19 A. Yes. It was no hidden secret. It's an open secret,  
13:24:03 20 because immediate Tongo was clear, civilians leave from Kenema,  
21 they go to do business and they were there doing business with  
22 them.

23 Q. And who was in charge of that exploitation of the resources  
24 of the Republic of Sierra Leone? Who was in charge of it? Who  
13:24:17 25 was in charge of ECOMOG?

26 A. Maxwell Khobe. Khobe was in direct control.

27 Q. I now have a spelling, Mitikshe, M-I-T-I-K-I-S-H-E,  
28 Maxwell, M-A-X-W-E-L-L. Khobe, K-H-O-B-E.

29 So you were removed from Tongo to Kenema?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And in your absence ECOMOG is busy mining?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So what did you do next?

13:24:48 5 A. Well, they told us to then do the final assault on Freetown  
6 to remove AFRC from power, so we were airlifted from Bo to Jui.

7 Q. J-U-I?

8 A. Yeah, Jui.

9 Q. And that's close to Freetown on the peninsula, isn't it?

13:25:13 10 A. That's very close to Freetown, that's correct.

11 Q. Who airlifted you to Jui?

12 A. ECOMOG.

13 Q. How many people were airlifted to Jui?

14 A. 400.

13:25:22 15 Q. Were they all Special Forces?

16 A. Special Forces and Kamajors.

17 Q. What happened when you got to Jui?

18 A. Well, we are told that there was final orders that we  
19 should move on Freetown and remove the AFRC from power, and so we  
13:25:42 20 made that move and the order, it was a very difficult one. We

21 pushed through and Freetown was liberated, and the President of

22 that country was returned back. It was on that very day when the

23 President was supposed to return back in Sierra Leone that the

24 Sierra Leone government rejected the Liberian delegation from

13:26:06 25 entering Sierra Leone and that they would only allowed that

26 delegation when they released Sparrow. So they then released

27 Sparrow to Liberian delegation, and he was brought together the

28 same day the President was returning back to Sierra Leone.

29 Q. Because there. You've given us a lot of detail there, and

1 I just want to prevent any future misunderstanding. Which  
2 President was returning to Freetown?

3 A. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

13:26:35

4 Q. You mentioned that the Liberian delegation were supposed to  
5 come to Freetown. Is that right?

6 A. That's correct, for the inauguration.

7 Q. But their entry was refused unless Sparrow was released?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. And Sparrow was indeed released?

13:26:47

10 A. Yes, he came with the Liberian delegation and he was  
11 released to the Government of Sierra Leone.

12 Q. And who insisted that Sparrow be released as a condition  
13 for the Liberian group to be allowed into Freetown?

14 A. Because --

13:27:06

15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. Yes, Ms Howarth.

16 MS HOWARTH: Yes, the objection again is on the basis of  
17 leading. The whole entirety of the last question was evidence  
18 coming from counsel and not from the witness. There's been  
19 evidence that Sparrow was released, but no evidence as to it  
20 being a condition for the Liberian group to be allowed into  
21 Freetown.

13:27:20

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I think it was. It was a  
23 condition, according to the evidence that the witness has given.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: 104 starting at or about line 16.

13:27:43

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think the witness has indicated  
26 that it was a precondition. Please continue.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Who insisted on that precondition?

29 A. Well, because the unit was now - because we thought



1 Freetown has been cleared, so the only thing was to pile pressure  
2 on the government now to release Sparrow. So that pressure was  
3 piled on both Khobe and Chief Sam Hinga Norman. So by the time  
4 they realised that the Liberian delegation was supposed to come,  
13:28:10 5 they flatly denied that that delegation will not be accepted  
6 until Sparrow is released.

7 Q. Now, I just want to clarify a couple of matters before --  
8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please, but the witness has not said who  
9 insisted on that precondition. He says pressure was piled on  
13:28:28 10 Khobe and Chief Hinga Norman, but we don't know by who. Pressure  
11 by who?

12 THE WITNESS: The pressure was mounted by Khobe himself.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. That's General Maxwell Khobe, commander of ECOMOG forces in  
13:28:46 15 Sierra Leone?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. He was the one that applied that pressure?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. These arms that you received, the Peter Penfold rifles, was  
13:29:06 20 that before or after this intervention you are telling us about?

21 A. It was before the intervention.

22 Q. And help me also with this: The Tongo operation to capture  
23 Tongo, was that before or after this intervention?

24 A. It was before the intervention.

13:29:26 25 Q. Now, were your forces involved, the Special Forces, in the  
26 intervention?

27 A. Of course. I took --

28 Q. Alone?

29 A. No, with the CDF. I told you they airlifted up to about

1 400 of us to Jui to backup ECOMOG from that position to move.

2 Q. So --

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, Mr Griffiths, we have come up to  
4 the end of our morning and you have to continue from now - from  
13:29:54 5 there at 2.30. We will reconvene at 2.30.

6 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

7 [Upon resuming at 2.31 p.m.]

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, before you  
9 continue, I thought I'd seek a clarification from the witness  
14:31:29 10 where he said at Zimmi when the RUF took over Zimmi from ECOMOG  
11 the witness's faction lost a lot of arms. I think the evidence  
12 he gave was "a lot of arms". Could the witness indicate in terms  
13 of numbers what "a lot of arms" means, please.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:32:00 15 Q. You will recall this morning that we discussed the capture  
16 of Zimmi; you then going on an operation and hearing that Zimmi  
17 had been retaken by the RUF. Do you remember telling us that?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. And you told us how the RUF managed to capture a lot of  
14:32:25 20 arms and ammunition.

21 A. You're correct.

22 Q. Can you give us idea of what quantities we are talking  
23 about?

24 A. Well, any time a base is used as the operational or  
14:32:43 25 tactical headquarters, that is where you have your ammunition  
26 dumps and your artilleries. So when ECOMOG left Liberia and  
27 initially advanced and occupied Zimmi, almost - there was a very  
28 big building at Zimmi, the two big storey buildings at Zimmi.  
29 The down of it - the down floors were used for stores of arms and

1 ammunition, and there was a large quantity of arms and ammunition  
2 in that particular building, and then they just pull out and left  
3 everything at the disposal of the enemy.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Does that suffice, Madam President?

14:33:21 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: So, Mr Witness, you can't really say how  
6 much in terms of arms and ammunition; is that what you're saying?

7 THE WITNESS: Correct, I cannot tell you the exact quantity  
8 because it was a very huge arms. Those arms were transported by  
9 trucks and offloaded in those buildings. So I don't have the  
10 exact specification, but a large quantity of it.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I go any further, can I indicate to  
12 the Court a change of representation. We've now been joined by  
13 Mr Terry Munyard, Mr Morris Anyah having left us:

14 Q. Now, I just want to get an idea because I'm sure you didn't  
14:34:05 15 go around counting every box of ammunition, but these two  
16 buildings that you're talk about, how big were they? Using the  
17 dimensions of this room, how big were these buildings?

18 A. Both buildings are bigger than this room. They are  
19 two-storey buildings in Zimmi. That is just in the junction in  
14:34:24 20 Zimmi Town. There is one - if you are leaving Kenema there is  
21 one facing you, and if you are leaving Liberia there is one on  
22 the other side. So they are just adjacent - I mean, opposite  
23 each other.

24 Q. Yes. And you say the two buildings are bigger than this  
14:34:39 25 courtroom and the area where the arms and ammunition were stored,  
26 are they taller than this courtroom?

27 A. No, because they are storey buildings. They are not as  
28 tall as this, but the basement of that building, the floor, they  
29 were used as shop initially by the people that own it and that -

1 the first store was almost full - half fully packed with  
2 ammunition. Half of it was packed with G3 rounds, AK rounds and  
3 RPG bombs.

4 Q. And that was both buildings or just one building?

14:35:13 5 A. Both buildings were used because they were dividing the  
6 explosives from the rounds. Like, the RPG bombs were kept at a  
7 separate location; the mortar rounds kept at a separate location;  
8 then the rounds for the GPMG were kept at a different location  
9 where the AK and G3s were kept at the first building.

14:35:34 10 Q. Now, picking up where we left off before the luncheon  
11 adjournment, you've told us about being airlifted to Base Zero  
12 and from there you're airlifted to Jui. Is that right?

13 A. You are correct.

14 Q. And the objective was to push the junta government out of  
14:36:00 15 Freetown, yes?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Now, what did that operation actually involve, from your  
18 point of view, as a member of the Special Forces?

19 A. Say again?

14:36:15 20 Q. What did it actually involve you doing?

21 A. In taking Freetown?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Well, we were as an advance party for the ECOMOG troop that  
24 were based in Jui, because there was a part that - there was a  
14:36:38 25 camp very close to Jui that was minded by another group of  
26 Liberians that were called the STF. There was a very small camp  
27 there. They were there based together with some AFRC. So they  
28 thought it was necessary that we engage that unit because they  
29 know - they were not too good at this guerilla tactics.

1 Q. Which group were not good at guerilla tactics?

2 A. The ECOMOG forces. So they decided that we go in for that  
3 target because it was a closer target, and we went for that  
4 target at dawn. Although we have enough coverage from them -  
14:37:16 5 from Jui, we took that axis and from the head on we were just  
6 hitting and pushing now: Allen Town, Calaba Town, Wellington,  
7 all the way to State House.

8 Q. And help me: This group you've mentioned called STF, on  
9 which side were they?

14:37:35 10 A. The STF?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. Well, initially they were fighting on the side of the AFRC.  
13 There were two units of them. Some of them surrendered to the  
14 government. They were in Lungi. Then the other unit that  
14:37:52 15 remained with the AFRC, they were based in Freetown very close to  
16 Jui.

17 Q. Yes, and who was in charge of that unit of STF?

18 A. There was a general called General Bropleh.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: So this STF that was at Jui, this was  
14:38:11 20 fighting on whose side?

21 THE WITNESS: They were fighting on the AFRC side at that  
22 time.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. And they were led, you say, by General Bropleh, yes?

14:38:23 25 A. That's correct.

26 Q. Now, did you engage them in battle?

27 A. Of course we engaged them. That was the predawn attack I  
28 was telling you about.

29 Q. And were you able to push them back?

1 A. Yes, we pushed them back all the way to Allen Town. We  
2 engaged them at Allen Town, then they were folding back now with  
3 the AFRC people.

14:38:54 4 Q. Now, this force of STF, where did these soldiers who  
5 comprised that force come from?

6 A. They were also Liberians. Most of them were former ULIMO  
7 fighters that came back and - that were fortunate to rejoin the  
8 Sierra Leonean army, and they were given Sierra Leonean numbers -  
9 army numbers and they were called the STF.

14:39:13 10 Q. So just so that we get an overview of this situation, we  
11 have Liberians in Special Forces unit fighting with the CDF. Is  
12 that right?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Former ULIMO combatants. Is that correct?

14:39:31 15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And you've also got Liberians fighting on the other side,  
17 the STF?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. They too are former ULIMO fighters?

14:39:42 20 A. Not all.

21 Q. Some?

22 A. Some were ULIMO fighters.

23 Q. Now, so you've told us how you pushed them all the way back  
24 to State House, yes?

14:40:00 25 A. That's correct.

26 Q. Whilst you were engaged in doing that, where were the  
27 ECOMOG troops?

28 A. They were backing us up, because as we were advancing -  
29 because the obstacle was the point that that unit was occupying.

1 But as soon as that predawn raid was carried out and they started  
2 retreating, we then told ECOMOG that they are moving and they  
3 were giving us artillery cover, mortars and anti-aircraft tanks,  
4 they start moving and the advance started.

14:40:37 5 Q. Okay. After State House, to where did you go?

6 A. Well, initially we were moved to Wilberforce Barracks, but  
7 later we were told to come and occupy the Brookfields Hotel,  
8 which would be a blocking force, because that is the road that  
9 leads to the presidency. So we were told to be in that hotel and  
10 that should be our immediate headquarters.

11 Q. Now, the Brookfield Hotel, that's the building right next  
12 door to the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Freetown, isn't it?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. So that's where you were based?

14:41:10 15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Now, following that operation you're now based at the  
17 Brookfields Hotel?

18 A. You're right.

19 Q. What happens to you thereafter?

14:41:32 20 A. Well, after the return of the President Dr Alhaji Ahmad  
21 Kabbah, we were now - after they released Sparrow, we were in  
22 Freetown and then we were encouraged by the government - they  
23 were feeding us and they were giving us stipend, and they told us  
24 we should be there because all the country was not yet safe, so  
14:42:00 25 we should be there until further orders. So we were in Freetown  
26 waiting.

27 Q. All right. Now, it's totally my fault, but I need to just  
28 go back a little bit. You've told us about pushing the forces  
29 all the way back to State House. Did you actually force that

1 opposition out of Freetown?

2 A. Completely. Completely.

3 Q. How far did you pursue them?

14:42:38 4 A. Well, after the push from Wilberforce, we pursued them all  
5 the way to 7th Battalion, that's Goderich, then we took the  
6 peninsula. Then there was another advanced party that came  
7 straight from the peninsula; we linked up at Benguema. Then  
8 there was another force that moved to - there is this fishing  
9 place after Waterloo, Tombo.

14:43:03 10 Q. And from there where did you push them?

11 A. Well, few of them crossed the river. Those that made it  
12 came and - because there is a bypass from Benguema. There is a  
13 bush road they call Fogbo. In Fogbo you will cross Mabang  
14 Bridge, then you are in the jungle again. So they used that  
14:43:27 15 route to get back into the jungle.

16 Q. And did you pursue them into the jungle?

17 A. Well, initially, after we took Freetown, it was - we were  
18 told that we should just stop the operation there and they  
19 redeployed some of our unit at the Makolo Junction. That was the  
14:43:45 20 junction that was leading from the highway to the southern part  
21 of Sierra Leone, because the AFRC are occupying now the main  
22 highway from Masiaka all the way going. So the only route that  
23 we had was the road to Moyamba and we are told to be at that  
24 junction to defend that junction, so that if any supply we want  
14:44:06 25 to get to Bo, food for the civilians, we open that corridor to  
26 Moyamba. So our unit were based at Makolo whilst our headquarter  
27 was in Freetown, Brookfields Hotel.

28 Q. And where were you, as an individual, based?

29 A. At Makolo, Makolo Junction.



1 Q. And for how long were you based there?

2 A. We were based in Makolo for 11 months.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, the witness mentioned there  
4 headquarters in Freetown at some hotel. What was that hotel?

14:44:38 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. What was the hotel?

7 A. Brookfields Hotel.

8 Q. That's the one right beside the Special Court for Sierra  
9 Leone building in Freetown, yes?

14:44:49 10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. On Jomo Kenyatta Road?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Thank you. So that was your base, yes?

14 A. That's correct.

14:44:59 15 Q. Now, when you left Makolo Junction, to where did you go?

16 A. Well, we were at Makolo Junction when I was recalled to  
17 Freetown for another briefing and then it was at this junction  
18 that I met Dr Vamba Kanneh.

19 Q. Pause there. Doctor who?

14:45:22 20 A. Vamba Kanneh.

21 Q. How do you spell the name?

22 A. I don't know how to spell that name.

23 Q. Does V-A-M-B-A, K-A-N-N-E-H sound about right? Is that  
24 right? Is that spelling right?

14:45:46 25 A. That's correct.

26 Q. Now, I want you to be very careful here, do you understand  
27 me? Because I'm anxious to protect your identity, okay? Let's  
28 just recap so we get things in perspective. After you push the  
29 junta forces out of Freetown you spent 11 months at Makolo

- 1 Junction, yes?
- 2 A. That's correct.
- 3 Q. Where do you go from there?
- 4 A. From Makolo?
- 14:46:21 5 Q. Yes.
- 6 A. I told you our headquarters was at Brookfields Hotel.
- 7 Q. Did you go there?
- 8 A. Yes, I was called.
- 9 Q. Who by?
- 14:46:28 10 A. By a brother that I don't want to name now. He was in the  
11 hotel and he called me and introduced Dr Vamba Kanneh and  
12 Councillor Janneh.
- 13 Q. J-A-N-N-E-H?
- 14 A. That's correct.
- 14:46:52 15 Q. Anybody else?
- 16 A. Then Supuwood. Councillor Supuwood.
- 17 Q. Where was Councillor Supuwood from?
- 18 A. At that time?
- 19 Q. Uh-huh.
- 14:47:05 20 A. Well, he never told me where he was from exactly at that  
21 time, but later on he told me he just came from abroad.
- 22 Q. So through an individual you were introduced to these three  
23 individuals, Dr Vamba Kanneh, Councillor Janneh and Councillor  
24 Supuwood. Is that right?
- 14:47:24 25 A. That's correct.
- 26 Q. Where did that introduction took place?
- 27 A. At the base at Brookfields Hotel.
- 28 Q. And who were these people, starting with Dr Vamba Kanneh?
- 29 A. Well, he introduced himself to us as a politician.

1 Q. From where?

2 A. From Liberia.

3 Q. Yes?

4 A. And then Council l or Janneh introduced himself as a legal  
14:47:55 5 man.

6 Q. From where?

7 A. From Liberia also, but he was not residing there now  
8 because of the threat. And Supuwood also told us he was part -  
9 once part of the NPFL, but he's no more. He's in the States and  
14:48:13 10 they are trying to put things together to see how best we can go  
11 across and to overthrow the Taylor government.

12 Q. And how was that to be achieved, did they say?

13 A. Yes. We asked them that question and we told them that  
14 this government in Sierra Leone is starting to be shaky. It  
14:48:46 15 would be very much impossible for us to use any crossing point  
16 from Sierra Leone and that our unit in fact is under surveillance  
17 and - but they told us we shouldn't worry about that, they will  
18 get back to us because they are going to consult with higher  
19 authorities. So they left that very day.

14:49:05 20 Q. Now, I want you to help us with a timeline here. In which  
21 year did this meeting take place?

22 A. I couldn't quite remember the year, but I believe we are  
23 pushing for 2000 at that time.

24 Q. Well, help me with this: Were you in Freetown at the time  
14:49:46 25 of the Freetown invasion in January 1999?

26 A. Of course we were in Freetown.

27 Q. When you say we were in Freetown, who is "we"?

28 A. The Special Forces were in Freetown.

29 Q. And where were you based?

1 A. We were based at Brookfields Hotel.

2 Q. And what did you do as a consequence of that invasion?

3 A. The January 6th invasion in Freetown, we were used as a  
4 back-up force for ECOMOG, because initially when these guys  
14:50:26 5 gathered strength in Kono - they were led by SAJ Musa - they  
6 overrun ECOMOG in Kono. So they have to pull back to Makeni. We  
7 were then ordered to reinforce the highway, because we were right  
8 at Makolo, to move at RDF. There was a training base just --

9 Q. Called what?

14:50:47 10 A. RDF.

11 Q. RDF. Yes, continue.

12 A. That base was where the - there was a special training  
13 going on for the Sierra Leone military called the Rapid  
14 Deployment Forces. That was the base. So we were ordered to  
14:51:04 15 move as a defensive line at RDF.

16 Q. And did you do that?

17 A. Yes, we moved there.

18 Q. And did you see any action when you moved there?

19 A. Yes, because the very day the people attacked Masiaka and  
14:51:20 20 we saw lots and lots of ECOMOG with - some without shoes, some  
21 without even their rifles. They came with stories that they have  
22 been disarmed; they have lost ammunitions and they were moving.  
23 So there was that panic, total panic in the RDF. So we were  
24 still there until the next day in the evening that we came under  
14:51:43 25 attack. First, we came under mortar attack. We tried to resist,  
26 but the firing power of the enemy was too great, so we have to  
27 pull back to Makolo. Makolo, we couldn't make it there. We came  
28 Waterloo. We spend that night in Waterloo.

29 Q. And then?

1 A. And then we were ordered to move back because there was  
2 this colonel at Jui, Colonel Akpata, that told us that he was not  
3 going to allow anybody to base in Jui and that he is in control  
4 of Jui; that we should move and defend Calaba Town. So he gave  
14:52:22 5 us passage and we moved and were just behind Jui at Calaba Town  
6 defending the hills.

7 Q. And for how long did you remain there?

8 A. We were there until January 6th now, because the attack  
9 started at Calaba Town on January 6th. We were there until  
14:52:45 10 January 6th.

11 Q. And were you and your fellow Special Forces actually  
12 involved in engaging the invaders of Freetown in January 1999?

13 A. Of course, yes.

14 Q. Were you involved in street fighting?

14:53:00 15 A. We were involved in street fighting.

16 Q. And just describe that experience to us. What was it like?

17 A. Well, when these guys were advancing that morning - in  
18 fact, that night what they did was, they have already infiltrated  
19 Freetown, because most of these guys were soldiers, they were  
14:53:22 20 born in Freetown, they know Freetown, they have already  
21 infiltrated.

22 Q. Pause there. Most of these guys you say were soldiers?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Soldiers from where?

14:53:29 25 A. From the armed forces of Sierra Leone.

26 Q. So when you say "most of these guys were", most of which  
27 guys?

28 A. Those that attacked Freetown.

29 Q. So the "most of those" who attacked Freetown were soldiers

1 from the Sierra Leonean army?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Who had lived in Freetown?

4 A. Who were living in Freetown that retreated from Freetown  
14:53:52 5 when we attacked Freetown and they were now in the jungle, the  
6 AFRC.

7 Q. And they were the ones who were coming back now?

8 A. Yeah, they were coming back.

9 Q. So you were saying about street fighting and I was asking  
14:54:04 10 you to describe that experience.

11 A. It was bloody, because these guys were hiding behind -  
12 because they forced all the civilians to move from the houses and  
13 they were behind the civilians coming. So any time they engage  
14 us, you want to engage them, there are civilian casualty. Any  
14:54:28 15 time they engage - so that force - that's the reason why even our  
16 commander called us to say, "Hey, look, guys, come to the hotel,  
17 Pademba Road. Defend the prison and the hotel. That's our  
18 operation, because it's very difficult to fight these guys now.  
19 People are so much in the streets. If you continue fighting like  
14:54:45 20 this, you will just kill every body."

21 Q. And so did you follow that instruction?

22 A. Yeah, we followed that instruction.

23 Q. So where did you deploy?

24 A. We deployed a unit at Pademba Road with ECOMOG to defend  
14:54:57 25 the prison, Pademba Road Prison. Then we moved to unit to New  
26 England. There was where I was based. New England is just a  
27 stone's throw to where the Court is and the hotel. So we had our  
28 deployment at that particular location overseeing the hills in  
29 Darzack. That was where we based that morning.

1 Q. And what happened after that?

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, overseeing the hills in what?

3 THE WITNESS: Darzack. When you are in England Ville and  
4 you take the hilltop, you see Darzack beneath you. There is an  
14:55:37 5 area called Darzack. Darzack farm.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm told D-A-R-Z-A-C-K.

7 Q. Yes, and you were saying what happened?

8 A. And then in the evening they attack our position from  
9 Pademba Road all the way to this - and they overrun our

14:55:57 10 positions, so we have to retreat and we couldn't defend the  
11 hotel. We moved everybody from the hotel to Wilberforce, so we  
12 moved our headquarter now to Wilberforce. Everybody had moved.

13 ECOMOG, CDFs, Special Force, we were all in Wilberforce. It was  
14 there that we were met by Chief Sam Hinga Norman and Khobe and  
14:56:20 15 they told us that should be defensive line because we shouldn't  
16 allow those guys to take Wilberforce. If they take Wilberforce,  
17 then there will be total anarchy. So then we draw our defensive  
18 line from that position and started resisting.

19 Q. And was there actual fighting at Wilberforce?

14:56:38 20 A. Of course.

21 Q. How long did that last?

22 A. Well, it lasted for two days. Then we were given  
23 instruction, because at that time our commander - name I don't  
24 want to mention - has already left for more reinforcement because  
14:56:54 25 we have a unit in Zimmi also. He went and collected that unit by  
26 air and then collected the remaining units in Kenema, and we were  
27 reinforced. The next day there was also CDF reinforcement by  
28 air, and then we started the ground offensive in Freetown.

29 Q. Just so that we can keep things in perspective, the person

1 who went to Zimmi to obtain reinforcement, was that the person  
2 whose release was made a condition for the Liberian delegation to  
3 arrive in Sierra Leone?

4 A. That's correct.

14:57:35 5 Q. Okay, so what happened after that?

6 A. After that we were told to start the operation to retake  
7 Freetown and we started the operation.

8 Q. Was it difficult?

9 A. Very, very difficult.

14:57:59 10 Q. What did it involve?

11 A. Well, it involved using heavy artilleries, because those  
12 guys were heavily armed in Freetown and they knew Freetown very  
13 well. So moving them from those built-up areas was not an easy  
14 target. So ECOMOG used to shell those areas both by land and  
15 air, and then we moved in for those targets.

16 Q. And in due course were you successful?

17 A. Yes, we were successful.

18 Q. And did you manage to push them out of Freetown?

19 A. Yeah, we managed to push them out of Freetown.

14:58:34 20 Q. How far did you push them?

21 A. Well, we pushed them as far as where we were last deployed  
22 at Calaba Town, and they used the hills to retreat back to  
23 Waterloo. Then they used the jungle route back into their  
24 jungle.

14:58:49 25 Q. Now, following that successful operation to drive out the  
26 January invaders in 1999, did you stay in Freetown?

27 A. We were - after we pursued them all the way to Masiaka we  
28 were ordered to redeploy back to that position, Makolo, because  
29 there is a junction that was used to access food to the south.



1 We were redeployed there as a unit. By that time I was based now  
2 in Freetown, and there was a unit commander deployed at Makolo.

3 Q. I know this might appear boring, Mr Witness, but I need to  
4 do this in order to keep things in perspective, yes?

14:59:39 5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Now, you spoke of being based at Makolo junction on more  
7 than one occasion. Were you based at Makolo junction for a  
8 period before the January 6 invasion and also after the January 6  
9 invasion?

14:59:53 10 A. We were based at Makolo before the January 6 invasion, and  
11 then after they attacked us we moved to Freetown. Then after we  
12 pushed them out of Freetown, we redeployed back at Makolo.

13 Q. Thank you. And when you were redeployed at Makolo after  
14 the Freetown invasion, how long did you remain at Makolo?

15:00:13 15 A. Well, we stayed there at least longer, because we were told  
16 that we should use that point now as our rallying point for this  
17 mission, that these people came with Vamba Kanneh and then  
18 Supuwood and Counsellor Janneh.

19 Q. That's what I was coming to. Because help us now: That  
15:00:35 20 meeting with Dr Vamba Kanneh, Counsellor Janneh and Counsellor  
21 Supuwood, was that before or after the January 6th invasion?

22 A. They met us before the January 6th invasion --

23 HER HONOUR: Please pause.

24 MS HOWARTH: Yes, my objection is on the basis that counsel  
15:00:54 25 is trying to rehabilitate his own witness there. He already gave  
26 evidence that the meeting occurred in 2000.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: How does this really rehabilitate the  
28 witness? I asked was it before or after, so how does that  
29 contradict what the witness has said before?

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Howarth, could you guide us to the  
2 page where the witness said the meeting occurred in 2000, please.

3           MS HOWARTH: Yes, I can. On my LiveNote it's 118 at around  
4 about line 14 to 15. The question preceding that is:

15:02:11 5           "Q. Now I want you to help us with a timeline here. In  
6 which year did the meeting take place?

7           A. I couldn't quite remember the year, but I believe we  
8 were pushing for 2000 at that time."

9           PRESIDING JUDGE: And "pushing 2000" means what in your  
15:02:25 10 opinion, Ms Howarth?

11           MS HOWARTH: Well, "pushing for 2000" I suppose means 1999.

12           PRESIDING JUDGE: In which case I would overrule your  
13 objection then, wouldn't I? Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

14           MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

15:02:44 15           Q. That meeting with Dr Vamba Kanneh, Counsellor Janneh or  
16 Counsellor Supuwood, was it before or after the Freetown  
17 invasion?

18           A. After the Freetown invasion.

19           Q. Help us: How long after?

15:03:01 20           A. After the invasion it was just the second month.

21           Q. After the invasion?

22           A. Yeah.

23           Q. That's when this meeting took place?

24           A. Correct.

15:03:21 25           Q. At Brookfield Hotel?

26           A. You're correct.

27           Q. Now, after that meeting - and just remind us: These three  
28 individuals had told us that their objective was what?

29           A. Was for us to go and overthrow the government of

1 Charles Taylor.

2 Q. Using what means?

3 A. Well, they gave us two options initially: The first option  
4 was we use arms and ammunition to fight a guerilla warfare,  
15:03:57 5 because that is the only way we would move him from power; then  
6 the other option, they told us we should wait until they have  
7 consideration with General Khobe and others.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, when the witness says -  
9 refers to "us" - he gave "us", who is "us"?

10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. You've heard the question, Mr Witness. Who is the "us" to  
12 whom these three men spoke?

13 A. The Special Forces directly.

14 Q. How many of you roughly?

15:04:28 15 A. The total strength of Special Forces?

16 Q. Yes, at this point?

17 A. At this point they were just talking to the high command.  
18 We were just 12 in number at that initial time.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: And the witness was part of that high  
15:04:41 20 command? Were you part of that high command, Mr Witness?

21 THE WITNESS: Correct. I was the {redacted} at  
22 that time.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. And so you were present at this meeting, were you?

15:04:54 25 A. Correct.

26 Q. And just help us so that we're clear. Apart from the three  
27 named individuals, are you saying there were 12 senior commanders  
28 from the Special Forces, or what?

29 A. That's correct.

1 Q. And you mentioned that they - then the other option they  
2 told us is that we should wait until they have something with  
3 General Khobe and others. What was that?

4 A. Well, later on we were briefed again.

15:05:40 5 Q. By whom?

6 A. By Dr Vamba Kanneh now. At that time Kabinah Janneh was  
7 not there and Vamba Kanneh had a house by Hill Cot Road. That  
8 was where he was residing with our chairman, whose name I don't  
9 want to mention. That was where they were dwelling, and they  
10 called us there for the second time for this meeting.

11 Q. Yes, and what transpired at that meeting?

12 A. They told us that there is other options, but since I was  
13 the {redacted} they have called Albert Nallo from Bo,  
14 and he was to join us to see Khobe the next day, together with  
15 the chairman and our commanding officer, General Ibrahim Jalloh,  
16 the late Colonel Old Pa. Then we waited for Albert Nallo, he  
17 came, and the other day we met General Khobe at Cockerill.

18 Q. Pause there. Out of an excess of caution, it seems to us,  
19 Madam President, that the reference to a particular military  
20 title should be redacted. It's been mentioned on two occasions  
21 now by the witness, most recently in the last answer. But prior  
22 to that, because I didn't want to draw attention to the fact,  
23 there was an earlier mention.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Officer, if we would please  
25 redact the part of the answer that reveals a certain title. It  
26 was at page 127, line 16, and then where that occurs subsequently  
27 somewhere. 128, line 12. Please redact those from the record.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, can I caution you, please, Mr Witness, it's not merely

1 a name which might disclose an identity. You follow?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. So be very careful, because we're dealing with an

4 identifiable group with certain numbers, so disclosure of any

15:09:15 5 rank could lead to the disclosure of an identity. Do you follow  
6 me?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Now, bearing that in mind, you're speaking now of a further  
9 meeting, yes?

15:09:27 10 A. Yes, so we met with General Khobe.

11 Q. Pause there. First of all, where did this meeting talk  
12 place?

13 A. At Cockerill military headquarters.

14 Q. Secondly, who was present at this meeting?

15:09:45 15 A. Myself, the late Old Pa Bendu.

16 Q. The late who?

17 A. General Old Pa Bendu.

18 Q. How do you spell that?

19 A. It's Old Pa, O-L-D, P-A. That's the way Liberians call a  
15:10:10 20 nickname to old people.

21 Q. Old Pa?

22 A. Bendu, yeah.

23 Q. So Bendu is - how do you spell that?

24 A. I don't want to give wrong spellings here.

15:10:17 25 Q. Okay, but the first part of it is O-L-D, P-A?

26 A. Old Pa Bendu.

27 Q. So when he was there. Who else was there?

28 A. My brother, I don't want to name here. General Ibrahim

29 Jalloh. Then Albert Nallo was in that meeting.

- 1 Q. And you mentioned General Khobe being present?
- 2 A. That's correct.
- 3 Q. Which Khobe is that?
- 4 A. He was the army chief of staff of Sierra Leone.
- 15:10:56 5 Q. Is that the man whose name you couldn't pronounce earlier?
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 Q. Maxwell Khobe?
- 8 A. That's right.
- 9 Q. Okay. So what happened at that meeting at Cockerill
- 15:11:12 10 Barracks with General Maxwell Khobe?
- 11 A. Well, he told us they were looking at another option.
- 12 Q. And who was looking at another option?
- 13 A. He, General Khobe, and the group that had earlier met him.
- 14 Q. Which group that had met him?
- 15:11:28 15 A. The group of Supuwood, Vamba Kanneh and Kabinah Janneh.
- 16 Q. So those three had met with General Khobe, had they?
- 17 A. Correct.
- 18 Q. And what was General Khobe's position at this meeting at
- 19 Cockerill Barracks?
- 15:11:46 20 A. Well, he had referred them that he directly speak with the
- 21 military people on the ground because those that met him were
- 22 purely political people and do not know about military. So he
- 23 asked that he discuss the option with us, we see if we can carry
- 24 on the task, and then that was why we were called at Cockerill.
- 15:12:08 25 Q. So what task was being discussed?
- 26 A. Well, he told us that there was troop rotation for ECOMOG
- 27 every one to six months.
- 28 Q. Pause there. Troop rotation for ECOMOG, yes? And what did
- 29 that troop rotation involve?

1 A. Those troops that are in Liberia that would stay above six  
2 months, at times if you are lucky one year, they need to  
3 re-change them and a new troop come back to take their positions.

4 Q. Take their positions where?

15:12:47 5 A. In Liberia.

6 Q. I'm sorry. I'm sure it's my fault, Mr Witness, but could  
7 you just explain that movement to me again, please?

8 A. They were always rotating troops.

9 Q. From where to where?

15:13:00 10 A. From Liberia to Sierra Leone. Then another troops would  
11 come from Nigeria to replace them.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. If you are fortunate they will fly you back to Nigeria. If  
14 you are not fortunate, you will work in Sierra Leone whilst the  
15:13:13 15 other troop will come and go and replace in Liberia.

16 Q. So what was the plan?

17 A. Well, he told us we are going to be - we go through a crash  
18 programme at Cockerill and then they are going to use us  
19 specifically as - at the ECOMOG replacement that is going back  
15:13:34 20 into Liberia. That was the initial plan. So --

21 Q. No, no, no, sorry. We need to details of this. First of  
22 all, who is telling you about this plan?

23 A. This General Khobe.

24 Q. And when you say use you as part of the rotation, how?

15:13:50 25 A. Well, we were there as Special Forces and he knew taking us  
26 there was a very big gamble, so the only way to do that was to  
27 have used ECOMOG fatigue and presented us like we are ECOMOG  
28 troops going to be redeployed in Liberia.

29 Q. So when you say "use ECOMOG fatigues", what are you talking

1 about?

2 A. They would give us their uniforms.

3 Q. So you would be dressed in ECOMOG uniforms?

4 A. That's correct.

15:14:20 5 Q. Passed off as ECOMOG troops. And through this process of  
6 rotation, taken to where?

7 A. To Monrovia.

8 Q. And this is the plan that General Khobe outlined at this  
9 meeting at Cockerill?

15:14:33 10 A. To us, yes.

11 Q. And, help me, once you were in Liberia using that disguise,  
12 what were you supposed to do?

13 A. Well, he came out with a map at Cockerill and he show us a  
14 total convincing map that we were going to be deployed from  
15 Capitol bypass to the Executive Mansion and the road leading  
16 straight to - I don't know, there was a building, Varmuma  
17 Building, that's where you leave for the airfield.

18 Q. For which airfield?

19 A. For the James Spring airfield in Monrovia.

15:15:25 20 Q. Which?

21 A. James Spring airfield.

22 Q. James Spring airfield, yes?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. And go on.

15:15:31 25 A. And that was where our deployment was supposed to be.

26 Q. And to do what?

27 A. He demonstrated it on paper that we were to be deployed  
28 strategically at that location because that is the road Mr Taylor  
29 was using to come to the Executive Mansion. So when that convoy



1 enters our territory --

2 Q. Which convoy?

3 A. Taylor's convoy.

4 Q. Yes?

15:15:55 5 A. It should have been engaged.

6 Q. In order to do what?

7 A. To capture Mr Taylor alive. But if by any means they fully  
8 resisted, we should then blow up all the vehicles. That was the  
9 for instruction they gave us.

15:16:11 10 Q. At Cockerill Barracks?

11 A. At Cockerill Barracks.

12 Q. And remind us who gave you that instruction?

13 A. Khobe. General Khobe gave us that instruction.

14 Q. Now, in which year is this taking place, can you help?

15:16:25 15 A. We are now in 2000.

16 Q. Now, was that - how were you to travel to Liberia?

17 A. Well, we raised all those questions. In fact, the very  
18 first day he gave us the map, he gave us the deployment positions  
19 for us to go and see for ourselves to see, because he told us  
15:16:50 20 it's a very big gamble, it's a very big risk and we were to  
21 travel by the ECOMOG gunboat, because there was a gunboat in  
22 Freetown that usually conveyed troops to Monrovia. They would  
23 land at the port, then they will take us to our deployment.

24 Q. So you were to travel from Sierra Leone to Liberia by sea?

15:17:08 25 A. That's correct.

26 Q. Now, was it only Special Forces who were to be involved in  
27 this operation?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Who else was to be involved?

1 A. The CDF. Then ECOMOG itself told us, in case there was  
2 anything, they will give off a backup. That was their assurance.  
3 Because we told them, deploying at those positions, if for  
4 instance our position is overrun, where do we go? They told us  
15:17:50 5 they will give us backup. Because if you enter such a situation,  
6 you don't have any back route, your rear to retreat, then there  
7 is problem. And so we asked them all those question. They told  
8 us, while the situation will be like that, they will find ways  
9 and means to make sure that they give us backup and they will  
15:18:07 10 know how to remove us from the area. But that's why told us  
11 strictly that we should be patient with the convoy and timely  
12 engage the convoy. That was why we were supposed to do the crash  
13 programme at Cockerill. So we do some drills to make sure that  
14 everything is done perfectly well. When we are in Liberia, we  
15:18:27 15 just carry on the task.

16 Q. Now, help me, this operation, was it given a name?

17 A. Of course.

18 Q. What was the name?

19 A. Well, after we have deliberated on this - before we started  
15:18:36 20 the crash programme, he asked us to code name the operation, but  
21 we told him, "No, you are planning this operation." So he told  
22 us Operation Eagle would be very good.

23 Q. Operation what?

24 A. Eagle.

15:18:51 25 Q. And so who gave the operation that name?

26 A. General Khobe.

27 Q. Now, what was in it for you and your colleagues in the  
28 Special Forces?

29 A. Say again.

1 Q. What were you going to get out of participating in  
2 Operation Eagle?

3 A. Well, our objective was, because Khobe thought taking the  
4 war to the jungle will last for days, months, if possible years.  
15:19:23 5 So the objective was to do the dirty job in Monrovia so easily,  
6 because they told us the only stumbling block is Mr Taylor in  
7 Liberia and henceforth we eradicate Mr Taylor, things will be  
8 fine; they will put situation under control.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: That still doesn't answer your question.  
15:19:40 10 What was the benefit for you, participants?

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. What benefit were you going to get out of participating in  
13 this very risky mission?

14 A. At the end of the day, there was going to be a government  
15:19:55 15 in Liberia and that government should have been in our favour,  
16 because we carried out the attack. And we were told most of us  
17 would be reinstated in good jobs in Liberia, either we join the  
18 SSS, the special security, or the VIP protection. So those were  
19 the benefits that were supposed to be allocated to us.

15:20:15 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps if I may ask a further question  
21 to that. Why was it necessary to remove Mr Taylor from power, if  
22 you know?

23 THE WITNESS: If I know? Because we were briefed that we  
24 are all in exile. There's no way we can go back. Mr Taylor is a  
15:20:33 25 stumbling block. Even elections are in Liberia, he will rig  
26 elections. So the only way - the only thing Mr Taylor could  
27 understand, he came through the force of the barrel, we force him  
28 through the barrel, then we re-instate the government that we  
29 want.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Did General Khobe tell you why he wanted to remove  
3 Mr Taylor?

15:21:03

4 A. He told us that Mr Taylor was a stumbling block for a lot  
5 of programmes in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, and he told us  
6 that their objective in Liberia would actually fail if Mr Taylor  
7 remains in Liberia. To succeed is to eliminate Mr Taylor. Then  
8 ECOMOG will be able to bring perpetual peace in Monrovia.

15:21:32

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, I've been asked to ask you,  
10 Mr Witness, to speak a little slowly, please, for the sake of the  
11 record.

12 THE WITNESS: Okay, ma'am.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Pick up where you left off, please.

15:21:43

15 A. So that was the understanding.

16 Q. Now, at the time that General Maxwell Khobe was having this  
17 meeting with you, what was his role? Was he still commander of  
18 ECOMOG?

15:22:06

19 A. He was a commander. He was army chief of staff of Sierra  
20 Leone.

21 Q. So he was now army chief of staff of Sierra Leone, yes?

22 A. That's correct.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: And therefore no longer a commander for  
24 ECOMOG?

15:22:17

25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Was he still a commander for ECOMOG at this time?

27 A. No. He has - he was the commander - he was the army chief  
28 of staff of Sierra Leone, but he was coordinating this thing with  
29 the ECOMOG field commander. And it was at this junction, in

1 fact, when - because of money, I never knew - because they told  
2 us money came and the allocation for the ECOMOG was not that  
3 much, there was this here and there tussle until there was an  
4 information leaked that Mr Taylor came on the air one day and  
15:22:51 5 said people were planning in Sierra Leone to come and overthrow  
6 him, so they just decided to kill the operation. And because he  
7 has received money, he decided to give us arms and ammunition.  
8 Q. Pause there because you've told us a lot there and I need  
9 to get some of the detail, okay? First of all, taking things in  
15:23:12 10 stages, by this time General Maxwell Khobe is chief of staff of  
11 the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, yes?  
12 A. That's right.  
13 Q. He's no longer commander of ECOMOG?  
14 A. That's right.  
15:23:28 15 Q. Who is the commander of ECOMOG?  
16 A. It Shel pi di .  
17 Q. Shel pi di , yes?  
18 A. That's correct  
19 Q. Now, you spoke of some issue arising between ECOMOG and  
15:23:45 20 Khobe. Is that right?  
21 A. That's correct.  
22 Q. It was an issue to do with money?  
23 A. That's correct.  
24 Q. Now, taking things slowly, this money which created this  
15:23:58 25 issue, where did it come from?  
26 A. Well, that money directly came from the US. We were told  
27 it came directly from the US.  
28 Q. To whom?  
29 A. To General Khobe.

1 Q. To be used for what purpose?

2 A. For that operation, that particular operation.

3 Q. Which operation?

4 A. Operation Eagle.

15:24:18 5 Q. Right. Just so that we're clear, then, the United States  
6 had sent money to Khobe to finance Operation Eagle, yes?

7 A. Then --

8 Q. Pause there. Is that what you're telling us?

9 A. Yes. It's a group that came from the United States that  
15:24:36 10 backup Kabinah and others told us this money came directly from  
11 the United States and they came with the money.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that the United States government?

13 THE WITNESS: Well, we do not know if it was - whether it  
14 was from the United States government. But a group calling  
15:24:53 15 itself New Horizon came with the money and they met with us and  
16 they told us they were going to see Khobe before this mission.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. It's getting all rather confusing, now so let's just take a  
19 little time and clarify matters, shall we? There is money which  
15:25:10 20 comes from the United States to Khobe?

21 A. Direct, yes. Correct.

22 Q. That money is to be used to finance Operation Eagle?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Who brought that money to Khobe?

15:25:21 25 A. A group calling themselves New Horizon.

26 Q. This group calling themselves New Horizon, how were they  
27 composed? Who made up that group?

28 A. They were Liberians.

29 Q. Liberians living where?

1 A. In the United States.

2 Q. And they came from the United States, these Liberians, did  
3 they --

4 A. Correct.

15:25:47 5 Q. -- to Sierra Leone?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. When they came to Sierra Leone, did you meet them?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Where did you meet them?

15:25:54 10 A. At the house at Hill Cot Road where Kabinah Janneh was  
11 living.

12 Q. And what happened at that meeting?

13 A. They told us they were here and they have a mission from  
14 the United States, and that we want to do this thing as quickly

15:26:16 15 as possible, and that funding is there, and from speaking to us  
16 they were going to see General Khobe. Then from there - because  
17 they were told that General Khobe told them he will move them to  
18 the garrison commander, Colonel Buhari Musa, who was the garrison  
19 commander for ECOMOG at Wilberforce.

15:26:40 20 Q. So this money brought by New Horizon was given to Khobe,  
21 was it?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Now, you told us earlier of a dispute arising. Firstly,  
24 who was that dispute between?

15:26:50 25 A. It was between General Khobe and the ECOMOG that were on  
26 the ground. Because what we understood was this was an ECOMOG  
27 exit route that we were going to use, so Buhari Musa was not  
28 comfortable for the bulk of the money to be given to Khobe, and  
29 there was that tussle. At one point he even told us, "Gentlemen,

1 if you people are not straight with us we will just abort  
2 everything that you have planned."

3 Q. Now, as a result of this dispute you mentioned something -  
4 word leaking out?

15:27:28 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Yes, how?

7 A. Well, I don't really know, but we were only briefed one  
8 afternoon that Mr Taylor has made an announcement in Liberia that  
9 they were training Liberians in Freetown to go and overthrow his  
10 government. So it became alarming, and Khobe told us to just  
11 play low and wait.

15:27:46

12 Q. Now, there's still some other details that I want to  
13 clarify here. You spoke earlier of a meeting with Vamba Kanneh,  
14 Counsellor Janneh and Counsellor Supuwood?

15:28:08 15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. When in relation to that meeting did this meeting with New  
17 Horizon take place?

18 A. After we have met with Vamba Kanneh and others, we have  
19 seen Khobe. Then they gave us a time to re-study this whole  
20 arrangement. It was during this time that the New Horizon came.  
21 But when they came, in the first place they started thinking  
22 about leadership, and they thought Vamba Kanneh was not the right  
23 person, if the mission shall have accomplished, to lead Liberia,  
24 because they thought he was not 100 per cent competent. So  
25 that's where the scuffle started between them. And then Vamba  
26 Kanneh was fully connected to Buhari Musa whilst the New Horizon  
27 were fully connected with Khobe. So that was where some  
28 misunderstanding starting happening.

15:28:25

15:28:46

29 Q. Now, this Operation Eagle, did it ever take place?



- 1 A. Well, it was aborted because Taylor has already given  
2 indication that we are planning to go across to overthrow his  
3 government, so they aborted it. But since Khobe has received the  
4 money, what he did was he told us that there was huge piles of  
15:29:29 5 arms and ammunition packed at Wilberforce Barracks, that we  
6 should be going there every morning, pretending that they are old  
7 rifles and we are cleaning them. Then after every cleaning we  
8 will take those weapons to Hill Cot Road to where our commander  
9 was.
- 15:29:51 10 Q. Pause. Your commander, is that a person you're willing to  
11 name?
- 12 A. No, I don't want to name him here.
- 13 Q. But that commander lived at Hill Cot Road, yes?
- 14 A. Yes, that was where he was residing.
- 15:30:04 15 Q. And what was the nature of the residence? Was it a house,  
16 a warehouse, a what?
- 17 A. It was a well-built house. A fine house.
- 18 Q. So you were told by Khobe because the mission is aborted,  
19 you can remove arms from Wilberforce to this address, yes?
- 15:30:26 20 A. That's correct.
- 21 Q. For what purpose?
- 22 A. Well, it was imminent now that the only option was the  
23 guerilla option: To start fighting.
- 24 Q. Fighting where?
- 15:30:35 25 A. From the borders.
- 26 Q. Which borders?
- 27 A. Well, initially it was planned that we start from Pujehun,  
28 because that's the area that we know very well, from Gendema and  
29 all the 19 crossing points into Liberia.

1 Q. Now tell us, at this time did this did this new  
2 organisation have any name?

3 A. The organisation that was supposed to move?

4 Q. Yes.

15:31:07 5 A. No, it was not named initially at that time.

6 Q. We'll come back to the name in a moment. But in any event,  
7 you were being provided by arms under cover by Maxwell Khobe  
8 which was being stored at your commander's residence. Is that  
9 right?

15:31:21 10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. With the intention that those arms and ammunitions be used  
12 for an armed incursion into Liberia. Is that right?

13 A. That's correct.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm not very certain. The  
15:31:38 15 witness tried, or he's trying, to tie in the money aspect - the  
16 money that Khobe is holding - with the guerilla warfare. I'm not  
17 sure how the two are tied in.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

19 Q. Let's return to that issue. You've spoken of a dispute  
15:31:58 20 over money, yes, between General Khobe and the name of the second  
21 man?

22 A. Okay. Let me just clarify to you so the Court will  
23 understand. The ECOMOG high command in Freetown were based at  
24 Lungi. That was where Shelpidi was. The commanding officer in  
15:32:20 25 Freetown was the garrison commander. He was called Colonel  
26 Buhari Musa. The operational commander on the ground was called  
27 Major Tanko. Khobe was the army chief of the armed forces of  
28 Sierra Leone then. He has control over us, the Special Forces,  
29 the Civil Defence Forces and the SLAs that have surrendered to

1 the government. So the initial money was taken directly to  
2 General Khobe so that he shall have gone into consultation with  
3 Colonel Buhari Musa. But that never went very well among these  
4 both parties. So it was through that medium that I believe this  
15:33:12 5 information leaked and Mr Taylor got word of this information  
6 that we were planning to go and overthrow, and this thing came up  
7 and we decide - Khobe just decided to play it low. It was at  
8 this point that he told us now that the only way now is for us -  
9 for you to collect these arms and ammunition from Wilberforce  
15:33:35 10 Barracks and start stockpiling it so that it will be located to  
11 Zimmi - Makolo, Zimmi. Then when the plans start for the  
12 operation, they will know how to replenish those ammunition.  
13 That was the initial plan.

14 Q. So the first plan you told us about, Operation Eagle,  
15:34:00 15 involved you being transferred by sea to Liberia to capture  
16 Mr Taylor, yes?

17 A. That's true.

18 Q. Word of that leaked out and it was aborted. Is that right?

19 A. That's correct.

15:34:12 20 Q. So the second option now was to give you arms and  
21 ammunition. Is that right?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. To penetrate over the border via Zimmi into Liberia. Is  
24 that correct?

15:34:27 25 A. That's correct.

26 Q. Now, how did things develop after this second option was  
27 put in place?

28 A. Well, we started cleaning the rifles, taking them to the  
29 headquarters where our commander was.

1 Q. Is that Hill Cot Road?

2 A. Hill Cot Road. It was a big building, a storey building.  
3 So at the basement we were storing these arms and ammunition.  
4 But then since this deal was not 200 per cent with ECOMOG --

15:35:04 5 Q. Pause. Which deal?

6 A. The deal with between Khobe and ECOMOG was still giving us  
7 problem in Freetown.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: What deal? We haven't been told exactly  
9 what the deal was.

15:35:15 10 THE WITNESS: The deal was very simple. These people came  
11 with money - I don't know the amount of money - but what we do  
12 receive as part of our own package - as commander I received  
13 \$10,000 at the hotel from them, and they told us they were going  
14 to sort out arms, ammunition and a uniform, because ECOMOG was  
15:35:33 15 supposed to supply all these things, but they'd be paid for. So  
16 the quantity of money given to Khobe I personally did not know.  
17 So unless our commander - because he was there with Khobe when  
18 this presentation was made - his name I don't want to mention -  
19 he will clarify that to you people.

15:35:54 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. But just help us with this: First of all taking things  
22 slowly, because it's important that we all understand, who was  
23 involved in the deal you've mentioned? Just name the parties.

24 A. The New Horizon.

25 Q. Yes.

26 A. Vamba Kanneh was involved.

27 Q. Yes.

28 A. Kabinah Janneh was involved. The only person I never saw  
29 in that last arrangement was Supuwood. He was not in Freetown

1 because he has left.

2 Q. And was this garrison commander involved in the deal?

3 A. He was involved, even including the then Vice-President Joe  
4 Albert Demby.

15:36:36 5 Q. Vice-President of which --

6 A. Sierra Leone.

7 Q. He was involved as well?

8 A. He was involved in that, exactly.

9 Q. And General Khobe, yes?

15:36:43 10 A. And General Khobe.

11 Q. Now, the money that was given to General Khobe, was any of  
12 that money given to the garrison commander to your knowledge?

13 A. Yes, the money was given to the garrison commander, but he  
14 told our commander that that money was not sufficient in order to

15:37:04 15 give us that leeway, because he also has to talk to other  
16 commanders on the ground in Liberia.

17 Q. So he, the garrison commander, wanted more money, did he?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. So what was the dispute about about the money?

15:37:20 20 A. About the money, that's correct.

21 Q. But I know it's about the money, but who was upset about  
22 the deal?

23 A. The garrison commander was upset about the deal.

24 Q. Because?

15:37:32 25 A. He thought he hasn't had enough, and he thought they have  
26 given more.

27 Q. To?

28 A. General Khobe.

29 Q. Right.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: And the deal was what exactly? I still  
2 am not clear.

3           MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q.       What was the deal?

15:37:47 5           PRESIDING JUDGE: Because for me a deal is something that  
6 all the parties agree to. So what was the deal?

7           THE WITNESS: The deal between the New Horizon was directly  
8 done with New Horizon and General Khobe. General Khobe was  
9 directly to do the shares. That's what the understanding was.

15:38:07 10          So he took the money that was meant for the garrison commander  
11 and did hand it over to the garrison commander. But later on we  
12 learned that the garrison commander told our commander that that  
13 money was not sufficient for that type of operation.

14          MR GRIFFITHS:

15:38:24 15 Q.       And that's the point: Which operation?

16 A.       Operation Eagle.

17 Q.       The one which you've spent a little time describing to us?

18 A.       That's correct.

19 Q.       So the deal was to finance that operation?

15:38:34 20 A.       That's correct.

21          PRESIDING JUDGE: Not necessarily. I'm sorry, I beg to  
22 differ, and unless the witness - this has come from you,  
23 Mr Witness. The deal could have been to keep quiet, to conceal  
24 this information and money could have been payment for that.

15:38:51 25          MR GRIFFITHS: [Microphone not activated].

26          PRESIDING JUDGE: Because I've asked on more than one  
27 occasion exactly what the deal was and it seems to me from what  
28 the witness is explaining, the deal was a payment of bribery to  
29 various commanders. It does not necessarily mean financing. So,

1 Mr Witness, please clarify. What was the deal, if you know?

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Mr Witness, just start right from the beginning and very  
4 slowly spell out what you've been telling us over the last half  
15:39:22 5 hour, okay?

6 A. For this operation, we needed money and the operation  
7 needed finance, and the New Horizon told us they were going to  
8 finance that operation directly. So the deal was the financial  
9 aspect. They brought the money from the United States directly  
15:39:39 10 and gave it to General Khobe.

11 Q. Yes. And General Khobe was supposed to give some money to  
12 whom?

13 A. To the garrison commander, Colonel Buhari Musa.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: For what purpose?

15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. What was he being paid to do?

17 A. Directly, because they were in charge of the gunboat, they  
18 were supposed to supply us the uniforms and they were supposed to  
19 give us the arms.

15:40:09 20 Q. So he was to receive money to provide transport to Liberia,  
21 uniforms to disguise you as ECOMOG soldiers. What else?

22 A. And arms and ammunition.

23 Q. And what he complaining about?

24 A. He was complaining about the money involved, that the money  
15:40:29 25 involved initially would not be enough for us to carry on all the  
26 tasks, uniforms, arms, because we needed ECOMOG vehicles to  
27 convey us whilst we were in Monrovia.

28 Q. So he was complaining about the amount of money given by  
29 Khobe to him to pay for the logistical aspect of the mission,

1 yes?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Khobe of course by this stage, no longer ECOMOG commander,  
4 but chief of staff of the armed forces of Sierra Leone, so  
15:41:01 5 therefore not in control of the gunboat, the uniforms and the  
6 rest of it, yes?

7 A. That's correct. That was the problem.

8 Q. All right. Now that we've cleared that up, moving on. So  
9 when that I won't say deal - when that operation was aborted  
15:41:26 10 you've then told us that a second option was offered by General  
11 Khobe. Is that right?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. That option being to be provided with arms and ammunition  
14 for a land based invasion of Liberia. Is that right?

15:41:42 15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And just explain to us how that was supposed to work?

17 A. They told us that there was arms stored at Wilberforce  
18 Barracks and we are to go there and clean - pretend that we are  
19 cleaning those rifles and every day when we clean we would bring  
15:42:05 20 them on to a safer place, that's at Hill Cot Road. So it went on  
21 for almost two weeks, we are cleaning those rifles, mortars,  
22 BZTs, anti-aircraft. Most of them were support weapons, heavy  
23 support weapons, artilleries really.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: And, Mr Griffiths, these were arms and  
15:42:27 25 ammunition rightly belonging to who?

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Who did these arms and ammunition belong to?

28 A. That arms and ammunition belonged to the armed forces of  
29 Sierra Leone because they were in Wilberforce, the ammunition



1 dump.

2 Q. And they were taken to the Hill Cot Road address, were  
3 they?

4 A. Yeah.

15:42:44 5 Q. And were they stockpiled there?

6 A. It was stockpiled there.

7 Q. And help us, what kind of quantities of arms and ammunition  
8 are we talking about?

9 A. A large cache of arms and ammunition because even when the  
15:43:01 10 place was full the last day when we came with the last mortar  
11 rounds it was at this point that we saw one ECOMOG that came and  
12 asked us where are we getting the weapons from and that they are  
13 not very much satisfied with us and that we should tell them. We  
14 told them exactly that we are Special Forces, we have been  
15:43:27 15 fighting alongside with them and these are our weapons and then  
16 we are just cleaning our rifles and packing them in case this  
17 thing is over for disarmament. He told us okay, that's okay.  
18 But the next day this information was leaked and there was a  
19 journalist in Freetown reporting for the BBC Winston  
15:43:51 20 Ojukutu-Macaulay.

21 Q. The name, please?

22 A. Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that one long name?

24 THE WITNESS: That is the way they used to call him.

15:44:05 25 MR GRIFFITHS: The spelling I have is O-J-U-K-U-T-U

26 M-A-C-A-U-L-E-Y:

27 Q. And for whom did he work?

28 A. He was reporting for the BBC.

29 Q. And so what are you saying about him?

- 1 A. We were relaxing at our base and some of our colleagues  
2 came rushing to us, telling us, oh, this thing -  
3 Mr Ojukutu-Macauley has just announced this thing that you are  
4 stockpiling rifles and they are seeing Liberians, they are not  
15:44:50 5 satisfied with them. So we took our vehicles, because we are  
6 having these jeeps that they assigned to us. We then took these  
7 jeeps and went up because immediately we reach there, our  
8 commander was there, he told us to start moving some of these  
9 weapons to Brookfields Hotel.
- 15:45:03 10 Q. To where?
- 11 A. To Brookfields Hotel.
- 12 Q. Okay, and so you moved some of the arms and ammunition to  
13 the Brookfields Hotel?
- 14 A. Yeah, we moved some of the arms and ammunition to the  
15:45:14 15 Brookfields Hotel. So the last trip before we reached to the  
16 place now, ECOMOG has already cordoned the area.
- 17 Q. Cordoned off which area?
- 18 A. The house at Hill Cot Road.
- 19 Q. They've cordoned it off?
- 15:45:28 20 A. They've cordoned it off, yeah.
- 21 Q. So just so that we're clear, there is this report on the  
22 BBC, yes, Liberian stockpiling arms at this address, yes?
- 23 A. That's correct.
- 24 Q. And that's what triggers this whole process?
- 15:45:38 25 A. Yeah.
- 26 Q. So ECOMOG cordon off the house. What happens after that?
- 27 A. Then when we came they told us we don't have any access to  
28 the house until they have gone through their investigation. At  
29 that time our commander was in the house with some of our unit

1 members. He was ordered out. Initially they wanted to arrest  
2 him but he had a chat with them and told them he have this  
3 instruction from higher authorities and in his vehicle there was  
4 a communication gadget and he made a call.

15:46:14 5 Q. To whom?

6 A. To General Khobe.

7 Q. So your commander who you don't want to name --

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. -- calls General Khobe, yes?

15:46:23 10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. What happens?

12 A. Then after that Khobe told him to wait, he will get in  
13 touch with the then Vice-President Albert Joe Demby. He got in  
14 touch, then we saw the Transport Minister at that time Momoh

15:46:41 15 Pujeh.

16 Q. Can you help us with a spelling? Momoh I think we're  
17 familiar with, M-O-M-O-H?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Surname?

15:46:49 20 A. P-U-J-E-H, Pujeh.

21 Q. So what happens?

22 A. So they call ECOMOG to tell them that everything is under  
23 control and everything is fine. So ECOMOG release our commander  
24 and they left. They only collected few arms from the house and  
15:47:11 25 took it to Wilberforce Barracks.

26 Q. What happens after that?

27 A. Then by 505 Momoh Pujeh went over air to counter what  
28 Ojukutu-Macauley has just said and he told them that was not  
29 true, those arms were there and these were purely there because

1 this was a CDF operation and everything just died down.

2 Q. Now at that time in Sierra Leone when this incident blew  
3 up, what was actually going on in Sierra Leone at the time?

4 A. Can I just ask for a favour?

15:47:50 5 Q. Yes.

6 A. You know I travelled the whole Saturday and I'm not feeling  
7 too much well. If you could ask for adjourn for tomorrow I'll be  
8 very much happy.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President will have heard that. The  
15:48:06 10 witness only arrived in the Netherlands on Saturday and I know  
11 that he was fully engaged on Sunday and I note the hour and, in  
12 our submission, it's a perfectly reasonable request.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. We do appreciate that the  
14 witness is tired, he's been speaking all day. He is very likely  
15:48:45 15 jet lagged as well. So we will adjourn for the rest of today and  
16 reconvene tomorrow at 9.30.

17 But, Mr Witness, I must caution you now that you've started  
18 your evidence you are not to discuss your evidence with anyone  
19 until you have fully completed all your evidence. Is that clear?

15:49:07 20 We will reconvene tomorrow at 9.30.

21 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.49 p.m.  
22 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 8 June 2010 at  
23 9.30 a.m.]

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**I N D E X**

**WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:**

DCT-190	42172
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	42172